Panel Discussion: Responses to the Question ‘What has been the driving force behind German unifications and reunifications: cultural identity, power politics, or economic necessity? 1. William Carr (University of Shefield) Patriotism €or most Germans for much of the nineteenth century was dynastic and regional in character. No truly ‘national’ solution of the German problem was on offer: Kleindeutschland was an exercise in Prussian power politics to exclude Austria from Germany; Mitteleuropa an Austrian bid to dominate Central Europe; and Grossdeutschland (which included Czechs and Poles) had little chance of success because of state rivalries and liberal dislike of the Deutscher Bund (0, Bund du Hund du bist nichtgesund). Bismarck, however, was able to profit from the conservative concept of nationalism: the nation was not a conscious act of will but the product of regional growth opening up the possibility of several (larger) ‘German’ states embodying the Volksgeist; thus Crosspreussen could be depicted as a ‘national’ state. The identity problem remained a burning issue long after 1866. Neither the FRG nor the GDR resolved it: were there ‘two states in one nation’ or ‘two nations’? More important was the power-political rivalry of Prussia and Austria. The changing international scene after the Crimean War favoured Prussian expansionism: the break-up of the old conservative trinity and the threat Napoleon posed to the established (Austrian) order. Add to this the overhaul of the Prussian army-William I was as much a ‘maker of Modern Germany’ as Bismarck. Austria, menaced by Russia in the east and by France in Italy, fell easy prey to Prussia. Similarly in 1989-90 international changes were crucial in making the German Revolution possible: the Gorbachev era, democratization in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary), and the mounting cost of armaments obliging the USA and USSR to cut defence expenditure combined together to diminish the strategic value of a divided Germany to the former war-time allies. Within this internationally determined framework, ‘Grossbonnland’ absorbed the GDR because of the attractions of the D-Mark economy, the failure of the SED to reform quickly, and the intervention of West German parties; ‘Wir sind das Volk’ soon became ‘Wir sind ein Volk’. Thirdly, economic factors. Re-unification in 1989-90 did not seem to have been a necessity for the FRG locked into western markets but it might have at Temple University on May 1, 2010 http://gh.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from
Transcript
Panel Discussion: Responses to the Question
‘What has been the driving force behind German unifications and reunifications: cultural identity,
power politics, or economic necessity?
1. William Carr (University of Shefield) Patriotism €or most Germans for much of the nineteenth century was dynastic and regional in character. No truly ‘national’ solution of the German problem was on offer: Kleindeutschland was an exercise in Prussian power politics to exclude Austria from Germany; Mitteleuropa an Austrian bid to dominate Central Europe; and Grossdeutschland (which included Czechs and Poles) had little chance of success because of state rivalries and liberal dislike of the Deutscher Bund (0, Bund du Hund du bist nichtgesund). Bismarck, however, was able to profit from the conservative concept of nationalism: the nation was not a conscious act of will but the product of regional growth opening up the possibility of several (larger) ‘German’ states embodying the Volksgeist; thus Crosspreussen could be depicted as a ‘national’ state. The identity problem remained a burning issue long after 1866. Neither the FRG nor the GDR resolved it: were there ‘two states in one nation’ or ‘two nations’?
More important was the power-political rivalry of Prussia and Austria. The changing international scene after the Crimean War favoured Prussian expansionism: the break-up of the old conservative trinity and the threat Napoleon posed to the established (Austrian) order. Add to this the overhaul of the Prussian army-William I was as much a ‘maker of Modern Germany’ as Bismarck. Austria, menaced by Russia in the east and by France in Italy, fell easy prey to Prussia. Similarly in 1989-90 international changes were crucial in making the German Revolution possible: the Gorbachev era, democratization in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary), and the mounting cost of armaments obliging the USA and USSR to cut defence expenditure combined together to diminish the strategic value of a divided Germany to the former war-time allies. Within this internationally determined framework, ‘Grossbonnland’ absorbed the GDR because of the attractions of the D-Mark economy, the failure of the SED to reform quickly, and the intervention of West German parties; ‘Wir sind das Volk’ soon became ‘Wir sind ein Volk’.
Thirdly, economic factors. Re-unification in 1989-90 did not seem to have been a necessity for the FRG locked into western markets but it might have
been a lifeline for the GDR feeling the effects of changes in the Russian economy: as defence expenditure declines there is less need for German and Czech steel. It would be wrong to suppose the Zolluerein made unification inevitable in the 1860s. On the other hand, interlocking economic ties between Prussia and theZolherein states excluded the creation of Grossdeutschland under Austrian auspices. Important, too, as industrialization gathered pace in Prussia, was the middle-class agitation (Nutionaherein and chambers of commerce) for Kleindeutschland in the belief that political unification would be of economic advantage. Marx was wrong about the origins of nationalism (intellectuals, not entrepreneurs, were in the vanguard) but right to suppose Kleindeutschland was an expression of German capitalism. Fortunately for Bismarck the National Liberal demand for a strong Reich on the western frontier coincided with Prussian expansionist designs, enabling him to exploit anti-French feeling in Prussian interests, notably in 1870. Reunification in 1990 was also an expression of capitalism but more importantly it leaves unresolved the national identity question: will the Germans duck the issue by becomine ‘more European than the Europeans’?
2 . Gustavo Corni (University of Chieti, Italy)
German unification and reunification in comparison with Italy
When I was invited to deliver a paper on the topic of German unification to the annual meeting of the German History Society, I baulked for some considerable time in face of such a complex theme. Would I be able, on the basis of my own research and knowledge, to say anything original, or at least intelligent, which had not already been said during these past two years in thousands of newspapers, television programmes, articles, and books?
So I decided to make a few raw and preliminary remarks in a comparative perspective: to compare Germany with Italy, a state with which it shares a number of significant historical turning-points and phenomena. As is well known, in the second half of the nineteenth century the unification processes of these two states ran chronologically in parallel; and in the inter-war period the two states had in common the bitter experience of a fascist dictatorship, up to the unleashing of the war and ultimate defeat. It seems to me that international historiography has not as yet adequately evaluated the simi- larities in these patterns of development, tending rather to compare and evaluate the allegedly unique German Sonderweg with reference to the ‘nor- mal’ trajectories of England, the United States, and France. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a comparison with Italian history would be at least as significant in seeking a better understanding of the peculiarities of the German question.
Some notable similarities in both cases are revealed in the first phase of
unification, in the 1860s and 1870s. Both previously fragmented nations were unified through a series of successful military exploits-r rather, both nations were unified, more or less against their will, through the drive of a dynasty and a territorial state: in Italy, the Savoy rulers of Piedmont, and in Germany the Hohenzollern rulers of Prussia. Another important common factor can be identified in the historical background of these processes of unification: the cultural and intellectual currents of a romantic nationalism, which was above all the expression of an articulate and rising bourgeoisie, known in Italy as Risorgimento.
But if we analyse these factors a little more closely, we can identify certain important differences. On the one hand, the economic preparation for the unification process was far more significant and advanced in Germany than in Italy. The level of economic development in both countries was very variable, such that one may ask whether the general concept of ‘late-comer’, used by economic historians, is really useful. For several decades dev- elopments had been underway in Germany, even if regionally uneven, which tended towards industrialization and the constitution of a common national market; by contrast, Italy at the time of the Risorgimento was economically and socially less developed. A less than dynamic agricultural sector was dominant, and even the few lively sectors of industry were closely connected with agriculture. A thin stratum of entrepreneurs, lacking in self-confidence (and in large measure made up of foreigners), had in general no conception of a national market and also no plans to modernize either state or economy. The modern sections of the Italian economy-for example, the export-orien- tated specialized sectors of agriculture, or the textile industries of the north- were financially, strategically, and in terms of personnel, orientated rather towards foreign markets. There was also no far-sighted, progressive bureauc- racy in Italy, with any internalized sense of the need for economic and social modernization (as was to some degree the case in Prussia), apart from the few exceptions in Piedmont, ruled under Cavour on an English model.
It seems therefore that economic motivation was much weaker in the process of unification in Italy than was the case in Germany. Even the very existence of a flourishing discipline of economics (Nationafdionomie) in German uni- versities is an indication of the importance of economic factors in Germany. Italy, by contrast, had no Friedrich List, no Zolloerein, and no entrepreneurs and politicians of a bourgeois cast like Mevissen, Harkort, Camphausen, or Krupp.
Another important difference, in my opinion, appears if one considers political factors. In the preparation for unification, the role of the Savoy dynasty and its territorial state Piedmont was weaker than that of the Hohen- zollerns and Prussia in the German Empire. At least from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, Prussia had attained a status as a medium- sized power in the concert of European powers, thanks to the lively military and diplomatic activity of Frederick 11, whereas Piedmont was in this respect
a less important territorial state. One indication of this was the fact that Piedmont was only able to play a major role in the unification of the peninsula thanks to the protection of France.
With the war of 1866 Prussia had finally defeated Habsburg Austria and thus entirely excluded this possible alternative from the game; and, as is well known, the defeat of Austria was first evident in the economic sphere, even before the armies met in the field of war at Sadowa (Koniggratz).
A demonstration--expostfucf~f the qualitative difference in the political weight of the two states can be seen in their development in the following years. The political, cultural, and economic domination of Piedmont disappeared in a very short time, and its ruling Clite was dissolved within a national elite, in which, in the course of the decades, southern elements gained precedence. Only the dynasty retained, to some degree, its distinctive nature as a regional dynasty, and it was able only with great difficulty to improve and ‘nationalize’ its public image. By contrast, almost up to the period of the Nazi dictatorship, Prussia remained in all respects the hard core of the new state.
The elements of Realpolitik-that is, the political interests of the territorial states, which were the empire of unification respective-were also of different significance in Italy and Germany in this period. Democratic forces played a more important role in the Italian peninsula than in Germany. The Italian Risorgimento was accompanied and carried by a democratic movement from below, which, even if its role should not be exaggerated, was nevertheless in conservative eyes a very disturbing element, and even remained such for a while after 1860. The names of Garibaldi and Mazzini, relevant in this connection, have in my opinion no equivalent in Germany. The Risorgimetito was also to some extent a popular movement, even if carried only by a minority of the people, and contained very strong cultural forces. Such cultural factors, in my opinion, played a much less important role in the parallel German developments, as compared with real-political, dynastic, and econ- omic factors. 1 have no intention, in this connection, of overlooking the fact that in Germany, too, a popular movement for national unification had existed since the lectures of Fichte and the military achievements of the Prussian Lundwehr during the Napoleonic wars; and this German movement too possessed a deep cultural component. But it does seem to me that, in contrast to Italy, the relative weight of the cultural and democratic factors was of less significance.
A possible explanation for this difference may perhaps be found in the devastating effects of defeat in the 1848 revolutions. In Italy, the revolution- which in Venice and Rome experienced defeats comparable to those in Germany-was associated with the so-called ‘wars of liberation’ or inde- pendence, which were fought by King Charles Albert of Piedmont, so that from the outset revolution and dynastic wars of unification at least ran in parallel, even if not entirely without friction.
If one applies-as Harold James has recently done in his book A German
Zdentity Z770-1990 (London 1989)-the conceptual pair ‘unity’ and ‘freedom’ in seeking to explain these two parallel historical processes, one could perhaps establish that in the unification of Germany the concept of ‘unity’ took precedence, while in the Italian peninsula the concept of ‘freedom’ was given priority. But that by no means implies that the subsequent course of Italian history proceeded under the banner of freedom.
Only the most important consequences of these different trajectories of unification can be briefly mentioned here. Thanks to its economic strength (which, in the course of the so-called ‘second industrialization’, put the Empire into first place in Europe), and thanks to its domestic homogeneity (based on the hard core of Prussia), the Empire was able to play a leading role in the international balance of power (but a role which also aroused anxieties and contributed to the making of war). By contrast, lack of social homogeneity and economic weakness characterized the development of Italy in the following decades, and contributed to the fact that this country and its ruling elite (full of resentments and frustration) were able only to play a second-class role in Europe.
Viewed strictly historically, both states did not experience a second common unification, since Italy subsequently remained a unified state. But it may be permissible for me to stretch the notion of ‘unification’ a little and make a few passing remarks about a form of ‘unification’ which both states and societies either experienced or were supposed to experience. I am referring to the fascist phase of their history, in which (even if with clear instrumental goals) certain concepts such as ‘national community’ (Volksgerneinschaft) or ‘totalitarian state’ (stuto totulitario) played a role in Germany and Italy which cannot be overlooked. In my opinion, both regimes were seeking an answer to their inner crises under the banner of a reunification of souls and individual wills.
Both Hitler and Mussolini came to power through the decisions of a narrow economic-political elite, which no longer saw itself in a position to master the chaos of the post-war period or the consequences of the economic crisis. But the chronological discrepancy (1922-1933) demonstrates, among other things, that Italian fascism was to a greater degree carried and supported by the existing ruling elite than was Hitler’s movement, and that at the beginning there was little popular consensus for the “blackshirt” dictator in Italy. Hitler, on the other hand, was able to gain the support (even if rather fickle) of a full one-third of the German people, so that the social roots of National Socialism were from the outset far deeper than was the case for Italian fascism. This led to a far-reaching difference between the two regimes. Mussolini’s regime was so strongly determined and constrained by the pre-fascist status quo that his attempt to realize a qualitatively ‘new’ unification of the people remained to a large extent incomplete, despite the longevity of the regime itself.
The Hitler regime, however, was able to take a greater variety of more decisive steps in this direction, such that many historians speak of a ‘brown
revolution’, which opened the gates of modernity to German society. We can find an impressive piece of evidence for this in the course of the war: apart from a few exceptions, the great majority of the German people, civilian and military, remained united behind the insane orders of Hitler, and fought on to the very last to defend the ruins of the Third Reich. In Italy, by contrast, a brutal civil war broke out after September 1943 between partisans and supporters of Mussolini and fascism.
Finally, I would like to make a comment about the present day. It is not only Germany and the Germans who find themselves in a difficult phase of unification at the moment, but also the British, the Italians, and others, who have to face the far-reaching transformations which the European unification process will bring with it. Precisely in the light of the experience of German reunification in 1989-90, it seems to me that a serious danger arises: that the driving forces of this transnational unification will once again be solely econ- omic forces. Everyone, and particularly intellectuals, should in these cir- cumstances make their contribution to ensuring that ideas and cultural factors play a leading role in the arena of political decisions.
3. Robert Knight (Loughborough University)
The description of the German unification of 1989-90 as an Anschluss is a product of the polemics of German unification which need not be taken too seriously as a historical analogy. It expresses in polemical form the discrepancy between the rhetoric of harmonic partnership and the real disproportion in economic and political power between the two Germanies which became evident as events unfolded. The inadequacies of the term are almost too obvious to point out. It clearly misrepresents (West) German foreign policy and a completely different international position. From the other side of the Alps, on the other hand, it might easily be criticized for taking over the simple equation of Anschluss with ‘rape’ which has been undermined in recent historiography.’
’ The polemical usage referred to here goes back to a view of the historical Anschluss as a ‘rape’ formulated (ambiguously) by the three Allies in the Third Moscow Declaration of November 1943, propagated as the ‘occupation’ theory by the Austrian government after the war, and taken over (albeit with scepticism) by governments and commentators thereafter. Since the 1970s Austrian historiography has tended to place “Anschluss” in inverted commas in recognition of the widespread belief in pre-war Austria that its future ultimately belonged within a Greater Germany (of whatever ideological colour), a ‘historicization’ of inter-war pan-German trends which is at least potentially apologetic. On the other hand the ‘occupation theory’ has been increasingly attacked as a legally opportune but historically inadequate construction on the basis of empirical research into the Austrian support for Nazism before 1938 and the various shades of acceptance afterwards. This ‘revisionist’ view was taken up in turn with some enthusiasm by the outside world after the ‘Waldheim affair’. For the first Austrian discussions of German unification see Emil Brix, ‘Mitteleuropa und die deutsche Einheit’ in Arno Truber and Thomas H. Mache (eds.), Mitreleuropiiische Perspektiuen (Vienna, 1980), pp. 77-81; Gerhard Botz, ‘The
The level of analogy which may be useful in providing an oblique approach to the question posed in this discussion is that of the state, its legitimacy and stability. In both cases a state disappeared from the map with dramatic suddenness, as a result of something less than a war. In both cases, after the world stopped rubbing its eyes it concluded that the emperor had never had any clothes, or rather that the clothes he had been wearing had been an artificial cover for his natural (national) condition.
Admittedly it may be objected that there is a fundamental difference between the non-national ‘artificial’ state of the GDR and the first Austrian republic. And I will argue here that there are indeed major differences. Yet the differences do not appear so great as to preclude any comparisons. Both states put forward what might be termed ‘quasi-national’ claims to legitimacy and it is not clear that the Austrian claim to be the ‘better German state’, for example, which was put forward by both Christian Socialists and Social Democrats in the inter-war period2 was qualitatively different from the claim of the GDR to be the better (anti-Nazi) Germany. Furthermore, since the growth of Austria’s political identity has been presented as a possible model for the GDR in showing that cultural or linguistic homogeneity does not necessarily lead to political integration, the collapse of the GDR is bound to provoke comparative questions about Austria.3
The most obvious way in which the demise of the GDR and the end of Austria in 1938 seem comparable is that both resulted from a failure to achieve a rudimentary ‘instrumental’ or institutional loyalty in their population. Above all they failed to provide their citizens with what was considered an acceptable standard of living. The main difference is probably that in the case of the first Austrian republic the failure was contingent and non-systematic, or if systematic then on the international rather than the national level. The social and political divisiveness which proved so fatal to Austria after the First World War was not intrinsic to the organization of the new state either, except in the sense that its creation out of the ruins of the Habsburg Empire produced a lopsided social and regional structure and a weak export base. Nor were the severe deflationary policies which the Austrian government adopted to overcome its problems necessarily entailed either by the ideology of ‘Austro- fascism’ or by the state’s claim to legitimacy. The authoritarian ideology of Dolfuss or Schuschnigg did not preclude a more dirigiste route out of the
, recession than that actually adopted. By contrast the state socialism of the GDR and its failure to supply consumer needs appears systematically linked breathtaking union: After the “German Question” the “Austrian Question”?’, Austria Today, 2/90, pp. 7-11; Gerald Stourzh, introduction to Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum Oster- reichbewusstsein im 20. Jahrhunderr (Vienna, 1990); Oliver Rathkolb, Georg Schmid, and Gernot Heiss (eds.), Osterreich und Deutschlands Grdsse: ein schlampiges Verhiiltnir (Salzburg, 1990); Anton Pelinka, Zur osterreichischen Identitat. Zwirchen deutscher Vereinigung und Mitreleuropa (Vienna, 1YW).
Stourzh. OD. cit.. D. 35. E.g. by Piter Katienstein, Disjoined Partners: Austria and Germany since 1815 (Berkeley,
to its ideologically based claim to legitimacy. Once its failure to succeed on the economic level was manifest it had no leg to stand on.
What proved fatal for the First Austrian Republic was the way Austria’s economic malaise was interpreted by its middle classes-even outside the ranks of Nazis-in terms of uolkisch, social darwinistic ideology. The attachment of the label ‘unviable’ was only one example of this. This ideology dominated intellectual and public life and even influenced the perceptions of Austrian social democracy as well, especially when reinforced by liberal ideas of self- determination, which viewed the ban on the Anschluss as contrary to a ‘natural’ right. The official counter-argument that Austria was ‘the better German state’ proved fatally defensive, reflecting a basic lack of belief in the future of Austrian statehood. In contrast the ideological premise of the GDR was not merely anti-Nazi but also ‘post-national’. The claim to be the better German state implied that after the Third Reich nationalism could or should be redundant, especially in Germany. Those middle-class groups roughly corresponding to Austria’s inter-war greater-Germanists either left or were forced out of the country. Those remaining tended to share the post-national premiss, however much they may have opposed the regime.
As a drama of disintegration, of political manoeuvring, sauue qui peut, utopian expectations, and purges, the two cases also appear to have some similarities. I will restrict myself here to three points: first, the state resources devoted to penetrating and mobilizing society in the GDR were far greater and more systematically applied than in the case of Austria. And yet Schuschnigg’s regime-bankrupt though it was by March 1938-still enjoyed a base of support greater than that of either Honecker or Krenz. A less blinkered policy might have harnessed this potential. Secondly, the near hysteria of sections of the Austrian population in 1938 was far removed from the ambivalence, passivity, and apprehension of many East Germans fifty years later. The utopian anti-Semitism which was unleashed in Vienna cannot be compared with the racially articulated inferiority complex evident in East Germany, disturbing though this is. The difference is encapsulated by the treatment of the icons of the fallen regime-on the one hand Jews humiliated and press- ganged into scrubbing the pavements clean of Schuschnigg’s Kruckuckreuz, on the other hand Turkish traders selling SED insignia to international tourists in front of the Berlin Wall. Thirdly, whatever the inadequacies and injustices of the purges now taking place in the ex-GDR-and their dimension is not yet clear-a comparison with the fate of the victims of the Anschluss is surely not merely unrewarding but even frivolous.
Extending the discussion from a comparison between 1938 and 1989/90 to that between Austria and the GDR since 1945 leads directly into current controversies about the nature of Austrian national identity. These can be confusing because they are usually conducted in coded terms. Many of the arguments are only ostensibly about empirical data (which invariably show a large and increasing identification with an Austrian nation). In reality they
are about attitudes towards the Third Reich: for fifty years affirmative answers about Austrian national identity have stood for a rejection of Nazism. By the same token, questioning that ider :ity has indicated at the least a failure to confront the ethical problems pos.2 1 by National Socialism, at the most support for some or all of its aims.
It seems possible to avoid this rcnch warfare. There seems no reason why a readiness to make comparisors between the (successful) development of Austrian national identity since 1945 with the unsuccessful development of a GDR identity should inexorably lead to an interpretation of the German history since 1945 as a Dreiteilung or even (in the language of Deutsche Nationale Zeirung) a Vier t e i l~ng .~
A first similarity is that both Austria and the GDR were states formed as a result of geo-strategic decisions by the victorious allies of the Second World War rather than as a result of social or political participation. Austria’s (re-)creation by the three Allies in Moscow in 1943 was undertaken largely in order to weaken Germany. It was not primarily a response to previously demonstrated Austrian discontent with the Third Reich. And the resistance movement which it was hoped would be encouraged did not on the whole materialize, The division of Germany too was accepted, if not directly promoted, for similar geo-strategic reasons. Nevertheless, Austria clearly was not ‘the state which came from Moscow’ in the sense that Ulbricht’s GDR was. Though doubts about Austria’s future and ‘national identity’ and econ- omic future were more widespread in the post-war period than is sometimes maintained, the state clearly enjoyed a much greater level of legitimacy than the GDR.
A second point of resemblance is the way both states attempted to establish their legitimacy as an ‘antithesis’ to the Third Reich. The Austrian ‘de- coupling’ argument was a national one-that Austria had been occupied in 1938 and treated by Hitler in roughly the same way as the other occupied countries of Europe. The GDR de-coupled itself from National Socialism with the ideology of anti-fascism. On the basis of these flimsy constructions both states refused to recognize any legal continuity with the Third Reich and both refused to pay compensation to Jewish and other victims of Nazism, though Austria (reluctantly) made some payments under other headings.
From a West German perspective both these processes may appear as attempts to ‘steal’ out of the shadow of the ‘Third Reich. Yet in most respects Austria’s Vergangenheitsbewultigung appears closer to that of West Germany
See the arguments of Karl Dietrich Erdmann, ‘Drei Staaten-zwei Nationen-ein Volk? Uberlegungen zu einer deutschen Geschichte seit der Teilung’; id., ‘Die Spuren Osterreichs in der deutschen Geschichte’, Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unferrichf, 10 (1987). 597-626; and criticisms by Stourzh. op. cit., and Rudolf Ardelt, “Drei Staaten-zwei Nationen-ein Volk? oder die Frage: Wie deutsch ist Osterreich?”, Zeifgeschichre, 13 (1985/6), 253-68; for a recent summary of the discussion, Peter Malina, ‘Von Historikern und ihren Geschichte. Der nationale Ort Osterreichs in der osterreichischen und der deutschen Diskussion’ in Rathkolb, Schmid, and Heiss (eds.), op. cit.. pp. 93-1 10.
than East Germany. The social dynamics of denazification and subsequent reintegration appear broadly similar. The Lebensliige of a collective national victim-and the application of a mutually protective two-party Proporz- probably only muted the conflict, or delayed it for a generation.
Arguably-at least as far as the top leadership was concerned-the GDR’s anti-fascist mythology had a firmer empirical basis than Austria’s. At any rate Austria’s anti-Nazi anti-German mythology was inauthentic for the bulk of the ‘war generation’. It rebounded against the state when the second post- war generation examined it on the basis of its internalized anti-Nazi values. Later mythologies, above all Austria’s permanent neutrality, were more successful. Neutrality appears to have established itself as a source of positive identification among a broad segment of the Austrian population, transcending its original historical role of soothing Soviet anxiety about a revived German threat.
If one sees national myths as a kind of essential elixir on which the nation- state depends for its revival, the end of the East-West division might be taken as threatening not only Austria’s neutral role, but also its whole sense of national identity. On a less dogmatic view positive myths can be as easily adapted or recreated under changed circumstances. The counter-example of the GDR (or Yugoslavia) suggests that the empirical validity of an anti-fascist national mythology is beside the point when other conditions for national survival are missing. In the case of the GDR the anti-fascist credentials of the leadership merely highlighted the hypocrisy of the apparatus of repression.
In terms of pragmatic instrumental and institutional attachment the gulf between the GDR and Austria is evident. The past forty years have produced the basic instrumental loyalty which was missing in the First Republic. Opinion polls since 1956 show that Austria’s national identity is strong and getting stronger, gradually extending from the educated middle classes, geo- graphically from Vienna, generationally from the post-war generation. The fact that this growth in national consciousness was accompanied-perhaps even made possible-by a far greater degree of (West) German penetration than that of the 1930s highlights the changes in international economy since the inter-war period. Though this process clearly means an effective loss of sovereignty it is hard to imagine the gulf between Austrian and German standards of living ever becoming so wide as to produce the kind of political repercussions as under the First Republic or the GDR.
There are admittedly plenty of shadows on Austria’s institutional stability. There is widespread alienation from the two main political parties, the two Lager are being eroded electorally, corruption in political life still seems extraordinarily high. But none of these phenomena have led to anything comparable with the alienated Nischengesellschuft of the GDR.
A comparison between the GDR and Austria thus suggests the not sur- prising conclusion that a state with a balanced social structure, favourable external and internal economic conditions and a quasi-national tradition to
build on, is more likely to succeed than one which explicitly rejects national appeals, fails to woo or convince a modern elite, and is inextricably associated with relative economic failure. Real or imagined ethnic identity or the empiri- cal validity of state-sponsored myths appear secondary.
Austria’s future is hard to predict. Entry into the Common Market will bring a degree of cultural, linguistic, and economic integration with Germany in excess of that between any other European neighbours. Against this central relationship talk of central European identity appears even more nebulous than it did three years ago. If the test of a Central European supranational identity is to be sought on the Austro-Hungarian border, Austria has already failed it by blocking it against Rumanian refugees. The conspicuous failure to develop any regional initiatives since the end of the Iron Curtain shows that Austria as much as its neighbours is looking to Bonn and Brussels, not the Danube basin.
4. Jorg Roesler (formerly of GDR Academy of Sciences, Berlin)
Between Self-Determination and Unification: East Germans from October 1989 to October 1990
In order to analyse the events of last year in East Germany, it seems to me that we need to look at four genuine forces inside Germany, which contributed to the results: the civic movements of the GDR, the East German citizens who were merely consumption-orientated, the Federal government and coalition parties of Bonn, and West German big business. Their interests, their aims, and especially their activities will tell us a lot about the reasons for unification in 1990.
The civic movements came to the public with their aims in proclamations, programmes, etc., in autumn 1989. The most widespread of the movements was ‘New Forum’ (Neues Forum). In its short and carefully worded proc- lamation, adopted on the foundation day of the organization on 10 September 1989, the need for a democratic dialogue about justice, economy, and culture in the GDR was underlined, and self-determination demanded. Changes should happen within the existing geographical framework of the GDR, which the proclamation called ‘our country’. ‘Our country’ was understood as a separate cultural identity, one of the four German or mainly German-speaking states in Europe. This became obvious in that part of the paper which demanded changes in the economy. In this, West German society, charac- terized as Ellenbogengesellschaft (‘elbow society’), was denounced. ’ Only one week later the proclamation of a ‘Social Democratic Initiative’ was spread, demanding self-determination. The aim of an ecologically orientated social
I Charles Schuddekopf (ed.), ‘Wir sind das Volk’, Flugschriffen, Aufrufe und Tare einer deutschen Revolution (Reinbek, 1990). pp. 29 f .
democracy was put on the table. The group expressed its desire to work together with all groups which wished to democratize ‘our country’-using as self-evident the same phrase as ‘New Forum’.* The civic movement ‘Demo- cratic Awakening’, founded on 30 October 1989-relatively late, when the civic movements had already won predominant influence on the streets- declared itself ready to take part in the conceptional discussion about socialism in the GDR.3
Thus it is obvious that the desire of the civic movements was to abandon the SED political dictatorship with its many restrictions on political life, to introduce democratic changes, and to carry through basic economic reforms within a socialist framework, or at least within the framework of the existing state, the second Germany.
The movements were able to mobilize for their aims hundreds of thousands of people, mostly in the big cities-in Berlin on 4 November at least half a million. A remarkable fact is that none of the movements, up to the fall of the Wall on 9 November (and some weeks later), spoke of German unification; no orator demanded it, not even on 4 November, some days before the Wall was actually opened up. None of the hundreds of posters at that stage demanded German ~ n i t y . ~ T h e writer Stefan Heym, at that time probably the most popular person in the civic movement, was applauded when he spoke of the vision of building up socialism, ‘not the Stalinist, but the right one . . . for the advantage of the whole of Germany’.’ Self-determination was the slogan, not unification. Therefore the opening up of the Wall can-in my opinion-be understood only as a consequence of the demand for democracy and freedom in the GDR, not as the result of a desire to get the Germans under one roof again. ‘Freedom to travel’, one of the most popular aspects of self-determination, was not confined to West Germany. But the chancellor of the Federal Republic, Helmut Kohl, found another interpretation of the events in East Germany when he made a speech at a debate of the Bundestag on 9 November. In his speech he deliberately linked the desire of the East Germans for self-determination and freedom with the desire for reunification. ‘Our countrymen’, he said repeatedly, ‘can now decide their own future’. And he was convinced that they would have in mind the future that he had in mind: a united Germany, based on the West German constitution, shaped like the western one.‘
Did the GDR population take up Kohl’s ideas? With the step-by-step breakdown of the SED regime the media in the GDR became free and could publish opinion polls with impunity. One was carried out in Berlin during the third week after the opening of the Wall. The overwhelming majority (90.2
* Schuddekopf, pp. 41 f . Schuddekopf, p. 163. Zeno and Sabine Zimmerling, Neue Chronik DDR (Berlin, 1990). i i . 67 f . ; Schuddekopf, p.
205. Schuddekopf, p. 208. Dns Parlament, 4 7 4 8 (1990), 1 ff.
per cent) of those questioned answered with ‘Yes’ to the question whether the changes, which had begun more than a month earlier, should be carried on in a socialist direction. While 4.1 per cent expressed their opinion that this could happen within a German confederation (not a unitary German state), 53.4 per cent decided that the changes should go on without closer links with West Germany.’ It seemed that Kohl, in his speech of 9 November, had been simply wrong.
Thus the second force mentioned above, the West German political estab- lishment, had made its opinions clear, but without much influence up to that point. The aims of the civic movements still proved to be more attractive to the population. Kohl’s prospect of convincing the GDR civic movements seemed weak. (Indeed only one of the civic movements, the ‘Democratic Awakening’, was later converted to Kohl’s position.) But in the meantime, as a result of the opening of the Wall, a new movement had come into being in the GDR, which was soon able to compete (as far as the masses on the streets were concerned) with the civic movements. Some GDR citizens were only interested in getting western goods. The West German regulations for GDR visitors, even before the fall of the Wall, gave every East German a gift of DM 100 from the West German state, officially called ‘welcome money’, allowing him or her to have a small taste of ‘western’ consumption-and to develop an appetite for more.
In contrast to the demonstrations on the streets, there was no East German organization behind the consumer stream into West Berlin and the border towns of West Germany, but the current was nevertheless powerful. It was even more powerful than the streams of Polish people coming to the GDR for cheap food, as soon as the border regulations on the river Oder were liberalized. Like the East Germans in the West, the Polish were driven by the desire to partake a little of the higher standard of living in the neighbouring country, not by a sense of cultural identity. In the civic movements there were fears that the desire for West German money and goods would endanger the aims of the East German revolution. These fears were very soon expressed in leaflets, the first by Demokrutie Jetzt on 10 November, the most widespread by Neues Forum on 12 November.N But-as the above-mentioned opinion polls proved-the ‘selling of the new democracy for bananas’ did not happen immediately. How long it could have lasted will never be known. Why? The West German government was not in the mood to wait. When it learned that the spontaneous journeys to the West were not followed by an immediate desire for reunification on the part of the majority of visitors, Bonn decided to turn the purely economically motivated movement westwards into a political one. The West German government proved to be a master of power politics.
On 27 November 1989, during the traditional ‘Monday demonstration’ in Leipzig, now held for two months with 200,000 people taking part, the black- ’ Zimmerling, i i i . 5 . ” Zimmerling, 87 f f .
red-yellow flag of Germany during the Weimar Republic, now the West German Flag, suddenly appeared, together with calls for 'Germany, United Fatherland'.' The next day, in the West German Bundestag, Kohl offered his 10-Point-Plan on German Policy. The content: financial aid and economic co- operation with East Germany are possible, provided the political and econ- omic system becomes similar to that of West Germany. Confederational structures can be developed. The eventual aim must be a reunited Germany.'"
The Ten-Point-Plan was a challenge to the recently created new East German Government under Modrow. It was even more of a challenge to those in a real position of power in East Germany in October/November, the civic movements. Their answer to the Kohl plan was quick and clear: the proclamation 'For our country' denounced the Kohl Plan as an 'Overture to annexation'. Stefan Heym, who initiated the proclamation, the writer Christa Wolf who formulated it, and many other artists, academics, and rep- resentatives of the civic movement who stood behind the proclamation, knew that Kohl with his plan struck not only against the new socialist experiment in the GDR, but against the whole existence of the second German state." In its fight against Kohl the civic movement used the weapons which had successfully brought the Honecker regime down-demonstrations, proc- lamations, collection of signatures to its appeals. These were effective weapons against a politically fragile and economically vulnerable government, but proved not to be powerful enough against an economically healthy, politically stable West German government commanding enormous financial resources, a media network which covered the whole GDR and-last but not least-a leadership willing to make use of these resources. The Bonn politicians soon taught the 'man on the street' that catching up with the West German standard of living would depend mainly on one decision: a decision in favour of (West) Germany.
The question of when Kohl's views would gain the upper hand against the civic movements was only one of time. Nothing can illustrate better the dwindling influence of the civic movements on the population than the gradual change from the famous slogan of the anti-SED demonstrations, 'Wir sind das Volk', to the slogan demanding reunification, 'Wir sind ein Volk', of the Monday demonstrations. In December the latter slogan gained the upper hand-at least, if judged by the appearance of demonstrators on television. On his first visit to the GDR, in Dresden on 19 November 1989, Kohl could address a large crowd, enthusiastically greeting him under West German flags.'* On the same day representatives of the civic movement revealed how many signatures had been collected for the proclamation 'For our country' during the last month: 560 ,OOknly a few more than the number that the
' Deutschland Archiv [DA]. Cologne, H.12 (1989), Chronik, p. 1485. I" Zirnmerling, i i i . 13f.; D A , H.12 (1989). Chronik, p. 1486. I I Zimmerling, i i i . 15 f . '* Zimmerling, i i i . 1 1 1 .
civic movement had been able to attract at the beginning of November on one spot on one day.I3
The defeat of the civic movements became obvious in January, when step by step they had to take over the now popular demands for German unity and the introduction of market economy. When the election goals were proclaimed during February, nearly all parties, including the former com- munists (now named ‘Party of Democratic Socialism’), and nearly all civic movements, said ‘Yes’ to the goals which Kohl had proclaimed on his own at the beginning of November.14
Nevertheless there were different views between the contesting parties and movements on German unity and the market economy. The dispute no longer revolved on the question of market economy in a unified Germany versus experiments with more market in the GDR framework, but rather full market economy and full unification as early as 1990, or some years later. This debate focused on the question of currency union as soon as possible, or at the end of the process of introduction of a market economy. Because the arguments used were mostly economic ones, something needs to be said about the connection between the status of the economy and the events in East Germany since the autumn. To put it bluntly: it was not economic breakdown that provoked the political uprising. Even if we take into consideration only those recalculated facts which the statistical office published in April 1990-i.e. after all restrictions and falsifications of economic data were over-economic growth (recalculated in gross material product) showed a remarkable decline since 1985 (from 5.5 to 2.1 per cent), but no red figures were reached.I5 No, said Doris Cornelsen, head of the East European (GDR included) department of the West Berlin ‘Deursches Instirut fur Wirrschuftsforschung’, in December 1989, the status of the economy cannot be said to be catastrophic in the GDR. People eat well, households are well equipped with consumer durables, industry and agriculture are producing as before. l6 The revolutionary days of October/November/December did not reduce production massively. Even in Berlin, the centre of the revolutionary events, industrial production declined by only 3 per cent by the end of the year, and in January by 10 per cent compared with September. But during this month seasonal elements also played a part.I7 In February and March production went up again, a clear sign of a (temporary?) stabilization of the economy. The stabilization was at a lower level, reaching 95 per cent of one previous year’s level in industry as well as in the economy as a whole.” This proves that the economic impact of emigration from the GDR to West Germany was over-estimated in the media,
I’ Zimmerling, i i i . 113. l4 ‘Stern’-Extra zur Wahl. Sonderdruck fur die DDR, Feb. 1990; ‘Der “Stern” hat uns nicht
I s Die Wirfschaff, 5 (1990), 1. l6 Wochenposf, 52 (1989) 16.
I R Die Wirfschaft, 6 (1990). 1 .
gefragt. Wir antworten trotzdem’ (PDS leaflet, Feb. 1990).
Neues Deufschland [ND], Berlin, 21 Feb. 1990, p. 3.
which argued that with an emigration of up to 40,000 persons a month the GDR economy had to break down immediately and automatically. In reality not a shortage of labour, but unemployment began to become a problem in the GDR. At the beginning of March, when the union of unemployed was founded, the official number of those out of work was 14,000, one third of them skilled workers. l 9
The economic stabilization coincided with a political one. The signs of economic stabilization, beginning in February, were accompanied by an end of the political stalemate between the Modrow government and the civic movements and parties, organized as a ‘Round Table’ from December 1989.20 On 5 February a ‘government of national responsibility’ under Modrow was created. To the new political movements and parties were given six ministerial posts. This meant in reality a sharing of power between the former ruling communists and allied block parties (Christian Democrats and others) and the new political forces.” Two of the main concessions Modrow had made to the civic movements and the general public, influenced mainly by the West German media, were the abdication of a planned economy and the promise to promote German Confederation as a transitional step to German unity.22 As one of the first fruits of the new coalition the ‘Round Table’ adopted in principle the draft of the ‘Economic Reform concept’ of the Modrow government. The draft proposed a step-by-step transition from a planned to a market economy during the years 1990 to 1993.23 A step-by-step approach to changing the economy of the GDR was also favoured in the judgement of the five leading economic institutes of the FRG at the end of January 1990. The judgement deplored the fact that it would not be possible to realize the necessary reform measures en bloc and at once. A crash of the fragile GDR economy was to be avoided. The representatives of the five West German economic institutes emphasized that precautionary measures had to be taken to secure the steady progress of the reform without setbacks.24 What seemed to be a compromise between the wishes of the Modrow government, the ‘Round Table’, and the general public was in reality the victory of the West German government over the civic movements, because the former had brought the ‘general public’ of the GDR behind it. Self-determination was given up in principle for unification.
In principle, but not in detail. The area of compromise included the vague hope that during the step-by-step introduction of a market economy and West German constitutional rights it would retain enough time and space to save
’’ Zimmerling, iv/v. 223. 2o Hans Modrow, ‘Ein Jahr danach’, N D . 17-18 Nov. 1990, p. 1. 2 1 DA, H.3 (1990). Chronik, p. 485. 22 DA, H.3 (1990). Chronik, p. 484. ’’ Regierungskonzept zur Wirtschaftsreform in der DDR (Berlin, 1990). pp. 15 ff. 24 Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachten der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung: Zur Unter-
stiitzung der Wirtschaftsreform in der DDR, Voraussetzungen und Mogiichkeiten (Wiesbaden, 1990). pp. 34 ff.
some GDR identity, especially the newly created political democratic tra- ditions of autumn 1989 and most of the social advantages of the forty years of SED rule.’5 But the slow transformation to a market economy proposed by economists of East and West Germany did not come into being. Even this vague compromise was not realized. Why not? During the first half of February 1990 the Federal government must have learned from Gorbachev that he would be ready to renounce his claims on East Germany, provided the Soviet Union got massive West German economic help.26 Kohl must have realized that this Soviet offer was bound to the personality of Gorbachev and his government, which became shakier every month in 1990. The chance of unification under Soviet approval seemed to be limited with respect to time. Only this explains why Chancellor Kohl ignored not only the East German Government proposals (which he had done several times since the first Modrow-Kohl meeting in December), but also the recommendations of West German economists, and in his speech to the Bundestag on 15 February opted for currency union as the economic precondition for fast political unification.*’ Not wanting to announce the real reason for his decision, the chancellor had to invent a plausible one. Instead of the actual foreign-policy background Kohl chose an economic one: German unity as soon as possible was related to economic necessities, which, as we know, did not exist. Thus they had to be created-at least in the media. Probably, therefore, civil servants of the Kohl administration spread news of a complete financial breakdown of the GDR economy and another period of impending political turmoil.28 This news soon proved to be far from the reality, and was later sometimes dismissed as ‘private opinion’, after the new course of immediate unification was announced.” The man with whom Kohl first wished to carry through the currency union was Hans Modrow. After he had said ‘No’ to Kohl’s repeated offers because of the economic and social dangers of an en bloc introduction of market economy,’” the chancellor gave his full support to the ‘Alliance for Germany’ under Wolfgang Schnur of ‘Democratic Awakening’, one of the first openly to favour currency union and unification as early as 1990. But Schnur soon became discredited because his secret service (‘Stasi’) activities had become known. So Kohl now supported de Maizibe, the leader of the only former block party in the ‘Alliance’, the CDU (East).3’ The ‘Democratic Alliance’ benefited from massive financial help, and repeated promises during Kohl’s appearances in the big cities of the GDR (despite, incidentally, a ban by the ‘Round Table’) that the currency union on the conditions of ’’ See interview of N D with Konrad Weiss one of the leaders of the civic movement, in Feb.:
N D , 19 Feb. 1990, p. 3 . ‘Von der Zweistaatlichkeit zur deutschen Einheit. Die deutschlandpolitische Wende in Ost-
Berlin und Moskau’. DA, H.3 (1990). pp. 166 f . 27 Das Parlament, 9-10 (1990). I.
2y N D , 10 Feb. 1990, p. 1 ; 19 Feb. 1990, p. 2. “ Karl-Heinz Arnold, Die ersten 100 Tuge des Huns Modrow (Berlin, 1990), pp. 89 ff.
1 DM : 1 Mark would soon bring the West German standard of living to the East Germans. With this sort of backing, the ‘Democratic Alliance’ attained a good vote in the elections of 18 March, won 163 of 400 seats in the peoples chamber, and became the leading force in the coalition government of de Maizihe. The civic movements (together with PDS) clung to their February goal of smooth changes in the direction of a market economy and a united Germany. They obtained only 14 seats, and had to go into opposition. The victory of the Bonn Government and coalition parties over the civic movement became calculable in numbers.32
In his inauguration speech on 19 April de Maiziere gave the highest priority to the transformation from dirigiste state planning to self-regulation and a market e~onorny.’~ During May the date of currency union was fixed for 1 July. What should happen when market forces governed the economy of East Germany again had been prescribed by Hans Willgerodt, a university teacher in Cologne, in his judgement ‘Advantages of economic unity of Germany’, which may have been ordered by Kohl after his decision for immediate reunification in March. Willgerodt was convinced that market forces would bring an immediate recovery of the East German economy, followed within some weeks by a Willgerodt’s ideas convinced de Maizihre, who promised in his inaugural speech that economic union would entail losses in standard of living for nobody, but advantages for many.35 Rarely have an economist (or economic adviser) and a prime minister made forecasts which differed so much from reality, in such a short time, as was happening now. After the first month of the new market economy, production in 56 out of 69 industrial branches had gone down, sometimes by as much as 40 per cent.36 At no time since the last month of the Second World War had industry between the Rivers Elbe and Oder declined so much within such a short period of time. In September 1990 real unemployment figures reached 17.4 per cent of the workforce, more than in the troubled years after the lost war (1946-50), when the transformation from a market to a planned economy was carried through in East germ an^.^' This result was due not only to the blind belief that market forces would work well as soon as the plan was taken out of the economy, but also to the autonomous movement of the fourth power, which we have to take intoconsideration when analysing the process of German unity in 1990: West German big business. Ever since the annexation of the GDR had become clear, West German capital had developed its own ideas on what to do with the vast East German market.38 The deliberately
32 Zimmerlina, iv/v. 246. ’’ ND, 20 Air. 1990, p. 3. Hans Willgerodt, Vorteile der Wirtschaftlichen Einheit Deutschlands, Gurachten (Cologne,
1990), p. 44. ND, 20 Apr. 1990, p. 3.
36 Die Wirtschaft, 20 (1990), 3. 37 Wolfgang Zank, Wirtschafr und Arbeit in Ostdeutschland 1945-1949 (Munich, 1987), p. 173.
’17 Klaus Humann (ed.) , Wir sind das Geld. Wie die Westdeutschen die DDR aufkaufen (Reinbek, 1990). pp. 151 ff.
low degree of state intervention in the change to a market economy allowed West German capital to use the new eastern provinces as additional markets for their goods, produced in West Germany, and as a resource of skilled labour-as Manfred Dube, State Secretary in the GDR Economic Ministry, said in August.j9 Thus it is no accident that devastated factories and rising unemployment in the new eastern provinces, degraded to a mere consumer market, coincided with full use of production potential and falling unem- ployment in the old part of Germany. In autumn 1990 unemployment in West Germany reached the lowest level seen since the m i d - 7 0 ~ ~ The official number of unemployed rose from 7400 in the GDR in January to 537,800 in October with 1,767,000 persons officially doing short-time work. During the same time the number of unemployed in the former Federal Republic went down from 2.2 million to less than 1.7 million." Only after July, with the introduction of the wrong economic policy, did East Germany's economy become vulnerable in such a way that political unification as soon as possible became unavoidable. The day of unification therefore had to be brought forward from the beginning of December to the beginning of October. The economic behaviour of West German big business in the ex-GDR shows certain signs of a colonial economy: for example, the protection of newly conquered markets against competitors from outside (including EC partner states, despite calls-from time to time-for Europeanization of the East German market by the West German government). Making high profits from additional sales in the ex-GDR. West German entrepreneurs-with only some exceptions-do not make investments in production. Even repeated calls for investment by Kohl, de Maiziere, and the responsible ministers, when they became aware of the economic disaster in East Germany (at least in August and September), did not help much."
Thus big business proved to be even stronger than the Bonn government, and, in creating the new economic and social landscape corresponding to their economic needs, became the most influential power in East Germany. The political parties of the Bonn government are now obliged to pay for the colonial-style behaviour of big business in the ex-GDR: the demands for the money necessary simply to keep the crashed economy going and social conditions on a level avoiding political risks are growing day by day. The ordinary tax payer, whether of West or East German origin, will have to pay for a stable political framework for profitable big business activities, unless the government is able to stop the devastation.
Summing up, I wish to say that there were three periods in which the process of self-determination of East Germany and/or unification of Germany was influenced by different forces. In autumn 1989 the political desire for a '' Der Morgen. 8 Aug. 1990, p. I .
" 'Sozialreport', N D , 9 Nov. 1990. '? Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeirung. Frankfurt/Main. 25 Aug. 1990. p. 11; Der Tagesspiegel, 4
democratic (socialist) society prevailed; from December 1989 to June 1990, but especially from February 1990, pure power politics got the upper hand, often using as ‘democratic cover’ the desire of the average GDR citizen to catch up with the West in living standards. From July 1990 economic profitability was the decisive motive for the shaping of a market economy in East Germany. The needs of West German big business defined what should be left, econ- omically and socially, of forty years of separate development in the East. Calls for re-establishing cultural identity, focused in the slogan ‘Deutschland einig Vaterland’, were used by the Bonn government to break the dominance of the civic movements and were accepted by broad parts of the population not so much because they were attractive as because unification seemed to be the (only) necessary precondition for catching up with the West German standard of living.
Finally, some remarks on those forces which I have left out in my analysis. Not surprisingly, the communists did not play any decisive role in the events of last year. They were mainly objects, not subjects, of East German history after they had decided not to use military power to suppress the civic move- ment-the last decision they were able to make fully by themselves. The SPD (the second-largest political Party in East and West Germany) also proved not to have their own approach to the problems of self-determination and/or unification. The negligible role of the SPD in the East German (de Maizikre) Government proved this more than once. It is still not clear what impact the annexation of the East will have on the West. The trade unions fear the damaging effects of cheap labour in the East. The political left, within and outside of the SPD, had no chance to influence the process of German unity. It has to learn that hopes of being supported by the basic democratic movements of the East, expressed vehemently in autumn 1990, have dis- appeared. The centre-right positions have become stronger in the West by the electoral victories of the Bonn coalition parties in the East. The European neighbours and Allied Powers also belong to the non-influential forces in the process of German unity. While the USA supported West Germany’s desire for re-education and colonization of East Germany almost from the beginning, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union undertook some activities in December 1989 supporting the newly created East German democracy, but by February 1990 were convinced by the Federal Government in Bonn that they should not disturb West Germany’s plans for ‘unification’.
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