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OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

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OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe. David Coleman, University of Oxford d [email protected] http://www.apsoc.ox.ac.uk/oxpop. Netherlands: foreign citizen and foreign – origin populations 1956 – 2003. Source: CBS. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
34
OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe David Coleman, University of Oxford david. coleman @ socres .ox.ac. uk http://www. apsoc .ox.ac. uk / oxpop
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Page 2: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Netherlands: foreign citizen and foreign –

origin populations 1956 – 2003. Source: CBS.

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

1955

1958

1961

1964

1967

1970

1973

1976

1979

1982

1985

1988

1991

1994

1997

2000

2003

Foreign citizens

All foreign origin

First generation, all foreign origin

Second generation, all foreignoriginNon-Western foreign originpopulation

Page 3: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Migration – a heterogeneous process. Many streams, many ‘causes’, many

consequences.• ‘Pull’ and ‘push’ factors; inequalities.• Population pressures.• Force, political instability and persecution.• Environmental change.• Labour demand and recruitment• Opportunities for ‘betterment’.• Chains and bridgeheads, family and marriage.• Population ageing. • Subversion, terrorism and crime.• Policies in sending and receiving countries

Page 4: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Migration theory – rather a mess

• Economists’ ‘equilibrium’ models – supply and demand for labour and capital.

• Economic refinements – cost/benefit decisions; household investments;

• World systems theory, Global cities; Segmented or ‘dual’ labour markets.

• Networks, Cumulative causation. ‘transnational’ populations, non-economic movement.

• Recent rediscovery of policy.

Page 5: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Some components of gross immigration inflows to Western Europe (blue is family; OECD

2003)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Australia 2

Switzerland

United Kingdom 3

Portugal

Canada

Norway 4

Denmark

France 5

United States 6

Sweden 7

Workers Family reunification Refugees

Page 6: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Southern Europe and its neighbours

Southern Europe and North Africa: Projections 1990 - 2050 (millions).Source UN World Population Prospects - the 2002 revision

100

150

200

250

300

350

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Southern Europe

North Africa

Page 7: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Turkey and Western EuropePopulation trends and projections, selected European countries and

Turkey 1950-2050 (millions). Source: United Nations 2004-based estimates.

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

France

Germany

Italy

United Kingdom

Turkey

Page 8: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Long-term trends of migration to a ‘country of immigrants’

Gross immigration inflows to the United States 1820 - 2002.

Source: US Immigration and Naturalization Service

0

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

1200000

1400000

1600000

1800000

2000000

1820

1827

1834

1841

1848

1855

1862

1869

1876

1883

1890

1897

1904

1911

1918

1925

1932

1939

1946

1953

1960

1967

1974

1981

1988

1995

2002

Page 9: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Long-term trends to a ‘country of emigrants’

UK Net Immigration (2 definitions) 1962-2005 (thousands). Source: ONS.

-100

-50

0

50

100

150

200

250

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

thou

san

ds

Net balance corrected Post-2001 Census (re-revised)

Page 10: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Net foreign immigration to the EU 1960-2005. Net foreign immigration to EU-15 1960 - 2007 (thousands).

Source: Eurostat, various years. Statistics in Focus (to 2005) and website table (to 2007)

-500

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

thousands

EU 15 net migration (thousands)

EU 15 net migration residual method

Page 11: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Figure 2 Natural change and net migration, Europe 2006. Source: Eurostat.

Netherlands

Malta

Macedonia

Spain

Cyprus

FranceDenmark

UK

Italy

SwedenBelgium

FinlandSlovakia

PolandMoldova

Lithuania

Romania

Czech R.

Belarus Estonia

Latvia

Russian Fed.Ukraine

Iceland

NorwaySwitzerland

Ireland

Greece

Hungary

Austria

Germany

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

-8.0 -7.0 -6.0 -5.0 -4.0 -3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0

natural change per thousand of population

net

mig

rati

on p

er t

hou

san

d o

f p

opu

lati

on

Page 12: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Numbers of foreign-born and non-citizens compared to

native born and citizens in selected European countries, around 2000 millions Foreign

Native-born Foreign-born Immigrants All Foreigners citizens as non- non- all imm- as percent foreigners as percent percent of

citizens citizens all citizens citizens igrants total pop. total pop. immigrants

Austria 6.9 0.1 7.0 0.4 0.6 1.0 12.5 0.7 8.8 70.8 Belgium 9.0 0.2 9.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 10.7 0.8 8.2 77.0

Denmark 4.9 0.0 5.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 6.8 0.3 4.8 71.6 Finland 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.5 0.1 1.7 68.3

France 52.1 0.5 52.7 3.1 2.8 5.9 10.0 3.3 5.6 55.6 N'lands 14.3 0.1 14.4 1.1 0.6 1.6 10.1 0.7 4.2 41.3

Portugal 9.7 0.0 9.7 0.4 0.2 0.7 6.3 0.2 2.2 35.6

Spain 38.6 0.1 38.7 0.7 1.5 2.2 5.3 1.6 3.8 72.4 Sweden 7.8 0.1 7.9 0.7 0.4 1.1 12.0 0.5 5.3 44.1

UK 53.9 4.9 8.3 2.6 4.4 53.2

Note: persons of undeclared status excluded.

Source: Dumont and Lemaitre 2005, Annex 2 p. 34 except UK citizenship data from Salt 2004, Report to the OECD of the UK SOPEMI Correspondent 2004, t. 4.1.

Migration Research Unit, Dept of Geography, University College London.

Page 13: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

Cyp

rus

Spa

inU

SA

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Irela

ndS

witz

erla

ndA

ustr

iaM

alta

Luxe

mbo

urg

(G-D

)N

orw

ayS

wed

enLi

echt

enst

ein

Net

herla

nds

EU

-15

Fran

ce m

étro

polit

aine

EU

_hig

h G

DP

Eur

o ar

ea (

EU

R-1

2)Ic

elan

dIta

lyD

enm

ark

Bel

gium

EU

-25

Fin

land

Por

tuga

lE

U_l

ow G

DP

Ger

man

yG

reec

eE

ston

iaR

ussi

aH

unga

ryC

zech

Rep

ublic

New

Mem

ber S

tate

sLa

tvia

Rom

ania

Slo

veni

aS

lova

kia

Pol

and

Lith

uani

aB

ulga

ria

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

Combined Fertility Original Fertility (TF) Migratory Fertility MF range

Replacement Level

Year: 2004

Page 14: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

England and Wales: percent of births to immigrant mothers 1971 - 2006. Source: ONS Series FM1 table 9.1 (various years).

0

5

10

15

20

25

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Mother born outside UK

Mother born in New Commonwealth

Page 15: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Migration can go down as well as up… (EU, Germany)

Migration to Germany 1954 - 2003, by citizenship. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden. Up to 1990 German Federal Republic only.

- 300 000

- 200 000

- 100 000

-

+ 100 000

+ 200 000

+ 300 000

+ 400 000

+ 500 000

+ 600 000

+ 700 000

+ 800 000

1954

2)

1956

2)

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

Net migration Germans including aussiedler Foreigners

Page 16: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Consequences of migration

• Demographic change. Growth and decline, age-structure effects, depopulation.

• Salvation through migration?

• Economic change – who benefits?

• Replacement migration.

• Ethnic change

Page 17: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe
Page 18: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

UK population 2003-2051(1000s) : no decline imminent.

UK population projected to 2081, GAD Principal Projection, Natural Change and high and low migration variants (millions). Source: Government Actuary's Department 2007

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056 2061 2066 2071 2076 2081

Principal projection

Natural change

High migration: 250,000

Low migration: 130,000

Page 19: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

UK population 1900 - 2081 (millions), actual and projected. Source: ONS, GAD

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

9019

00

1905

1910

1915

1920

1925

1930

1935

1940

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

2055

2060

2065

2070

2075

2080

UK population

2006-based Principal Projection

Page 20: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

GAD / ONS projections of the UK population, 2006-based (millions). Population increase Percent of from 2006 (millions) increase in Principal Natural difference with without PP due to

year Projection Change (millions) migration migration migration 2006 60.6 60.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 2026 69.3 63.6 5.6 8.7 3.0 65.1 2031 71.1 63.8 7.3 10.5 3.2 69.4 2051 77.3 62.3 15.0 16.7 1.7 89.8 2081 85.3 57.3 27.9 24.7 -3.3 (all)

Source: data from GAD website

Page 21: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Table 3 Effects of independent variables on total net immigration to the UK (thousands per annum) 1976-80 to 1986-90 to 1996-2000 1996-2000 Change in UK unemployment rate 13.4 -6.1 Log GDP per capita ratio 2.6 0.6 Gini coefficient ratio 36.6 13.1 Europe dummy variable 12.0 12.0 Other country dummy variables 5.4 4.1 UK policy dummy variable 33.8 33.8 Explained total 103.8 57.5 Actual total 113.0 69.4 Source: Hatton 2005 table 8 Note: the 'actual totals' of migration do not seem to make sense.

Page 22: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Work permits holders and dependants admitted, UK 1973-2006.

Source: Home Office Control of Immigration Statistics

0

20000

40000

60000

80000

100000

120000

140000

16000019

73

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

≥12 months <12 months dependants total

Page 23: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Spouse migration by sex and NC origin, UK 1973-2005Source: Home Office acceptances for settlement.

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Accepted for settlement as husbandAccepted for settlement as wifeAdmitted as husband or fiance

Admitted as wife or fiancee

Page 24: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Probabilistic projection of UK population 2001-51 (1000s) within given confidence limits. Source: Coleman and Scherbov 2005.

55000

60000

65000

70000

75000

80000

2001 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

0.025

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

0.975

Page 25: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Comparison of UK PSR, and population aged 20-24 (millions), 2006 - 2081.

Source GAD 2006-based projections

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056 2061 2066 2071 2076 2081

PSR Principal projection; migration =190,000

PSR Natural change

Population 20-24 Principal Projection

Population 20-24 natural change

Page 26: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Table 5 Summary of population projections by 'foreign

origin' or ‘foreign background’. Austria Denmark Germany Netherlands 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 Population (millions) 8.1 7.8 5.4 5.5 82.2 68.3 15.9 16.9 Immigration rate 0.07 0.2 0.29 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.17 0.27

% 'Western' 5.4 7.9 2.4 3.3 3.3 5.4 8.6 13.2 % 'Non-Western' 3.9 5.1 6.0 11.5 6.6 18.2 8.9 16.5 % 'Foreign origin' 9.3 28.0 8.7 14.8 9.9 23.6 17.5 29.7 Norway Sweden UK USA 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 2005 2050 Population (millions) 4.6 5.6 9.0 10.6 52.0 63.1 287.7 403.7 Immigration rate 0.37 0.30 0.37 0.29 0.50 0.27 0.35 0.24 % 'Western' 4.1 9.2 9.7 10.5 2.7 11.6 % 'Non-Western' 3.4 14.3 6.3 10.7 8.7 24.5 % 'Foreign origin' 7.5 23.5 15.9 32.3 11.4 36.1 17.6 33.2 Note: US data includes non-white foreign origin only. White immigrants comprised 17-19% of immigrants 2000-2050. Austrian total percent foreign origin derived by subtraction in 'Compensation' scenario to exclude naturalisation. Subtotals include naturalisation. Source: For sources and details of assumptions and methods see Coleman (2006)

Page 27: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Netherlands 2005- 2050. Percent of population of foreign orgin ('Western' and 'non-Western') with and without migration. Source: CBS.

10

15

20

25

30

35

2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

percent foreign-origin with zeromigration, 2003-based

percent foreign-origin 2004-based

Page 28: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Sweden 2004-2050: projected total population, millions, standard and zero-

migration assumptions. Projected total population, Sweden 2004-2050, standard and zero

migration assumptions. Source: Statistics Sweden.

8.0

8.5

9.0

9.5

10.0

10.5

11.0

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

2024

2026

2028

2030

2032

2034

2036

2038

2040

2042

2044

2046

2048

2050

Zero-migration projection (millions)

Standard projection (millions)

Page 29: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

UK population size required to maintain given PSRs by immigration, 2000 - 2100 (millions)

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

35020

00

2010

2020

2025

2030

2050

2060

2080

2100

PSR 3.0 PSR 3.5 PSR 4.22

Page 30: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Ethnic replacement:

• Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other.

• If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated.

• Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.

Page 31: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100

US population 1999 - 2100 Middle Series, ethnic group. Source; US Bureau of the Census 2000.

0.000

50.000

100.000

150.000

200.000

250.000

1999

2002

2005

2008

2011

2014

2017

2020

2023

2026

2029

2032

2035

2038

2041

2044

2047

2050

2053

2056

2059

2062

2065

2068

2071

2074

2077

2080

2083

2086

2089

2092

2095

2098

Hispanic White non-Hispanic Black NH American Indian NH Asian and Pacific NH

Page 32: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Probabilistic projections of the UK – average outcome for major groups (%).

UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2001

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

2055

2060

2065

2070

2075

2080

2085

2090

2095

2100

White

Black

Asian

Mixed

Page 33: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Comparison of results of European foreign-origin projections

Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,

selected countries, as percent of total population.

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

per

cen

t

Germany medium variant

USA medium variant (excludes black population)

Netherlands base scenario

Denmark 2002- based medium variant

Sweden foreign background 2004 based

Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.

Page 34: OxREP workshop Monday 14 April 2008. The Demographic Consequences of Immigration to Europe

Conclusions

• Migration now a primary driver of population change in many low TFR countries. Not Far East, some CEE.

• Patterns, sources, causes and consequences highly heterogeneous

• Mixed economic consequences• Can moderate, not solve ageing• Possible ‘third demographic transition’


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