Page 1-21 Legal Case CIVPRO digest

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NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 141524

September 14, 2005469 SCRA 6

CORONA, J.:

F!"t#$Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgmentand titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion withpreliminary injunction before the RTC against the privaterespondents. Later, in an order, the trial court dismissedpetitioners complaint on the ground of prescription.Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissalon !arch ", #$$% and, on the #&th day thereafter or on!arch #%, #$$%, filed a motion for reconsideration. 'n (uly #,#$$%, the trial court issued another order dismissing themotion for reconsideration which petitioners received on (uly

)), #$$%. *ive days later, on (uly )+, #$$%, petitioners filed anotice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on ugust ", #$$%.

'n ugust -, #$$%, the court a uo denied the noticeof appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This wasreceived by petitioners on (uly "#, #$$%. Petitioners filed amotion for reconsideration but this too was denied in anorder dated eptember ", #$$%. 0ia a petition for certiorariand mandamus under Rule 1&, petitioners assailed thedismissal of the notice of appeal before the C. 2n theappellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonablyfiled their notice of appeal. They argued that the #&3day

reglementary period to appeal started to run only on (uly )),#$$% since this was the day they received the final order ofthe trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. 4henthey filed their notice of appeal on (uly )+, #$$%, only fivedays had elapsed and they were well within the reglementaryperiod for appeal. 'n eptember #1, #$$$, the C dismissedthe petition. 2t ruled that the #&3day period to appeal shouldhave been rec5oned from !arch ", #$$% or the day theyreceived the *ebruary #), #$$% order dismissing theircomplaint. ccording to the appellate court, the order wasthe 6final order7 appealable under the Rules.

%##&e#$

2. 4hether or not receipt of a final order triggers thestart of the #&3day reglementary period to appeal the*ebruary #), #$$% order dismissing the complaint or the (uly#, #$$% order dismissing the !otion for Reconsideration

22. 4hether or not petitioners filed their notice ofappeal on time.

'e()$ 2. The (uly #, #$$% order dismissing the motion forreconsideration should be deemed as the final order. 2n thecase of 8uelnan v. 09* Philippines, 2nc., the trial courtdeclared petitioner non3suited and accordingly dismissed hiscomplaint. :pon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed anomnibus motion to set it aside. 4hen the omnibus motionwas filed, #) days of the #&3day period to appeal the orderhad lapsed. 9e later on received another order, this timedismissing his omnibus motion. 9e then filed his notice ofappeal. ;ut this was li5ewise dismissed < for having been

filed out of time. The court a uo ruled that petitioner shouldhave appealed within #& days after the dismissal of hiscomplaint since this was the final order that was appealableunder the Rules. The C reversed the trial court and declaredthat it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of anorder of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the finalorder as it was what ended the issues raised there. Thispronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case ofpuyan v. 9aldeman et al. where the C again consideredthe order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration asthe final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in

the case. ;ased on the aforementioned cases, the Csustained petitioners view that the order dated (uly #, #$$%denying their motion for reconsideration was the final ordercontemplated in the Rules.

22. =es. To standardi>e the appeal periods provided inthe Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appealtheir cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a freshperiod of #& days within which to file the notice of appeal inthe RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a

motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.9enceforth, this 6fresh period rule7 shall also apply to Rule


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-?, Rule -), Rule -" and Rule -& but does not apply to Rule1-@Review of (udgments and *inal 'rders or Resolutions ofthe Commission on Alections and the Commission on uditBbecause Rule 1- is derived from the Constitution. 2t isli5ewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases. Thenew rule aims to regiment or ma5e the appeal perioduniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying themotion for new trial, motion for reconsideration @whether fullor partialB or any final order or resolution.

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule -#,ection " of the Rules which states that the appeal shall beta5en within #& days from notice of judgment or final orderappealed from. The use of the disjunctive word 6or7 signifiesdisassociation and independence of one thing from another.2t should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which itordinarily implies. 9ence, the use of 6or7 in the aboveprovision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed

within #& days from the notice of judgment or within #& daysfrom notice of the 6final order,7 which we already determinedto refer to the (uly #, #$$% order denying the motion for anew trial or reconsideration.

P%NGA vs. 'E%RS OF SANT%AGOGR No. 1*054+&e 0, 2006494 SCRA 9

T%NGA,J.$F!"t#$ The 9eirs of antiago filed an injunction against Pingaalleging that Pinga had been unlawfully entering the cocolands of the respondent cutting wood and bamboos andharvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. s a counterclaim,Pinga contests the ownership of the lands to which he washarvesting the fruits. 9owever, due to failures of 9eirs ofantiago to attend the hearings, the court ordered the

dismissal of said case. Respondents thus filed a !otion forReconsideration to as5 for the entire action to be dismissed

and not to allow petitioner to present evidence e parte. aidmotion was granted by the RTC, hence the counterclaim wasdismissed.The lower court further ruled that compulsory counterclaimscannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause ofaction vis a vis the dismissal of the complaint carries with itthe dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner thereforeelevated the matter to the upreme Court via petition forcertiorari under Rule -& on pure uestions of law alsoaverring that respondents motive for see5ing the dismissalof their entire case is to avoid putting their ownership incontroversy in the counterclaim.%##&e$

4hether or not the dismissal of the original complaintaffects that of the compulsory counterclaim.

'e()$ Do, the counterclaim herein can stand on its own. Thedismissal of the complaint does not carry with it the dismissalof the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. 2n fact, thedismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right ofdefendants to prosecute his counterclaim. ection "contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeitjustified by causes imputable to him and which, in thepresent case, was petitionerEs failure to appear at the pre3trial. This situation is also covered by ection ", as etendedby judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of

defendant or motu proprio by the court. 9ere, the issue ofwhether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissiveor compulsory, is not of determinative significance. Thedismissal of plaintiffEs complaint is evidently a confirmation ofthe failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlinedtherein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter ofevidence, an adjudication on the merits.

The complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but reliefcan nevertheless be granted as a matter of course todefendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with orwithout any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his

conduct, epress or implied, he has virtually consented to theconcomitant dismissal of his counterclaim.


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The present rule embodied in ections ) and " of Rule#+ ordains a more euitable disposition of the counterclaimsby ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the meritof the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the maincomplaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably withoutmerit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independentof the complaint, the trial court is not precluded fromdismissing it under the amended rules, provided that thejudgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premisedon those defects. t the same time, if the counterclaim isjustified, the amended rules now uneuivocally protect suchcounterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of thedismissal of the complaint.

ection ", Rule #+ of the Rules of Court, as amended,providesF

If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on thedate of his presentation of his evidence x x x the complaintmay be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the

courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of thedefendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in aseparate action.

-AR%TUAvs. ERCA/ERG.R. No. 1604

+!&!r 2, 200150 SCRA 6

PANGAN%-AN,J.:

F!"t#$!ercader boarded the bus of herein petitioner (; Line

bounded from !anila to D. amar. 9owever, while said buswas traversing the ;eily ;ridge in D. amar, the bus fell intothe river and as a result, !ercader died. The heirs of!ercader sued petitioner for breach of contract of carriage.4ith the heirs of !ercader attaining a favorable judgment atthe lower court and C level, petitioner assails the saiddecisions rendered therein with the upreme Court viaPetition for Review under Rule -& on the ground of

procedural flaws, specifically uestioningF @#B the jurisdictionof the lower court over the original and amended complaints

or over the subject matter of the case as the trial court wasnot paid the correct amount of doc5et and other lawful feesG@)B the arbitrary disregard for petitioners constitutional rightto procedural due process and fairness as the appellate courtdenied their right to present evidence, to epect that theirevidence will be duly considered and appreciated and whenthe court passed sub silencio on the trail courts failure torule frontally on petitioners plea for a bill of particularsG and@"B that both the RTC and C failed to adhere to the rule thattheir decision must state clearly and distinctly the facts andthe laws on which they are based.

%##&e#$2. 4hether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over thesubject matter of the case22. 4hether or not petitioners procedural rights weredisregarded as to the denial of their

!otion for a ;ill of Particulars

222. 4hether or not petitioner was denied of hisprocedural right to adduce evidence

'e()$2. =es. The Court, in !anchester Hevelopment

Corporation v. C, held that 6the court acuires jurisdictionover any case only upon the payment of the prescribeddoc5et fee n amendment of the complaint or similarpleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, muchless the payment of the doc5et fee based on the amountssought in the amended pleading.7

Ienerally, the jurisdiction of a court is determined bythe statute in force at the commencement of the action,unless such statute provides for its retroactive application.'nce the jurisdiction of a court attaches, it continues untilthe case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot beousted therefrom by subseuent happenings or events,although of a character that would have preventedjurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

The !anchester ruling, which became final in #$%+,has no retroactive application and cannot be invo5ed in thesubject Complaint filed in #$%-.


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22. Do. 2t must be noted that petitioners counselmanifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a billof particulars. The RTC gave him ten days within which to doso. 9e, however, filed the aforesaid motion only eleven dayspast the deadline set by the trial court. !oreover, suchmotion was already moot and academic because, prior to itsfiling, petitioners had already filed their answer and severalother pleadings to the amended Complaint. ection #, Rule#) of the Rules of Court, providesF

Section . !hen applied for" purpose. ## $eforeresponding to a pleading, a party may move for a moredefinite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matterwhich is not averred with sufficient definiteness or

particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsivepleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filedwithin ten %&' days from service thereof. Such motion shall

point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs whereinthey are contained, and the details desired.

222. Do. *irst, judges cannot be epected to rely on thetestimonies of every witness. 2n ascertaining the facts, theydetermine who are credible and who are not. 2n doing so,they consider all the evidence before them. 2n other words,the mere fact that (udge Doynay based his decision on thetestimonies of respondents witnesses does not necessarilymean that he did not consider those of petitioners. econd,there is no sufficient showing that (udge 'perario wasover>ealous in uestioning the witnesses. 9is uestionsmerely sought to clarify their testimonies.

ATTY. A-REN%CAvs. LA F%R OF A-REN%CA, TUNGOLAN/ T%-AYAN

G.R. No. 169420September 22, 2006

502 SCRA 614

YNARES3SANT%AGO,J.:

F!"t#$

Respondents filed with the ecurities and AchangeCommission @ACB two cases against petitioner regarding an

alleged refusal of petitioner to return and transferpartnership funds. The AC initially heard the cases but theywere later transferred to the RTC of 8ue>on City pursuant toRepublic ct Do. %+$$, which transferred jurisdiction overintra3corporate controversies from the AC to the courts. TheRTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, causingpetitioner to file with the Court of ppeals a !otion for Leaveof Court to dmit ttached Petition for Review under Rule -"of the Revised Rules of Court. The C, however, denied saidmotion as well as the subseuent !otion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner invo5es liberal construction of the rules insee5ing reversal of the above resolutions. 9e alleges that hisappeal was not filed late but that he only resorted to thewrong mode of appealG that reali>ing his error, heimmediately filed the !otion *or Leave to dmit Petition forReviewG that his notice of appeal had the effect of tolling theperiod of perfecting his appeal under Rule -" of the Rules ofCourtG that although unaware of .!. Do. ?-3$3?+3C, he

appealed four days after receiving the consolidated decisionthrough a notice of appeal, thus showing his JsincerityJ inappealing the decision.

%##&e$4hether or not the Court of ppeals erred in the non3

application of a liberal construction of the rules resulting inthe refusal to admit petitioners petition for review

'e()$Do. :nder Rule #, ection 1 of the #$$+ Rules of Civil

Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is the controllingprinciple to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should,as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not ontechnicalities. This does not mean, however, that proceduralrules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit theconvenience of a party. Procedural law has its own rationalein the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure theeffective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for asystem that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, orwhimsicality in the settlement of disputes. 9ence, it is amista5e to suppose that substantive law and procedural law

are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, thatenforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if


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it would result in prejudice to the substantive rights of thelitigants.

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but everycase must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribedprocedure so that issues may be properly presented andjustly resolved. 9ence, rules of procedure must be faithfullyfollowed ecept only when for persuasive reasons, they maybe relaed to relieve a litigant of an injustice notcommensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribedprocedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules ofprocedure should be an effort on the part of the partyinvo5ing liberality to eplain his failure to abide by the rules.

J'versightJ and Jecusable negligenceJ have becomean all too familiar and ready ecuse on the part of lawyersremiss in their bounden duty to comply with establishedrules. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promoteefficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainmentof justice, such that strict adherence thereto is reuired. The

application of the Rules may be relaed only when rigiditywould result in a defeat of euity and substantial justice.

PALOAvs. ORAG.R. No. 15**

September 2, 20054*0 SCRA *11

C'%CO3NAAR%O,J.:

F!"t#$

Petitioner was terminated from his appointment asIeneral !anager of the Palompon, Leyte 4ater Histrict. ;yreason thereof, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus withprayer to be restored to his former position and forpreliminary injunction with damages before the RTC. :nableto obtain a favorable ruling with the RTC, petitioner filed acomplaint with the Civil ervice Commission for alleged0iolation of Civil ervice Law and Rules and for 2llegalHismissal. The CC, however, dismissed the petition for lac5of merit, which was li5ewise affirmed by the Court ofppeals.

%##&e#$

2. 4hether or not mandamus will lie to compel the;oard of Hirectors of Palompon, Leyte 4ater Histrict toreinstate the Ieneral !anager thereof

22. 4hether or not the Civil ervice Commission hasprimary jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal ofpetitioner

'e()$2. Do. !andamus does not lie to compel the ;oard of

Hirectors of the Palompon, Leyte 4ater Histrict to reinstatepetitioner because the ;oard has the discretionary power toremove him under ection )" of P.H. Do. #$%, as amended byP.H. Do. +1%.

!oreover, ection ", Rule 1& of the Rules of CourtprovidesF

6Sec. (. )etition for mandamus. * !hen any tribunal,corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a

duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfullyexcludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right oroffice to which such other is entitled, and there is no other

plain, speedy and ade+uate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petitionin the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and

praying that judgment be rendered commanding therespondent, immediately or at some other time to bespecified by the court, to do the act re+uired to be done to

protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the damagessustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of

the respondent.!andamus lies to compel the performance, whenrefused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel theperformance of a discretionary duty. !andamus will not issueto control or review the eercise of discretion of a publicofficer where the law imposes upon said public officer theright and duty to eercise his judgment in reference to anymatter in which he is reuired to act. 2t is his judgment that isto be eercised and not that of the court.

22. =es. s a general rule, no officer or employee of the

civil service shall be removed or suspended ecept for causeprovided by law as provided in ection )@"B, rticle 2K3; of


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the #$%+ Constitution. s eception to this, P.H. Do. #$%, aspecial enabling charter of Local 4ater Histricts,categorically provides that the Ieneral !anager shall serveEat the pleasure of the board.

4ater districts are government instrumentalities andtheir employees belong to the civil service. Thus, the hiringand firing of employees of government3owned or controlledcorporations are governed by the Civil ervice Law and Civilervice Rules and Regulations.

2n cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction isclearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself theauthority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over whichis initially lodged with an administrative body of specialcompetence. 8uasi3judicial bodies li5e the CC are better3euipped in handling cases involving the employment statusof employees as those in the Civil ervice since it is withinthe field of their epertise. This is consistent with the powersand functions of the CC, being the central personnel agency

of the Iovernment, to carry into effect the provisions of theCivil ervice Law and other pertinent laws, including, in thiscase, P.H. Do. #$%.

UESA/Avs. /EPARTENT OF +UST%CEG.R. No. 15025A&t 1, 2006500 SCRA 454

SAN/O7AL3GUT%ERRE,J.:

F!"t#$Respondent Teruel filed with the 'ffice of the City

Prosecutor in !andaluyong City an affidavit3complaintagainst petitioner, Camacho, (r., and Corgado with the crimeof estafa under rticle "#& @)B and @"B of the Revised PenalCode, which in turn was opposed by petitioner who filed acounter3affidavit thereto. Thereafter, an 2nformation forestafa was filed with the RTC upon the recommendation ofssistant City Prosecutor Asteban . Tacla, (r. after thelatters issuance of a Resolution finding probable cause. 2n

the meantime, petitioner filed with the Hepartment of (ustice

a Petition for Review challenging the Resolution of the2nvestigating Prosecutor, but was however, dismissed.

Pending the criminal case at the RTC, petitioner filedwith the upreme Court a Petition for Certiorari alleging thatthe ecretary of (ustice, in dismissing his Petition for Review,acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac5 orecess of jurisdiction.

%##&e$4hether or not the filing of the present petition

directly with the upreme Court constitutes an utter violationof the rule on hierarchy of courts

'e()$=es. The upreme Court is a court of last resort, and

must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functionsassigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorialtradition. 2t cannot and should not be burdened with the tas5

of dealing with causes in the first instance. 2ts originaljurisdiction to issue the so3called etraordinary writs shouldbe eercised only where absolutely necessary or whereserious and important reasons eist therefor. 9ence, thatjurisdiction should generally be eercised relative to actionsor proceedings before the Court of ppeals, or beforeconstitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whoseacts for some reason or another are not controllable by theCourt of ppeals. 4here the issuance of an etraordinary writis also within the competence of the Court of ppeals or aRegional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the

specific action for the writs procurement must be presented.The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the venueof appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant ofthe appropriate forum for petitions for the etraordinarywrits. 2t is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinatedemands upon the Courts time and attention which arebetter devoted to those matters within its eclusivejurisdiction, and to prevent further over3crowding of theCourts doc5et.

NGO -UN T%ONGvs. 'ON. ARCEL%NO . SAYO

G.R. No. L34525+&e 0, 19


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16 SCRA 2*

PARAS,J.:

F!"t#$The case originated from a decision of the Court a *irst

2nstance of !anila, ;ranch K222 in a case entitled 6Calte

@Phil.B 2nc. vs. Pilares Construction Co.7 ordering amongothers, the payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of thesum of P1+,?&).") plus interests, attorneyEs fees and costs.aid decision became final and eecution thereofcommenced with an eecution sale for the purpose.!eanwhile, the case was appealed up to the upreme Court.Pending proceedings in the latter court, private respondentfiled a complaint with the Court of *irst 2nstance of Ri>al,;ranch KKK222, Caloocan City, against herein petitioner andAmilio . Reyes for JHeclaration of Dullity of the uction aleand HamagesJ and a !otion to nnul Certificate of ale and

to declare alleged auction sale with the Court of *irst2nstance of !anila, ;ranch K222 as null and void. The saidcourt rendered judgment issuing a writ of preliminaryprohibitory and mandatory injunction restraining defendantsfrom pulling out or removing any such property of theplaintiff from its compound, and ordering defendants toreturn immediately such euipments and properties now intheir possession which were removed or hauled by them byvirtue of the sale allegedly had between them. This order ofthe C*2, ;ranch KKK222 is now being assailed.

%##&e$4hether or not a Court of *irst 2nstance or a branchthereof, has jurisdiction to annul or set aside, for allegedirregularities an eecution sale, held by virtue of a decisionrendered by another Court of *irst 2nstance or a branchthereof, and subseuently to order the return of theproperties sold at public auction to the judgment debtor

'e()$Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the

judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be

interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. Docourt has the power to interfere by injunction, with the

judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinatejurisdiction having eual power to grant the relief sought byinjunction. *or the simple reason that the power to open,modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but isrestricted to the court in which the judgment was rendered.

*or obvious reasons, the matter should have been laidto rest, but private respondent instead again filed acomplaint with the Court of *irst 2nstance of Ri>al, ;ranchKKK222, raising the very same issues which were alreadydecided by the Court of *irst 2nstance, ;ranch K222 withfinality. 2t is an important fundamental principle in 'urjudicial system that every litigation must come to an end.ccess to the courts is guaranteed. ;ut there must be a limitthereto. 'nce a litigantEs rights have been adjudicated in avalid final judgment of a competent court, he should not begranted an unbridled license to come bac5 for another try.The prevailing party should not be harassed by subseuentsuits. *or, if endless litigations were to be encouraged,unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to thedetriment of the administration of justice.

ELLAvs. 'ON. +U/GE SALANGAG.R. No. L3226

September 2, 19*05 SCRA 6

A8AL%NTAL,J.:

F!"t#$ verified complaint was filed in the Court of *irst2nstance of 2locos ur by petitioners against respondents forspecific performance, to compel the payment of the price ofthe land allegedly purchased by the government under aperfected sales contract with petitioners, as well asattorneys fees, epenses of litigation, and moral andeemplary damages. The case was raffled and assigned to;ranch 22 whereby the latter, through (udge Humaual, issueda writ of preliminary injunction against respondents andsubseuently proceeded with the trial thereon. Later,

Aecutive (udge ngelino alanga, formerly presiding (udgeof ;ranch 222 filed a J!otion A Parte to Return the Case to


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0igan and To et ame for Trial.J Thereafter, (udge alangaissued an order directing the JCler5 of Court of Darvacan,;ranch ), to transfer all the records of the above entitledcase to this Court for the further prosecution of thisproceeding.J

The plaintiffs filed an e3parte motion see5ing toreverse and/or recall the order of (udge alanga on thegrounds that they had not been served with notice thereofand that after the hearing had been commenced in ;ranch 22,jurisdiction to hear and decide the case had been firmlylodged in said branch to the eclusion of other branches. motion was subseuently filed see5ing to dissolve the writ ofpreliminary injunction issued by (udge Humaual.

%##&e$2. 4hether or not ;ranch 22 had acuired eclusive

jurisdiction over the case22. 4hether or not the transfer of the case from ;ranch

22 to ;ranch 222 constituted undue interference with theprocesses of the former

222. 4hether or not the writ of injunction, issued by;ranch 22, may be validly dissolved by respondent (udge of;ranch 222

'e()$2. Do. The different branches of a Court of *irst

2nstance of one province do not possess jurisdictionsindependent of and incompatible with each other. The(udiciary ct vests jurisdiction upon the court, not upon any

particular branch or (udge thereof. 4hen a case is filed inone branch jurisdiction over the case does not attach to thebranch or judge alone, to the eclusion of the otherbranches. Trial may be held or proceedings continued by andbefore another branch or judge. 2t is for this reason thatection &+ of the (udiciary ct epressly grants to theecretary of (ustice, the administrative right or power toapportion the cases among the different branches, both forthe convenience of the parties and for the coordination of thewor5 by the different branches of the same court. Theapportionment and distribution of cases do not involve a

grant or limitation of jurisdictionG the jurisdiction attachesand continues to be vested in the Court of *irst 2nstance of

the province, and the trials may be held by any branch orjudge of the court.

22. Do. Ienerally, the branches being coordinate andco3eual, one branch or the judge thereof cannot undulyinterfere with the processes and proceedings of anotherbranch or (udge constituting an undue interest. The transferof the case to 0igan was not an unusual one under thecircumstances, and did not constitute a grave abuse ofdiscretion, or an ecess of jurisdiction such as to call for theissuance of the etraordinary writ of certiorari. had authorityfrom the Hepartment of (ustice to continue holding court at0igan, where he was Presiding (udge of ;ranch 222 prior to hisappointment to ;ranch 20. This authority granted to (udgealanga is allowed under ection &1 of the (udiciary ct,which provides as followsF

S-. /. Special terms of court. 0 !hen so directedby 1epartment 2ead, 1istrict 3udges shall hold special termsof court at any time or in any municipality in their respectivedistricts for the transactions of any judicial business.

The order for him to remain in 0igan came aboutbecause the Candon branch still had neither personnel noravailable courthouse, by reason of which (udge alanga couldnot immediately assume his duties there.

222. =es. The dissolution of the writ of injunction afterthe filing of a bond is allowed under section 1 of Rule &%. 2trests upon the sound discretion of the court, which,unfortunately, has been abused in this case. The damage

that it could cause to the petitioner is not irreparable, beingsubject to compensation in money. nd a furtherconsideration that cannot be ignored at this stage is that twoof the original plaintiffs, co3owners of the land which was thesubject of the earlier negotiations with the government, havesold their shares to a third party, as a result of which there isa distinct possibility that the said land may no longer besuited for the purpose for which it was intended.

7%LLAORvs. SALAS

G.R. No. 101041Noember 1, 1991


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20 SCRA 450

GRIO-AQUINO,J.:

F!"t#$Carlos filed an administrative case against (udge

0illamor, charging him with having issued illegal orders and

an unjust decision in a case he was a party of regarding adispute on ownership and possession of a certain parcel ofland against Daval. The same was summarily dismissed bythe upreme Court. Hissatisfied, Carlos filed a civil action fordamages against (udge 0illamor for 5nowingly rendering anunjust judgment when he dismissed five criminal casesagainst Daval and the same was raffled to the RTC presidedby (udge alas. !eanwhile, ttorney IuerreroEs complaint fordamages was raffled to ;ranch )#, Regional Trial Court, CebuCity wherein (udge leonar too5 cogni>ance of the same.

%##&e$4hether or not (udges leonar and alas may ta5ecogni>ance of the actions for damages against (udge 0illamorfor allegedly having rendered an unjust order against Carlosand ttorney Iuerrero which the upreme Courtsubseuently annulled

'e()$Do. Do Regional Trial Court can pass upon and

scrutini>e, and much less declare as unjust a judgment ofanother Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof

liable for damages without running afoul with the principlethat only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court ofppeals and the upreme Court, are vested with authority toreview and correct errors of the trial courts.

To allow respondent (udges leonar and alas toproceed with the trial of the actions for damages against thepetitioner, a co3eual judge of a co3eual court, would ineffect permit a court to review and interfere with thejudgment of a co3eual court over which it has no appellatejurisdiction or power of review. The various branches of aCourt of *irst 2nstance @now the Regional Trial CourtB being

co3eual, may not interfere with each otherEs cases,judgments and orders. 'nly after the ppellate Court, in a

final judgment, has found that a trial judgeEs errors werecommitted deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of5nowingly rendering an unjust decision be leveled againstthe latter.

/ELA ROSAvs. ROL/ANG.R. No. 12

September 5, 2006501 SCRA 4

CALLE+O, SR.,J.:

F!"t#$The case originated from a claim of ownership over a

parcel of land which was decided in favor of defendant.9owever, plaintiff therein, despite the order of the court,continues to refuse to vacate the land thereby prompting

defendant to file with the !TC a complaint for recovery ofownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages.The !TC rendered judgment therein in favor of defendant onthe ground of lac5 of jurisdiction. The court held that theissue between the parties was one of ownership and notmerely possession de facto. Thus, the possession of theproperty by defendants was not by mere tolerance, but byvirtue of a claim of ownershipG in fact, defendants neverrecogni>ed the plaintiffsE claim of ownership over theproperty.

%##&e$4hether or not the !TC had jurisdiction over theaction of respondents

'e()$=es. The action of respondents against petitioners was

one for unlawful detainer, and as such, the !TC hadjurisdiction over the same. 2t is settled jurisprudence thatwhat determines the nature of an action as well as whichcourt or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations ofthe complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether

or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayedfor. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of


10/29

the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses setup in the court or upon a motion to dismiss, for otherwise,the uestion of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely ondefendant. 'nce jurisdiction is vested, the same is retainedup to the end of the litigation.

(urisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act oragreement of the partiesG it cannot be acuired through orwaived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission.Deither is it conferred by the acuiescence of the court. 2t isneither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregardthe rule, this matter being legislative in character. Thus, thejurisdiction over the nature of an action and the subjectmatter thereof is not affected by the theories set up bydefendant in an answer or motion to dismiss.

ection " of Republic ct Do. +1$#, amending ection""@)B of ;atas Pambansa ;lg. #)$, which was the law ineffect when respondents filed their complaint againstpetitioners, provides that J!etropolitan Trial Courts,!unicipal Trial Courts and !unicipal Circuit Trial Courtseercise eclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcibleentry and unlawful detainerG provided that, when, in suchcases, defendant raises the uestions of ownership in hispleadings and the uestion of possession cannot be resolvedwithout deciding the issue of ownership, the issue ofownership shall be resolved only to determine the issues ofpossession.J

T%+Avs. S%-ONG'ANOYG.R. No. L321450

Apr:( 15, 1962 SCRA 29

/%ON,J.:

F!"t#$Tijam filed for the recovery of P#,$?% and legal interest

from ibongahanoy. Hefendants in turn, filed a counter bondwith !anila urety and *idelity Co. (udgement was renderedin favour of the plaintiffs and a writ of eecution was issuedagainst the defendant. Hefendants then moved for writ of

eecution against the urety which was granted. The urety,after the denial of its motion to uash the writ appealed to

the Court of ppeals, without raising the issue on lac5 ofjurisdictionG however the appellate court affirmed theappealed decision. 9ence, the urety then filed a !otion toHismiss on the ground of lac5 of jurisdiction against C*2 Cebuin view of the effectivity of (udiciary ct of #$-% a monthbefore the filing of the petition for recovery. The ct placedoriginal eclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actionsfor demands not eceeding ),??? eclusive of interest. Hueto such, the C set aside its earlier decision and referred thecase to the upreme Court since it has eclusive jurisdictionover Jall cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court isin issue.7

%##&e$4hether or not the urety is estopped from

uestioning the jurisdiction of the C*2 Cebu for the first timeupon appeal

'e()$=es. The urety is barred by laches from invo5ing a

plea after almost fifteen years before the urety filed itsmotion to dismiss raising the uestion of lac5 of jurisdictionfor the first time. party may be estopped or barred fromraising a uestion in different ways and for different reasons.Thus what is referred to is estoppel in pais, or estoppel bydeed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in ageneral sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable anduneplained length of time, to do that which, by eercisingdue diligence, could or should have been done earlier 3

*urthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarilysubmitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision onthe merits, it is too late for the loser to uestion thejurisdiction or power of the court 3Jundesirable practiceJ of aparty submitting his case for decision and then accepting thejudgment, only if favorable, and attac5ing it for lac5 ofjurisdiction, when adverse.

The contention of the urety that the lower courtshould have granted its motion to uash the writ of eecutionbecause the same was issued without the summary hearingis untenable. summary hearing is not intended to be

carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions areprosecuted. 2t is, rather, a procedure by which a uestion is


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resolved with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and inpreference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings.4hat is essential is that Jthe defendant is notified orsummoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hearwhat is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, afterwhich follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties. 2nthe case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffsEmotion for eecution and of the date when the same wouldbe submitted for consideration. 2n fact, the suretyEs counselwas present in court when the motion was called, and it wasupon his reuest that the court a uo gave him a period offour days within which to file an answer. =et he allowed thatperiod to lapse without filing an answer or objection. Thesurety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprivedof its day in court.

CAL%L% vs. 'ON. RA%REG.R. No. L3462

Noember 19, 19211 SCRA 99

7ASUE,J.:

F!"t#$2ndependent !ercantile Corporation filed a petition in

the respondent Court to compel !anuel !agali to surrenderthe ownerEs duplicate of TCT Do. $#"% in order that the samemay be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of thesaid corporation. Dot being the registered owner and the title

not being in his possession, !anuel !agali failed to complywith the order of the Court directing him to surrender thesaid title. This prompted 2ndependent !ercantile Corporationto file an e3parte petition to declare TCT Do. $#"% ascancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The saidpetition was granted by the respondent Court and theRegister of Heeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in thename of the corporation, TCT Do. 1%&1%. Petitioner, uponlearning that her husbandEs title over the parcel of land hadbeen cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court,sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of

TCT Do. 1%&1% but the court dismissed the petition.

Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record Do. "$-$)for the cancellation of TCT Do. 1%&1% but the same wasdismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of acomplaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances andsales that had been made with respect to the property,covered by TCT Do. $#"%, against *rancisco Ramos whoclaimed to have bought the property from 2ndependent!ercantile Corporation. Private respondent *rancisco Ramos,however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his namein view of the eistence of an adverse claim annotated on thetitle thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.*rancisco Ramos filed a !otion to Hismiss on the ground thatthe same is barred by prior judgement or by statute oflimitations. Resolving the said !otion, the respondent Courtdismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by priorjudgment.

%##&e$4hether or not dismissal of the case is proper on theground of estoppel by prior judgment

'e()$Do. 2t is error to consider the dismissal of the petition

filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record Do. "$-$) for thecancellation of TCT Do. 1%&1% as a bar by prior judgmentagainst the filing of the subseuent civil case. 2n order toavail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, amongothers, that the judgment in the prior action must have beenrendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to ta5e

cogni>ance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment ororder was rendered. 2f there is lac5 of jurisdiction over thesubject3matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment ororder cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy.This essential element of the defense of bar by priorjudgment or res judicata does not eist in the case.

The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record Do."$-$) was an apparent invocation of the authority of therespondent Court sitting as a land registration court. Reliancewas apparently placed on ection ##) of the LandRegistration ct wherein it provides that a Court of *irst

2nstance, acting as a land registration court, is a court oflimited and special jurisdiction. s such, its proceedings are


12/29

not adeuate for the litigation of issues pertaining to anordinary civil action, such as, uestions involving ownershipor title to real property.

/ELA CRUvs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 19442

/e"ember 6, 2006510 SCRA 10

7ELASCO, +R.,J.:

F!"t#$The case stemmed from a dispute when petitioner

refused to adhere to several verbal and written demands bythe Reyeses to vacate a certain lot which it leased from thelatter. Respondent Tan Te, having bought the lot from theReyeses, demanded from petitioner to vacate the lot to beused as the formers residence. 9owever, petitioner

continues to reject such demands, prompting respondent TanTe to file an ejectment suit against him at the !anila !eTC,which rendered judgment in respondents favor. ggrievedwith the decisions rendered upon appeal, petitioner now filesa petition for review see5ing to nullify the decision andresolution of the Court of ppeals which reversed thedecision of the !anila RTC and reinstated the decision of the!anila !eTC, which ordered petitioner Hela Cru> to vacatethe subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te.

%##&e#$

2. 4hich court, the !anila RTC or the !anila !eTC, hasjurisdiction over the Tan Te ejectment suit22. 4hether or not the present petition filed before the

upreme Court for review under Rule -& is proper.

'e()$2. (urisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law

to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certaincontroversies. (urisdiction over the subject matter isconferred by law.

ection "" of Chapter 222 33 on !etropolitan Trial Courts,

!unicipal Trial Courts, and !unicipal Circuit Trial Courts of ;.P. Do. #)$ providesF

Section ((. 3urisdiction of 4etropolitan 5rial-ourts, 4unicipal 5rial -ourts and 4unicipal -ircuit5rial -ourts in civil cases.04etropolitan 5rial -ourts,4unicipal 5rial -ourts, and 4unicipal -ircuit 5rial-ourts shall exercise6

x x x x%7' xclusive original jurisdiction over cases of

forcible entry and unlawful detainer6 )rovided, 5hatwhen, in such cases, the defendant raises the +uestionof ownership in his pleadings and the +uestion of

possession cannot be resolved without deciding theissue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall beresolved only to determine the issue of possession.Thus eclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment

proceedings @accion interdictalB is lodged with the first levelcourts. This is clarified in ection #, Rule +? of the #$$+Rules of Civil Procedure that embraces an action for forcibleentry @detentacionB, where one is deprived of physicalpossession of any land or building by means of force,intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. 2n actions forforcible entry, three @"B reuisites have to be met for themunicipal trial court to acuire jurisdiction. *irst, theplaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of theproperty. econd, they must also assert that they weredeprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed withinone @#B year from the time the owners or legal possessorslearned of their deprivation of physical possession of the landor building.

The other 5ind of ejectment proceeding is unlawfuldetainer @desahucioB, where one unlawfully withholdspossession of the subject property after the epiration ortermination of the right to possess. 9ere, the issue of rightfulpossession is the one decisiveG for in such action, thedefendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffscause of action is the termination of the defendants right tocontinue in possession. The essential reuisites of unlawfuldetainer areF @#B the fact of lease by virtue of a contractepress or impliedG @)B the epiration or termination of thepossessors right to hold possessionG @"B withholding by the

lessee of the possession of the land or building afterepiration or termination of the right to possessionG @-B letter


13/29

of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with theterms of the lease and vacate the premisesG and @&B theaction must be filed within one @#B year from date of lastdemand received by the defendant.

person who wants to recover physical possession ofhis real property will prefer an ejectment suit because it isgoverned by the Rule on ummary Procedure which allowsimmediate eecution of the judgment under ection #$, Rule

+? unless the defendant perfects an appeal in the RTC andcomplies with the reuirements to stay eecutionG all ofwhich are nevertheless beneficial to the interests of the lotowner or the holder of the right of possession.

'n the other hand, ection #$, of Chapter 22 of ;.P. Do.#)$ on Regional Trial Courts providesF

Section 8. 3urisdiction in civil cases.09egional5rial -ourts shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction6x x x x%7' In all civil actions which involve the title to,

or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,except actions for forcible entry into and unlawfuldetainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction overwhich is conferred upon 4etropolitan 5rial -ourts,4unicipal 5rial -ourts and 4unicipal -ircuit 5rial-ourts.Two @)B 5inds of action to recover possession of real

property which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC areF @#Bthe plenary action for the recovery of the real right ofpossession @accion publicianaB when the dispossession has

lasted for more than one year or when the action was filedmore than one @#B year from date of the last demandreceived by the lessee or defendantG and @)B an action for therecovery of ownership @accion reivindicatoriaB which includesthe recovery of possession.These actions are governed bythe regular rules of procedure and adjudication ta5es alonger period than the summary ejectment suit.

To determine whether a complaint for recovery ofpossession falls under the jurisdiction of the !eTC @first levelcourtB or the RTC @second level courtB, allegations of thecomplaint must be referred to. The general rule is that what

determines the nature of the action and the court that hasjurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the

complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon thedefenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by thedefendant. This general rule however admits eceptions.4hile the allegations in the complaint ma5e out a case forforcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of defenseand is proved to be the real issue, the case should bedismissed for lac5 of jurisdiction as the case should properlybe filed with the then Court of grarian Relations.

The cause of action in a complaint is not what thedesignation of the complaint states, but what the allegationsin the body of the complaint define and describe. Thedesignation or caption is not controlling, more than theallegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not evenan indispensable part of the complaint.

22. *irm is the rule that findings of fact of the C arefinal and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal tothis Court provided they are supported by evidence on recordor substantial evidence. *ortunately for petitioner, the casehas been relaed therefrom as the Court gave a liberal withthe petition considering that the Cs factual findingscontradict those of the RTC, and there was an asseverationthat the court a uo went beyond the issues of the case.2ndeed, these grounds were considered eceptions to thefactual issue bar rule. econdly, the petition unnecessarilyimpleaded the C in violation of ection -, Rule -&. Thisbreach, however, was allowed to pass by the Court in thiscase only because there is a need to entertain the petitiondue to the conflicting rulings between the lower courtsG

however, a repetition may result to sanctions.

STA. CLARA 'OEONERSvs. GASTONG.R. No. 141961

+!&!r 2, 20029* SCRA 96

PANGAN%-AN,J.:

F!"t#$

Private respondents filed a complaint for damages withpreliminary injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and


14/29

temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court inDegros 'ccidental at ;acolod City against petitionersalleging the followingF @#B upon private respondentspurchased lots in the subdivisionG @)B at the time of purchase,there was no mention or reuirement of membership in anyhomeowners association and since then, they haveremained non3members of C9G @"B an arrangement wasmade wherein non3members of the association were issued

Mnon3member gatepass stic5ers for their vehicles foridentification by the security guards and such arrangementremained undisturbed until mid !arch, #$$%, when C9disseminated a board resolution which decreed that only itsmembers in good standing were to be issued stic5ers for usein their vehiclesG @-B on three separate incidents, 0ictor !.Iaston, the son of the private respondents herein who liveswith them, was reuired by the guards on duty employed byC9 to show his drivers license as a prereuisite to hisentrance to the subdivision and to his residence thereindespite their 5nowing him personally and the eact locationof his residenceG @&B private respondent herein 0ictor !a.Iaston was himself prevented from entering the subdivisionand proceeding to his residential abodeG and @1B these acts ofthe petitioners were done in the presence of othersubdivision owners had caused private respondents to suffermoral damage.

Petitioners argued that the trial court has nojurisdiction over the case as it involves an intra3corporatedispute between C9 and its members pursuant to Republicct Do. &%?, as amended by Aecutive 'rder Dos. &"&, much

less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of theboard of directors of C9, the proper forum being the 9ome2nsurance @and IuarantyB Corporation @92ICB.

%##&e#$2. 4hether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over thecomplaint22. 4hether or not the complaint states a cause ofaction

'e()$

2. =es. 2n order to determine if the 92IC has jurisdictionover the dispute, it is necessary to resolve preliminarily 33 on

the basis of the allegations in the Complaint 33 whetherprivate respondents are members of the C9. 2t is a settledrule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined bythe allegations in the complaint. (urisdiction is not affectedby the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in ananswer or a motion to dismiss. 'therwise, jurisdiction wouldbecome dependent almost entirely upon the whims of thedefendant. The Complaint does not allege that private

respondents are members of the C9. 2n point of fact, theydeny such membership. Thus, the 92IC has no jurisdictionover the dispute.

The 92IC eercises limited jurisdiction overhomeowners disputes. The law confines its authority tocontroversies that arise from any of the following intra3corporate relationsF @#B between and among members of theassociationG @)B between any and/or all of them and theassociation of which they are membersG and @"B between theassociation and the state insofar as the controversy concernsits right to eist as a corporate entity.

22. =es. defendant moving to dismiss a complaint onthe ground of lac5 of cause of action is regarded as havinghypothetically admitted all the factual averments in thecomplaint. The test of the sufficiency of the allegationsconstituting the cause of action is whether, admitting thefacts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment on theprayers. This test implies that the issue must be passed uponon the basis of the bare allegations in the complaint. Thecourt does not inuire into the truth of such allegations and

declare them to be false. To do so would constitute aprocedural error and a denial of the plaintiffs right to dueprocess.

complaint states a cause of action when it containsthese three essential elementsF @#B the legal right of theplaintiff, @)B the correlative obligation of the defendant, and@"B the act or omission of the defendant in violation of thesaid legal right.

2n the instant case, the records sufficiently establish acause of action. *irst, the Complaint alleged that, under theConstitution, respondents had a right of free access to and

from their residential abode. econd, under the law,petitioners have the obligation to respect this right. Third,


15/29

such right was impaired by petitioners when privaterespondents were refused access through the ta. Claraubdivision, unless they showed their drivers license foridentification.

SUN %NSURANCE OFF%CEvs. 'ON. ASUNC%ONG.R. No. *99*3

Febr&!r 1, 1991*0 SCRA 2*4

GANCAYCO,J.:

F!"t#$un insurance filed a case for the consignation of

premiums on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for thejudicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent!anuel :y Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared indefault for failure to file the reuired answer within thereglementary period. !eanwhile, the Respondent !anuelTiong also filed a case against un 2nsurance for the refundof premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminaryattachment, see5ing the payment of actual, compensatory,moral, eemplary and liuidated damages, attorneys fees,epenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damagessought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although itmay be inferred from the body of the complaint that it wouldamount to about P&?!. The amount of only P)#?.?? was paidfor the doc5et fee. Private respondent filed an amendedcomplaint wherein in the prayer it is as5ed that he beawarded no less than P#?! as actual and eemplarydamages but in the body of the complaint the amount of hispecuniary claim is approimately P--,1?#,1)".+?. aidamended complaint was admitted and the privaterespondent was reassessed the additional doc5et fee ofP"$,+%1.??, which he paid.

Later, private respondent filed a supplementalcomplaint alleging an additional claim of P)?! in damages sothat his total claim is approimately P1-,1?#,1)?.+?. *ourmonths after, private respondent paid an additional doc5et

fee of P%?,"$1.??. fter the promulgation of the decision ofthe respondent court wherein private respondent was

ordered to be reassessed for additional doc5et fee, andduring the pendency of this petition, private respondent paidan additional doc5et fee of P1),#").$). lthough privaterespondent appears to have paid a total amount ofP#%),%)-.$? for the doc5et fee considering the total amountof his claim in the amended and supplemental complaintamounting to about P1-,1?#,1)?.+?, petitioner insists thatprivate respondent must pay a doc5et fee of P)&+,%#?.-$.

%##&e$4hether or not the court acuired jurisdiction when

the correct and proper doc5et fee has not been paidN

'e()$=es. 2t is not simply the filing of the complaint or

appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of theprescribed doc5et fee that vests a trial court with jurisdictionover the subject matter or nature of the action. 4here thefiling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied bypayment of the doc5et fee, the court may allow payment ofthe fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond theapplicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,third party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not beconsidered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribedtherefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of saidfee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond itsapplicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

4here the trial court acuires jurisdiction over a claim

by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of theprescribed filing fee but, subseuently, the judgment awardsa claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the samehas been left for determination by the court, the additionalfiling fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. 2tshall be the responsibility of the Cler5 of Court or his dulyauthori>ed deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collectthe additional fee.

-ALLATANvs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 1256!r"; 2, 1999


16/29

04 SCRA 4

PUNO,J.:

F!"t#$;allatan discovered encroachments made on her land

when she constructed her house which was surveyed byAngineer (ose 8uedding, the authori>ed surveyor of theraneta 2nstitute of griculture @2B, the owner3 developer ofthe subdivision project. ;allatan made a written demand onrespondent to remove and dismantle their improvements onthe said lot. *ailing to agree amicably, petitioner ;allataninstituted against respondents Io a civil case for recovery ofpossession before the RTC. The Io s filed their 6nswer withThird3Party Complaint7 impleading as third3party defendantsrespondents Li Ching =ao, the 2 and Angineer 8uedding.(udgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs but the third3party complaint filed by third3party plaintiffs Io against third3

party defendants was dismissed. :pon appeal by Io, theCourt of ppeals affirmed the dismissal of the third3partycomplaint against the 2 but reinstated the complaintagainst Li Ching =ao and (ose 8uedding.

Petitioners uestion the admission by the C of thethird3party complaint by respondents Io against the 2, (ose8uedding and Li Ching =ao. Petitioners claim that the third3party complaint should not have been considered by theCourt of ppeals for lac5 of jurisdiction due to third3partyplaintiffs failure to pay the doc5et and filing fees before thetrial court.

%##&e$4hether or not the Court of ppeals erred on uestion

of law and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lac5 ofjurisdiction when it did not dismiss the third Oparty complaintdue to non3payment of any filing of doc5et fee.

'e()$Do. The Court of ppeals correctly dismissed the third3

party complaint against 2. The claim that the discrepancyin the lot areas was due to 2s fault was not proved. The

appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneoussurvey by Angineer 8uedding that triggered these

discrepancies. nd it was this survey that respondent4inston Io relied upon in constructing his house on hisfathers land. 9e built his house in the belief that it wasentirely within the parameters of his fathers land. 2n short,respondents Io had no 5nowledge that they encroachedpetitioners lot. They are deemed builders in good faith untilthe time petitioner ;allatan informed them of theirencroachment on her property.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action isfiled in court, the complaint must be accompanied thepayment of the reuisite doc5et and filing fees. 2n realactions, the doc5et and filing fees are based on the value ofthe property and the amount of damages claimed, if any 2fthe complaint is filed but the fees are not paid at the time offiling, the court acuires jurisdiction upon full payment of thefees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barringprescription.

YUC'ENGCOvs. REPU-L%C OF T'E P'%L%PP%NESG.R. No. 1112*

+&e , 2000 SCRA 6

YNARES3SANT%AGO,J.:

F!"t#$The Republic of the Philippines filed with the

andiganbayan a complaint for Rescission, Reconveyance,

Restitution, ccounting and Hamages against *erdinand A.!arcos, 2melda !arcos and Prime 9oldings, 2nc. llegingownership of the properties of the !arcoses sought to beforfeited by the Republic, petitioner =uchengco filed a motionfor intervention and complaint3in3intervention on, impleadingthe Republic, the PCII, *erdinand A. !arcos, 2melda !arcosand P92 as defendants3in3intervention. fter petitionerspayment of the doc5et fee of P-??.??, the andiganbayanissued a Resolution granting the motion for intervention andadmitting the complaint3in3intervention, thereafter denyingthe Republics motion for reconsideration thereto. Petitioner

moved for leave to admit amended complaint3in3interventionto implead the said claimants. This was admitted by the


17/29

andiganbayan in open court and as a conseuence,amended answers3in3intervention were filed by the Republicand the P92.

'n the other hand, the Astate of Ramon Cojuangcoand 2melda '. Cojuangco filed a motion to dismiss theamended complaint3in3intervention on the ground of failureto state a cause of action and lac5 of jurisdiction of theandiganbayan over the case, inasmuch as petitioner did not

pay the correct doc5et fees. They argued that the amended3complaint3in3intervention failed to state the amount of theclaim or the value of the property subject of the complaint, inviolation of the doctrine laid down in !anchesterHevelopment Corporation, et al. v. Court of ppeals andection + @aB of Rule #-# of the Rules of Court. *urther, theycontend that as the action see5s to litigate the ownershipand disposition of properties consisting of subject shares, theamount of doc5et fees must be based on the total value ofthe same. Petitioners opposed, maintaining that no doc5etfees are payable to the andiganbayan, pursuant to ection## of Presidential Hecree Do. #1?1, as amended.

%##&e$4hether or not petitioner is barred from asserting his

alleged causes of action against respondents by reason ofnon3payment of the proper doc5et fees

'e()$The ruling that the timely filing of correct doc5et fees

is jurisdictional is all too familiar. 2t should be noted,however, that the pronouncements of the Court on thematter have always been influenced by the peculiar legal andeuitable circumstances surrounding each case. 2n thepresent case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules iscalled for considering that, unli5e !anchester, privaterespondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by therules by paying the additional doc5et fees as reuired. 2n thesaid case, the payment of the correct fee within Jareasonable timeJ but in no case beyond its applicableprescriptive or reglementary period was allowed.

Two situations may arise. 'ne is where the complaint

or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money ordamages and there is no precise statement of the amounts

being claimed. 2n this event the rule is that the pleading willJnot be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise beepunged from the record.J 2n other words, the complaint orpleading may be dismissed or the claims as to which theamounts are unspecified may be epunged, although asaforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment ofthe complaint and payment of the fees provided the claimhas not in the meantime become time3barred. The other is

where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim,but the fees paid are insufficientG and here again, the rulenow is that the court may allow a reasonable time for thepayment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, andupon such payment, the defect is cured and the court mayproperly ta5e cogni>ance of the action, unless in themeantime prescription has set in and conseuently barredthe right of action.

7/A. /E URGAvs. C'AN

G.R. No. L32460O"tober *, 196

25 SCRA 441

ANGELES,J.:

F!"t#$Petitioner as lessor, entered into a contract of lease

with respondent as lessee. ;efore the epiration of the ten3year period of the lease, there had been intercourse ofcommunications between the lessor and the lessee for therenewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at anagreementG hence, this action by the lessor against thelessee. letter of demand to vacate the leased premises wassent to lessee as followsF 6Please be advised further that wereiterate our demand made to you in our registered letterdated *ebruary -, #$&$ @to vacate the leased premisesBwhich was received by you on the #?th instant, unless youpay the amount of i 9undred pesos @P1??.??B or even9undred pesos @P+??.??B as new rental per our letter of(anuary #$, #$&$, before the epiration of the #&3day period

granted you for vacating the same.7


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4ithout any further definite demand on the lessee tovacate the premises, petitioner filed a complaint of unlawfuldetainer in the municipal court of amboanga City againstthe lessee, (uanito Chan, to eject the latter from the leasedpremises. The facts alleged in the complaint as cause ofaction, consisted in reproducing and reiterating thesubstance of the correspondence echanged between lessorand lessee, as narrated above, and claiming that the

possession of the lessee of the premises had become illegalby his failure and refusal to pay the increased new rental. *orrelief, the plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered tovacate the premises, and JT' P= T9A DA4 RADTHA!DHAH '* P1??.?? or P+??.?? *R'! *A;R:R= #, #$&$!'DT9L= T9A CA != ;A.J ttached to the complaint,as annees thereto, were copies of the letters echangedbetween the lessor and the lessee.

%##&e$4hether or not the allegations in the complaint

constitute a cause of action for unlawful detainer, and conferjurisdiction over the case to the municipal court @now citycourtB of amboanga City, under the provisions of Rule +? ofthe Rules of Court and decisions interpreting the same

'e()$The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay

the increased rental or otherwise to vacate the land is notthe demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawfuldetainer cases. 4hen after such notice, the lessee elects tostay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannotbe ejected until he defaults in said obligation and necessarydemand is first made.

2n the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demandletter that the obligation to vacate the leased premises wouldbe dependent on the failure of the lessee to agree to the newrent demanded by the lessor. s the lessee, however, was inthe physical possession of the land by virtue of a priorcontract of lease, and the demand was in the alternativeimposing a new rental, even without ta5ing into account theefficacy of the stipulation for an automatic renewal of the

lease. 4ithout any subseuent definite demand to vacate thepremises, subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in

default which would give rise to a right on the part of thelessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.

Clause J+J of the contract of lease, meant an epressgrant to the lessee to renew the lease at his option, contraryto the claim of the lessor3appellee that there must be a priormutual agreement of the parties. Clause J+J provides thehappening of two eventualities at the epiration of the lease either the lessor may purchase the improvements

constructed by the lessee on the land, or in case the lessorfails, for any cause or reason, to eercise the option to buy,the lease shall be deemed automatically renewed. Theevidence has established that the lessor had refused to buythe buildings on the land. The statement in said clause J+Jthat in case of renewal the duration of the lease and the newrental to be paid shall be adjusted by the parties, is of nomoment in the solution of the issue, whether or not the factsalleged in the complaint constitute a cause of action ofunlawful detainer. The pleadings of the parties, and theannees thereto, clearly show that the jugular vein of thecontroversy hinges on the correct interpretation of clause J+Jof the contract of lease, a matter outside the jurisdiction ofthe municipal court. 2nasmuch as the controversy hinges onthe interpretation of clause J+J of the contract, that is,whether or not said clause contemplated an automaticrenewal of the lease, the action was not for unlawful detainerbut one not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore,beyond the competence of the municipal court.

'E%RS OF 7ALER%ANO CONC'Avs. SPOUSES GREGOR%OLUOCSO

G.R. No. 15121/e"ember 12, 200*

450 SCRA 1

PUNO,J.:

F!"t#$This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule -& of the

Rules of Court on the decision and resolution of the Court of

ppeals, annulling the resolutions and order of the RegionalTrial Court of Hipolog City, ;ranch $, in a civil case wherein


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petitioners filed for a complaint for Reconveyance and/ornnulment of Title with Hamages against respondents,see5ing to annul *ree Patent Do. @2K3%B$%& and thecorresponding 'riginal Certificate of Title @'CTB Do. P3))&&1issued in the name of JIregorio LumocsoJ covering a certainparcel of land.

Respondents moved for the dismissal of the respectivecases against them on the same grounds ofF @aB lac5 of

jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of thecomplaintsG @bB failure to state causes of action forreconveyanceG @cB prescriptionG and @dB waiver,abandonment, laches and estoppel. 'n the issue ofjurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has nojurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to ection #$@)B of;atas Pambansa ;lg. @;.P.B #)$, as amended by R.. Do.+1$#, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lotsare less than P)?,???.??. Petitioners opposed, contendingthat the instant cases involve actions the subject matters ofwhich are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, underection #$@#B of ;.P. #)$, as amended by R.. +1$#, fallwithin the eclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. Theyalso contended that they have two main causes of actionF forreconveyance and for recovery of the value of the treesfelled by respondents. 9ence, the totality of the claims mustbe considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within theeclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.

%##&e$4hether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the

complaints pursuant to ection #$@)B of ;atas Pambansa ;lg.@;.P.B #)$, as amended by R.. Do. +1$#, as in each case,the assessed values of the subject lots are less thanP)?,???.??

'e()$ (urisdiction over the subject matter is the power to

hear and determine cases of the general class to which theproceedings in uestion belong. 2t is conferred by law and anobjection based on this ground cannot be waived by theparties. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over

the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine thenature of the cause of action and of the relief sought. The

trial court correctly held that the instant cases involveactions for reconveyance. n action for reconveyancerespects the decree of registration as incontrovertible butsee5s the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully orerroneously registered in other personsE names, to its rightfuland legal owners, or to those who claim to have a betterright. There is no special ground for an action forreconveyance. 2t is enough that the aggrieved party has a

legal claim on the property superior to that of the registeredowner and that the property has not yet passed to the handsof an innocent purchaser for value.

;eing in the nature of actions for reconveyance oractions to remove cloud on oneEs title, the applicable law todetermine which court has jurisdiction is ection #$@)B of ;.P.#)$, as amended by R.. Do. +1$#, vi>F

Section 8. 3urisdiction in -ivil -ases.##9egional 5rial -ourts shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction6%7' In all civil actions which involve the title to,

or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,where the assessed value of the property involvedexceeds 5wenty thousand pesos %)7&,&&&.&&' or forcivil actions in 4etro 4anila, where such valueexceeds :ifty thousand pesos %)&,&&&.&&' exceptactions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer oflands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which isconferred upon the 4etropolitan 5rial -ourts,4unicipal 5rial -ourts, and 4unicipal -ircuit 5rial-ourts"2n the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject

lots are situated in Cogon, Hipolog City and their assessedvalues are less than P)?,???.??. 9ence, the !TC clearly hasjurisdiction. PetitionersE contention that this case is one thatis incapable of pecuniary estimation under the eclusiveoriginal jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to ection #$@#B of;.P. #)$ is erroneous.

AGUST%Nvs. -ACALANG.R. No. L346000!r"; 1, 19515 SCRA 40


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GUT%ERRE, +R. ,J.:

F!"t#$The precursor of this case was a complaint for

ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff3appellant gustin,as adininistrator of the 2ntestate Astate of usana gustin,against defendant3appellee ;acalan, before the City Court ofCebu. ;acalan is a lessee of a one3door ground floor space in

a building owned by the late usana gustin. Hue tononpayment of rentals despite repeated demands an actionto eject him was filed wherein the City Court of Ceburendered judgment dismissing the counterclaim and orderingthe defendant to vacate the premises in uestion and to paythe plaintiff unpaid bac5 rentals. *rom this decision, thedefendant filed an appeal with ;ranch 2ll of the Court of *irst2nstance of Cebu which rendered judgment reversing that ofthe City Court. Do appeal was ta5en by the plaintiff3appellanthence the decision lapsed into finality and becameeecutory. writ of eecution was issued by virtue of whicha notice to sell at public auction real properties belonging tothe estate of usana gustin was issued by the Heputyheriff to satisfy judgment in the case. PlaintiffEs counsel fileda motion for reconsideration, confessing his fault and givingthe reason why he failed to perfect the appeal on time. Themotion was denied.

Thereafter, with the aid of new counsel, the plaintiff3appellant filed a complaint with ;ranch 0, Court of *irst2nstance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Heputyheriff of Cebu for the declaration of the nullity of the above3

cited decision of ;ranch 222, Court of *irst 2nstance of Cebu inthe ejectment case on the ground that the eercise of itsappellate jurisdiction was null and void. The court sustainedthe defendant.

%##&e#$2. 4hether or not the present action for the annulment

of the judgment in the ejectment case is the proper remedyafter it has become final and eecutory

22. 4hether or not the Court of *irst 2nstance may, in anappeal, award the defendant3appelleeEs counterclaim in an

amount eceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court oforigin

'e()$2. To this procedural dilemma, the solution lies in the

determination of the validity of the judgment sought to beannulled, for against a void judgment, plaintiff3appellantEsrecourse would be proper. There is no uestion as to thevalidity of the courtEs decision with respect to the issue ofphysical possession of property, the defendant3appelleeEs

right to the same having been upheld. 9owever, the plaintiff3appellant assails the money judgment handed down by thecourt which granted damages to the defendant3appellee. ;yreason thereof, he see5s the declaration of the nullity of theentire judgment. Plaintiff3appellant loses sight of the fact thatthe money judgment was awarded the defendant3appellee inthe concept of a counterclaim. defending party may set upa claim for money or any other relief which he may haveagainst the opposing party in a counterclaim @ection 1, Rule1, Revised Rules of CourtB. nd the court may, if warranted,grant actual, moral, or eemplary damages as prayed for.The grant of moral damages, in the case at bar, as acounterclaim, and not as damages for the unlawful detentionof property must be upheld. 9owever, the amount thereof isanother matter.

22. 2t is well3settled that a court has no jurisdiction tohear and determine a set3off or counterclaim in ecess of itsjurisdiction @ection &, Rule &, Revised Rules of CourtG go v.;uslon, #? CR )?)B. counterclaim beyond the courtEsjurisdiction may only be pleaded by way of defense, thepurpose of which, however, is only to defeat or wea5enplaintiffEs claim, but not to obtain affirmative relief @ection &,Rule &, Revised Rules of CourtB. Devertheless, the defendant3appellee, in the case at bar, set up his claim in ecess of thejurisdiction of the city court as a compulsory counterclaim. sa conseuence, the doctrine enunciated under the case of'ne 9eartClub, 2nc. vs. Court of ppeals, an appellant whofiles his brief and submits his case to the Court of ppeals fordecision, without uestioning the latterEs jurisdiction untildecision is rendered therein, should be considered as havingvoluntarily waives so much of his claim as would eceed the

jurisdiction of said ppellate CourtG for the reason that acontrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of


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appellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court ofppeals in epectation of favorable judgment, but with intentof attac5ing its jurisdiction should the decision beunfavorable.

The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in theinferior court cannot be entertained in the Court of *irst2nstance on appeal. The amount of judgment, therefore,obtained by the defendant3appellee on appeal, cannot

eceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the actionbegan. ince the trial court did not acuire jurisdiction overthe defendantEs counterclaim in ecess of the jurisdictionalamount, the appellate court, li5ewise, acuired no jurisdictionover the same by its decisions or otherwise. ppellatejurisdiction being not only a continuation of the eercise ofthe same judicial power which has been eecuted in thecourt of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that theoriginal and appellate courts are capable of participating inthe eercise of the same judicial power.

ANGAL%AGvs. CATU-%GG.R. No. 14951O"tober 25, 2005

4*4 SCRA 15

AUSTR%A3ART%NE,J.:

F!"t#$Private respondent polinario eruina, (r. filed before

the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners Dorma

!angaliag and Darciso olano for failure to eerciseetraordinary diligence in the selection of her employee@truc5 driverB resulting to serious injuries and permanentdeformities of private respondent and his co3passengerstherein. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground oflac5 of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim,alleging that the !unicipal Trial Court has jurisdiction overthe case since the principal amount prayed for, in theamount of P+#,"$).??, falls within its jurisdiction.

%##&e$

2n an action for recovery of damages, does the amountof actual damages prayed for in the complaint provide the

sole test for determining the courts jurisdiction, or is thetotal amount of all the damages claimed, regardless of 5indand nature, such as moral, eemplary, nominal damages,and attorneys fees, etc., to be computed collectively withthe actual damages to determine what court O whether the!TC or the RTC O has jurisdiction over the actionN

'e()$The judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron3clad rule.

2t generally applies to cases involving warring factualallegations. *or this reason, litigants are reuired to repair tothe trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth orfalsity of these contending allegations on the basis of theevidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputedfacts for decision cannot be brought immediately beforeappellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, astrict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is notnecessary when the cases brought before the appellatecourts do not involve factual but legal uestions.

The well3entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction ofthe court over the subject matter of the action is determinedby the material allegations of the complaint and the law,irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled torecover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 2nthe present case, the allegations in the complaint plainlyshow that private respondent see5s to recover not only hismedical epenses, lost income but also damages for physicalsuffering and mental anguish due to permanent facialdeformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident.0iewed as an action for uasi3delict, the present case fallssuarely within the purview of rticle ))#$ @)B, whichprovides for the payment of moral damages in cases ofuasi3delict causing physical injuries. Private respondentsclaim for moral damages of P&??,???.?? cannot beconsidered as merely incidental to or a conseuence of theclaim for actual damages. 2t is a separate and distinct causeof action or an independent actionable tort. 2t springs fromthe right of a person to the physical integrity of his or herbody, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due andassessable 9ence, the demand for moral damages must be

considered as a separate cause of action, independent of theclaim for actual damages and must be included in


22/29

determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear consonancewith paragraph ) of dministrative Circular Do. ?$3$-.

ONG YUvs. PACLE-G.R. No. 1*21*2

Febr&!r 24, 200950 SCRA 19*

PUNO, C.J.:

F!"t#$The present action is an action for specific

performance and damages filed by petitioner spousesagainst (avier to compel performance of the lattersunderta5ings under their Contract to ell. decision wasrendered therein at the RTC ac5nowledging Langcaan, not aparty in the case, as the rightful owner of the property indispute. Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the

Regional Trial Court as to the rightful owner of the LangcaanProperty is conclusive and binding upon respondent even ifthe latter was not a party thereto since it involved theuestion of possession and ownership of real property, and isthus not merely an action in personam but an action uasi inrem.

%##&e$4hether or not the present action is a proceeding inrem or in personam

'e()$The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action

determine its character. 4hether a proceeding is in rem, orin personam, or uasi in rem for that matter, is determinedby its nature and purpose, and by these only. proceeding inpersonam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights andobligations brought against the person and is based on thejurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to,or the eercise of ownership of, specific property, or see5 tocompel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the

mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding inpersonam is to impose, through the judgment of a court,

some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of thedefendant. 'f this character are suits to compel a defendantto specifically perform some act or actions to fasten apecuniary liability on him. n action in personam is said to beone which has for its object a judgment against the person,as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety todetermine its state. 2t has been held that an action inpersonam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or

obligationsG such action is brought against the person.'n the other hand, a proceeding uasi in rem is one

brought against persons see5ing to subject the property ofsuch persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. 2n anaction uasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant andthe purpose of the proceeding is to subject his intereststherein to the obligation or loan burdening the property.ctions uasi in rem deal with the status, ownership orliability of a particular property but which are intended tooperate on these uestions only as between the particularparties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off therights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgmentstherein are binding only upon the parties who joined in theaction.

The present actions object is to compel (avier toaccept the full payment of the purchase price, and toeecute a deed of absolute sale over the Langcaan Propertyin their favor. The obligations of (avier under the contract tosell attach to him alone, and do not burden the LangcaanProperty. ;eing a judgment in personam, the civil case isbinding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein andduly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, itcannot bind respondent since he was not a party therein.Deither can respondent be considered as privy thereto sincehis signature and that of his late first wife, ngelita Chan,were forged in the deed of sale.

/OAGASvs.+ENSENG.R. No. 1540*

+!&!r 1*, 200544 SCRA 66

CALLE+O, SR.,J.:


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F!"t#$Homagas filed for a forcible entry case against (ensen.

ummons and complaint were not served on respondentbecause the latter was apparently out of the country but itwas received by respondents brother 'scar who was then atthe respondents house. The trial court rendered a decision infavor of petiti

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