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Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45

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Research in Transportation Economics

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Overview of public transport policy developments in South Africa

Jackie Walters*

Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (ITLS (Africa)), Department of Transport and Supply Chain Management, University of Johannesburg, PO Box 524, Auckland Park,Johannesburg 2006, South Africa

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 6 July 2012

Keywords:Public transport developments in SouthAfricaPublic transport policy processesTaxi recapitalisationBRT systemsPRASA

* Tel.: þ27 5592088.E-mail address: jwalters@uj.ac.za.

0739-8859/$ e see front matter � 2012 Elsevier Ltd.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2012.05.021

a b s t r a c t

Public transport in South Africa is one of the most burning issues in the transport sector. The governmentis faced with huge public pressure to improve public transport systems in the face of rising fuel costs, thepending implementation of expensive urban toll road systems in the Gauteng province, and elsewhere inurban environments, public transport safety issues, public transport fleet renewal, especially thecommuter rail services, as well as limited resources to fund public transport. As a developing country, theSouth African Government has pressing funding issues such as funds needed to improve housing for thepoor to improve schooling and public health services. Government is also faced with a vocal minibus taxiindustry that transports an estimated 65% of all commuters in the country that is also insisting onsubsidies for its services.

Many policies and strategies have been put in place to address the public transport system in thecountry, some more successful than others. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of thelatest policy and strategy developments, to highlight the latest modal developments and to build onprevious overviews in the Thredbo Conference series.

� 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Public transport in South Africa has always been a burning issue.Throughout the country’s history of separate development, millionsof people were artificially located long distances away from jobopportunities, places of recreation and daily chores such as shop-ping centres, health facilities etc. Public transport, in particular therail and bus modes of transport, was used as an “instrument” ofpolicy to provide mobility at reduced costs (subsidised services) toaffected communities. The spatial engineering of the past unfor-tunately continues today and in some ways are still perpetuated bythe development of major urban housing developments on rela-tively cheap land (tomake the houses more affordable), often at thefringes of the long established townships. The challenge govern-ment faces is how to provide (and balance) affordable, safe andaccessible public transport to these townships and the urban andrural communities of SA in the face of high levels of urbanisation,inwardmigration of millions of people from other African countriesto the urban areas of South Africa, and the financial demands placedon the government for school and health services, provision ofhousing for the poor, security, etc.

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In the light of these challenges, a large number of studies havebeen undertaken, with public transport strategy documentsdeveloped and legislation enacted. Yet, the progress has beenrelatively slow in transforming the public transport system in thecountry. Many reasons are given for this lack of progress, forexample, a lack of funding for public transport policy imple-mentation; organised labour opposition to a tender for contracts inthe commuter bus industry; cumbersome and complicated publicengagement processes e also involving the respective modes oftransport; a lack of skills to implement policy initiatives; compli-cations involving three levels of government in public transportdecisions; a lack of integrated public transport plans, especially atthe metro levels of government to guide the implementationprocess; and changes in political role players (and often seniorbureaucrats) at the national, provincial and local levels of govern-ment following elections (loss of institutional capacity resulting ina lack of continuity in policy direction and implementation).

This paper provides an overview of public transport develop-ments in South Africa over recent years and will describe the majorevents that have taken place over this period. As will be seen,progress is not consistent across the modes of transport while insome areas, such as commuter bus transport, policy implementa-tion has been delayed for many years. In other areas, for examplethe recent introduction of bus rapid transit (BRT) systems and theoperationalization of Gautrain, progress is evident.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 35

Public transport policy and its implementation can however beseen as one of the most complex areas of transport policy in thecountry due to its political implications, political linkages, fundingconstraints, a major push to involve previously excluded businessesin the subsidy system, and being faced with financial constraintsand a public outcry over the state of public transport in the country(e.g., adequacy, public transport user costs, accessibility, safetyissues, affordability). In other areas of transport policy making andimplementation, substantial progress has been made with thederegulated air and road transport industries, and the developmentof the national road system.

1.1. How is the current public transport system performing?

Few formal studies are conducted to establish the current stateof public transport in South Africa. However, national travel surveysare conducted from time to time, the last undertaken by theDepartment of Transport (DoT) in 2003 (to be repeated in 2012).

An overview of the characteristics of public transport in SouthAfrica, based on a National Household Travel Survey (NHTS, 2003),is given in Walters (2008). The following salient points regardingthe South African public transport system were highlighted:

� Only about 10.7% of households surveyed in South Africa hada monthly income that exceeded R 6000 (about US$800 at anexchange rate of R 7.50/US$). The majority of households(83.1%) had a monthly household income of less than R 6000.

� Bus and taxi services are relatively more accessible than railservices.

� The percentage of households that have access to a car is 26.1%with an average of 0.40 cars per household. The highestnumber of cars per household are to be found in the metro-politan and urban areas.

� Almost half of the households surveyed said that their mainproblem was that public transport was either not available orwas too far away.

� One third of households reported that safety from accidentsand bad driving behaviour was the most serious transportproblems they experienced.

� One fifth of households mentioned that the cost of publictransport was of concern.

� Respondents were also unhappy with security on trains (63%),lack of facilities at bus stops (74%), crowding on buses (54%)and 51% with the low off-peak frequencies of bus services.

� Minibus taxi users were most unhappy about safety fromaccidents (67%), lack of facilities at taxi ranks (64%) and a lack ofvehicle road worthiness (60%).

Fig. 1. Policy framework for road-base

This profile suggests that there is general discord with the leveland quality of public transport services being provided by publictransport operators in the country. Subsequent to the 2008 paperby Walters (2008), as well as an update at the Thredbo 10 confer-ence at Hamilton Island, Australia as well as at Thredbo 11conference held in Delft, The Netherlands, progress with policyimplementation has been slow, although progress has been madein a number of key areas. Government has recognised this and hasinitiated a number of new strategies and policies to address theissues of concern. Progress with policy implementation as well asthe strategies will be discussed in the following sections, followedby specific reference to the progress made (or the lack thereof) forthe respective modes of public transport.

2. Policy framework: road-based public transport

The policy framework for road-based public transport (bus andtaxi) is depicted in Fig. 1:

2.1. The White Paper on National Transport Policy, 1996

In brief, the White Paper established the principle of competi-tive tendering for subsidised services, and promoted the principleof competition for the route in contrast to on the route. In future, alloperators would be required to tender for their subsidised services.This would “open up the market” to new previously disadvantagedoperators that did not participate in subsidised public transportservice provision, as well as to potential international operators.Following the White Paper, a number of tendered contracts wereconcluded with operators in areas where existing operators indi-cated that they wished to withdraw their services due to financialconstraints.

2.2. The conclusion of interim contracts, 1997

In 1997 the Department of Transport (DoT) concluded interimcontracts (ICs) with existing subsidised operators which, inessence, put their existing services on a contractual footing. Prior tothis development, services were developed based on DoT approvalbut not within the ambit of a formal contract or an agreed Inte-grated Transport Plan (ITP). This situation gave the operatorsperpetual rights in the operation of their services. The ICs wereoriginally intended to last between one and three years in order togive the operators time to “get fit” for the tendering system byreorganising their businesses in such away that they would be ableto tender competitively for their existing services. Interim contractswould also only come to an end when the services incorporated in

d public transport (bus and taxi).

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e4536

the ICs were put out to tender, and until such developments tookplace would continue to remain valid.

2.3. The Moving South Africa Strategy, 1998

The Moving South Africa Strategy study was undertaken toprovide amulti-modal transport vision and strategy for the countrybased on the White Paper of 1996s vision for transport in SouthAfrica. This extensive study made a number of strategic recom-mendations regarding public transport, such as the establishmentof a corridor focus, the densification of such corridors, optimisingmodal economics (by promoting the mode that offers the best cost/service trade-off for a given corridor), and improving firm levelperformance and productivity by creating, amongst other, compe-tition within and between modes of transport through tendering/concessioning of services to private operators (Moving South Africa,1998, p. 135). This also laid the foundation for the formalisation ofthe taxi industry (Moving South Africa, 1998, p. 156).

2.4. The Tripartite Heads of Agreement, 1999

During the period 1997 and 1999, a number of tenderedcontracts were concluded with IC operators, even before it was firstlegislated in 2000. Experiences with job losses and a reduction ofcondition of service and benefits of labour led to two years ofdiscussions between the DoT, organised labour and the SouthernAfrican Bus Operators Association (SABOA) (representing opera-tors), and eventually resulted in the Tripartite Heads of Agreementin 1999 (HOA). The main purpose of the agreement was to softenthe impact of competitive tendering on labour through job lossesand a reduction in wages. In particular, the agreement compelledany operator to source at least 75% of the required workforce of thecontract service from the incumbent operator. It also made provi-sion for a right of refusal of 10% where, should a service be put outto tender, and the incumbent operator’s tender prices was within10% of the most acceptable tender, the incumbent operator wasoffered the contract at the tender price of the most acceptabletender. This principle was agreed to with a view to giving theincumbent operator the best chance of winning its services back,thus lessening the impact on labour.

2.5. National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000 (NLTTA)

In 2000, the National Land Transport Transition Act was enac-ted. This act, for the first time, defined the functions of therespective levels of government in managing public transport (aconcurrent function in terms of the RSA Constitution), establishedthe principle of transport authorities to manage public transport,legislated arrangements around competitive tendering, and alsomade provision for negotiated contracts under certain conditions,for example for transformational and empowerment reasons (arequirement that the negotiated service had to be majority blackowned within two years of such negotiated agreements). The actalso made provision for integrated public transport planning e

a condition for concluding contracts with operators. This conditionwas later amended when an operator took government to court(and won the case) when a provincial government tried to put itsservices out to tender without the existence of an ITP.

Despite the conditions contained in the HOA to protect labour ina tender situation, labour continued to voice its opposition tocompetitive tendering. It remained, in principle, against competi-tive tendering in public transport. This continued opposition andthe lack of finding common ground between labour, the DoT andSABOA (the Southern African Bus Operators Association) eventuallyled to the indefinite suspension of the competitive tendering

system in 2002. Other reasons cited for the suspension was theunaffordability of the tendering system considering the govern-ment’s financial constraints. In most cases the tendered contractsproved to be more expensive than the services they were replacing(Walters & Cloete, 2001). A number of negotiated contracts havehowever been concluded since 2000. These negotiations involvedorganised labour, the DoT and the operator reaching amicablesettlements in the negotiations preceding the conclusion of thecontract.

2.6. National land transport framework (NLTSF)

The establishment of the NLTSF is a legislative requirement interms of the NLTTA of 2000 and provides a five year forward-looking view of public transport developments (2006e2011). Interms of bus and taxi services the framework provided for allprovincial and municipal bus operators to be corporatized; allsubsidised services had to be provided in terms of tendered/negotiated contracts that would be open to all road-based publictransport operators (Department of Transport, 2006, p. 5). Insupport of the tendering system, it foresaw the gazetting of a modeltender document, the replacement of interim and tendered buscontracts with new tendered or negotiated contracts, and theissuing of tenders based on transport plans (where possible).

2.7. Taxi recapitalisation programme (2006)

Following many years of discussion and debate, agreement wasreached between the DoT and the South African National TaxiCouncil (SANTACO) to begin a formal process of scrapping andreplacing old and unroadworthy taxi vehicles with new vehiclesthat had to meet new national standards for the conveyance ofpassengers. More information about this process is included in thetaxi modal overview section of this paper.

2.8. Public transport strategy documents, 2007

In March 2007 the DoT published two influential strategydocuments, The Public Transport Strategy, and The Public TransportAction Plan, Phase 1 (2007e2010): Catalytic Integrated Rapid PublicTransport Network Projects. The purpose of these documents wasto give new direction to public transport management as well as tomake provision for the introduction of bus rapid transit (BRT)systems. The Strategy document contains two key thrusts: accel-erated modal upgrading (multi-modal) that included a consolida-tion of the passenger rail sector; rolling out a National Rail Plan;implementing the taxi recapitalisation programme, includingimproved regulation and law enforcement; and transforming andoptimising current subsidised bus services. Secondly, it madeprovision for Integrated Rapid Public Transport Networks (IRPTNs)in the main metro areas of the country. The longer term vision until2020 is to develop a system that places over 85% of a metropolitancity’s population within one km of an IRPTN trunk or feedercorridor. A further goal for metropolitan cities by 2020 is to achievea mode shift of 20% of car work trips to public transport networks.These networks will consist of core road and rail trunk corridorswith feeder and distributor systems. The aim is also to achievemaximum physical and fare integration in the core public transportservices.

The Public Transport Action Plan details the Public TransportStrategy. It focuses on the six main metros and the public transportsystems of the six secondary cities. It planned for the scrapping andreplacement of 75 000 taxis by 2010, the refurbishment of 2000 railcoaches used for commuter rail services, and the replacement of30% of the current commuter bus fleet of 7500 to be tender

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 37

compliant by 2009/10. The Action Plan also established, amongstother, more detail about the BRT system principles (such as how toaccommodate affected operators) and included new specificationsfor buses on the trunk routes.

2.9. National Land Transport Act, 2009

This act replaced the NLTTA of 2000 and expanded on theprinciple of the acceptance of negotiated contracts. Negotiatedcontracts can now also follow a tendered contract, which was notallowed under the 2000 act. It also spelled out clearly that publictransport should be devolved to the lowest effective level ofgovernment e the metro and local government levels. In addition,it created new institutional structures applicable to the licensing ofoperators (permits), long distance passenger transport andrequirements for integrated public transport plans.

Progress with policy thrusts regarding commuter buses andtaxis will be highlighted later in a later section.

3. Policy framework: rail based commuter transport

Commuter rail services are operated by Metrorail (previouslywithin the Rail Commuter Corporation and today a division ofPRASA) in the Western Cape (Cape Town), Eastern Cape (PortElizabeth), KwaZulu Natal (Durban/Pietermaritzburg) and Gauteng(the greater Johannesburg and Pretoria areas). A total of 2.2 millionpassenger trips are operated dailyMonday to Friday (PRASA & 2010,p. 12) making it the third largest public transport operator in SA.

The policy framework for commuter rail services in the countryis depicted in Fig. 2:

3.1. The Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act

This act made provision for the establishment of the SouthAfrican Rail Commuter Corporation Ltd, a company wherein thestate was the only shareholder and member of the company.

3.2. The White Paper on National Transport Policy

The White Paper confirmed that the national transportauthority (DoT) would own the commuter rail infrastructure, roll-ing stock and land associated with rail reserves until the provincialor metropolitan transport authorities (TAs) were in a position totake over the responsibility. It was also foreseen that operating andmaintenance concessions would be awarded by the TAs, initiallynationally, and later at the provincial or metro levels of govern-ment. It also foresaw the abolishment of the deficit form offinancing (deficit subsidies) and the replacement of it with

Fig. 2. Policy framework for

a concessioning system for the operation of rail services ona competitive basis. Provision for the concessioning of commuterrail services was also made in the NLTTA. To date, concessioning hasnot happened and it is doubtful as to whether it is still governmentpolicy to concession services. However, at a recent investors’conference held in Cape Town, mention was made of private sectorinvolvement in commuter rail services (van der Walt, 2011).

3.3. The Moving South Africa (MSA) Strategy

The main recommendation of the strategy pertaining to trans-port in South Africa, and by definition commuter rail commuterservices, is that transport corridors should be densified; that thereshould be an optimisation of modal economics and service mix e

best cost/service trade-offs for each corridor through encourage-ment of differentiated public transport services; and, improvingfirm level performance by creating competition within andbetween modes through tendering/concessioning (e.g. rail) ofservices to private sector operators (MSA, p. 136).

3.4. National Land Transport Transition Act

Similar to road-based public transport, the act makes provisionfor the inclusion of rail services in the development of transportplans. In contrast to the approval process of such plans for road-based modes, the act stipulates that until the rail function isdevolved from the national to another level of government, theplans had to be submitted to the Minister of Transport for approvalof the commuter rail components of the plan. To date the functionhas not been devolved to a lower level of government, andcommuter rail remains a national government competency.

3.5. The National Railway Safety Regulator Act

Prior to the establishment of the act, safety issues weremanaged by Transnet, the national rail operator, previously knownas South African Transport Services, as well as Metrorail as theoperator of commuter rail services. The act established an inde-pendent Regulator to oversee safety in the railway transportindustry and to promote the use of rail as a mode of transportationthrough improved safety performance of the industry. It was taskedwith drafting regulations in compliancewith the act and tomonitorand ensure compliance with the act.

3.6. National land transport framework

This framework provides policy and strategy guidelines for a fiveyear forward-looking period (2006e2011). In terms of rail services,

rail commuter services.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e4538

the DoT envisaged significant rail capability enhancements in orderto better manage the rail function. It also foresaw the completion ofa National Rail Plan and for significant implementation of the planto occur over the five year period. This would require the identifi-cation of priority rail corridors through a rail network classificationsystem, the upgrading of infrastructure and service levels on thekey corridors e.g. rolling stock, security and station improvementsand improved infrastructure condition. Measures would also betaken to reduce levels of fare evasion on the priority corridors.

3.7. The National Rail Plan (NRP)

The principal objective of the National Rail Plan is to secure thefuture of commuter rail in South Africa by applying a prioritycorridor strategy to the rail network in each of the regions. Througha series of regional rail plans (provinces where commuter rail isoffered), the NRP seeks to find clarity in the role that commuter railshould play in the context of an integrated approach to publictransport service provision (South African Rail CommuterCorporation/Metrorail. National Rail Plan: i). Emphasis is also puton regions adjacent to metropolitan areas currently served bycommuter rail, as well as other urban areas and provinces such asLimpopo and Mpumalanga where there are at present nocommuter rail services.

In each region, corridors were allocated A, B, C or D, based on thelevel of service appropriate to the travel corridor of which rail isa part. “A” represents corridors wheremuch higher levels of servicethan at present are warranted, and “D” corridors those where thereis no longer a case for providing commuter rail services.

3.8. Public transport strategy and the public transport strategyaction plan (2007)

The two key thrusts of these strategies (Department ofTransport, 2007a, 2007b) applicable to commuter rail pertains,firstly, to accelerated modal upgrading; the consolidation of thepassenger rail sector; the roll-out of the National Rail Plan in theshort to medium term and, secondly, Integrated Rapid PublicTransport Networks (IRPTNs) with the aim to have a phasedoperational implementation of these networks in place in twelvecities and at least six rural districts by 2014. The latter thrust couldalso be more widely interpreted as to investigate new rail possi-bilities and even the establishment of rail services where the needmay arise.

In terms of the Public Transport Action Plan Phase 1: 2007e2010(Department of Transport, 2007b, p.19) the target to implement therail corridor strategy was to implement the Rail Priority Corridors Aand B in the applicable cities during the period 2007e2010. It wasalso envisaged that by the end of 2010 the services had to beimproved in the following ways:

Table 1Priority rail corridors.

Regions Corridor Total

A B C

Gauteng (Johannesburg and Pretoria area) 7 7 6 20Western Cape (Cape Town) 3 3 2 8KwaZulu Natal (Durban/Pietermaritzburg area 1 0 5 6Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth) 1 0 1 2Total 12 10 14 36% 33 28 39% (A D B corridors) D C 61 39

Source: PRASA Corporate Plan 2009/10e2011/12:19.

� “Service levels to be improved with increased frequencies andreliabilities

� Improved rail infrastructure, including the removal of capacitylimiting bottlenecks

� Improved signalling capacity� Enhanced levels of security and accessibility associated withthe station precincts with the A and B corridors

� The refurbishing of 2000 rail coaches by 2010”

A summary of the rail priority corridors, where 61% of the A andB corridors are supportive of public transport strategy, is set out inTable 1.

It can be seen that 61% of the corridors identified (or 22 incorridors in total) were grouped in the A and B categories and 39%(or 14 corridors) in category D. In terms of the NRP the “D” corridorsno longer warrant commuter rail services.

3.9. Legal Succession to the SATS Amendment Act

One of the main purposes of the amendment of the act was torename the SARCC to the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa(PRASA) and to expand its mandate to also include long distancepassenger rail and bus services within, to, and from the RSA. Thelong distance passenger and rail services had to be transferred toPRASA from Transnet by the end of March 2009.

3.10. National Land Transport Act

In addition to the information supplied in the previous sectionregarding the NLTA, the act makes provision for the rail function tobe devolved to the municipal level where such municipality wouldplan for rail services on a corridor network basis in consultationwith PRASA. This function, although nationally planned at thisstage, can be requested by a municipality subject to an acceptableIntegrated Transport Plan. At this stage no municipality hasrequested the function.

4. Current state of commuter rail in the country (servicesmanaged by PRASA)

The commuter rail section of PRASA (Metrorail) owns 317stations (but operates 468 stations) and provides rail services on3180 of single km track. It has a fleet of 406 train sets of which 97.5%were built between 1958 and 1985. The majority of the rail fleettechnology dates back to the 1950s (PRASA Corporate Plan, p. 10).Currently, 65e70% of the resources required to operate the railfunction come from Government in the form of deficit subsidieswhile the balance comes from internally generated free operatingcash-flow (PRASA Corporate Plan, p. 8).

% TotalA & B

Corridor definitions

% A Ideal corridor for rail, high quality service

56 70 B Important role for rail, 2000 service levels22 75 C Role of rail uncertain, investigation required17 175 50

100100

Fig. 3. Gautrain route map. Source: van der Merwe (2011).

1 The Bombela ConsortiumConcession Company Shareholders consist of: �Murray& Roberts Limited e a leading South African engineering, construction and con-tracting services company. � Strategic Partners Group (SPG) e a 25% shareholder inthe Consortium. � Bombardier UK e a Canadian company and world leader in theaerospace and rail transportation sectors. � Bouygues Travaux Publics e one of theworld’s top global “design and build” civil engineering and building contractors withextensive experience in concessionprojects. � The J&J Groupe an investment holdingcompany with more than 200 000 shareholders representing individuals and theirfamilies. � ABSACapital, a division of Absa Bank Ltd (subsidiary of Barclays Bank PLC).Source: http://www.gautrain.co.za/about/about-gautrain/concessionaire/.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 39

During the period 2007e2010 governmentmade available R 25b(or about US$3.33b at R 7.50/US$) for the stabilisation of PRASA anda turnaround strategy. This figure included an operational subsidyto the value of R 9.9bn, capital investment of R 14.7bn for thebusiness, R 7bn for the refurbishment of 2000 rail coaches, R 1.4bnfor the procurement of new buses, infrastructure upgrades to thevalue of R 2.6bn, and planned signalling upgrades at major stationsto the value of R 1.5bn (PRASA Leaflet: Our Positive Future).

At a recently organised (2011) DoT International TransportInvestors Conference held in Cape Town, where the DoT showcasedtransportation infrastructure projects which may attract privatesector capital, PRASA highlighted the following potential projectsfor financing: the Cape Town Airport Rail Link; the Moloto RailCorridor (north of Pretoria); the Bloemfontein e BotshabeloPassenger Rail Corridor; the Bara Rail Link (Gauteng); The Moth-erwell Rail Link (Port Elizabeth); the Daveyton Rail Extension(Gauteng) and the re-introduction of the Hammanskraal Rail Linknorth of Pretoria (van der Walt, 2011).

In terms of its ageing rolling stock, PRASAmentioned that it wasbusy with a feasibility study to replace 8600 rail coaches with newrolling stock over an 18 year time frame. A transaction adviser forthe project was appointed and it was estimated that the rollingstock renewal programme would cost about R 86b over the 18 yearperiod. It was estimated that a Request For Proposals (RFPs) wouldbe issued by mid-2012 (van der Walt, 2011).

Some of the challenges faced by PRASA are detailed in itsCorporate Plan 2009/11e2011/12 (PRASA Corporate Plan, pp.21e28):

� Consolidation/Turnaround/Restructuring processes.� Change management e consolidation of five organisations intoa consolidated organisation (Metrorail (commuter rail); Auto-pax (consisting of Translux and City to City long distance busservices); Shosholoza Meyl (long distance passenger railservices) and Intersite Property Services.

� Sustainable funding.� Ageing rolling stock and infrastructure.� Human capital development.� Leadership and skills development e shortage of key skills aswell as a lack of depth in skills

� Rail technology developmente “catchup”withnew technology.� Long term planning alignment e road, rail and land.� Strategic partnerships e national alliances and strengtheningrelationships (nationally and internationally).

� Modal integration e poses internal and external challenges.

5. The Gauteng high speed rail service (gautrain)

The need to establish a high speed rail service between themetropolitan area of Tshwane (which includes Pretoria), Johan-nesburg and Oliver Tambo International Airport (South Africa’smain international air hub) has been a point of discussion for manyyears. The project was meant to speed up the travel time betweenTshwane and Johannesburg, a notoriously congested freeway link,thereby enticing car users to make use of the rail service instead.

As the airport is some 20 km from the CBD of Johannesburg andabout 40 km from Tshwane, a link to the airport was also built intothe project as it is expected that the airport would in future becomesignificantly busier. The system consists of 10 stations and 80 km ofrailway lines (of which 15 km are underground) linking the threenodes (see Fig. 3).

The Gautrain system interfaces with Metrorail commuter railservices at Hatfield Station, Pretoria Station, Rhodesfield Stationand Johannesburg Park Station. The maximum speed of the systemis 160 km/h and operates on standard gauge.

Currently there are 24 Electrostar train sets manufactured byBombardier. The train sets operating to the airport differs from thenormal commuter sets as provision is made for luggage capabilitieson the airport services. The current frequency is between 10 minand 30 min with the latter mainly applying to weekend services.The initial operating hours is from 05:30 to 20:30.

A significant bus feeder and distributor system supports the railservice to and from stations. An example of the feeder system isincluded in Fig. 4:

The feeder and distribution system is operated with 125 busesoperating 36 feeder and distribution routes spanning 420 km. TheGautrain service operates every 12e30 min generating about 2200bus trips per day and over 26 000 daily operating kilometres. Theservice complements existing bus services in the various metro-politan areas (Dachs, 2011).

The project is one of the largest PublicePrivate-Sector-Partnership (PPP) concession projects of its kind in Africa. Theconcession is for 20 years for the design, build, part-finance andoperation of the system. The Bombela Consortium1 manages theclient interface with the Gauteng Provincial Government andprovides an integrated solutions approach for the PPP (http://www.gautrain.co.za/about/about-gautrain/concessionaire/). The esti-mated value of the project at completion was R 25.4bn orUS$3.39bn at an R 7.50/US$ exchange rate (Engineering News,2009).

Gautrain has five sources of funding (van der Merwe, 2011):

� The Division of Revenue Act e which enables funds to flowfrom Central Government via the Department of Transport(44.2%) to the Gauteng Province.

� The Medium Term Expenditure Framework from the GautengProvincial Government (26.1%).

� Private sector equity (1.8%).� Private sector borrowing (9.5%), and

Fig. 4. Sandton Station: feeder and distribution routes (OCD 2). Source: http://www.iweek.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Gautrain-BusRoute.pdf.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e4540

� Provincial borrowing (18.4%).

The project has a patronage guarantee of R 360m per annum forthe concessionaire (Dachs, 2011).

In terms of the concession agreement, the concessionaire takesall completion and integration risks, offers a fixed price for theproject, fixed specification and fixed time frame (turnkey contract).The concessionaire is fully involved in the operation and mainte-nance of the system for the entire concession period. At the end ofthe concession the concessionaire has to hand over the system tothe client in a prescribed condition.

The Sandton/Airport link was operationalized just before theSoccer World Cup event in SA in 2010, and the remainder of thenetwork opened in August 2011, excepting for a part of an under-ground section between the Johannesburg Park and Rivoniastations where water seepage and sub-surface water issues arecurrently being addressed.

The project is not without criticism. Opponents were of the viewthat the project is “elitist” as it was meant to relieve the congestionon the highways around Gauteng (between Tshwane (Pretoria) andJohannesburg and the airport). These users were considered to bealready “mobile” through the use of their cars and now had theluxury of a choice ofmodes. Opponentswere of the opinion that thevalue of the project would have been much better spent, andreached many more potential users, should the funds have beenspent on the existing commuter rail services in the country. Theseservices generate about 2.2 million passenger trips per day where itwas estimated that the Gautrain would generate about 120 000passenger trips per day by 2010 (http://www.gautrain.co.za/about/services/ridership-fare-structure/).

6. Commuter bus transport

An overview of the policies, strategies and legislation applicableto the commuter bus industry was provided earlier in the paper.This section considers the latest developments regarding policyimplementation, and also highlights some issues that the industryis concerned about.

The government policy is, and remains, that subsidisedcommuter transport, now and in future, should be put out to

competitive tender. As an interim measure, it will enter intonegotiated contracts with incumbent operators for a period of up to12 years. Requirements to enter into such agreements may involveset-asides for the taxi industry as well as small bus operators thathave not yet participated in the subsidy system. It is alsoa requirement that such contracts should be entered into based onapproved Integrated Public Transport Plans.

As mentioned earlier, a major impasse has been reachedregarding competitive tenders mainly due to organised labour’sopposition to the tendering system and concerns about thepotential costs of the system. At issue is the impact of competitivetenders on employment levels, labour wages and benefits, and thelack of continuity of employment. In this regard the last competi-tively tendered contracts were concluded in 2002. Since then mostof these contracts have expired, and almost all operators areoperating on short term contracts e from month to month orslightly longer. Since 2002 a few negotiated contracts wereconcluded. Government has indicated that it would negotiate allcontracts in the next round of tenders to avoid the issues thatlabour has with tendered contracts. This will probably allow suffi-cient time to solve the remaining issues that labour has with thetendering system.

All new contracts ought to be based on Integrated TransportPlans (ITPs). ITPs involve all public transport modeserail, buses andtaxis. These plans are currently being updated, and once completedshould result in a wave of negotiated contracts being concluded.Should negotiations with operators not be successful, services willbe put out to competitive tender for a period of seven years.

Table 2 sets out the current state of contracting in South Africa.Some of the challenges faced by the commuter bus industry and

which impact policy implementation are the following:

� Lack of funds to adequately fund road-based public transport.� Inadequate cost indexing in existing contracts e especiallyproblematic over longer term contracts.

� Organised labour opposition to competitive tenders.� The slow progress with the development/revision of IntegratedTransport Plans.

� Lack of managerial and implementation skills/capacity at theprovincial and local levels of government.

Table 2Contracts in place in South Africa.

Type of contract Number of buses Contract characteristics Duration

Interim contracts þ/� 3849 (68% ofsub budget)

Foreseen as transition arrangement in 1997 1e3 Years originally.In practice some interim contracts are 15 years old

Tendered contracts þ/�1834(28% of subsidybudget)

Based on standard contract documentMostly “stand alone” services in rural/urbanoperations

5 Years originally.Contracts are being extended to 7 yearsNew contracts to be 7 years.Most contracts are currently on a month-to-month basis.

Negotiated contracts 250 Mostly applicable to state-owned and operatedbus companies e form of privatisation

5 Years originally.New contracts to be 7 years.Some contracts on a month-to-month basis

Sale of bus entity throughnegotiation based on servicecontract specification (formof privatisation)

1050 Applicable to bus operations owned by local andprovincial governments

Contracts are 5 years in duration.New contracts to be 7 years.Implemented in the City of Durban (June 2003) andNorth West Province (January 2004).

Source: Compiled by the author for the purpose of this paper (SABOA and DoT sources) (2006 data).

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 41

� Lack of properly capacitated institutional structures to imple-ment PT policy.

� Institutional complexities between National, Provincial andLocal government (concurrent functions i.t.o. the RSAConstitution).

� Complexities of integrating the minibus taxi industry and thecommuter bus industry in one service design.

7. Modal overview: bus rapid transit (BRT) systems

The introduction of BRT systems in the country was officiallysanctioned in the DoT Public Transport Strategy and the PublicTransport Strategy Action Plans of 2007. These documents spell outgovernment policy and strategy and provide guidelines for theintroduction of the systems in SA. Amongst other, guidelines arespelled out on how to deal with existing operators on routesaffected by the introduction of BRT systems.

At present two systems are in operation e the Rea Vaya systemin Johannesburg and MyCiTi in Cape Town. A number of othermetro governments are planning systems, such as in Durban, PortElizabeth, Pretoria and Brits (west of Pretoria).

Fig. 5. Long term network proposed for Rea Vaya BRT in

7.1. Rea Vaya: Johannesburg

Plans are to introduce 325 km of BRT routes and 30 interchangenodes in the Johannesburg area. Phase one of the system consistingof 122 km of routes was approved by the Johannesburg MetroCouncil in 2006 (Seftel, 2011). The envisaged Rea Vaya BRTnetwork, when fully implemented is depicted in Fig. 5 and consistsof a number of phases.

The intention of the Johannesburg Metro (and supported bygovernment policy and strategies) was to incorporate the taxiindustry in the BRT, as the sole operator (therewere no bus serviceson the route) on the Phase 1A route. The Johannesburg Metrotherefore was one of the first Metros to engage the taxi industry ina new business model that would manage the BRT route. Majordifficulties were however encountered to get the taxi industry to“transform” from an informal business to a formal business. Taxiowners and their drivers were (amongst other) concerned abouttheir future earnings, the loss of revenue as their taxi vehicles hadto be removed from the route, the potential job losses, thecomplexities associated with a “formal” business etc. This led toprotracted negotiations and many acrimonious meetings.

the greater Johannesburg area. Source: Seftel, 2011.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e4542

The Metro was however under pressure to have the first phaseof the service up and running by a certain date (a financialrequirement) and services began operating before agreement couldbe reached with the taxi industry to buy into and manage the BRTsystem. In this regard the city initially signed a 12 year contractwith Clidet, an interim company owned by the BRT Systems Trust.Clidet signed a management contract with Metrobus (the munici-pally owned bus company) to manage the bus operating companyin the interim whilst negotiations were still on-going with the taxiindustry. After the Metro reached an agreement with the taxiindustry to take over and manage the BRT, Clidet passed a resolu-tion on 31 January 2011 to transfer the Clidet shares to the newshareholders of the bus operating company consisting of taxiindustry role players (Ndebele, 2011).

The service is operated on a 12 year contract by the bus oper-ating company (valued at about R 184m per year) consisting of nineTaxi Operator Investor Companies (TOICS) who are taxi operatorsaffected by Phase 1A (Ndebele, 2011). Over 300 taxi owners owningabout 550 taxi vehicles contributed R 54 000 equity derived fromthe sale or scrapping of their minibus taxis in exchange for oneshare in the bus operating company (Seftel, 2011). The BOC wasrenamed PioTrans as from 1 February 2011 and operates in part-nership with an experienced South American (Columbian) BRToperator, Fanalca (Rea Vaya, 2011).

Phase 1A from Soweto, a large township south west of Johan-nesburg, to Ellis Park on the north eastern side of the JohannesburgCBD, has been operating since August 2009 and transports about30 000 passengers per day over the 25.5 km of dedicated roadway,33 stations and 146 Euro 4 buses (Seftel, 2011).

Fig. 6 shows the Phase 1A route.Phase 1B construction is nearing completion and the expecta-

tion is that this phase will be operational during the first quarter of2012. In contrast to the first phase, this phase impacts existing busoperators that will have to be accommodated in the business modelto manage this section. These discussions have been very pro-tracted. Major issues were encountered in determining marketshares of the respective modes (buses and taxis), the sharing offinancial risk versus market share, expertise to manage the systemetc.

One of the criticisms of the current Metro approach is that itappears as if each new section will demand a new round of nego-tiations. As the entire network is being rolled out section-by-section, this could mean that a host of operating companies willhave to be established to manage the system, eventually leading tooperational, integration, systems efficiency and managerial issues.It should be remembered that there are a host of taxi operatorsoperating sections of the route compared to only a few bus

Fig. 6. Phase 1A route of the Johannesburg BRT. Source: www.r

companies directly impacted by BRT route proposals. This couldprove to be unmanageable.

7.2. MyCiTi: Cape Town

The MyCiTi BRT in Cape Town (or Integrated Rapid Transit as it’sreferred to in Cape Town) is a 15 year project to establish BRTsystems in the city area. The inner-city distribution service linkedthe World Cup stadium in Sea Point area (to the west of the CapeTown CBD) during the World Cup in 2010. A shuttle service linksthe Cape Town station to the Cape Town International Airport.

The most recent phase of the BRT was launched in May 2011 e

the West Coast corridor between Table View and the Cape TownCBD. This service is shown in Fig. 7.

The entire service is supplemented with an extensive bicycleroute network and links existing bus, taxi and rail services. Theinterim inner-city feeder route between Gardens, the Civic Centreand the Cape Town Waterfront also began operating recently. Thebusiness model included operators affected by the BRT. The marketshare model was based on passenger trips, passenger km gener-ated, fare revenue and profits. The outline of the business model isdepicted in Fig. 8 with the future systems plan in Fig. 9.

8. Modal overview: commuter taxi industry

In South Africa, the dominant public transport mode is the 16-seater minibus taxi. These services had their origin after a 1985White Paper on National Transport Policy where the services were“legitimised”. This led to the rapid growth of the industry at theexpense of the formal commuter bus and rail industries. Today, it isestimated that about 65% of all commuter trips take place in taxis,although the figure varies depending on local circumstances (ArriveAlive, 2011a). Table 3 provides a statistical overview of the taxioperating sector:

The industry is regarded as a prime example of Black EconomicEmpowerment in the country, in particular small black business.The industry is largely unregulated, although route associationscontrol access to routes and the associated associations. This has,especially in the past, led to major rivalry among operators, oftenleading to bloody battles, deaths and injuries.

It is estimated that there are between 120 000 and 140 000 taxisin the country with the largest concentrations in urban areas. Thereis little effective governmental control over the industry by ways offares (the market and intensity of intra- and inter-modal compe-tition determines fare levels), and the effective enforcement of roadtraffic laws governing vehicle road worthiness, driving techniques.

eavaya.org.za/images/stories/2010/transportfor2010/routes.

Fig. 7. Map of the MyCiTi West Coast corridor route and picture of the route as seen from the Gardens area towards Cape Town. Map source: Fortune, 2011. Picture source: Fortune,2011.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 43

The industry is also criticised for its poor safety record e a pointthat was mentioned in the National Household Travel Survey.

Government has been engaging with the taxi industry throughits representative structure SANTACO (South African National TaxiCouncil). This institution was formed by the DoT in 2001 to enablegovernment to engage with the taxi industry in a single nationalforum. This specific aim has largely been achieved although thereare a number of large associations not affiliated with SANTACO. Inaddition, the DoT established a National Joint Working Group(NJWG) to deal with matters such as the taxi recapitalisation pro-gramme, taxi subsidies, legislation, regulation and enforcement. Italso deals with enterprise and skills development, communication,stakeholder management, the BRT systems, and Integrated PublicTransport Networks (South African Government Information,2010).

In an effort to address the financial viability of the industry, andto improve its service levels, a number of governmental interven-tions have been identified, the most visible being the taxi recapi-talisation programme that began in 2006 (Department ofTransport, 2006). Other initiatives include the involvement of taxi

Fig. 8. MyCiTi business management model. Source: Fortune, 2011.

companies in the subsidy system (tenders), the BRT developmentsin the country, and promises of taxi industry subsidies.

8.1. The taxi recapitalisation programme

The government’s aim is to formalise the taxi industry throughan R 7.7bn taxi recapitalisation programme (Arrive Alive, 2011a)toassist the industry to replace ageing and unroadworthy taxis, and,eventually, to make it part of the overall public transport solutionthrough its envisaged involvement in ITPs. The governmentalassistance is in the form of a once-off capital subsidy where, irre-spective of the condition of the vehicle, government willcompensate the operator R 57 400 to use as a deposit on a new

Fig. 9. MyCiTi development phases. Source: Fortune, 2011.

Table 3Taxi operating statistics.

� Number of people using taxi services each day: 14 millionþ� Number of officially registered minibus taxis on South African

roads: 120 000þ� Average number of taxis per owner: 2� Average number of hours taxi drivers spend daily on the road: 8.8� Number of days each taxi driver works per week: 6.33� Average monthly kilometres driven by a taxi: 8000� Average number of passengers transported monthly per vehicle: 3161� Average time spent daily in a taxi by a passenger: 65 min� Average number of trips per passenger per day: 2.3

Source: http://www.ComutaNet.co.za as quoted by the Mercatus Policy Series.Policy Comment No 3. Taxing Alternatives: Poverty Alleviation and the SouthAfrican Taxi/Minibus Industry. Author: K Boudreaux, Senior Fellow, MercatusCenter, George Mason University, February 2006 page 6.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e4544

vehicle or to use the money to exit the industry (South AfricanGovernment Information, 2010). The vehicles that are traded in(or handed in should the operator wish to exit the industry) arephysically destroyed to ensure that they do not re-enter theindustry. A special Taxi Scrapping Agency (the Taxi ScrappingAdministrator) was established by the DoT and has a presence in allnine provinces. To date (May 2007) more than 42 000 taxis havebeen scrapped and a total of R 2.13b paid out as compensation forthese vehicles (Department of Transport, 2011).

The aim of the recapitalisation programme is to improve thesafety and reliability of the industry through the replacement ofolder vehicles with new, higher quality, purposefully specifiedvehicles; to reduce the number of vehicles to about 85 000(Walters, 2008); to ensure that the new vehicles meet the SouthAfrican Bureau of Standards safety requirements for instance, roll-over protection, brakes, tyre ratings, seating arrangements, andsafety belts (Arrive Alive, 2011b); to replace existing 16-seatervehicles with 18-seater as well as 18e35 seater vehicles; toaddress the economic sustainability of the industry, and to effec-tively regulate the industry.

In order to qualify for the recapitalisation programme:

� Taxi operators are required to convert their radius basedoperating permits to route based operating licences (forexisting vehicles as well as for replacement/recapitalizationvehicles).

� To ensure that minimum wages are paid to drivers and otheremployees working in the taxi sector.

� To regulate driving hours. Drivers are allowed to work at most48 h per week and must have at least 12 h a day and 36continuous hours of rest per week.

� To regulate leave conditions.� To ensure that operators have adequate passenger liabilityinsurance.

� To ensure that operators pay their income taxes. A tax clear-ance certificate is required before operators may participate inthe scrapping allowance as part of the recapitalisation pro-gramme (Walters, 2007).

8.2. The involvement of the taxi industry in the public transporttender and contracting system

Provision is made in the “model tender document”, a guidelinedocument developed by the DoT in consultation with provincialdepartments of transport and the respective industries, for, amongother, the taxi industry to participate in the tender and contractingsystem. Little progress has been recorded to date, but it is ex-pected that once negotiated contracts are entered into, the taxiindustry, as well as the small bus operators that have not yet

participated in the subsidy system, will be accommodated throughthe designs of such contracts, based on ITPs, to favour the “mostappropriate mode of transport” for given circumstances. In prac-tice this would mean that on trunk and high density routes,especially in the peaks, buses would be specified in the contract,and on the less dense routes, during the off-peak and after hours/late night services, lower capacity vehicles. The lower capacityvehicles, i.e. taxis, would also be used as feeder and distributorvehicles to the trunk routes. Taxi cooperatives/companies wouldalso be encouraged to tender, or be involved in, the negotiationsfor traditional bus service contracts, and in doing so, exit the taxiindustry, and participate in traditional larger capacity publictransport service provision.

8.3. The involvement of the taxi industry in the formal publictransport system through BRTs

Two successful examples of the conversion from taxis to busesare the BRT systems in Johannesburg and Cape Town. Taxi servicesare predominantly short distance urban commuter services, mainlyconcentrating on high density corridors. Many of these corridorshave been identified for BRT services. Based on the 2007 DoTstrategy documents discussed earlier (Department of Transport,2007a, 2007b), it is evident that many taxi operators will beencouraged to participate in these systems in future. The challengeremains to find acceptable business models to accommodate bothexisting bus and taxi industry service providers.

8.4. Taxi industry subsidies

The call to subsidise the taxi industry has come from variousquarters over many years. The most vocal of these have beenSANTACO. Philip Taaibosch, the General Secretary of SANTACO isquoted as follows: “.government subsidised othermodes of publictransport in the country, such as rail and bus transport, but the taxiindustry did not get any subsidy and was discriminated againstdespite transporting between 68 percent and 70 percent ofcommuters daily” (Taaibosch, 2011).

The DoT has indicated that it was investigating the subsidisationof the industry but the funding constraints faced by government, aswell as the difficulty in managing such a system among thousandsof small operators, remain a challenge. Most of the effort in thisregard has been through developing enabling policy and strategydocumentation, especially the model tender documents, the BRTsystems and statements that provision will be made in ITPs for thetaxis to participate in the formal public transport system. Therehave been calls for set-asides in the future contracts of up to 30% ofthe vehicle kilometres for the taxi and small bus operators. This willno doubt negatively affect the financial wellbeing of establishedbus operators that will find it difficult to cut overheads in relation tothe proposed 30% cut in their services. It has however often beenstated by government that the intention was to expand the publictransport services to accommodate the taxi industry and the smallbus operators, and that it would not be at the expense of existingoperators. In reality, the lack of sustainable funding and the totalsum available for public transport subsidies will most likely dictatethe policy direction that the DoT will be following. In the urbanareas there are however significant rationalisation possibilitiesamong bus operators, Metrorail (where commuter rail services arepresent) and the taxi industry. Most, if not all, of the present urbantransport system design emanates from the days before 1994 andthe transition to democracy. The envisaged ITPs will address theseinequities in favour of integrated and operationally optimisedpublic transport systems and should be ready for implementationin some metros as from 2012.

J. Walters / Research in Transportation Economics 39 (2013) 34e45 45

Some of the unintended consequences of a de facto deregulatedtaxi industry include: infighting about routes; issues arising fromtaxi associations controlling routes and taxi ranks; road safetyissues; lack of long term economic sustainability; maintenance andcapital renewal issues; driver behaviour etc.

9. Conclusions

The public transport sector in South Africa faces major chal-lenges. There is no lack of a holistic vision as to the role that publictransport should play in the future of South Africa e this is evi-denced in the many policy and strategy documents that have beendeveloped. The main problem is the lack of effective policyimplementation, mainly due to a lack of sustainable funding toachieve the ambitious policy objectives; the huge financialdemands to replace ageing bus, rail and taxi fleets; a lack of skills toeffectively implement and monitor policy initiatives; the complexpolitical and policy relationship between the three levels ofgovernment dealing with public transport; complex intra- andinter-modal negotiation processes where many of the discussionsare, and will be centred on, how to involve the informal taxiindustry and the many small bus operators in the formal subsidisedpublic transport industry; significant migration to the cities fromthe poorer parts of South Africa as well as countries to the north ofSouth Africa; the resultant spread of existing townships further andfurther away from job opportunities and the concomitant compli-cations of offering extended public transport services to serve thesecommunities; and complicated labour arrangements that opposecertain policy thrusts such as the competitive tendering system.

There is also mounting public pressure to drastically improvepublic transport access, availability and safety, especially in the faceof the imminent introduction of expensive urban tolls on thefreeways surrounding and supporting the cities of Pretoria,Johannesburg and Cape Town, as well as persistently high fuelcosts. Opponents to the toll system argue that they have no choicebut to use their cars to commute to and from work as publictransport is not regarded as a viable alternative to the car.

On the positive side there are encouraging signs that issues arebeing addressed and progress made: major funding has been madeavailable for the renewal of Metrorail rolling stock and infrastruc-ture improvements; there are major investments in BRT systems etwo of which are already operating and many more being planned;the development of a BRT business model in Cape Town thatinvolves both existing bus and taxi operators in the operation of theBRT, and a business model that is emerging in the Rea Vaya Phase1B involving established bus companies, small bus operators andthe taxi industry; the introduction of the Gautrain high speed railservice; a firm decision to speed up the public transport contractingsystem through the introduction of negotiated contracts of up to 12years (thus by-passing the labour issues related to the competitivetendering system), and the recapitalisation of the taxi industrythrough the taxi recap programme e although behind schedule,more than 42 000 taxis have been part of the programme.

The key to future urban transport in South Africa is to be foundin the implementation of ITPs that will, over time, integrate andcoordinate public transport service provision. This is however,a medium term process, and full implementation is not expectedfor many years to come.

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List of abbreviations

BOC: bus operating companyBRT: bus rapid transitCBD: central business districtDoT: Department of Transport (National)HOA: Heads of AgreementIC/ICs: interim contract/sIRPTN/s: Integrated Rapid Public Transport Network/sIRT: Integrated Rapid TransitITP: Integrated Transport PlanLTA: Land Transport Act, 2009MSA: Moving South AfricaNHTS: National Household Travel SurveyNJWG: National Joint Working GroupNLTSF: National Land Transport Strategic FrameworkNLTTA: National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000NRP: National Rail PlanPPP: PublicePrivate PartnershipPRASA: Passenger Rail Agency of South AfricaRFP: request for proposalRSA: Republic of South AfricaSA: South AfricaSABOA: Southern African Bus Operators AssociationSANTACO: South African National Taxi CouncilSPG: Strategic Partners GroupTA: transport authorityTOICS: Taxi Operator Investor Companies