lmmMILITARY -'1E:'\"-~\T-:\R-'1S SERIES 59

THE SUDANCAMPAIGNS 1881-1898

ROBERT \\l1J\.I:\SO:\-L\TH\.\1 \lICH\EL ROFFE

Emm./ MIUTAlty

EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES 59

THE SUDANCAMPAIGNS 1881-1898

Text byROBERT WILKINSON-LATHAM

Colour plates by .MICHAEL ROFFE

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Vie "Britisll ru1rl11Joftlle 1880's

When the British army intervened in Egyptianaffairs in 1881 to smash the revolt orthe Turko­Egyptian army under Arabi Pasha, it was still inthe throes of the greatest reorganisation in itshislory. Theregirncntal system, the lime-honouredpraClice of denOling a regiment's seniority by itsnumber in the Line, had been swept away withthe stroke of a pen. No longer would a regimentbe known by its number (and perhaps its sup·plementary title, many of which were given in1782) but solely by its new 'Territorial Title'.Regimental individuality was also losl as the newsystem - commonly called the Cardwell reformsbut really following lhe recommendations of theStanley Committee-amalgamated twO numberedline regiments to form the first and secondbattalions ofeach 'TerritOrial' regiment. In manycases this marriage was resented by both regiments,since a number of the mergers effectcd secmcd tobe without reason. As George Bernard ShawwrOte: 'The British soldier can stand up to any­thing except the British War Office.' The onlyregiments not affected were those numbered I to25 inclusive, which already had two battalions;and also the 79th Highlanders. The main ideabehind the reforms was that in each regiment onebattalion would serve overseas on a tour of dUlywhile the other remained for home defence,trained recruits and provided drafts for thebattalion abroad. In addition, each regiment wasalso now allocated a fixed depot and a recruitingarea. In fact, the use ofcounty titles for a numberof regiments was propitious since it gave the

soldiers a permanent home and the civilians asense of pride in their county regiment.

Besides the formation of these new regimentswith titles in place of numbers, the cherishedfacing colours on the collars and cuffs of mnicswere standardised. 1\'0 more the grass greenfacings of the 24th, or the !losling green of the 5thFusiliers; gone for ever the purple of the 56th andthe yellow of the 57th. In their place, it wasdictated that all Royal Regiments would wearblue facings, all English and Welsh regimentswould wear white, Scottish regiments yellow, andIrish regiments green. Now the only distinctionbetwcen, say, English non-Royal regiments layin the regimental name embroidered on theshoulder strap, since e\'en rcgimental-patlernbuttons had been done away with in the early18705.

The British army was like most other Europeanarmies of the late nineteenth century except thatit was a volunteer and not a conscripted force. AsAlfred de Vigny wrOte, 'An army is a nationwithin a nation .. .' and of the British army this

The interior of FOr1 Me.... Ale....dria .fter the BritiAh navalbotnbardtneat,July .882. Briti,h .oldiel'll an inspecting thecIa.....ge doae to the def"acu _d artillery, while warshipAca.a be seeD .UUldiag-off in tloe distaace. (Isabel aad AliaeScou-Elliol)

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was undoubtedly true. WolseJey said in hisSoldier's Pockel Book that 'The soldier is a peculiarbeing that can alone be brought to the highestefficiency by inducing him to believe that hebelongs to a regiment that is infinitely superior to

the others round him.' While the armed forcesstood apart from normal society, being con­sidered as de Vigny wrote' ... one of the vicesof our age', they were as Kipling was quick topoint out' ... no thin red 'erocs, nor we aren'tno blackguards too. But single men in barricks,most remarkable like you .. .' The life was hardand disciplined and the pay abysmally low, butthe regiment gave to its members a home and - inpeace time at least - food and lodging, in returnfor which the 'Soldiers of the Queen' were ex­pected to maintain the 'Pax Britannica'.

The basic pay of the private was a shilling aday, 'the Queen's shilling'. out ofwhich stoppageshad formerly been made for uniform and food.

However, a series of reforms led to the introduc­tion of free food by 1870; this resulted in thesoldier receiving every penny of his shilling, al­though beer money was discontinued.

In 1876, each man was given !.ld. a day more,but this was termed deferred pay and was onlypayable on discharge as a lump sum to help theex-soldier settle into civilian life. 'Good Conductbadges', as they were called, carried an extra Id.a day after three years' exemplary service, but thisperiod was later reduced to two years. Service,as in other volunteer armies, had originally beenfor twenty-one years, but in 1870 a system oftwelve years' service was introduced by SecretaryofState for War, Edward Cardwell. Even in 1882

there were still a certain number of 'old soldiers'left in the army; William Robertson, who laterrose from the ranks to become a Field-Marshal,wratc in 1877 that 'The system introduced by 11.11'.Cardwell under which men enlisted for twelve

OffiC'"-r$ or thl! Q..._'. 0_ CameTOft HiSh1a.ftdl!n, qypl.SIb. Notl! thl! _rio... ,..It....... of 'frock' hUlio:s, som.. withbreast podo:..t d Hm.. witholll, also th.. cliffl!",",-' _y. ofw......u.s thl! <$a BroWII..' bl!tt ...d "'-quipm",t. (lAbel IUtdAIm.. Scott_Elliot)

...:.. .

,..

\ ,

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years' regular service, had not yet had time to getinto full swing. Regiments were, therefore, stillcomposed mainly of old soldiers who, althoughvery admirable comrades in some respects andwith a commendable code of honour of lheir own,were in many cases addicted to rough behaviour,heavy drinking, and hard swearing. They couldnot be blamed for this. Year in and year out theywent through the same routine, wcre treated likemachines - of an inferior kind - and having littleprospect of finding deccm employment on thecxpiration of their twenty-one years' engagement,they lived only for the present, the single brightspot in their existence being the receipt of a fewshillings - perhaps not more than one - on theweekly pay-day.'

Barrack life was harsh and often insanitary.Men lived, slept and ate in their barrack room,the Government allowing I lb. of bread and 12 oz.of meat per day per head. Groceries, vegetables

and other extras were provided by the men them·selves. Bennet Burleigh, war correspondent of theDaily Telegraph, described what rations wereissued to the soldier on campaign in the Sudan in18g8: 'He usually has a "grand appetite" whencampaigning. On active service the Governmentration allowed him comprises (inclusively) ­bread 1* lb., meat 1* lb., tea 1 ounce, sugar 21ounces, sail 1ounce, rice! ounce, pepper I !36thounce, fresh vegetables 1 lb., or in lieu of latter,S ounces onions, daily. That was what he gOt atDekesh. For fresh vegetables he received onions3 ounces of. In addition he could purchase, bypayment out of his own pocket, one·third more ofeach article. As a matter of fact, he constantlybought food, a grateful country not even givingits troops in the field sufficiently varied diet. Nowa­days the commonest folk at home look for some­thing more than plain bread and tough meat. Themeat ration issued was poor, and ran I~rgcly to

Offict:rs and mt:n oftht: EgypriaD army paradinf!: ;n man:hingordt:r with packs, Cairo 18&l. Tht: summt:r whitt: UIl;form ;sshown. In wmtt:r a hlut: UIliform was wom. (lsabt:1 and A.lint:Scott-Elliot)

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,-----

"Fri~dli"·. Suda.nese lribesmea friendly to ~t, with~tiaJ:oannyoffi«n ........Ied oa nome'" .8h.(lsabei andAliGe ScOt1-Elliot)

bone - t lb. of meat to I lb. of bone. I n theregimental canteens, cheese, tinned milk, jams,sardines, bacon, tinned fruits, tea, coffee, datepudding, soup, ctc. were sold in large quantitiesto the men. "'ere a smart contractor to take upthe job, the War Office and the country might, onthose lines, succeed in making campaigns pay forthemselves. I commend the suggcstion to them. Atany rate, they would recover every farthing of thesoldier's pay, and a trifle over.' Wellington haddescribed the army private as 'the scum of theearth' iti the early 1800s, and by 1880 the servicehad not attracted many recruits of a bettercalibre. True, there was selection on joining, butmost of the men enlisted only because they lackeda trade or were starving. No wonder the largeindustrial slums of Manchester, Birmingham,Glasgow and London yielded the majority of therank and file.

The reforms of the ,870S had done much tobeller the lot of the soldier, but there was still along way to go. Officers such as Sir GarnetWolseJey realised the amateur aspect of theBritish army compared with the professionalspirit shown by the Prussians. Up U11til 1871officers had purchased commissions and promo­tion; Cardwell put a stop to this practice, buteven SO officers were still not cducatt.-d in theirprofession. During the 1882 campaign Sir Garnetcomplained that 'I have seen splendid battalions

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kept in the rear while others of inferior qualitywere sent to the front because the general com­manding did not dare employ against the enemya corps whose commanding officcr was manifestlyincompctent ... I hold that it is criminal to handover in action the lives of gallant soldiers to menwho are deplorably ignorant of the clements oftheir profession ... '

As for the rank and file, the Rev. G.J. Hardy inhis book The British Soldier (1915) described thetypes of recruits that were daily accepted. 'Whentrade is bad we get good recruits and when good,bad ones. The army is still recruited mainly fromthe elass of manual labour ... Only 49 recruits ina thousand can be described as well educated.'

If the officers were unprofessional and the rankand file recruited from the illiterate and starving,the backbone of the army was, as throughouthistory, 'lile Non-commissioned man'. Juniorofficers and soldiers alike depended on the harshjudgment, skill and devotion to duty of the non­commissioned officers~ the army professionals who- often of intimidating countenance - were abreed unto themselves. Everything in their liveswas done 'by the book', yet they were the mainstayofeach and every regiment. A regiment with goodNCOs was an efficient piece of military ma­chinery. The soldier was not encouraged to

think; this was done by the non-commissionedofficer who was the vital link between the rank

and file and the officers. During the 1880s andI 890S lhe private soldier, the shil1ing-a-day man,was solely rcquired to act as a mindlcss brick in ahuman wall, and thc sySlcm of drill cnsured thatthe 'wall' would stand against anything. Disciplinehad been maintained by lhc lash, loss of pay andconfincment. In 1868 flogging was dcclining inthc army, and in 1881 an ACI of Parliamentabolished it.

At the end ofa campaign, the soldier probablyreceived a medal with 'bars' 10 denote his par­licipation in various battles and actions, hut oncea war was ovcr it was hack to 'peace-time soldier­ing' and boring garrison life.

In Egypt and thc Sudan in the 1880s theBritish soldier was dressed as he always had beenin red or scarlet, the only concession to heat beingthe while-covered cork helmet. Sweltering in his'grey-back' shirt and scarlet frock, encumberedwith straps of white buff leather equipment, andcarrying a rifle (the Martini-Henry) that kickedlike a mule, Brilish troops began an associationwith Egypt and the Sudan lhat was to endureuntil the Anglo-Frcnch expedition of 1956 wasaborted by pressure from the United Stales.

The cha'l:e ofthe Royat HOrM Guard" at Ka""u"ift, Septem_ber .8811, hy Seccomh<!. This paintin$ shows the equipmefttcarried by cavalry during the caDlpa.lgtl. (Parker Gallery)

1I,eu1/1g/o-eg)'fJtiollu1rm)'

The Anglo-Egyptian army lhat fought Mahdismin the Sudan, at first on its own hut later with lheaid of British troops, was formed after the Arabirevolt of 1881-2. The previous army was aTurco-Egyptian force in which the British had nosay. The new Egyptian conscripted army was atfirst limited to 6000 men with twenly-five Britishofficers, but was later in<Tcased to over 18,000men and 140 while officers. It consisted ofeightcen battalions of inTantry; six of these,numbered 9 to 14, were made up of ~udancse

blacks, whose terms of service differed from thoseof the Egyptians. Each infantry battalion wasdivided into six companies of I 00--120 men, givinga total battalion strength - with band andstretcher-bearers - ofbctwecn 650 and 750 men.

Of the Egyptian or ftl/oh baualions, I to 4 and15 to 18 were officered by the British, whilebattalions 5 to 8 were led by so-called 'nativeofficers'. British officers usually numbered threefor a f~l/ah baualion and four for a Sudanesebattalion. The naliveofficers were usually Turkish,

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Circassian or Albanian, but there were also a fewEgyptians. In the Sudanese battalions there wereusually a few native captains or subalterns, but asG. W. Steevens tells us, , .. lack of educationkeeps them from higher grades.'

No British officer held a lower rank than that ofMajor or Bimbashi, and matters were SO arrangedthat there was never a native officer senior to aBritish one in the same battalion. Command of abattalion usually fell to a Lieutenant-Colonel orKaimakam, but he was usually addressed by thecourtesy tide of Bey. Battalion commanders wereusually captains or majors in the British army,and Bimbashis were subalterns.

Each battalion also had a 'Scrgeant Whatsis­name', as Kipling affectionatcly called him - aBritish non-commissioned officer whose task wasto drill and makc soldiers out of the raw materialat his disposal. The NCOs, eithcr colour sergeantsor sergeants, were volunteers likc thc officers.

The uniform of the infantry baualions and otherarms of thc servicc was a brown jersey, sand­coloured trousers and dark blue puttees. Headwear was the tarbush with a cover, the Egyptianbattalions having a neck flap in addition. Theywere armed with the Martini-Henry rifle and longsocket bayonet.

All the cavalry were Egyptian conscripts andmost of their squadron leaders were Britishofficers. As G. W. Steevens wrote in WithKitthenerto Khartoum, the reason for 'all-Egyptian'cavalry was that' ... a black can never be madeto understand that a horse needs to be groomedand fed.' The cavalry consisted often squadrons,each numbering about lOa men.

The Egyptian artiHery had two batteries offield artillery armed with Maxim-Nordenfcldtquick-firing g-pounders or 18-pounders with adouble shell, '. handy little creatures which acouple of mules draw easily.' The horse batterywas armed with 12-pounder Krupp guns, and theother twO field baueries with g-pounders. Again,all the gunners were Egyptian conscripts and thebattery commanders British.

Finally, there was the Soo-strong camel corps,divided into eight companies composed of halfSudanesc and half Egyptian troops with fivewhite officers. There were also the usual non­combatant services.

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The conscripted Egyptian soldier or feliah,representing one in every 500 of the population,was required to serve for six years with the coloursand a further nine with the rescrve or police. Hispay was a piastre a day (equivalent to 2!d. in18gS) which Steevens gleefully wrote was' ... amagnificent salary, equal to what hc wouldusually be making in full work in his nativevillage.' The black Sudanese soldicr was liable tobe cnlisted where found, and served for life. Hewas paid a basic 14 shillings a month to begin withand a family allowance of 3id. per day for thosewho had permission to marry. naccustomed togarrison and town life, the Sudanese battalionswcre usually quartered on thc frontier. Many ofthe Sudanese recruits were former enemies, thebetter prisoners and deserters being enlisted intoone of the black battalions.

Valentinc Baker Pasha, an ex-officer of the lothHussars who had been court-martialled and dis­missed from the service over his alleged conductwith a woman in a railway carriage, was offeredthe post ofCommander-in-Chiefofthe new Anglo­Egyptian army, but at the last moment (somesay through the intervention of Queen Victoria)the offer was withdrawn. Baker was thcn giventhe command of a ramshackle police force, theEgyptian 'Gendarmerie'.

rhe 'Dervish~rmy

The original Dervish army that did very much asit pleased in the Sudan during 1881-4 under thecommand of the Mahdi, the spirilUal and tempor­al leader long awaited by Mohammedans, wasvery different from the army formed by hissuccessor, the Khalifa, which was finally destroyedat Omdurman in 18gB.

Mohammed Ahmed Ibn AI·Sayid Abdullahwas the son of a boat-building carpenter, and wasborn in 1844. His father claimed that he wasdescended from the Prophet, and in 1861Mohammed Ahmed became a Summaniya Derv­ish, a member of a strict Moslem sect. The wordDervish means a Moslem friar vowed to poverty

''110.. Briti.h Squar..•. Officeu ....d nu. of the Q...een'. Ow:nCameroa Hilllh1a.Dden iu the tnulitioa.al want..,. squa~(onn.lion. NOI" the red p"!p~ aroun.d the mea'. __b•.JlDels, .1_ wo by the offic..... with the addition of,.r~me.laJ patte bad",.. 0.. the Cront. (Isabel and AlineS<:ou-Elliot)

and austerity, and the self-proclaimed Mahdidemanded these virtues in the followers - or'ansars', as he preferred to term them - whom herallied to his cause.

Their original 'uniform'. ifil can be called thaI,was thcjihbah. a plain cotton garment; latcr, asE. N. Bennet, war correspondent of the West.minsltrGo<:.ttltpointed out in his book, The Downfallofthe Dm:ishes' ... the Mahdi, who was somewhatascetic - in theory, at any rate, if not in practice­ordered his followers to sew black patches upontheir nice while coats, as tokens of humility. Butalas for human frailty, what was intended to curbthe spiritual pride of the faithful became a directincentive to the vainglorious adornment of theirpersons! The ladies of Omdurman were stronglyopposed to the dowdiness of the black patchesupon their husbands and lovers, and, under theinAuence of the morc acsthetic circles of Dervishsociety, the white gihhths were gradually trickedout with gaudy squares ofblue, red and purple.'

The initial religious frenzy which cnabled theMahdi to defy the Egyptian army, and tomassacre and defeat it, abated when he died inJune ,885, some months aftcr the death ofGeneral Gordon - 'Gordon of Khanoum', whowas killed defending that city. The successor to

the Mahdi was the Khalifa, Abdullah theTaiaishi, a ehief of the Baggara tribe who hadbecn considered thc Mahdi's right hand as earlyas ,883.

The Khalifa reformed the followers into anorganiscd army upon European lines. Warcorrespondent Bennet Burleigh described thisreformation: 'He to a great extent replaced themad fury of the early dervishes by the introductionof military organisation among the wild tribes,endeavouring, though in a crude way, to adoptthe system of training and tactics employed in theEgyptian army. Oflate he has succeeded in so farmodifying the original tribal system ofconductingwarfare, that his infantry, cavalry, and artilleryan: ordered and commanded much in the Euro·pean fashion. The emirs and lesser leaders now­adays wear distinctive insignia showing theirrank; and, more wonderful still, the restlessBaggara cavalry have been dragooned, and madeto drill and work by squadrons. It is, however, inthe handling of military supplies and keeping theaccounts of stores that the Mahdists have ap·parently nOt only sensibly copied, but bettered,the instruction of the Khedival commissariatdepartment. Some of the dervish accounts, prob·ably kept by Coptic clerks, which fell into myhands at Hallr, Dongola, and elsewhere, showedthat, down to the uttcrmOst pound of bc:ans orpackct of small·arms ammunition, nothing wasissued without a written warrant, and thatreceipts for everything were taken and the stores

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on hand could be ascertained at a glance.'The Dervish army was divided into four

separate parts, each to perform a specific dUly.Firstly there were the mounted horsemen whowcre all Baggara tribe Arabs; then camclmen,composed of Danagla and jaalin tribesmen. Therest of the army consisted of foot soldiers: thejehadia, who were Sudanese blacks (with a fewArabs) armed with rifles, and the swordsmen andspearmen who were commanded by Emirs andorganised into Ruhs equivalent to battalions.

Disciplinc was hard in the Dervish army;smoking. drinking, wearing fine clothes andjewellery, festivities, dancing and bad languagewcrc all met with severe punishments which in­cluded nogging up to 1000 lashes. Rations wereisslled 011 a strict basis and given out in ardebsequivalent to 5.6 bushels. Arabs rcceivcd /4 permonth,jehadia I~ and Baggara '!~~.

Each portion of the army was subdivided intosections with section leaders; they were requiredto paradc at regular intcrvals, but there was nobattle training. Thc inborn skill and resources ofthe Dervish made him a first·class fightingsoldier, one of the best with which 'TommyAtkins' had brushed. As Rudyard Kipling, theunofficial spokesman for the British soldier, wrotein his famous poem 'FuZi!,Y lVuW':

'We've fought with many men across the seas,An' somc of 'em was brave an' some was not;The Paythan an' the Zulu an' Burmese;But the Fuzzy was the finest 0' the lot.'

Charles Neufeld, a German trader who hadventured into the Sudan in 1885 in search ofgum-arabic and been captured by the Khalifa,wrOte in the account of his twelve years ofcaptivity, II Prisoner oj the Klwleifa, about theefficiency and unbeatable figh ti ng q uali lies of theDervish. 'At dose quarters the dervish horde wasmore than a match for the best drilled army inEurope. Swift and silent in their movement,covering the ground at four or five times the speedof trained troops, every man, when the moment ofattack came accustomed to fight independentlyof orders, lithe, supple, nimble as cats and asbloodthirsty as starving man-eating ligen, utterlyregardless of their own lives, and capable of con­tinuing stabbing and jabbing with spear and

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sword while carrying half a dozen wounds, any ofwhich would have put a European//Orsdecomhat­such were the 75,000 to 80,000 warriors which theKhalifa had already ... Artillery, rifles and bayon­ets would have been oflittle avail against a hordelike this rushing a camp by night.'

'Surely enough "\\'hen Allah made the Sudan",say the Arabs, "he laughed". You can almost hearthe fiendish echo of it crackling over the fierysands,' wrOtC G.· W. Steevens, famous war cor­respondent of the Daily Mail. The events whichoccurred in the Sudan were very closely allied lO

Egyptian aAairs, and to see how Britain becameinvolved in Egypt one must look briefly back to thebeginning of the nineteenlh century.

For hundreds of years Egypt had been underthedominationofforeign rulers;Arabs, Mamlukesand finally the Turks who engulfed it in lhe vaSlOttoman Empire. By the beginning of the nine·teenth century this once vast empire had startedto decay rapidly and various powers, especiallyRussia, were watching it with more than passingintcrest.

Britain first became interested in Egypt in 1798when lhe French, under i\apoleon, invaded thecountry. Ever conscious of protecting India, theBritish government was frightened that the youngFrenchman might make a bid to attack theirEastern empire by the overland route. In Britisheycs, the overland route to India depended almostentirely on Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean,previously considered to be of lillie strategic im­portance. The route to India had always beenvia the Cape of Good Hope, but Britain nowdecided to adopt preventive measures to guard thealternative entry. Malta and Gibraltar were re·garded as being ofgreat strategic significance andbecame first.line naval bases. Thc Turkish rule ofEgypt also suffered under this new-found im·portanee.

During the early years of the nineteenthcentury Viceroys of the Sultan of Turkey wereappointed, the first being Mohammed Ali, a

I colourful rogue dubbed 'The father of modernEgypt'. He had in his former years been a harshruler, but his skill and wit had enabled him togain a certain amount of autonomy from theSultan of Turkey in Egyptian affairs, eventhough he was unable to read or write until hewas fony.

The importance of Egypt was apparent toBritain when shortly after the accession of theViceroy Mohammed Ali a certain British officer,Lieutenant \Vaghorn, organised an 'overland'route connecting the Mediterranean and the RedSea. This venture flourished and soon a regularroute was establishing. Ships came from Britain toAlexandria where they discharged their pas­sengers and cargo; these were then transponed byWaghorn's efficient river boats and baggageanimals to Suez, where passengers and goodsalike were put aboard Bombay-bound vessels.This 'short cut' took at least four weeks from thejourney to India. To Britain, Egypt had assumeda vital imponance.

Meantime, Mohammed Ali had not been con­tent with ruling in Egypt. In 1821 he cast an eyesouthwards to the substantial lands lying belowEgypt - the Sudan. Having conquered thenonhern pan of this hostile and barren countryby force. he found an untapped source of first­class fighting men, slan::s and ivory. For theEgyptian economy this new.found wealth provedof immeasurable value. During the fifleen yearsbetween 1860 and 1.875. more than 400,000Sudancse were captured and sold by lhe Arabslave traders. As supplies of potential slaves in onepan of the country dried up, so the Arabs movedto another area, and as a result somc of the manySudanese trihes ceased to exist.

Besides the slavers, Egyptian troops had 'colon­ised' the area, or at least set up garrisons to helpenforce Egyptian rule. Taxes were collected byharsh and brutal means, and corruption on thepart of the Egyptian officials \\'as rife. Therhinoceros·hide whips wielded by the tax-collect­ors not only extracted the last few piastrcs, theyalso started something of more serious con­sequencc. II was the British who wcre later toreap the han'est ofyears of Egyptian misrule.

By the time of the Crimean War in 1854, SaidPasha had inherited the Viceregal throne and

The battle orTewl_Kebir, 5ot'ptemb<i!r 18&1. 'First in tlo.e Fray'by F. Dadd. Men oCthe Cameron Hish.IaDden .tormlns the..artltworll. co........cte<! by Arabi P••h.a a.d h.ayon..tins tbepnners. (Natio.al Army M.H.m/lfl....tr.ted lAmd_'N~.)

opened the country to European traders andexperts. Amongst these was the FrenchmanFerdinand de Lesseps who, inspired by Waghorn'sidea, elaborated it to consider the possibility thata canal could becut connecting the ivlediterraneanand Red Sea, shortening still furthcr the route tothe East. Said Pasha, always open to the per­suasive tongue of the Frenchman, who wasneither engineer nor builder, agreed to allot himlarge areas of land, free labour and mincral rightsplus permission to realise his lifctime's dream.Britain, for obvious reasons, opposed the canalproject in ordcr to protect her interests in India,and thc Forcign Office wcnt so far as to warn theGovernment that 'At present India is unauack­able. It will no longer be so when Bombay is only4,600 miles from Marseilles.' Because of theCrimean War, in which Britain and France wereallied, little pressure could be brought to bearagainst the project, however, and the idea wentahead. At the crucial point, as digging com·menced, Said Pasha died; financial crises aroseand under the forcibly re-negotiated terms of thenew Viceroy, Ismail Pasha, work ceased.

I I

After the baule ofTel-el-Kebir. The arrival of Lord Wolseleyand bis staff at tbe bridgeofTel-eI-Kebir while prisooers arecollected and soldiers slake their thirst. Painting by ElizabethBuder. (Parker Gallery)

The company formed by de Lesseps claimedcompensation and the arbitrator, no less a personthan Napoleon III, awarded £3 million damages.To meel this bill Ismail Pasha agreed to forfeit hisprofits from Egypt's shares in the canal to thatamount, in return for immunity from funherclaims. Egypt's nalional debt had increased from£3± million in [841 to a staggering £94 millionby 1876, mainly to Britain, France, Russia andother European countries.

On 17 November 186g, at a £2-millionceremony, lhe Suez Canal was opened, butduring the next few years Egypt's economy de­clined rapidly. The assumption of the title ofKhedive by Ismail P"asha alone cost the country£ [ million which was paid to the Sultan ofTurkey. By 1875 the foreign bankers who hadfinanced Egypt began to worry and in that sameyear Britain unwittingly cemented herself toEgypt and the Sudan.

The major user of the Canal had been Britain,who, having been unable 10 prevent its construc­tion, endeavoured to bring it under her control.In an unprecedented move Prime MinisterDisraeli· borrowed £4 million from the Rothschildbanking family to purchase the shares of theKhedive, which represented 44 per cent of Ihecapital. On 25 November [875, Disrac1i wrote to

12

Lady Bradford informing her of his action, ' ... aState secret' he wrote, 'certainly the most im­portant of the year.' Secrecy had been uttermostin the Prime Minister's plans because as hewrote, 'The day before yesterday, Lesseps, whoseCompany has the remaining shares, backed by theFrench Government, whose agent he was, made agreat olTer. Had it succeeded, the whole of theSuez Canal would have belonged to France, andthey might have shut it up! We have given theKhedive 4 millions sterling for his interest, andrun the chance of Parliament supporting us. \'Vecould not call them together for the maller, forthat would have blown everything 10 the skies, orto Hades.' The news was received with over­whelming applause by Britain and other countries.Queen Victoria wrote that 'what she liked mostwas, it was a blow at Bismarck', while the King ofthe Belgians hailed it as 'the greatest event ofmodern politics, Europe breathes again .. .'

Through this move Britain had increased herinterest in Egyptian affairs. In April the followingyear her involvement deepened when the bank­rupt Egyptian government suspended paymentsof interest and debts. Britain and France, as thetwo imperial powers 10 whom owed most, imposedon Ismail a Commission of the Debt, a type of'receivership' which in effect gave them cOnlrol of

I

l

Egyptian affairs. In 1879, after an abortive revoltstirred up by Ismail, the British and French de·manded that the Sultan ofTurkey should deposehim. In his place Tewfik, Ismail's son, wasappointed Khedive.

1Ite 1<.i!,e ofr3rCaltdismfwdt!leulrab 'R.r!Jolt

While Britain and Francecxerciscd 'Dual Control'of Egypt in the aflairs of government, they cer­tainly did not contemplate expensive militaryintervention. Egypt's main problem had alwaysbeen the Sudan and the Khedive's governmenthad appointed various outsiders to try to manageit. The title of Governor-General of the Sudanwas held by a succession of foreigners, one ofwhom was General Charles Gordon. By 1880Egypi had nearly 40,000 troops in garrisonsthroughout the Sudan, imposing her corrupt rulethrough the Governor-General in Khartoum.Poverty, oppression and disaffcction were rife inthe province, which was constantly ravished byslave and ivory traders and plundered by thesoldiers and corrupt tax collcctors. Gordon, whohad restored some form of just rule during histerm of office, plainly saw the trouble that wasbrewing for Egypt. In 1880 he wrote, 'If theliberation of slaves is to take place in 1884 (inEgypt proper) and the present systcm of govern­ment goes on there cannot fail to be a revolt of thewholc country. But our government will go onslceping till it comes and then havc to act aI'improuiste' .

In 1881 the ob_s~ure son of a carpcnter pro­claimed himself thc 'Mahdi' or 'Guidcd Onc ofthe Prophct', the long-expected Messiah of theIslamic faith. Mohammed Ahmed Ibn AI-SayidAbdullah could not havc chosen a better time.Egypt was in financial chaos, and the grip of theTurco-Egyptian armyon the Sudan was weakenedby foreign intervention and general apathy. TheGovernor-Gcncral of the Sudan was then RauofPasha, an incompetent and corrupt official whom

Gordon had twice dismissed from subordinatepositions. The deputation sent by Rauo!" Pasha tothe Mahdi had littlc effcct, and the Govcrnor­Gencral decided to scnd a punitive expedition tocapture the rcbel leader. An ill.armed forcesailed up the Nile in the steamer lsmailia, reachingit goal at Aba after dark. Instead of waiting untildawn the troops disembarked in chaos in thedark, and stumbling amongst the mud and reedsof the shoreline, fell easy prey to the Mahdi'sansars. A few Egyptians escaped to the steamer,which hastily fled.

Three months later, in December 1881, aforce of 1400 Egyptian troops under Rashid Bey,Governor of Fashoda, was 3Jl1bushed and hackedto pieces by the Mahdi's forces. In Egypt it

TH Britbb e.try iatO Cairo, September ,882. Camero.Hisbl.aDden passias ia review before Lord Wobeley.(Isabel aDd Aliae Scott-Elliof)

appeared that the Mahdi in the Sudan wasgetting out of hand and that the Army seemedincapable of putting down the rebellion. TheMahdi's forces were swelling daily. Recruits whowere eager, after the defeats of the Egyptians, tocast offcorrupt and oppressive rule joined in theirthousands ready to carryon the Holy War he hadproclaimed.

Egypt had, however, her own internal problemsbrought about by the 'Dual Control' of Britainand France. As in other spheres of Egyptian rule,the key and senior posts were held by foreignersand not Egyptians. The army was run by Tmkish­Circassian officers, and Egyptian officers hadlittle say. Ahmed Bey Arabi, son of an Egyptianvillage chief, felt the time had come to air thegrievances ofmany officers like himself. Army payhad been cut back, foreign domination was on theincrease and the corrupt rule of the Turks in

13

, {, •I

,,~ ., .. ,

The Military Police Us Cairo drused La KarIIl'I ru.n.ics ...dwhite helmets with tloeir distiDcri"e arm_baIRd,. The Policewen'rtD~with abort carbines ...d the 1879 panera artillerysword-bayonet. They a« Hell "heclrialll: p-p<en, "-pia!order ...d deterri.n! beggars. (Parker Gallery)

power was devastating an already ruined country.Arrested by the Government, Arabi was broughtbefore a Council of Ministers for censure, bUItroops and officers loyal to his cause burst in,turned out the Council (having emptied inkpolsover them) and rorced Tewfik to accept Arabi asa minister in the new government.

Feeling in Britain and France was acute. Theprospect of revolution and the probability of thenational debt being refuted stirred Britain intoaClion. There was no joint plan by the twopowers, since intense rivalry prc'"entcd anyagreement or understanding being reached overEgypt. By .May 1882 the Admiralty had orderedIhe Mediterranean Squadron to Alexandria andIhe French had also despatched some warships.Turkey, how('vcr, remained inactive despite de·

14

mands from both Britain and France 10 intervene.Arabi rcrused to be intimidatcd and started toreinforce his seaward defences, (0 man the fortswith hcavy artillery and to dig cmplacements.A British ultimatum to dismantle the forts wasignored, and the Royal i\"avy was lert to intervenealone when the French Acet sailed away becauseofa change in government. A bombardment com­menced at 7 a.m. on II July 1882, and shellingbetween ship and shore lasted the entire day,until both panics fell silent through lack ofammunition. Afler two days of inactivity, watch­ing the Egyptians firing Alexandria, looting thelown and killing Christians, a party of 'Blue·jackels' and :Marines was ordered ashore. Theirswirt progress through Alexandria and the restora·tioll of law and order were vividly described bywar correspondents of the leading newspapers.Looters were summarily dealt with, either beingshot on sight, or, if caught, tried by a militarycourt and hanged as a warning to others.

The rebellion was far from over, however. With60,000 men, Arabi was still in control ofCairo anda large part of Egyp!. 'Our only General', SirGarnet Wolsely, was despalched to Egypl to dealwith the rebellious Egyptian army. In typicalWolsele)' fashion, he made il known to Ihe pressand other officers that he was going to attackAboukir, but Ihis was purely a diversionary move.Wolseley had himself written in his famousSoldiers Pocket Book ([869) concerning the news­hUllgry war correspondents that ' ... this veryardour for information a General can turn toaccount by spreading fake news among thegentlemen of the press and thus use them as amedium by which to deceive Ihe enemy.' In thiscase, Wolscle)' did just thaI. Even de Lcsseps,worried about damage to his Canal, telegraphedArabi that the British were landing at Aboukir.This was the last message sent, as Wolseley'stroops landed at Suez and closed the telegraphoffice. Surprised by the unexpected direclion ofthe allack, Arabi reinforced his lines at Tel-el­Kebir.

On 28 August the Egyptian army attacked aforce of about 2000 men under General Grahamat Mahsama, and despite the fears of Lieutenant­General Willis (who telegraphed to Wolseley'. .. Fear Graham has been defeated') IheEgyptian force, which outnumbered the Britishfive to one, was driven off; much of the credit forthe victory went to Drury Lowe's cavalry andtheir famous so-called 'moonlight charge'. On10 Seplember \Volseley's force was marching 10­

wards Arabi's well-positioned lines at Tel-cl~

Kabir, and the General was worried. Inconlidence, he wrote to his wife about his anxietiesand his weak position. ' ... I have determined tomove out from here on Tuesday night to attackthe enemy's fortified position on Wednesdaymorning a little before daybreak. I am so weakthat I cannot afford to indulge in any other plan,and it requires the steadiest and the best troops 10

attain my object - and then I may fail - oh Godgrant I may not! - I know that I am doing adangerous thing, but I cannot wait for reinforce­ments; to do so would kill the spirit of my troops,which at present is alii could wish it to be. I hopeI may never return home a defeated man: Iwould sooner leave myoid bones here than go

home to bejeercd at ... Everylhingdcpends uponthe steadiness of my infantry. If they arc steady inthe dark - a \'ery crucial trial - I must succeed.Otherwisc I might fail altogcthcr, or achicve vcryliltle. '

The Egyptians had done a good job ofmanningtheir lines. In addition 10 the 25,000 troops therewcre about seventy field guns including some ofthe latest Krupp breechloaders. The area in frontof the fortifications was desert - pOOl' fightinggl'Ound for troops attacking against earthworks.For four days Wolselcy's staO'rcconlloitred, map­ped and discussed the position, and at lastdiscovered the 'Achilles heel' of the Egyptians:they did not man their outwsts at night. Wolseleywas decided: it would havc to be a night attack,or failing thai a night march followed by a swiftdawn allack. He chose the latter course. Kightmarches were always risky; in the desert soundcarried for miles, troops lost their way in the dark,directions were hard to follow and the sense ofdirection erratic. Besides these factors, the mostimponant was that soldiers tended to become un­steady when they lost contact with their officers orcomrades in the dark, and this could provokepanic or chaos and jeopardise the allack.

Progress over the desert would be slow, at aboutone mile per hour, therefore Wolseley timed histroops' departure for 1.30 a.m. calculating toreach the enemy's linejust before dawn. Directingpoles had been placed in the sand by Ihe RoyalEngineers to show the line of march, but theseproved of lillIe use. Al various points during theadvance incidents occurred which might havejeopardised the entire operation. Riders comingwith instructions from the staffwel'e mistaken fol'Arabs, although no shots were lired; and the linewas disrupted when a Highland regiment restedfor twenty minutes. Since this regiment was in thecentre of the line, and orders were passed byword of mouth, the flanks continued to advanceuntil they also halted, the entire line now forminga crcscenl with the opposing flanks confrontingeach other. In the dark, each could have easilymistaken the other for the enemy and opened fire,but fortunately calm prevailed.

Frank Powel', The Times war correspondent,summed lip the attack in his despatch. 'There wasno moon, and thus almost within cannon shot, the

15

two armies were resting peacefully, the one sidedreaming probably little of the terrible scene ofthe awakening, when their rest at length rudelydislUrbed, they awoke to see swiftly advancingupon every side an endless line of dreaded red­coats, broken by the even morefMrful blue of theMarines.' The Egyptians were totally defeated ata cost of 399 casualties among the British force,243 ofwhich were from the front-line troops of theHighland Brigade.

After a forced march the following day thetroops entered Cairo and captured Arabi, whosurrendered his swor#d to General Drury Lowe.Arabi was tried in December 1882 and banishedto Ceylon, but was pardoned in Igo I.

'Ihe <SudoI/1881-1883While the Egyptian army had been preoccupiedwith fighting the British expeditionary force, thel\'!ahdi in the Sudan did vcry much as he pleased.Britain had been unwillingly drawn into Egypt,which she now garrisoned, but Gladst.one's firm

16

The Tokar Expedition. Disembarkation of Parker Pasha'stroop. with lItorn at Trinkilat for tbe relief of Tokar. Thee"pedltlon wall short_lived and _ded in tbe diSalltro... firstbattle ofEI Teb (4 February 1884). Drawing by Melton Prior,war .rti.t for the 1I1...t .."ted L_do.. New•. (National ArmyM"$elun/111",'",,'ed Lo..d_ New.)

opposition to imperialism for whatever reasonsdrew the line at intervention in the Sudan. Theundisputed fact was, however, that Egypt'ssecurity rested on keeping the Sudan subdued.and Britain had assumed the responsibility ofEgypt. The newly·formed Anglo-Egyptian armyunder British officers, financed by the Khediveand not the British tax payer, would have to solvethe problem. Soldiers uncleI' British officers shouldbe able to deal with the ill·armed savages of theSudan, who, it was thought, possessed mainlyspears and a few small.arms.

The Mahdi's troops had already defeated anEgyptian force under YussifPasha, who succeededRaoufPasha in March 1882. The Mahdi had alsodecided to establish his base at EI Obeid and bySeptcmber his troops were ready for thc assault.Thc attack launched on 8 September failed, andthe Mahdi was hastily forced to find an excuse forhis followers, 10 whom he had previously declared

• _~_: '"l.~....__J. _._'---...- ~.

hopeless task. Most of them were recruited fromthe army defeated by Wolscley at TcI-el-Kebir,and their morale was as non-existent as theirfighting qualities. This noticeable inferiority ofhis troops was not echoed by some of his fdlowofficers. ""'c were all in high spirits,' wroteColonel the Hon. J. Colborne, 'and eagerly look­ing forward to the campaign.' British aid was outof the question as the force sct off towardsKhartoum. 'Whethcr Hicks falls or conquers,'stated the Pall l\4all Gazelle, 'is not our business,not a single British soldier will be ordered toKhartoum if the Mahdi were to rout the wholcforce under the orders of the Khedive's officers.'

Later Col borne noted ominoLlsly in his book,With Hicks Pasha ill the Stu/all (1884), regarding thequality of the troops: 'During their passage fromCairo, men and officers had completely forgollcntheir drill. When the guns were attempted to bebrought into action, dire confusion reigned. Menran against each other; the ground was strewnwith cartridges; hoppers were placed anywhereblH where they should have been. ~o one ap­peared to havc the slightest knowledge of how to

feed. aim, and discharge thc pieces. In the midstofall this, poor \Valker - not knowing anything of

.... .....-~ -:.-.::;-- ~--

The baltle of Tamai, b), G. D. GlIes_ Ouri.nS this battle theDervisbes 'broke' tbe Britisb squaft. Nou: the fierce hand.t(l..hand fishtialf; OD the lefl, Ihe mediea..l orderlies auead.irls 10wounded ... the «Dire aDd tbe relle~"eammuaitioo mules 10tbe Msht. (Natina.1 Ann)' Museum)

that the enemy bullets could not kill them.Lacking adequate firepower, he settled down tostarve out the city, which fell on 19January 1883,yielding up large supplies of arms and munitions.An Egyptian relief force of 3,000 which set Out inSeptember was systematically slaughtered.

In February, Cairo learned of the disaster ofEI Obeid and the ensuing slaughter, and decidedthat some firmer action mllst be taken. A retiredIndian army officer re-employed as Chiefof Staffin the new Egyplian army was chosen to lead anexpedition. William Hicks, 01' 'Hicks Pasha' as hewas called, had nOt had a panicularly disting­uished career. He had spent most of his career inIndia, having fought in the Mutiny and takenpan in the Abyssinian campaign of 1867. Aidedby a few other British officers but hampered by theinterference of an eighty·year-old Pasha to whomhe was subordinate, he endeavoured to instilsome fighting spirit into his gooo men. It was a

17

~'~...­'" ....I ':...,.w.,-J: ....... , .

Sada.a '8&f' British troot" ... tropical dress in C&fDp. NOI..the shapes of the IltDts, aDd the .blllies ~ardiDl!: stons 011tlo.. lett. See also the HiSh.laad palle.... of Cllr-_y tuaic,althou«h the ma.a 011 lII.. Jeft wpn the standard iDf....trypaue..... (habel aad A1io>.. Scott-Elliot)

the language beyond the words of command ­stood aghast. General Hicks thundered out thathe had never secn such a disgraceful scene in hislife, and ordered ForCSlier.Walkcr to remain forthree days perpetually drilling his men in thatsandy scorching camp, instead of returning withus to the comparatively "blest abode" ofKhartoum.'

The column moved out from Khanoum and on26 June scored a minor victory by defeating anattack of Baggara cavalry. Three days latcr amorc determined attack was beaten off. Colbornedescribed with enthusiasm the start of the battle.'Onward they came, waving their banners ... butthe Khedive's troops, encouraged by their Englishofficers, had no fear. They had seen the charm­protected enemy bite the dust under their fire ...But Nordenfcldts and Remingtons are no re­spectors of creeds.'

On reaching Jebcl.Ain, Hicks thought thecampaign over as there was no sign of the enemy.The next garrison he visited was that of Dueim

18

which had been attacked on 23 August but hadbeaten off the Dervishes, inflicting over 4,000casualties. Spending almost a month there, Hicksmoved south.west on 23 September on his routetowards EI Obeid. Morale was low, since ex·pected reinforcements had not appeared and thecamels and horses were dying at an alarming rate.'The ill-fated army scarcely met a living soul, butflocks of vultures f01l0wed them as if waiting fortheir prey.' From deserters, the Mabdi knew thedisposition of Hicks's force, its low morale, itslack of water and its depleted numbers owing todeath and desertion. He despatched a letter toHicks inviting him to surrender, but this wasnaturally ignored. Previous warnings left by theMahdi in the form of leaflets were used by theEgyptian troops as lavatory paper.

On 3 November 1883 the remainder of Hicks'sforce, now down to 7,000, reached Kashgeil,twelve miles south ofEI Obeid. Fightingstarted onthe 3rd and lasted until the 5th when the Mahdi'stroops finally killed the last of the Khedive's force.The Dervishes had attacked Hicks's square on the3rd and the night of the 4th. Desperately short ofwater, three smaller squares were formed on themorning of the 5th to get to the next waterhole.

None reached their goat. According to statementsmade by the Dervishes, Hicks was one of the lastto die: '... he had emptied his revolver and,holding his sword in his right hand, waited for therush of the enemy; he was soon surrounded andhis horse wounded in the back; he then dis­mounted and fought most gallantly with hissword until he fell, pierced by several spears .. .'

While the Mahdi was finishing off Hicks'scolumn Osman Digna, an ex-slave trader whomthe Mahdi had created an Emir and granted thetitle of a provincial governor, had defeated an­other Egyptian force. Osman Digna had con­centrated his efforts on the eastern side of theSudan but mainly around the area east of theNile and the towns of Tokar and Suakin.

Having been repulsed by Tewfik Bey at Suakin,Osman Digna turned his attention to Tokar,which he besieged. A relief force of 500 accom­panied by Commander Moncrieff, R.N., theBritish Consul, marched from Suakin and fell preyto the Dervishes. Inexperienced and of poorcalibre, the Egyptians panicked and Red leaving athird of their number dead. For Osman Dignathe death of the Egyptians was unimportant. Hisvictory lay in gaining possession of severalhundred riRes and the entire extra ammunitiondestined for the defenders ofTokar. The effect onrecruiting for Osman Digna was stupendous.

1883 had been a year of disaster for the Egyp­tians and 1884 would prove equally so, not onlyfor Egypt but for Britain and imperial prestige.

It was obvious in Cairo that this situation couldnot continue, for the Dervishes were now in aposition to menace Khartoum itself. An army of3,600 men with six field guns was assembled underValentine Baker Pasha. Most of the force con­sisted of the 'Gendarmerie', who were describedas 'a rubbishy lot of worthless ex-soldiers', byAndrew Haggard (a serving officer in the King'sOwn Borderers) in Under Crescenl and Star, WilliamBlackwood, 1896. There was a serious attempt atmass desertion when the men were ordered to

form part of the expedition. Embarking, the forcesailed for Trinkitat on the Red Sea coast of theSudan, some sixty miles south of Suakin, and wellpositioned for the relief of Tokar. On 4 Februarythe army reached El-Teb only to be confronted bythe Dervish forces. The ensuing action was dis­astrous for the Egyptians. The Standard warcorrespondent described the engagement: 'Theenemy now gathered thickly and advanced to­wards us, and at nine o'clock showed in consider­able force on some slightly rising ground, near thewater springs, while on our left front I could seeclumps of spears with bannerets partially con­cealed amidst the hillocks and bushes. Our gunsagain opened fire; but the shell seemed to passover the enemy's heads. : .

'J ust before this, 1 had ridden along by theinfantry column, and I saw that it was advancingin the most disorderly manner. There was no signof discipline or steadiness; it was a mere armedmob tramping along. I was convinced they wouldbreak at the first charge. As the cavalry rodewildly in, the order was given for the infantry toform square - a manoeuvre in which they hadbeen daily drilled for weeks. At this crisis, how­ever, the dull, half-disciplined mass failed to ac­complish it. Three sides were formed after afashion, but on the fourth side two companies ofthe Alexandria Regiment, seeing the enemycoming on leaping and brandishing their spears,stood like a panic-stricken flock of sheep, andnothing could get them to move into their place.Into the gap thus left in the square the enemypoured, and at once all became panic and con­fusion. The troops fired indeed, but for the mostpart straight into the air. The miserable Egyptiansoldiers refused even to defend themselves, butthrowing away their riRes, flung themselves onthe ground and grovelled there, screaming formercy. No mercy was given, the Arab spearmenpouncing upon them and driving their spearsthrough their necks or bodies. Nothing couldsurpass the wild confusion: camels and guns mixedup together, soldiers firing into the air, with wildArabs, their long hair streaming behind them,darting among them, hacking and thrusting withtheir spears.

'''Vhile the charge had been made by the enemyon the left flank, General Baker with his Staff

19

S..daa '884. The inspKt:ioa of the :md detachmtal of theG_rds Cam.el Corps al ~DIa: Gel'lenl S.lvte. Note theNCO. keep""l camel.... liDe while tile Mldienp~1anns.Sketch by M" loa Prior, warartisI, III_tr.ted Lo"do" Nnvs.(National Army Museum)

were out with the cavalry in front. Upon ridingback they found that the enemy had already gOl

between them and the column ... When theGeneral finally reached the square, the enemy hadalready broken it up. and it was clear that allwas lost.'

Any altcmpt on Baker's part to rally the troopswas hopeless, and the army fled back to theirships leaving a trail oftJead - and to the enemy,3000 rifles, machine guns and Krupp field guns.Four days later Sinkat fell, and only six men andthirty womcn survived out of 400 men andnumerous women and children who bad at­tempted to leave the town.

London at last stirred itself into action and atelegram was sent to the Commander of theBritish Army of Occupation in Egypt, orderinghim to detach a portion of his army under SirGerald Graham to relieve Tokar. The force,augmented by somc troops on their way homcfrom India, consisted of 2,850 infantry, 750mounted troops, 150 Bluejackets, 100 Royal

20

,

.<.·f··

Artillery, 80 Royal Engineers, six machine gunsand eight 7-pounder guns. On their arrival atTrinkitat news was recei\·ed that Tokar hadfallen, but even so Graham decided to push on andengage the enemy if he could. nder a flag oftruce he sent a leiter to the sheiks calling on them'to disperse your fighting men before daybreaktomorrow, or thc consequences will be on yourown head.' The enemy showed no signs of com­plying, and on 29 F'ebruary the huge squareformation, wilh transport animals in the centre,a squadron of loth Hussars in front to seOUl, therest of lhe cavalry in the rear and artillery andmachine guns suitably positioned, moved forwardover the barrcn sandy soil. Thc line of march wasstrewn with the remains of Baker's ill-fatcd ex­pedition and swarms of carrion crows hoveredover the area.

The Dervishes had entrenched themselves welland wilh lhe aid of the captured Krupp gunsopened fire on the advancing square. Grahamordered his square to advance towards theenemy's left flank and by noon the formation washalted and the artillery brought into actionagainst the Dervishes. The two field guns pos­sessed by the enemy were silenced but small-arms

fire continued to fallon the attackers. Thesoldiers were becoming impatienL at this in­activit}' but Graham soon ordered the advance.'It is nO( a charge,' wrote one of the war cor­respondenl.S, 'but a steady solid movemenL in theformation which has all along been observed. Itlooks, however, all the more formidable, for en­thusiasm and discipline are equally marked, asthe whole of the troops are cheering, while thesquare sweeps towards the enemy.' \-\'hen thesquare was within 200 yards of the Dervishes theenemy ceased firing and, grabbing their spearsand swords, advanced with fanatical fervour.John Cameron, war correspondent of the Standard,described this advance. 'So hotly do the Arabspress forward that the troops pause in their steadyadvance. It becomes a hand-to-hand fight, thesoldier meeting the Arab spear with cold steel,their favouritc weapon, and beating them at it.Thcre is not much shoUling, and only a short,

sharp exclamation, a bricfshout or an oath, as thesoldiers engage with their foe. At this criticalmoment for the enemy, the Gardener guns openfire, and their leaden hail soon decides matters.'

Having won the first line, the square was haltedand adjusted for the final assault against thetrenches and rifle pits the enemy had dug, whichwith the aid of the cavalry - who had swung wideof the square and engaged the enemy- werc takenafter some bitter fighting.

The action had lasted three hours and had costGraham 34 killed and [55 wounded, with Dervishcasualties estimated at over 6,000. Graham'stroops also recaptured the two Krupp guns, someold brass ordnance, onc Gatling gun and a vastamount of rifles and ammunition. The victoriousforce returned to Suakin, taking with them theirspoils and the surviving inhabitants of Tokar.The reinforced stronghold of Suakin was to pro­vide an excellent base for actions against Osman

Sudan 1885. OfficerllaJId men oftheGuani. Camel R~mentrKting. Notice the NCO .erving out water from ••k.... andtbe I:ook. at work. (Parker Gallery)

21

- .

Sud....88S- Tlo.. 6rst view or llte _emy at Ab.. Klea, 17J...u.ary. Note the dral. o(the cavalryt~_lef1 ...d m..vari..... s.yln wora by the offi«.n. (N.lional Army M .._m)

Digna, and at the beginning of March 1884 aproclamation was issued calling on the rebelchiefs to surrender. This was mel with a defiantreply by Osman Digna and his chiefs. On 12

March a force left Suakin and marched abouteight miles to a ~artba (a square position formedwith thickets, brush and pallisadcs). They ad·vanced on Tarnai and bivouacked within a milefrom the enemy. The troops were harassedthroughout the night b·y a dropping fire and asdawn came up a large body of the enemy ap­proached the square. 'This was morc than Britishflesh and blood, however patient, could endure,'and anillcry fire was ordered lodispcrsc the Arabs.

At last the order for the advance was given andthe squares, one behind the other at a distance ofa thousand yards, moved over the rough groundintersected with watercourses and bouldcrs. Theenemy attacked with remarkable ferocity andsoon the whole area was clouded in dense smokefrom the rifle fire of both sides. 'And now, as thepressure increased, the weak points of a squareformation became visible. The companies of the

22

Yorks and Lancaster and the Black Watch, form­ing the front face, swept fom'ard against the foe;but the remaining companies of those regiments,which formed the sides of the square, and werealso expecting an attack, did not keep lip with therapid movement of those in front, the con­sequence being that many gaps appeared in whatshould have been a solid wall of men.' TheDervishes took advantage of this and despite theorders of the officers and the shrill calls of thebugle which were drowned in the din, the 'Fuzzy'<\'uzzies' broke the square. Bennet Burleigh, thefamous war correspondent of the Daily Telegraph,was in the square and described the scene as theDervish swordsmen rushed into the confused massof troops. 'The 65th (York and Lancaster) gaveway, and fcll back on the Marines, throwing theminto disorder, though many men disdained to turntheir backs, but kcpt their faces to the foc firingand thrusting with the bayonet. Both regimentswere inextricably huddled together. and throughthe smoke at this dire crisis the dark demon-likefigures of the foe could be sccn rushing on, un-

checked even for a moment by the hailstorm ofbullets, and then the fight became hand-to-hand.'

Luckily, there was no panic, and the troopsretired in good order, the Naval Brigade stayingby their Gatlings to the last moment before lockingthe breech mechanism. The rear square, however,pressed forward to the right and drove everythingberore it, taking some or the pressure off the othertroops. The 'broken' square rallied - some main­tained, through the efforts or Bennet Burleigh,who above the shouting and din was heardordering 'Men orthe 65th - close up! Give it to thebeggars. Let 'cm have it boys! Hurrah!'

The combincd fire orboth squares soon decidedthe outcome, but it was round dangerous to moveover the battlefield because or the woundedDervishes. They accepted no quarter and de­manded none. Many a British soldier to his bitterregret offered water to a wounded Arab, only tobe wounded, maimed or killed by the enemy hewas trying to help.

The victories at EI-Teb and Tarnai, however,did not prevent the Government's action In

ordering a general evacuation or the Sudan.

s..d.a.D 1885- The battle of Ab.. KI"a. '7 January. 'Our squareadvaaciaS to the attack WIder a yery heavy 6re from the"""my.' Note the :o:areba. fIUIde of bo"o. <:am"t .addl"" ...dtho", b h with the wOUDd~m the ceutre. (National ArmyM ..se )

..,

..• ." •,''" ".

., . "...-,. , •. ~ .~--

(Jordol/, K!!ftrtOtlJ11ondthe :N]£e expedition

While the events previously described were hap­pening, there was another more serious occurrencewhich would thrust the Sudan into the limelight.The \-\'ar Office and the British Government haddecided to send General Charles Gordon toKhartoum. Forced to take action, Gladstone andhis Government were given the choice belween acostly imperial expedition to thc Sudan, distaste­rul to the Prime l\'finistcr, or a complete evacua­tion or troops and civilians. To his c\'erlastingshame, Gladstone chose the latter course oraction. Although Gordon had been a popularchoice at the outset, he soon grew tiresome to theGovernment with his sheaves or telegrams sug­gesting action and then countermanding thesuggestion. Berore embarking ror the SudanGordon had given an interview, the first or itskind, to W. T. Stead, Ihe controversial editor orthe Pall Mall Ga<elte. Gordon's main criticism orthe Government's publicised intention orevacuat­ing the Sudan was that, 'The moment it is knownthat we have given up the game every man will

23

Sud....88,5- The batde of Abu Klea. Den-isbes au.a.clWI!: theBritis'" lMIuare by Coulan. The D.trvishes broke a Britis'"square fo .. the st<'Oftd tilDe 0. this OCcaSiOD. (Pa...."rC.U....y)

go over to the Mahdi. All men worship the risingsun. The difficulty of evacuation will be enorm·ously increased, if indeed, the withdrawal of ourgarrison is not rendered impossible.'

It was a confusing situation in the Sudan, mademore so by Gordon's unpredictable na{Ure andhis reluctance to order the evacuaLion of civiliansand troops in Khartoum. Gordon, now Governor­General of the Sudan, announced to the waitingcrowds in Khartoum, who had expected morethan a single man, 'I come without soldiers, butwith Cod on my side, to redress the evils of theSudan.' He attempted to set up an ex-slave tradernamed Zebchr as the rulcr of the province lO beevacuated, but anti-slavery feeling and lheGovernment's natural reluctance stifled lhe plan.Gordon was convinced that the Mahdi could bereasoned with and thal resloration of order waspossible; he offered him lhe lide of Sultan ofKordofan. Aflcr lhc evacuation ofseveral hundredEgyptians the Mahdi, ignoring all Gordon'sattempts at reconciliation, closed on Khartoumand on 12 March the siege commcnced.

The siege, however, was far from total andGordon's steamers continued up and down theBlue and White Niles with no interference from

24

thc Dervishes. Wounded Egyptian soldiers andwomen and children were transferred to Berberwhile Gordon set about recruiting nativc volun­teers, reinforcing thc defences and personallysupervising thc issuc of rations. The gravity of thesituation had been appreciated in Britain; fromQueen Victoria, Sir Garnel Wolseley, the popula­tion and the Press, warnings, pleas, and demandswere made to Gladslonc and his Governmcnt lOact. Sir Garnet Wolsclcy wrote lhat, 'This feelinglhat something should be done, like a rollingsnowball, will go on increasing until the Govcrn­ment will be forced lO adopl measures to save lheKhartoum garrison ... bUl if nothing is done thalplace will be besieged, and we shall be, in myhumble opinion, faced with a war 011 a largescale.'

Howevcr, Gladstone did nothing but conlinueto assure lhe House and the Queen that intervcn­tion was nOl nccessary. From Cairo the BritishAgent, Sir Evelyn Baring, tclegraphed that'Having sent Gordon to Khartoum, it appears tome that it is our boundless duty, bolh as a matterof humanity and policy, nOt lO abandon him.'Communicalion wilh Khartoum delcriorated,and Parliament and Press wcre suddenly made

I'ri,'ale, Black Walch, Egypt .882

\I: Private, Royal Marine Light lnfantr}',Egypt .882

..,

3 Corporal of Horse, Life Guards, Egypt .882

'H A

B

Officer, ColdSlream Guards, Egypl .682

2 Private, SCOIS Guards, Egypt 1882

3 Private, General PaSI Office Rilles, Egypl,88,

MICHAEl ROFFE

MICHAH ROFfE

•

F"Uah, Es)'pda" Army, SUdOl" .883

:I. Pri,.,..", C<o ..."l RI!'!;"'''n., Sudan '881-1;

3 Rati..s. Naval BriS:l.d", Sudan .8&t-l;

3

c

D

War corr~spond"nt,Sudan .884-85

2 Fellah, 10th Sudanese Banlllion, Sudan '897

3 Priv'u,", Gr"nadier Guards, Sudan .llgo8

MICHAEL ROiFE

Troop..r, ~'~I L..nc:..rs, Sud"n '1l98

~ Troo.>t'r, ~ISI L"nc:er~, Sudan ,~

... HA,f IlOfH E

F

Sergeant-Major, "'SI Lancers, Sudan'898

" Private, Cameron Highlanders, Sudan '898

3 Officer, Lincolnshire Regiment, Sudan '898

3

.... < HM

, Hadem.dowah W......ior, .1l8.t""98

2 Taaishi W:lrrior, ,88..-98

" "." R fl [

•

G

H

,

I and 3 D~n';sh Infantry, ,884"""98

2 jaid;" Warrior, ,88.1"""'98

, •• AI

aware of the worsening situation, when on I AprilThe Times published a despatch fro~ FrankPower, their correspondent in Khartoum. Powerdescribed the 'serious reverse' suITered by a sortiefrom Khartoum and the continuous fighting, butabove all he wrote about the hopes of those inKhartoum. 'We are daily expecting Britishtroops. We cannot bring ourselves to believe thatwe are to be abandoned by the Government.'The Times smugly commented that the Govern­ment was largely dependent on their Khartoumcorrespondent for information. \Volseley con­tinued to circulate memoranda about a reliefforce while other political figures tried to pressurethe Government. Gladstone refused to be drawnand commented in the House that 'the debatesthus constantly renewed are out of all proportionto the pressure and urgency of the question, andhave the eITect of oITering immense obstructionto important public business.'

On 2 May 1884 Berber was captured by theMahdi's troops, and little hope was held out forthe safety of the smaller garrisons. Khartoum,

however, continued to stand, and Gordon to con­fuse the issue with his contradieto'r'y messages anddemands for troops from Britain and Turkey. Thesituation was worsened by the time taken formessages lo'be sent from and to reach Khartoum- up to three months in some cases. The plight ofthe town, where Gordon had imposed rationing,printed his own paper money and awarded hisown medals, was described in the last despatchfrom Frank Power, written on 31 July but nOtreceived in London until the end of September.'Since March 17 no day has passed withoutfiring, yet our losses in all at the very outside arenOt 700 killed. We have had a good many wound·ed, but as a rule the wounds are slight. Since thesiege General Gordon has caused biscuit and cornto be distributed to the poor, and up to this timethere has been no case ofany one seriously wantingfood. Everything has gone up about 3000 per centin price, and meat is, when you can get it, 8s or gsan ober ... \\/hen our provisions, which we haveat a stretch for two months, are eaten we must fall,nor i~ there any chance, with the soldiers we have,

s..daD 188S- ne fierce baDd·, baDd 6A:hti.a! involved in reopaJsin! the ene...y fro... t.he~ ". OD-t.he-spot drawUt! byMeltOil Prior. (National Army M..se.....)

. ~)". ' . '';''~:;j;,. ~\..,. ~"~""".4. po

2S

Sudan ,885, After the battle of Abu Kru or Gubat; the armypreparing to ~tart for the Nile, arranging the transport ofthewound~. Note the wOUDd~ <:arri~ in litten or sitting On<:amels at left while war <:orrespondent Bennet Burleigh(<:entre) watches the wound~being I",nd~.G",n",ral St",wart,mortally wound~ during Ib", battl",. lj"'li under a Sun sbad",on tb", righl. (National Army Mus",um)

and Ihe greal crowd of women, children, elc. ofour being able to cut our way through the Arabs.',\Ie have not steamers for all, and it is only fromthe steamers we can meet the rebels.'

The Press cominued to pressure the Govern­ment, the Pall Mall Gazette declaring that theGovernment was prepared to 'let Gordon bespeared with the garrisons he was sent to save!'The dissension wilhin lhe Government - lhebitler controversy th<l't raged between Gladstoneand Lord Haningdon - decided the issue. Walll­ing to avoid any risk of the Government fallingthrough Hartingdon's threatened resignation,Gladstone moved a motion in the House on 5August 1884, proposing that 'a sum not exceeding£300,000 to be granted to Her Majesty. . toundertake operations for the relief of GeneralCordon should they become necessary, and tomake certain preparations in respect thereof.'

Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in Egypt on 9September to take command of lhe ExpedilionaryForce, the same day that Colonel Stewart andFrank Power left Khartoum on a steamer with

26

Gordon's cypher key and detailed reports of thesituation. They were murdered by Arabs somedays later, after landing when the steamergrounded. Preparations were put in hand to leaveEgypt, but lack of a suitable number of camelsand the necessary saddles prevented any forwardmovement until 5 October. Even so, Wolseley'spreparations were quick and thorough. The mainforce assembled at Wadi Haifa, just before lhesecond calaract of the Nile, where lhe whale boalswhich Wolscley had ordered began to arrive.There was a certain amount of confusion sortingout the stores for each, and also in the camp itself.Colonel Sir William Butler later described thescene: 'Horses, camels, steam-engines, heads ofdepartments, piles of food and forage, newspapercorrespondents, sick men, Arabs and generals,seemed to be all thrown together as though thegoods station of a London terminus, a couple ofbattalions of infantry, the War Office, and a con­siderable portion of Woolwich Arsenal had allbeen thoroughly shaken together, and then caSIforth upon the desen.' Wolseley had beenprompted to use whalers after his success withthem during the Red River Campaign in Canadain 1870, and he even went so far as to hireCanadian boatmen. The Press was not impressedwith the boats, and described them as 'that un-

•

71

J j .... ,

<\-. '. ,~

I"'~. .• , , .• ,

/, .

-.d ._,. " '~..L.

.. • ..... ,--.J..J... ,~ ...~ _ '::ok. -t"".. _

floatable flotilla for the :"lile.' Their usc alsoplayed havoc with the men's uniforms, and therowing blistered many a hand. A correspondentwrote about the soldiers thai 'Their clothessuffered very severely in places, and for want ofbetter material, the men used 10 sew pieces artin,commandeered from old commissariat boxes totheir nether garments, which they very face­tiously said acted as a kind ofsliding board.'

The route that lay before the force was morcthan difficult, since much of the Nile was badlycharted or completely uncharted. South of WadiHaifa, at Dongola, General Slewart was posi­tioned with mounted infantry and a single linebatlalion. Beyond Dongola lay Dervish-infestedcountry, morc cataracts, and Berber, before lheforce came anywhere near being within strikingdistance of Khartoum. Progress was slow and byDecember Wolseley had only reached the thirdcataract; time was running out for Gordon. Ifspeed was needed in reaching Khartoum, the onlyway lay across the desert. At Debbah the l'\ileswings sharply east to Abu Hamed, then southagain to Atbara before turning south.west toKhartoum. This stretch ofthe Nile included threecataracts and would take considerable time tocover, whereas from Koni to Khartoum over thedesert was only 200 miles. By the beginning of

Sud....88S- After the fall ofKhartCKOm (aG J...uary), 'Gntoer.:JBuDer's column returaDsS from Mdem.m.aJo to Korn. GordODPa.ha'. nldiers from tile SleaD>ers carryins our woundedlltrouSh a wadi OD tile road to Abu KIea.' (National ArmyMUHum)

January 1885 the desert column had been formed,consisting of 1,800 men including the GuardsCamel Regiment, artillery, cavalry, a battalion ofthe line and one of rifles, marines and Blue·jackets. The advanced elements moved out on 30December and were followed at the beginning ofJanuary by the main body.

On 17 January the column was attacked nearthe wells of Abu Klea by 10,000 Dervishes. Theadvancing square was experiencing difficulties inkeeping its dressing, a not unusual occurrencewilh this type offormation but made worse on thisoccasion by the centre being filled with camelseither carrying ammunition or allocated for useby lhe wounded. The camels that the soldiers hadbeen cursing ever since their first meeting wouldon this occasion help to save the situation. Ad­vancing al a sluggish pace under enemy fire, thesquare halted to redress the rear when ' ... theenemy suddenly started up from behind flags, ad­vanced at a quick run, in a serrated line, headedby horsemen, and charged down with the utmostfury towards Ihe lefl front corner of lhe square.'At a range of eighlY yards the withering fire of

27

Sudan 188~ The battle o(Tofrek, 22 March. A force led by thelSI 8n., the Berl••hire R"!;menl was sent from Su.kin toeatabli'han advaneed depollowards Tarnai. Tbec:ohunn w••blced eonstructing .. xareb. whe.. the Dervishes aU.dud.The I"ft ....If of the battalion was having dinner while therisht half was cuttins brushwood. &cause of the glare, thecavalry patrols had failed to spot the enemy IlDtiltbey were100 dose. The eaauiDlIl aCbOD, which lasted fiflefll miDuIUI_was fierce as the mus'ratioa by Charles E. Fripp shows.EVftltually the _emy w--e beal.... aff"lfllviaS2,- doead.. 0..I October ISS? the ~mftltwas rewarded for ita coaduct atTofrdo by be~ awarded the titl" 'Royal'. (N.tio....J AnnyMuseulDJ

the Guards and mOUnied infantry look its deadlytoll, but as the enemy hailed they look ground totheir right with (he intention ofattacking the rearleft corner of lhe squ';rc, where cursing mountedinfantrymen were trying to pull the camels insideand close the gap, The retiring skirmishers hinder­ed any firing for the moment and once they weresafely inside the square, the enemy was danger­ously close. Sir Charles Bersford rushed hisGatling gun to the gaping corner, while 'Battling'Colonel Burnaby of the Royal Horse Guards, whowas killed during the battle, wheeled round acompany of Heavy Camel Corps and aggravatedthe situation. The right was now losing contactrapidly with the left, violating the most elementaryrules of square formation fighting, The Dervishespoured through the gap, as Callings' jammed,

28

cartridges stuck in breeches, and bayonet andsword bent.

Had the square been hollow the outcome mighlwell have been different, but with the bunchedbaggage animals inside the cnemy had to fighl forevcry inch. Hand-la-hand fighting ensued as lherear ranks of lhe fronl face, endeavouring to savethe situation, fired into the crush offriend, foe andanimals. At last the Dervishes were drivcn offandas onc correspondcnt wrole " , , not one of theArabs thaI got inside left the square alivc.'Lieutenant Douglas Dawson wrote after thebattle, 'I think that all present would never carc(0 sce a nearer shave, .. and it is, in my opinion,due to Ihe fact that the IwO sides not immediatclyanacked stood their ground that the enemy re­tired discomfited. Had the Guards moved, none ofus would have lived to tell the tale.'

On the 19th lhe column, now only a few milesfrom the :\Iile, was once more attacked by theDervishes at Abu Kru, the whole affair lastingonly a few minutes as the enemy was beaten offand the way was opened to the i\ile; Stewart hadbeen mortally wounded during the action, andthe command now devolved on Colonel CharlesWilson, a staff officcr with little experience ofcommanding troops in action.

2 July ,889·

3 August 188g.

22 March 1885.

Dervishes defeated atHasheen.

Dcrvishes defeated atTofrek.

go December 1885. Dcrvishes defeated atGinnis.

20 December 1888. Dervishes defeatcd ncarSuakin.

Dervishes defeated atArguin.

Dervishes dcfeated atToski.

Ig february 18gl. Dervishes defeated atTokar.

The battle of Ginnis was significant in that itwas the last engagement fought by British troopsin their scarlet tunics. The campaign conducted

SudaD 11Ig6. The Sirdar, Lord Kilchnoer, «iviD~orders I" hi5ADC... Non the l)'I'io;:a] dress _d eqDipmnol olofficlN"'S ollb"Aal:l_f«yptiaD army. (WiJk.i.Dsoo_Lalluorn)

defeated the Mahdi's troops on lO february.Earle himself was killed during the engagement.With all British troops safely back in Egypt, theonly stronghold held in the Sudan was Suakin.

Although thc Mahdi died in June 1885 thefight was continued by his successor, the Khalifa.Between 1885 and 1896, when the reconquest ofthe Sudan was undenaken, the following actionswere fought:

20 March 1885.

While Wolseley with his two forces - the desertand river columns - continued planning to crushthe Mahdi, Gladstone's Government decreedotherwise. The troops were ordered back to

Egypt; and they seem to have presented a motleysight. Count Gleichen, a lieutenant in the GuardsCamel Regiment, recorded that on the returnmarch a long-promised supply of boots was en­countered bUI they lumed out to be ofsuch smallsizes thal the men could not get into them. 'Theywere as hard as bricks, there was no grease tosoften them, and the only way of using them wasto slit them opcn at the end, and shove your toesthrough. As for the officers, no twO had the samefooL-covering: field boolS, lawn-tennis shoes,garters, puttees, and boots in all stages of decayand attempted repair were worn.'

While the caplure of Khartoum by the Mahdiseemed to be the end of lhe campaign, Britishforces still continued to brush with the Dervishesin the Sudan. The last battle fought by Wolseley'sexpeditionary force was that of Kerbekan, wherethe river column under General William Earle

On the 2 lsi four of Gordon's steamers reachedWilson with news that the garrison, though in asorry state, was still holding out. Wilson, however,waited for three days, as he felt his men neededrest and that defensive works should be built toprotect those who were nOt 10 be embarked on thes\eamers for Khartoum. 'At any rate,' he latersaid in his defence, 'there was nothing to show ...that a delay of a couple of days would make anydifference.' Two steamers left on the 24th andarrived before Khartoum on the 28th, just those'couple ofdays' too late. The ~1ahdi's hordes hadattacked and taken Ihe town on the 25th, afterg'7 days of siege, and had murdcred GeneralCharles Gordon. On 5 february a telegram wasreceived in London stating, 'Khartoum taken bythe Mahdi. General Gordon's fate uncertain.' Itwas received with a profound sense of shock anddespair, and the Queen voiced the opinion of hersubjects when she wrote in her diary, 'TheGovernment alone is to blame.'

29

around Suakin in 1885 was also notable for thefirst use of Colonial troops outside their owncoumry. An Australian force arrived on 29 March1885 wearing '. the familiar red serge coat,albeit rather strange out here, but they very soonchanged into Kharkee like the rest of us.' Indiantroops had been engaged during the Arabi revoltand they also took part in the 1885 Suakincampaign.

'rile 'R.t;co1Zquest oji/leeJt/dOlt 1896-1898

All the previous expeditions since Khartoum hadachieved, according to Bennel Burleigh, was to' ... scotch the snake whose slimy trail lies all overthe Soudan, marked by the desolation of ruinedvillages and fields, and the whitened bones ofcounlless human beings. . From the beginning,Mahdism, as a social movement, has only shownpotency for deslruction and mischief Still,there was, in lhe zenith of its power, always therisk that, with successful Dervish raids made northof Wady HaIfa, the infection of fanaticism mightspread to the confines of Lower Egypt, if not toCairo itself.'

The situation in Egypt and the Sudan in 1896was complicated. The Sudan, technically part ofthe Turkish Empire, had ceased to be ruled byEgypt in 1885 and for over len years had been leftuntouched except for the affairs around Suakin.Britain could not help but scc the intentions ofother European powers such as France, Italy andGermany with regard to the Sudan. In 1884 shehad declared a Protectorate over Somaliland andthe Italians and French had swiftly followed suil.In [896, however, the Italians, intent on furtherexpansion, had been disastrously thrashed by theAbyssinians at Adowa, and their outpost in theSudan, Kassala (held with British concurrence)was pressured by the Dervishes. The Italiansasked lhe British Government to relieve thispressure by a diversionary move elsewhere, where­upon to Ihe surprise of Egypt - who was to financeit - Britain ordered an expedition to reconquerDongola.

30

Sudan _896. Private in campaigning kit. Note the white SladeWallace equipment and the while helmet. A khaki cover wasusually worn, and this can be seen on the top step to the leftof the soldier. (Wilkinson-Latham/Navy ","d A,.my III..s_t,.",t"tlj

The Sirdar of the Egyptian Army was HerbertKilchener, a Royal Engineer officer like Gordon.With little money at his disposal, and with pain­fully few men (only 18,000) Kitchener plannedhis move south. His most importam ally was to belhe railway system which would be built over thedesert, doing away with the prime importance offollowing lhe Nile and employing boats asWolseley had done. This masterpiece of engineer­ing, the Sudan Military Railway, was constructedby a French-Canadian Royal Engineer officer,Eduard Girouard. It enabled troops and supplies10 be moved quickly and efficiently without totalreliance on camels. Railway battalions were con­scripted and, considering all the natural hazards,made remarkable progress in putting down thetracks.

Thc invading forces moved south from WadiHaifa and at the beginning ofJune headquarlerswas established at Akasha. The advance con-

31 Dec. 1897

26 Feb. 18gB

3 March 18gB15 March 18gB16 March 18gB20 March IB9821 March 18gB27 March IB98

30 March IB98

remaining Dervishes around lhe seaboard of theRed Sea. The most importanl factors of lhe lwoyears of campaign had been the high state ofefficiency of the Egyptian army, especially theSudanese battalions, and the indispensable Sudan­ese Military Railway. Both of these were to givegood accounts ofthemsclves in the final thrust onOmdurman.

Preparations for the final smashing of theDervishes and the re-occupation of Khartoumand the Sudan commenced in December 1897.The chief events leading up to the battle ofAtbara and finally Omdurman were:

Sirdar asks for reinforcements ofBritish troops. . . •

British brigade starts for frontfrom Abu Dis

British brigade reaches Dibdka,beyond Berber

Sirdar leaves BerberConcentration al KenurArmy moves up the AtbaraFirst contact with Dervish cavalryShendi raided and destroyedCeneral Hunter reconnoitres

Mahmud's zaribaSecond re<:onnaissance: cavalry

action before Mahmud's zariba 4 April 18gB

On 8 April 18gB the Anglo-Egyptian army wasface to face with a large Dervish force underMahmud, one of the Khalifa's most able generals.Kilchener had been undecided about whether toassault Mahmud's zariba hut at last ordered anight march and dawn attack. The squaresmoved forward, stopped to rest and readjust andthen moved on again, until 4 a.m. when a hall

Sudaa 18g8. o-vi.betl ill foill paaoply mo....lNl OD c;a.u..,1s....d al"llled wilb lbeir ioar;-blachd double ed«ed .word. alldbroad-beaded .pe Note lbe various palches _ OD lbe'jibbab'. (Wil.ki.a Laliulin/N.vy _ ..d. A ......)' IU..drtlatetl)

S..daa .8gB.. Afler t.he Nlde or Alba.... Moumecl, wbo WS5Ulken pri5ODer. pinllred belWffft soldien or ODe of dH:SlIdaaese Ntu1iOD•. PbotOC"'ph .ulOS...phed ror BeaaelBarleir;b ....d ~roduced ill his .CCOWIl1 of t.he campaipSird..r -J KJo.'if. (1891). (Wilki.a.soa.Latbmj

tinued towards Firket. where on 7 June theDervishes under Emir Osman Azaq were engagedand beaten. The railway sadly lagged behind andby the beginning of August had not got fartherthan six miles beyond Firket, when Roods andcholera slowed the army. Parts of the railwaywere carried away, but Kitchener put the men towork day and night to re·establish his vital life­line. By September the force had reached Kerma,pushed on to Merowe on the 26th and enteredDongola on 5 October, where after a brief en­counter with the Dervishes the army found thetown abandoned. The campaign had undoubtedlybeen a succ<:ss·and the combined use ofthe railwayand suitably constructed shallow draft steamers,made in transportable sections, had proved theirworth. Meanwhile in Suakin little progress hadbeen achieved, and the reinforced garrison stag­nated and suffered without contributing verymuch.

In 1897 the advance was pushed further up theNile. On 7 July 1897 Major Ceneral A. Hunterand his force, having set out from Kassinger, cap­tured Abu Hamed, and Berher was secured whenlhe Dervishes abandoned it. At the end of theyear the Italians handed Kassala back [Q theEgyptians (much to the chagrin of the French,whose ambitions in Africa had already caused acertain Major Marchand to commence his marchfrom the west coast with the intention of raisingthe tricolour at Fashoda). Altogether 1897 hadbeen a year of consolidation, of slow advance, ofefficient preparation and of 'mopping up' the

31

•

Sud... '698. A ~coutinS patrol of the Esyptiao Cam,,-l Corps.Note the k1laIti UJliforDlS, blue pUllees, broWft le.the..b....dolierll a.ad Martini.Henry rifles with 10DS blad~ socketbayonel. (WilkU.SOD.Latbam/Narry ...11 Army 1I1...,,..',,J)

was called and the soldiers lay down and slept ifthey could. The enemy's position was a circularzariba behind which was the dry bed of the riverAlbara. Inside the zariba facing the Anglo­Egyptian force was a stockade and trenches, withthe centre composed of rifle pits and morctrenches. II was this centre which proved the mostdifficult to clear and capture.

As the dawn rose, the men rose 100 and the fourbrigades advanced towards the enemy zariba. AsG. W, ,Slccvcns recorded in his book WithKitchener 10 Kharloum:#'Thc word came, and themen sprang up. The squares shifted into thefighting formations: at one impulse, in one superbsweep, near 12,000 men moved forward towardsthe enemy. All England and all Egypt, and theflower of the black lands beyond, Birminghamand the Wcst Highlands, the half.regeneratedchildren of the earth's earliest civilisation, andgrinning savages from the uttermost swamps ofEquatoria, muscle and machinery, lord andlarrikin, Balliol and the Board school, the Sirdar'sbrain and the camel's back - all welded into one,the awful war machine went forward into ac·tjon The line went on over the erunchjng

32

gravel in awful silence, or speaking briefly inhalf-voiccs- went on till it was nOt halfa mile fromthe flags. Then it halted. Thud 1 went the firstgun, and phult! came faintly back, as its shellburst on the zariba into a wreathed round cloud ofjust the zariba's smoky grey.'

After an hour and twenty minutes of intensivebombardment the guns fell silent, much to therelief of the soldiers' ears, and the word to ad·vance was given. The Cameron Highlanders werefirst to the zariba and, tearing aside the low loosehedge ofcamellhorn, were over lhe stockade andinto the trenches. The interior of the zariba, filledwith mimosa thorn and grass, was honeycombedwith rifle pits and holes. The troops surged for­ward killing every Dervish in lheir palh. G. W.Stccvens witnessed the scene: 'Bullet and bayonetand bUll, the whirlwind of Highlanders sweptover. And by this time the Lincolns were in on theright, and the Maxims, galloping righl up to thestockade, had withered the left, and the Warwicks,the enemy's cavalry definitely gone, were volley­ing off the blacks as your beard comes orr under akeen razor. Farther and farther they cleared theground - cleared it ofeverything like a living man,for it was left carpeted thick enough with dead.Here was a trench; bayonet that man. Here alittle straw tukl; warily round to the door, andthen a "·olley. Now in column through this opening

in the bushes; then into line, and drop those fewdesperately firing shadows among the dry stemsbeyond. For the running blacks poor heroes ­still fired, though eyery second they fired less andran more. And on, on the British stumbled andslew, till suddenly there was unbroken blue oyer·head, and a clear drop underfoot. The ri\'er! Andacross the trickle of water the quarter-mile ofdrysand·bcd was a fly·paper with scrambling spots ofblack. The pursuers thronged the bank in doubleline, and in two minutcs the paper was still black­spotted, only the spots scrambled no more. "Nowthat," panted the most pessimistic senior captainin the brigade - "now I call that a very goodftgIH." 'The entire action after the bombardmenthad lasted fony minutes and had cost the Anglo­Egyptian force 81 killed and 493 wounded.

S"dan T8g8. The Gut ~ll!lht of the d..rvl.h horde at Omd"....man. British and (e"lreme right) Egyptian army officerswatching the enemy movements. (National Army Muse"m)

.............................

.'

l'ttOlol •••.••••••••••...•••••.•••.••.•.••••••••••••••••••

,898,8g8,8g8

18 April 18gB

11 April 1898

29 August 18g8

28 August 1898

30 August 1898

31 August 1898

(early) July 1&98

:l 17 August13 August18 August

Sirdar's triumphal entry intoBerber

Railhead reachcs Abeidieh:construclion of newgunboau begun

Railhead reachesFort Albarn (middle) June 1&98

Lewis's Brigadc leavcs Atbamfor south

Second British brigadearrivcs at Atbara

Sirdar leavcs Atbarn for frontLast troops lcavc AtbaraFin,,! concentration at Gebel

RoyanMarch from Gebel Royall to

Wady Abid (eight miles)March from Wady Abid to

Sayal (tell miles)March from Sayal to Wady

Suetne (eight miles)Kerrcri reconnoitred and

shcik-d 31 August 18g8~'Iarch from Wady Suetne to

Agaiga (six milcs)Omdurll1an reconnoitred and

forts silenced I September 18gB

As dawn rose on '2 September, the Sirdar andhis Angla.Egyptian force of about 25,000 menwere assembled in a horseshoe formation, witheach flank touching the :\'ile where suitable pra.

The calendar of events after the battle was asfollows:c~ rb:-,- ;,.!....To \- ll\ ~ ..?J. .!'fa : .

AT ..

. r 'A cLtlA.SfOYj.TQll.~ ••••••J ..Y.'".frr'; •• .. •

Sudan 18q8. The order that resulted u.. I--he raonou. cluo.""!e ofI--he 2.U I.a..een al Oond"nnaJIl. RankinS u.. ,peaade wil--hthe chars" of I--he Lip;ht Bripde u.. the Crimea, this cluo.'ll"was eonsidered by on...y as 'u..disp<uable foUy'. (WaDi., ...dWalli./R. Buller)

AT .

Bou.;.f...J.O..... DAT...f.. ' 1. 18.1!

l · ...:.;....:...,.. .L......._....._...._....._...._....._...._....."-.....~....._... ,.___-"):ft .. I t''''

......~--

33

Suda.rl 1llq8. The cba""!1t of the "lUI Laaccu al OrndUrn>aD. Acolourfuf im.pl'ft'.i_ of the actioD by the military .rtistR. C.loa Woodvill". (Parker Gallery)

tcction was given by shallow draft gun boats. Theposition was only seven miles from Omdurman.lnfront of the army lay a dry open plain dotted withgrass, devoid of cover except for several dried-upwater courses and a few folds in the terrain. Atdawn the cavalry, both British and Egyptian, hadgone out but at about 6.30 a.m. they came in.'The noise of something began to creep in uponus' wrote StCCVCIlS, 'it cleared and divided intothe tap of drums and the rar·away surfof raucouswar cries ... They were coming on.' On the rightwas seen the black banner of the Khalifa's brotherand on the left the blue and white banners of hisSOil. 'They came very rast, and they came verystraight' continued Slcevcns, 'and then presentlythey came no farther. 'vVith a crash the bulletsleaped out of the Brilish rifles ... section volleysat 2,000 yards.... The British stood. up in adouble rank behind their zariba; the blacks laydown in their shelter-trench; both poured ourdeath as fast as they could load and press trigger.'The Dervishes did not stand a chance but evokedthe admiration of those who witnessed the fight.'And the enemy? ~o white troops would havefaced that torrent ofdeath for fi\'e minutcs, but the

34

Baggara and the blacks came on. The torrentswept into them and hurled them down in wholecompanies. You saw a rigid line gather itself upand rush on evenly; then before a shrapnel shellor a Maxim the line suddenly quivcred andstopped. The line was yet unbroken, but it wasquite still. Bur other lines galhcred up again,again, and yet again; they went down, and yetothers rushed on. Sometimes they came ncar tosee singlc figures quite plainly ... Itwas thc lastday of Mahdism, and the greatest. They couldnever get ncar, and they refused to hold back. Bynow the ground before us was all white with deadmcn's drapery. Rifles grew red-hot; the soldiersseized thcill by the slings and dragged them backlO thc reserve lO change for cool ones. It was not abattle, but an execution.'

Kitchener, seeing the effect of this murderousfire which, as Bennet Burleigh wrote, 'was reapinga gigantic harvcst', knew that if the Dervisheswere able to get amongst his lincs his weaponsuperiority would be useless. He quickly and sur­prisingly ordered a counter-attack which, largelydue to the Sudanese troops, sealed the Khalifa'sfatc. The brigades advanced in perfect order and

the troops were able to see ' ... what awfulslaughter we had done. The bodies wcrc not inheaps - bodies hardly ever are; but thcy wcrespread evenly over acres and acres.' The enemywere not all dead, some feigning death or slightlywounded. Steevens recorded that, 'Some lay verycomposed with their slippers placed under theirheads for a last pillow; some knelt, cut shon in themiddle of a last prayer. Others were torn topieces, vermilion blood already drying on brownskin, killed instantly beyond doubl. Others again,seemingly as dead as these, sprang up as we ap­proached and rushed savagely, hurling spears atthe nearest enemy. They were bayoneted or shot.'

AtB.30 a.m. the Sirdar had instructed ColonelMartin of the 21st Lancers (a regiment given theunofficial motto 'Thou shalt not kill' by the rest ofthe army, because they possessed no battle hon·ours) to annoy the Dervishes on 'their flank and tohead them off from Omdurman. The regimentmoved off towards Omdurman and shortly after­wards came across some 300 Dervishes. To cutthem off, it was thought better to go a little west,wheel and gallop down on thcm. 'The trumpctssang out the order' wrOte Steevens, 'the troopsglided into squadrons, and, four squadrons inline, the 21st Lancers swung into their first charge.Knee to knee they swept on till they were but200 yards from the enemy_ Then suddenly - thenin a Aash - they saw the trap. Between them andthe 300 there yawned suddenly a deep ravine;out of the ravine there sprang instantly a cloud ofdark heads and a brandished lightning of swords,and a thunder ofsavage voices ... '

'Three thousand, if there was one, to a shonfour hundred; but it was too late to check now.Must go through with it now! The blunders ofBritish cavalry are the fertile seed of Britishglory: knee to knee the Lancers whirled on. Onehundred yards - fifty - knee to knee - Slap! "Itwas just like that," said a captain, bringing hisfish hard into his open palm. Through the swords­men they shore without checking- and then camethe khor. The colonel at their head, riding straightthrough everything without sword or revolverdrawn, found his horse on its head, and the swordsswooping about his own. He got the charger upagain, and rode on straight, unarmed, througheverything. The squadrons followed him dowll

the fall. Horses plunged, blundered, recovered,fell; Dervishes lay on the ground for the ham­stringing cut; officers pistolled them in passingover, as one drops a stone into a bucket; troopersthrust till lances broke, then cut; e\'erybody wenton straight, through everything.'

Having passed through the enemy, the lancersdismounted and fired at the Dervishes with theircarbines, driving them back towards tile artillery.'The shrapnel flew shrieking over them,' wroteStcevens, 'the 3000 fell all ways and died.' Afirst-hand account of the charge was graphicallywritten for the readers of the Morning Post by theircorrespondent, Winston S. Churchill, 4th Hussars,attached to the 21St L.:'l.ncqs.

Although the charge was costly, and almost ­as the headlines stated - 'A Second Balaclavacharge', the Dervishes were cut off from Omdur.man and at 11.30 a.m. the baule was vinuallyover. By midday victory was complete, and at thebcginning of the afternoon Omdurman was in thchands of the Sirdar's troops. The final Dervishresistance was crushed and the field occupied asthe advancing battalions cleared the city and thearea around it. 'The last Dervish stood up andfilled his chest; he shouted the name of his Godand hurled his spear. Then he stood quitc still,waiting. It took him full; he quivered, gave at theknees, and toppled with his head on his arms andhis face towards the legions of his conquerors.'

'Sir Herben Kitchener's Brilliant Victory'screamed the newspaper headlines, but while theDervishes had been 'killed out as hardly an armyhad been killed out in the history of war,' manythought it not all due to the Sirdar's brilliance.The battle was, as Steevcns wrote, ' ... a miracleofsuccess. For that thanks arc due to the Khalifa,whose generalship throughout was a masterpieceof imbecility ... tile Sirdar would have won inany case; that he won socrushingly and so cheaplywas the gift of luck and the Khalifa.' The chargeof the Lancers, the heroic episode in which threeVictoria Crosses were won, also came in for itsshare of rebuke; 'For cavalry to charge unbrokeninfantry, of unknown strength, over unknownground ... was as grave a tactical crime ascavalry could possibly commit.' The regimenthad, however, earned its first ballie honour,'Khanoum'.

35

J

Sudan .¥. Private T. Byrne, lIut Lancers. One ofth" threememJH,u o(th" ~m~llopin the Victoria Croll! for hisheroic: actioa dllriax: the c:ba,"«". Pie:tu..m ira Cairo after theQmpaip, he wears the ....ifo...... WO.... 00 thai day. Note til,",wide .... shade to the heLrnd, furled la.Dce peftRon, pickel ...d'pllr" boots oa the hol.te.... (WllJo..U>5Oft-LathamIN_rry ••dArmy 1I1...tr.tetl)

The casualties of the enemy were enormous:9,700 dead and an estimated 10,000 wounded,and 4000 taken prisoner. The first estimation ofthe Anglo-Egyptian casualties, Ilot includingthose who died later of wounds, was 13 I Britishand 256 native killed "and wounded.

Before the battlc Kitchcncr had receivedscaled secret orders from London not to be openeduntil Khanoum was captured. These concernedthe French Major Marchand who was now in­stalled under the tricolour at Fashoda. Kitchener,acting on his ordcrs to proceed upstrcam and dis­lodge any French force he found, staned out on9 September after having conducted a funcralservice for Gordon and ordered the Mahdi's tombto be dcstroyed. On 24 September, having con­fronted the French, who stood down and retiredfrom the Sudan, Kitchener made a triumphalreturn to Khanoull1.

36

Thc fight in tbe Sudan was almost over, butnot quitc. Various Dervishes still had to be sub­dued and this was achieved on 22 Septcmber atGedaref in the Eastern Sudan, against AhmedFedil. The following year Ahmed Fedil, havingescaped and rejoin~1 the Khalifa, who was still atlarge. was killed together with his master on 2'1Kovcmber 1899. Osman Digoa was captured inJanuary [goo and lived until 1926. The re­conquest of the Sudan was complete and Gordonrevenged.

Bctween 19°0 and Ig08 the Sudan still con­tinued to occupy the Egyptian army and varioussmall insurrections had to be deah with, cit her bypolice action or punitivc expeditions.

'Thc poor Sudan! The wretched dry Sudan!'wrote Stcevens at the end of the 18gB campaign,'Count up all thc gains you will, yCt what ahideous irony it rcmains, this fight of half agencration for such an cmptiness.'

In 1956 Britain finally withdrew from Egyptand the 'emptiness' that had been namcd theAnglo-Egyptian Sudan.

TIle Plates

A I Private, Black Walch, Eg;pt 1882There was very little difference between the dressof the British soldier in England or in Egypt atthis period except for the exchange of full dressbead-dress for a white sun hclmet with brass chinchain. In the Black Watch, thc treasured redhackle was worn in the puggaree on the left side.Thc 'frock' of scarlet cloth had a blue collar withregimental badge and the letters 'R.H.' (RoyalHighlanders) on the shoulder straps; it wasrounded at the front 10 dear thesporran, with twolower pockets with three buttons and whileworsted loops. The equipment was the 'Valise'pattern and worn with haversack and waterbottleall campaign.

A2 Private, Ro]al Marine Light Infantry, 1882The Royal Marine Light Infantry uniform wornin Egypt in [88'1 consisted of the customary white

helmet and a blue 'frock' with brass buttons. Theblue collar was decorated with a bugle-horn badgein scarlet worsted and the shoulders were decor­ated with scarlet worsted cords. The trouserswere blue with a scarlet wclt on thc outside of theleg and worn tucked into black leather gaiters.The equipment was the 'Valise' pattern worn withblack leather pouches, which had been replacedby white in most regimenu by this datc. At Tel-el­Kebir The Times war correspondcnt remembcredsceing thc ' ... cndless line of thc dreaded red­coats, brokcn by thc cvcn more fearful blue of thcMarines.'

A3 Corporal of Horse, Life Guards, EgYPI 1882Thc whitc helmct was worn with an unlinedscarlct serge 'frock' with fivc brass buttons. TheCorporal of Horse depicted wcars a whitc waist­belt with sword slings to suspend the specialHousehold Cavalry pattern sword on thc left sidc.Thc waist belt also supported a brown leatherholster on the left hip with a pouch on the rightside. Troopers wore the same dress but withoutthe rcvolver, the pouch carrying carbine am­munition. Breeches were in blue and had a double

Sudan .8g8. Cap..... P. A. Ke,".", 2.SI LaDU.... ODe ofthr_membe... of the rTmeDI 10 S the Victoria Cross for hispari ... the charse at Omdurm. NOle the offia:r cu-ryin.S.I.aDce and weariaS. differCIII pattern ofhelm.el from thai ofthe other ...aks. The persoa.aJ ...d "o...e equipment CSJI

clearly be aeCII. (WiUo.itlacm-LathamIN."'Jl' .... A ......" Ill....t,..t~d)

scarlet stripe with plpmg between on the outerscam of each leg. Haversack and watcr boulewcre carried on straps crossing lhe chest.

8/ Officer, Coldstream Guards, Egypt 1882The officer of thc ColdSlream Guards depicted iswearing the dress as worn on arrival in Egypt. Onthe way out helmcts had been stained brown, butthe rcgimental badge was still fitted to thepuggaree at thc front. Thc Scots Guards also worethcir badge, but thc Crenadiers dispensed withtheirs. The scarlet 'frock' had the buttons ar­ranged in pairs, with two pockets below the waistand two patch pockets on the breast. Rankingwas shown on the scarlct s~oulder straps and theregiment was dislinguished by the badge on theblue collar. Officcrs worc drab brceches andbrown riding boots, or blue trousers lucked intogaiters like those of lhc men. The equipmentwas the 'Sam Brownc' belt with rcvolver holster,pouch, sword frog and braces.

82 Privatt, Scots Guards, Egypt /882Thc private shown wears essentially the sameuniform as used by the line infantry involved inthe campaign. This consisted of thc white helmet,sometimes dyed brown as in this case (ScotsGuards also wore their badge); scarlet 'frock'with blue collar (Royal rcgiments had bluecollars, English regiments white, Scottish regi­ments yellow, and Irish regiments green) andbrass buttons. The trouscrs were dark blue withscarlct wclt, tucked into black gaiters. The cquip­ment consisting ofwaist belt, braces, pouches, andvalise, was of the 'Valise' pattern. An oW·whitchaversack and a watcrbottle werc also carried.

83 Private, General Post Office Rifles, Egypt /882The 24th Middlesex Rifle Voluntcers, composedmainly of workers from the Post Office, furnishedSir Carnet Wolseley's Egyptian expedition with aTelegraphic Detachmcnt. Thcy worc their usualtunic, bluc with grecn collar and cuffs, and darktrousers tucked into black gaiters. The 'Valise'equipment was in black leather as was usual withRifles both regular and volunteer, and the Homepattern helmet was rcplaced by a white one. Thecampaign won for the rcgimcnt the first Volunteeroverseas batt.le honour, 'Egypt 1881'.

37

Sudan dIgS. The end of Mahdism.' Ihe dead Yakub and hisfollowers b.",ide the Khalifa'. black aag. DrawUlg by warartist H. C. Seppings Wright. (National ArlDY MuseulD/Iflustrated London News)

CI Fellah, Egyptian Amljl, Sudan 1883The Egyptian Army formed after the smashing ofthc Arabi rcvolt were dressed in the same fashionas the old army. Originally the new army wasformed of 6,000 men with twenty-five Britishofficers. The uniform consisted of the tarbush, awhite tunic and loose trousers tucked into whitegaiters. The equipment, comprising waistbell,ammunition pouch and bayonet frog, was inblack leather. A large pack was worn on the backwith blankets and rolled greatcoat. The rifle wasat first the American Remington rolling-blockpattern with brass-hilted sword bayonet.

C2 Private, Camel Regiment, Sudan 1884-85The Camel Regiment in thc rclief force sent [0rescue General Gordon from Khartoum consistedof detachments from the Guards, HouseholdCavalry, regular cavalry and Royal Marines,their [ask being [0 act as mounted infantry. Theuniform was the white helmet with brass chinchain, blue goggles against glare from the sun and

38

a green net against £lies. The 'frock' was grey withtwo patch pockets and five brass butlons down thefront. Drab Bedford Cord breeches were wornwith dark blue puttees and brown boots. Theequipment consisted of the waist belt and pouch ofthe 'Valise' equipment, a brown leather bando­lier, haversack and 'Oliver' pattern waterbottle.The Martini-Henry riAe was carried with the long'yatagan'-bladed sword bayonet.

C] Rating, NavaL Brigade, Sudan /884-85There were a number of'Bluejackets' landed fromships with thc Khartoum relief force, mainly em­ployed in manning the Gatling guns. The uniformwas the standard blue blouse and bell-boltomtrousers tucked into black gaiters, and the headdress was the sennet hat in straw with the name ofthe ship on a blue 'tally' band. On occasion lhesmall round hal with white cover was also worn.Equipment consisted of brown leather belt,pouches, and braces, haversack and waterbottle.A grey blanket was carried, rolled and worn overthe left shoulder, with the ends tied together on theright hip. Ratings carried the cutlass bayonet forthe Martini-Henry riAe.

VI War Correspondent, Sudan 1884-85The figure represents the typical dress worn by thewar correspondents, although individual tasteswcre often apparent. 5t. Leger Herbert of theMorning Post, killed at Abu Kru in 1885, wore ared tunic; others wore grey or drab. The figure(representing Bennet Burleigh of the Dairy Tele­graph) wears a blue serge jacket, dyed helmet,brown leather waist belt with revolver holstcr andpouch, a binocular case slung over the shoulderand usually a brown leather note case with padand pencils. Breeches were drab and worn witheither boots or puttees.

D2 FeUah, 10th Sudanese BaltaLion, Sudan 1897The standard uniform of the Egyptian army hadaltered from the previous pattern shown and wasnow the tarbush, a brown jersey, sand colouredtrousers and dark blue puttees. The equipmentwas in brown leather and consisted ofbelt, pouchesand braces and an additional bandolier for am­munition. Haversack and waterbottlc were car­ried, and a blanket when needed. Egyptian troops

worc a ncckflap to thcir khaki tarbush covcr, butthe Sudanesc baualions dispenscd with this. Eachbaualion bore its number on a coloured clothpatch on the right side.

D3 Prien/t, Grn/adier Guards, Sudan 18gBThc infantry of the line and the Guards werebarely distinguishable in the khaki drill foreignservice dress they wore in the Sudan, except for theflash on the helmct and the shoulder strap badgcs.Thc helmct had a khaki cover and ncck flap anda brown leather chin strap. In thc case of theGrenadier Guards, both officers and men wore agrenade-type design in black cloth. Line regi­ments identified their helmets with pieces of theshoulder straps of the scarlet 'frock', which borethe regimental title in white worsted embroidcry;Sconish regiments, howf:ver, tended to use apatch of their kilt tartan. Tunic and trouserswere in khaki drill, the formcr with tWO patchpockets and the laller tucked into khaki puttees.The equipment was the 1888 pattcrn Slade­Wallace in white bufT leathcr, which was usuallyleft unclean on campaign.

£1 Trooptr, 21S/ Lnnctrs, Sudan 1898This and the next trooper wear the same uniform,this rear view showing the chain shoulder straps,the spine pad and the method of hooking upthe ISgo pattern sword with its steel scabbardcovered in khaki cloth. The quilled sun shade to

the helmet is also shown, in this instance tuckedunder the puggaree. There were se\'cral methodsof fixing the sun shade, contemporary photo­graphs as well as the lIlus/raled London News andGraphic showing various combinations.

£2 Trooper, 21st Lancers, Sudan 1898The figure rcpresents Trooper Byrne V.C., a par­ticipant in the famous charge at Omdurman. Thecavalry wore the same pattern tunic as the in­fantry but with breeches and puttees. There wasno waist belt over the tunic, thc sword belt beingworn under. \Vhen mounted the sword wascarried on the saddle in the 'shoe case'. A bandolierin brown leather was worn over the left shoulderwith ammunition for the carbine, which wascarried on the right rear of the saddle in a brownleather holster. Various other items such as

pickets and forage were carried by cavalry oncampaign, and being lancers the rank and file ofthe regiment were armed with a lance with steclhead and butt, dccoratcd with a rcd-ovcr-whitepennon. This was furlcd, as shown, on activeservIce.

FI Strgtant-Major, 21S1 Lancers, Sudan 1898The Sergeant-Major had a uniform akin to thatof the officers. He wore the standard khaki helmetand neck flap but with a tunic like the officcrs',single-breasted with four patch pockcts and twobuttons on the slecve. The breeches were the sameas the rank and file, drab Bedford cord withleathcr reinforce tucked into brown leathergaitcrs and brown boots. E.quipment was the'Sam Browne' belt in brown leather with braccs,pouch, sword frog and holster for the WebleyRevolvcr. The badge of rank, a crown on the lowersleeve, was in gold embroidcry.

F2 Prh'att, Cameron flighlanders, Sudan 18gHThe figure is taken from the well-known sketch byW. T. ~Iaude, war artist during the Omdurmancampaign for the Graphic newspaper. It ponraysa private of the regiment running back from thefiring linc with o\'crheated riAes, to cxchangethem with those of the reserve line. Tbe uniform

39

SudUl .8g8. SMIonh aDd Can."roa Hil!llolaDdn. baryial!l th"d""d aIt.,.. th" bald" ofOmdunnUl. Casualti"" in II." British.and El!lYPtiaJI arrn.i"" w.,..., rdath,,,ly Iil!lht c:ompa.red with the,laul!lht"r oflh" D"rvi,h"., some '0,000 of whom lay dead onthe field. (National Army Mu",,,um)

was typical of that worn by Highland regimentsduring this campaign. The khaki helmet withtartan flash had a brown leather chin strap, andthe tunic had the front rounded to dear thesporran. On occasion the standard infantry pat­tern tunic was issued to Highland regiments inlieu of the pattern shown. The equipmcnt was theSlade Wallace pattern, and the riAe the LeeEnfield with the bayonet 1888 Mk. I I.

1'3 Officer, Lincolnshire Regiment, Sudan /898Thc officcr shown is dressed in the typical uniformof the infantry officer during the campaign. Thckhaki helmet was a different shape from that oftherank and file, and was later known as the Wolseleypattern. Thc tightly wound puggaree on thehelmet had the regimental identification on theright side. Although ~orders stated that officersshould wear the badge as used on the field servicecap, they tended to utilise the cut·down 'frock'shoulder straps of the rank and file, Scottishregiments excepted. The khaki tunic had fourpatch pockets and was worn with brceches andbrown leather gaiters, although somc officers pre­ferrcd puttces or riding boots. The equipment wasthe usual 'Sam Browne' belt, with braces, pouch,revolver holster and sword frog. The 1895 or 1897pattern infantry sword was carried in a brownleather scabbard with steel chape. Scottish rcgi.ments carried the 'claymore', Guards and Riflesswords of their own patterns.

G and H Dervishes, Sudan 1884-98The dress of the Dervishes varied according to thetribe and the area from which they came, but allwore the basicjihhah, a loose shon blouse in whitecotton (some with blue stripes) patched withsquares of black, red, blue and yellow cloth inimitation of the Mahdi, who wore this garb toemphasise poverty. The word 'Dervish', from thePersian 'darvesh', was an all.embracing wordmeaning poor. The original jihhahs were white,with the coloured cloth patches applied to mcndwear and tear, but later these patches were usedas symbolic badges of the AnsoTS (helpers) of theMahdi. The figures show the various types oftroops in the Mahdi's and later the Khalifa'sarmy. G1 shows a Taaishi warrior of the Baggaratribe mounted on a camel. He wears the jibbahwith patches and carries a sharp double·edgedsword in a leaf-shaped scabbard, also spears.E. N. Bcnnet, the war correspondent oftne Wtst.minster Gazette, noted that 'The cross handledDervish sword is terribly heavy and the longstraight blades ... freshly ground ... The largeDervish spear, too, when properly handled, is amost formidable weapon, and if a thrust is drivenwell home into the body, the wound from thebroad iron head is so wide and deep that a manhas little chance of recovery.' G2 shows a Hadcn­dowan, one of the fiercest tribes in Africa accord­ing to some, whose hair spawned the name of'fuzzy wuzzy'. They worc cotton trousers patchedlike thejihhah and carried the sharp double· bladedsword and hide shield. One of their habits was toattack the enemy's hands first, hacking them off.In battle they would also lie still, feigning dead,and then hamstring horses or hack at the hands ofBritish or Egyptian troops. The other figuresshow Dervishes in various dress: H3 shows a blackJiadia rifleman armed with a Remington cap­tured from the massacred Hicks column. TheDervishes understood littlc about rifles, and ac­cording to E. N. Bennet knocked the sights offand cut down the barrels to suit themselves, withdire consequences to accuracy. The openingvolley at Omdurman was recorded by many warcorrespondents as being a simple wastc of am·munition on the part of the enemy.

!I

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THE MEDIEVAL WORLD147 Rormr\Oo8yzant,neArm.es4th·9th C.IS4 Arthur & MillooSa:<on WarslSS Arm.es 01 the Mushm ConquestI2S Arm.esollsL1m" 7th-lithe.ISO The Aif' 01 Charlemagne89 ByuontJnl! ~886-IIISIS Saxon" WU"il & Norman

111 French Med.evalArrru6IlXn-1lOO7S~ 01 the Crusadr:s

171 SaIacIon & the SMlCensISS kruihUoIChnu100 EIGd&Reconquosu 1050-1492lOS The J'1oneak111 TheAeeolT~

......, ...-.doo....~ .... 1eIJlland- eft ,.,......

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15 I /'1edie>IaI 0wte5c ArrnoeSO~ Europe¥I.a.n-s

lSI Scots&WdshWar594 The s..ms IlOO-l 500

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101 TheConquistadores163 Muihullnd1.l.1S04-176111S C;uSUvus Adolphus (I ~ Infantsy161 C;umvus AdolphusmCavalry

14 EnghihCMIWarArm.es110 NewModelAnrrfI645-W201 LouI$XW,Army267 The 8ntlmlvrrrt 1660-11'0497 f"Iarlboroutl"s Ivrrrt16 5imlno Annoes 1550-1615

114 I'OtshAtmoes 156"·16'16(1)IIII'okhAtmoes 1569-16'16(2)

119 Thellorder~

11TH CENTURY261 I&hUntury~260~ the Gtw-s flvrrrt (I~ lnfantty264 ~the~-sflvrrrtmCavalry

II' )oatb<te RebeIoons116 Fredend< the Great (II240 Fredend<theGreat(2141 Fre<lend<theC;reat{J)271 AuwIan Army 1740-80 (I)176 AustnanArmy 1740-80(2)110 AustnanArmy 174O-«l(])

48 WoIIe"sArrny118 Amencan Woodland Ind'ins

19 Bnt,m Army ,n N Ameroca144 Frend"lIl Amer" Warlnd21) Gene<-al Washlngton"s Army(I)' InS·lns

NAPOLEONIC PERIOD157 NapoIeon'sCampa'ilns ,n lWy

79 NapoIMn'sEgyptlanCampa'iln87 Napoleon's~l\

64 Nap·sCU"'l.s~&Caraboruen

55 Nap",r.ncoons&lan(tn" Nap"sllneChuse\l"76Nap"s~

Il Nap"se--dCavairy141 Nap"sllnelnfantsy146 Nap"slJihtlnlantry151 Nap"sG-olniantsy(l)

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ISBN 0-85045-254-6

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