Oxfam International
Tsunami Fund Final
Evaluation: Livelihoods
Review Summary
An evaluation of Oxfam International’s livelihoods response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunamiby Rajan Alexander
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As part of its ongoing aims to learn from experience and to hold itself accountable for its actions, Oxfam has commissioned a wide-ranging evaluation of its response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. This comprises 14 thematic evaluations, 12 of the 14 studies have been conducted by independent consultants, while the remaining two conducted by members of Oxfam International Tsunami Fund secretariat (*)
Recurring issues and key themes from the 14 individual evaluations are brought together in this evaluation summary report ’In the Wake of the Tsunami’.
The reports available in this series are:
Evaluation summary report: ’In the Wake of the Tsunami’
Thematic evaluations:
1. Livelihoods Review (Rajan Alexander)2. Public Health Review (Pradeep Bharwad & Wim Klassen)3. Shelter Review (Sarbjit Singh Sahota & Dave Hodgkins) 4. Gender Review (Annette Salkeld)5. Downward Accountability Review (Ravinder Kumar & N. Raghunathan, Catalyst Management Services)6. Corporate Accountability Review (John Chilver*)7. Advocacy Review (Alasdhair Collins)8. Disaster Risk Reduction Review (Man B. Thapa)9. Partners and Partnerships Review (Stuart Kenward)10. Monitoring and Evaluation Programme Review (Catherine Lowery)11. Communications Review (Alex Wynter)12. Funding and Finance Review (Clive Surman & John Chilver*)13. Management Issues Review (Simon Harris)14. OITF Architecture and Structure Review (Geoffrey Salkeld)
The evaluation summary report and the executive summaries for the individual reviews can be found on the Oxfam website at www.oxfam.org/emergencies/tsunami. Full versions of the individual reviews are available on request from the Oxfam International Secretariat via www.oxfam.org/contact
Philip Horgan, Oxfam International Tsunami Fund Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator, December 2009
Cover image: Habsah Budiman, who lives in Kulee village near Sigli, Aceh Province, Indonesia, is a widow who has received a small loan or grant from Oxfam to help her to start making mats in order to earn an income. Credit: Jim Holmes/Oxfam
Tsunami Evaluation series
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Summary Report
ContentsAcronyms and abbreviations 2
Acknowledgements 3
1. Introduction 4
2. Key challenges 4
3. Sector:fisheries 5
4. Sector: farm 7
5. Sector:coastalnon-farmeconomy(CNFE) 9
6. Intervention: cash programming 10
7. Intervention:micro-credit/micro-finance 12
8. Cross-cutting:chronicvs.transientpoverty 14
9. Cross-cutting:gender 16
10. Sustainability 18
11. Conclusions 21
12. Recommendations 25
References 32
Acronyms and abbreviationsADB Asian Development BankBRAC BangladeshRuralAdvancementCommitteeCBO Community-basedorganisationCCD CovenantCentreforDevelopmentCEE CentreforEnvironmentEducationCFW CashforworkCNFE Coastalnon-farmeconomyDEC DisastersEmergencyCommitteeDRR Disaster risk reductionFADS FishaggregatingdevicesFRP Fibre-reinforcedpolytheraneIDP InternallydisplacedpeopleIFRC InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRed
CrescentSocietiesINGO Internationalnon-governmentorganisationIO IntermónOxfamOxfam ReferstoOITF,affiliates,andsometimespartnersMC Micro-creditM&E MonitoringandevaluationMF Micro-financeMFI Micro-financeinstitutionMSSRF MSSwaminathanResearchFoundationMoU Memorandum of understandingNGO Non-governmentorganisationOGB OxfamGreatBritainODI OverseasDevelopmentInstitute(UK)OI OxfamInternationalOITF OxfamInternationalTsunamiFundPIP ProgrammeimplementationplanPO Projectofficer
QIP Quick-impactprojectRCL RicecreditlineSEEDS SarvodayaEconomicEnterprise
Development ServicesSHG Self-helpgroupSLF SewalankaFoundationSRI SystemofriceintensificationSL SustainablelivelihoodTOR TermsofreferenceVO VillageorganisationsWB WorldBankWFP WorldFoodProgramme
AcknowledgementsAsitstsunamiprogrammewasdrawingtoaclose,theOxfamInternationalTsunamiFund(OITF)plannedafinalreviewofallsectorsandcross-cuttingthemes,amongthemthelivelihoodssector.Therewerethreedeliverablesspecifiedasoutputstothisstudy:adetailedreport,acondensedreport,andasummaryfinding.
IwouldliketothankinparticularPhilipHorgan,OITsunamiFundM&ECoordinator,whoco-ordinatedtheoverallstudyandwithoutwhose encouragement and support this study may not have seen thelightofday.IamalsodeeplyobligedtoStephanieGriggs-Trevarthen,Administrator,OI,whoco-ordinatedthewebsurvey,toRaymondSimbarasheMubayiwa,OITF,SriLankaM&ECo-ordinator,whomadeallthearrangementsfortheOITFColomboLivelihoodWorkshopheldinOctober2008,andtoDavidWilson,whoaidedwiththefinaleditingofthisreport.
Myextremeindebtednessextendstoalltheparticipantsintheworkshop and to all those across the globe who were interviewed duringthestudyprocess,eitherinpersonorbytelephone,andwho provided the primary data for this study. I was fortunate also tospendtwodaysinColombo,interactingwithacross-sectionof
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OxfamAustraliastaffinSriLanka.Thishelpedgivethestudyafirst-handperspectiveonhowthetsunamilivelihoodprogrammewasbeingimplementedinSriLanka.
TherearetwoindividualsIwouldliketothankespeciallyfortheirprofoundinfluenceonthestudy.V.VivekanandaoftheSouthIndianFederationofFishermenSocietiesinTrivandrumplayedasignificantrolenotonlyinshapingthewaythestudywasdesignedbutalsoinprovidingusefulinsightsfromthefield,whichwerereflectedintheinterpretationofdata.Lastbutnotleast,IamgratefultoPeterChamberlainofOxfamAustralia,whonotonlyminutelyreviewedthefirstdraftsbutwhosefeedbackdeeplyinfluencedthestructureofthereport.Allphotosandgraphics,unlessotherwisecredited,arefromOxfamInternationaloritsaffiliatesorpartners.
Summary findings1. IntroductionTheIndianOceantsunamiofDecember2004wasunprecedentedinitsscale,affecting12differentcountries.Oxfamrespondedinsevenoftheworst-hitareas:theprovinceofAcehinIndonesia,togetherwithIndia,SriLanka,Thailand,Myanmar,theMaldives,and Somalia.
Intermsofambition,Oxfam’stsunamiresponsewasunprecedented.Withsufficientmoneyavailabletofundprogrammes for as long as they were needed1,itwasexpectedthatprogrammeswouldnotonlyrestorelivelihoodstopre-tsunamilevelsbutwouldsubstantiallyimprovethem.Inthisrespect,Oxfam’s‘reconstructionplus’sloganechoedthe‘buildbackbetter’ambition of the broader response.
2. Key Response Challenges UnderliningOxfam’schoiceofresponsescalewastheassumptionthatitsorganisationalcapacityhadsufficientelasticityto meet challenges that could potentially limit the quality and
efficiencyofitscapacitytorespond.Thesechallengesarosefromdifferentsetsofsignificantrisks,whichoftenoccurredsimultaneously and reinforced one other.
AidflowsreflectingprinciplesofGoodHumanitarianDonorship(GHD)needtobeembeddedwithincommitmentsthatareproportionatetoexistingdonorresourcestrengthsandcapacities.Thisisoneoftheprerequisitestoensurethataidflowsareefficientandcompliantwithaccountabilitystandards.
Re-engineeringexistingsystemstomeetthedemandsofanabruptandsignificantscale-upoforganisationalcapacitiesisnotaneasytask,eveninnormaltimes.Thiswasexactlythe organisational challenge demanded by the scale of the tsunamiresponse.WhileOxfambyandlargemeasureduptothechallenge,itsresponseprovedtosomeextentinadequatein terms of administrative and programming capacity in the implementation of livelihood programmes.
3. Sector: FisheriesThelargestincreasesinincomefacilitatedbyOxfam’slivelihoodinterventionswereseeninthecoastalfisheriessector,whichsaw household income levels rise by at least 100–200 per cent comparedwithpre-tsunamilevels.Averageassistanceperpersoninfisherieswasalsothehighestofanysub-sector.Combined,thesefactorssupportedcoastalfishingcommunitiesandhelpedtoliftthemoutofpoverty.Thestrategicfocusoftheresponse,however,wasmoreoneliminatingtransientpovertythanonbringingaboutstructuralchangestomitigatelong-termproblemssuchaschronicpoverty,agoalthatwasclearlystatedfromtheoutsetinOxfam’spolicydirective.
Withplentyoffundsavailablewithinthebroadtsunamiresponse,the preferred intervention was to replace damaged boats. However,inSriLankaOxfampartnerNAFSO,atradeunion,wasable to set up its work yards to successfully repair boats within aweek.NAFSO’sboatswerethefirsttoreturntoseaandwerewidely praised for their seaworthiness.
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Most of the boats destroyed by the tsunami were wooden catamarans.However,Oxfam,likeotherdonors,fundedboatsthatweremostlymadeoffibre-reinforcedpolytherane(FRP)andwhichwerefittedwithhigh-poweredoutboardmotors.
Whilemostboatproductionwasoutsourced,boatsbuiltinyardsownedbyOxfampartners(suchasPREPAREinIndia)orbuiltoutdoors(suchasbyWOCAinSomalia)hadaclearedgeintermsofquality.However,partnersgenerallygavelowprioritytothe safety of boats.
Thefactthatthevalueofaspecificassetoftendependsonother complementary assets was not always fully appreciated. Consequently,therewereinstanceswhereboatsweredistributedwithout adequate nets or where boats and engines were mismatched.
Requirementsforsustainabilityofthefisheriessectordemandedthatlabourbeshiftedoutofthesector.Instead,someOxfampartnersdidtheexactopposite,attemptingtoencouragelabourshiftsintofisheries.
Similarly,thestrategyofencouragingashiftfromfishingtofishfarmingwasnotadequatelypursued,andwhereitwas,ityieldedmixedresults.Thisstrategywasdevisedtoavoidover-exploitationoflimitedmarineresources,astheincreasednumberoffishingcraftpost-tsunamiresultedinincreasinglysmallcatchesper craft.
Greatermarketaccesswaspromotedbythreestrategiesofdifferingscale;overallthesestrategieswereveryappropriate,butthe lack of focused application limited their potential impacts. At thesimplestendofthescale,Oxfamattemptedtoprovidegreatermobilityforfishvendors(whotraditionallycarrythecatchasaheadload)bypromotingsolutionssuchasrickshaws,bicycles,scooters,andmotorbikes.Themedium-scalestrategyfocusedonprovidinginfrastructuresuchasrefrigerationtrucksandfishstalls.
AfewOxfaminterventionswereonascalethatenabledamuchwiderreach.InNias,Indonesia,Oxfamconstructedadockingfacilitythatprovidedsafeoceanaccessforanentiretown,
significantlyboostingthecommunity’scapacitytotradeinfishandalso agricultural produce.
Intheareaofinlandfisheries,Oxfam’sstrategieshighlightedgaps in the overall response; they also demonstrated a better contextualunderstandingthanwasthecasewithitsinterventionsincoastalfisheries.Inlandfishermenusedifferentkindsofboatsfromcoastalfishermen–smallerandwithadifferentdesign.Theyalsousedifferentkindsofnet.OxfampartnerssuchastheDhanFoundationandShrutiinIndiaandEhedinSriLankaprovidedboats and nets designed to meet the particular requirements of thesefishers.
4. Sector: FarmAverage increases in income in the farm sector were claimed to bebetween50and100percent,verymuchhigherthanthoseachievedinthenon-farmsector,butconsiderablylessthanthoseclaimedbythefisherysector.ThiswouldseemtoimplythatOxfam’sperformancewasbetterinthefisherysectorthaninthefarmsector.However,theorganisation’sobjectivewastopromotesustainablelivelihoodsandinthiscontextfarmingbettermetitsobjectivesas(unlikeinfisheries)itsemphasisonlow-inputorganicagricultureresultedinahighdegreeofeco-sustainability.
ProgrammesindifferentcountriescontributedtoOxfam’ssuccessfulperformanceinthefarmsector–focusing,forexample,onadvocacyinAceh(Indonesia),systemofriceintensification(SRI)cultivationinIndia,homegardensinSriLanka,andlandrightsinThailand.
SRI could be considered to have had the greatest impact of any ofOxfam’slivelihoodinterventions.Itssuccesscanprobablybeattributedtoaconvergenceeffect,wheremostOxfampartnersworkedwithinacommonSRIframework,actingasaforcemultiplier for the promotion of a technology that was closely alignedwithgovernmentpolicies.Elsewhere,inThailandandinAcehprovince,Oxfamwasabletosignificantlyinfluencegovernment policy.
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Whatworked–asseeninIndiaandSriLanka–werelow-inputmodelsbuiltuponlocalcapacityandknowledge.MostOxfampartnersemployedavarietyoflow-inputbiologicalmethods,suchascompostingandvermicomposting,toflushsalinityoutofthesoil.Thegreenmanurecropdhaincha2 is traditionally used inTamilNadu,anddhainchawassoextensivelypromotedbyOxfampartnersandothersthatitsseedswereinshortsupplythroughout the state.
ThestrategytopromoteSRIwasbasedonfarmer-to-farmermethodologies and so the rate of uptake was less dependent ontheprojectitself,relyingmoreonpracticaldemonstrationsofthetechnology.InAceh,whereadifferentmodelwasadopted,agricultural programmes struggled.
Similarly,inmarketing,thericecreditline(RCL)largelysucceeded in India as it was kept at a scale and level of simplicity thatcouldbemanagedbyvillagewomenusingcommunity-basedorganisationsasaplatform,andinvolvedonlyasingleproductline.Villageself-helpgroups(SHGs)purchasedriceinbulkfromwholesalers at discounted prices and sold it on to members.
CCampinSriLankawasasimilarinitiative,thoughthiswasscaledup(multi-product)andincorporatedgreaterlogisticalcomplexity(multiplemarkets).Despiteoperatingforanumberofyears,however,ithasfailedtobreakevenandremainsproject-dependent for its daily operation.
OneofthekeystrategicdeficienciesinAceh(onethatwaslargelyavoidedinIndiaandSriLanka)wasthatofweaklinkagesbetweencash-for-work(CFW)activitiesandcashgrantbeneficiaries,whichledtorehabilitatedlandbeingleftidle:
• Oftenwherelandwasclearedthroughcash-for-workprojects,these were not followed up by cash grants for farmers.
• Therewerepoorlinkagesbetweencash-basedprogrammesandtheexpansionofwaterinfrastructureandirrigation.
Programmesthataimedtoincreasethewaterretentioncapacityof the soil and enhance irrigation potential often also made it
easiertoflushsalinityoutofthesoil.Asaresult,agriculturalrecoverywasfastestinIndia,asmostlandrestorationactivitieswerecompletedintimetotakeadvantageofthefirstmonsoonsandsubsequentfloods.
Many economists believe that agricultural growth can be up to four times more effective than growth in other sectors in reducing poverty.Agricultureactsasanengineofgrowthforothersectors,andthusOxfam’sstrategicfocusonthefarmsectorwaswellplaced.
Agriculturaldevelopmentgeneratesavirtuouscycle,inwhichtheexpansionofthefarmsectorfuelsgrowthinthecoastalnon-farmsector.OutcomesinthelatterthereforecanbeexpectedtohavegreatersustainabilityprospectsinIndiaandSriLanka,whereOxfam’sinterventionsgavevisiblesupporttoagriculture.
5. Sector: Coastal Non-farm Economy (CNFE)Inmostdevelopingcountries,CNFEispartofadiversifiedlivelihoodsportfolio,andaccountsfor45–60percentofthelabourmarket.Thesectorencompassesanyactivityassociatedwithwagedworkorincomegeneratedfromself-employment(includingin-kind)whichisnotagriculturalbutwhichtakesplaceincoastalareas.Italsoincludesmicro-enterprises,smallormedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs),andtradeactivities.Farmersandfishersareinpartdependentonit,asameansofreducingriskandincreasing returns on their labour.
ThegreatmajorityofOxfam’slivelihoodbeneficiarieswerefromthissectorand,comparedwithfisheriesandfarming,itwaswheretheorganisationexpendedthemostenergy,time,andhumanresources.Inparticular,OxfamalmostexclusivelytargetedwomenintheCNFEsector.Sincewomen’scapitalrequirementswerelow,theassistancepercapitaprovidedbyOxfamwasonlyafractionofthatprovidedineitherthefisheryorfarmingsectors.
However,despitesuccessfullyre-establishingmostofthelivelihoodslostinthissector,therewaslittletangibletoshow
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forit.Priortothetsunami,mostCNFElivelihoodactivitieswerelow-skilled,low-income,anddistress-driveni.e.theywereonlyadopted because of a lack of alternative opportunities in the farmingorfisherysectorsorinothergrowthsectorssuchasconstruction.IncomesaremuchlowerinCNFEthanintheseothersectors.Itstypicallysmall-scaleactivitiesemploylittlecapital,arelowinproductivity,andofferlowreturns,oftenlittlebetter than farm labouring.
Byworkingtorecovertheselivelihoods,Oxfam’sfocuswasonrebuildingmostlylow-skilledandlow-incomeactivities.Scaleexpansionofdistress-drivenlivelihoodssometimesgeneratedhigherpercapitaincomeintheshortterm,butduetovarioussupply/demand-relatedfactorsthisisunlikelytobesustainedduringthemediumterm.Thelow-returnactivitiesprevalentinthesector are not likely to maintain households above the poverty line,astheydonotusuallyfostergrowth.Nevertheless,theintervention undoubtedly helped people to cope with the reality of poverty much better.
TherewereveryfewsuccessfuloutcomestoOxfamdiversificationstrategiesledbydemandi.e.responsesdrivenby new market or technological opportunities that would enable CNFEgrowth.Amongthereasonsforthiswerefailurestoadequatelyleveragemultipliereffectsflowingfromthefarmingsector and to address all the bottlenecks present in the supply chain.
Thebestpracticesweredemonstratedbypartnerswhohadlivelihoodsaspartoftheircorecompetence,whilethebiggestgapswereseenwiththoseforwhomthiswasanewexperience.Oxfamcarriedoutmanymarketstudiesbutthesewereoftenpublishedlate,diminishingtheirusefulness.
6. Intervention: Cash Programming DespitethemanychallengesfacedbyOxfam,theoutcomesofcash programming interventions across different countries were largely positive.
Themulti-countryGreenCoastprogrammeachievedafairamountofsuccess.Anexternalevaluationconsideredthat,oftheprojectsfundedthroughtheSmallGrantsFacility,about10percentmightfail,70percentwereperformingwell,andafurther10–20percenthadthepotentialtogrowintofull-scalemicro-enterprises.3
Cash-for-work(CFW)programmeswerelargelyappropriate,primarilybecausetheyprovidedshort-termemploymentopportunities.Projectsgainedinappropriatenessdependingonthevalueplacedbythecommunityonthesocialinfrastructure,long-termproductivityoflivelihoodassets,orenhancedmarketaccesstheycreated.Grantsprovedmoresuitableforthemostvulnerablebeneficiarieswhileloansweremoresuitedtobetter-offhouseholds.
Transitioningbetweenonetypeofinterventionandthenext(fromrelieftorecoverytodevelopment)oftenprovedachallengeforOxfam,particularlyinAceh.
However,inSriLankaandIndiaitconformedmorecloselytothisidealsequencingoftransition.UnlikeinAceh,thereweremanyOxfampartnersinboththesecountrieswhichhadsubstantialexperienceinmicro-credit,whileafewwell-establishedmicro-financeinstitutionswerealsopresent.Thisenabledaneasiertransitiontolonger-termdevelopment.
Whereinstitutionalandotheradministrativerequirementswerelacking,theuseofcashgrantsasastrategyledtosomelow-scale corruption. Despite the widespread employment of cash programmingasatool,thedesignofOxfam’sgrantprogrammesoftenlackedcontextualappropriateness.
Overall,Oxfamtendedtosomewhatdogmaticallypromotecashgrants,evenwhenlarge-scalecashinjectionsintolocaleconomiescreatedhighratesofinflation.SinceOxfamcannotdictatetheactionsofotherplayers,itcouldhavepursueddifferentstrategiesofitsownthatwouldhavemitigatedinflationarytrends,ratherthanexacerbatingthem.
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Duetolarge-scaleinvestmentinreconstructionofhouses,therewasaveryhighdemandforconstructionworkers,bothskilledandunskilled.Thiscreatedlargewagedifferentialsacrosssectorsandskills,leadingtoshortagesoflabourinothersectors,suchasfarming.
Cashprogrammingalsotookatollontraditionsofcommunityvolunteerism(inAceh,gotong-royong)andreciprocalassistance(tolong-menolong).Suchpracticesofmutualhelpareprevalentinall the countries involved.
7. Intervention: Micro-credit/Micro-financeMicro-credit/micro-financeactivitiesmoppedupexcessliquidityin local economies by channelling cash into various savings mechanisms.Bydoingso,theyprovidedtheperfectantidotetoinflationarypressuresdrivenbycashprogramming.
InplacessuchasAceh,however,Oxfamintroducedmicro-credit/financeactivitiesonlyverylateintheresponse.Cashprogramming,beingsolargeinscale,assumedalifeofitsown,makingitdifficulttomakeatransitiontolonger-termprogramming.InAceh,Oxfamalsolackedexperienceandskillsinmicro-credit/finance,unlikeinIndiaorSriLanka.
WithintheCNFEsector,micro-financeinstitutions(MFIs)clearlydemonstratedthehighestlevelsofcompetenceofallofOxfam’spartnersinrestoringlivelihoods.Notonlydidtheygoaboutthetaskinanorganisedway;theyalsohadbetteroutreach,eventhough many of them entered the response late in the relief or recovery phases.
Oxfam’smicro-credit/financeactivitieswereconditionedbytwocontraryphilosophies.InAceh,forexample,OxfampartnerBRACmadefinancial(institutional)sustainabilitythecornerstoneofitsstrategies.ThepolicyofaffiliateOxfamAustraliawasjusttheopposite.‘Theobjectiveisnottocreateafinanciallysustainablesystemofrevolvingloans,butratherreliefwithfinancialincentivestobeneficiariesinimprovingtheirlivelihoods,’itreported.4
Theywerealsodifferencesinperceptionsregardingthelong-termimpactofloans.SomeofOxfam’smicro-financepartnerswerenotkeentouseloansforfearthat‘individualgrantswouldincreasecommunity dependence and reduce community commitment to loanschemesinthefuture’.5
Theoppositeview–whichwasheldbyalargemajoritywithinOxfam–wasbestarticulatedbyanODIworkshopinColombo:‘Aidagenciesbelievethatassetslostinadisastershouldbereplacedforfree,usingtheprincipleofretrospectiveinsurance.WhereMF[micro-finance]cannottargetthepoorestofpoorbecauseoftheirlackofsavings(andthereforeabilitytorepayloans)grantsshouldbeprovided...MFshouldbeavailableforbetter-offhouseholdsfromthebeginningofanemergencyresponseastheymightpreferthisoption.’6
Amixedgrant/loanmodelwasalsofoundtobeappropriateformiddle-incomehouseholds,astheexperienceoftheSewalankaFoundation(SLF)demonstrated:‘Grantsarefineifusedtosupplementalackofequity,butnevertobolsteralackoffeasibility.Veryoften,donorstalkofownerequity.Thisishardtocomebyinpoorcommunities.Projectsbasedonloansonlycanwork,butloanplusgrantworksmuchbetter.’7
Althoughtheself-helpgroup(SHG)modelwasadoptedbyallpartners,thereweredifferencesinoperatingmodelsformicro-credit/financeactivities.Underthefirstapproach,MFIssuchasBRACcollectedandmanagedalltherepaymentsandinterestthemselves.Thepotentialforempowermentwaslowunderthismodel,whilelogisticscostswerehigher,leadingtohigherinterestrates.
Thesecondapproach,adoptedbythelargemajorityofOxfampartners,wasoneinwhichallrepaymentswereretainedwithinthecommunity.Empowermentpotentialwashighunderthismodelandlogisticscostswerelower.Consequently,suchschemes were able to offer more competitive interest rates than thefirstmodel.
IncountriessuchasSriLanka,micro-credit/financeactivitieswerebasedonmonthlyrepayments.InAceh,however,the
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BRACmodelintroducedaweeklyrepaymentsystemthatprovedcontroversial,asweeklypaymentswereinappropriateformanyhouseholds who depended on infrequent or seasonal income flows.
Inaddition,thesizeofloansofferedbyOxfamwasnotquiteadequatetoliftfamiliesoutofpoverty,eventhoughsomeMFIs,suchastheDhanFoundationinIndia,wereflexibleonloanamounts:‘Theamountisdependentontheactivitythatthegroupisgoingtoimplement’8.OtherssuchasBRACweremorerigid,with a bureaucratic standardisation of loan amounts that hindered their impact.
Interest rates were found to have a direct correlation to achieving theaimoftargetingthepoorestpeople.Thehighertheinterestrate,thelessthistargetwasmet,andviceversa.Atthesametime,theevaluationstudiesconductedfoundthatrepaymentratesdidnotnecessarilyreflecttheprofitabilityofaclient’sbusiness,foravarietyofreasons.
ThemostinnovativecontributionmadebyOxfam’stsunamiresponseintheareaofmicro-credit/financewastheBioRightsmodel,whererepaymentwasmadebycontributinglabourforeco-restorationactivities.
8. Cross-cutting: Chronic vs. Transient PovertyOxfam’spolicydirectivewasveryclearfromtheoutset:that,apartfromrestorationobjectivesthataddressedproblemsoftransientpoverty,itsresponseshouldaimtoremedyproblemsthatweremore structural in character – chronic poverty being one of the dimensions to be addressed.
TheoverallperceptionwithinOxfamwasthat,forthemostpart,itsresponsemaintainedaclearfocusonlow-incomeandmarginalisedpopulations,andthatitreachedouttothemostmarginalisedpeople,suchassmallfarmers,landlesslabourers,etc.
InThailand,oneviewwasthattheobjectiveofremovingchronicpoverty led to successful advocacy efforts and policy changes with regard to the land rights of stateless Burmese refugees. InSriLanka,a2007governmentsurveyindicatedthatchronicpovertyhaddecreased–althoughNGOs,includingOxfampartners,didnotsharethegovernment’soptimism.
TherewasalsoaninternalperceptionwithinOxfamthatitslivelihoodstrategyaimedmoretorestoreexistinglivelihoodsthanto encourage new entrepreneurship. Here lies a contradiction: theunjustsocialstructuresandsystemsresponsibleforchronicpovertyareembeddedwithinexistinglivelihoods.Consequently,chronicpovertycannotbeendedsimplybyrestoringexistinglivelihoods: this can only be achieved when people are empowered to use their entrepreneurial spirit in new businesses and vocations.
Constrainingforcesthatpulledtheimplementationfocusawayfrom chronic poverty to concentrate on transient poverty included the following:
• Thepromotionofalternativelivelihoodsonalargescalemeantthatcommunitiesalsoneededtobuildlarge-scalecapacity.Incontrast,accordingtooneevaluation,‘whereverprojectinterventionwasdirectedatstrengtheningtheexistinglivelihoods,ityieldedbetterresultsandresultedinenhancedincomepost-tsunami’9.
• Whenitcametothemostvulnerablecommunities,suchasdalitsortribalpeople,engaginginnewenterprises,failurerates were higher10.Incontrast,‘beneficiarieswithahigherpre-tsunamieconomicstatusdemonstratedgreaterabilityto choose a livelihood activity which could be sustained and providealevelofsupplementaryincomeusefultothefamily’11. Pressurestogenerateresultsledtoatendency,particularlyamongMFIs,toreachouttohigher-incomehouseholdsasthisreduced the risk of defaults and led to faster outreach growth.
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• Theremovalofchronicpovertywasatime-consumingchallenge.ManyOxfamstaffandpartnersfeltthatamorelucidvisionoftheresponseasafour-yearprogrammecouldhave helped them to focus their strategies more clearly on combating chronic poverty.
9. Cross-cutting: GenderJustasdisastersaresaidtohavegenderedimpacts,affectingmenandwomendifferently,humanitarianresponsescanalsoendupbeinggendered.Despiteastrongpolicyintent,aweakcohesive strategy for translating ambition into practical action affectedthepotentialimpactofthegenderdimensioninOxfam’slivelihood interventions.
TheGenderParityIndex(GPI)12ofOxfam’scashprogrammingandin-kindassistanceshowedabiasinfavourofmen.InAceh,forinstance,itwasestimatedthatonly38percentofcashgrantrecipients were women.
Inthetsunami-affectedcountries,high-valueproductiveassetssuch as boats and agricultural land remain traditionally in the ownershipofmen.Women,ontheotherhand,controllow-valueassetssuchassewingmachines,whichtheyoftenpurchasewiththeirownincome.Withinthiscontext,theGPIofOxfam’sprogramming ended up being even further skewed in favour of men in terms of per capita assistance.
Attemptstosociallyengineerexistingownershipstructuresoflivelihoodassetsandtochangegenderstereotypeshadmixedoutcomes.Aprojectaimedatgivingwomenboatownershipended up with the women being called names and ridiculed. Someofthestrategiesusedweretoosimplistic,giventhatgenderinequalityisalong-entrenchedculturalreality.
However,someinnovativeattemptstobreakgenderstereotypes,such as encouraging women to take up professions such as painting,driving,stonemasonry,etc.,metwithmoresuccess–eventhoughthesewereexceptionsratherthantherule.
TheparticipationratesofwomeninCFWprogrammes,thoughhigh,werenotuniformatcountrylevel.Inaddition,programmesfailed to overcome the challenges of formal divisions of labour on genderlines,particularlyinIslamiccountries.
EventhoughOxfampreparedcomprehensiveguidelinesandtoolkitstoenhancetheinclusionofwomeninlivelihoodstrategies,inthefieldthisoftentooktheformof‘playingthenumbersgame’.
WomenwerealmostexclusivelythebeneficiariesintherehabilitationphaseoftheCNFEprogramme.Thisphasewasalsomarkedbyastrategicshiftto‘long-termdevelopment’approaches that revolved mostly around savings and credit groupsandmicro-financeprogrammes;inallcountries,thesewere almost entirely targeted at women.
Consequentlywomenbeneficiarieshadtosettleformostlysmallloans,withinterestratesashighas12–30percentormore–unlikemen,whobenefitedfromcashormaterialgrantsorinterest-freeloans.Oxfam’sinterventionstendedtoleavemenfreeofdebt,whilewomenwerepredominantlyexpectedtousedebt as an instrument to improve their circumstances.
ThebiggestchallengestothelogicofOxfam’sintervention,asseeninternallywithintheorganisation,includedthefollowing:
• Whatistheevidencethatcommunitylivelihoodsarebestrestored or enhanced through women?
• Morewomenthanmenwerekilledbythetsunami,andinmany cases single men became the sole livelihood providers andhomecarersfortheirfamilies.Whatthenistherationalefortargetingmorewomenthanmen,iftherealityisthatmorehouseholds are run by single men? Is there a danger that womenarebeingover-targeted?
• Howrealisticistheambitionofradicallychanginggenderrelations within three years?
• ParticularlyinIslamiccountries,doesOxfam’sambitionofradicallychanginggenderrelationsconflictwithprinciplefiveoftheCodeofConduct,concerningcultureandcustom?
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10. SustainabilityShort,andfrequentlyshifting,timelineswerenotconducivetopromotingsustainableprojectbenefitsinOxfam’slivelihoodprogramme.Change-inducinginterventions(Types2and3;seetable)weremorevulnerabletoprematureexitsthanchange-neutralinterventions(Type1).
Impact of Premature Exit
Typeofintervention Sustainability prospectsType1:Change-neutral e.g.reinstatinglostlivelihoods, cash/foodforwork
High
Type2:Change-inducing e.g.upgradingorexpandinglostlivelihoods,encouragingentrepreneurship,diversifyinglivelihoods
Low
Type3:Change-inducing e.g. structural change such as gender equality,eco-restoration
VeryLow
Forexample,thereinstatementofpre-existinglivelihoodswaslargelyunaffectedbyOxfam’sexitstrategies:suchbusinessortradingactivitieswerenon-training-orproject-dependentandskillsformanagingthemalreadyexistedwithinthecommunities.
CFWactivitiessuchassoilandwaterconservationfellintoacategorywherethesustainabilityprospectsofbenefitsmaybehighintheshortterm,butlesssooverthemediumterm.Theirmedium-tolong-termsustainabilityoutlookdependedonwhetherfarmers,localCBOs/NGOs,orlocalgovernmenttookresponsibility for continued maintenance of the structures created. Whetherornotthishappenedwasdependentuponlarge-scale,andoftentime-consuming,capacity-buildinginputs.
Amajorityofworkshopparticipantsfeltthatitwasnoteasytoinstitute systems or leadership in any newly created institution. Infact,whenOxfamfirstidentifiedpartners,itrealisedthatmany
partnersthemselvesrequiredmassivecapacity-buildingefforts,totheextentthatthisbecameoneofthecoreresponsibilitiesoftheprogramme.Onlywhenpartnershaveadequatelybuiltcapacitycan communities do likewise.
Duringtheresponsetherewerecasesofaffiliate-to-affiliatehandoversofprogrammes.Affiliatesthattookoverprogrammesconsideredthema‘legacy’.However,partnersinvolvedintheprogrammes sometimes considered relationships with the new affiliatestobe‘enforcedpartnerships’andwerenotabletoadjustfullytothechange.Thiscausedtensionanduncertaintyonbothsides.
Themorepartners’tsunamiprogrammeswerealignedwiththeircoreprogrammes,thebettertheprospectsforsustainability.ForIndianpartnertheDhanFoundation,theincrementalcostsofabsorbingOxfam’slivelihoodprogramme(EnablingLivelihoodRehabilitationProgramme,orELRP)intoitsowncoreprogrammewereinsignificant,anditwaseasilyabletoreplaceOxfam’sfundingwithfundingfromanotherdonor,onceOxfam’ssupportcametoanend(seetable).
Theflip-sidewasthatthissometimescameatacosttoOxfamprogrammes.Midwaythroughthetsunamiresponse,mostMFIsworkingwithOxfamalignedtheirlivelihoodprogrammeswiththoseoftheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB).WhileADBfundingmayhavegiventheirprogrammesgreatersustainability,suchrealignmentsresultedinmajorstrategicdeviationswithrespecttotheirlivelihoodprogrammeswithOxfam.
WhileMFIsclaimthattheirprogrammesare‘sustainable’,thiscouldinsomecasesprovetobeinaccurate.Whattheyrefertoas‘sustainability’canbemoreaccuratelydescribedasfinancialself-reliancei.e.thecapacitytoself-financetheirprogrammes.
Whilethisisanimportantdimensionofsustainability,someMFIsportrayitasthewholeand,insodoing,downplaytheneedsoftheirclientbusinesses–theirwholeraisond’être.Attheleveloftheclient,‘sustainability’becomes‘theuseofone’sendowmentsto generate adequate resources to meet the requirements of the householdinasustainablemanner’13.
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EvaluationstudiesofMFIsindicatethattheirso-called‘sustainability’oftencomesataveryhighprice.Pressurestobreak even operationally tend to tempt them to move away fromservicingthevulnerabletothemoderatepoor.‘InsomeofthenewlyopenedbranchesitwasobservedthatPOs[projectofficers]tendtoselectbeneficiariesthatareabovethepovertyline in an attempt to assure loan repayment and minimise the risk ofdefault,’notedonestudy14.
Dhan FoundationImpact of absorbing tsunami operations into core programme
Particulars Coreatpresent ELRP Growth
Members (number) 500,000 61,500 12%
Communitystaff(number) 3,000 414 14%
DHANstaff(number) 700 119 17%
Anevenmoreseriousquestionisthequalityofmicro-enterprisessupportedbyMFIs.‘Whethermicro-enterprisesthathavebeen(andarebeing)supportedconstitutelong-termsourcesof livelihoods is an aspect that goes beyond the reach of the programme both in terms of scope and time span. It has to be takenintoaccountthat,forthemostpart,thebusinessesofthebeneficiariesarenotnecessarilyproductiveunitsbutsubsistenceenterprises.’15
Inthecaseoffarminginterventions,wherethesewerebasedonlow-inputorganicpracticesandbuiltlargelyonlocaltraditionalknowledgeandexperience–aswasthecaseinIndiaandSriLanka–theireco-sustainabilityprospectswerehigh.Oxfam’sinterventionsinAceh,however,didnotfollowtheseprinciplesandin this case prospects for sustainability were low.
Thesustainabilityprospectsforcommunitymanagementwerehighincasessuchasthericecreditline,wherethemodelwaskeptatascaleandcomplexitythatdidnotleadtoproject
dependence.Asthescaleandoperationalcomplexityofprojectsincreased,however,asinthecaseofCCamp,sustainabilityprospectsdiminished,whileprojectdependencyrose.
Theover-responseinthedistributionofboatspromptedmanyevaluationstudiestowarnthatindiscriminateover-supplyofthissortthreatenedthesustainabilityofallfisherysectorlivelihoods,asitwasleadingtofisheryresourcesbecomingincreasinglydepleted.
Oxfam’slivelihoodresponsecontainedonlyaminorstrategicemphasisonincreasingfishresources.GreenCoastpartnersinThailand,Aceh,India,andSriLankaattemptedtorestoremangroves and coral reefs as interventions aimed at increasing fisheryresources.TheseprogrammesappeartohavemetwithgreatersuccessinAcehthanelsewhere.Thiswasbecauseprogrammes here were not only strongly aligned with the policy outlookoftheAcehgovernment,butplayedakeyroleinshapingthat policy.
Therewasverylittlestrategicfocusoninterventionssuchasfishaggregatingdevices(FADS)andartificialreefs.ResearchhasprovedthatFADS,contrarytopopularunderstanding,arearesource-depletingtechnology,unlikeartificialreefs,whichareresource-regenerating.
Boththeseinterventionspotentiallyruntheriskofcausingconflictwithinfishingcommunities,astheywereintroducedmainlybytechnologically-drivenOxfampartners,whosecommunityorganisationcapabilitieswererelativelyweak.However,mostinterventionsofthiskindweresimplyexperimental,ratherthanbeing implemented as tried and tested solutions.
11. Conclusions It is impossible for individual nations or relief players to effectively tackle a disaster of the magnitude of the tsunami on their own.
Asoneofthefewinternationalplayerswithextensiveexperienceandwithstaffonthegroundinmostofthecountriesaffected,
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Oxfamchosetobeoperationalinsevendifferentcountries.Thisentailedanenormousandabruptscaling-upofitsactivities,withimplications for all parts of the organisation.
Realisingthataninstitutionalised,centralmechanismwasneededtoco-ordinatesucharesponse,theOITFwasestablishedastheco-ordinatingarchitecturefortheresponsesofsevenoperationalaffiliates,underthecommonbrandofOxfamInternational.
Thisuniquesituationwarrantedintensivestrategicco-ordinationforrecoveryeffortstobeeffective,aswellasconsiderablepressuretodelivertangibleresults.However,theOITFremainedmoreasupportorganisation,withaffiliatesretainingtheirdecentralisedlinepowers.TheOxfamresponsewasthereforecharacterisedbywidediversityandweakenedco-ordinationduetotheinherentlimitationsoftheconfederationstructure.‘Theamountofmanagementsupportrequiredwasunder-estimated.Moreover,themechanismwasnotdesignedincollaborationwithOxfam[GB]’sfundingexpertswhowouldhaveadvisedonimprovedsystemsandaccountability,’saidoneevaluationstudy16.
‘Underthebestofcircumstances,changingthebehavioursofhugeorganizationsisdifficult,’observedanother17. Shortcomings inOxfam’scopingcapacitywerereflectedinreducedadministrative and programming capacity to implement livelihood programmes.Intheprocess,Oxfamalsoexperienceditsshareoffalse steps and setbacks.
However,allthingsconsidered,theoutputsweretrulyastounding.UptoSeptember2008,Oxfamspent€200moverall.Whileitisnotoriouslydifficulttocountthenumberofpeoplebenefitingfromahumanitarianresponse,itisestimatedthat,cumulatively,Oxfam’stsunamiresponsereachedsome2.5millionpeople18. Thelivelihoodprogrammecomponentsoftheresponsespent€65m,accountingfor33percentofallfundsused.Oxfam’slivelihoodprogrammereached962,000people,or38percentofallbeneficiariesofitstsunamiresponse.
Whiletherewasatrendwithintheoverallresponsetoconcentrateoninterventionsthatwereeasiertoimplement,more
visible,andmorequantifiable–whichledtoover-responseinsomeareas–Oxfamlimiteditsexposuretocoastalfisheriesand sought out gaps left by others. It soon emerged as one of theleadingvoicesinhighlightingtheplightsofsaltpanworkers,shell-gatherers,inlandfishers,tailors,craftspeople,barbers,sexworkers,etc.,allofwhomhadlosttheirincomes,whilethehumanitarian and media focus remained largely centred on fisheries.
Intheprocess,Oxfampuncturedthemediamyththatthetsunamiwas a great leveller. Marginalised communities were found to be more affected by its destructive force since they were more vulnerable to begin with.
Thestrategicemphasisonthefarmsectorwasverysuccessful,withOxfamchalkingupsignificantachievements.Althoughitwasnoteasywithintheshorttimelines,Oxfam’slivelihoodsadvocacyeffortswereabletosignificantlyinfluencegovernmentpolicyinAcehandThailand.InIndia,SRIwasfoundpotentiallytohavethegreatestimpactofallOxfam’slivelihoodinterventions.InSriLankahomegardenswererestoredusingsustainableagriculturalpractices,andthiscouldlenditselfasareplicablemodel.
Growthintheagriculturalsectorisoftenconsideredtobeupto four times more effective in reducing poverty compared with growth in other sectors; it thus acts as an engine of growth acrosstheboard.Thisissomethingthatisonlynowbeingfullyappreciated,afterevaluationandimpactstudiesoftsunamiresponsesbyotheragencieshaveunderlinedthefarmsector’seconomicsignificance.Oxfamconcentratedonagricultureasthepivotalsectorfromthestart,adecisionthatwasquestionedatthetime but which has since been widely vindicated.
Oxfam’sperformanceinthefisheriessectorisalsotobecommended,ashouseholdincomeshaveincreasedtoagreaterextentthaninallothersectors.BioRightswasaninnovativemicro-creditmodelpilotedduringthetsunamiwhichprovedeffectiveineco-restorationactivities.
AreaswhereresultsdidnotmeasureuptoexpectationsofOxfam’s‘reconstructionplus’ambitionwereCNFEandgender.
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Thereasonsforthisoverlapped,aswomenwerealmostexclusivelythetargetofOxfam’slivelihoodinterventionswithinCNFE.Oxfam’sstrategiesfocusedmainlyonrestoringincome-generatingactivitiesthatwerelow-skilledanddistress-driven,and for which wage rates and returns on investment were low.
Otherwise,Oxfam’sperformancewasimpressive:itsucceededin restoring the livelihoods of at least 70 per cent of all people targetedwhohadlosttheirlivelihoodswithintheCNFEsector.Atleast40–60percentofthe962,000peoplereachedbyitslivelihood programme were from this sector.
Wherewomenwereconcerned,Oxfam’slivelihoodinterventionsmayhavefallenshortofachievingrealeconomicbreakthroughs,but they did give women greater social empowerment in many significantways,acrosscountries.
WhereOIfellshortonstrategies,itmadeupforitintargeting.Interventions provided alternative livelihoods and life options forwomen,enablingthemtoavoidformsofexploitationandoppressionsuchasprostitutionanddomesticviolence,whileofferingsurvivalstrategiestofemale-headedhouseholdsandsingle women.
Nevertheless,ifthetsunamiexperienceisanyindicator,Oxfam’sproblem was not so much one of policy or intent as one of translating and mainstreaming gender goals in such a way that its ambitionscouldbemorepracticallyrealisedinthefield.
ThetsunamiresponsealsogaveOxfamanopportunitytoscaleupinterventionssuchascashprogrammingandmicro-finance.Excessesandshortfallswereexperiencedinbothtypesofintervention,butbothwerecriticalinsignificantlyimprovinglivelihoods. All these lessons should help to mould more effective strategies for use in future responses.
A clear lesson learned was that short and frequently changing timelinesdidnotallowOxfamtotranslateitshumanitariansuccessesintosustainablelegacies,particularlywherelong-termstructural change was involved.
Whenanoperationofsuchunprecedentedscopeandscaledrawstoaclose,itthrowsupmanyusefullessonsofwhatworked and what did not – to which hopefully this study in whateversmallmeasurehascontributed.‘It’snotenoughtopickupthepieces.Wemustdrawoneverylessonwecantoavoidsuchcatastrophesinthefuture.’19
Ingeneral,wheneverOxfamappliedprinciplesofgooddevelopmentprogrammingtoitstsunamilivelihoodresponse,itmet with higher chances of success in its emergency response programming. Many of the successes and failures during the tsunamiresponsewerenotneworuniquetoOxfam,orindeedtothe relief sector as a whole.
Some failings had been highlighted in previous international responses,promptingonestudytosuggestthatthesewereperhaps not so much an outcome of inadequate learning but of mental blocks to learning itself20.
SowillOxfamdobetterthenexttimeatsunamiorsimilardisasterstrikes? It all depends on how it learns to multiply successes and overcome shortfalls by applying the lessons learned to future responses.
12. Key Recommendations12.1 The potential for replication is higher if the lessons learned are embedded within a low-cost framework.
Thechallengesofthetsunamiresponseflowedfrom‘problemsofplenty’,whereasmoreoftenchallengesflowfromresourcescarcity.Learningfromthetsunamishouldbesuitablyreviewedtotakeaccountofthisdistinction.Thecurrentglobaleconomiccrisisservesasaharshreminderthat,whateverthelessonsforreplication,theyneedtobeembeddedwithinalow-costframework.
‘Luckily,themostimportantlessonswehavelearnedarenotnecessarily those that depend on the availability of large amounts offunding.’21
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12.2. The convergence effect of operating within a common framework creates a greater potential impact, as exemplified by the SRI experience in India.
OIcanonlyemergeasacorporatebrandifitsstrategiesaresynchronised.Atthesametime,thediversityofaffiliatescanbepreserved by maintaining a high degree of freedom in the use of tactics.Forthis,co-ordinationstructuressuchastheOITFneedtohavemorelineauthority.Toensurethattheirdecisionsareappropriate,theyneedtoextendtheirstructuresclosertotheactiontofacilitatebettercontextualunderstanding.
12.3. Oxfam should have a more realistic perception of its built-in systemic shortcomings.
TheassumptionthatanyorganisationalsystemhastheelasticitytoscaleupcapacityovernightprovedafallacywhenOxfam’sorganisational structures were severely tested and weaknesses exposed.Thewaythatthereliefindustryiscurrentlystructuredmeans that it is probably impossible to eliminate all of these systemic weaknesses when there is an abrupt demand for rapid scale-upbyorganisations.
Oxfam,likemostotherreliefplayers,endedupbeingtrappedby‘thePeterPrinciple’22,thedegreeandsymptomsofwhichvariedwidelyacrosscountriesandaffiliates.Thecopingcapacityofaffiliatesdependedontheirability(orinability)toadaptrapidlytochallengesposedtotheirexistingsystems.
12.4 Continue to adhere to high accountability standards and set an example to the relief sector by complying more closely with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).
TheconsequencesofOxfamexceedingitscopingcapacityweremostclearlydocumentedinAceh,whereafewinstancesoflow-scalecorruptionoccurredwithinitscashprogrammingoperations.
‘Withlargeamountsofcashandgoodsinmotion,corruptionisalwaysathreatduringacrisis.Butdespitetheinfluxofbillions
ofdollarsintsunami-affectedcountries,corruptionlevelsacross the board were kept remarkably low. Key to this success wasacommitmenttoviewcorruption,notasanuisanceorunfortunatesideeffectoftherecovery,butasacorethreattothereconstruction effort as a whole.23’
OxfamstoodoutasoneofthefewinternationalNGOswillingtomakevoluntarydisclosuresoffraud,thusenhancingitsownpublic accountability standing.
12.5 Oxfam should avoid subscribing to the myth that equates recovery to a mere logistical challenge in jumpstarting the economy.
Thistendencywasmostvisibleinthefisheriessector,whereOxfamcontributedtotheover-supplyofboatsdesignedtoimprovefishingcapacity.Replacementofassetssuchasfishingboats should be always be tempered with an understanding of the effects on resources over the medium to longer terms.
Inmostoftheaffectedcountries,fishresourcesarealreadyexploitedclosetothelevelofmaximumpotentialyield.Effortstoachieveshort-termincreasesinfishcatchescanputpressureon scarce stocks and be unsustainable over the medium to long term.Sustainablestrategiesshouldfirstincreasetheavailabilityoffishstocksandtheninacalibratedmannerincreasefishingcapacity.
12.6. Micro-credit and micro-finance interventions need to be applied in a more strategic fashion.
Ifthestrategicintentistoreachthemostvulnerablepeople,thenNGOmicro-creditmodelsareappropriateasaninterventiontool.
However,iftheintentistopreventmiddle-andhigher-incomehouseholdsslippingintopoverty,thetsunamiexperiencesuggeststhatmicro-financeisabetterchoice.Nevertheless,micro-financeshouldnotbeseenasapanaceaforallcommunitylivelihoodproblems,norshoulditbeseenaspro-poor.
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12.7. Strengthen non-financial support services provided by micro-finance institutions to enhance their impact.
Inthecontextofmarketswithextremelylimitedpotentialdemand,theindiscriminateandexcessivesupplyofcredittobusinessessuch as grocery shops can lead to intensive competition and a subsequentdeclineinprofits.
Inseveralcases,theonlyresponsethatMFIscouldmanagewasto provide further loans to their clients in an attempt to prevent greaterdeteriorationoftheirbusinesses,ratherthanmorebroadly-basedinterventionsaimedatbringingaboutawiderstabilisationofmarkets.Theevaluationfoundthatsupportwasgivenfortheexpansionofbusinesseswithoutanyconsiderationofthepossibledestabilisationofexistingmarketsthroughexcessivesupply.Thiscameaboutthroughover-dependenceonexpansionandunder-dependenceondiversificationatastrategiclevel.
FailuretoadequatelycomplementMFIserviceswithnon-financialmicro-supportassistancealsoconsiderablyweakenedoutcomesintransitioningsubsistencebusinessesintofully-fledgedmicro-enterprises.
OneofthereasonswhyMFIsarereluctanttodevelopnon-financialservicesisthatthesearebasicallycost-centred,thusaddingtotheirsustainabilitychallenges.OnesolutionisforMFIstocreateanon-profitsubsidiarytodeliversuchnon-financialservices.
12.8. When intervening in coastal disasters, the pivotal strategic thrust on agriculture should be maintained to maximise potential impact.
AstrategicemphasisonagriculturebuildsonOxfam’sstrengthsinthissector.Inaddition,suchastrategycanleveragethesector’spotentialasanengineofgrowthandpotentiallydriveupdemandinothersectors,suchasCNFEandfisheries.
12.9. The logic of gender interventions needs to be reviewed to improve the prospects of realising gender objectives within livelihood strategies.
Oxfam’sgenderobjectivesweremoresuccessfullyrealisedinnon-IslamiccountriesthaninIslamicones.Thisisalessonthatshouldinformthereviewofexistinggenderframeworkswithintheorganisation,particularlygivenitsprofessedprincipleofrespecting local cultures.
WideracceptanceofmainstreaminggenderwithinlivelihoodstrategieswilldependonthedegreetowhichOxfam’sgenderframeworkconvincespractitionersthatthealmostexclusivetargeting of women is the best way to restore community livelihoods lost during disasters and to build vibrant economies.
12.10. Avoid changes to timelines and align these with strategic ambitions.
Settimelinesprovidegreaterclarityinthefieldonimplementation.However,strategicambitionscannotbeformulated in isolation from realistic timelines. Most structural changeobjectivescannotberealisedwithinathree-yearperiod:sustainableoutcomesforeco-restorationactivities,forinstance,needatleasta15-yeartimehorizon.Ifthesearethestrategicobjectivesofaresponse,thereshouldbeaclearsustainabilityplanthatfactorsinprematureexitsbyOxfam.
ShortandshiftingtimelinesmaybeinfluencedbyOxfam’sowndonors.Evenso,OxfamcouldhavelearnedfromtheapproachoftheCanadianRedCrossSociety(CRCS).DuringitsTsunamiAppeal,CRCSreleasedanoverviewassistanceplanthatstated,‘CanadianRedCrosswillfundprogramsoverseasforatleast10years.Itwilltakeagenerationtorebuild.ThegenerosityofourdonorsputstheRedCrossinanexcellentpositiontoadapttothechangingneedsinthetsunami-affectedcountriesanddirectfundsasneedsevolve.’24
12.11 Livelihood strategies, to be truly sustainable, need to be conditioned by eco-restoration and disaster risk reduction (DRR) philosophies.
Oxfam’sstrategicthrustwasweakonapproachestosustainablelivelihoods that aimed to reduce vulnerability and provide better copingmechanismsintheeventoffuturedisasters.Furthermore,
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such approaches were incorporated piecemeal and did not permeateOxfam’soveralllivelihoodstrategyasafundamentalphilosophy.
12.12. At the country level Oxfam needs to demonstrate more evidence of being a strategically functional organisation.
Acrossaffiliatesandcountries,Oxfamprovidedonlyafewglimpses of acting as a strategically functional organisation. Whileitsgloballivelihoodstrategywasrelativelyclear,country-specificstrategies,however,wereoftenconfusing.Thereweredeficienciesinprogrammedesignandimplementationprocessesduetolackofclarityinobjectives,exacerbatedbyfrequentandcostly strategic shifts and reversals.
Evenworse,accordingtooneevaluation,‘PlanninginsomecaseshasbeenbasedonwhatOxfamwouldliketodo,notonaclear assessment of need and on what can be done in terms of contextandinternalcapacity’25.
It may be good practice at the country level to design at least one large-scaleinterventiontogeneratevisibleimpact.
12.13. Close alignment with in-country policy environments enhances potential impacts.
TheimpactofSRIinIndiawaslargelyfacilitatedbyafavourablein-countrypolicyenvironment.Oxfamactedasaforcemultiplierto spread a technology that was closely aligned with the priorities ofthegovernment,atbothstateandcentrallevels.
Thegovernmentimposednocaponmarketpricesforriceproducts. It also had a policy of reducing subsidies for inorganic agriculturalinputs,whichmadethemmoreexpensive.Thesefavourablepolicyconditionshelpedboosttheexpansionoforganic SRI.
BycontrastinSriLanka,althoughSRIdemonstratedsignificantpromise,therewasnotthesamemomentumforitsspread,asthe policy environment was less conducive. Here the spread of SRIwasconstrainedbycost/pricesqueezesthaterodedmuchofits competitive advantage.
12.14. There is a greater chance of success when strategies are built on existing traditions.
Theneedtocreatedemandforaninterventiononlyariseswhenactivitiesarenottraditionalwithincommunities.InIndia,attempts to promote home gardens failed. Home gardens are not traditionalinTamilNadu’scoastalareasand,besides,plotswereeither not readily available or were not large enough to ensure profitability.
InSriLanka,however,theprogrammemetwithresoundingsuccess. Here home gardens are a tradition: they are maintained byfarmers,villagers,andfishermenandsupplyasignificantproportionofhouseholds’nutritionalneeds.Participationrateswerehigh,andtherewasnoneedtocreatedemandastherewas in India.
12.15. Strong links between recovery and long-term rehabilitation are needed to ensure impact.
InAceh,weaklinkagesbetweenCFWactivitiesandcashgrantbeneficiariesledtorehabilitatedlandbeingleftidle.Oxfam,likeotheragencies,initiallyputnospecialfocusonreclaimingpaddyfieldsaffectedbysalinisation.Consequently,therewerewide-scalechangesinlandusepatternsasatleasthalfthericefarmers opted to cultivate alternative crops such as watermelon andgroundnuts.However,farmers’copingskillswerefoundwanting,astheyhadnopreviousexperienceofcultivatingthesenew crops.
Bycontrast,inIndiatherewerestronglinkagesbetweenCFWactivitiesandcashgrant/loanbeneficiaries.Theseprogrammesaimed to increase the water retention capacity of the soil and to enhance irrigation potential. Systems of this kind often also make iteasiertoflushsalinityoutofthesoil.Asaresult,agriculturalrecoverywasfastestinIndia,aslandrestorationactivitiesweremostlyinplaceintimetotakeadvantageofthefirstmonsoonsandsubsequentfloods.
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12.16. The use of cash programming needs greater calibration.
AttimescashprogrammingwasusedbyOxfaminareckless,supply-drivenmanner,insteadofbeingcalibratedtosuitthecontext.
Thereisaneedforgreaterappreciationthataninterventioncannotexistinavacuum.Itisboundtobeaffectedbytheconditions of the broader response. Just as it paid to avoid ‘followingtheherd’bylimitingitsexposuretothefisherysector,Oxfamneedstoadoptdifferentialstrategieswheneverthereliefenvironmentisover-reliantonasingleinterventiontoproduceresults,whichleadstoexcessesandabuse.
Thismayimplythewideruseofcashvouchersasaninterventionwhileoperatinginaninflationaryenvironment,drivenbythe indiscriminate supply of cash programming by the relief community.
Better still – and a strategy which proved to be an effective remedy during the tsunami – savings interventions can be used tosuckexcessiveliquidityoutoftheeconomy.Onewaytoensuresufficientdemandforsavingscouldbetousematchinggrantsbuttolockinsavingsuntilinflationstartstosubside.
12.17. Completely stop agricultural interventions based on high-input, inorganic chemicals.
ThesegoagainstOxfam’ssustainablelivelihoodframework;moreover,failureratesarehigh,aswasseeninOxfam’sexperienceinAceh.
References1 Oxfam Tsunami Accountability Report, December 2005.2 Dhaincha (Sesbania acculeata) is a green manure crop which fixes nitrogen in the soil and is able to grow under a variety of extreme conditions, including in highly saline soil.
3 Green Coast Mid-Term Evaluation.
4 ‘Indirect Impacts of Tsunami Aid, A Sri Lankan Case Study’, Oxfam Australia, Sri Lanka.5 Final Report, ECDF Tsunami Program Partner Assessment.6 ODI, ‘Tsunami Cash Learning’, Sri Lanka Workshop Report, 15–16 July 2005.7 Sewalanka Evaluation Study.8 Dhan Foundation, Evaluation Study.9 ‘Evaluation of Rehabilitation and Community Capacity Reinforcement of Families Affected by the Tsunami in Rasapattai Village of Cuddalore District, Tamil Nadu’.
10 Final Report, ECDF Tsunami Program Partner Assessment.11 Ibid.12 The Gender Parity Index, or GPI, is calculated as the ratio of the value for women (e.g. number of girls enrolled at a school) divided by the value for men (e.g. number of boys enrolled). A value of less than one indicates a discrimination against women and vice versa.13 T. Fisher and M.S. Sriram (2002) ‘Beyond Micro-Credit: Putting development back into micro-finance’.
14 Final Evaluation, BRAC.
15 Ibid.16 P. Sandison (2007) ‘Corporate Level Lessons from the Tsunami Response’.17 The Tsunami Learning Project, ‘Lessons for Grantmakers in Natural Disaster Response’.18 OITF End of Program Report, December 2008.19 Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General.20 The Tsunami Learning Project, ‘Lessons for Grantmakers in Natural Disaster Response’.21 The Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project, ‘Tsunami Legacy, Innovations, Breakthroughs and Change’.
22 The principle that every employee tends to rise to his/her own ‘level of incompetence’.
23 The Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Project, ‘Tsunami Legacy, Innovations, Breakthroughs and Change’.
24 www.redcross.ca/article.asp?id=11724&tid=001
25 Evaluation Report, Oxfam International Aceh and Nias, Tsunami and Earthquake Response.
International
Oxfam International is a confederation of fourteen organizations working together in more than 100 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty and injustice: Oxfam America, Oxfam Australia, Oxfam-in-Belgium, Oxfam Canada, Oxfam France - Agir ici, Oxfam Germany, Oxfam GB, Oxfam Hong Kong, Intermón Oxfam (Spain), Oxfam Ireland, Oxfam Mexico, Oxfam New Zealand, Oxfam Novib (Netherlands), and Oxfam Québec. Please call or write to any of the agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org
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Intermón Oxfam (Spain): www.intermonoxfam.org
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Oxfam Novib (Netherlands): www.oxfamnovib.nl
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Oxfam International Secretariat: Suite 20, 266 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 7DL, UK Tel: +44 1865 339100 Email: [email protected] Web site: www.oxfam.org
For contact details of Oxfam International advocacy offices, please see the website of Oxfam International Secretariat, or: E-mail: [email protected]
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