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Outline. User authentication Password authentication, salt Challenge-response authentication protocols Biometrics Token-based authentication Authentication in distributed systems (multi service providers/domains) Single sign-on, Microsoft Passport Trusted Intermediaries (KPC and CA). - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Outline User authentication Password authentication, salt Challenge-response authentication protocols – Biometrics Token-based authentication Authentication in distributed systems (multi service providers/domains) Single sign-on, Microsoft Passport Trusted Intermediaries (KPC and CA)
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Page 1: Outline

Outline• User authentication

– Password authentication, salt

– Challenge-response authentication protocols

– Biometrics

– Token-based authentication

• Authentication in distributed systems (multi service providers/domains)

– Single sign-on, Microsoft Passport

– Trusted Intermediaries (KPC and CA)

Page 2: Outline

Objectives• Understand the four major individual authentication

mechanisms and their comparison

• Understand the basic mechanisms of trusted intermediaries for distributed authentication using different crypto methods

– Symmetric key: KDC (the key concept of ticket)

– Asymmetric key: CA

• Know the practical protocols of distributed authentication

– Symmetric key: Kerberos

– Asymmetric key: X.509

Page 3: Outline

Password authentication

• Basic idea

– User has a secret password

– System checks password to authenticate user

• Issues

– How is password stored?

– How does system check password?

– How easy is it to guess a password?

• Difficult to keep password file secret, so best if it is hard to guess password even if you have the password file

Page 4: Outline

Basic password scheme

Password fileUser

exrygbzyf kgnosfix ggjoklbsz … …

kiwifruit

hash function

Page 5: Outline

Basic password scheme

• Hash function h : strings strings

– Given h(password), hard to find password

– No known algorithm better than trial and error

• User password stored as h(password)

• When user enters password

– System computes h(password)

– Compares with entry in password file

• No passwords stored on disk

Page 6: Outline

Unix password system

• Hash function is 25xDES

– 25 rounds of DES-variant encryptions

• Any user can try “dictionary attack”

R.H. Morris and K. Thompson, Password security: a case history, Communications of the ACM, November

1979

Page 7: Outline

UNIX Password System

• Password linewalt:fURfuu4.4hY0U:129:129:Belgers:/home/walt:/bin/csh

25x DES

InputSalt

KeyConstant,A 64-bit block of 0

Plaintext

Ciphertext

Compare

Page 8: Outline

Dictionary Attack – some numbers

• Typical password dictionary

– 1,000,000 entries of common passwords

• people's names, common pet names, and ordinary words.

– Suppose you generate and analyze 10 guesses per second

• This may be reasonable for a web site; offline is much faster

– Dictionary attack in at most 100,000 seconds = 28 hours, or 14 hours on average

• If passwords were random

– Assume six-character password

• Upper- and lowercase letters, digits, 32 punctuation characters

• 689,869,781,056 password combinations.

• Exhaustive search requires 1,093 years on average

Page 9: Outline

Outline• User authentication

– Password authentication, salt

– Challenge-response authentication protocols

– Biometrics

– Token-based authentication

• Authentication in distributed systems (multi service providers/domains)

– Single sign-on, Microsoft Passport

– Trusted Intermediaries

Page 10: Outline

Challenge-response Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

Failure scenario??“I am Alice”

Page 11: Outline

Authentication

Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him

Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

in a network,Bob can not “see”

Alice, so Trudy simply declares

herself to be Alice“I am Alice”

Page 12: Outline

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packetcontaining her source IP address

Failure scenario??

“I am Alice”Alice’s

IP address

Page 13: Outline

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packetcontaining her source IP address

Trudy can createa packet

“spoofing”Alice’s address“I am Alice”

Alice’s IP address

Page 14: Outline

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret password to “prove” it.

Failure scenario??

“I’m Alice”Alice’s IP addr

Alice’s password

OKAlice’s IP addr

Page 15: Outline

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret password to “prove” it.

playback attack: Trudy records Alice’s

packetand later

plays it back to Bob

“I’m Alice”Alice’s IP addr

Alice’s password

OKAlice’s IP addr

“I’m Alice”Alice’s IP addr

Alice’s password

Page 16: Outline

Authentication: yet another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

Failure scenario??

“I’m Alice”Alice’s IP addr

encrypted password

OKAlice’s IP addr

Page 17: Outline

Authentication: another try

Protocol ap3.1: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her encrypted secret password to “prove” it.

recordand

playbackstill works!

“I’m Alice”Alice’s IP addr

encrypptedpassword

OKAlice’s IP addr

“I’m Alice”Alice’s IP addr

encryptedpassword

Page 18: Outline

Authentication: yet another try

Goal: avoid playback attack

Failures, drawbacks?

Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime

ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R. Alice

must return R, encrypted with shared secret key“I am Alice”

R

K (R)A-B

Alice is live, and only Alice knows key to encrypt

nonce, so it must be Alice!

Page 19: Outline

Authentication: ap5.0

ap4.0 doesn’t protect against server database reading

• can we authenticate using public key techniques?

ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography“I am Alice”

RBob computes

K (R)A- (K (R)) = RA

-K A

+

and knows only Alice could have the

private key, that encrypted R such that

(K (R)) = RA-

K A+

Page 20: Outline

Outline• User authentication

– Password authentication, salt

– Challenge-response authentication protocols

– Biometrics

– Token-based authentication

• Authentication in distributed systems (multi service providers/domains)

– Single sign-on, Microsoft Passport

– Trusted Intermediaries

Page 21: Outline

Biometrics• Use a person’s physical characteristics

– fingerprint, voice, face, keyboard timing, …

• Advantages

– Cannot be disclosed, lost, forgotten

• Disadvantages

– Cost, installation, maintenance

– Reliability of comparison algorithms

• False positive: Allow access to unauthorized person

• False negative: Disallow access to authorized person

– Privacy?

– If forged, how do you revoke?

Page 23: Outline

Token-based AuthenticationSmart Card

• With embedded CPU and memory

– Carries conversation w/ a small card reader

• Various forms

– PIN protected memory card

• Enter PIN to get the password

– PIN and smart phone based token

• Google authentication

– Cryptographic challenge/response cards

• Computer create a random challenge

• Enter PIN to encrypt/decrypt the challenge w/ the card

Page 24: Outline

Smart Card Example

• Some complications

– Initial data (PIN) shared with server

• Need to set this up securely

• Shared database for many sites

– Clock skew

ChallengeTime

function

Time

Initial data (PIN)

Page 25: Outline

Group Quiz• Suppose Bob is a stateless server which

does not require him to remember the challenge he sends to Alice. Is the following protocol secure?

“I am Alice”

R

R, K (R)A-B

Page 26: Outline

Outline• User authentication

– Password authentication, salt

– Challenge-Response

– Biometrics

– Token-based authentication

• Authentication in distributed systems

– Single sign-on, Microsoft Passport

– Trusted Intermediaries

Page 27: Outline

Single sign-on systems

Rules

Authentication Application

Database

Server

LAN

user name,password,other auth

• Advantages

– User signs on once

– No need for authentication at multiple sites, applications

– Can set central authorization policy for the enterprise

Page 28: Outline

Microsoft Passport• Launched 1999

– Claim > 200 million accounts in 2002

– Over 3.5 billion authentications each month

• Log in to many websites using one account

– Used by MS services Hotmail, MSN Messenger or MSN subscriptions; also Radio Shack, etc.

– Hotmail or MSN users automatically have Microsoft Passport accounts set up

Page 29: Outline

Passport log-in

Page 30: Outline

Trusted Intermediaries

Symmetric key problem:

• How do two entities establish shared secret key over network?

Solution:

• trusted key distribution center (KDC) acting as intermediary between entities

Public key problem:

• When Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web site, e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob’s public key, not Trudy’s?

Solution:

• trusted certification authority (CA)

Page 31: Outline

Key Distribution Center (KDC)

• Alice, Bob need shared symmetric key.

• KDC: server shares different secret key with each registered user (many users)

• Alice, Bob know own symmetric keys, KA-KDC KB-KDC ,

for communicating with KDC.

KB-KDC

KX-KDC

KY-KDC

KZ-KDC

KP-KDC

KB-KDC

KA-KDC

KA-KDC

KP-KDC

KDC

Page 32: Outline

Key Distribution Center (KDC)

Alice and Bob communicate: using R1 as session key for shared symmetric encryption

Q: How does KDC allow Bob, Alice to determine shared symmetric secret key to communicate with each other?

Page 33: Outline

Ticket and Standard Using KDC• Ticket

– In KA-KDC(R1, KB-KDC(A,R1) ), the KB-KDC(A,R1) is also known as a ticket

– Comes with expiration time

• KDC used in Kerberos: standard for shared key based authentication

– Users register passwords

– Shared key derived from the password

Page 34: Outline

Kerberos• Trusted key server system from MIT

– one of the best known and most widely implemented trusted third party key distribution systems.

• Provides centralised private-key third-party authentication in a distributed network

– allows users access to services distributed through network

– without needing to trust all workstations

– rather all trust a central authentication server

• Two versions in use: 4 & 5

• Widely used

– Red Hat 7.2 and Windows Server 2003 or higher

Page 35: Outline

slide 35

Two-Step Authentication

Encrypted TGS ticket

Joe the User

Key distributioncenter (KDC)

USER=Joe; service=TGS

Prove identity once to obtain special TGS ticket Use TGS to get tickets for any network service

File server, printer,other network services

Encrypted service ticket

Ticket granting service (TGS)

TGS ticket

Encrypted service ticket

Page 36: Outline

slide 36

Still Not Good Enough• Ticket hijacking

– Malicious user may steal the service ticket of another user on the same workstation and use it

• IP address verification does not help

– Servers must verify that the user who is presenting the ticket is the same user to whom the ticket was issued

Page 37: Outline

slide 37

Symmetric Keys in Kerberos• Kc is long-term key of client C

– Derived from user’s password

– Known to client and key distribution center (KDC)

• KTGS is long-term key of TGS

– Known to KDC and ticket granting service (TGS)

• Kv is long-term key of network service V

– Known to V and TGS; separate key for each service

• Kc,TGS is short-term key between C and TGS

– Created by KDC, known to C and TGS

• Kc,v is short-term key betwen C and V

– Created by TGS, known to C and V

Page 38: Outline

slide 38

“Single Logon” Authentication

User

• Client only needs to obtain TGS ticket once (say, every morning)

– Ticket is encrypted; client cannot forge it or tamper with it

kinit program (client)Key Distribution Center (KDC)

password IDc , IDTGS , timec

EncryptKc(Kc,TGS , IDTGS , timeKDC ,

lifetime , ticketTGS)Kc

Convert intoclient master key

Key = Kc

Key = KTGSTGS

All users mustpre-register theirpasswords with KDC

Fresh key to be usedbetween client and TGS

Decrypts with Kc and obtainsKc,TGS and ticketTGS EncryptKTGS

(Kc,TGS , IDc , Addrc , IDTGS , timeKDC , lifetime)Client will use this unforgeable ticket to get other tickets without re-authenticating

Page 39: Outline

slide 39

Obtaining a Service Ticket

User

• Client uses TGS ticket to obtain a service ticket and a short-term key for each network service

– One encrypted, unforgeable ticket per service (printer, email, etc.)

Client Ticket Granting Service (TGS)

usually lives inside KDC

System command,

e.g. “lpr –Pprint”

IDv , ticketTGS , authC

EncryptKc,TGS(Kc,v , IDv , timeTGS ,

ticketv)

Fresh key to be usedbetween client and service

Knows Kc,TGS and ticketTGS

EncryptKc,TGS(IDc , Addrc , timec)

Proves that client knows key Kc,TGS

contained in encrypted TGS ticket

EncryptKv(Kc,v , IDc , Addrc , IDv ,

timeTGS , lifetime)Client will use this unforgeableticket to get access to service V

Knows key Kv foreach service

Page 40: Outline

slide 40

Obtaining Service

User

• For each service request, client uses the short-term key for that service and the ticket he received from TGS

Client

Server V

System command,

e.g. “lpr –Pprint”

ticketv , authC

EncryptKc,v(timec+1)

Knows Kc,v and ticketv

EncryptKc,v(IDc , Addrc , timec)

Proves that client knows key Kc,v

contained in encrypted ticket

Authenticates server to clientReasoning: Server can produce this message only if he knows key Kc,v.

Server can learn key Kc,v only if he can decrypt service ticket.

Server can decrypt service ticket only if he knows correct key Kv.

If server knows correct key Kv, then he is the right server.

Page 41: Outline

Kerberos 4 Overview

Page 42: Outline

slide 42

Important Ideas in Kerberos• Short-term session keys

– Long-term secrets used only to derive short-term keys

– Separate session key for each user-server pair

• … but multiple user-server sessions re-use the same key

• Proofs of identity are based on authenticators

– Client encrypts his identity, address and current time using a short-term session key

• Also prevents replays (if clocks are globally synchronized)

– Server learns this key separately (via encrypted ticket that client can’t decrypt) and verifies user’s identity

• Symmetric cryptography only

Page 43: Outline

Practical Uses of Kerberos

• Email, FTP, network file systems and many other applications have been kerberized

– Use of Kerberos is transparent for the end user

– Transparency is important for usability!

• Local authentication

– login and su in OpenBSD

• Authentication for network protocols

– rlogin, rsh, telnet

Page 44: Outline

When NOT Use Kerberos• No quick solution exists for migrating user

passwords from a standard UNIX password database to a Kerberos password database

– such as /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow

• For an application to use Kerberos, its source must be modified to make the appropriate calls into the Kerberos libraries

• All-or-nothing proposition

– If any services that transmit plaintext passwords remain in use, passwords can still be compromised

Page 45: Outline

Trusted Intermediaries

Symmetric key problem:

• How do two entities establish shared secret key over network?

Solution:

• trusted key distribution center (KDC) acting as intermediary between entities

Public key problem:

• When Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web site, e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob’s public key, not Trudy’s?

Solution:

• trusted certification authority (CA)

Page 46: Outline

Certification Authorities• Certification authority (CA): binds public key to

particular entity, E.

• E (person, router) registers its public key with CA.

– E provides “proof of identity” to CA.

– CA creates certificate binding E to its public key.

– Certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA – CA says “this is E’s public key”Bob’s public

key K B+

Bob’s identifying informatio

n

digitalsignature(encrypt)

CA private

key K CA-

K B+

certificate for Bob’s public

key, signed by CA

Page 47: Outline

Certification Authorities• When Alice wants Bob’s public key:

– gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere).

– apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key

• CA is heart of the X.509 standard used extensively in

– SSL (Secure Socket Layer)/TLS: deployed in every Web browser

– S/MIME (Secure/Multiple Purpose Internet Mail Extension), and IP Sec, etc. Bob’s

publickey K B

+

digitalsignature(decrypt)

CA public

key K CA+

K B+

Page 48: Outline

General Process of SSL

C

Version, Crypto choice, nonce

Version, Choice, nonce,signed certificatecontaining server’spublic key Ks

SSecret key Kencrypted with server’s key Ks

hash of sequence of messages

hash of sequence of messages

switch to negotiated cipher

Page 49: Outline

Authentication in SSL/HTTPS• Company asks CA (e.g., Verisign) for a

certificate

• CA creates certificates and signs it

• Certificate installed in server (e.g., web server)

• Browser issued with root certificates

– Windows Root Certificates List

• http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/2592.aspx

• Browser verify certificates and trust correctly signed ones

Page 50: Outline

Single KDC/CA

• Problems

– Single administration trusted by all principals

– Single point of failure

– Scalability

• Solutions: break into multiple domains

– Each domain has a trusted administration

Page 51: Outline

Multiple KDC/CA Domains

Secret keys:

• KDCs share pairwise key

• topology of KDC: tree with shortcuts

Public keys:

• cross-certification of CAs

• example: Alice with CAA, Boris with CAB

– Alice gets CAB’s certificate (public key p1), signed by CAA

– Alice gets Boris’ certificate (its public key p2), signed by CAB (p1)

Page 52: Outline

Key Distribution Center (KDC)

Aliceknows

R1

Bob knows to use R1 to communicate with Alice

Alice and Bob communicate: using R1 as session key for shared symmetric encryption

Q: How does KDC allow Bob, Alice to determine shared symmetric secret key to communicate with each other?

KDC generate

s R1

KB-KDC(A,R1)

KA-KDC(A,B)

KA-KDC(R1, KB-KDC(A,R1) )

Page 53: Outline

Group Quiz

Consider the KDC and CA servers. Suppose a KDC goes down. What is the impact on the ability of parties to communicate securely; that is, who can and cannot communicate? Justify your answer. Suppose now a CA goes down. What is the impact of this failure? 

Page 54: Outline

Backup Slides

Page 55: Outline

Advantages of salt• Without salt

– Same hash functions on all machines

• Compute hash of all common strings once

• Compare hash file with all known password files

• With salt

– One password hashed 212 different ways

• Precompute hash file?

– Need much larger file to cover all common strings

• Dictionary attack on known password file

– For each salt found in file, try all common strings

Page 56: Outline

Four parts of Passport account• Passport Unique Identifier (PUID)

– Assigned to the user when he or she sets up the account

• User profile, required to set up account– Phone number or Hotmail or MSN.com e-mail address

– Also name, ZIP code, state, or country, …

• Credential information– Minimum six-character password or PIN

– Four-digit security key, used for a second level of authentication on sites requiring stronger sign-in credentials

• Wallet– Passport-based application at passport.com domain

– E-commerce sites with Express Purchase function use wallet information rather than prompt the user to type in data

Page 57: Outline

slide 57

Kerberos in Large Networks• One KDC isn’t enough for large networks (why?)

• Network is divided into realms

– KDCs in different realms have different key databases

• To access a service in another realm, users must…

– Get ticket for home-realm TGS from home-realm KDC

– Get ticket for remote-realm TGS from home-realm TGS

• As if remote-realm TGS were just another network service

– Get ticket for remote service from that realm’s TGS

– Use remote-realm ticket to access service

– N(N-1)/2 key exchanges for full N-realm interoperation


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