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Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment...

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PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 217-256 Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment Report.
Transcript
Page 1: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 217-256

Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment

Report.

Page 2: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 217

7.2 RISK ASSESSMENT

7.2.1 Scope

Scope of the risk assessment covers the storage of all chemicals involved in existing and proposed facilities. It also

covers Chlorine and Hydrogen pipelines conveying these materials to existing adjacent off-site facilities of to M/s.

Flowtech Chemicals (P) Limited & Goyal Gases Ltd.

Consequence Analysis for worst case scenario and maximum credible scenarios;

Quantitative Risk Analysis providing results for individual risk and societal risk;

Recommendation for risk reduction methods.

7.2.2 Methodology

Risk is the combination of severity of consequence and the likelihood of occurrence. Some failure events may have

potential for consequences of high severity but the likelihood of occurrence would be very low. On the other hand,

some failure events with low severity consequence might occur very frequently.

Risk = (Severity of Consequence) × (Likelihood of Occurrence)

Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) provides measure of risk in numerical value for specified time period, which is

normally one year.

The five normal components of a QRA study are:

Hazard, (or failure case) identification;

Failure frequency estimation;

Consequence calculations;

Risk calculation (Risk Summation);

Risk assessment (using appropriate risk acceptability criteria).

The objective of risk assessment is to bring the risk ‘as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)’.

The risk levels associated with the facilities are presented in the following standard forms:

Individual risk contours which show the geographical distribution of risk to an individual.

Group risk (FN) curves which show the cumulative frequency (F) distribution of accidents causing different

numbers (N) of fatalities. The FN curve therefore indicates whether the societal risk to the facility is dominated

by relatively frequent accidents causing small numbers of fatalities or low frequency accidents causing many

fatalities.

Approach to QRA (process chart)

The steps involved in preparation of QRA study are presented in Figure 7.1.

Page 3: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 218

Figure 7.1: QRA Process Chart

7.2.3 Hazard Identification

Considering the existing facilities and those to be added under the Expansion Project, the following hazards are

identified for the purpose of this QRA study:

Chlorine storage tanks and filled chlorine tonners;

Hydrogen storages – gas holder and cylinder banks;

Chlorine and Hydrogen pipelines

Failure Scenarios

In this study, toxic and flammable hazards are relevant. There is a possibility of failure associated with each

mechanical component of the plant (vessels, pipes, pumps or compressors). These are generic failures and can be

caused by such mechanisms as corrosion, vibration or external impact (mechanical or overpressure).

The range of possible releases for a given component covers a wide spectrum, from a pinhole leak up to a

catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture (of a pipe). For the purpose of QRA in an objective manner,

representative failure cases are generated covering both the range of possible releases and their total frequency.

Accordingly, the following typical types of failures are considered:

Page 4: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 219

Minor Leak: 6 mm

Medium Leak: 25 mm

Large Leak: 100 mm

Line rupture

Tank – Catastrophic Rupture

For each identified failure case, the appropriate data required to define that case is input to the past risk package.

Input Data

The input data required for QRA consist of the following:

Plant data including process parameters, inventory of hazardous material in the section, equipment layout

drawing and site location map;

Generic failure rate data for the type of equipment covered in the QRA study;

Meteorological data including ambient temperature, humidity and wind rose data;

Ignition source data including electrical installations, fired heaters, roads etc;

Population data including distribution of people in and around the plant.

Software

DNV risk analysis software package Phast version 6.7 is used in this QRA study. Phast has been in use worldwide

more than 20 years. It is based on the well validated Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) version 2.

Weather Data

Representative weather categories for the site used in this risk analysis are given in Table 7-3.

Table 7-3: Weather Categories

Parameter Weather Category #1 Weather Category #2 Weather Category #3

Ambient temperature °C 17.3 13.6 15.5

Relative Humidity (%) 64 80 70

Wind speed (m/s) 1.2 1 4

Atmospheric Stability (Pasquill Class) D E D

Consequence Analysis for selected failure scenarios

Consequence analysis using Phast software has been carried out to provide results for the following:

Toxic dispersion of chlorine;

Fire effect for hydrogen gas.

Results for the consequence analysis calculations are provided in the subsequent sections.

The project description, and other project related data have been comprehensively reviewed to identify the

hazardous Chemicals and information on the hazardous Chemical properties (MSDS) of all the chemicals handled at

the site has been reviewed to identify the hazards associated with the same.

The chemical properties and storage details of hazardous raw materials & finished products are tabulated in Table

7-4 and Table 7-5. Pipeline details for the same are tabulated in Table 7-6.

Page 5: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL

EXPAN

SIO

N O

F C

HLO

R A

LKALI

PLA

NT A

ND

ESTABLI

SH

MEN

T O

F N

EW

FLA

KER

PLA

NT,

STABLE B

LEACH

ING

PO

WD

ER P

LAN

T,

HYD

RO

GEN

PERO

XID

E P

LAN

T &

CAPTIV

E P

OW

ER P

LAN

T A

T N

AYA N

AN

GAL

AD

DIT

ION

AL

STU

DIE

S

KAD

AM

EN

VIR

ON

MEN

TAL C

ON

SU

LTAN

TS |

AU

GU

ST 2

019

220

Ta

ble

7-4

: C

he

mic

al

Pro

pe

rtie

s a

nd

Sto

rag

e D

eta

ils

of

Ha

zard

ou

s R

aw

Ma

teri

als

an

d F

inis

he

d P

rod

ucts

– U

nit

1

S.

No .

Ra

w M

ate

ria

ls/

Pro

du

cts

Fla

sh

Po

int

(°C

)

IDLH

(pp

m)

Sto

rag

e

me

tho

d

No

. o

f

sto

rag

e

tan

ks /

dru

ms

Ma

x.

lice

nse

d

Sto

rag

e

Ca

pa

cit

y

(KL)

Ca

pa

cit

y o

f

Sto

rag

e

tan

k /

dru

ms e

ach

(m3)

To

tal

Sto

rag

e

Vo

lum

e

(m3)

Sto

rag

e T

an

k

typ

e

(Un

de

rgro

un

d

or

Ab

ove

gro

un

d)

Ta

nk

Te

mp

era

ture

(°C

)

Pre

ssu

re

(ba

r)

Dyk

e

Sa

fety

Me

asu

res

Pro

vid

ed

He

igh

t

(m)

Dia

(m

) D

yk

e/B

un

d

he

igh

t (m

)

Dyk

e/B

un

d

are

a (

m2)

Dyk

e c

ap

acit

y

(m3)

= h

eig

ht

x a

rea

1

Caust

ic S

oda lye

N

A

10 m

g/m

3

Tanks

3

3000

1000

2700

Above

g G

round

9

12

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

0.8

875

700

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

2

HCl

NA

50

Tanks

2

600

300

540

Above

Gro

und

7.5

7.5

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

0.6

5

480

312

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

3

HYPO

-

- Tanks

2

100

50

90

Above

Gro

und

4.5

4

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

0.9

100

90

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

4

Dilu

te H

2SO

4

- 15 m

g/m

3

Tanks

1

30

30

27

Above

Gro

und

4.5

3.2

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

0.4

138

55.2

D

rain

Valv

e

Pro

vided

5

Conce

ntr

ate

d H

2SO

4

- 15 m

g/m

3

Tanks

1

20

20

18

Above

Gro

und

3.6

2.8

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

0.4

138

55.2

D

rain

Valv

e

Pro

vided

6

Chlo

rine

- 10

Tanks

4

284

71

213

Above

Gro

und

12

2.8

-5

12 k

g

0.5

352

176

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

7

Chlo

rine

- 10

Cyl

inders

Appro

x.

1200

900

0.7

5

720

Above

Gro

und

2.1

0.7

6

25-4

0

10 k

g

- -

- -

8

Hyd

rogen

NA

- Tanks

1

120

120

120

Above

Gro

und

5.4

5.4

-

0.2

kg

No W

all

50

5

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

9

Hyd

rogen

NA

- Ski

p

Cyl

inders

0

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

N

A

NA

NA

10

HSD

52°C

-

92°C

-

0

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

11

FO

M

in 6

6°C

-

Tanks

1

40

40

38

Above

Gro

und

4.5

3.6

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

1

69

69

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

12

Salt

Sto

rage

yard

1

9000

9000

8200

Above

Gro

und

- -

- -

1.0

m

3250

3250

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

Page 6: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL

EXPAN

SIO

N O

F C

HLO

R A

LKALI

PLA

NT A

ND

ESTABLI

SH

MEN

T O

F N

EW

FLA

KER

PLA

NT,

STABLE B

LEACH

ING

PO

WD

ER P

LAN

T,

HYD

RO

GEN

PERO

XID

E P

LAN

T &

CAPTIV

E P

OW

ER P

LAN

T A

T N

AYA N

AN

GAL

AD

DIT

ION

AL

STU

DIE

S

KAD

AM

EN

VIR

ON

MEN

TAL C

ON

SU

LTAN

TS |

AU

GU

ST 2

019

221

Ta

ble

7-5

: C

he

mic

al

Pro

pe

rtie

s a

nd

Sto

rag

e D

eta

ils

of

Ha

zard

ou

s R

aw

Ma

teri

als

an

d F

inis

he

d P

rod

ucts

– U

nit

2

S.

No .

Ra

w M

ate

ria

ls/

Pro

du

cts

Fla

sh

Po

int

(°C

)

IDLH

(pp

m)

Sto

rag

e

me

tho

d

No

. o

f

sto

rag

e

tan

ks /

dru

ms

Ma

x.

lice

nse

d

Sto

rag

e

Ca

pa

cit

y

(KL)

Ca

pa

cit

y o

f

Sto

rag

e

tan

k /

dru

ms e

ach

(m3)

To

tal

Sto

rag

e

Vo

lum

e

(m3)

Sto

rag

e T

an

k

typ

e

(Un

de

rgro

un

d

or

Ab

ove

gro

un

d)

Ta

nk

Te

mp

era

ture

(°C

)

Pre

ssu

re

(ba

r)

Dyk

e

Sa

fety

Me

asu

res

Pro

vid

ed

He

igh

t

(m)

Dia

(m

) D

yk

e/B

un

d

he

igh

t (m

)

Dyk

e/B

un

d

are

a (

m2)

Dyk

e c

ap

acit

y

(m3)

= H

eig

ht

x a

rea

1

Caust

ic S

oda lye

N

A

10 m

g/m

3

Tanks

4

1750

1750

1575

Above

Gro

und

8.4

9

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

1

675

675

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

2

HCl

NA

50

Tanks

3

300

100

270

Above

Gro

und

10

3.5

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

1

320

320

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

3

HYPO

-

- Tanks

2

100

50

90

Above

Gro

und

4.5

4

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

No W

all

110

110

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

4

Dilu

te H

2SO

4

- 15 m

g/m

3

Tanks

1

30

30

27

Above

Gro

und

4.5

3.2

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

1

140

140

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

5

Conce

ntr

ate

d H

2SO

4

- 15 m

g/m

3

Tanks

1

40

40

36

Above

Gro

und

4.5

3.6

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

1

140

140

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

6

Chlo

rine

- 10

Tanks

4

320

80

240

Above

Gro

und

12

2.8

-5

12 k

g

0.5

514

257

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

7

Chlo

rine

- 10

Cyl

inders

Appro

x.

1800

1350

0.7

5

1080

Above

Gro

und

2.1

0.7

6

25-4

0

10 k

g

- -

- -

8

Hyd

rogen

NA

- Tanks

1

200

200

200

Above

Gro

und

6.0

6.9

-

0.2

kg

No W

all

50

5

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

9

Hyd

rogen

NA

- Ski

p

Cyl

inders

0

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

N

A

NA

NA

10

HSD

52°C

-

92°C

-

0

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

NA

11

FO

M

in 6

6°C

-

Tanks

2

65

65

58.5

Above

Gro

und

4.5

3.6

25-4

0

Atm

osp

heric

1

166

166

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

12

Salt

Sto

rage

yard

1

9000

9000

8200

Above

Gro

und

- -

- -

1.0

m

5592

5592

Dra

in V

alv

e

Pro

vided

Page 7: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL

EXPAN

SIO

N O

F C

HLO

R A

LKALI

PLA

NT A

ND

ESTABLI

SH

MEN

T O

F N

EW

FLA

KER

PLA

NT,

STABLE B

LEACH

ING

PO

WD

ER P

LAN

T,

HYD

RO

GEN

PERO

XID

E P

LAN

T &

CAPTIV

E P

OW

ER P

LAN

T A

T N

AYA N

AN

GAL

AD

DIT

ION

AL

STU

DIE

S

KAD

AM

EN

VIR

ON

MEN

TAL C

ON

SU

LTAN

TS |

AU

GU

ST 2

019

222

Ta

ble

7-6

: P

ipe

lin

e d

eta

ils

for

the

Ha

zard

ou

s m

ate

ria

l h

an

dle

d a

t P

AC

L

S.

No

. R

aw

Ma

teri

als

/ P

rod

ucts

M

ate

ria

l o

f

Co

nstr

ucti

on

(M

OC

)

Ma

ss I

nve

nto

ry

(m3)

Pip

eli

ne

typ

e

(Un

de

rgro

un

d o

r A

bo

ve

gro

un

d)

Pip

e D

ia.

(m)

Pip

e L

en

gth

(m)

Te

mp

era

ture

(°C

)

Pre

ssu

re

(ba

r)

Sa

fety

mea

su

res p

rovid

ed

1

Hyd

rogen g

as

pip

elin

e f

rom

Hyd

rogen G

as

Hold

er

(Un

it 1

) to

Opp. Civ

il D

ept.

M

S

7.1

Above

gro

und

0.1

5

400

25

0.2

W

ate

r se

al

2

Hyd

rogen g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit 1

- O

pp. Civ

il D

ept.

to P

ACL

Main

Gate

M

S

0.8

Above

gro

und

0.1

100

25

0.2

W

ate

r se

al

3

Hyd

rogen g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit 1

- P

ACL

Main

Gate

to G

oya

l G

ase

s M

S

0.8

Above

gro

und

0.1

100

25

0.2

W

ate

r se

al

4

Hyd

rogen g

as

pip

elin

e f

rom

Hyd

rogen G

as

Hold

er

(Un

it 2

) To H

Cl Pla

nt.

M

S

1.8

Above

gro

und

0.1

5

100

25

0.2

W

ate

r se

al

5

Hyd

rogen g

as

pip

elin

e -

Unit 2

- H

Cl Pla

nt

To P

ACL

Main

Gate

. M

S

2.5

Above

gro

und

0.0

8

500

25

0.2

W

ate

r se

al

6

Hyd

rogen g

as

pip

elin

e -

Unit 2

- P

ACL

Main

Gate

To G

oya

l G

ase

s.

MS

0.5

Above

gro

und

0.0

8

100

25

0.2

W

ate

r se

al

7

Inte

r Connect

ing P

ipe L

ine B

etw

een U

nit I

and U

nit 2

as

altern

ate

route

To G

oya

l G

ase

s M

S

6.3

Above

gro

und

0.1

800

25

0.2

W

ate

r se

al

8

Chlo

rine g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit-1

fro

m L

iquifie

r To S

tora

ge

MS

0.3

Above

gro

und

0.0

5

150

-2.5

3

Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

11

Chlo

rine g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit-1

Fro

m S

tora

ge T

o C

hlo

rine F

illin

g

MS

0.2

Above

gro

und

0.0

5

100

0

10

Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

12

Chlo

rine g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit-1

fro

m C

hlo

rine F

illin

g T

o C

PW

Pla

nt O

ff S

ite

MS

0.4

Above

gro

und

0.1

50

30

4

Ruptu

re D

isc

and S

afe

ty V

alv

e

13

Chlo

rine g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit-1

fro

m C

hlo

rine f

illin

g t

o C

PW

Pla

nt O

ff Site

MS

0.8

Above

gro

und

0.1

100

30

4

Ruptu

re D

isc

and S

afe

ty V

alv

e

14

Chlo

rine g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit-2

fro

m L

iquifie

r to

Sto

rage

MS

0.9

Above

gro

und

0.0

5

200

-2.5

3

Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

15

Chlo

rine g

as

pip

elin

e U

nit-2

fro

m S

tora

ge t

o C

hlo

rine F

illin

g

MS

0.3

Above

gro

und

0.0

5

150

0

10

Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

On t

he b

asi

s of

the info

rmation p

rovi

ded in a

bove

table

and a

s dis

cuss

ed o

ver

failu

res

sceneries

giv

en in p

ublic

ations

like U

K-H

SE a

nd t

he e

xperience

of

the c

onsu

ltant,

MCLs’

whic

h m

ay

take

pla

ce a

re p

rese

nte

d in t

able

belo

w:

Ta

ble

7-7

: Y

ea

r w

ise

He

alt

h a

nd

Sa

fety

Ex

pe

nse

s o

f P

AC

L

Sr.

No

. C

om

po

ne

nt

MO

C

No

. / Q

ua

nti

ty

Ma

teri

al(

s)

Mo

de

led

16

Typ

es o

f Fa

ilu

re P

ossib

le w

ith

Fre

qu

en

cy

Flo

w R

ate

/

Ca

pa

cit

y

Te

mp

era

ture

(oC

) P

ressu

re (

ba

r)

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

s

Stu

die

d

Dyk

e a

rea

(m

2)

&

he

igh

t (m

)

Co

ntr

ol

Syste

m /

Ind

ica

tors

1

Chlo

rine S

tora

ge

tanks

4

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: C

hlo

rine

6 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 4 x

10

-5

13 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 1 x

10

-5

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 5 x

10

-6

50 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 5 x

10

-6

Cata

stro

phic

: 2 x

10

-6

80 m

3

-5

12

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

Heig

ht:

0.5

Are

a:

514

Dra

in V

alv

e P

rovi

ded

2

Chlo

rine C

ylin

ders

Appro

x. 1

800

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

Chlo

rine

L: N

A

6 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 4 x

10

-5

13 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 1 x

10

-5

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 5 x

10

-6

50 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

: 5 x

10

-6

Cata

stro

phic

: 2 x

10

-6

0.7

5 m

3

25-4

0

10

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

- -

3

Hyd

rogen h

old

er

1

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: H

ydro

gen

Sm

all

(75 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

): 1

x 1

0-3

Larg

e (

250 m

m d

iam

ete

r hole

): 1

x 1

0-4

Cata

stro

phic

: 1.6

x 1

0-5

200 m

3

- 0.2

Pool Fire

- D

rain

Valv

e P

rovi

ded

16 T

hese

hav

e se

lect

ed o

n th

e ba

sis o

f the

Tec

hnic

al P

aper

55

by th

e W

orld

Ban

k, H

AZO

P, in

vent

ory

asse

ssm

ent a

nd P

&I D

iagr

am.

Page 8: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL

EXPAN

SIO

N O

F C

HLO

R A

LKALI

PLA

NT A

ND

ESTABLI

SH

MEN

T O

F N

EW

FLA

KER

PLA

NT,

STABLE B

LEACH

ING

PO

WD

ER P

LAN

T,

HYD

RO

GEN

PERO

XID

E P

LAN

T &

CAPTIV

E P

OW

ER P

LAN

T A

T N

AYA N

AN

GAL

AD

DIT

ION

AL

STU

DIE

S

KAD

AM

EN

VIR

ON

MEN

TAL C

ON

SU

LTAN

TS |

AU

GU

ST 2

019

223

Sr.

No

. C

om

po

ne

nt

MO

C

No

. / Q

ua

nti

ty

Ma

teri

al(

s)

Mo

de

led

16

Typ

es o

f Fa

ilu

re P

ossib

le w

ith

Fre

qu

en

cy

Flo

w R

ate

/

Ca

pa

cit

y

Te

mp

era

ture

(oC

) P

ressu

re (

ba

r)

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

s

Stu

die

d

Dyk

e a

rea

(m

2)

&

he

igh

t (m

)

Co

ntr

ol

Syste

m /

Ind

ica

tors

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

- -

Nil

- -

4

0.1

5 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 400 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

Hyd

rogen

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

7.1

m3

25

0.2

Pool Fire

- W

ate

r Seal

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

Nil

- -

5

0.1

m d

iam

ete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 100 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

Hyd

rogen

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.8

m3

25

0.2

Pool Fire

- W

ate

r Seal

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

Nil

- -

6

0.1

m d

iam

ete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 100 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

Hyd

rogen

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.8

m3

25

0.2

Pool Fire

- W

ate

r Seal

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

Nil

- -

7

0.1

5 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 100 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

Hyd

rogen

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

1.8

m3

25

0.2

Pool Fire

- W

ate

r Seal

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

Nil

- -

8

0.0

8 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 500 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

Hyd

rogen

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

2.5

m3

25

0.2

Pool Fire

- W

ate

r Seal

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

Nil

- -

9

0.0

8 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 100 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

Hyd

rogen

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.5

m3

25

0.2

Pool Fire

- W

ate

r Seal

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

- -

Nil

- -

10

0.1

m d

iam

ete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 800 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

Hyd

rogen

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

6.3

m3

25

0.2

Pool Fire

- W

ate

r Seal

Page 9: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL

EXPAN

SIO

N O

F C

HLO

R A

LKALI

PLA

NT A

ND

ESTABLI

SH

MEN

T O

F N

EW

FLA

KER

PLA

NT,

STABLE B

LEACH

ING

PO

WD

ER P

LAN

T,

HYD

RO

GEN

PERO

XID

E P

LAN

T &

CAPTIV

E P

OW

ER P

LAN

T A

T N

AYA N

AN

GAL

AD

DIT

ION

AL

STU

DIE

S

KAD

AM

EN

VIR

ON

MEN

TAL C

ON

SU

LTAN

TS |

AU

GU

ST 2

019

224

Sr.

No

. C

om

po

ne

nt

MO

C

No

. / Q

ua

nti

ty

Ma

teri

al(

s)

Mo

de

led

16

Typ

es o

f Fa

ilu

re P

ossib

le w

ith

Fre

qu

en

cy

Flo

w R

ate

/

Ca

pa

cit

y

Te

mp

era

ture

(oC

) P

ressu

re (

ba

r)

Co

nse

qu

en

ce

s

Stu

die

d

Dyk

e a

rea

(m

2)

&

he

igh

t (m

)

Co

ntr

ol

Syste

m /

Ind

ica

tors

Toxi

c:

G:

NA

L: N

A

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

- -

Nil

- -

11

0.0

5 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 150 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.3

m3

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

Chlo

rine

L: N

A

-2.5

3

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

- Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

12

0.0

5 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 100 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.2

m3

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

Chlo

rine

L: N

A

0

10

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

- Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

13

0.1

m d

iam

ete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 50 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.4

m3

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

Chlo

rine

L: N

A

30

4

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

- Ruptu

re D

isc

and

Safe

ty V

alv

e

14

0.1

m d

iam

ete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 100 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.8

m3

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

Chlo

rine

L: N

A

30

4

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

- Ruptu

re D

isc

and

Safe

ty V

alv

e

15

0.0

5 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 200 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.9

m3

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

Chlo

rine

L: N

A

-2.5

3

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

- Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

16

0.0

5 m

dia

mete

r

pip

ing

MS

Length

: 150 m

Fla

mm

able

:

G:

NA

L: N

A

Ruptu

re (

>110 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.5

X 1

0-9

Larg

e h

ole

(>

75 -

≤110m

m d

iam

ete

r):

3.3

X 1

0-8

Sm

all

hole

(>

25 m

m -

≤75 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

6.7

X 1

0-8

Pin

hole

(≤

25 m

m d

iam

ete

r):

1.6

X 1

0-7

0.3

m3

- -

Nil

- -

Toxi

c:

G:

Chlo

rine

L: N

A

0

10

Maxi

mum

Conce

ntr

ation

Eff

ect

- Exp

ansi

on V

ess

el

Page 10: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 225

7.2.4 Consequence Analysis Results

As the MCLS’ were developed for the selected set of chemicals, the next step is to carry out the consequence

analysis. The consequence analysis results along with their contours are presented in the following sections.

Chlorine

Toxic dose effect distance due to the release of Chlorine are presented in table below,

Table 7-8: Effect Distance due to Release of Chlorine

Chemical with

Scenario Failure Scenarios Met. Data

Effective Distance in meter to Toxic level

IDLH (10 ppm)

Chlorine gas pipeline

from Liquifier (Unit 1) to

Storage

2 5mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 1943

1.0/E 1943

4.0/D 893

Line Rupture

1.2/D 1958

1.0/E 1959

4.0/D 820

Chlorine gas pipeline

from Storage to Chlorine

filling unit

25mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 1661

1.0/E 1661

4.0/D 826

Line Rupture

1.2/D 1664

1.0/E 1664

4.0/D 817

Chlorine gas pipeline

from Chlorine filling

(unit 1) to CPW Plant

Off-site

25mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 718

1.0/E 718

4.0/D 322

75mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 908

1.0/E 908

4.0/D 603

Line Rupture

1.2/D 244

1.0/E 244

4.0/D 198

Chlorine gas pipeline

from Chlorine filling

(unit 1) to CPW Plant

Offsite

25mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 855

1.0/E 855

4.0/D 370

75mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 1081

1.0/E 1081

4.0/D 703

Line Rupture

1.2/D 314

1.0/E 314

4.0/D 253

Chlorine gas pipeline

from Liquifier (Unit 2) to

storage

25mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 2858

1.0/E 2858

4.0/D 1335

Page 11: Pages from 217 to 256 of Main EIA report –Risk Assessment ...environmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/... · pacl expansion of chlor alkali plant and establishment of new

PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

POWDER PLANT, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE PLANT & CAPTIVE POWER PLANT AT NAYA NANGAL ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 226

Chemical with

Scenario Failure Scenarios Met. Data

Effective Distance in meter to Toxic level

IDLH (10 ppm)

Line Rupture

1.2/D 2693

1.0/E 2693

4.0/D 1178

Chlorine gas pipeline

storage (Unit 2) to

Chlorine filling

25 mm diameter hole leak

in storage tank

1.2/D 1952

1.0/E 1952

4.0/D 963

Line Rupture

1.2/D 1935

1.0/E 1935

4.0/D 933

The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Chlorine are presented below;

Figure 7.2: Maximum concentration Effect Contour due to Line rupture of Chlorine gas pipeline from

Chlorine filling (Unit 1) to CPW Plant at 4.0/D

Hydrogen

Radiation level effect distance due to the release of Hydrogen are presented below,

Table 7-9: Effect Distance due to Release of Hydrogen

Chemical with

Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence

Met.

Data

Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

Hydrogen Storage

Tank

75mm dia hole leak Jet Fire

1.2/D 11 8 NR

1.0/E 10 8 NR

4.0/D 11 9 NR

Jet Fire 1.2/D 36 26 19

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PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 227

Chemical with

Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence

Met.

Data

Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

250mm dia hole

leak

1.0/E 36 26 19

4.0/D 36 29 24

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 49 25 5

1.0/E 49 25 5

4.0/D 49 25 5

Catastrophic

Rupture Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 49 25 5

1.0/E 49 25 5

4.0/D 49 25 5

Hydrogen Gas

Pipeline from

Hydrogen gas

holder (Unit 1) to

opposite Civil

Department

25mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D NR NR NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 7 3 NR

1.0/E 7 3 NR

4.0/D 7 3 NR

75mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 3 NR NR

1.0/E 3 NR NR

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 7 3 NR

1.0/E 7 3 NR

4.0/D 7 3 NR

100mm dia hole

leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 5 2 NR

1.0/E 5 2 NR

4.0/D 5 3 NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 7 3 NR

1.0/E 7 3 NR

4.0/D 7 3 NR

Line Rupture

Jet Fire

1.2/D 8 5 NR

1.0/E 8 5 NR

4.0/D 7 6 NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 11 5 NR

1.0/E 11 5 NR

4.0/D 11 5 NR

Hydrogen Gas

Pipeline from Civil

Department (Unit

1) to PACL main

gate

25mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D NR NR NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 3 1 NR

1.0/E 3 1 NR

4.0/D 3 1 NR

75mm dia hole leak Jet Fire 1.2/D 3 NR NR

1.0/E 3 NR NR

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 228

Chemical with

Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence

Met.

Data

Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 3 1 NR

1.0/E 3 1 NR

4.0/D 3 1 NR

Line Rupture

Jet Fire

1.2/D 6 3 NR

1.0/E 6 3 NR

4.0/D 6 4 NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 4 2 NR

1.0/E 5 2 NR

4.0/D 5 2 NR

Hydrogen Gas

Pipeline from

PACL main gate to

Goyal gases

25mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D NR NR NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 3 1 NR

1.0/E 3 1 NR

4.0/D 3 1 NR

75mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 3 NR NR

1.0/E 3 NR NR

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 3 1 NR

1.0/E 3 1 NR

4.0/D 3 1 NR

Line Rupture

Jet Fire

1.2/D 6 3 NR

1.0/E 6 3 NR

4.0/D 6 4 NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 5 2 NR

1.0/E 5 2 NR

4.0/D 5 2 NR

Hydrogen Gas

Pipeline from H2

holder (Unit 2) to

HCL Plant

25mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D NR NR NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 4 2 NR

1.0/E 4 2 NR

4.0/D 4 2 NR

75mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 3 NR NR

1.0/E 3 NR NR

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 4 2 NR

1.0/E 4 2 NR

4.0/D 4 2 NR

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 229

Chemical with

Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence

Met.

Data

Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

100mm dia hole

leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 5 2 NR

1.0/E 5 2 NR

4.0/D 5 3 NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 4 2 NR

1.0/E 4 2 NR

4.0/D 4 2 NR

Line Rupture

Jet Fire

1.2/D 11 9 NR

1.0/E 11 6 NR

4.0/D 9 7 NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 6 3 NR

1.0/E 6 3 NR

4.0/D 6 3 NR

Hydrogen Gas

Pipeline from HCL

Plant (Unit 2) to

PACL main gate

25mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D NR NR NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 5 2 NR

1.0/E 5 2 NR

4.0/D 5 2 NR

75mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 3 NR NR

1.0/E 3 NR NR

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 5 2 NR

1.0/E 5 2 NR

4.0/D 5 2 NR

Line Rupture

Jet Fire

1.2/D 1 NR NR

1.0/E 1 NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 8 3 NR

1.0/E 8 3 NR

4.0/D 8 3 NR

Hydrogen Gas

Pipeline from

PACL main gate to

Goyal gases

25mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 3 1 NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 3 1 NR

1.0/E 3 1 NR

4.0/D 3 1 NR

75mm dia hole leak Jet Fire

1.2/D 3 NR NR

1.0/E 3 NR NR

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse 1.2/D 3 1 NR

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PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 230

Chemical with

Scenario Failure Scenarios Consequence

Met.

Data

Effect distance (in m) to Radiation Level

4 kW/m2 12.5 kW/m2 37.5 kW/m2

1.0/E 3 1 NR

4.0/D 3 1 NR

Line Rupture

Jet Fire

1.2/D 4 NR NR

1.0/E 4 NR NR

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 4 2 NR

1.0/E 4 2 NR

4.0/D 4 2 NR

Interconnecting

Hydrogen Gas

Pipeline between

Unit 1 & 2 as

alternative route

to Goyal gases

25mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D NR NR NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 6 3 NR

1.0/E 6 3 NR

4.0/D 6 3 NR

75mm dia hole leak

Jet Fire

1.2/D 3 NR NR

1.0/E 3 NR NR

4.0/D 4 NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 6 3 NR

1.0/E 6 3 NR

4.0/D 6 3 NR

Line Rupture

Jet Fire

1.2/D NR NR NR

1.0/E NR NR NR

4.0/D NR NR NR

Fireball Ellipse

1.2/D 11 5 NR

1.0/E 11 5 NR

4.0/D 11 5 NR

The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Hydrogen are presented below;

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PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 231

Figure 7.3: Fireball Effect Contour due to catastrophic rupture of Hydrogen storage at 4/D

Figure 7.4: Jetfire Effect Contour due to Line rupture of Hydrogen Gas Pipeline from Civil Department (Unit

1) to PACL main gate at 4/D

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PACL EXPANSION OF CHLOR ALKALI PLANT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW FLAKER PLANT, STABLE BLEACHING

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 232

Figure 7.5: Jetfire Effect Contour due to Line rupture of Hydrogen Gas Pipeline from H2 holder (Unit 2) to

HCL Plant at 1/E

Figure 7.6: Fireball Effect Contour due to Line Rupture of Interconnecting Hydrogen Gas Pipeline B/W Unit

1 & 2 as alternative route to Goyal gases at 4/D

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 233

7.2.5 Quantitative Risk Assessment Results

The results of quantitative risk analysis carried out using DNV Phast Risk software are presented in this section.

Individual Risk

Iso-risk contours for individual risk due to PACL Plant are shown in Figure 7.7.

Figure 7.7: Iso-Risk Contours for Individual Risk

Societal Risk

FN Curve for Societal Risk due to PACL Plant is shown in Figure 7.8

Figure 7.8: FN Curve for Societal Risk

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 234

Conclusion

Chlorine impacts will always be outside the facility and thus considered as risk.

The safety measures provided below will be strictly followed and thus the risk will be minimised.

7.2.6 Action Plan for Risk Reduction

Salient safety measures provided in the plant system and recommendations for improvement are indicated below:

1. PACL have maintained highly effective process safety management system, health and safety management

system as per British Safety Council with 5 star rating system for consequently 5 years and integrated

management system (QMS / IMS / OSHAS) in the existing facilities.

2. Mechanical integrity assurance programme is most important to prevent loss of containment incidents involving

hazardous materials. The following safety measures are implemented in the existing system.

Chlorine tanks are subjected to rigorous periodic testing and inspection;

One tank is always kept empty to facilitate transfer from another tank in case of emergency;

All connections to chlorine tank are provided at the top and there is no pipe connected to the tank

bottom;

Liquid chlorine connection to the tank top is provided with emergency isolation valve.

3. Timely detection of leaks is critical to prevent major incidents. Chlorine leak detectors are provided in sensitive

locations of the existing facility. Refer Map 7-1 for locations of Chlorine detectors within PACL site

4. Chlorine leak absorption system with adequate capacity has been provided in the existing facility to absorb

chlorine gas in circulating caustic soda solution to produce hypochlorite.

5. If hypochlorite solution gets inadvertently mixed with acid, there will be chlorine gas evolution at ground level

and this will affect persons nearby. In the existing plant, care has been taken to segregate the areas in which

hypochlorite and acid are handled.

6. Check Safety system timely, including Emergency Shut Down (‘ESD’) switches at regular intervals, for their

proper functioning. ESD may be activated to stop the unloading operation, if required.

7. Safe Operating procedures and Emergency Response Procedures to place and to followed strictly.

7.2.7 Control Measures In Case Of Leakage from Chlorine Pipeline or Vaporiser

The following control measures are in place in case of any leakage from Chlorine Pipeline Or Vaporiser:

1. There are remote controlled isolation valves which can be closed from DCS to isolate the pipeline / vaporiser

from main stream

2. Caustic scrubbing system remains operational 24x7 with one additional tower operating in series as polishing

tower.

3. The lines are connected with above hypo plant to suck out all the chlorine quickly.

4. All around the plant, hypo headers are provided with suction hood and long hose which can be used as

additional source to send the chlorine from leaking equipment to hypo plant

5. Portable self breathing apparatus and online breathing apparatus are kept at strategic points which can be

used to isolate the system.

6. Water sprinklers are provided all around chlorine storage tanks

7. Chlorine sensors are provided nearby to sense any leakage.

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 236

7.3 DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

An industrial emergency is referred to a situation arising from any catastrophic failure of an industrial plant, which

may have detrimental effects on life, property or the environment. The potential intensities of such emergencies are

determined by the nature and size of the industry, while the magnitude of the damages they leave is largely

decided by the effectiveness of the preparedness to manage them.

The emergencies are classified into two broad categories, the first consisting of those situations affecting one or

more plants of the industrial facility, but which can be managed by reasonably developed resources of the industrial

facility itself-known as On-Site Emergency Plan.

The second category consists of more serious situations affecting several plants of the industrial facility, even

spreading outside and requiring district, state or national level resource mobilization to manage them – known as

Off-site Emergency Plan.

The present document is restricted to first category of emergency covered under On-site Emergency Management

Plan which is the building block of emergency management capability in totality.

7.3.1 Categorization of Emergency

Emergency Due to Plant Failure

Fire

Explosion

Toxic release

Electrocution

Emergency due to Natural Calamity

Flood

Earthquake / Cyclone

Storm

Cloud bursting / lightning

Emergency due to external factors:

Food poisoning / water poisoning

Sabotage

War

7.3.2 Onsite Emergency Plan

Emergency Procedures

Handling of an emergency calls for critical planning and ensuring a state of readiness at all times. Proper handling

of the actual emergency needs certain actions to be taken before the emergency to ensure that all systems are

ready and the emergency can be handled smoothly. Similarly after an emergency, rehabilitation and reconstruction

programmes are necessary. The actions to be taken before, during and after an emergency are described below:

Actions to be taken before the Emergency

Training programme should be conducted at regular intervals for:

Use of Personnel Protective Equipment’s

Use of chlorine kit

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KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | AUGUST 2019 237

Fire fighting

First Aid

Drills to be conducted for testing of emergency plans once in a six month

Safe handling procedures (MSDS) for the chemicals handled in the plant should be written and copy made

available in plant area.

Actions to be taken during the Emergency

For major emergency situations, the various actions to be taken during emergency are as follows:

Emergency Response to Toxic Material Release

Among the hazardous chemicals handled at the facility, the worst emergency situation will involve release of

chlorine gas.

A chlorine leak in easily detected due to its peculiar odour. As soon as a leak in piping or equipment handling

chlorine is noticed, the immediate action should be to evacuate the downwind area and make efforts to isolate the

source of supply.

Personnel performing such emergency operations should wear all personal protective equipment including air line or

self-contained breathing apparatus.

Immediately on report of a leak, the Incident Controller should take following actions:

Declare the EMERGENCY

Evacuate the downwind area. If the consequences are likely to affect outside population, use available means

to inform the public and nearby installations about the incident and possible effects and actions

Instruct to isolate the system supplying gas to source of leak and arrange safe shutdown of the plant.

If emergency situation permits, attempt repair using necessary precautions

Perform all other responsibilities as per the Emergency Response Plan

The following actions are to be taken for the hazardous chemicals handled in the plant:

Chlorine

Chlorine storage tanks are provided with inbuilt safety arrangements like double Safety Valves, rupture discs,

level controllers / indicators, chlorine sensor alarms, pressure switches, chlorine emergency blower / hoods

connected with de-chlorination system, wind socks, fire fighting arrangement, fencing, escape gates from all

sides, dyke walls, periodic testing, communication facility, PPEs provisions, periodic drills, Display Boards etc.

Chlorine filling stations are also provided with sensor alarms, emergency blowers, wind socks, fire fighting

arrangement, PPEs facilities, escape gates from all sides, periodic testing, chlorine emergency blower/hoods

connected with de-chlorination system etc.

Occupational Health Centre remains operative round the clock to take care of emergency medical aids

Hydrogen

Hydrogen storage is provided with Hydrogen Gas Holder under positive pressure and water overflow all the time,

Flame proof fittings, flame arrestor, fire fighting arrangements, process monitoring through DCS.

Caustic Soda, Hydrochloric Acid, Sulphuric Acid

Storages with dykes, proper labeling, PPEs provisions, Maintenance under work permit system, Double Valve

arrangement.

HCl furnaces are provided with rupture discs Do not attempt to attend leakages on pressurized line / vessel or

on running equipment;

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There are tripping devices to trip HCl furnace in case of low chlorine and low hydrogen pressure and also in

case of variation of hydrogen and chlorine ratio;

Leaking gas can be sucked by emergency blowers and discharged into Hypo towers.

Handling, Housekeeping, Storage & Transportation

The major points where handling is to be carried i.e. Liquid Chlorine filling in tonners and in cell house where

cranes are used for heavy loading/unloading, persons are trained specially for this purpose for safe handling;

Caution notices are displayed at conspicuous places in the plant regarding the handling of hazardous chemicals,

good housekeeping etc.

In HCl and caustic filling area, good housekeeping is maintained;

Chlorine storage tank area is fenced and kept cleaned;

In Chlorine filling station proper housekeeping is maintained;

Regarding transportation of HCl, Caustic Soda and Liq. Chlorine tonners, drivers are given training from time to

time for safe handling and transportation;

Personal protective equipment are provided to the persons involved in handling of hazardous jobs;

Emergency panels (PLA Card) are provided on the vehicles for transit emergency;

TREM Cards are provided to the drivers to take care in case of transit emergency

Description of Other safety Measures

Color Code Details

All the pipelines in the plant have been color coded. The details are as provided in Table 7-10.

Table 7-10: Details of Color Code

S. NO. CONTENTS GROUND COLOR BAND FIRST COLOUR BAND

1. Process water, soft water etc. Sea green -

2. Chilled Water Insulated -

3. Air line Sky Blue -

4. Steam Insulated pipeline -

5. Transformer oil Dark Brown -

6. Furnace oil Dark Brown -

7. Light diesel oil Dark Brown Green

8. Dry chlorine Golden yellow -

9. Wet chlorine / Dilute chlorine FRP line Golden yellow

10. Freon-22 Dark grey -

11. Hydrogen Postman Red -

12. Nitrogen Sky Blue -

13. Sulphuric Acid (98%) Orange -

14. Sulphuric Acid (78%) FRP lines Orange

15. Hydrochloric acid FRP lines Signal red

16. Caustic solution Navy Blue -

17. Brine FRP line Smoke grey

18. Sodium hypo FRP line -

Work Permit System

Work permit system is being followed for all the jobs in the plant. PACL has two classes of safety work permit

(Class I and Class II.)

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Class I permit is issued for all hazardous jobs that have been identified and listed. Class I permit is signed by three

persons, one each from production, maintenance and safety dept. Class II safety work permit is issued for all less

hazardous jobs.

Class II safety work permit is signed by persons from production and maintenance depts. only.

Safety Audit

Safety Audit of the plant is being carried out annually with help of competent external agencies.

Preventive Maintenance Schedule

The preventive maintenance schedule is evolved and maintained for the rotary equipment, critical equipment

installed in the plants.

Safety Committee

The following safety committees have been formed in PACL in compliance of Rule 66 F of Punjab Factories Rule

1952:

Plant safety committee;

Plant safety sub-committee for Unit 2;

Plant safety sub-committee for Unit 1.

The tenure of the committee is 2 years. The committee meets as often as necessary but at least once in each

quarter of the year.

The committees are meeting as per schedule to discuss and achieve the aim and objectives of health and safety

policy and to arrive at practical solutions to problems encountered, creating safety awareness amongst all the

workers and reviewing the implementations of recommendations made by safety committee.

Details of Safety Organization and Its Activities

Figure 7.9: Safety Organogram

The safety department consists of one AGM (QC & safety) who is assisted by Sr. Engr. (Safety). The reporting is as

shown above.

Activities

Identification of hazards and their management.

Safety propaganda and publicity.

Training related to safety for employees, customers, transporter and general public.

Meeting statutory requirements.

Rehearsal/Mock Drill and training regarding on-site Emergency plan.

Raising indents of equipment related to safety and their maintenance.

Liaison with statutory authorities and outside agencies in safety related matters.

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Implementation of safety work permits.

To maintain records related to accidents and investigate accidents.

Organize Motivational Activities like quiz contests, poster competitions etc.

Holding safety committee meeting and follow-up for implementation of minutes.

Following up for testing of pressure vessels and maintenance of their records.

Implementation of recommendations of Safety Audit and Safety inspections reports.

Periodic updating of Safety Documents/Data, On-Site/Off-Site Emergency Plan etc.

15. Fire Safety Management, Fire Drills, implementation of AMC recommendation & upkeep / indent of Fire

Equipment.

7.3.3 Inspection Procedure

In plant/In process Inspection

All in process inspections are undertaken by concerned Head of Section (HOS) – Production, as defined in process

inspection plan for both the Units. The records of analysis registers and analysis reports are sent to individual HOS

(Production).

Shut Down Inspection

The equipment and vessels for which in process inspections are not possible, the inspections are carried out during

annual shutdown. The testing of various pressure vessels etc. and other equipment are carried out during the

shutdown periods.

Prior to the shutdown, all the maintenance depts. and the process dept. make a list of the maintenance jobs which

they would like to attend during the planned shutdown.

During the planned shutdown, it is ensured that emergency equipment like DG. Set and the Absorption towers etc.

are kept ready.

Electrical Continuity Test

Electrical continuity test of all the equipment and structures are carried out periodically. In addition to this, earth

continuity of all the supporting equipment are also carried out.

Testing Of Pressure Vessels, Pipelines

The pressure vessels and piping are being tested for thickness and pressure testing by a competent person

periodically.

Techniques and Procedures for Testing Safety Alarms, Tripping and Interlocking Devices and Other

Safety Instruments

Alarm and trip settings of initiating instruments are checked in the instrument test stand by simulating the set

values. However, settings of initiating instruments of stand by equipment and auto start –up of auxiliary devices

are checked. Critical instruments are also checked during each start up after a plant shutdown.

Complete logic system is tested by simulation during shutdown. However logic systems for critical machinery and

equipment are checked during each startup.

Trip solenoid valves and trip control valves are overhauled and checked once during shutdown. Proper function &

operation of control valves are checked after each start up.

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7.4 SAFETY AWARENESS AMONG WORKERS

The following steps are taken at PACL to improve the safety awareness among the workers:

Lectures, seminars and Workshops: These are organized at regular intervals. The faculty for the same is both

from inside the factory and from outside agencies.

Practical Exercises: Mock drills are periodically conducted to keep the employees alert and ready to meet any

emergency situation. Practical exercises and training regarding use of personal protective equipment and

firefighting appliances etc. are also conducted.

Safety Quiz Competitions: These are organized to generate awareness about safety.

Display of Safety Posters/Stickers: They are displayed at conspicuous locations in the plant to generate

awareness amongst the employees.

Safety Instructions: The safety instructions for the job are displayed at conspicuous places. Training

programmes are organized for following topics:

The hazards involved in the handling of chemicals and the methods to deal with such hazards in case of an

emergency and otherwise.

The measures to control the physical and health hazards arising out of the exposure because of handling of

hazardous chemicals.

The measures to be taken by the workers to ensure safe handling, storage and transportation of hazardous

chemicals.

The correct use of personal protective equipment.

The measures to be taken in case of any spillage of chemicals and gas leakage.

Training Programmes by outside agencies: The personnel from all the departments (including the safety dept.) are

being sponsored to the training programmes (on safety topics) organized by agencies like National Safety Council,

(NSC), NSC-North Zone Chapter., Regional Labour Institute (RLI), HRD foundation, National Productivity Council

(NPC) etc.

7.4.1 Public Awareness and Disclosure of Information to Public

The company maintains contact with the Gram Pradhan and they are made aware by conducting training

programme about the type of emergencies that could arise in the company and they would actively assist the

company in coordinating with the general public in case any such emergencies arise.

PACL has about 150 workers on it’s rolls who are from the local villages. These employees are aware and

trained regarding the hazardous properties of the chemicals and steps to be taken in case of any emergency.

They are also aware about the manufacturing processes of the company and emergencies that may arise.

They form an important link for dissemination of information to the local villages.

In case of any emergency or otherwise the Security and Fire Officer at the main gate will serve as the liaison

officer with the public.

The people of adjoining villages are kept informed about the precautions/steps to be followed in case of any

emergency through handouts and training programmes.

7.4.2 Details of Medical Facilities Provided Inside the Factory

Table 7-11: List of Medical Facilities Provided at Site

Description of facilities, Names of Persons Details

A. Nos. and Location of First Aid Centre, Hospitals etc. One Medical First Aid

Centre (Near Security Gate)

B. Arrangement and Facilities in First Aid Centre

a) Emergency Care Equipment

(i) 02 cylinders with attachment – 09

(ii) Beds –03

(iii) Stretcher –02

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Description of facilities, Names of Persons Details

(iv) Ambulance Van –01

(v) Nebulizer –01

(vi) Peak Flow meter for L.F.T-01

b) Emergency Medicines:

(i) Inj. Dexamethosone

(ii) Inj. Coramine

(iii) Inj. Deriphylline

(iv) Inj. Avil

(v) Inj. T.T.

(vi) Inj. Baralgan

(vii) Inj. Novalgene

(ix) Inj. Aderline

(x) Inj. Histac

(xi) Dressing

c) Decontamination Facilities: Autoclave for sterlization of syringes, needles and other

equipment. Safety showers are provided in the plant

d) Ambulance Van One Ambulance Van with Oxygen cylinder and First Aid Box

C. Strength and Status of Medical Staff:

(i) Medical Officer –1

(ii) Pharmacist –4

(iii) Ambulance Driver –1

D. Details of Trained in First Aid (Names & Work place) :

Name Work place

(i) Mr. Narinder Singh Officer (L& S)

(ii) Mr. Gurbinder Singh Security Supervisor

(iii) Mr. Tarlochan Singh Jr. Security Supervisor

(iv) Mr .V.S Raman Jr Officer Spl Gr (T/O)

(v) Mr. Hari Om J.E ( Mech.)

(vi) Mr. Amrik Singh Jr Officer Spl Gr(T/O)

(vii) Mr .Bipan Kumar Jr. Officer (T/O)

(viii) Mr.Puran Chand Assistant(T/O)

(ix) Mr. R.K Garg Jr. Officer(Health)

(x) Mr. Shailender Dev Sr. Compounder/Pharmacist

(xi) Mr. Neelam Kumari Clerk

(xii) Mr. R.K Bansal SI Spl Grd (Mech)

(xiii) Mr. Naveen Joshi Jr. Officer (Sales)

(xiv) Mr. Anil Vishwakarma Sr. Engr. (Process)

(xv) Mr. S.K Thakur Dy. Mgr. (Stores)

(xvi) Mr. Arvind Kumar Exec. (QC)

(xvii) Mr. Rajan Dewedi Sr.Engr (Safety)

(xviii) Mr. Pardeep kr. Suman Engr (Mech)

(xix) Mr. Kuldeep Singh Asst Engr (Mech)

(xx) Mr.Paras Ram ASI (Mech)

(xxi) Mr Gaurav Singh Sr. Engr (Inst)

(xxii) Mr. Gurmmet Singh JE Spl Gr. (Mech)

(xxiii) Mr. Jatinder Singh ASI (Prod.)

(xxiv) Mr. Parvesh Kr ASI (Prod)

(xxv) Mr. Joginder Kr Sr. Engr (Elect)

(xxvi) Mr. Ankush Bali Engr (Elect)

(xxvii) Mr. Sohan Singh JE (Elec)

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Description of facilities, Names of Persons Details

(xxviii) Mr. Sanjeev Kumar ASI (Prod)

(xxix) Mr. Keshav Sharma Foreman (Elect)

(xxx) Mr. Avtar Singh AE. Gr II (Civil)

E. Whether the Medical Facilities provided inside the Factory are sufficient in case major emergency occurs:

Yes

Table 7-12: List of Antidotes and Medicines at site

List of Antidotes & medicines

(i) Inj. Dexamethosone

(ii) Inj. Coramine

(iii) Inj. Deriphylline

(iv) Inj. Avil

(v) Inj. T.T.

(vi) Inj. Baralgan

(vii) Inj. Novalgene

(ix) Inj. Aderline

(x) Inj. Histac

(xi) Dressing

All these medicines and antidotes required are available in the factory.

7.4.3 Evacuation Routes

The routes which will be used for removing the affected persons from the place of emergency to the first aid center

have been given in the plan. A different route, will however be used by the rescue personnel to avoid further

exposure to the toxic gas on the way, keeping in view the wind directions prevailing at that time and the place of

emergency.

7.4.4 Emergency Medical Action Plan

As soon as the message about an accident involving injuries is received from the plant, the ambulance van will rush

to the Site of the accident to bring the patient to the first aid center and then first aid is provided as per the need of

the case. As far as possible, the compounder should accompany the ambulance van.

The following points are kept in mind while carrying out the emergency medical activities during major emergency

in the plant.

Medical Officer

Medical officer will rush to the first aid center as soon as he comes to know about the declaration of

emergency;

He will guide the Site Main Controller about the suitability of sending the injured persons to the other medical

facilities available under the mutual aid scheme or otherwise;

He will follow any other instructions given by the Site Main Controller.

Medical Supervisor/Compounder

The Medical supervisor/ Compounder available in the first aid center will accompany the ambulance van when it

goes to fetch the affected person. In case, medical officer is present in Occupational Health Centre, he will follow

the instruction given by the medical officer. In case, Medical Officer is not present he will act as per the

instructions for such occasion. In case there is any special instruction from the Site Main Controller, he will follow

the same. In case of absence of Medical Officer in the factory, he will inform the complete details of the injured

person to the Site Main Controller on phone.

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Ambulance Driver

Ambulance driver will ensure that fuel is available in his van in adequate quantity all the time. He will also

ensure that stretcher/trolley and other essential equipment are all the time available in the van;

As soon as he gets the instructions he will take the medical Supervisor/Compounder and rush to the spot;

In case no body is available in the first Occupational Health Centre to go with him, he will not delay his departure

on this account.

7.4.5 Details of Treatment and Antidotes

The details of treatment to be given as well as antidotes to be administered are given in Table 7-13.

Table 7-13: Treatment and Antidotes Details

Name of Chemical/ Gas

handled, used and

Produced

Health Hazard Associated First Aid and Supportive Treatment

Specific antidotes, if known.

Chlorine Toxic

Eye Contact :

Flush eye immediately with normal water for atleast 15 minutes or longer, Keeping eyelids

open. Contact lenses not be worn.

Skin Contact:

Remove Contaminated clothes. Wash skin with large amounts of normal running water using

mild soap. Dust the affected area with powdered sodium bicarbonate; wash the

affected area again with normal running water.

Inhalation:

Remove the person to a fresh air area. If breathing has stopped give him artificial

respiration. Keep the affected person warm and at rest. If the victim is unconscious but breathing administer low pressure oxygen.

Ingestion:

Make the victim drink water or milk of magnesia. Do not induce vomiting. Rest is a

must. In all the above cases, report to a doctor.

Hydrochloric Acid A strongly corrosive acid. May affect the eyes, mucous membranes respiratory system & skin

- do -

Sodium Hydroxide Caustic Soda solution is highly corrosive substance, may irritate the eyes & cause

pneumonitis may cause temporary loss of hairs. - do -

Sulphuric acid

It destroys skin tissues causing skin burns. Repeated contact with skin can cause

dermatitis. In concentrated form, it destroys the epidermis layer of the skin. Inhalation of acid mist can cause inflammation of upper respiratory tract which may lead to chronic

bronchitis. Inhalation of vapors of oleum can cause loss of consciousness affecting lung

tissues. Ingestion of concentrated acid can cause severe internal irritation & damage.

- do -

7.4.6 Details of Personal Protective Equipment

The details of personal protective equipment are provided in Table 7-14, Table 7-15, Table 7-16 and Table

7-17.

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Table 7-14: S.C.B.A Sets (35 min Duration)

S. No. Location Quantity (Nos.)

1. Chlorine filling (Unit 2) 02

2. Control Room (Unit 2) & Cell House 03

3. Cell House(Unit 1) 0

4. Safety Office 0

5. Chlorine filling (Unit 1) 02

6. Control Room (Unit 1) 01

7. Chlorine ST Unit 1 & 2 02

8. DM Office Unit 2 01

9. Compressor House Unit-1 01

Table 7-15: Escape Sets/ Saver Sets (15 Minutes Duration)

S. No. Location Quantity (Nos.)

1. Cell House (Unit 1) 01 (escape)

2. Compressor House (Unit 1) 01 (escape)

3. Sodium Hypo (Unit 2) 01 (escape)

4. Safety Office 02 (saver)

5. DGM (W) Office 01 (saver)

6. Security Office 01 (saver)

Table 7-16: Trolley Mounted Set ((2 Cylinder) Duration: One hour 30 Min.)

S. No. Location Quantity (Nos.)

1. Chlorine Filling (Unit 1) 01

Table 7-17: On –Line Breathing Apparatus Set

S. No Location Quantity (Nos)

1. Chlorine Filling (Unit 1) 01

2. Chlorine Filling (Unit 2) 01

7.4.7 Fire Fighting Facilities

Fire fighting facilities at site is given as below:

Table 7-18: Storage Water Capacity at Plant

Plant Max. Water Storage Capacity

Unit – 2 345.95 m3

Unit – 1 1400 m3

Table 7-19: List of Fire Fighting Equipment Installed Fire Facilities & Fire Hydrant Details

Details Unit –1 Unit-2

I. Reservoir Capacity 1400 m3 345 mM3

II. Pump Flow rate

273 m3 /hr

171 mM3/hr

(Main pump)

273 m3 /hr

(D/G operated pump)

11 m /hr

(Jockey pump)

III. Head 70 M (All pumps) 70 M

IV. Hydrant Points 61 35

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Table 7-20: Portable Extinguisher Details

Sr. No. Extinguisher Type Unit –1 Unit-2

1. CO2 type 32 35

2. DCP Type 29 29

3. ABC Type 09 11

4. Foam Type 04 04

5. Water Type 01 04

Table 7-21: Details of Fire Fighting Staff

Name Designation Experience (in years) with

PACL

Total Experience (in

years)

Sh. Narinder Singh Security officer 21 26

Sh. Gurbinder Singh Sec. Supervisor 15 15

Sh. B.S Parmar Jr. Sec. Supervisor 05 21

Sh. Tarlochan Singh Jr. Sec. Supervisor 04 28

Sh. Jaspal Singh Jr. Sec. Supervisor 01 19

Note: Staff is working at the time of EIA report writing

In addition to above 50 Nos. security guards (contract basis) are available for firefighting work.

Table 7-22: Details of Hydrant Valves Installed In Unit –1& 2

Fire Fighting System Unit 1 Unit 2

Single Hydrant Valves 36 26

Fire escape hydrant landing valves 22 09

Double Hydrant landing valves 02 -

7.4.8 Disaster Control Measures

Co-Ordination Plan

This includes the responsibilities like preparation of plan and its updating, keeping liaison with Government

authorities, mutual aid agencies and other related organizations etc. as explained in the following subsections.

Liaison with External Authorities

The officials nominated to liaise with the external authorities and the matters in which their cooperation will be

sought are given below as authority wise.

District Magistrate

The DGM (HR) (Alternate Dy. Manager- Personnel & Administration) will keep in touch with the District Magistrate

to make him aware about the different accident scenarios envisaged in the plan & the physical damage possible

from them within and outside the factory. He may also be provided with any other information required by him for

preparing off-site emergency plan. District Magistrate may be invited to witness the rehearsal of on-site emergency

plan conducted from time to time. He may also be persuaded to mobilize the services like district health services,

hospitals, police, fire department, civil defense etc. wherever required in connection with the on-site emergency

plan.

Police Department

The liaison with the police department officials will be maintained by DGM (HR) (Alternate Dy. Manager- Personnel

& Administration). The police officials will be kept informed about the type of assistance required from police in

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case of any major emergencies in the plant. They will also be invited to take part in the rehearsals of the onsite

emergency plan. The role and statutory duties of police officials at the time of emergency are:

Traffic control

Assisting rescue & medical teams to work without hindrance

Helping in evacuation of persons & domestic animals

Preventing unauthorized entry etc.

Fire Services

The liaison with District Fire Services will be maintained by AGM (QC & Safety)/ Alternate DGM (HR).

District Medical Services

DGM (HR) (Alternate Dy. Manager-Labour Welfare (LW)) along with Medical Officer will get in touch with the

officials and arrange for necessary cooperation for making use of their services in case of emergency.

Directorate of Factories

The AGM (QC & Safety) or his Alternate will keep the officers of Directorate of Factories (Punjab) informed about

the various aspects of the on-site emergency plan.

Liaison with Other Neighboring Factories

The DGM (HR) or his alternate will keep liaison with the two nearby units i.e. BBMB and NFL which are under

mutual aid scheme with the plant. They will ensure that the services will be available on receiving the call without

any loss of time.

Other External Agencies & Organizations

The DGM (HR) (alternate Dy. Manager- LW) will keep liaison with other external agencies on the matters connected

with on-site emergency plan.

Making Plan In Advance

The AGM ( QC& S)/ Alternate SE(Safety) will be responsible for making the plan in advance and keeping it updated

to the satisfaction of the statutory bodies/statutory requirement.

7.4.9 Emergency Organization

The key persons and essential workers who are responsible for managing the various tasks involved during the

incident form the organization to work during the emergency. The following chart presents relative positions of

various key personnel and essential workers.

Figure 7.10: Emergency Organization

As indicated in the chart the Site main controller is the supreme authority of emergency organization. The incident

controller is the highest technical authority who supervises all the emergency activities for control of emergency

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and mitigation of effects with the help of other key personnel and essential workers. The persons appointed as Site

main controller, incident controller, other key personnel and essential workers are spelt out in the following

paragraphs.

Site Main Controller (SMC)

Site main controller is the highest authority of onsite emergency organization. The executives listed in the table are

nominated as Site main controller in the event of emergency, if the first named is not available in the factory or in

his nearby residence the second named person will assume the charge of this position. In the similar way the 3rd

name will also assume the charge. It is the responsibility of the first named to ensure that at least one out of these

is always present in station all the time. The Site main controller will make himself available in the emergency

control center.

Persons Appointed As Site Main Controller & His Alternates in Descending Order

Incident Controller (IC)

The Incident Controller is the officer responsible for taking immediate charge of the incident, start the rescue, relief

and emergency maintenance operation and feed the information to SMC, decide without loss of time as to whether

emergency has to be declared or not. The officials who will function as ICs are given in the Table. If two ICs are

present in the plant at the time of incident, the senior among them will assume the charge of this position and the

other will act as deputy.

Table 7-23: Persons Appointed as Incident Controller & His Alternates in Descending Order

Designation Office Tel. No. Internal P & T

AGM (QC & Safety) 307 220751-54

Mgr (Process)/Dy. Mgr (Process) 404/439 220751-54

Shift Incharge 431/432 220751-54

AGM (QC & Safety) 307 220751-54

Manager (Process.)/SE (P) 306 220751-54

Shift Incharge 354/355 220751-54

Note: Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing.

Other Key Personnel

The other key personnel who are required to advise the Site Main Controller and assist him and Incident controller

to combat the emergency are listed in Table 7-23. In the event of declaration of emergency they will be informed

at the factory or at their residences. They will report to Site Main Controller at the Emergency Control Centre and

on his instructions carry out the tasks with the help of essential workers under their control.

Other Essential Workers

Some workmen and supervisors have been nominated for carrying out the liaison, communication and other

emergency services already discussed. In addition to that, a large number of workers are attached to the various

emergency teams to function at the time of major accident.

The emergency tasks for which the essential workers nominated above (and any other as decided by SMC) will be:

Fire Fighting, control of gas leak, control of spills of hazardous substances, rescue of affected persons till the

fire brigade takes the charge.

To help the plant Fire-brigade and mutual aid teams if so required.

Shutting down the plant safely.

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Emergency Engineering work e.g. isolating equipment, materials, processes, providing temporary by-pass lines,

safe transfer of materials, urgent repairing or replacement, electrical works etc.

Provision of emergency power, water, lighting, instruments, equipment, material etc.

Movement of equipment, special vehicles to or from the scene of the accident.

Search, Evacuation & welfare.

First aid and medical help.

Carrying out atmospheric test and pollution control.

Manning of assembly points and outside shelters to record the arrival of evacuated personnel and to carry out

welfare activities.

Assistance at casualties’ reception area.

Assistance at communication centers to help in sending or receiving the messages and to act as messengers, if

necessary.

Manning the main entrance to direct outsiders to different points.

Informing the surrounding factories or the public as directed by the Site Main Controller

Note

Adequate numbers of persons have been nominated to perform the tasks listed above. In case due to any reason

there is shortage of men for carrying out the emergency activities, the additional workers will be called from the

assembly points or from the residences at the instance of Site Main Controller.

All the employees of the plant who have not been nominated to function as key personnel and essential workers in

various emergency teams are termed as “Non Essential Workers”. Such employees on hearing emergency alarm will

attentively listen to the announcements through public address system and get to know about the nature, place

and size of emergency. If the emergency has been declared and plant has been ordered to be shut down, then

(the plant will be shut down employing emergency shut down procedure) and move to the assembly point which is

not effected (or likely to be affected by the incident). In Case of toxic release, they first move away from the line

starting from the place of release and going towards the wind ward side and then turn towards the assembly point

wherever it is. The safe routes for escaping have been indicated in the Site plan. They should ensure that they do

not head towards the place of incident.

Emergency Control Centers (ECC)

The instructions for carrying out various activities will be issued by the Site Main Controller from one of the control

centers. Two emergency control centers have been identified for use under emergency.

The office of Fire & Security Officer near main gate;

Engineering Block of Unit-1.

The ECC No. 1 will be used as first priority. In case this center gets overcome by the toxic gas due to wind

conditions prevailing at the time of emergency, the ECC No.2 will be used. The communication systems and the

facilities provided in these two centers are identical.

Action on Site

Making Emergency Known

As soon as accident leading to major emergency is observed by any person he will inform to Fire & Security Officer

(in case of fire) by pushing the fire alarm switch and inform the Incident Controller on duty in addition to warning

the nearby workers. In case of fire the Security and Fire Officer will send the firefighting & rescue team to the spot

of incident.

The Incident Controller will reach the spot of accident, judge the situation and initiate the activities for rescue and

relief and will get in touch with the Site Main Controller and appraise him with the situation. The SMC and IC will

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decide about application of on-site emergency and declare the emergency if required. The decision will be passed

on to the nominated emergency communication officer or his alternate who will raise the emergency alarm as per

the predefined codes.

The appointed person will announce in public address system disclosing the information regarding nature, place

and size of emergency. The appointed person will, simultaneously, start communicating the information about the

emergency to internal key personnel, external authorities and mutual aid agencies.

Evacuation

As soon as the plant level emergency is declared by the SMC, the operations in the plant will be shut down by the

emergency shut down procedure. The essential workers and key personnel nominated in the plan will report to

their respective reporting places and the Non-Essential Workers and other employees will move to the assembly

point which is neither affected nor is likely to be affected. At the assembly point the nominated essential worker

will record the attendance and intimate the Site Main Controller at Emergency control Centre. Contract Workers

and visitors present at that time will also move to the appropriate assembly point. At the control center the

persons who had come to the plant will be tallied with the persons engaged in emergency operations, persons

gathered at the assembly point and those who are affected by the accident. In case any person is missing, a

search will be made for him by the essential workers and his where about will be found out.

The key personnel and essential workers will report back to their reporting places after the task allocated to them is

completed.

Assembly Points

Following places have been identified as the emergency assembly points. Suitable display has been made at the

respective locations. These places are:

Plant Time Office

South-West corner of chlorine storage near Horticulture area (Unit 1)

Engineering Block (unit-2)

Adjoining Effluent Treatment plant (Unit 1)

Adjoining process Water Reservoir (Unit 2)

The assembly point No. 1 will be used as first priority. If due to any toxic release the point No 1 is within the

affected area, then the assembly point No. 2 will be used and if both of them are not usable then the assembly

point No. 3, 4 and 5 respectively in order will be used. The persons nominated in the following list are nominated to

take the attendance of the employees reporting at the assembly point.

Table 7-24: Persons Appointed For Roll Call at Assembly Point

Shift Designation (Normal) Designation (Emergency) Place of Reporting

General Incharge of time keeping Assembly Point

Roll call Officer Assembly Point

A,B,C Time Keeper - do - Assembly Point

Controlling the Situation

Controlling the emergency situation is primarily the duty of the Incident Controller. For performing this task

satisfactorily he will utilize the services of various key personnel & essential workers of different specialization such

as maintenance, operation, fire & rescue, medical, safety etc. He may also consult the expert organizations and the

data banks available in the country. He should decide the plan of action to be followed keeping in view the situation

on emergency. For his guidance the modalities to be adopted under different types of emergencies are indicated as

under:

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On Toxic Release

If the release is intermittent and slow and is likely to get controlled soon the effects of the gas may not reach

beyond the plant. If, however, the situation is not likely to grow in severity it might be desirable to evacuate

the people nearest to the Site in the windward direction.

If the Chlorine tonner is so close to a fire or mechanical impact risk that there is a danger of its getting burst,

the evacuation of the people living within 30o angle of downwind line is justified. Priority should be given to

those who are nearer.

Rapid release of limited quantity of chlorine gas, the subsequent release of which has been controlled or is

likely to be controlled soon will not require evacuation. In such cases the people living is the area through

which the cloud of gas may pass may be advised to keep their doors and windows shut.

In case of large release like bursting of chlorine tonner, evacuation is advisable. The escaping persons follow a

route that is at right angle to the wind line from the source directed away from the line.

The persons, who have failed to escape before the toxic environment has overcome the surroundings, may be

advised to remain confined to the houses closing their windows and doors. If necessary, respiratory protective

equipment may be sent through rescue teams to take them out safely.

The Safety Officer and the emergency personnel under him will ensure that the employees involved in rescue

and relief operations are not exposed to toxic environment. Safety team will make the suitable types of PPE

available to these persons.

The Emergency Environment team will carry out the monitoring of air borne levels of the chlorine at the

different places in the plant and outside and report the Site Main Controller about the conditions prevailing at

different places in the plant and outside. SMC will make use of this information for making decisions regarding

evacuations.

On Fire & Flammable Gas / Vapor Release

In case of major fire, having no danger of any explosion, the hazards will be limited to the heat radiations and

smoke. Under these circumstances the persons envisaged to be affected by the heat and the smoke may be

evacuated.

The items in the plant which are likely to be affected by the heat radiation shall be kept cooled by the

firefighting team.

If there is any threat of bursting of vessel or structures due to over pressurization and / or weakening of vessel

or structures due to heating up, the area that is likely to be affected shall be evacuated.

If there is any risk of release of hydrogen gas with the concentrations in the range of flammable limits, the

area where such concentrations exist or are likely to exist will be evacuated.

If there are any areas outside the plant premises which have potential danger of any kind, the Site main

controller will be made aware of it so that he can inform the district emergency authority or his representative

to evacuate the areas by applying off Site emergency plan.

Emergency Shut Down

As soon as the decision to shut down the plant is taken and major emergency is declared, by the Site main

controller, the In-charge of various plants and equipment will ensure that emergency shut down procedure is

applied and plant is safely closed down before the employees assume their emergency duties. The emergency shut

down procedures for different departments are available in respective departments.

Assistance to External Authorities

The Site Main Controller will receive the external authorities and provide them all the Facilities required by them to

perform their part of functions well.

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Medical Treatment

The casualties found on search in the affected areas will be given immediate treatment at the plant first aid center.

The Emergency Medical Officer will advise the SMC to send the casualties to other hospital after first aid if required.

7.4.10 Accounting for Personnel

Assembly Point Reporting

The persons nominated in Table to record the presence of the persons reporting at assembly point will reach the

assembly point as early as possible along with the shift schedule, nominal roll of employees present in the shift, list

of contract workers present on the day, visitors who have entered the factory etc. The details of the persons who

have reported at the assembly point will be passed to the SMC at the emergency control center.

Recording the Entrance and Exit

The entrance and exit of the persons during the emergency will be recorded by the security personnel. The

information regarding this will be passed on to the SMC at emergency control center as and when demanded.

Records about Casualties

The name of the persons injured and died during emergency will be recorded by the emergency medical team

along with the details of the injuries and the hospitals to which they have been sent for the treatment. These

details will be passed on to the Site Main Controller as soon as possible.

Overall Accounting of Personnel

The Emergency Liaison Officer will assist Site Main Controller in accounting the persons and identify the missing

persons with the help of the report of assembly point, time office, medical emergency team and the list of the

persons deployed in emergency activities. If there are such persons whose where about are not traceable, SMC will

arrange to search for the missing persons through Incident Controller.

Informing the Relatives of Affected Persons

SMC will release the names of the persons affected by the incident to the police department and will arrange to

pass on the information regarding the casualties to the relatives of the affected persons. The Emergency Liaison

Officer will respond to the calls of outsiders enquiring about the conditions of specific employees. He will release

the limited information decided by Site Main Controller.

Access to Records

The important records like residential address of employees, important drawings of the plant, operational and

maintenance codes etc. will be kept in Emergency Control Centers so that these are accessible to SMC on

emergency.

Termination of Emergency

After the emergency is controlled, the casualties have been sent to the hospital and all the persons have been

accounted for, the SMC in consultation with the IC and other key personnel will decide to terminate the emergency.

The alarm raiser will be informed to raise the all-clear siren. The siren will be followed by announcement to this

effect by Public Address System and by internal telephones by the respective nominated persons.

Area scanning to be carried out after termination of emergency to ensure no incident victim is lying in the area.

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Note

In case of fire the fire officer will ensure that there is no chance of re-ignition and in case of toxic release it will be

ensured that source has been properly isolated and toxic clouds have been dispersed to safe levels before the

emergency is terminated.

Public Relations

The present system of PACL to meet requirement of emergency public relations would be upgraded as per

requirement for proposed facilities.

Rehabilitation

After “All Clear” has been signaled and emergency termination siren has been sounded, the employee assembled at

the emergency operations will be allowed to go to their places of work. Restarting of the work will however be done

as decided by the incident controller keeping in view the situation.

The incident controller will take care not to allow any salvage operations to start (except those required to control

of the emergency or to rescue the casualties) till the state Government and other statutory agencies have not

carried out their investigations and clearance has been given by them to remove the debris.

Re-Entry Procedure

Keeping in view the area blocked by the debris of the incident, the re-entry procedure will be decided by the Site

Main Controller after discussing with the Incident Controller and other key personnel. The instructions about the re-

entry procedure will be posted at the main entrance and the appointed essential workers will be assigned the task

of guiding the persons entering the plant as per the decided routes and procedures.

Action off – Site

The Site Main Controller will communicate to the key persons to inform the District-Magistrate about the possibility

of the incident affecting the population and property outside the boundary of the factory so that the off-site

Emergency Plan (which is supposed to be the part of District Disaster or Contingency Plan) may be actuated. If any

responsibilities have been assigned to the factory office by the District Administration in the off-site Emergency

plan, the respective officials will then start the actions as per off -site plan, under the directions of the District

Administration.

Testing and Updating Of Plan

The AGM (QC & Safety) / Alternate Sr. Engr (safety) shall be keep the plan updated. For this purpose a record

about the persons/places to which the on-Site emergency plans have been issued will be maintained. Whenever

there is any change in plant, personnel, statute etc. due to which any information in the plan needs to be altered,

he shall make necessary corrections in the plans. The AGM (QC & Safety)/Alternate Sr.Engr (safety) will also

organize the re-hearsal of the On-Site emergency plan.

7.4.11 Rescue and Relief Operation

Communication System

Raising the Alarm: There are two type of alarm systems

Fire Alarm

Emergency Alarm

The Site Main Controller or alternatively the Incident Controller will take the decision as to whether the emergency

should be declared or not. If he decides to implement the emergency plan, he will declare the emergency and give

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the instructions to raise the alarm of the appropriate type. (If the emergency is such that its effects are limited

within a department, then emergency plan will not be executed.

Note

In case the siren is not operable due to power failure, a runner will go about the safely accessible parts of the plant

with hand held bell and sound the bell which should be considered declaration of emergency.

Declaring the Major Emergency

The responsibility of declaring the major emergency lies with the Site Main Controller or the alternate Site Main

Controller. The decision of declaration of emergency should be taken after due consideration because it may involve

closure of the plant and heavy losses. Under no circumstances however, the decision should be delayed. In case

the Site Main Controller (or his alternatives) are not available due to any reason, the Incident Controller will take

the decision without the loss of time.

Making the Emergency Known

The emergency will be made known to different category of persons as given below:

To Those Inside the Works

The sounding of alarm will be followed by announcement on public address system indicating the declaration of

emergency, its nature and place of emergency.

To Key Personnel Outside Normal Working Hours

The information regarding emergency (outside normal working hours) will be passed on to the key personnel by the

shift Incharge with the help of telephones. In case there is a fault in a telephone written message-giving details of

the emergency will be passed on with the help of company vehicle through the timekeeper in the time office.

To Authorities and Contact Persons of Neighboring Factories

The DGM (HR) / Security and Fire Officer are assigned the responsibility of communicating the information about

the emergency to District Authorities and mutual aid scheme contact persons of neighboring factories. In case of

Fire- emergency NFL fire station will be informed giving the exact location and simultaneously one of the GM

(Works), DGM (HR), Sr. Manager (Fire & Safety) will be informed. In case none of the above mentioned officers at

NFL are available then the message will be conveyed to the Central Control Room.

Details about the Alarms and Sirens

Table 7-25: Detail of Alarms and Sirens

Location of

Siren/Alarm

Type of

Siren/Alarm

Siren

Range

Sound Description

Emergency Type Alarm/Siren Type Sound

Duration Sound Type

Main Gate

Electrically

Operated

Siren

1 km.

Normal Factory Siren

Siren 1 Minute Continuous

Fire Siren 45 Seconds 10 sec on & 5 sec off 3 times

Heavy Toxic releases

Siren

125 seconds

(2 minutes) approx.

20 sec on & 5 sec off 5 times

Explosion Siren 24 second

(4 minutes)

25 sec on & 5 sec off 8 times

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Location of

Siren/Alarm

Type of

Siren/Alarm

Siren

Range

Sound Description

Emergency Type Alarm/Siren Type Sound

Duration Sound Type

All clear Siren 3 Minutes Continuous

Persons Nominated For Sounding the Alarms in Various Shifts

Shift Name & Designation On-Site Emergency Plan Designation Internal Tel. No.

All Shifts Security Supervisor on duty Emergency Communication Officer (Internal) 311

Note: Phone no. is valid at the time of EIA report writing.

Persons nominated for communication of emergency in diff. Shift within the works – emergency

communication officer (internal)

Shift

Name of

person &

Designation

Deptt/ Sect. Tele. No.

Name &

Designation of

alternate person

Tel. No.

Name &

Designation Of

Runner

For announcing on public

address system in all shifts

Shift Incharge Control Room 354/ 355

432/ 431

Shift Chemist in Control Room

354/355

432/431

Operator in Control Room/ Cell House

Note: Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing.

In case of power failure battery operated (Portable) PA system to be used on a vehicle.

Persons Nominated To Inform the Emergency to Key Personnel – Emergency Communication Officer

(Key Personnel)

Shift Name and Designation Tel. No. Name and Designation

of alternate Person Tel. No.

Name & Designation

of runner

(For Communication to Site Main Controller)

A,B,C Incident Controller (Shift

Incharge)

354/355

(Unit 2)

432/431

(Unit 1)

Shift Chemist 354/355

432/431

Control Room

Attendant

(For Communication To Incident Controller)

A,B,C and

overall

Any body who witnesses the incident first time

-- His immediate senior -- Attendant of

the deptt.

(FOR REMAINING KEY PERSONS)

A,B,C and

overall Telephone Operator 360,90 Time keeper 381 Time Office Attendant

Note: Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing. In case the telephone lines are out of order telephone

operator will get the attendant with the help of SMC at the emergency control rooms.

Persons Nominated To Communicate the Message to Outside Emergency Services – Emergency

Communication Officer (External)

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Shift

Name and

Designation of the

person

Tel. No.

Name and Designation

of alternate Person

Tel. No.

Name &

Designation of

runner

(For Mutual Aid Services)

General

Shift

In Shift

SE (safety)

Shift Incharge

Unit 2: 344

354/355

Unit 1: 432/431

Security &

Fire Officer

Shift Chemist

311/312

354/355

432/431

Any Security Guard on Duty

- do -

(For District Administration And Other Authorities)

A,B,C and General

Site Main Controller 300 Alternate Site Main

Controller

388

307

DGM(HR)

AGM(QC & Safety)

Note: SMC may assign the duty to communicate to District Authorities to DGM (HR) / Dy. Mgr. (LW) who have been

in liaison with them. Phone no are valid at the time of EIA report writing.

7.4.12 Action to Be Taken In Case Of Flooding Of the Plant

All the plants would be shut down employing emergency shutdown procedures.

The electric supply to the plant should be cut to prevent electrocution.

Evacuate all non-essential persons.

Be in contact with district authorities for proper communication to take further action.

7.4.13 Safe Movement of Workers

On declaration of major emergency and sounding of siren and announcement by public address system the key

persons and essential workers having emergency duties will assume their tasks as per the On-Site emergency plan

and the other employees will move to the safe assembly point as indicated in the plan.

In case of toxic or flammable gas/vapor cloud release, the escaping workers will first see the wind direction with

the help of windsocks provided at the different places and if his place happen to be in the downwind side of the

point of release, they will move towards right angle direction from the windward line from the point of release, after

reaching a distance which is considered safe from the effect point of the view, they will move towards the upwind

direction to reach the assembly point. They will enroll their names with the roll call essential worker at the assembly

point.

In case the emergency escalates and is likely to affect the assembly point also, the collected workers will be taken

to a safe place to be decided and arranged by the Site Main Controller.

7.4.14 Expenditure of PACL on First aid and Safety

The year wise expenditure on First aid and Safety issues done by PACL is as per Table 7-26.

Table 7-26: Year wise Health and Safety Expenses of PACL

S No. Year Item & Expenses (Rs.)

Total Amount (Rs.) First Aid Safety

1 2015-2016 16,73,545 92,441 17,65,986

2 2016-2017 20,26,153 2,90,139 23,16,292

3 2017-2018 21,70,023 2,80,297 24,50,320

Total 58,69,721 6,62,877 65,32,598


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