PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 217-256
Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment
Report.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 217
7.2 RISK ASSESSMENT
7.2.1 Scope
Scope of the risk assessment covers the storage of all chemicals involved in existing and proposed facilities. It also
covers Chlorine and Hydrogen pipelines conveying these materials to existing adjacent off-site facilities of to M/s.
Flowtech Chemicals (P) Limited & Goyal Gases Ltd.
Consequence Analysis for worst case scenario and maximum credible scenarios;
Quantitative Risk Analysis providing results for individual risk and societal risk;
Recommendation for risk reduction methods.
7.2.2 Methodology
Risk is the combination of severity of consequence and the likelihood of occurrence. Some failure events may have
potential for consequences of high severity but the likelihood of occurrence would be very low. On the other hand,
some failure events with low severity consequence might occur very frequently.
Risk = (Severity of Consequence) × (Likelihood of Occurrence)
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) provides measure of risk in numerical value for specified time period, which is
normally one year.
The five normal components of a QRA study are:
Hazard, (or failure case) identification;
Failure frequency estimation;
Consequence calculations;
Risk calculation (Risk Summation);
Risk assessment (using appropriate risk acceptability criteria).
The objective of risk assessment is to bring the risk ‘as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)’.
The risk levels associated with the facilities are presented in the following standard forms:
Individual risk contours which show the geographical distribution of risk to an individual.
Group risk (FN) curves which show the cumulative frequency (F) distribution of accidents causing different
numbers (N) of fatalities. The FN curve therefore indicates whether the societal risk to the facility is dominated
by relatively frequent accidents causing small numbers of fatalities or low frequency accidents causing many
fatalities.
Approach to QRA (process chart)
The steps involved in preparation of QRA study are presented in Figure 7.1.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 218
Figure 7.1: QRA Process Chart
7.2.3 Hazard Identification
Considering the existing facilities and those to be added under the Expansion Project, the following hazards are
identified for the purpose of this QRA study:
Chlorine storage tanks and filled chlorine tonners;
Hydrogen storages – gas holder and cylinder banks;
Chlorine and Hydrogen pipelines
Failure Scenarios
In this study, toxic and flammable hazards are relevant. There is a possibility of failure associated with each
mechanical component of the plant (vessels, pipes, pumps or compressors). These are generic failures and can be
caused by such mechanisms as corrosion, vibration or external impact (mechanical or overpressure).
The range of possible releases for a given component covers a wide spectrum, from a pinhole leak up to a
catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture (of a pipe). For the purpose of QRA in an objective manner,
representative failure cases are generated covering both the range of possible releases and their total frequency.
Accordingly, the following typical types of failures are considered:
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 219
Minor Leak: 6 mm
Medium Leak: 25 mm
Large Leak: 100 mm
Line rupture
Tank – Catastrophic Rupture
For each identified failure case, the appropriate data required to define that case is input to the past risk package.
Input Data
The input data required for QRA consist of the following:
Plant data including process parameters, inventory of hazardous material in the section, equipment layout
drawing and site location map;
Generic failure rate data for the type of equipment covered in the QRA study;
Meteorological data including ambient temperature, humidity and wind rose data;
Ignition source data including electrical installations, fired heaters, roads etc;
Population data including distribution of people in and around the plant.
Software
DNV risk analysis software package Phast version 6.7 is used in this QRA study. Phast has been in use worldwide
more than 20 years. It is based on the well validated Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) version 2.
Weather Data
Representative weather categories for the site used in this risk analysis are given in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3: Weather Categories
Parameter Weather Category #1 Weather Category #2 Weather Category #3
Ambient temperature °C 17.3 13.6 15.5
Relative Humidity (%) 64 80 70
Wind speed (m/s) 1.2 1 4
Atmospheric Stability (Pasquill Class) D E D
Consequence Analysis for selected failure scenarios
Consequence analysis using Phast software has been carried out to provide results for the following:
Toxic dispersion of chlorine;
Fire effect for hydrogen gas.
Results for the consequence analysis calculations are provided in the subsequent sections.
The project description, and other project related data have been comprehensively reviewed to identify the
hazardous Chemicals and information on the hazardous Chemical properties (MSDS) of all the chemicals handled at
the site has been reviewed to identify the hazards associated with the same.
The chemical properties and storage details of hazardous raw materials & finished products are tabulated in Table
7-4 and Table 7-5. Pipeline details for the same are tabulated in Table 7-6.
PACL
EXPAN
SIO
N O
F C
HLO
R A
LKALI
PLA
NT A
ND
ESTABLI
SH
MEN
T O
F N
EW
FLA
KER
PLA
NT,
STABLE B
LEACH
ING
PO
WD
ER P
LAN
T,
HYD
RO
GEN
PERO
XID
E P
LAN
T &
CAPTIV
E P
OW
ER P
LAN
T A
T N
AYA N
AN
GAL
AD
DIT
ION
AL
STU
DIE
S
KAD
AM
EN
VIR
ON
MEN
TAL C
ON
SU
LTAN
TS |
AU
GU
ST 2
019
220
Ta
ble
7-4
: C
he
mic
al
Pro
pe
rtie
s a
nd
Sto
rag
e D
eta
ils
of
Ha
zard
ou
s R
aw
Ma
teri
als
an
d F
inis
he
d P
rod
ucts
– U
nit
1
S.
No .
Ra
w M
ate
ria
ls/
Pro
du
cts
Fla
sh
Po
int
(°C
)
IDLH
(pp
m)
Sto
rag
e
me
tho
d
No
. o
f
sto
rag
e
tan
ks /
dru
ms
Ma
x.
lice
nse
d
Sto
rag
e
Ca
pa
cit
y
(KL)
Ca
pa
cit
y o
f
Sto
rag
e
tan
k /
dru
ms e
ach
(m3)
To
tal
Sto
rag
e
Vo
lum
e
(m3)
Sto
rag
e T
an
k
typ
e
(Un
de
rgro
un
d
or
Ab
ove
gro
un
d)
Ta
nk
Te
mp
era
ture
(°C
)
Pre
ssu
re
(ba
r)
Dyk
e
Sa
fety
Me
asu
res
Pro
vid
ed
He
igh
t
(m)
Dia
(m
) D
yk
e/B
un
d
he
igh
t (m
)
Dyk
e/B
un
d
are
a (
m2)
Dyk
e c
ap
acit
y
(m3)
= h
eig
ht
x a
rea
1
Caust
ic S
oda lye
N
A
10 m
g/m
3
Tanks
3
3000
1000
2700
Above
g G
round
9
12
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
0.8
875
700
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
2
HCl
NA
50
Tanks
2
600
300
540
Above
Gro
und
7.5
7.5
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
0.6
5
480
312
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
3
HYPO
-
- Tanks
2
100
50
90
Above
Gro
und
4.5
4
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
0.9
100
90
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
4
Dilu
te H
2SO
4
- 15 m
g/m
3
Tanks
1
30
30
27
Above
Gro
und
4.5
3.2
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
0.4
138
55.2
D
rain
Valv
e
Pro
vided
5
Conce
ntr
ate
d H
2SO
4
- 15 m
g/m
3
Tanks
1
20
20
18
Above
Gro
und
3.6
2.8
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
0.4
138
55.2
D
rain
Valv
e
Pro
vided
6
Chlo
rine
- 10
Tanks
4
284
71
213
Above
Gro
und
12
2.8
-5
12 k
g
0.5
352
176
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
7
Chlo
rine
- 10
Cyl
inders
Appro
x.
1200
900
0.7
5
720
Above
Gro
und
2.1
0.7
6
25-4
0
10 k
g
- -
- -
8
Hyd
rogen
NA
- Tanks
1
120
120
120
Above
Gro
und
5.4
5.4
-
0.2
kg
No W
all
50
5
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
9
Hyd
rogen
NA
- Ski
p
Cyl
inders
0
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
N
A
NA
NA
10
HSD
52°C
-
92°C
-
0
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
11
FO
M
in 6
6°C
-
Tanks
1
40
40
38
Above
Gro
und
4.5
3.6
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
1
69
69
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
12
Salt
Sto
rage
yard
1
9000
9000
8200
Above
Gro
und
- -
- -
1.0
m
3250
3250
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
PACL
EXPAN
SIO
N O
F C
HLO
R A
LKALI
PLA
NT A
ND
ESTABLI
SH
MEN
T O
F N
EW
FLA
KER
PLA
NT,
STABLE B
LEACH
ING
PO
WD
ER P
LAN
T,
HYD
RO
GEN
PERO
XID
E P
LAN
T &
CAPTIV
E P
OW
ER P
LAN
T A
T N
AYA N
AN
GAL
AD
DIT
ION
AL
STU
DIE
S
KAD
AM
EN
VIR
ON
MEN
TAL C
ON
SU
LTAN
TS |
AU
GU
ST 2
019
221
Ta
ble
7-5
: C
he
mic
al
Pro
pe
rtie
s a
nd
Sto
rag
e D
eta
ils
of
Ha
zard
ou
s R
aw
Ma
teri
als
an
d F
inis
he
d P
rod
ucts
– U
nit
2
S.
No .
Ra
w M
ate
ria
ls/
Pro
du
cts
Fla
sh
Po
int
(°C
)
IDLH
(pp
m)
Sto
rag
e
me
tho
d
No
. o
f
sto
rag
e
tan
ks /
dru
ms
Ma
x.
lice
nse
d
Sto
rag
e
Ca
pa
cit
y
(KL)
Ca
pa
cit
y o
f
Sto
rag
e
tan
k /
dru
ms e
ach
(m3)
To
tal
Sto
rag
e
Vo
lum
e
(m3)
Sto
rag
e T
an
k
typ
e
(Un
de
rgro
un
d
or
Ab
ove
gro
un
d)
Ta
nk
Te
mp
era
ture
(°C
)
Pre
ssu
re
(ba
r)
Dyk
e
Sa
fety
Me
asu
res
Pro
vid
ed
He
igh
t
(m)
Dia
(m
) D
yk
e/B
un
d
he
igh
t (m
)
Dyk
e/B
un
d
are
a (
m2)
Dyk
e c
ap
acit
y
(m3)
= H
eig
ht
x a
rea
1
Caust
ic S
oda lye
N
A
10 m
g/m
3
Tanks
4
1750
1750
1575
Above
Gro
und
8.4
9
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
1
675
675
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
2
HCl
NA
50
Tanks
3
300
100
270
Above
Gro
und
10
3.5
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
1
320
320
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
3
HYPO
-
- Tanks
2
100
50
90
Above
Gro
und
4.5
4
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
No W
all
110
110
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
4
Dilu
te H
2SO
4
- 15 m
g/m
3
Tanks
1
30
30
27
Above
Gro
und
4.5
3.2
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
1
140
140
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
5
Conce
ntr
ate
d H
2SO
4
- 15 m
g/m
3
Tanks
1
40
40
36
Above
Gro
und
4.5
3.6
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
1
140
140
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
6
Chlo
rine
- 10
Tanks
4
320
80
240
Above
Gro
und
12
2.8
-5
12 k
g
0.5
514
257
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
7
Chlo
rine
- 10
Cyl
inders
Appro
x.
1800
1350
0.7
5
1080
Above
Gro
und
2.1
0.7
6
25-4
0
10 k
g
- -
- -
8
Hyd
rogen
NA
- Tanks
1
200
200
200
Above
Gro
und
6.0
6.9
-
0.2
kg
No W
all
50
5
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
9
Hyd
rogen
NA
- Ski
p
Cyl
inders
0
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
N
A
NA
NA
10
HSD
52°C
-
92°C
-
0
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
11
FO
M
in 6
6°C
-
Tanks
2
65
65
58.5
Above
Gro
und
4.5
3.6
25-4
0
Atm
osp
heric
1
166
166
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
12
Salt
Sto
rage
yard
1
9000
9000
8200
Above
Gro
und
- -
- -
1.0
m
5592
5592
Dra
in V
alv
e
Pro
vided
PACL
EXPAN
SIO
N O
F C
HLO
R A
LKALI
PLA
NT A
ND
ESTABLI
SH
MEN
T O
F N
EW
FLA
KER
PLA
NT,
STABLE B
LEACH
ING
PO
WD
ER P
LAN
T,
HYD
RO
GEN
PERO
XID
E P
LAN
T &
CAPTIV
E P
OW
ER P
LAN
T A
T N
AYA N
AN
GAL
AD
DIT
ION
AL
STU
DIE
S
KAD
AM
EN
VIR
ON
MEN
TAL C
ON
SU
LTAN
TS |
AU
GU
ST 2
019
222
Ta
ble
7-6
: P
ipe
lin
e d
eta
ils
for
the
Ha
zard
ou
s m
ate
ria
l h
an
dle
d a
t P
AC
L
S.
No
. R
aw
Ma
teri
als
/ P
rod
ucts
M
ate
ria
l o
f
Co
nstr
ucti
on
(M
OC
)
Ma
ss I
nve
nto
ry
(m3)
Pip
eli
ne
typ
e
(Un
de
rgro
un
d o
r A
bo
ve
gro
un
d)
Pip
e D
ia.
(m)
Pip
e L
en
gth
(m)
Te
mp
era
ture
(°C
)
Pre
ssu
re
(ba
r)
Sa
fety
mea
su
res p
rovid
ed
1
Hyd
rogen g
as
pip
elin
e f
rom
Hyd
rogen G
as
Hold
er
(Un
it 1
) to
Opp. Civ
il D
ept.
M
S
7.1
Above
gro
und
0.1
5
400
25
0.2
W
ate
r se
al
2
Hyd
rogen g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit 1
- O
pp. Civ
il D
ept.
to P
ACL
Main
Gate
M
S
0.8
Above
gro
und
0.1
100
25
0.2
W
ate
r se
al
3
Hyd
rogen g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit 1
- P
ACL
Main
Gate
to G
oya
l G
ase
s M
S
0.8
Above
gro
und
0.1
100
25
0.2
W
ate
r se
al
4
Hyd
rogen g
as
pip
elin
e f
rom
Hyd
rogen G
as
Hold
er
(Un
it 2
) To H
Cl Pla
nt.
M
S
1.8
Above
gro
und
0.1
5
100
25
0.2
W
ate
r se
al
5
Hyd
rogen g
as
pip
elin
e -
Unit 2
- H
Cl Pla
nt
To P
ACL
Main
Gate
. M
S
2.5
Above
gro
und
0.0
8
500
25
0.2
W
ate
r se
al
6
Hyd
rogen g
as
pip
elin
e -
Unit 2
- P
ACL
Main
Gate
To G
oya
l G
ase
s.
MS
0.5
Above
gro
und
0.0
8
100
25
0.2
W
ate
r se
al
7
Inte
r Connect
ing P
ipe L
ine B
etw
een U
nit I
and U
nit 2
as
altern
ate
route
To G
oya
l G
ase
s M
S
6.3
Above
gro
und
0.1
800
25
0.2
W
ate
r se
al
8
Chlo
rine g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit-1
fro
m L
iquifie
r To S
tora
ge
MS
0.3
Above
gro
und
0.0
5
150
-2.5
3
Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
11
Chlo
rine g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit-1
Fro
m S
tora
ge T
o C
hlo
rine F
illin
g
MS
0.2
Above
gro
und
0.0
5
100
0
10
Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
12
Chlo
rine g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit-1
fro
m C
hlo
rine F
illin
g T
o C
PW
Pla
nt O
ff S
ite
MS
0.4
Above
gro
und
0.1
50
30
4
Ruptu
re D
isc
and S
afe
ty V
alv
e
13
Chlo
rine g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit-1
fro
m C
hlo
rine f
illin
g t
o C
PW
Pla
nt O
ff Site
MS
0.8
Above
gro
und
0.1
100
30
4
Ruptu
re D
isc
and S
afe
ty V
alv
e
14
Chlo
rine g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit-2
fro
m L
iquifie
r to
Sto
rage
MS
0.9
Above
gro
und
0.0
5
200
-2.5
3
Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
15
Chlo
rine g
as
pip
elin
e U
nit-2
fro
m S
tora
ge t
o C
hlo
rine F
illin
g
MS
0.3
Above
gro
und
0.0
5
150
0
10
Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
On t
he b
asi
s of
the info
rmation p
rovi
ded in a
bove
table
and a
s dis
cuss
ed o
ver
failu
res
sceneries
giv
en in p
ublic
ations
like U
K-H
SE a
nd t
he e
xperience
of
the c
onsu
ltant,
MCLs’
whic
h m
ay
take
pla
ce a
re p
rese
nte
d in t
able
belo
w:
Ta
ble
7-7
: Y
ea
r w
ise
He
alt
h a
nd
Sa
fety
Ex
pe
nse
s o
f P
AC
L
Sr.
No
. C
om
po
ne
nt
MO
C
No
. / Q
ua
nti
ty
Ma
teri
al(
s)
Mo
de
led
16
Typ
es o
f Fa
ilu
re P
ossib
le w
ith
Fre
qu
en
cy
Flo
w R
ate
/
Ca
pa
cit
y
Te
mp
era
ture
(oC
) P
ressu
re (
ba
r)
Co
nse
qu
en
ce
s
Stu
die
d
Dyk
e a
rea
(m
2)
&
he
igh
t (m
)
Co
ntr
ol
Syste
m /
Ind
ica
tors
1
Chlo
rine S
tora
ge
tanks
4
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: C
hlo
rine
6 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 4 x
10
-5
13 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 1 x
10
-5
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 5 x
10
-6
50 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 5 x
10
-6
Cata
stro
phic
: 2 x
10
-6
80 m
3
-5
12
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
Heig
ht:
0.5
Are
a:
514
Dra
in V
alv
e P
rovi
ded
2
Chlo
rine C
ylin
ders
Appro
x. 1
800
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
Chlo
rine
L: N
A
6 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 4 x
10
-5
13 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 1 x
10
-5
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 5 x
10
-6
50 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
: 5 x
10
-6
Cata
stro
phic
: 2 x
10
-6
0.7
5 m
3
25-4
0
10
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
- -
3
Hyd
rogen h
old
er
1
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: H
ydro
gen
Sm
all
(75 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
): 1
x 1
0-3
Larg
e (
250 m
m d
iam
ete
r hole
): 1
x 1
0-4
Cata
stro
phic
: 1.6
x 1
0-5
200 m
3
- 0.2
Pool Fire
- D
rain
Valv
e P
rovi
ded
16 T
hese
hav
e se
lect
ed o
n th
e ba
sis o
f the
Tec
hnic
al P
aper
55
by th
e W
orld
Ban
k, H
AZO
P, in
vent
ory
asse
ssm
ent a
nd P
&I D
iagr
am.
PACL
EXPAN
SIO
N O
F C
HLO
R A
LKALI
PLA
NT A
ND
ESTABLI
SH
MEN
T O
F N
EW
FLA
KER
PLA
NT,
STABLE B
LEACH
ING
PO
WD
ER P
LAN
T,
HYD
RO
GEN
PERO
XID
E P
LAN
T &
CAPTIV
E P
OW
ER P
LAN
T A
T N
AYA N
AN
GAL
AD
DIT
ION
AL
STU
DIE
S
KAD
AM
EN
VIR
ON
MEN
TAL C
ON
SU
LTAN
TS |
AU
GU
ST 2
019
223
Sr.
No
. C
om
po
ne
nt
MO
C
No
. / Q
ua
nti
ty
Ma
teri
al(
s)
Mo
de
led
16
Typ
es o
f Fa
ilu
re P
ossib
le w
ith
Fre
qu
en
cy
Flo
w R
ate
/
Ca
pa
cit
y
Te
mp
era
ture
(oC
) P
ressu
re (
ba
r)
Co
nse
qu
en
ce
s
Stu
die
d
Dyk
e a
rea
(m
2)
&
he
igh
t (m
)
Co
ntr
ol
Syste
m /
Ind
ica
tors
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
- -
Nil
- -
4
0.1
5 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 400 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
Hyd
rogen
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
7.1
m3
25
0.2
Pool Fire
- W
ate
r Seal
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
Nil
- -
5
0.1
m d
iam
ete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 100 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
Hyd
rogen
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.8
m3
25
0.2
Pool Fire
- W
ate
r Seal
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
Nil
- -
6
0.1
m d
iam
ete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 100 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
Hyd
rogen
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.8
m3
25
0.2
Pool Fire
- W
ate
r Seal
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
Nil
- -
7
0.1
5 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 100 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
Hyd
rogen
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
1.8
m3
25
0.2
Pool Fire
- W
ate
r Seal
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
Nil
- -
8
0.0
8 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 500 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
Hyd
rogen
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
2.5
m3
25
0.2
Pool Fire
- W
ate
r Seal
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
Nil
- -
9
0.0
8 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 100 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
Hyd
rogen
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.5
m3
25
0.2
Pool Fire
- W
ate
r Seal
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
- -
Nil
- -
10
0.1
m d
iam
ete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 800 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
Hyd
rogen
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
6.3
m3
25
0.2
Pool Fire
- W
ate
r Seal
PACL
EXPAN
SIO
N O
F C
HLO
R A
LKALI
PLA
NT A
ND
ESTABLI
SH
MEN
T O
F N
EW
FLA
KER
PLA
NT,
STABLE B
LEACH
ING
PO
WD
ER P
LAN
T,
HYD
RO
GEN
PERO
XID
E P
LAN
T &
CAPTIV
E P
OW
ER P
LAN
T A
T N
AYA N
AN
GAL
AD
DIT
ION
AL
STU
DIE
S
KAD
AM
EN
VIR
ON
MEN
TAL C
ON
SU
LTAN
TS |
AU
GU
ST 2
019
224
Sr.
No
. C
om
po
ne
nt
MO
C
No
. / Q
ua
nti
ty
Ma
teri
al(
s)
Mo
de
led
16
Typ
es o
f Fa
ilu
re P
ossib
le w
ith
Fre
qu
en
cy
Flo
w R
ate
/
Ca
pa
cit
y
Te
mp
era
ture
(oC
) P
ressu
re (
ba
r)
Co
nse
qu
en
ce
s
Stu
die
d
Dyk
e a
rea
(m
2)
&
he
igh
t (m
)
Co
ntr
ol
Syste
m /
Ind
ica
tors
Toxi
c:
G:
NA
L: N
A
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
- -
Nil
- -
11
0.0
5 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 150 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.3
m3
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
Chlo
rine
L: N
A
-2.5
3
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
- Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
12
0.0
5 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 100 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.2
m3
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
Chlo
rine
L: N
A
0
10
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
- Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
13
0.1
m d
iam
ete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 50 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.4
m3
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
Chlo
rine
L: N
A
30
4
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
- Ruptu
re D
isc
and
Safe
ty V
alv
e
14
0.1
m d
iam
ete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 100 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.8
m3
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
Chlo
rine
L: N
A
30
4
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
- Ruptu
re D
isc
and
Safe
ty V
alv
e
15
0.0
5 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 200 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.9
m3
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
Chlo
rine
L: N
A
-2.5
3
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
- Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
16
0.0
5 m
dia
mete
r
pip
ing
MS
Length
: 150 m
Fla
mm
able
:
G:
NA
L: N
A
Ruptu
re (
>110 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.5
X 1
0-9
Larg
e h
ole
(>
75 -
≤110m
m d
iam
ete
r):
3.3
X 1
0-8
Sm
all
hole
(>
25 m
m -
≤75 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
6.7
X 1
0-8
Pin
hole
(≤
25 m
m d
iam
ete
r):
1.6
X 1
0-7
0.3
m3
- -
Nil
- -
Toxi
c:
G:
Chlo
rine
L: N
A
0
10
Maxi
mum
Conce
ntr
ation
Eff
ect
- Exp
ansi
on V
ess
el
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 225
7.2.4 Consequence Analysis Results
As the MCLS’ were developed for the selected set of chemicals, the next step is to carry out the consequence
analysis. The consequence analysis results along with their contours are presented in the following sections.
Chlorine
Toxic dose effect distance due to the release of Chlorine are presented in table below,
Table 7-8: Effect Distance due to Release of Chlorine
Chemical with
Scenario Failure Scenarios Met. Data
Effective Distance in meter to Toxic level
IDLH (10 ppm)
Chlorine gas pipeline
from Liquifier (Unit 1) to
Storage
2 5mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 1943
1.0/E 1943
4.0/D 893
Line Rupture
1.2/D 1958
1.0/E 1959
4.0/D 820
Chlorine gas pipeline
from Storage to Chlorine
filling unit
25mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 1661
1.0/E 1661
4.0/D 826
Line Rupture
1.2/D 1664
1.0/E 1664
4.0/D 817
Chlorine gas pipeline
from Chlorine filling
(unit 1) to CPW Plant
Off-site
25mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 718
1.0/E 718
4.0/D 322
75mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 908
1.0/E 908
4.0/D 603
Line Rupture
1.2/D 244
1.0/E 244
4.0/D 198
Chlorine gas pipeline
from Chlorine filling
(unit 1) to CPW Plant
Offsite
25mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 855
1.0/E 855
4.0/D 370
75mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 1081
1.0/E 1081
4.0/D 703
Line Rupture
1.2/D 314
1.0/E 314
4.0/D 253
Chlorine gas pipeline
from Liquifier (Unit 2) to
storage
25mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 2858
1.0/E 2858
4.0/D 1335
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 226
Chemical with
Scenario Failure Scenarios Met. Data
Effective Distance in meter to Toxic level
IDLH (10 ppm)
Line Rupture
1.2/D 2693
1.0/E 2693
4.0/D 1178
Chlorine gas pipeline
storage (Unit 2) to
Chlorine filling
25 mm diameter hole leak
in storage tank
1.2/D 1952
1.0/E 1952
4.0/D 963
Line Rupture
1.2/D 1935
1.0/E 1935
4.0/D 933
The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Chlorine are presented below;
Figure 7.2: Maximum concentration Effect Contour due to Line rupture of Chlorine gas pipeline from
Chlorine filling (Unit 1) to CPW Plant at 4.0/D
Hydrogen
Radiation level effect distance due to the release of Hydrogen are presented below,
Table 7-9: Effect Distance due to Release of Hydrogen
Chemical with
Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence
Met.
Data
Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
Hydrogen Storage
Tank
75mm dia hole leak Jet Fire
1.2/D 11 8 NR
1.0/E 10 8 NR
4.0/D 11 9 NR
Jet Fire 1.2/D 36 26 19
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 227
Chemical with
Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence
Met.
Data
Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
250mm dia hole
leak
1.0/E 36 26 19
4.0/D 36 29 24
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 49 25 5
1.0/E 49 25 5
4.0/D 49 25 5
Catastrophic
Rupture Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 49 25 5
1.0/E 49 25 5
4.0/D 49 25 5
Hydrogen Gas
Pipeline from
Hydrogen gas
holder (Unit 1) to
opposite Civil
Department
25mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D NR NR NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 7 3 NR
1.0/E 7 3 NR
4.0/D 7 3 NR
75mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 3 NR NR
1.0/E 3 NR NR
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 7 3 NR
1.0/E 7 3 NR
4.0/D 7 3 NR
100mm dia hole
leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 5 2 NR
1.0/E 5 2 NR
4.0/D 5 3 NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 7 3 NR
1.0/E 7 3 NR
4.0/D 7 3 NR
Line Rupture
Jet Fire
1.2/D 8 5 NR
1.0/E 8 5 NR
4.0/D 7 6 NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 11 5 NR
1.0/E 11 5 NR
4.0/D 11 5 NR
Hydrogen Gas
Pipeline from Civil
Department (Unit
1) to PACL main
gate
25mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D NR NR NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 3 1 NR
1.0/E 3 1 NR
4.0/D 3 1 NR
75mm dia hole leak Jet Fire 1.2/D 3 NR NR
1.0/E 3 NR NR
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 228
Chemical with
Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence
Met.
Data
Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 3 1 NR
1.0/E 3 1 NR
4.0/D 3 1 NR
Line Rupture
Jet Fire
1.2/D 6 3 NR
1.0/E 6 3 NR
4.0/D 6 4 NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 4 2 NR
1.0/E 5 2 NR
4.0/D 5 2 NR
Hydrogen Gas
Pipeline from
PACL main gate to
Goyal gases
25mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D NR NR NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 3 1 NR
1.0/E 3 1 NR
4.0/D 3 1 NR
75mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 3 NR NR
1.0/E 3 NR NR
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 3 1 NR
1.0/E 3 1 NR
4.0/D 3 1 NR
Line Rupture
Jet Fire
1.2/D 6 3 NR
1.0/E 6 3 NR
4.0/D 6 4 NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 5 2 NR
1.0/E 5 2 NR
4.0/D 5 2 NR
Hydrogen Gas
Pipeline from H2
holder (Unit 2) to
HCL Plant
25mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D NR NR NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 4 2 NR
1.0/E 4 2 NR
4.0/D 4 2 NR
75mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 3 NR NR
1.0/E 3 NR NR
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 4 2 NR
1.0/E 4 2 NR
4.0/D 4 2 NR
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 229
Chemical with
Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence
Met.
Data
Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
100mm dia hole
leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 5 2 NR
1.0/E 5 2 NR
4.0/D 5 3 NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 4 2 NR
1.0/E 4 2 NR
4.0/D 4 2 NR
Line Rupture
Jet Fire
1.2/D 11 9 NR
1.0/E 11 6 NR
4.0/D 9 7 NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 6 3 NR
1.0/E 6 3 NR
4.0/D 6 3 NR
Hydrogen Gas
Pipeline from HCL
Plant (Unit 2) to
PACL main gate
25mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D NR NR NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 5 2 NR
1.0/E 5 2 NR
4.0/D 5 2 NR
75mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 3 NR NR
1.0/E 3 NR NR
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 5 2 NR
1.0/E 5 2 NR
4.0/D 5 2 NR
Line Rupture
Jet Fire
1.2/D 1 NR NR
1.0/E 1 NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 8 3 NR
1.0/E 8 3 NR
4.0/D 8 3 NR
Hydrogen Gas
Pipeline from
PACL main gate to
Goyal gases
25mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 3 1 NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 3 1 NR
1.0/E 3 1 NR
4.0/D 3 1 NR
75mm dia hole leak Jet Fire
1.2/D 3 NR NR
1.0/E 3 NR NR
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse 1.2/D 3 1 NR
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 230
Chemical with
Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence
Met.
Data
Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level
4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2
1.0/E 3 1 NR
4.0/D 3 1 NR
Line Rupture
Jet Fire
1.2/D 4 NR NR
1.0/E 4 NR NR
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 4 2 NR
1.0/E 4 2 NR
4.0/D 4 2 NR
Interconnecting
Hydrogen Gas
Pipeline between
Unit 1 & 2 as
alternative route
to Goyal gases
25mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D NR NR NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 6 3 NR
1.0/E 6 3 NR
4.0/D 6 3 NR
75mm dia hole leak
Jet Fire
1.2/D 3 NR NR
1.0/E 3 NR NR
4.0/D 4 NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 6 3 NR
1.0/E 6 3 NR
4.0/D 6 3 NR
Line Rupture
Jet Fire
1.2/D NR NR NR
1.0/E NR NR NR
4.0/D NR NR NR
Fireball Ellipse
1.2/D 11 5 NR
1.0/E 11 5 NR
4.0/D 11 5 NR
The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Hydrogen are presented below;
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 231
Figure 7.3: Fireball Effect Contour due to catastrophic rupture of Hydrogen storage at 4/D
Figure 7.4: Jetfire Effect Contour due to Line rupture of Hydrogen Gas Pipeline from Civil Department (Unit
1) to PACL main gate at 4/D
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 232
Figure 7.5: Jetfire Effect Contour due to Line rupture of Hydrogen Gas Pipeline from H2 holder (Unit 2) to
HCL Plant at 1/E
Figure 7.6: Fireball Effect Contour due to Line Rupture of Interconnecting Hydrogen Gas Pipeline B/W Unit
1 & 2 as alternative route to Goyal gases at 4/D
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 233
7.2.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment Results
The results of quantitative risk analysis carried out using DNV Phast Risk software are presented in this section.
Individual Risk
Iso-risk contours for individual risk due to PACL Plant are shown in Figure 7.7.
Figure 7.7: Iso-Risk Contours for Individual Risk
Societal Risk
FN Curve for Societal Risk due to PACL Plant is shown in Figure 7.8
Figure 7.8: FN Curve for Societal Risk
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 234
Conclusion
Chlorine impacts will always be outside the facility and thus considered as risk.
The safety measures provided below will be strictly followed and thus the risk will be minimised.
7.2.6 Action Plan for Risk Reduction
Salient safety measures provided in the plant system and recommendations for improvement are indicated below:
1. PACL have maintained highly effective process safety management system, health and safety management
system as per British Safety Council with 5 star rating system for consequently 5 years and integrated
management system (QMS / IMS / OSHAS) in the existing facilities.
2. Mechanical integrity assurance programme is most important to prevent loss of containment incidents involving
hazardous materials. The following safety measures are implemented in the existing system.
Chlorine tanks are subjected to rigorous periodic testing and inspection;
One tank is always kept empty to facilitate transfer from another tank in case of emergency;
All connections to chlorine tank are provided at the top and there is no pipe connected to the tank
bottom;
Liquid chlorine connection to the tank top is provided with emergency isolation valve.
3. Timely detection of leaks is critical to prevent major incidents. Chlorine leak detectors are provided in sensitive
locations of the existing facility. Refer Map 7-1 for locations of Chlorine detectors within PACL site
4. Chlorine leak absorption system with adequate capacity has been provided in the existing facility to absorb
chlorine gas in circulating caustic soda solution to produce hypochlorite.
5. If hypochlorite solution gets inadvertently mixed with acid, there will be chlorine gas evolution at ground level
and this will affect persons nearby. In the existing plant, care has been taken to segregate the areas in which
hypochlorite and acid are handled.
6. Check Safety system timely, including Emergency Shut Down (‘ESD’) switches at regular intervals, for their
proper functioning. ESD may be activated to stop the unloading operation, if required.
7. Safe Operating procedures and Emergency Response Procedures to place and to followed strictly.
7.2.7 Control Measures In Case Of Leakage from Chlorine Pipeline or Vaporiser
The following control measures are in place in case of any leakage from Chlorine Pipeline Or Vaporiser:
1. There are remote controlled isolation valves which can be closed from DCS to isolate the pipeline / vaporiser
from main stream
2. Caustic scrubbing system remains operational 24x7 with one additional tower operating in series as polishing
tower.
3. The lines are connected with above hypo plant to suck out all the chlorine quickly.
4. All around the plant, hypo headers are provided with suction hood and long hose which can be used as
additional source to send the chlorine from leaking equipment to hypo plant
5. Portable self breathing apparatus and online breathing apparatus are kept at strategic points which can be
used to isolate the system.
6. Water sprinklers are provided all around chlorine storage tanks
7. Chlorine sensors are provided nearby to sense any leakage.
PACL
EXPAN
SIO
N O
F C
HLO
R A
LKALI
PLA
NT A
ND
ESTABLI
SH
MEN
T O
F N
EW
FLA
KER
PLA
NT,
STABLE B
LEACH
ING
PO
WD
ER P
LAN
T,
HYD
RO
GEN
PERO
XID
E P
LAN
T &
CAPTIV
E P
OW
ER P
LAN
T A
T N
AYA N
AN
GAL
AD
DIT
ION
AL
STU
DIE
S
KAD
AM
EN
VIR
ON
MEN
TAL C
ON
SU
LTAN
TS |
AU
GU
ST 2
019
235
Ma
p 7
-1:
Ma
p s
ho
win
g l
oca
tio
ns
of
Ch
lori
ne
de
tecto
rs a
t P
AC
L s
ite
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 236
7.3 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
An industrial emergency is referred to a situation arising from any catastrophic failure of an industrial plant, which
may have detrimental effects on life, property or the environment. The potential intensities of such emergencies are
determined by the nature and size of the industry, while the magnitude of the damages they leave is largely
decided by the effectiveness of the preparedness to manage them.
The emergencies are classified into two broad categories, the first consisting of those situations affecting one or
more plants of the industrial facility, but which can be managed by reasonably developed resources of the industrial
facility itself-known as On-Site Emergency Plan.
The second category consists of more serious situations affecting several plants of the industrial facility, even
spreading outside and requiring district, state or national level resource mobilization to manage them – known as
Off-site Emergency Plan.
The present document is restricted to first category of emergency covered under On-site Emergency Management
Plan which is the building block of emergency management capability in totality.
7.3.1 Categorization of Emergency
Emergency Due to Plant Failure
Fire
Explosion
Toxic release
Electrocution
Emergency due to Natural Calamity
Flood
Earthquake / Cyclone
Storm
Cloud bursting / lightning
Emergency due to external factors:
Food poisoning / water poisoning
Sabotage
War
7.3.2 Onsite Emergency Plan
Emergency Procedures
Handling of an emergency calls for critical planning and ensuring a state of readiness at all times. Proper handling
of the actual emergency needs certain actions to be taken before the emergency to ensure that all systems are
ready and the emergency can be handled smoothly. Similarly after an emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction
programmes are necessary. The actions to be taken before, during and after an emergency are described below:
Actions to be taken before the Emergency
Training programme should be conducted at regular intervals for:
Use of Personnel Protective Equipment’s
Use of chlorine kit
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 237
Fire fighting
First Aid
Drills to be conducted for testing of emergency plans once in a six month
Safe handling procedures (MSDS) for the chemicals handled in the plant should be written and copy made
available in plant area.
Actions to be taken during the Emergency
For major emergency situations, the various actions to be taken during emergency are as follows:
Emergency Response to Toxic Material Release
Among the hazardous chemicals handled at the facility, the worst emergency situation will involve release of
chlorine gas.
A chlorine leak in easily detected due to its peculiar odour. As soon as a leak in piping or equipment handling
chlorine is noticed, the immediate action should be to evacuate the downwind area and make efforts to isolate the
source of supply.
Personnel performing such emergency operations should wear all personal protective equipment including air line or
self-contained breathing apparatus.
Immediately on report of a leak, the Incident Controller should take following actions:
Declare the EMERGENCY
Evacuate the downwind area. If the consequences are likely to affect outside population, use available means
to inform the public and nearby installations about the incident and possible effects and actions
Instruct to isolate the system supplying gas to source of leak and arrange safe shutdown of the plant.
If emergency situation permits, attempt repair using necessary precautions
Perform all other responsibilities as per the Emergency Response Plan
The following actions are to be taken for the hazardous chemicals handled in the plant:
Chlorine
Chlorine storage tanks are provided with inbuilt safety arrangements like double Safety Valves, rupture discs,
level controllers / indicators, chlorine sensor alarms, pressure switches, chlorine emergency blower / hoods
connected with de-chlorination system, wind socks, fire fighting arrangement, fencing, escape gates from all
sides, dyke walls, periodic testing, communication facility, PPEs provisions, periodic drills, Display Boards etc.
Chlorine filling stations are also provided with sensor alarms, emergency blowers, wind socks, fire fighting
arrangement, PPEs facilities, escape gates from all sides, periodic testing, chlorine emergency blower/hoods
connected with de-chlorination system etc.
Occupational Health Centre remains operative round the clock to take care of emergency medical aids
Hydrogen
Hydrogen storage is provided with Hydrogen Gas Holder under positive pressure and water overflow all the time,
Flame proof fittings, flame arrestor, fire fighting arrangements, process monitoring through DCS.
Caustic Soda, Hydrochloric Acid, Sulphuric Acid
Storages with dykes, proper labeling, PPEs provisions, Maintenance under work permit system, Double Valve
arrangement.
HCl furnaces are provided with rupture discs Do not attempt to attend leakages on pressurized line / vessel or
on running equipment;
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 238
There are tripping devices to trip HCl furnace in case of low chlorine and low hydrogen pressure and also in
case of variation of hydrogen and chlorine ratio;
Leaking gas can be sucked by emergency blowers and discharged into Hypo towers.
Handling, Housekeeping, Storage & Transportation
The major points where handling is to be carried i.e. Liquid Chlorine filling in tonners and in cell house where
cranes are used for heavy loading/unloading, persons are trained specially for this purpose for safe handling;
Caution notices are displayed at conspicuous places in the plant regarding the handling of hazardous chemicals,
good housekeeping etc.
In HCl and caustic filling area, good housekeeping is maintained;
Chlorine storage tank area is fenced and kept cleaned;
In Chlorine filling station proper housekeeping is maintained;
Regarding transportation of HCl, Caustic Soda and Liq. Chlorine tonners, drivers are given training from time to
time for safe handling and transportation;
Personal protective equipment are provided to the persons involved in handling of hazardous jobs;
Emergency panels (PLA Card) are provided on the vehicles for transit emergency;
TREM Cards are provided to the drivers to take care in case of transit emergency
Description of Other safety Measures
Color Code Details
All the pipelines in the plant have been color coded. The details are as provided in Table 7-10.
Table 7-10: Details of Color Code
S. NO. CONTENTS GROUND COLOR BAND FIRST COLOUR BAND
1. Process water, soft water etc. Sea green -
2. Chilled Water Insulated -
3. Air line Sky Blue -
4. Steam Insulated pipeline -
5. Transformer oil Dark Brown -
6. Furnace oil Dark Brown -
7. Light diesel oil Dark Brown Green
8. Dry chlorine Golden yellow -
9. Wet chlorine / Dilute chlorine FRP line Golden yellow
10. Freon-22 Dark grey -
11. Hydrogen Postman Red -
12. Nitrogen Sky Blue -
13. Sulphuric Acid (98%) Orange -
14. Sulphuric Acid (78%) FRP lines Orange
15. Hydrochloric acid FRP lines Signal red
16. Caustic solution Navy Blue -
17. Brine FRP line Smoke grey
18. Sodium hypo FRP line -
Work Permit System
Work permit system is being followed for all the jobs in the plant. PACL has two classes of safety work permit
(Class I and Class II.)
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 239
Class I permit is issued for all hazardous jobs that have been identified and listed. Class I permit is signed by three
persons, one each from production, maintenance and safety dept. Class II safety work permit is issued for all less
hazardous jobs.
Class II safety work permit is signed by persons from production and maintenance depts. only.
Safety Audit
Safety Audit of the plant is being carried out annually with help of competent external agencies.
Preventive Maintenance Schedule
The preventive maintenance schedule is evolved and maintained for the rotary equipment, critical equipment
installed in the plants.
Safety Committee
The following safety committees have been formed in PACL in compliance of Rule 66 F of Punjab Factories Rule
1952:
Plant safety committee;
Plant safety sub-committee for Unit 2;
Plant safety sub-committee for Unit 1.
The tenure of the committee is 2 years. The committee meets as often as necessary but at least once in each
quarter of the year.
The committees are meeting as per schedule to discuss and achieve the aim and objectives of health and safety
policy and to arrive at practical solutions to problems encountered, creating safety awareness amongst all the
workers and reviewing the implementations of recommendations made by safety committee.
Details of Safety Organization and Its Activities
Figure 7.9: Safety Organogram
The safety department consists of one AGM (QC & safety) who is assisted by Sr. Engr. (Safety). The reporting is as
shown above.
Activities
Identification of hazards and their management.
Safety propaganda and publicity.
Training related to safety for employees, customers, transporter and general public.
Meeting statutory requirements.
Rehearsal/Mock Drill and training regarding on-site Emergency plan.
Raising indents of equipment related to safety and their maintenance.
Liaison with statutory authorities and outside agencies in safety related matters.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 240
Implementation of safety work permits.
To maintain records related to accidents and investigate accidents.
Organize Motivational Activities like quiz contests, poster competitions etc.
Holding safety committee meeting and follow-up for implementation of minutes.
Following up for testing of pressure vessels and maintenance of their records.
Implementation of recommendations of Safety Audit and Safety inspections reports.
Periodic updating of Safety Documents/Data, On-Site/Off-Site Emergency Plan etc.
15. Fire Safety Management, Fire Drills, implementation of AMC recommendation & upkeep / indent of Fire
Equipment.
7.3.3 Inspection Procedure
In plant/In process Inspection
All in process inspections are undertaken by concerned Head of Section (HOS) – Production, as defined in process
inspection plan for both the Units. The records of analysis registers and analysis reports are sent to individual HOS
(Production).
Shut Down Inspection
The equipment and vessels for which in process inspections are not possible, the inspections are carried out during
annual shutdown. The testing of various pressure vessels etc. and other equipment are carried out during the
shutdown periods.
Prior to the shutdown, all the maintenance depts. and the process dept. make a list of the maintenance jobs which
they would like to attend during the planned shutdown.
During the planned shutdown, it is ensured that emergency equipment like DG. Set and the Absorption towers etc.
are kept ready.
Electrical Continuity Test
Electrical continuity test of all the equipment and structures are carried out periodically. In addition to this, earth
continuity of all the supporting equipment are also carried out.
Testing Of Pressure Vessels, Pipelines
The pressure vessels and piping are being tested for thickness and pressure testing by a competent person
periodically.
Techniques and Procedures for Testing Safety Alarms, Tripping and Interlocking Devices and Other
Safety Instruments
Alarm and trip settings of initiating instruments are checked in the instrument test stand by simulating the set
values. However, settings of initiating instruments of stand by equipment and auto start –up of auxiliary devices
are checked. Critical instruments are also checked during each start up after a plant shutdown.
Complete logic system is tested by simulation during shutdown. However logic systems for critical machinery and
equipment are checked during each startup.
Trip solenoid valves and trip control valves are overhauled and checked once during shutdown. Proper function &
operation of control valves are checked after each start up.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 241
7.4 SAFETY AWARENESS AMONG WORKERS
The following steps are taken at PACL to improve the safety awareness among the workers:
Lectures, seminars and Workshops: These are organized at regular intervals. The faculty for the same is both
from inside the factory and from outside agencies.
Practical Exercises: Mock drills are periodically conducted to keep the employees alert and ready to meet any
emergency situation. Practical exercises and training regarding use of personal protective equipment and
firefighting appliances etc. are also conducted.
Safety Quiz Competitions: These are organized to generate awareness about safety.
Display of Safety Posters/Stickers: They are displayed at conspicuous locations in the plant to generate
awareness amongst the employees.
Safety Instructions: The safety instructions for the job are displayed at conspicuous places. Training
programmes are organized for following topics:
The hazards involved in the handling of chemicals and the methods to deal with such hazards in case of an
emergency and otherwise.
The measures to control the physical and health hazards arising out of the exposure because of handling of
hazardous chemicals.
The measures to be taken by the workers to ensure safe handling, storage and transportation of hazardous
chemicals.
The correct use of personal protective equipment.
The measures to be taken in case of any spillage of chemicals and gas leakage.
Training Programmes by outside agencies: The personnel from all the departments (including the safety dept.) are
being sponsored to the training programmes (on safety topics) organized by agencies like National Safety Council,
(NSC), NSC-North Zone Chapter., Regional Labour Institute (RLI), HRD foundation, National Productivity Council
(NPC) etc.
7.4.1 Public Awareness and Disclosure of Information to Public
The company maintains contact with the Gram Pradhan and they are made aware by conducting training
programme about the type of emergencies that could arise in the company and they would actively assist the
company in coordinating with the general public in case any such emergencies arise.
PACL has about 150 workers on it’s rolls who are from the local villages. These employees are aware and
trained regarding the hazardous properties of the chemicals and steps to be taken in case of any emergency.
They are also aware about the manufacturing processes of the company and emergencies that may arise.
They form an important link for dissemination of information to the local villages.
In case of any emergency or otherwise the Security and Fire Officer at the main gate will serve as the liaison
officer with the public.
The people of adjoining villages are kept informed about the precautions/steps to be followed in case of any
emergency through handouts and training programmes.
7.4.2 Details of Medical Facilities Provided Inside the Factory
Table 7-11: List of Medical Facilities Provided at Site
Description of facilities, Names of Persons Details
A. Nos. and Location of First Aid Centre, Hospitals etc. One Medical First Aid
Centre (Near Security Gate)
B. Arrangement and Facilities in First Aid Centre
a) Emergency Care Equipment
(i) 02 cylinders with attachment – 09
(ii) Beds –03
(iii) Stretcher –02
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 242
Description of facilities, Names of Persons Details
(iv) Ambulance Van –01
(v) Nebulizer –01
(vi) Peak Flow meter for L.F.T-01
b) Emergency Medicines:
(i) Inj. Dexamethosone
(ii) Inj. Coramine
(iii) Inj. Deriphylline
(iv) Inj. Avil
(v) Inj. T.T.
(vi) Inj. Baralgan
(vii) Inj. Novalgene
(ix) Inj. Aderline
(x) Inj. Histac
(xi) Dressing
c) Decontamination Facilities: Autoclave for sterlization of syringes, needles and other
equipment. Safety showers are provided in the plant
d) Ambulance Van One Ambulance Van with Oxygen cylinder and First Aid Box
C. Strength and Status of Medical Staff:
(i) Medical Officer –1
(ii) Pharmacist –4
(iii) Ambulance Driver –1
D. Details of Trained in First Aid (Names & Work place) :
Name Work place
(i) Mr. Narinder Singh Officer (L& S)
(ii) Mr. Gurbinder Singh Security Supervisor
(iii) Mr. Tarlochan Singh Jr. Security Supervisor
(iv) Mr .V.S Raman Jr Officer Spl Gr (T/O)
(v) Mr. Hari Om J.E ( Mech.)
(vi) Mr. Amrik Singh Jr Officer Spl Gr(T/O)
(vii) Mr .Bipan Kumar Jr. Officer (T/O)
(viii) Mr.Puran Chand Assistant(T/O)
(ix) Mr. R.K Garg Jr. Officer(Health)
(x) Mr. Shailender Dev Sr. Compounder/Pharmacist
(xi) Mr. Neelam Kumari Clerk
(xii) Mr. R.K Bansal SI Spl Grd (Mech)
(xiii) Mr. Naveen Joshi Jr. Officer (Sales)
(xiv) Mr. Anil Vishwakarma Sr. Engr. (Process)
(xv) Mr. S.K Thakur Dy. Mgr. (Stores)
(xvi) Mr. Arvind Kumar Exec. (QC)
(xvii) Mr. Rajan Dewedi Sr.Engr (Safety)
(xviii) Mr. Pardeep kr. Suman Engr (Mech)
(xix) Mr. Kuldeep Singh Asst Engr (Mech)
(xx) Mr.Paras Ram ASI (Mech)
(xxi) Mr Gaurav Singh Sr. Engr (Inst)
(xxii) Mr. Gurmmet Singh JE Spl Gr. (Mech)
(xxiii) Mr. Jatinder Singh ASI (Prod.)
(xxiv) Mr. Parvesh Kr ASI (Prod)
(xxv) Mr. Joginder Kr Sr. Engr (Elect)
(xxvi) Mr. Ankush Bali Engr (Elect)
(xxvii) Mr. Sohan Singh JE (Elec)
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 243
Description of facilities, Names of Persons Details
(xxviii) Mr. Sanjeev Kumar ASI (Prod)
(xxix) Mr. Keshav Sharma Foreman (Elect)
(xxx) Mr. Avtar Singh AE. Gr II (Civil)
E. Whether the Medical Facilities provided inside the Factory are sufficient in case major emergency occurs:
Yes
Table 7-12: List of Antidotes and Medicines at site
List of Antidotes & medicines
(i) Inj. Dexamethosone
(ii) Inj. Coramine
(iii) Inj. Deriphylline
(iv) Inj. Avil
(v) Inj. T.T.
(vi) Inj. Baralgan
(vii) Inj. Novalgene
(ix) Inj. Aderline
(x) Inj. Histac
(xi) Dressing
All these medicines and antidotes required are available in the factory.
7.4.3 Evacuation Routes
The routes which will be used for removing the affected persons from the place of emergency to the first aid center
have been given in the plan. A different route, will however be used by the rescue personnel to avoid further
exposure to the toxic gas on the way, keeping in view the wind directions prevailing at that time and the place of
emergency.
7.4.4 Emergency Medical Action Plan
As soon as the message about an accident involving injuries is received from the plant, the ambulance van will rush
to the Site of the accident to bring the patient to the first aid center and then first aid is provided as per the need of
the case. As far as possible, the compounder should accompany the ambulance van.
The following points are kept in mind while carrying out the emergency medical activities during major emergency
in the plant.
Medical Officer
Medical officer will rush to the first aid center as soon as he comes to know about the declaration of
emergency;
He will guide the Site Main Controller about the suitability of sending the injured persons to the other medical
facilities available under the mutual aid scheme or otherwise;
He will follow any other instructions given by the Site Main Controller.
Medical Supervisor/Compounder
The Medical supervisor/ Compounder available in the first aid center will accompany the ambulance van when it
goes to fetch the affected person. In case, medical officer is present in Occupational Health Centre, he will follow
the instruction given by the medical officer. In case, Medical Officer is not present he will act as per the
instructions for such occasion. In case there is any special instruction from the Site Main Controller, he will follow
the same. In case of absence of Medical Officer in the factory, he will inform the complete details of the injured
person to the Site Main Controller on phone.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 244
Ambulance Driver
Ambulance driver will ensure that fuel is available in his van in adequate quantity all the time. He will also
ensure that stretcher/trolley and other essential equipment are all the time available in the van;
As soon as he gets the instructions he will take the medical Supervisor/Compounder and rush to the spot;
In case no body is available in the first Occupational Health Centre to go with him, he will not delay his departure
on this account.
7.4.5 Details of Treatment and Antidotes
The details of treatment to be given as well as antidotes to be administered are given in Table 7-13.
Table 7-13: Treatment and Antidotes Details
Name of Chemical/ Gas
handled, used and
Produced
Health Hazard Associated First Aid and Supportive Treatment
Specific antidotes, if known.
Chlorine Toxic
Eye Contact :
Flush eye immediately with normal water for atleast 15 minutes or longer, Keeping eyelids
open. Contact lenses not be worn.
Skin Contact:
Remove Contaminated clothes. Wash skin with large amounts of normal running water using
mild soap. Dust the affected area with powdered sodium bicarbonate; wash the
affected area again with normal running water.
Inhalation:
Remove the person to a fresh air area. If breathing has stopped give him artificial
respiration. Keep the affected person warm and at rest. If the victim is unconscious but breathing administer low pressure oxygen.
Ingestion:
Make the victim drink water or milk of magnesia. Do not induce vomiting. Rest is a
must. In all the above cases, report to a doctor.
Hydrochloric Acid A strongly corrosive acid. May affect the eyes, mucous membranes respiratory system & skin
- do -
Sodium Hydroxide Caustic Soda solution is highly corrosive substance, may irritate the eyes & cause
pneumonitis may cause temporary loss of hairs. - do -
Sulphuric acid
It destroys skin tissues causing skin burns. Repeated contact with skin can cause
dermatitis. In concentrated form, it destroys the epidermis layer of the skin. Inhalation of acid mist can cause inflammation of upper respiratory tract which may lead to chronic
bronchitis. Inhalation of vapors of oleum can cause loss of consciousness affecting lung
tissues. Ingestion of concentrated acid can cause severe internal irritation & damage.
- do -
7.4.6 Details of Personal Protective Equipment
The details of personal protective equipment are provided in Table 7-14, Table 7-15, Table 7-16 and Table
7-17.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 245
Table 7-14: S.C.B.A Sets (35 min Duration)
S. No. Location Quantity (Nos.)
1. Chlorine filling (Unit 2) 02
2. Control Room (Unit 2) & Cell House 03
3. Cell House(Unit 1) 0
4. Safety Office 0
5. Chlorine filling (Unit 1) 02
6. Control Room (Unit 1) 01
7. Chlorine ST Unit 1 & 2 02
8. DM Office Unit 2 01
9. Compressor House Unit-1 01
Table 7-15: Escape Sets/ Saver Sets (15 Minutes Duration)
S. No. Location Quantity (Nos.)
1. Cell House (Unit 1) 01 (escape)
2. Compressor House (Unit 1) 01 (escape)
3. Sodium Hypo (Unit 2) 01 (escape)
4. Safety Office 02 (saver)
5. DGM (W) Office 01 (saver)
6. Security Office 01 (saver)
Table 7-16: Trolley Mounted Set ((2 Cylinder) Duration: One hour 30 Min.)
S. No. Location Quantity (Nos.)
1. Chlorine Filling (Unit 1) 01
Table 7-17: On –Line Breathing Apparatus Set
S. No Location Quantity (Nos)
1. Chlorine Filling (Unit 1) 01
2. Chlorine Filling (Unit 2) 01
7.4.7 Fire Fighting Facilities
Fire fighting facilities at site is given as below:
Table 7-18: Storage Water Capacity at Plant
Plant Max. Water Storage Capacity
Unit – 2 345.95 m3
Unit – 1 1400 m3
Table 7-19: List of Fire Fighting Equipment Installed Fire Facilities & Fire Hydrant Details
Details Unit –1 Unit-2
I. Reservoir Capacity 1400 m3 345 mM3
II. Pump Flow rate
273 m3 /hr
171 mM3/hr
(Main pump)
273 m3 /hr
(D/G operated pump)
11 m /hr
(Jockey pump)
III. Head 70 M (All pumps) 70 M
IV. Hydrant Points 61 35
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 246
Table 7-20: Portable Extinguisher Details
Sr. No. Extinguisher Type Unit –1 Unit-2
1. CO2 type 32 35
2. DCP Type 29 29
3. ABC Type 09 11
4. Foam Type 04 04
5. Water Type 01 04
Table 7-21: Details of Fire Fighting Staff
Name Designation Experience (in years) with
PACL
Total Experience (in
years)
Sh. Narinder Singh Security officer 21 26
Sh. Gurbinder Singh Sec. Supervisor 15 15
Sh. B.S Parmar Jr. Sec. Supervisor 05 21
Sh. Tarlochan Singh Jr. Sec. Supervisor 04 28
Sh. Jaspal Singh Jr. Sec. Supervisor 01 19
Note: Staff is working at the time of EIA report writing
In addition to above 50 Nos. security guards (contract basis) are available for firefighting work.
Table 7-22: Details of Hydrant Valves Installed In Unit –1& 2
Fire Fighting System Unit 1 Unit 2
Single Hydrant Valves 36 26
Fire escape hydrant landing valves 22 09
Double Hydrant landing valves 02 -
7.4.8 Disaster Control Measures
Co-Ordination Plan
This includes the responsibilities like preparation of plan and its updating, keeping liaison with Government
authorities, mutual aid agencies and other related organizations etc. as explained in the following subsections.
Liaison with External Authorities
The officials nominated to liaise with the external authorities and the matters in which their cooperation will be
sought are given below as authority wise.
District Magistrate
The DGM (HR) (Alternate Dy. Manager- Personnel & Administration) will keep in touch with the District Magistrate
to make him aware about the different accident scenarios envisaged in the plan & the physical damage possible
from them within and outside the factory. He may also be provided with any other information required by him for
preparing off-site emergency plan. District Magistrate may be invited to witness the rehearsal of on-site emergency
plan conducted from time to time. He may also be persuaded to mobilize the services like district health services,
hospitals, police, fire department, civil defense etc. wherever required in connection with the on-site emergency
plan.
Police Department
The liaison with the police department officials will be maintained by DGM (HR) (Alternate Dy. Manager- Personnel
& Administration). The police officials will be kept informed about the type of assistance required from police in
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 247
case of any major emergencies in the plant. They will also be invited to take part in the rehearsals of the onsite
emergency plan. The role and statutory duties of police officials at the time of emergency are:
Traffic control
Assisting rescue & medical teams to work without hindrance
Helping in evacuation of persons & domestic animals
Preventing unauthorized entry etc.
Fire Services
The liaison with District Fire Services will be maintained by AGM (QC & Safety)/ Alternate DGM (HR).
District Medical Services
DGM (HR) (Alternate Dy. Manager-Labour Welfare (LW)) along with Medical Officer will get in touch with the
officials and arrange for necessary cooperation for making use of their services in case of emergency.
Directorate of Factories
The AGM (QC & Safety) or his Alternate will keep the officers of Directorate of Factories (Punjab) informed about
the various aspects of the on-site emergency plan.
Liaison with Other Neighboring Factories
The DGM (HR) or his alternate will keep liaison with the two nearby units i.e. BBMB and NFL which are under
mutual aid scheme with the plant. They will ensure that the services will be available on receiving the call without
any loss of time.
Other External Agencies & Organizations
The DGM (HR) (alternate Dy. Manager- LW) will keep liaison with other external agencies on the matters connected
with on-site emergency plan.
Making Plan In Advance
The AGM ( QC& S)/ Alternate SE(Safety) will be responsible for making the plan in advance and keeping it updated
to the satisfaction of the statutory bodies/statutory requirement.
7.4.9 Emergency Organization
The key persons and essential workers who are responsible for managing the various tasks involved during the
incident form the organization to work during the emergency. The following chart presents relative positions of
various key personnel and essential workers.
Figure 7.10: Emergency Organization
As indicated in the chart the Site main controller is the supreme authority of emergency organization. The incident
controller is the highest technical authority who supervises all the emergency activities for control of emergency
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 248
and mitigation of effects with the help of other key personnel and essential workers. The persons appointed as Site
main controller, incident controller, other key personnel and essential workers are spelt out in the following
paragraphs.
Site Main Controller (SMC)
Site main controller is the highest authority of onsite emergency organization. The executives listed in the table are
nominated as Site main controller in the event of emergency, if the first named is not available in the factory or in
his nearby residence the second named person will assume the charge of this position. In the similar way the 3rd
name will also assume the charge. It is the responsibility of the first named to ensure that at least one out of these
is always present in station all the time. The Site main controller will make himself available in the emergency
control center.
Persons Appointed As Site Main Controller & His Alternates in Descending Order
Incident Controller (IC)
The Incident Controller is the officer responsible for taking immediate charge of the incident, start the rescue, relief
and emergency maintenance operation and feed the information to SMC, decide without loss of time as to whether
emergency has to be declared or not. The officials who will function as ICs are given in the Table. If two ICs are
present in the plant at the time of incident, the senior among them will assume the charge of this position and the
other will act as deputy.
Table 7-23: Persons Appointed as Incident Controller & His Alternates in Descending Order
Designation Office Tel. No. Internal P & T
AGM (QC & Safety) 307 220751-54
Mgr (Process)/Dy. Mgr (Process) 404/439 220751-54
Shift Incharge 431/432 220751-54
AGM (QC & Safety) 307 220751-54
Manager (Process.)/SE (P) 306 220751-54
Shift Incharge 354/355 220751-54
Note: Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing.
Other Key Personnel
The other key personnel who are required to advise the Site Main Controller and assist him and Incident controller
to combat the emergency are listed in Table 7-23. In the event of declaration of emergency they will be informed
at the factory or at their residences. They will report to Site Main Controller at the Emergency Control Centre and
on his instructions carry out the tasks with the help of essential workers under their control.
Other Essential Workers
Some workmen and supervisors have been nominated for carrying out the liaison, communication and other
emergency services already discussed. In addition to that, a large number of workers are attached to the various
emergency teams to function at the time of major accident.
The emergency tasks for which the essential workers nominated above (and any other as decided by SMC) will be:
Fire Fighting, control of gas leak, control of spills of hazardous substances, rescue of affected persons till the
fire brigade takes the charge.
To help the plant Fire-brigade and mutual aid teams if so required.
Shutting down the plant safely.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 249
Emergency Engineering work e.g. isolating equipment, materials, processes, providing temporary by-pass lines,
safe transfer of materials, urgent repairing or replacement, electrical works etc.
Provision of emergency power, water, lighting, instruments, equipment, material etc.
Movement of equipment, special vehicles to or from the scene of the accident.
Search, Evacuation & welfare.
First aid and medical help.
Carrying out atmospheric test and pollution control.
Manning of assembly points and outside shelters to record the arrival of evacuated personnel and to carry out
welfare activities.
Assistance at casualties’ reception area.
Assistance at communication centers to help in sending or receiving the messages and to act as messengers, if
necessary.
Manning the main entrance to direct outsiders to different points.
Informing the surrounding factories or the public as directed by the Site Main Controller
Note
Adequate numbers of persons have been nominated to perform the tasks listed above. In case due to any reason
there is shortage of men for carrying out the emergency activities, the additional workers will be called from the
assembly points or from the residences at the instance of Site Main Controller.
All the employees of the plant who have not been nominated to function as key personnel and essential workers in
various emergency teams are termed as “Non Essential Workers”. Such employees on hearing emergency alarm will
attentively listen to the announcements through public address system and get to know about the nature, place
and size of emergency. If the emergency has been declared and plant has been ordered to be shut down, then
(the plant will be shut down employing emergency shut down procedure) and move to the assembly point which is
not effected (or likely to be affected by the incident). In Case of toxic release, they first move away from the line
starting from the place of release and going towards the wind ward side and then turn towards the assembly point
wherever it is. The safe routes for escaping have been indicated in the Site plan. They should ensure that they do
not head towards the place of incident.
Emergency Control Centers (ECC)
The instructions for carrying out various activities will be issued by the Site Main Controller from one of the control
centers. Two emergency control centers have been identified for use under emergency.
The office of Fire & Security Officer near main gate;
Engineering Block of Unit-1.
The ECC No. 1 will be used as first priority. In case this center gets overcome by the toxic gas due to wind
conditions prevailing at the time of emergency, the ECC No.2 will be used. The communication systems and the
facilities provided in these two centers are identical.
Action on Site
Making Emergency Known
As soon as accident leading to major emergency is observed by any person he will inform to Fire & Security Officer
(in case of fire) by pushing the fire alarm switch and inform the Incident Controller on duty in addition to warning
the nearby workers. In case of fire the Security and Fire Officer will send the firefighting & rescue team to the spot
of incident.
The Incident Controller will reach the spot of accident, judge the situation and initiate the activities for rescue and
relief and will get in touch with the Site Main Controller and appraise him with the situation. The SMC and IC will
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 250
decide about application of on-site emergency and declare the emergency if required. The decision will be passed
on to the nominated emergency communication officer or his alternate who will raise the emergency alarm as per
the predefined codes.
The appointed person will announce in public address system disclosing the information regarding nature, place
and size of emergency. The appointed person will, simultaneously, start communicating the information about the
emergency to internal key personnel, external authorities and mutual aid agencies.
Evacuation
As soon as the plant level emergency is declared by the SMC, the operations in the plant will be shut down by the
emergency shut down procedure. The essential workers and key personnel nominated in the plan will report to
their respective reporting places and the Non-Essential Workers and other employees will move to the assembly
point which is neither affected nor is likely to be affected. At the assembly point the nominated essential worker
will record the attendance and intimate the Site Main Controller at Emergency control Centre. Contract Workers
and visitors present at that time will also move to the appropriate assembly point. At the control center the
persons who had come to the plant will be tallied with the persons engaged in emergency operations, persons
gathered at the assembly point and those who are affected by the accident. In case any person is missing, a
search will be made for him by the essential workers and his where about will be found out.
The key personnel and essential workers will report back to their reporting places after the task allocated to them is
completed.
Assembly Points
Following places have been identified as the emergency assembly points. Suitable display has been made at the
respective locations. These places are:
Plant Time Office
South-West corner of chlorine storage near Horticulture area (Unit 1)
Engineering Block (unit-2)
Adjoining Effluent Treatment plant (Unit 1)
Adjoining process Water Reservoir (Unit 2)
The assembly point No. 1 will be used as first priority. If due to any toxic release the point No 1 is within the
affected area, then the assembly point No. 2 will be used and if both of them are not usable then the assembly
point No. 3, 4 and 5 respectively in order will be used. The persons nominated in the following list are nominated to
take the attendance of the employees reporting at the assembly point.
Table 7-24: Persons Appointed For Roll Call at Assembly Point
Shift Designation (Normal) Designation (Emergency) Place of Reporting
General Incharge of time keeping Assembly Point
Roll call Officer Assembly Point
A,B,C Time Keeper - do - Assembly Point
Controlling the Situation
Controlling the emergency situation is primarily the duty of the Incident Controller. For performing this task
satisfactorily he will utilize the services of various key personnel & essential workers of different specialization such
as maintenance, operation, fire & rescue, medical, safety etc. He may also consult the expert organizations and the
data banks available in the country. He should decide the plan of action to be followed keeping in view the situation
on emergency. For his guidance the modalities to be adopted under different types of emergencies are indicated as
under:
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 251
On Toxic Release
If the release is intermittent and slow and is likely to get controlled soon the effects of the gas may not reach
beyond the plant. If, however, the situation is not likely to grow in severity it might be desirable to evacuate
the people nearest to the Site in the windward direction.
If the Chlorine tonner is so close to a fire or mechanical impact risk that there is a danger of its getting burst,
the evacuation of the people living within 30o angle of downwind line is justified. Priority should be given to
those who are nearer.
Rapid release of limited quantity of chlorine gas, the subsequent release of which has been controlled or is
likely to be controlled soon will not require evacuation. In such cases the people living is the area through
which the cloud of gas may pass may be advised to keep their doors and windows shut.
In case of large release like bursting of chlorine tonner, evacuation is advisable. The escaping persons follow a
route that is at right angle to the wind line from the source directed away from the line.
The persons, who have failed to escape before the toxic environment has overcome the surroundings, may be
advised to remain confined to the houses closing their windows and doors. If necessary, respiratory protective
equipment may be sent through rescue teams to take them out safely.
The Safety Officer and the emergency personnel under him will ensure that the employees involved in rescue
and relief operations are not exposed to toxic environment. Safety team will make the suitable types of PPE
available to these persons.
The Emergency Environment team will carry out the monitoring of air borne levels of the chlorine at the
different places in the plant and outside and report the Site Main Controller about the conditions prevailing at
different places in the plant and outside. SMC will make use of this information for making decisions regarding
evacuations.
On Fire & Flammable Gas / Vapor Release
In case of major fire, having no danger of any explosion, the hazards will be limited to the heat radiations and
smoke. Under these circumstances the persons envisaged to be affected by the heat and the smoke may be
evacuated.
The items in the plant which are likely to be affected by the heat radiation shall be kept cooled by the
firefighting team.
If there is any threat of bursting of vessel or structures due to over pressurization and / or weakening of vessel
or structures due to heating up, the area that is likely to be affected shall be evacuated.
If there is any risk of release of hydrogen gas with the concentrations in the range of flammable limits, the
area where such concentrations exist or are likely to exist will be evacuated.
If there are any areas outside the plant premises which have potential danger of any kind, the Site main
controller will be made aware of it so that he can inform the district emergency authority or his representative
to evacuate the areas by applying off Site emergency plan.
Emergency Shut Down
As soon as the decision to shut down the plant is taken and major emergency is declared, by the Site main
controller, the In-charge of various plants and equipment will ensure that emergency shut down procedure is
applied and plant is safely closed down before the employees assume their emergency duties. The emergency shut
down procedures for different departments are available in respective departments.
Assistance to External Authorities
The Site Main Controller will receive the external authorities and provide them all the Facilities required by them to
perform their part of functions well.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 252
Medical Treatment
The casualties found on search in the affected areas will be given immediate treatment at the plant first aid center.
The Emergency Medical Officer will advise the SMC to send the casualties to other hospital after first aid if required.
7.4.10 Accounting for Personnel
Assembly Point Reporting
The persons nominated in Table to record the presence of the persons reporting at assembly point will reach the
assembly point as early as possible along with the shift schedule, nominal roll of employees present in the shift, list
of contract workers present on the day, visitors who have entered the factory etc. The details of the persons who
have reported at the assembly point will be passed to the SMC at the emergency control center.
Recording the Entrance and Exit
The entrance and exit of the persons during the emergency will be recorded by the security personnel. The
information regarding this will be passed on to the SMC at emergency control center as and when demanded.
Records about Casualties
The name of the persons injured and died during emergency will be recorded by the emergency medical team
along with the details of the injuries and the hospitals to which they have been sent for the treatment. These
details will be passed on to the Site Main Controller as soon as possible.
Overall Accounting of Personnel
The Emergency Liaison Officer will assist Site Main Controller in accounting the persons and identify the missing
persons with the help of the report of assembly point, time office, medical emergency team and the list of the
persons deployed in emergency activities. If there are such persons whose where about are not traceable, SMC will
arrange to search for the missing persons through Incident Controller.
Informing the Relatives of Affected Persons
SMC will release the names of the persons affected by the incident to the police department and will arrange to
pass on the information regarding the casualties to the relatives of the affected persons. The Emergency Liaison
Officer will respond to the calls of outsiders enquiring about the conditions of specific employees. He will release
the limited information decided by Site Main Controller.
Access to Records
The important records like residential address of employees, important drawings of the plant, operational and
maintenance codes etc. will be kept in Emergency Control Centers so that these are accessible to SMC on
emergency.
Termination of Emergency
After the emergency is controlled, the casualties have been sent to the hospital and all the persons have been
accounted for, the SMC in consultation with the IC and other key personnel will decide to terminate the emergency.
The alarm raiser will be informed to raise the all-clear siren. The siren will be followed by announcement to this
effect by Public Address System and by internal telephones by the respective nominated persons.
Area scanning to be carried out after termination of emergency to ensure no incident victim is lying in the area.
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 253
Note
In case of fire the fire officer will ensure that there is no chance of re-ignition and in case of toxic release it will be
ensured that source has been properly isolated and toxic clouds have been dispersed to safe levels before the
emergency is terminated.
Public Relations
The present system of PACL to meet requirement of emergency public relations would be upgraded as per
requirement for proposed facilities.
Rehabilitation
After “All Clear” has been signaled and emergency termination siren has been sounded, the employee assembled at
the emergency operations will be allowed to go to their places of work. Restarting of the work will however be done
as decided by the incident controller keeping in view the situation.
The incident controller will take care not to allow any salvage operations to start (except those required to control
of the emergency or to rescue the casualties) till the state Government and other statutory agencies have not
carried out their investigations and clearance has been given by them to remove the debris.
Re-Entry Procedure
Keeping in view the area blocked by the debris of the incident, the re-entry procedure will be decided by the Site
Main Controller after discussing with the Incident Controller and other key personnel. The instructions about the re-
entry procedure will be posted at the main entrance and the appointed essential workers will be assigned the task
of guiding the persons entering the plant as per the decided routes and procedures.
Action off – Site
The Site Main Controller will communicate to the key persons to inform the District-Magistrate about the possibility
of the incident affecting the population and property outside the boundary of the factory so that the off-site
Emergency Plan (which is supposed to be the part of District Disaster or Contingency Plan) may be actuated. If any
responsibilities have been assigned to the factory office by the District Administration in the off-site Emergency
plan, the respective officials will then start the actions as per off -site plan, under the directions of the District
Administration.
Testing and Updating Of Plan
The AGM (QC & Safety) / Alternate Sr. Engr (safety) shall be keep the plan updated. For this purpose a record
about the persons/places to which the on-Site emergency plans have been issued will be maintained. Whenever
there is any change in plant, personnel, statute etc. due to which any information in the plan needs to be altered,
he shall make necessary corrections in the plans. The AGM (QC & Safety)/Alternate Sr.Engr (safety) will also
organize the re-hearsal of the On-Site emergency plan.
7.4.11 Rescue and Relief Operation
Communication System
Raising the Alarm: There are two type of alarm systems
Fire Alarm
Emergency Alarm
The Site Main Controller or alternatively the Incident Controller will take the decision as to whether the emergency
should be declared or not. If he decides to implement the emergency plan, he will declare the emergency and give
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 254
the instructions to raise the alarm of the appropriate type. (If the emergency is such that its effects are limited
within a department, then emergency plan will not be executed.
Note
In case the siren is not operable due to power failure, a runner will go about the safely accessible parts of the plant
with hand held bell and sound the bell which should be considered declaration of emergency.
Declaring the Major Emergency
The responsibility of declaring the major emergency lies with the Site Main Controller or the alternate Site Main
Controller. The decision of declaration of emergency should be taken after due consideration because it may involve
closure of the plant and heavy losses. Under no circumstances however, the decision should be delayed. In case
the Site Main Controller (or his alternatives) are not available due to any reason, the Incident Controller will take
the decision without the loss of time.
Making the Emergency Known
The emergency will be made known to different category of persons as given below:
To Those Inside the Works
The sounding of alarm will be followed by announcement on public address system indicating the declaration of
emergency, its nature and place of emergency.
To Key Personnel Outside Normal Working Hours
The information regarding emergency (outside normal working hours) will be passed on to the key personnel by the
shift Incharge with the help of telephones. In case there is a fault in a telephone written message-giving details of
the emergency will be passed on with the help of company vehicle through the timekeeper in the time office.
To Authorities and Contact Persons of Neighboring Factories
The DGM (HR) / Security and Fire Officer are assigned the responsibility of communicating the information about
the emergency to District Authorities and mutual aid scheme contact persons of neighboring factories. In case of
Fire- emergency NFL fire station will be informed giving the exact location and simultaneously one of the GM
(Works), DGM (HR), Sr. Manager (Fire & Safety) will be informed. In case none of the above mentioned officers at
NFL are available then the message will be conveyed to the Central Control Room.
Details about the Alarms and Sirens
Table 7-25: Detail of Alarms and Sirens
Location of
Siren/Alarm
Type of
Siren/Alarm
Siren
Range
Sound Description
Emergency Type Alarm/Siren Type Sound
Duration Sound Type
Main Gate
Electrically
Operated
Siren
1 km.
Normal Factory Siren
Siren 1 Minute Continuous
Fire Siren 45 Seconds 10 sec on & 5 sec off 3 times
Heavy Toxic releases
Siren
125 seconds
(2 minutes) approx.
20 sec on & 5 sec off 5 times
Explosion Siren 24 second
(4 minutes)
25 sec on & 5 sec off 8 times
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 255
Location of
Siren/Alarm
Type of
Siren/Alarm
Siren
Range
Sound Description
Emergency Type Alarm/Siren Type Sound
Duration Sound Type
All clear Siren 3 Minutes Continuous
Persons Nominated For Sounding the Alarms in Various Shifts
Shift Name & Designation On-Site Emergency Plan Designation Internal Tel. No.
All Shifts Security Supervisor on duty Emergency Communication Officer (Internal) 311
Note: Phone no. is valid at the time of EIA report writing.
Persons nominated for communication of emergency in diff. Shift within the works – emergency
communication officer (internal)
Shift
Name of
person &
Designation
Deptt/ Sect. Tele. No.
Name &
Designation of
alternate person
Tel. No.
Name &
Designation Of
Runner
For announcing on public
address system in all shifts
Shift Incharge Control Room 354/ 355
432/ 431
Shift Chemist in Control Room
354/355
432/431
Operator in Control Room/ Cell House
Note: Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing.
In case of power failure battery operated (Portable) PA system to be used on a vehicle.
Persons Nominated To Inform the Emergency to Key Personnel – Emergency Communication Officer
(Key Personnel)
Shift Name and Designation Tel. No. Name and Designation
of alternate Person Tel. No.
Name & Designation
of runner
(For Communication to Site Main Controller)
A,B,C Incident Controller (Shift
Incharge)
354/355
(Unit 2)
432/431
(Unit 1)
Shift Chemist 354/355
432/431
Control Room
Attendant
(For Communication To Incident Controller)
A,B,C and
overall
Any body who witnesses the incident first time
-- His immediate senior -- Attendant of
the deptt.
(FOR REMAINING KEY PERSONS)
A,B,C and
overall Telephone Operator 360,90 Time keeper 381 Time Office Attendant
Note: Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing. In case the telephone lines are out of order telephone
operator will get the attendant with the help of SMC at the emergency control rooms.
Persons Nominated To Communicate the Message to Outside Emergency Services – Emergency
Communication Officer (External)
PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING
POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES
KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 256
Shift
Name and
Designation of the
person
Tel. No.
Name and Designation
of alternate Person
Tel. No.
Name &
Designation of
runner
(For Mutual Aid Services)
General
Shift
In Shift
SE (safety)
Shift Incharge
Unit 2: 344
354/355
Unit 1: 432/431
Security &
Fire Officer
Shift Chemist
311/312
354/355
432/431
Any Security Guard on Duty
- do -
(For District Administration And Other Authorities)
A,B,C and General
Site Main Controller 300 Alternate Site Main
Controller
388
307
DGM(HR)
AGM(QC & Safety)
Note: SMC may assign the duty to communicate to District Authorities to DGM (HR) / Dy. Mgr. (LW) who have been
in liaison with them. Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing.
7.4.12 Action to Be Taken In Case Of Flooding Of the Plant
All the plants would be shut down employing emergency shutdown procedures.
The electric supply to the plant should be cut to prevent electrocution.
Evacuate all non-essential persons.
Be in contact with district authorities for proper communication to take further action.
7.4.13 Safe Movement of Workers
On declaration of major emergency and sounding of siren and announcement by public address system the key
persons and essential workers having emergency duties will assume their tasks as per the On-Site emergency plan
and the other employees will move to the safe assembly point as indicated in the plan.
In case of toxic or flammable gas/vapor cloud release, the escaping workers will first see the wind direction with
the help of windsocks provided at the different places and if his place happen to be in the downwind side of the
point of release, they will move towards right angle direction from the windward line from the point of release, after
reaching a distance which is considered safe from the effect point of the view, they will move towards the upwind
direction to reach the assembly point. They will enroll their names with the roll call essential worker at the assembly
point.
In case the emergency escalates and is likely to affect the assembly point also, the collected workers will be taken
to a safe place to be decided and arranged by the Site Main Controller.
7.4.14 Expenditure of PACL on First aid and Safety
The year wise expenditure on First aid and Safety issues done by PACL is as per Table 7-26.
Table 7-26: Year wise Health and Safety Expenses of PACL
S No. Year Item & Expenses (Rs.)
Total Amount (Rs.) First Aid Safety
1 2015-2016 16,73,545 92,441 17,65,986
2 2016-2017 20,26,153 2,90,139 23,16,292
3 2017-2018 21,70,023 2,80,297 24,50,320
Total 58,69,721 6,62,877 65,32,598