Parental altruism:evidence from field experiments in Tanzania

Janine HuismanIdda MoschaJeroen Smits

Jana VyrastekovaRadboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Motivation The occurence and wide availability of various family planning

methods (contraceptives) has shifted the fertility decisions into a domain of choice, with resulting demographic changes in the West.

Nevertheless, the demographic transition (and investing into quality rather than only quantity of offspring) is still lacking in many third-world countries (sub-saharian Africa, Asia...).

PUZZLE

Motivation PUZZLE

Motivation: altruism and demographic puzzle

Hamilton's rule: "The social behavior of species evolves in such a way that in each distinct behavior-evoking situation the individual will seem to value his neighbor's fitness against his own according to the coefficients of relationship approriate to that situation (1964)." Coefficient between parent and child is 1/2; but parenthood is certain

only for the mother; suggesting gender differences in behavior wrt. offspring; moreover, father can remarry if a mother dies in birth (birth spacing and birth incidence poses serious health hazard for women)

When monogamous parents share the same living territory, communicate, can monitor each other - and develop "trust", fraternity is (less un)certain, the interests of mother and father more aligned, and the level of investments by altruistically linked parents is higher than the one of egoistic parents (Bergstrom, T., AER 2007; Bergstrom, T. 1994); implying (evolutionary) efficiency boost for the altruism; implying

demand for FP and a decrease in fertility (?)

Question

Demographic transition will be accompanied by altruism of parents toward children parental investments into child life quality (education,

health) self-control over fertility (FP approval and FP use) ultimately, lower number of offspring

Objective: link altruism and FP

Questions: causality? method!

Policy implications of parental altruism Parental altruism Up=Up(xp, xc)

direct cash transfers to any family member are at least as welfare increasing as targeted consumption intervention (health, fertility and education policies in developing countries)

BUT: sub-saharian FP programs ineffective in decreasing fertility

rate (World Bank 2007) parental preferences towards their offspring can be expected

to differ from each other (Trivers 1972; Eswaran and Kotwal 2004) “… even when ostensibly cooperating in a joint task, male and female interests are rarely identical.” (Trivers, 1972, p.174)

Gender differences in (parental) altruism

In the lab (altruism towards a stranger) Some altruists among human decision-makers (Andreoni and miller

2002, GARP): 75% participants show systematically some degree of altruism

gender diff. ambiguous (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund 1998): males are more sensitive the price of giving than females

In the field (parental altruism) Increase in maternal income only results in...

increase of survival rate of infants (Brazil; Thomas 1990) increase of food, and lower alcohol and tobacco consumption

(Cote d’Ivory; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995) Bhalotra (2004): altruism cannot be rejected for mothers, only for

fathers Assets in the hands of women increase educational budgets in

families (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2006)

Sister ... carrying a sibling while parents work

Do gender roles / gender differenceswith respect to preferences/society position / responsibilityarise / get imprintedat an early age already?

Research strategy Incentivized field experiments Ethics: guarantee anonymity Design: prevent appropriation of child income by parent(s); and re-sale

Game: a modified dictator game with a parent choosing from a set of

allocations containing an allocation benefiting ONLY a child (simple slippers suitable for walks to school, preventing feet from scratches, inflammations... thus improving health/welfare of the child); or allocation inferior in resale value (cash) but allowing parent consumption; and allocation approximately equal to resale value but representing luxury product (sugar)

slippers-value cca 1500TZS cash-varies between 0-500-800 on various sessions sugar-value cca 1500 TZS

Alternatives

Regions in Tanzania regional borders = ethnical

identity two neighboring regions

(Sukuma and Haya tribes) agriculture: Kagera (coffee,

banana’s) vs. Mwanza (cattle; maize, cassava)

values/norms/ community attitudes?

Kagera participants feel more respected in the community than Mwanza participants (MWU, p=0.000)

Making decisions in the field

Eight locations: urban or rural

Payment/choice

Participants N=361 (+1 lost questionniare) 4 wards in Mwanza + 4 wards in Kagera two sessions per location

minimal time interval to avoid transmission of ideas session 1= experiment 1 (unrelated pairs, 50% male, 50%

female) session 2= experiment 2 (married couples, 50% male, 50%

female); assuring that participants knew that the wives will leave BEFORE the husbands (appropriability!)

Region District Location SESSION Date Exp1; one per couple Exp2; couplesMwanza Magu Magu M1 29-2-2012 24 (sugar; 500) 24 (sugar; 500)mwanza Ilemela Ilemela M2 1-3-2012 24 (sugar; 500) 24 (sugar; 500)Mwanza Misungwi Misungwi M3 2-3-2012 24 (800) 22 (sugar; 800)Mwanza Kwimba Kwimba M4 3-3-2012 24 (sugar; 800) 22 (800)Kagera Bukoba Rural Kitwe K1 6-3-2012 22 (sugar; 700) 22 (sugar; 500)Kagera Bukoba Kashozi K2 7-3-2012 22 (sugar; 0) 16 (sugar; 1500)Kagera Muleba Rushwa K3 8-3-2012 24 (sugar; 0) 18 (sugar; 500)Kagera Muleba Muhutwe K4 9-3-2012 24 (sugar; 500) 24 (sugar; 0)

338 188 150

Number of participants (alternatives to slippers: sugar / TZS cash)

Reading instructions

Questionnaires

Parental altruism: observations A non-negligible fraction of individulas makes the

altruistic choice slipper choices are independent of whether a luxury consumption

good (sugar) is available; increasing the available cash does not decrease in a linear way

the choice of slippers

Choosing slippers as a non-resale choice less than 20% vs. more than 50% of individuals choose slippers

when without childern vs. having children age<10

Choosing slippers (no resale)

Choosing slippers vs. alternatives

Altruism by gender

We consider only individuals with barefoot kids, age <10 (N=92).Similar gender gap in altruism prevails if we include all parents with children, age<10 (N=187).

Mothers are more likely to make the altruistic choice, but many fathers choose slippers as well....

Decisions per location/experiment Altruistic decision of parents with children The rate of altruistic decisions varies between 16% and

95% across sessions... treatment effects?

Region differences: individual characteristics

Mwanza Kagera MWU

N (excluding missing

observations)

1. INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

1.1 Age 38,1 39 p=0,323 N=353

1.2 Years of education 6,6 7,9 p=0,299 N=205

1.3aOccupation: Agricultural selfemployed - Lower nonagricultural - Higher nonagricultural

46% - 35% -

5%

56% - 25% -

6% N=361

1.3b Religion: catholic - protestant - moslim

60% - 24% -

9%

54% - 24% - 21% N=346

1.4 Which tribe do you belong to?Sukuma

(89%)Haya

(100%) N=225

1.5 Distance to market (in minutes) 36 41 p=0,744 N=358

1.6 Own health status (1=Very good, till 5 = Very bad) 35 41 p=0,687 N=358

1.7 Self-selected partner (1=yes, 0=arranged marriage) 0,88 0,85 p=0,439 N=326

1.8Does your husband/wife lives with you at the same place (1=yes, 0=no) 0,91 0,94 p=0,121 N=303

1,9 Number of children (born to a couple). 4,1 4 p=0,584 N=360

No sample differences across the two regions,apart from the ethnical identity (Sukuma vs. Haya).

Region differences: family planning attitudes

Access and knowledge of FP methods does not differ across the two samples; but individuals in Kagera are more likely to discuss

FP with a partner; and with friends; and implementation of FP is expected less likely causing relationship problems.

Also, eventual use of FP is higher in Kagera than in Mwanza.

Mwanza Kagera MWU

N (excluding missing

observations)

3. FAMILY PLANNING (FP) ATTITUDES

3.1 Have you ever heard about FP? (1=yes, 0=no) 0,91 0,94 p=0,272 N=356

3.2Do you know where to get access to a FP method? (1=yes, 0=no) 0,92 0,97 p=0,106 N=218

3.3Can you freely discuss FP with your partner (1=Strongly Agree till 5 = Strongly Disagree) 2,3 1,8 p=0,003 N=304

3.4Did you discuss FP with friends, neighbors etc. in the last 12 months? 0,41 0,73 p=0,000 N=227

3.5The use of FP could increase partner problems (Strongly Disgree=1 till 5=Strongly Agree) 1,97 1,66 p=0,012 N=205

3.6Do you agree that having children is expensive (1=Strongly Agree till 5=Strongly disagree) 2,23 1,87 p=0,002 N=224

3.7Do you agree that families who have many children will become rich (1=Strongly Agree till 5=Strongly Disagree) 3,9 3,9 p=0,850 N=232

3.8Have you/your partner ever used contraceptives (0=no, 1=yes) 0,51 0,71 p=0,002 N=237

Region differences: female position

Husbands are more likely to decide over wives income; and “should” have the final say in financial and FP matters in Mwanza than in Kagera.

Mwanza Kagera MWU

N (excluding missing

observations)

4. FEMALE POSITION

4.1-menMEN: Who decides about the money you earn (2=me, 1=jointly with partner, 0=partner) 1,29 1,31 p=0,962 N=140

4.1-womenWOMEN: Who decides about the money you earn (several questions; 2=me, 1=jointly with partner, 0=partner) 1,09 1,47 p=0,009 N=120

4.2-men

MEN SAY: Final say in family matters (money, women paid work, handle momeny, decide contraceptives) (several questions; Partner=0; Jointly=1; Me=2) 2,9 3,6 p=0,002 N=160

4.2-women

WOMEN SAY: Final say in family matters (money, women paid work, handle momeny, decide contraceptives) (Partner=0; Jointly=1; Me=2) 3,1 3,6 p=0,002 N=170

4.2-men

MEN SAY: Woman has the right to say how many children to have and when to have the next one (two questions, 1=Yes, 0=No) 0,8 1,07 p=0,049 N=165

4.2-women

WOMEN SAY: Woman has the right to say how many children to have and when to have the next one (two questions, 1=Yes, 0=No) 1,21 1,45 p=0,095 N=175

4.3Woman can say no to husband asking sexual intercourse. (1=Yes, 0=No) 0,66 0,72 p=0,289 N=315

4.4WOMEN SAY: Women can ask husband to use condom (1=Yes, 0=No) 0,56 0,72 p=0,038 N=149

Sample differences - summary No Kagera/Mwanza sample differences on individual characteristics

level

BUT....

....the two regions differ significantly with respect to several variables characterizing .... the female position (decision-making power), and the family planning attitudes

Our Kagera sample shows more female empowerment and accompanying use of FP methods than our Mwanza sample.

Corr.coefficients of explanatory variables...

Discussed FP with friends

FP increases conflicts

Ever used FP

Women power in

family matters

Years of education

Discussed FP with friends

Pearson Correlation

-0,396 0,302 0,367 0,209 -0,110Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,003 0,000 0,040 0,282

FP increases conflicts

Pearson Correlation

-0,384 -0,207 -0,096 0,062Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000 0,042 0,351 0,548

Ever used FP Pearson Correlation 0,213 0,130 -0,037Sig. (2-tailed) 0,036 0,204 0,722

Women power in

family matters

Pearson Correlation

0,246 -0,147

Sig. (2-tailed) 0,015 0,150

Years of education

Pearson Correlation

0,232Sig. (2-tailed) 0,022

Spearman rank-based correlations

Discussing FP with friends is prevalently correlated with other explanatory variables linked to altruistic choice in the experiment.

Regression analysisCoeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig.

Discussed FP with friends (1=yes)

0,684 0,978 *** 0,832 **

FP increases conflicts (1=yes)

-0,032 -0,076 -0,177

Ever used FP (1=yes)

0,099 0,24 -0,375

Women power in family matters

-0,151 -0,051 0,129

Years of education

0,278 ** 0,307 **

Gender (1=female)

-0,772 -0,811 0,143 0,119

Children age<10 0,431 ** 0,401 ** 0,453 *** 0,446 ***

Constant -2,737 ** -2,653 ** -1,784 ** -1,324 *

- 2 Log likelihood 88,583 89,748 195,743 195,743N 73 73 158 151

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Discussing FP with friends OR years of education can be used to explain the altruistic choice in the experiment; these ar enot correlated and may present two channels interacting

with altruism: education vs. social influence.

Conclusions Akresh, Chen and Moore (2011). Altruism, Cooperation and

Efficiency: Agricultural Production in Polygynous Households, IZA WP 6265

"Our findings imply that there may be some notion of optimal social distance - perhaps policy makers could achieve better outcomes by targeting groups of individuals who belong to the same social network but are not directly connected (p.35)"

Parents are competing AND cooperating for scarce resources (time) at the same time; thus supplying the quality of children at suboptimal level; introducing influence from outside, from individuals that matter for the parents but are not in competition for the same resources, could increase efficiency