Culture:

Ramblings on Ketchup, Dagen H, Condensed

Matter Physicists, Efficiency and Diversity

Scott E Page

Outline

• Culture: what is it?• Culture: why we care?• Game Theory Model of Culture as Coordination• Bednar Page: GameS theory Model• The Model of our model as told to physicists• Our version of the model of our model• Culture in the laboratory• ABM culture

Culture: What is it?

• Behavior• Beliefs• Roles• Categories• Values• Symbols• Artifacts• Networks

Culture: Why We Care

Our ability to improve our lot and the lot of others depends on an understanding of culture. The performance of institutions from markets writ large to water rights systems to educational reforms hinges on culture. Knowing how people answer the question “do you trust other people?” is as informative in predicting per capita GDP as is average level of education.

Do I know Anything About Culture?

No!

Larger Project

Culture Institutions

Bednar and Page (2007) “Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior Within Multiple Game” Rationality and Society

Larger Project

Culture Institutions

Bednar and Page (2007) “Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior Within Multiple Game” Rationality and Society

Start Simple

Game Theory ModelAxelrod ModelBednar Page ModelModel of Bednar Page Model

Suppose you could ask people one question

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Where do you keep your ketchup?

A.Fridge

B.Cupboard

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No!

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Coordination

Formally, these are called games of coordination. People benefit by coordinating with others more than they benefit by doing what they want.

Subtle Difference

In the standing ovation model, we discussed to reasons why people might copy others:

- social influence- information

How does coordination differ from influence?

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Dagen H

At 4:45 am on September 3, 1967, all cars on the road in Sweden came to a stop. They switched sides (from the left to the right) and at 5 am, the cars began moving again.

Coordination Examples

Choice of LanguageTime Classes StartMeeting PlaceElectric Plugs

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Hard and Soft Externalities

An externality is hard (economic) f it’s easily measured

An externality is soft (psychological) if it’s not.

No Bright Line

Some decisions involve both hard and soft coordination externalities. Suppose I’m buying a bike. The more people that buy mountain bikes, the more trails that get created (hard). Buying a mountain bike might also make me hip (soft).

Anecdote

Once, I was riding in a cab to the New Orleans airport. I told the driver I was in a hurry and he began to run through stop signs. At first, I was scared. Then, I realized he was only running East-West stop signs.

Basic Coordination Game

1,1 0,0

0,0 1,1

EW NS EW NS

Cab #1

Cab #2

Cultural Efficiency

You and a friend are told that you’ve won a free trip for spring break provided that you both choose the same location from a list of two. If you do pick the same location, you get to go there for an all expenses paid week of fun.

Maui- Des Moines Game

10,10

0,0

0,0 1,1

Maui DM Maui

You

Friend

DM

Shake or Bow?

We could great people in a variety of ways. In the West, people tend to shake hands. In the East People tend to bow.

Shake or Bow Game

a,a 0,0

0,0 1,1

Shake Bow Shake

You

Friend

Bow

Is a <> 1

The CDC Opinion

Getting off from an airplane and shaking hands (or worse yet hugging or kissing) is akin to saying “here take all of these diverse germs and viruses I’ve accumulated after three hours in a sealed container with a bunch of strangers.”

a < 1

Inefficient Coordination

Beta vs VHSMac vs IBMEnglish vs MetricFruit Cake vs iStore

Lots of Ketchup

We’ve focused so far on how coordination can lead us to arbitrary behaviors and sometimes inefficient behaviors.

It also can explain cultural differences.

A List of Questions

Ketchup in the fridge?Do people wear shoes inside your house?Do you cross the street when the don’t walk sign

is flashing?Read the newspaper at the breakfast table?Do you hug your friends when you see them?Individual Napkins?

A List of Questions

Ketchup in the fridge? YesDo people wear shoes inside your house? NoDo you cross the street when the don’t walk sign is

flashing? YesRead the newspaper at the breakfast table? YesDo you hug your friends when you see them? YesIndividual Napkins? Yes

You’re part of YNYYY Nation

How Many Cultures?

Six questionsTwo answers each

2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 = 64

The Set of The Possible

Dead People: bury or burnFoods do you eat?Dress?Music do you playStories do you tell

8 x 19 x 40 x 6 x 11 x 23 x 2 x 43 .. = HUGE

Axelrod’s Culture Model

People play many cocrdination games with neighbors

If two neighbors don’t coordinate in many games, they stop playing with each other

Result: Emergence of distinct cultures

Bednar Page Model

Agents play game ensembles with a community of agents.

Each agent has only one brain (automata)Agents evolve “similar” strategies across

games

World vs Models

Coordination and Axelord Models: Inter cultural differences but intra cultural heterogeneity (all Irish the same)

Bednar Page Model and World: Heterogeneity within and across cultures.

Jenna’s Question

“Suppose people play many coordination games and that in addition to trying to coordinate with other people they also want to be consistent across the games. For example, suppose each game has a hot action (1) and a cold action (0). What happens?”

Scott’s Response

“Clearly, the community will just converge to everyone being hot or everyone being cold and it should happen fast. I’ll tell you after lunch.”

Scott’s Question to Len

“Suppose people play many coordination games and that in addition to trying to coordinate with other people they also want to be consistent across the games. For example, suppose each game has a hot action (1) and a cold action (0). What happens?”

Len’s Response

“Oh, like a coupled voter model. Neat question. Clearly, the community will just converge to everyone being hot or everyone being cold and it should happen fast. I’ll tell you after lunch.”

Len’s Question to Casey

“Suppose people play many coordination games and that in addition to trying to coordinate with other people they also want to be consistent across the games. For example, suppose each game has a hot action (1) and a cold action (0). What happens?”

Casey’s Response

“The time for both conformity and consistency (what we call exit time) is much longer than for either process alone.”

Conformity and Dissonance in Generalized Voter Models” - Scott E Page, Leonard M. Sander, and Casey Schneider - Mizell

Cultural Emergence in Game Ensembles: An Experimental Study

Jenna Bednar, Yan Chen, Xiao Liu and Scott Page

University of Michigan - Ann Arbor

This Paper

Does “culture” emerge in the laboratory by having subjects play

multiple games?

Behavioral Spillover = Institutional Externality

Standard Experiment

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7,7 2,10

10,2 4,4

D

Our Experiments

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7,7 2,10

10,2 4,4

7,7 4,14

14,4 5,5

Our Games

7,7 2,10

10,2 4,4

7,7 4,14

14,4 5,5

7,7 2,9

9,2 10,10

7,7 4,11

11,4 5,5

Strong ALT PD

Weak ALT Self Interest

Experimental Design

Controls: WA, SA, PD, SI

Pairs: WA + SA, WA +SI, WA + PD

Hypothesis 1

% of CC in WA higher in WA+PD, than in WA

% alternation in WA higher in WA than in WA+PD

Hypothesis 2

% alternation in WA higher in WA than in WA+SI

% CC,DD in WA higher in WA+SI than in WA

Hypothesis 3

% alternation in WA higher in WA+SA than in WA

Hypothesis 4

% Efficient outcomes in SI, PD, and SA lower when paired with WA.

Hypothesis 1

% of CC in WA higher in WA+PD, than in WA

% alternation in WA higher in WA than in WA+PD

WA: 33%alternateWA+PD: None alternate, one pair

cooperates

Hypothesis 2

% alternation in WA higher in WA than in WA+SI

% CC,DD in WA higher in WA+SI than in WA

WA + SI: 33% alternate, 33% play DD

Hypothesis 3

% alternation in WA higher in WA+SA than in WA

WA: 33% full alternation, more attempts at alternation

Hypothesis 4

% Efficient outcomes in SI, PD, and SA lower when paired with WA

PD: Less cooperationSA: Less alternationSI: No effect

Experimental Summary

Experiments fit mathematical and computational theory

Strong behavioral spillovers/institutional externalities

GameS experiments differ from game experiments

ABM Culture

You’ve heard talks about artificial life and will hear more talks about agent based models. These provide an incredible laboratory in which to investigate the emergence of culture and its implications.