Outline

• QUIZ at start of next Tuesday class - postponed• Prepare for discussion for next class• Key questions about institutions• Variables, IVs, and DVs• 3 types of interactions among states• Definition of regimes/institutions• Why do institutions form?• Two approaches: rationalist / reflective

Prepare for Discussionfor NEXT CLASS

• Real-life examples from the news that differ in problem structure terms used from this class session– Look at NYT before next class and find two

INTERNATIONAL problems that illustrate one of the differences we have discussed

Key questions about institutions

• Formation: Why (and when) do states form international institutions in the first place?

• Design: Why, given that they do form them, do they design them in the ways they do?

• Influence: How, given that states cannot be coerced to do what they do not want to do, do international institutions ever influence the behavior of states?

• Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international organization” limited to just states?

Variables, IVs, and DVs

• Variable: something that can vary (it varies between different values)

• Values: what a variable varies between • E.g., – Variable: color– Values: ROYGBIV

• DV: Dependent variable – what you want to explain• IVs: Independent variables – what you use to

explain the DV

Variable Terms and ConceptsExamples

Unit of analysis

Variable Indicator Values of variable Values of indicator

Problem Level of Difficulty

Time til Start of Negotiations

Malign Long

Benign Short

Problem Level of Difficulty

Time til Complete Negotiations

Malign Long

Benign Short

Treaty Ambitious-ness Type of Obligations

Ambitious Differentiated

Not-ambitious Common

Treaty Strength Monitoring Provision

Strong Provision present

Weak Provision absent

Some DVs for the Course

• Always start with the DV – need to know what you are going to explain before you can figure out how you will explain it

• DVs for the course– Whether institution forms or not– What are the features of the institution– Behavior of states

Institutional formation

• Basic DV and question: do states (or other actors) form an institution?

• Variable: institutional formation• Values: yes or no• IVs: features of problem structure– Capacities – Incentives– Information and knowledge– Norms

Logic of Consequences vs.Logic of Appropriateness

• Logic of consequences– States calculate what is best– Independent self-interest (narrow)– Independent self-interest ( broad)– Interdependent self-interest

• Logic of appropriateness– States behave to establish/maintain particular

identity and/or to follow social rules– Institutions alter of what is right/appropriate

What is problem structure?

• Features of the problem that influence:– Formation: How hard/easy to solve the problem? – Design: What kind of solution states arrive at? – Institutional influence: How effective is the

solution?• No need for single dimension of hard to easy• Think about different problem features and

implications for negotiation and effectiveness

Problem structure:Nine (9) key questions

• Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation, or harmony?• Q2: Who are the actors?• Q3: Absolute capacities and relative power• Q4: Incentives/preferences• Q5: Information/knowledge• Q6: Norms• Q7: Violation tolerance• Q8: Inherent transparency• Q9: Response incentives

Problem structure:Nine (9) key questions

• Mainly for comparing ACROSS problems• Answers to all effect– Whether states will form institution– What features they will incorporate– How states will respond to institutional rules

Q1: Is it conflict, cooperation or harmony?

• Is it conflict or would it be if no institution?• Is it harmony?• If conflict, is it Deadlock, i.e., unresolvable?• Potential for resolution REQUIRES absolute

gains frame

Q2: Who are the Actors?

• How many actors are there?• What roles do actors have?• What types of actors are involved?

Q3: Capacities and power

• Do “perpetrators” of problem have capacity to engage in “good” behavior?

• If not, it’s a “Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity”. E.g.,– Protecting accidental detonation of nuclear weapons– Reducing AIDS in developing countries– Helping small countries defend selves from attack

• Behavior not a result of logic of consequences or logic of appropriateness

Q4: Incentives/preferences

• How do material consequences for perpetrators depend on other countries?

• Types of incentive problems– Upstream / downstream – Coordination – Collaboration

• All involve logic of consequences issues

Q5: Information/knowledge

• Any unknown effects that perpetrators would care about if they knew about them?

• Two types of info/knowledge problems– Epistemic/knowledge problems (unsure about

how the world works): e.g., acid rain in Europe, trade wars, health quarantine regulations

– Assurance problems (unsure about how other actors will behave): e.g., war games

• Largely still logic of consequences

Q6: Norms

• Problem is not material consequences but violations of values and notions of legitimacy

• Normative problems involve “conflicts over values”, e.g.,– Human rights abuses– Apartheid or treatment of women– Choice of government

• Involves logic of appropriateness

Q7: Violation tolerance

• Question: Do violations matter a lot? Are states very concerned about them?

• Hypothesis: If strong violation INtolerance, leads to either preclusive strategies OR careful monitoring WITH enforcement

Q8: Inherent transparency

• Question: Is it easy to “see” violations and/or hard to conceal them?

• Hypothesis: If little inherent transparency, then strong monitoring provisions are likely.

Q9: Response incentives

• Question: Will states respond to violations? • Hypothesis: Strong incentives to respond to

trade violations ==> carefully devised dispute resolution systems

Types of problemReview

• Deadlock• Positive externality plagued by incapacity• Upstream / downstream problems• Coordination • Collaboration• Epistemic / knowledge problems• Assurance problems• Normative problems• Plus violation tolerance, inherent transparency, and

response incentives

Conclusion

• Is there a conflict?• Who are the actors• Capacities and power• Incentives• Information / knowledge• Norms• Violation tolerance• Inherent transparency• Response incentives