Orval Faubus: The Central Figure at Little Rock Central High School

Orval Faubus: The Central Figure at Little Rock Central High SchoolAuthor(s): David WallaceSource: The Arkansas Historical Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Winter, 1980), pp. 314-329Published by: Arkansas Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40024134 .

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Orval Faubus: The Central Figure

at Little Rock Central High School

By DAVID WALLACE*

Department of History, North Carolina Wesleyan College Rocky Mount, North Carolina 27801

vJn September 3, 1957, Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus focused the eyes of the world on a large yellow brick building in Little Rock when he ringed Central High School with Arkansas National Guard

troops to prevent the entrance of nine Negro students. The governor's subsequent confrontation with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who sent federal troops to force the integration of Central High School, resulted in instant fame for Faubus and lasting notoriety for Little Rock.

Since the fall school days of Little Rock Central in 1957 much has been written about Faubus's role in the desegregation of Arkansas's

largest high school. Many have portrayed the Arkansas governor as a venal Machiavellian figure who wrecked the Little Rock School Board's

plan for desegregation to further his desire to become the second Arkan- sas governor to be elected for a third term.1

Since the day he called out the guard, Faubus has consistently denied that he used the Central crisis to advance his political career. Instead, he has pointed to the potential violence inherent in the situation. As recently as 1974, Faubus was still sticking to his original version of events at

*The author is director of Project Upward Bound and adjunct instructor of history at North Carolina Wesleyan College at Rocky Mount. A version of this paper was presented at the 1979 annual meeting of the association in Little Rock.

1 Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South (New York, 1968), 98407; also see Fletcher Knebel, "The Real Little Rock Story," Loo\, XXI (November 12, 1957), 31-33.



FAUBUS AT LITTLE ROCK CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL 315

Central. According to interviewers Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, "Almost 17 years later, Faubus's eyes would light up and he would become animated when he discussed these events [at Little Rock Central] as if they had happened only a week before. ... He spoke of F.B.I,

reports that were never released which he said would substantiate his

story that the threat of violence was real and he expressed pride that no lives were lost in Arkansas because of civil rights violence."2

Historian Numan V. Bartley's analysis shifted the emphasis from Faubus to the white community of Little Rock during the Central crisis. He spoke of a "vacuum of leadership" and said: "Ironically, this [crisis] resulted not from massive resistance strategy but from an accumulation of failures by well-meaning leaders in Little Rock. ... In the end Governor Orval E. Faubus reluctantly filled the leadership void by coming to the defense of segregation and thereby created a major consti- tutional crisis." Bartley's conclusion "differs from a number of public accounts which have pictured the Little Rock debacle as the result of a deliberate conspiracy originating either when Deep South racists per- suaded Governor Faubus to thwart the creeping advance of integration or Faubus himself decided to manufacture a racial crisis for political gain."3

In order to understand the role of Faubus in the Central High School crisis, it is necessary to go behind the prevailing interpretations which stress the few days preceding desegregation of Central back to Faubus's first campaign for governor in 1954 and trace his evolution from a

politician with a moderate racial image to his emergence as symbol of massive resistance to public school desegregation in Dixie.

When Orval Faubus called out the guard in 1957, he had already accomplished more than was originally expected of him in Arkansas

politics. In the late forties, he had appeared on the state political scene with little more to recommend him than an ingratiating manner, but served successively under Governor Sid McMath as highway department

2 Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social

Change and Political Consequences Since 194$ (New York, 1976), 91-92. 3 Numan V. Bartley, The Rtse of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South

During the 1950' s (Baton Rouge, 1969), 252-253.



316 ARKANSAS HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

commissioner, administrative assistant and highway director, the last

being one of the most sought after positions in the state government.4 Despite his meager political background, Faubus decided to try for

the Democratic nomination for governor in 1954. He was given little chance for victory because his main opponent in the primary was in- cumbent governor Francis Cherry who had defeated McMath in 1952. There were some advantages that Faubus brought to the contest, however. While highway commissioner and, later, highway director, he had met many potential political supporters in small communities across the state. In addition, Cherry was a poor politician who had alienated many supporters during his first term. The governor's personality was austere, his premature white hair giving him an aura of aristocracy not altogether attractive in a political year. In contrast, Faubus was just a toothpick- chewing boy from the hills of northwest Arkansas who preferred to

identify with the common man.5 Both candidates tried to grab an issue that would stimulate the inter-

est of Arkansans. Faubus, early in the first primary, attempted to make use of the race issue which was coming to a head nationally in 1954, year of the Brown v. Tope\a Board of Education decision on desegregation of the public schools. He placed advertisements in both predominantly white newspapers in Little Rock and declared that "desegregation is the number one issue" in the gubernatorial campaign. He proceeded to out- line his position on this important subject. "The truth is that Arkansas is not ready for complete and sudden mixing of the races in the public schools." There were other "truths" and the candidate enumerated them. He felt that the issue should be met squarely to prevent Communists and radicals of both races from exploiting the situation, and declared that all concerned, particularly candidates for governor, should approach the issue calmly without prejudice or hatred or both races would be destroyed economically and socially.6

4 Harry A. Haines, "The Rural Dimension of the Faubus Vote" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Memphis State University, 1971), iii.

5 William C. Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge, 1974), 257-258; C. M. Wilson, "Orval Faubus, How Did He Get That Way?" Reader's Digest, LXXIV (February 1959), 82-83.

6 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, June 6, 1954, p. 10.




Faubus believed that there were things that were more important to

Negroes "than gaining access to white schools." Among them were economic security and the opportunity "to earn a decent livelihood . . . as well as equal consideration before the law." He proposed a solution that he felt would benefit all involved. He believed "that the rights of all will be protected but that the problem of Desegregation will be solved on the Local Level with state authorities standing ready to assist in every way possible." He ended this lengthy statement by promising that "as

your Governor, I pledge to remain free of prejudice, considerate of all."7 The Arkansas Gazette, located in Little Rock, promptly replied with

an editorial critical of Faubus's attempt to insert the race issue into the

campaign and the potential governor chose to ignore the issue for the remainder of the contest.8

Yet it was Faubus's first statement on this issue that propelled him to six terms as governor and provided significant insight into his later actions. Besides being his first pronouncement on race, it provided the basis for his later decisions on school desegregation. Faubus's flagship statement on integration of the public schools offered something for

everyone. His own attention-getting headline sums it up best: "This is no time for pussyfooters, nor is it a time for rabblerousers!" In the future, Orval Faubus tried to avoid making a firm political commitment on the race issue. He avoided extreme positions and attempted to capture the

allegiance of both blacks and whites. There was a definite moderate slant to his statement but, just under the surface, lay a thinly veiled appeal directed at the white population. Faubus appealed for equality but not

"complete sudden mixing of the races." By opposing sudden mixing of the races, the candidate held out the hope that sometime in the distant future the races would go to school together. By inserting the word

complete, he left the door open for the continuation of segregation in some situations. He clung to and amplified his local option solution in his successful reelection campaign in 1956.9

During his early political career Faubus was able to avoid taking an

tlbid. *lbid., June 8, 1954, p. 4. »/&V/.,Junc6, 1954, p. 10.




extreme stand on the desegregation issue but political considerations

slowly led him away from this moderate stance and into the camp of the white supremacists.

When Faubus began his first year in office, he was an unknown

quantity. Tentatively, in spite of his abortive effort to insert the race issue into the 1954 campaign, he was classified as a moderate. This meant that he was for "progress" in Arkansas and did not take an extreme position on the race issue. Throughout his first year, Faubus cemented his moderate image. A significant Negro vote had helped place Faubus into

office/0 and the new governor rewarded their faith in him by appointing several black members to the State Democratic Committee. In addition, when the small northeast Arkansas community of Hoxie desegregated its school system in 1955, Faubus refused to interfere in a local situation

despite segregationist appeals for him to do so.11

In 1956, Faubus began the transition that led to his calling out the Arkansas National Guard at Little Rock Central High School the fol-

lowing year. During his second year in the governor's chair he was pre- occupied with reelection plans. Faubus knew that his moderate stance on desegregation would draw segregationist opposition in the Demo- cratic gubernatorial primary and that his weakest area of support was eastern Arkansas, home of the planter class which was adamantly opposed to public school desegregation. Early in 1956 Faubus began to mend his fences with the east and to seek to cut the ground from under

any potential segregationist political foes. In January, with the governor's approval, five east Arkansans went to Virginia, the leader in massive resistance, to study ways of postponing desegregation legally. The governor publicly endorsed their report when they returned. The

"Virginia Committee" recommended that interposition and pupil place- ment bills be initiated and placed on the ballot in November. Faubus also produced a poll conducted by Eugene Newsom, a public relations

10 Black sentiment was mixed during the Cherry-Faubus confrontation, but the black- owned Arkansas State Press, published in Little Rock, felt that Negro support played a significant part in the Faubus victory. See Little Rock, Arkansas State Press, August 4, 1954, p. 8.

^Southern School News, II (September 1955), 10.




man and opinion analyst from Paragould, Arkansas, which purported to show that 85 per cent of the people of Arkansas opposed desegregation.12 In the light of the poll's results, Faubus said, "I cannot be a party to any attempt to force acceptance of a change to which the people of Arkansas are unalterably opposed."13

As election time came nearer, Faubus had effectively neutralized the race issue. His commissioned poll, the report of the five-man "Virginia Committee" on massive resistance, and the initiated November segregation measures had prepared the way for a gubernatorial contest between

segregationists. Segregation would be the number one issue in the cam-

paign, but the governor had skillfully appropriated its principles and made them his own.

Faubus's most serious challenge in the 1956 Democratic primary came from Crossett lawyer Jim Johnson. Johnson had led the legal battle for continued segregation of the Hoxie school system. He was tall and lean and consumed by the fire of old time white religion. His style was that of the evangelist as he condemned Faubus to a white man's hell for

having waited for sentiment to develop before taking a stand on the de-

segregation issue.14 In comparison to Johnson, Faubus appeared to be a calm, reasonable

man. He pictured Johnson as someone who had "made a living for the

past year as a purveyor of hate." Faubus promised that "no school board will be forced to mix races while I am governor." To make sure that the

people of Arkansas got the message, he said that after the segregation bills passed in November, Arkansas would be aligned "Solidly with the Solid South. I am convinced," he continued, "that the surest way to safe-

12 New York Times January 29, 1956, Sec. 1, p. 1; Southern School News, III (Feb- ruary 1956), 1. Newsom's 85 per cent total does not include 18 per cent who had no

opinion. Five hundred people from various parts of the state were asked a series of ques- tions including: "As you know, the Supreme Court ordered the end of segregation in the schools. How do you personally feel about whites and Negroes attending the same schools in Arkansas?" Eighty-five per cent of those responding answered that they were opposed to desegregation. Newsom gave no indication whether Negroes were questioned in his

poll. 13 New York Times, January 29, 1956, Sec. 1, p. 1. 14 Southern School N*ws, III (August 1956), 1, 3.




guard our public school system ... is to preserve our segregated schools."15

Faubus's message of "reason" prevailed over Johnson's evangelism of hate. The governor's political instincts had served him well. He easily defeated Johnson in the Democratic primary and followed that with

victory in the general election in November. He had used the race issue to his advantage and began his second term as governor still a moderate - and a segregationist.16

As his second term began, Faubus had strengthened his political base but still found it necessary to firm up his newly-formed alliance with eastern Arkansas. He had decided that the people of Arkansas should

spend $22 million to, among other things, raise teachers' salaries and increase welfare benefits. The state income and severance taxes would have to be raised to move "forward with Faubus."17

The key to any favorable action on the Faubus program in the legislature was the race problem. Eastern Arkansas, politically powerful and

racially sensitive, home of a high percentage of the black population, wanted to avoid desegregation legally. Their leaders, with the blessing of the governor, had made a trip to Virginia, the leader in legal resist-

ance, and had returned with recommendations the previous year which had been approved by most white Arkansans in November 1956. The final step was now in preparation. Four measures, the heart of the committee's program, were ready to be introduced into the legislature. They included a requirement that certain organizations, including the Na- tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), publish a list of members frequently; an amendment to the compulsory school attendance law designed to ensure that white children would not have to attend school with blacks; a provision which provided financial aid for resisting schools involved in desegregation litigation with the federal government; and a State Sovereignty Commission made up of three citizens to be appointed by the governor and of two senators and three representatives to be selected by the legislature. The governor and

™Md. 16Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South, 265. 17 Little Rock Arkansas Democrat, January 10, 1957, p. 1.




speaker of the house would be ex-officio members. The Sovereignty Commission would unify and disperse forces in the fight against de-

segregation.18 The leaders of the resistance movement placed an inordinate amount

of pressure on the legislators to pass the segregation bills as described by an eastern Arkansas senator for a Little Rock Arkansas Democrat re-

porter. Several

big people in East Arkansas talked to me for hours urging me to

support those segregation bills.

They came to me and said they didn't know whether they would do any good at all. But they told me, we've got to let the

Supreme Court at least know what we want. We can't sit still and do nothing.

Senators and representatives gave in to the pressure and passed the bills which the governor signed into law. One senator commented, "If members of the Senate had voted their convictions, those bills wouldn't have

gotten more than five votes."19 Eastern state lobbyists, supported by Faubus, helped pressure the

legislature into passing the segregation provisions. They were not the

governor's measures, and he did not actively campaign for them, but he did endorse the bills. The passage of the segregation bills was the price attached to reform in Arkansas. Prior to their introduction, Faubus got his program for progress in Arkansas through the legislature with sub- stantial support from the east.20

Faubus now proceeded to complete the circle in his brief political career. As the heat generated by the gubernatorial campaign and its aftermath dissipated in the spring of 1957, Faubus began to drift toward his 1955 silent moderate stance. He did not seek to implement the instru- ments of resistance that the legislature had placed in his hands in Febru-

ary. He refused to appoint his three members to the Sovereignty Com- mission which rendered it inactive and ineffectual. Frustration mounted

™lbid.t February 17, 1957, p. 5. 19 Ibid., February 24, 1957, p. 4. 20 /&'<*., February 18, 1957, p. 1, January 31, 1957, p. 1.




among many Arkansas segregationists. As the summer got hotter, so did the leaders of the resistance movement. Their heat was soon directed at the Arkansas governor.21

Up until this time, the governor had been working closely with east Arkansas's political elite who wanted to enact a series of laws that would

delay desegregation legally. There was another type of segregationist in Arkansas in the 1950s, however, as epitomized by the recently defeated Jim Johnson. These radical segregationists were not concerned with

delay but prevention. They felt that Faubus should block desegregation, not postpone it.

Faubus had consistently resisted the pull of the radical segregationists from the time he began his gubernatorial career in 1955. The potential opening of an integrated Little Rock Central High School in September 1957 made the governor slowly change his mind. On April 30, 1957, Robert Ewing Brown, president of the Capital Citizens' Council and

recently a losing candidate for Little Rock School Board president, wrote a letter to Faubus and urged him to close Central to blacks. "Under the

sovereignty of the state of Arkansas," Brown wrote, "you can under

police powers in order to preserve tranquility, order the two races to attend their own schools. As the Sovereign head of the state, you are immune to federal court orders." Faubus rejected Brown's suggestion and said that the Little Rock School Board had made a local decision to

desegregate their school system voluntarily, and he had no desire to thwart their intentions or illegally intervene and block a decision supported by the federal courts.22

Privately, his reaction was the same. Despite his campaign promise that no district would be forced to integrate while he was governor, he continued to back off from a confrontation with federal authorities. In

response to a letter written to him by Everett Kelley, superintendent of the Van Buren city school system, which was in the process of desegre- gating its educational facilities, the governor replied on April 19, 1957, "Since the matter of your schools is already in the Federal Court and

you are already under a federal ruling, I do not believe that there is any

^Southern School News, IV (April 1957), 1, (July 1957), 9. 22 Ibid., IV (July 1957), 9.




action that could be taken that would supersede this authority." Faubus wanted to avoid confrontation if possible and let others take

the consequences for decisions that had to be made. That proved to be

increasingly difficult as the time for the opening of Central got nearer. Radical segregationists resurrected all of the old cherished fears of the South on race mixing and focused attention on Faubus's lack of enthusi- astic opposition to public school desegregation. The vocal white suprem- acist minority replaced eastern Arkansans as the leaders in espousal of the cause of segregation. Faubus had to come to terms with the radicals or be placed where he did not want to be - in the center, between the

people of Arkansas and the opening of Little Rock Central High School.24

One event crystallized all the fears and rumors and perhaps moved Faubus to act on the issue. On August 22, Georgia's Governor Marvin Griffin and his aide, Roy Harris, kingmaker in Georgia politics, traveled to Little Rock to address the Capital Citizens' Council. Their speeches were full of Deep South rhetoric. They vowed that no one would force

Georgia to integrate as long as they were in power. They told their listen- ers that Arkansas did not have to desegregate its schools any more than Georgia did. All they needed was a leader to stand up to the federal encroachers. That leader should be Orval Faubus. Griffin and Harris left Arkansas the next day after an overnight stay at the governor's mansion and an amiable breakfast with Faubus, but their words lingered. They had managed to force the governor into the spotlight. Some people began to look at Georgia and ask Faubus, "If they do not have to inte-

grate their schools, why do we?" Faubus had no readily acceptable answer that would fit the image that he had cultivated.25

Even before Griffin and Harris came to Little Rock, Faubus had

begun to look at the opening of Central in terms of political survival. He had contacted Deputy United States Attorney General William P.

Rogers on August 20 and spoke of his fear that there might be violence

23 Letter from Governor Orval E. Faubus to Superintendent Everett Kelley, April 12, 1957, in Mr. JCelley's personal files.

24 Arkansas Gazette, January 18, p. 1, August 18, p. 1, August 20, 1957, p. 1. 25 "Georgia: Rallying Point of Defiance," Loo\, XXI (November 12, 1957), 34.




if Central were desegregated. Rogers indicated that the Justice Depart- ment would probably not be able to help in the protection of Little Rock Central unless private citizens conspired to thwart the school's desegregation.26

Faubus discussed the situation with Arthur Caldwell, Rogers' assistant and himself an Arkansan, in Little Rock on August 28. Caldwell came prepared to discuss the contingencies of the Justice Department's entrance into local affairs where violence might occur. Shortly after

noon, the conference began and it was soon apparent to the Justice De-

partment official that the governor was not interested in discussing the

legal verities of the situation. Rather, he had requested Caldwell's pres- ence in order to inform him of a preconceived plan of action and to

justify the execution of his strategy.27 Faubus opened his presentation with a rationale for what he was

about to do. He spoke of his grave concern over the possibility of violence if Little Rock Central were integrated on September 3. Thirty days before, the people of Little Rock had been resigned to the desegregation of Little Rock schools, Faubus said. Grudging compliance had been turned by Marvin Griffin and Roy Harris into a desire to resist. "Rabble- rousers" had been joined by solid citizens in planning resistance to the

desegregation of Little Rock Central. Since the Georgians had made their speeches, people had come to the governor and asked why he did not resist integration in Little Rock. Faubus told Caldwell that he could not effectively answer these people because the segregation acts passed by the Arkansas legislature had not been declared unconstitutional, although several legal advisers had told him that they were. Since his administration had supported these acts, he felt that he was committed to enforce them.28

Having set the stage, Faubus now began to fill Caldwell in on his

26 "Segregation in Public Schools in Arkansas," memo by Arthur B. Caldwell, August 21, 1957, in Arthur B. Caldwell Papers (University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, Arkansas).

27 "Conference with Governor of Arkansas on August 28, 1957," memo by Arthur B. Caldwell, August 30, 1957, in Caldwell Papers.

28lbid.




plans. Because of his concern for the welfare of the citizens of Little

Rock, he had arranged for a newly organized segregationist group called the Mothers League of Central High School to file a suit in Little Rock

Chancery Court that would delay Central's integration on the grounds of imminent danger of violence. Chancellor Murray Reed, a Faubus

appointee, would hear the case and was certain to issue the restraining injunction. The case would then go to the Federal District Court in Fort Smith presided over by Judge John Miller. Judge Miller had re-

cently ruled against the NAACP's suit for the immediate desegregation of the Little Rock school system. While it cannot be proven that Faubus and Miller had come to an understanding, there is some evidence to

support the fact that Faubus felt that the Fort Smith judge would agree to postponement of desegregation of Little Rock Central.29

If Miller did rule in Faubus's favor, the governor would have post- poned the issue until somewhere in the undefined future when someone else would have to deal with the problem. He correspondingly would be credited with the prevention of desegregation of Little Rock schools. An unstated bonus was that any decision would probably be delayed until after the next gubernatorial election.30

Caldwell perceived that the core of the rationale for Faubus's plan was the danger of violence if Central were integrated. He asked the

governor if he had any evidence of impending disturbances that he could turn over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the local police. The governor said that his evidence was too vague. Caldwell

pointed out that the Justice Department could not countenance his plan, and that all information gleaned by federal officials pointed away from the danger of violence at Little Rock Central. Faubus continued as if Caldwell had not spoken and ended the informal federal-state confrontation by praising the progress in Arkansas's race relations during his administration.31

Faubus had concocted his Mothers League plan only after he had

approached the Little Rock School Board. He had attempted to convince

™lbid. ™lbid. **Ibid.




them to ask for a temporary injunction which would delay the opening of Central. They had refused to do so because they felt that their plan provided for the minimum amount of segregation that the courts would

allow) and they were not inclined to waste three years of work because there might be opposition to their plan. Faubus was -Hearing the confrontation stage of his career. If the courts refused to postpone desegregation, he would have to act or allow the integration of Central.32

The next day Faubus's puppet Mothers League asked for an injunction delaying desegregation at Central. Faubus was the Mothers League's only witness. He spoke of impending violence if Central were integrated in a few days. The group gathered in the courtroom was impressed and

applauded the governor's performance. Just as Faubus had forecast to

Caldwell, Chancellor Reed granted the delaying injunction. The case then went before Judge Miller in Fort Smith. Miller, perhaps weary of

making integration decisions, requested that the case be transferred to the Eastern District at Little Rock presided over by Ronald N. Davies, a North Dakota federal judge temporarily sitting in the Arkansas juris- diction, who was not connected with Faubus in any way. The new judge summarily ordered desegregation to proceed at Central.33

Faubus's well conceived plan had collapsed, and he only had a short time to improvise. He met with his advisers on August 30 and 31 to decide what to do next. He could do nothing and allow the desegregation of Central to proceed on schedule. He would then become the

governor who stood by while Negroes entered the state's largest school. The alternative, while attractive, was risky. He could intervene with Arkansas National Guard and prevent Central's desegregation. If he did so, he would probably be branded as a radical of the stripe of the

recently repudiated Jim Johnson. But political logic had long been

leading Faubus in that direction. In the past he had consistently suc- cumbed to reality when his moderate stance was shown to be politically inadequate. He wanted to become the first Arkansas governor since Jeff Davis to be elected to a third term. The Little Rock crisis might be the

™lbid. 33 Arkansas Gazette, August 30, 31, 1957, p. 1.




issue that he needed to accomplish his goal.34 There was one last effort made to deflect Faubus from his political

course. During the last days of August, Little Rock School Superin- tendent Virgil Blossom and the school board had become increasingly alarmed over the prospect that Faubus might disrupt the integration of Central. Blossom and board member Robert Lile voiced their fears to

Winthrop Rockefeller, chairman of the Arkansas Industrial Develop- ment Commission (AIDC) and a Faubus appointee. Rockefeller agreed to talk to the governor and find out his plans concerning Central.35

Rockefeller and Faubus fenced with words for over two hours on

September 1. Their meeting brought together two men with irreconcil- able attitudes about the approaching desegregation of Little Rock Cen- tral High School. Faubus observed the situation with a political eye. Ostensibly he feared violence if Central were integrated, but political realities were his primary concern. Rockefeller stressed that defiance of the federal injunction would put Arkansas outside the law and jeopard- ize economic development in the state. Their meeting, though incon-

clusive, left the AIDC head with the feeling that Faubus was going to call out the Arkansas National Guard.36

On Sunday night, September 2, 1957, Faubus made his decision

public in a carefully worded television address. The governor had decided to call out the Arkansas National Guard. His decision had been "reached prayerfully . . . after conferences with dozens of people and after the checking and the verification of as many reports as possible. . . ." He had decided to call out the guard "to protect the lives and

property of citizens. They will act not as segregationists or integration- ists, but as soldiers called to active duty to carry out their assigned tasks." Faubus painted a picture of heightened fear and near hysteria brought on by danger of impending violence. While he had not ordered troops to bar Negro admission to Central, the only way to preserve the peace was to operate the schools "on the same basis as they had in the past."

34 "Summary of F.B.I. Report in Little Rock, Arkansas, Integration Difficulty," Sep- tember 13, 1957, p. 3, from Caldwell Papers.

™lbid. *«lbid.




He ended with the declaration: "The Public Peace will be Preserved."37 Orval Faubus, before and after the fact, stressed his belief in immi-

nent violence. Beginning with his conference with Arthur Caldwell and

continuing well into the twilight of the aftermath of Central, he con-

sistently stated that he called out the guard to prevent bloodshed. He first articulated his fears in detail to Caldwell on August 28. The next

day, at the hearing before Chancellor Reed, he said virtually the same

thing. The story was repeated with minor variations to Judge Davies, Winthrop Rockefeller, the nation's newspapers, and the FBI. Accord-

ing to Faubus's story, he had done the only thing he could do when he called out the National Guard at Little Rock Central.

There was another consistency to the Faubus story: he had no evidence to back up his claims of violence. When Caldwell confronted him with a request for evidence of potential violence, he replied that his evidence was vague and indefinable. He presented a few well-worn and well-known scraps of literature at the Reed hearing and came up with

nothing new at any subsequent court proceeding. He presented nothing in his conference with Rockefeller and, in fact, admitted that on the eve of Central's opening, knife sales were at a normal level in the Little Rock area while gun sales were only slightly higher. On the day the guard was called out, the Arkansas Gazette checked all stores that sold knives or

guns in Little Rock. Their replies indicated no abnormality in weapons sales.38

The most damaging evidence against Faubus's violence theory is con- tained in an FBI analysis of the situation. Faubus promised to turn over his evidence of violence to the FBI. The proffered evidence amounted to next to nothing. The FBI interviewed over 500 people in the Little Rock area ranging from public officials to gun salesmen. No one had any knowledge of potential violence. Weapon sales were not excessive before

September 3. The promised Faubus evidence consisted of a few segregation pamphlets and news clippings from the Little Rock papers. The rest was made up of rumors and innuendoes. There was nothing con- crete. The FBI came to the conclusion that there was little if any danger

37 Arkansas Gazette, September 3, 1957, p. 1. 38 Ibid.




of violence prior to the Central High opening in the fall of 1957.39 In reality, Faubus had closed Central for political reasons. Numan

Bartley was correct when he said, "Governor Orval E. Faubus reluctantly filled the leadership void by coming to the defense of segregation. . . ."

Rather, he was "a much worried man fearful of being pushed to the un-

popular side of a major racial controversy." Yet, though Faubus may not have been a "politician coolly manufacturing a crisis"40 his decision of

August 30-31 was a logical extension of a career that ran concurrently with the development of desegregation of public schools in Arkansas. In

1954, Faubus made his politically premature statement on the race issue. He used it as a foundation for his later actions. When feasible, he tried to avoid reactionary irrevocable statements on desegregation and preserve his moderate image. After January 1956, he found that his political objectives led him in a different direction. The January poll, which re- vealed that 85 per cent of the people of Arkansas supported public school

segregation, set the tone for his later actions. In order to be reelected in

1956, Faubus supported segregation. After the election, he continued to do so to ensure that his program of progress would be enacted. Faubus

cooperated wTith east Arkansas's leaders, who wished to delay segregation with legal maneuvers, until August 1957 when the governor felt the

political pressure engendered by the impending desegregation of Little Rock Central High School. Radical segregationists interested in immediate prevention, not delay, of desegregation, exploited the Central situation and managed to place the governor in a potentially untenable

political position. Faubus turned the disadvantageous situation to his

advantage. He appropriated the radical cause and used it to further his

political ambitions. As a consequence, the extremists won a temporary victory and Faubus became the most successful state politician in Arkan- sas history.

39 "Summary of F.B.I. Report in Little Rock," from Caldwell Papers. 40 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 263.



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Orval Faubus: The Central Figure at Little Rock Central High School

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