The Institute for Domestic and International Affairs, Inc.

African Union

Western Sahara

Director: Sonali Patel

© 2006 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)

This document is solely for use in preparation for Philadelphia Model United Nations 2007. Use for other purposes is not

permitted without the express written consent of IDIA. For more information, please write us at idiainfo@idia.net

Introduction _________________________________________________________________ 1

Background _________________________________________________________________ 2 The Saharawi People ______________________________________________________________ 2 A History of Colonialism ___________________________________________________________ 3

Resistance and the Emergence of the Polisario Front _____________________________________________6 Religious Unity and Political Tension ________________________________________________________8 The Referendum, MINURSO, and the Baker Plan _______________________________________________9

Current Status ______________________________________________________________ 11

Policy Positions _____________________________________________________________ 13 Saharawi Republic _______________________________________________________________ 13 Morocco ________________________________________________________________________ 14 Algeria _________________________________________________________________________ 15 States that Recognize the Saharawi Republic _________________________________________ 15 The Remainder of the African Union ________________________________________________ 16

Summary___________________________________________________________________ 17

Discussion Questions _________________________________________________________ 18

Works Cited ________________________________________________________________ 19

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Introduction The Western Saharan region is has been largely disregarded by the international

community. Although Africa has been decolonized, the aftermath of the redrawing of

borders and redistribution of land has left many scars on the continent. The rapid exit of

Europeans from Africa in the period of decolonization left Africans to develop political

and infrastructure systems that were

lacking as the European powers left. In

the case of Western Sahara, the Spanish

occupied the area including its native

inhabitants, the Saharawis. When the

Spanish left in 1960, the United Nations

General Assembly pushed for a

referendum to decide the independence of

the Saharawi people. Originally, both

Morocco and Mauritania supported the

independence of the Saharawis; however,

each withdrew its support as the

referendum slowly came to realization, and Morocco even claimed the territory as part of

its kingdom.

To assert its ownership of the territory, the Moroccan government sent 350,000 of

its civilians into Western Sahara to settle the territory. Yet, while this movement, known

as the “green march,” was wholly condemned by the international community, little was

done to reverse its effects, and only some 100,000 Saharawis were displaced to Tindouf,

Algeria. Immediately after this movement, there was an upsurge in Saharawi resistance

movements many of which were unsuccessful. After a few years, the Polisario

Liberation Front emerged as the dominant independence force, officially declaring the

Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), an independent state despite Morocco’s

continued claims to the territory. They received aid from Algeria, Mauritania, as well as

Western Sahara

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Libya. While some African states came to the aid of the Saharawi, many supported, and

in some cases still support, Morocco’s claims to the region.

The disagreement regarding the sovereignty of the Saharawi people has caused

much conflict between the Saharawis and Morocco. As a result, the United Nations

Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was made responsible for

overseeing maintenance of the border as well as progress regarding the referendum on

Saharawan independence. Despite commitments to peace, both sides are guilty of using

military forces in ways that violate the rules established by the United Nations.

Numerous attempts to solve this ever-growing political crisis have failed. An

International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision granting the Saharawi independence and

calling for a referendum has not yet been accepted or acted upon. The Baker Plans

initiated by MINURSO have also failed to bring a lasting peace to the region. While the

Moroccan government offered the Saharawi people “limited autonomy,” the Saharawi

refuse to accept anything less then full independence. The continuation of this standoff

threatens to undermine three decades of effort by the United Nations and will simply

cause further deterioration of the already meager living conditions of the Saharawi

people.

Acceptance of the ICJ-mandated referendum is integral to finding a solution to the

instability in the Western Saharan region, but the African Union must not neglect to

recognize the countless lives that hang in the balance. Addressing the number of

casualties in refugee camps due to natural disasters and malnutrition is essential in

establishing a long-lasting solution. Since the UN approach has been largely ineffective

in finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict, the African Union must take steps to

provide regional cooperation and stability.

Background The Saharawi People The Saharawi people reside on little known tract of land on the western edge of

the Saharan Desert known as Western Sahara. This land has been the site of an arduous

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and bloody conflict between the indigenous Saharawi people and the Moroccan

government and people. The Saharawi people identify the Moroccans as “invaders,” and

have been fighting to gain their independence since the late 19th Century.1 One of the

major points of contention is that the Saharawi people have a culture that differs from

their Moroccan neighbors. The Saharawi people descend from Arab Yemenites who

intermarried with Berbers and Black Africans in the late 13th Century.2 Initially a

nomadic people, by the 1960s many had settled into cities and towns.3 Today, the

Saharawis reside in an area the size of Nevada just south of Morocco.4 The Saharawis

speak Hasseriya, a very pure version of Arabic. They are Sunni Muslims who worship

without mosques in the desert camps where most now reside.5

Cultural differences between the Moroccans and the Saharawi people partially

explain their years of conflict. While the Moroccans share the Saharawis’ Berber roots,

the Moroccan culture has been greatly impacted by trade with Westernized nations. Both

the rural and urban populations maintain a high degree of loyalty to Islam, although

religious practice in many regions is unorthodox and the demands of industrialization

organization have made traditional devotion difficult for those employed in modern

sectors.6 These complicating factors ensure that fighting will continue until the Saharawi

people are given a definitive response regarding their sovereignty from the United

Nations and the international community.

A History of Colonialism International involvement in Western Sahara was minimal until the Treaty of

Marrakesh. Signed 28 May 1767 between Spain and Sultan Sidi Mohamed Ben

Abdallah, the agreement was cited in the 1975 ICJ hearings regarding the referendum

1 Ruddy, 548. 2 Ryan, Nick. “A Forgotten War.” Geographical Magazine (May 1999): 40. 3 Ibid. 40. 4 Hottelet, Richard C. “Western Sahara Climax?” Christian Science Monitor (12 November 1999): 11. 5 Ryan. 40. 6 “Islamic Religion in Morocco.” The Western Sahara. August 2006. University of Pennsylvania. 29 Nov 2006 <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Country_Specific/Morco_relgn.html>.

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dispute. The Arabic translation for Article 18 of this treaty, which remains highly

controversial, states that: His Imperial Majesty warns the inhabitants of the Canaries against any fishing expedition to the coasts of Oued Noun and beyond. He disclaims any responsibility for the way they may be treated by the Arabs of the country, to whom it is difficult to apply decisions, since they have no fixed residence, travel as they wish and pitch their tents where they choose.7

That is to say, the Arabic version seems to suggest that the Arabs will view fishing

expeditions emanating from the Canary Islands as hostile. Moreover, it implies

sovereignty over the region, suggesting that the Sultan “disclaims any responsibility for

the way they may be treated in the country…” The Spanish version, however, reads

considerably differently in that it does not suggest any form of Moroccan sovereignty

over the area, indeed it denies it:

His Imperial majesty refrains from expressing an opinion with regard to the trading post which His Catholic Majesty wishes to establish to the south of the River Noun, since he can not take responsibility for accidents and misfortunes, because sus dominios does not extend so far.8

Perhaps most compelling is a letter sent by the Sultan to Carlos III of Spain stating, “they

are not subordinate to nor fearful of anyone, because they are greatly separated from my

dominions and I do not have power over them ... These Arabs have no fixed abode and

move around as it pleases them without submitting to government or any authority.”9 As

far back as the 18th Century, the inhabitants of Western Sahara were a nomadic people

that were comfortable in their ability not to answer to a central government or to submit

to the control of the imperial powers.

In 1799, the Meknes Treaty was agreed upon by Spain and Sultan Moulay

Souleiman, reinforcing Spain’s interests in the region, specifically the Canary Islands.

Unlike most colonial powers, Spain had limited interaction with its colonies, and was

primarily concerned with the Canary Archipelago and the safety of its fishermen.10

Spain’s intentions changed in 1884 following Captain Emilio Bonelli Hernando’s

7 Western Sahara Online. 2003. Marrakesh Treaty. < http://www.wsahara.net/m_treaty.html > 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Aggad.

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successful conquest of Villa Cisneros, now known as Dhakla. A Spanish royal decree

announced: considering the importance of the Spanish installations … and in the view of the documents signed by independent tribes … who have on various occasions asked for and obtained the protection of the Spanish … the King has decided … to take under his protection the territories … between Bahia del Oeste [La Guera] and Cape Bojaodr.11

For the first time, the Spanish Monarch claimed specific sovereignty over the people of

the Western Sahara

When the major European powers met at the Berlin Conference of 1885 to divide

Africa into colonies, they ratified the Spanish proclamation. Spain also agreed to share

with France what was to become the Kingdom of Morocco, and until 1930 considered the

Rio de Oro its formally occupied territory. Because the Western Sahara was not reaching

its expected economic potential between 1934 and 1946, it was annexed to its

protectorate in northern Morocco.12 It became a part of the Africa Occidental Española

(AOE) in 1946 and remained so until the dissolution of the AOE in 1958.

By 1956, the Istiqlal party in Morocco won independence, giving the Saharawi

people hope for freedom, thereby intensifying their rebelliousness.13 This movement

continued to increase with Tunisian independence and the Algerian liberation war.

Despite violent resistance from the Saharawi people, Spain continued to claim ownership

of the “Spanish Sahara.” At one point, the Spanish recruited French assistance, and

together pursued military action, entitled the “Ecouvillon,” which subdued Saharawi

resistance. This continued until the mid-20th Century, when U.N. pressure and physical

conflict began to erode Spain’s colonial authority.14 By 1960, the international

community increasingly advocated decolonization. This pressure increased over the next

few years, and by 1963, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting that Spain

grant independence to the Saharawis. On 20 December 1966, the General Assembly

passed another resolution, this time asking Spain to organize a referendum to decide the

11 Damis 8. 12 Aggad. 13 Ibid. 14 “Triumph For Procrastination.” The Economist (4 November 2000) 52.

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fate of the Saharawi people. Morocco and Mauritania already supported an independent

Western Sahara, and by the Nouadhibou meeting Algeria was in support as well.15

Surmounting international support, combined with skirmishes with the Saharawi

liberation front beginning in 1974, led Spain to announce the following August that it

would hold a referendum allowing the Saharawans to determine the future of the

territory.16

While the Kingdom of Morocco had supported Saharawan independence just a

decade earlier, the state reconsidered its position on the issue. Just before Spain

announced its plan to offer independence to the Saharawis, Morocco asserted its presence

and its authority by sending three hundred-fifty thousand Moroccan civilians to settle the

Western Saharan territory.17 During this “Green March,” one hundred thousand

Sahawaris sought refuge near Tindouf, a garrison town in Algeria.18 This action drew

much attention from the international community, especially the United Nations. The

march even resulted in a 6 November 1975 Security Council resolution condemning the

Moroccan action and calling on Morocco to “withdraw from the Territory of Western

Sahara all the participants in the march.”19

Resistance and the Emergence of the Polisario Front Resistance by the Saharawi people was a strong force within the region dating to

colonization of the region. The Saharawis challenged the Spanish as early as 1906

despite repeated Spanish attempts to quash liberation movements. The liberation cause

enjoyed an intense but factional revitalization just before and shortly after Spain finally

handed administration of the territory to Morocco in 1975.20 The Mouvement de

Resistance “Les Hommes Bleus” (Morehob) was one of the first organizations in the new

15 Western Sahara Online. 2003. History: detailed chronology. www.wsahara.net/history.html 16 Ibid. 548. 17 “Triumph For Procrastination.” 52. 18 Ibid. 52. 19 Aggad. 20 Ruddy. 52.

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generation of resistance parties.21 Founded in July 1972 in Rabat, Morocco, Morehob’s

goal was to “lead a struggle against Spanish colonialism.”22 The royalist group often

referred to Morocco as the “mother country,” and wanted the African kingdom to replace

Spain as its ruling nation. Morehob was small throughout its existence, and moved

between Morocco, Algeria and Europe before finally dissolving in 1975.

One year before Morehob’s demise, a different party arose in the southern area of

the territory. Created in 1974 with the encouragement of the Spanish government, the

Partido de la Unión Nacional Saharawi (PUNS) was established to create an independent

state for the Saharawis closely linked to Spain. Backed by colonial power and

championed by supporters of Saharawi self-determination, the future of PUNS looked

promising; however, the group was seen by some as too supportive of the status quo.

Members often clashed violently with other liberation movements, most notably the

Saharawi Liberation Front, commonly referred to as the Polisario Front.

The Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Río de Oro

(Polisario Front) was founded on the 10 May 1973. A tighter, reworked version of the

“embryonic movement for the liberation of the Sahara,” the group was formed by a secret

congress of anti-colonial militants, Saharawi students from Morocco, and well-educated

youth still living in the Western Sahara. Shortly after, a special executive committee

appointed by the congress issued a manifesto to publicize creation of the Polisario Front.

The manifesto clearly laid out the goals of the group: to reject all forms of colonialism

and exercise self-determination. In its mission statement, the Front stated its initial goal,

stating: The Polisario Front is born as a unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by which the Saharawi Arab African people can recover total liberty and foil the manoeuvres of Spanish colonialism.23

21 Pazzanita, Anthony and Tony Hodges. “The Mouvement de Resistance ‘Les Hommes Bleus’ (MOREHOB),” Historical Dictionary of the Western Sahara, (New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1994): 300. 22 Ibid 300. 23 Ibid.162-3.

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This first public statement spoke largely of political ideals but did not mention any

particular course of action, hazily referring to a general “total liberty.”24 One year later, a

second congress meeting 25-31 August 1974 more clearly defined the Polisario Front’s

goals: “In the face of these manoeuvres, the Saharawi people have no alternative but to

struggle until wresting independence, their wealth, and their full sovereignty over the

land.”25

Despite receiving almost no external support its first two years, the Polisario Front

raided a Spanish port days after issuing its first manifesto and began publishing a

monthly journal called 20 de Mayo the following October. Algeria was at first reluctant

to support Polisario, focusing its energies on Morehob until 1975, when the government

decided that the faction was ineffective. Eventually, Libya gave the group broadcasting

facilities and a small amount of arms as Mauritania issued a few passports and harbored

some Polisario leaders. Mauritania also tacitly involved itself in guerilla missions. When

Spain finally withdrew from the region, Polisario began to assert itself as the voice and

fist of self-determination of Western Sahara, announcing the Saharan Arab Democratic

Republic (SADR) as an independent state.26 SADR is now recognized by seventy

different regimes, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.27

Religious Unity and Political Tension Religious and political life were enmeshed in the early centuries of Islam.28 A

pledge of religious allegiance by a population to an Islamic ruler (“bai’a”) gives religious

sovereignty to that leader. For example, the Moroccan sultan was the “steward of God,”

personifying both the church and the state. The Sunni Muslim Saharawis in the Western

Sahara likewise pledged this allegiance to the Moroccan sultans in the 19th and early 20th

Centuries. It is important to re-emphasize here that, because the sultan was recognized as

the head of the Muslim church, it was possible to accept him as a religious leader while

24 Ibid. 164. 25 Ibid. 26 Ruddy, 52. 27 Ryan, 40. 28 Damis, 19.

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expressing much distrust for him politically. Indeed, the Saharawis did this, to the

chagrin of the Moroccan central government.29 Moroccan political leaders and the sultan

took this religious allegiance as a simultaneous pledge of territory. This mutual

misunderstanding is at the core of the Saharawi-Morocco conflict. Morocco now seeks to

retain the Western Sahara because of deep religious tradition.

In 1975, the Kingdom of Morocco petitioned the United Nations General

Assembly to pass a resolution that would ask the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to

advise on two questions. The ICJ was to determine if the Western Sahara was

autonomous (terra nullious) when Spain colonized the area, and if so, if there were there

any legal ties between Morocco and Mauritania.30 According to Morocco’s logic, if the

ICJ were to confirm that Western Sahara was indeed a part of the Berber empire at one

time, then Morocco would be justified in retaining the area. The ICJ ruling was not

advantageous to the Moroccan cause: The Court’s conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara, and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples in the territory.31

With this ruling, the ICJ confirmed the right to self-determination of the Saharawi people.

The Spanish referendum, in this way, was approved in the international arena.

The Referendum, MINURSO, and the Baker Plan A referendum vote was agreed upon by Morocco and the Saharawi, enabling the

inhabitants of the Western Sahara to choose their political future by way of the ballot.

Unfortunately, neither side seems to be able to agree on the specifics of the referendum,

such as who is eligible to vote in this highly controversial election. Moreover, each side

accuses the other of trying to load the ballot box.32 Part of the Polisario mistrust stems

from recollection of the Green March. To them, the Green March and other such 29 Ibid 20. 30 Ruddy 52. 31 Ibid 52. 32 “Triumph For Procrastination.” 52.

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campaigns are examples of the creation of a false ratio of Moroccans to indigenous

Saharawis, potentially tipping the referendum unnaturally and unfairly in Morocco’s

favor. Morocco has a similar claim against the Saharawis, accusing them of identifying

random desert people as Saharawi to inflate their numbers, arguing that Saharawi claims

of one hundred-forty thousand members are unreasonable and false.33 Also at issue are

the 65,000 people who identify as Saharawis living in Morocco proper.34 Only two

thousand of these people currently qualify as eligible voters, and Morocco is appealing

the rest.35

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

was created as an interim administration and peacekeeping force in response to these

differences.36 Publicly proposed by then-U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar

in June 1990, MINURSO was to be responsible for monitoring the cease-fire between

Morocco and the Polisario Front, supervising the withdrawal and confinement of

Moroccan troops, identifying voters, overseeing the return of Saharawi refugees,

conducting the eventual referendum, and announcing the results of the vote. Squabbles

over Minurso’s size, the number of Moroccan troops to be recalled, and other specifics

delayed its inception until finally a Security Council resolution on the 27 June 1990

requested a detailed report on the practicalities and cost of the mission. The report came

out on 19 April 1991 and shortly thereafter a Security Council resolution established

MINURSO. The body consists of three units: civilian, military, and security. The

civilian unit is responsible for legal, legislative and administrative matters during the

interim before the referendum. The military unit provides lightly armed forces for

peacekeeping purposes. Lastly, the security unit is a civil police force responsible for law

and order in the area, including the supervision of Moroccan police forces.37

33 Ibid 52. 34 Ruddy 52. 35 Ibid. 36 “The Mouvement de Resistance ‘Les Hommes Bleus’ (MOREHOB).” 452. 37 Ibid.

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Current Status Today, the central concern in the Saharawi region is not the tension between

Morocco and the Polisario, but rather the condition of the refugees that have taken

residence in tent villages throughout the desert. After nearly 30 years of war, camps are

replete with unsanitary conditions, a lack of running water, and scarce amounts of food

for livestock. The harsh conditions in the Algerian desert, which render it prone both to

flash flooding and to sandstorms, threaten its inhabitants.38 An African Union delegation,

braving the harsh conditions, accompanied the African Union President’s Committee in a

five-day solidarity visit beginning 8 November 2006.39 In addition to distributing much

needed humanitarian aid, the visit was designed to show African community solidarity to

a people who have suffered immensely due to the occupation of their territory. The

African delegation also met with representatives of the Red Cross International

Committee (CICR), World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR), to “[raise] their awareness about the need to continue bringing and

increasing the necessary assistance to the Saharawi refugees.”40 In November 2006,

Algeria also showed its desire to aid the Saharawi by providing humanitarian assistance.

The Algerian delegation came with 400 tons of semolina flour, brought by a caravan of

twenty trucks that travelled more than 1,800 kilometers to reach the Saharawi refugee

camps.41

One of the most complicated obstacles to maintaining the refugee camps was the

flash flooding throughout the Tindouf region in early February 2006. Between 50,000

and 60,000 refugees were left homeless after their mud brick shelters failed to withstand

the flooding. Schools and dispensaries were also severely damaged. The UNHCR, WFP,

and the Algerian Red Crescent immediately organized an emergency response to address

the crisis, and Algeria dispatched a humanitarian convoy to bring relief to Saharan

refugees. In the early stages of the emergency response, MINURSO not only provided 38 Ibid 40. 39 http://www.spsrasd.info/sps-e081106.html 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid.

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water tanks, but also helped distribute and coordinate assistance. While such rapid

responses must be commended, tragedies such as these emphasize the fragility of these

refugee camps. Tent cities provide little stability, and without a resolution to the question

of independence the Saharawi people stand to suffer the most.

MINURSO has spent ten years and a half billion dollars organizing the

referendum, and the effort is all but frustrated.42 The Moroccan government and the

Polisario party seem no closer to agreement than they were in 1975. James Baker, the

former United Nations envoy to Western Sahara, has proposed a different solution to the

problem. His proposal of “limited autonomy,” recently approved by the United Nations,

delays the referendum another five years. The Baker Plan calls for determining and

defining a state of limited autonomy under the Moroccan government.43

Regardless of the pessimistic outlook of some observers, others claim that

relations with Morocco are becoming more positive. King Mohammed of Morocco is

said to exhibit a “lighter touch” than his father, and his actions have demonstrated

goodwill towards the Sahawari.44 He replaced Minister of the Interior Driss Basri, who

was “feared and hated” by the many he oppressed, and he freed fifty-six political

prisoners in a show of solidarity towards the “sons of the Sahara.”45 Moreover, evidence

shows that Morocco’s human rights record may be improving. However, as Morocco

continues to prevent the referendum, many believe that Saharawi freedom is not

Morocco’s primary concern.

Although both sides have been trying to achieve peace, neither will concede any of

their terms. Secretary General Report S/2006/249 notes a significant decrease in the

amount of violations made by the Polisario Front and the Moroccan government.

Furthermore, the Polisario lifted restrictions on the movement of United Nations military

observers which had been in place for several years, allowing access to its military units

for inspection purposes. From 14 October until 15 March 2006, MINURSO observed 42 “Polisario’s Sinking Hopes.” 44. 43 Ibid. 44. 44 “Triumph for Procrastination.” 52. 45 Ibid. 52.

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only eight new violations of the agreement by the Royal Moroccan Army and four new

violations by the military forces of the Polisario, reflecting a decrease of almost 50 per

cent compared to the previous reporting period. The violations included continued

incursions by both sides into the buffer strip by armed elements, construction of new

physical structures, and movement of weapons and military units without prior

notification of or approval by MINURSO.

The African Union is one of the few organizations that continues to recognize the

Saharawi Republic. The body has been providing humanitarian assistance to the

Saharawi people to alleviate the difficulties they face as they await a referendum on their

political future. With, military tensions easing, the atmosphere is conducive to a

constructive solution. The mission of the African Union remains to develop an effective,

feasible answer to the problems plaguing Western Sahara in order to create a lasting,

meaningful peace.

Policy Positions Saharawi Republic The Saharawi Republic maintains that the establishment of an independent

Saharawi state through a just and regular self-determination referendum is the “best way

for the consecration of security, peace, and stability in the region because this is the

democratic solution conforming to the UN Charter.”46 The Saharawi people maintain

that they have rightfully been granted their independence through passage of the Security

Resolution more than three decades ago. The Saharawi Minister for Occupied Territories

and Communities, Mr. El Khalil Sid M’hamed, argues against Moroccan claims that

Saharawan independence is a threat to stability in the region. The Minister highlights

that it was Morocco’s colonial presence in Western Sahara, against the will of the

Saharawi and against the stated desires of the international community, that caused

46 “The President of the African Union’s Committee for Refugees Visits the Saharawi Camps.” 11 November 2006. Sahara Press Service. http://www.spsrasd.info/sps-e081106.html

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tension in Morocco, Maghreb, and North Africa.47 While the Saharawans are not

opposed to bilateral negotiations with the Moroccan government, they are hesitant to

engage in discussions before clear objectives are established. The Saharawans hope to

engage in meaningful talks with Morocco once that government sets forth its highly

anticipated plan to resolve the issue of Saharawi independence.

Morocco Morocco’s refusal to join the African Union because of the status of Western

Sahara has caused tension with some of its closer allies. Since early 2006, the Security

Council has been waiting on a Moroccan plan to give extended autonomy to the

Saharawans, but the political viability of the plan remains to be seen. Morocco clearly

wants to retain sovereignty while granting real autonomy to a population that seeks

complete independence. Having fought thirty years of separatist wars, the Sahrawis will

not settle for limited freedom as a region of Morocco. Morocco blocked both Baker

Plans, not allowing any solution that could give the Saharawi people real independence.

Morocco is also blocking voting on the referendum, arguing that refugees from

neighboring countries, especially those from Morocco, cannot be counted as residents of

the Saharawi region and therefore should be ineligible vote. The only solution that

Morocco is willing to consider is for the parties to agree on a “transfer of competences to

the local populations … within the framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity

of the Kingdom.” Keeping this in mind, Morocco is ready to submit its autonomy plan

for consideration. Morocco also supports the approach of Peter Van Walsum, the United

Nations secretary-general’s personal envoy to Western Sahara. Although direct

negotiations stalled in early 2006, the Moroccan government is willing to participate in

direct negotiations with the Saharawans, provided that Algeria be present as well.48

47 Ibid 48 “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara.” United Nations Security Council. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/568/50/PDF/N0656850.pdf?OpenElement

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Algeria Algeria has been active in the Saharawi region, providing emergency assistance

and humanitarian aid whenever necessary. Algeria currently hosts refugee camps near its

borders for the Saharawi refugees, the most commonly known is Tindouf. Since 1975,

the government has fully supported the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara, delivering

arms, training, financial aid, and food for more than thirty years without interruption. As

a strong advocate for peace in the region, Algeria is fully invested in seeing the Polisario

achieve Saharawan independence. Algeria was responsible for the establishment of a

1991 cease-fire agreement in Algiers which many hoped would lead to a peaceful

resolution of the matter. While it has taken a very active stance in the issue, Algeria

refuses to take part in direct negotiations between the Polisario and Morocco. The

government feels that as they are not a party to the conflict they do not have the right to

actively engage in negotiations, instead advocating bilateral talks between the Saharawi

and Moroccan governments.49 While Algeria disagrees with Morocco’s stance on this

issue, both Algeria and Morocco have aimed to improve their relations with the hope of

achieving a meaningful, long lasting resolution to the conflict.

States that Recognize the Saharawi Republic Angola, Algeria, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mauritania,

Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe all recognize the Saharawi Republic.

Each state is therefore invested in regional peace, if not the independence of the Saharawi

people. While overall humanitarian support in this region is minimal at best, the majority

of the support the Saharawans receive comes from these states. Perhaps the most

surprising state to recently recognize the Saharawi independence was South Africa,

whose strong economic ties with Morocco originally precluded them from recognizing

the SADR. Yet, through time and political pressure, South Africa made the decision to

recognize the existence of the SADR. Many of these states also contribute troops to

49 “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara.” United Nations Security Council. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/568/50/PDF/N0656850.pdf?OpenElement

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MINURSO to help maintain peace in the region. While most states have allied with the

Saharawi due to political pressure, few nations have become actively involved politically

in the matter. Fostering a sense of responsibility in these states to develop a feasible

political solution to Saharawi independence is vital to finding an overall solution to this

concern.

The Remainder of the African Union Nations that have not yet been discussed, including Eritrea, Somalia, Ghana,

Egypt, and Senegal, disregard the African Union’s decision to recognize the Saharawi

people as a sovereign entity. Yet, although Ghana has not formally recognized the

SADR, the government has provided troops to help keep peace in the region.50 While

these states have each independently made the decision to on some level recognize the

SADR, almost all of these nations have individual motives for not formally recognizing

the Republic. They range from economic or political pressure from Morocco to merely

indifference to the Saharawan struggle. Many of these states, such as Eritrea, Ethiopia,

and Somalia, face their own humanitarian crises, and are therefore disinterested in

becoming entangled in this debate. These economic and political alliances will be

extremely important in determining whether or not to take action in Western Sahara.

50 “Report of the Secretary General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara.” United Nations Security Council. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/568/50/PDF/N0656850.pdf?OpenElement

PhilMUN 2007 17

Summary The Saharawi have fought for millennia against perceived invaders, and the

struggle continues today as they fight for independence and the end of Moroccan

influence. The nature of the struggle has forced the Saharawi people to reside in many

refugee camps, which are often unsanitary and lack clean water. While international,

regional, and governmental efforts have been made to alleviate human suffering, more

must be done to ensure that the basic needs of the Saharawans are met. Yet, despite the

conditions they are forced to endure, the Saharawi people maintain their desire for

independence from Morocco.

While many solutions have been proposed to the crisis during the thirty-year

standoff between Morocco and the Saharawi Republic, none of them have effectively

dealt with the main issues plaguing the area. While the United Nations called for a

referendum on the question of Saharawi independence almost thirty years ago, petty

arguments have precluded the referendum from taking place. Moreover, the Baker Plans,

as well as all other multilateral initiatives, have failed to achieve meaningful

consequences. As a result, in 2006 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested that it

may be time for the UN to step aside and allow the Saharawans and Moroccans to

attempt bilateral negotiations to address the question of Saharawi independence.

However, while the two parties struggle with this concern, the entire region is

destabilized. As an African body that understands the unique problems plaguing the

continent, the African Union must take an active role in solving this crisis before it

escalates further. Steps must be taken to ensure that the Moroccans and Saharawans are

able to negotiate peacefully rather than revert to violence and bloodshed.

PhilMUN 2007 18

Discussion Questions • Should the African Union be actively involved in the question of Saharawan

independence? • What measures could the African Union take to ensure that sovereign nations

attempt to implement their proposed solutions? • Is legislation enough? Would sanctions or tariffs be more effective? • What role do humanitarian concerns play in the issue of independence? Should the

African Union give humanitarian aid the Saharawi? If so, how and in what form?

• How do discrepancies in the formal recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic affect the solution that the African Union will present, if at all?

• Should there be greater involvement between the African communities to prevent

new military violations and general uneasiness? What preventative measures should be taken, if any?

• Should negotiations between the SADR and Morocco be bilateral? Should Algeria

have a role in the proceedings?

• Both Morocco and SADR have been accused of inflating the number of civilians that qualify for the referendum on independence. How should the numbers be determined? What qualifications should be necessary to vote?

PhilMUN 2007 19

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Arieff, Irwin. “More Talks Ahead in Western Sahara Impasse- UN Envoy.”

Reuters (2006): 1-4. Association for the support for a free and regular Referendum in Western Sahara

(ARSO). 2003. A Brief History of the Territory and its People. op cit, p. The Columbia Encyclopedia, sixth edition, 2001-2005 Damis, J. 1983. Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Saharan Dispute.

California; Hoover Institution Press. p8 Farouky, Saeed Taji. “Deserted in the Western Sahara.” openDemocracy 26 March 2006

1-8. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/wsahara/2006/0306deserted.htm>.

Hottelet, Richard C. “Western Sahara Climax?” Christian Science Monitor (12

November 1999): 11. “Islamic Religion in Morocco.” The Western Sahara. August 2006. University of

Pennsylvania. 29 Nov 2006 <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Country_Specific/Morco_relgn.html>.

“Marrakesh Treaty.”Encylopedia Britannica. 5th ed. 2005. Milestones of the Conflict.”MINURSO. 2006. “The Mouvement de Resistance ‘Les Hommes Bleus’ (MOREHOB).” 452. Pazzanita, Anthony and Tony Hodges. “The Mouvement de Resistance ‘Les Hommes

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“The President of the African Union’s Committee for Refugees Visits the Saharawi

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PhilMUN 2007 20

Ryan, Nick. “A Forgotten War.” Geographical Magazine (May 1999): 40. “Saharawi People ready to cooperate with the UN for a legal decolonization of the

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“Update on Western Sahara.” Security Council 26 April 2006

<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1510101/k.36C4/april_2006brWestern_Sahara.htm>

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