Parfit - An interview with Derek Parfit.pdf

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An

Interview

with Derek Parfit

Derek Parfit is a Fellow of ll Souls College Oxford and author of the

controversial and widely acclaimed book Reasons and ersons

Derek Parfit

Cogito: We usually start t he se in te rvi ew s by

asking

ou r

interviewees

samething

about

what turned

their

interests towards philoso-

phy. Was there same particular person or

problem or work

that

made y ou a p hi lo so -

pher?

Parfit: Yes there was. As

an

undergraduate I

di d

only

modern

history.

Then

I r ea d D avi d

Wiggins s book Identity n Spatiotempo-

ral ontinuity an d

in

p ar ti cu la r h is dis-

cussion of the ac

tu

al cases in which the

hemispheres of people s b ra in s h av e been

disconnected in

attempts

to treat epilepsy.

As a r es ul t t he se people seem to have two

0950-6664/95/020115-10

©

Th e

Cogito Society

quite separate streams of thoughts an d expe-

riences

in

having

each

of which t he y are

unaware of t he other. Wiggins

then

imag-

ined a case in w hi ch t he t wo halves of o ur

brain

would be successfully

transplanted

int o a pair of empty skulls an d there would

later be two people each of

whom

has

half

o ur b ra in

an d is fully psychologically con-

tinuous with u Since these would be two

different people it

can t

b e t ru e

that

e ac h of

them

is

u

So

h ow s ho ul d

we

regard

ou r

relation to these people? I found that a fasci-

nating question.

wa s t hi s i ma gi ne d cas e

that

drew m e i nt o p hi lo so ph y.

Cogito: is of course for your views on

personal identity

that

yo u are best known in

the philosophical world. But personal

i de nt it y is onl y o ne area-and by

no

means

t he s im pl es t

where

metaphysical concep-

tions of re al it y h av e b ee n t hou ght to be

practically important. Da you have a general

vie w ab ou t

th e

nature

of the relation be-

tween

metaphysics on the one hand

an d

practical reason

on

the other?

Partit: Yes.

Wh

at interests me most are those

m et ap hy si ca l q ue st io ns whose answers

seem to be relevant-ar to make a differ-

ence-to wh

at we have reason to care about

an d to da an d to ou r moral beliefs. Personal

i de nt it y is one such subject; tw o others are

freewill an d t im e s pass age. F re e w il l is

th e

most straightforward. Many

people

have ar-

gued

that if determinism is true no one ca n

d es er ve to be

punished a nd w ha t

Strawson

calls

ou r

reactive attitudes -such as re-

sentment indignation or

gratitude-would

be unjustified. I believe that

in

this an d

same other cases metaphysics should affect

ou r attitudes

an d

acts.

Cogito: So you re

no t

impressed

with

th e

view usually ascribed to Hume

that

we

ca n

care about

anything-that

ca ri ng is n ot con-

strained

b y t he facts? On this view even

if

time isn t real ly p as si ng o r no o ne ha s free

will

t ha t n ee d

make

no

diffe rence at all to

what we should care about.



Parfit No I reject that view. It

h as b ec om e

th e

dominant

view

in

much

of philosophy

an d

economics. On this view while we can

have

reasons

for

acting an d ou r

acts ca n be

irrational

we

can t

have reasons

for

caring

e xc ep t o f a derivative

kind

an d ou r desires

can t

be in

themselves

i rr at io na l. I f

that

we re true

metaphysics couldn t

have th e

significance that I think it has. Bu t I see no

reason to

accept

this view. On

t hi s v ie w

what

we

have

reason

to

do

is

w ha t w ou ld

get

us

what

we w an t. B ut most good reasons

for acting are no t given I believe by our

desires. They are

given by

ou r

reasons

for

having

these desir es. I

have th e

old-fash

ioned view that there can be straightforward

truths about

what

w e h av e r ea son

to

want.

To

d ef en d t ha t view

i1 s

better

to

start no t

with ethics b ut w it h simpler and

l es s c on

troversial

reasons. Mackie claimed

that

ob

jectively prescriptive values were too queer

to be part of the fabric

of

th e Universe. But

o ur o rd in ar y

reasons

for c ar in g an d

acting

don t

seem

too queer. If

we believe that

there can t be

such

reasons we ought to

conclude

that

there can t

b e r ea so ns

for be

l ieving either

and then we

might

as weIl

give up both philosophy an d science.

ogito

B ut presumably the

queerness

is no t in

th e

reasons

for acting;

th e

queerness

is

in

the idea that the reasons for a cti ng ar e c on

nected with

th e

n1etaphysical nature

of

th e

w or ld b y s om e

direct means that doesn t

involve

an y

d ep en de nc e o n

what we

hap

pe n

to

care

about.

Parfit There

isn t a sharp distinction between

metaphysical and ordinary facts.

Both

kinds

of fact a re involved in

on e

of th e

questions

that

interests

me most: t ha t o f t he

rationality

of ou r attitudes

to time.

On e

such

attitude

is

what I ve c al le d t he bias towards the near:

caring

more

about the near

future

than

about the d is ta nt

future.

This attitude

is

m os t p ro no un ce d when we re

considering

events that

are good or ba d to

experience

or

live

through. Pain provides

th e

clearest

case.

Since

we care more about the near

future we

sometimes

choose to postpone

s om e o rde al

knowing

that

this

postpone

ment

will only ma ke th e ordeal

worse.

In

such cases I would claim th e fact t ha t our

ordeal will

be worse

is a reason for not

postponing

it

an d

th e

fact

that

it

will

be

further in th e future is no reason for p os t

poning it. That

it will be further

in th e

C O GI TO : S U M ME R 1995

future won t make it

at

th e time an y less

painful

or an y less ours.

Ou r bias

towards

t he n ea r can I

think

be

usefully

compared with a

purely imaginary

attitude

to time. I

described

someone

who

ha s

wh

at I called Future uesd y Indiffer-

ence

This

person

cares

equally

about

hi s

whole

future except

that

he

doesn t

care at

all

about

wh

at

will

happen to hirn

on

future

Tuesdays. So if he had to

choose whether

to

have

a

mild

pain

on

e it he r M on da y

or

Wednesday of next week

o r g re at

agony on

Tuesday

he

would choose th e agony on

Tuesday.

Here again I would say the fact

that th e

agony

will

be

much worse

is a

reason

for

not

preferring it and th e fact that

itwill b e o n T ue sd ay is no reason for prefer

ring

i

This attitude

would be

qu i

te ir

rational.

Some people think this attitude

too

crazy to be

worth discussing.

Bu t

it s

like

ou r

bias

towards the ne

ar

e xc ep t t ha t

i s

more

obviously arbitrary. I also imagined an

intermediate

case:

caring

more about the

next year.

In

t he se e xa mpIes th e fact t ha t s om e p ai n

will

be more

painful isn t a metaphysical

fact

no r

are th e facts

that

some pain

w il l b e

on a Tuesday or further in th e future. Bu t

s om e o f o ur

attitudes to time

d o r es t

on facts

that

involve metaphysics.

On e

is

what

I

called

ou r bias towards the future This

applies to

events that

are

good or ba d

to

experience or live through. We care

more

about these events

when they are in

th e

future rather

t ha n t he

past.

A nd t hi s distinc

tion raises

deep

philosophical

questions.

On

one view

a bo ut t ime

th e

property

of

being present or occurring

now

is an objec

tive feature

of

reality an d time s

passage

is

t he m ov em en t o f t ha t

feature

into th e

future.

This

is t he vi ew t ha t c an s eem to justify

ou r

bias

towards

th e

future.

O n a no th er

vievy

which

I m i nc li ne d

to a cc ep t now is

no

more

objective than or here time s pass

age is a

myth

and there is l es s metaphysical

difference b et we en t he

past

and

th e

future.

T ha t s up po rt s t he a tt it ud e o f

caring

equally

about

good or ba d experiences whether

they are in th e f ut ur e o r

th e

past.

ogito Bu t

isn t ou r

bias

towards

th e future

so

deep-seated t ha t n o m et ap hy si ca l reasoning

could ever dispel it?

Parfit

There

are

tw o

ways

in which

meta

physics ca n

affect

ou r attitudes.

First

it ma y

only

change ou r beliefs about whether ou r



AN INTERVIEW

WITH

DEREK PARFIT

attitudes are justified or

what

we have rea

sons to care about. Second it mayaiso

change our attitudes or desires. O n t he first

more pe ss imis tic view we are just lum

bered with c er ta in a tt it ud es . We m ay c om e

to see that these attitudes are irrational but

that

will

da

nothing

to get

rid of

t he m. B ut

even this might make a practical difference.

Suppose for example

that

thinking abou t

free will

won t

enable us to get ri d of reac

tive a tt it ude s like anger. T her e s still a dif

ference between anger

which

we regard as

irrational

an d resentment

since the latter

includes the belief

that

t he person we want

to make suffer deserves to suffer.

we come

to believe this attitude to be unjustified that

ma y make a difference to

what

we da.

It s less easy to say ho w

th e

metaphysics

of personal identity should affect our view

about what we have reason to care abou t

an d d a. T he i mp li ca ti on s h er e ta ke l an ge r to

describe. But there is one well-known ex

ample. One central claim of early Buddhism

was that most of ou r suffering arises from a

false belief in the self. T he r em ed y was t he

n o s el f vi ew a ccording to

which

there

aren t really any selves or pers ans. But it

Were the Buddhists right about personal identity

wa s also claimed t ha t t he no self view was

very hard to believe. One main ai m of Bud

dhist monks

when

t he y m ed ita te is to try

fully to internalize the truth of this view so

that it ca n affect their attitudes an d emo

tions.

ogito Can I ask you about another of

Mackie s points? When Mackie doubted that

there could be objectively prescriptive val

ues part of

what

he doubted was

that

there

could

be facts about values o r about rea

sons which it would b e i mpo ss ib le to rec

ognize without being m oved to act.

Parfit

It might be p uz zl ing beliefs about

reasons could necessarily motivate u

That s

one of

Hume s main

arguments:

moral beliefs necessarily motivate

bu t

mere

beliefs

can t

da that so moral beliefs

must

really be a kind

of

des ire. B ut I

would

reject

that argument s first premise. Beliefs about

reasons da not I think necessarily motiv

ate.

ogito But presumably you

think

that suc h

beliefs could m ot iv at e us

and

that they

would then provide the explanation

of

wh y

we act. Isn t that w ha t Mackie finds puz

zling? reasons are facts a bo ut t he worl d

ho w

could

such

facts b ri ng it a bo ut

that

we

act in same particular way?

Parfit

It wouldn t be t he fact itself

bu t

only

ou r bel ie f i n thi s fact. T hos e w ho hold my

kind of view-or what are called External

ists -might cl aim at t hi s

point

that most of

us have a standing des ire to da what we

believe that we have reason to da. That

could be how if we bel ieve we have a

reason that belief tagether w it h t ha t desire

leads us to act. This reply accepts the

H um ea n a cc au nt a cc or di ng to which we

cannot

act

w it ho ut sa me

desire. That ac

count ca n b e chall enged bu t Externalists

don t need to challenge it. According to

Ross for example if I remember right

most

people have same d es ir e to da t he ir du ty

bu t we could know

that

samething was our

duty even if we completely lacked that de

sire.

I ve n ot t ri ed

to reach a view about the

Humean ac count be caus e it seems irrel

e va nt to t he q ue st io ns

w it h w hi ch

I m con

cerned.

I was

p er su ad ed t ha t w e

couldn t

believe

that

we

h ad s am e

reason unless we

had same corresponding desire I would



have to consider this issue. But I m per

suaded by an example of C hr is ti ne Kors

gaard s:

that of

someone

wh o

is so

depressed

that

sh e just

doesn t

c ar e a bo ut

anything. Such a person

could

still believe

that sh e ha d a reason to act in s om e way

because

sh e

will

later regret

it

sh e

doesn t.

If

sh e

lacks all motivation we

don t

h av e to

c on cl ude t ha t she c an t have

that

belief.

Cogito: When yo u

mentioned

th e Buddhists I

wondered

if you might

say

something

like

this.

Perhaps

the difficulty of c omi ng to act

on a re as on

that

is given you by the meta

physical

facts is th e same as the difficulty of

coming to believe in the metaphysical facts

in the

first place. So what th e Buddhists are

d oi ng is ac qui ri ng t he belief and

through

that th e motivation.

P arf it: In some cases such a claim may be

true; bu t I don t think i t s always true. fwe

take free will which may be the clearest

case many

people

have not

found

it

diff ic ult to b el ie ve

in

determinism. Many

indeed

have found

it

diff ic ult to b el ie ve

that determinism

could be false. f

they

con

clude

that th e truth of determinism under-

mines desert the effect on

their

attitudes

ca n be more straightforward.

T he y c an

still

h av e t he s tr on g c on vi ct io n that what some

c ri mi na l h as d on e

is a terrible thing. And

as I ve said

they

may s ti ll feel anger.

Bu t

they

won t

endorse il\-will towards the

criminal. They won t think either

that it

would

be good

if

th e criminal suffered or

that it matters less if t he c ri mi na l suffers

than if some

innocent

person suffers.

Cogito: So

th e

metaphysics might have

an

effect on

ou r

second-order

attitudes

e

ou r attitudes towards ou r ow n first-order

attitudes an d this second-order difference

might

in turn have an influence on our

behaviour? We might come to regard ou r

anger perhaps as m er el y a p at ho lo gi ca l re

action

an d

seek therapy for ourselves rather

than

demanding punishment

for t he crimi

nal?

Parfit: Yes;

an d

I think i t s also likely t ha t t hi s

would

make ou r anger less

intense

an d less

la st ing. W e all h av e t he se natural reactions

bu t

if we don t endorse

the m t ha t h elp s

to

ove rc ome t hem . I m helped in

this

area by

the fact that I get angry with material objects

all the time. I sometimes

want

to kick my

car for e xa mpl e. S inc e I have t hi s a nge r at

material objects which is manifestly ir-

C O GI T O: S U M ME R 1995

rational it s easier to me to think when I

get angry

with

people t hat t hi s is also ir

rational.

n obviously irrational aet But is

ny

more

rational

to

get angry t other people

Cogito: I was surprised to

hear

you say that

many

people find it eas y to be li ev e

in

deter

minism. Didn t Ka nt c la im t ha t a t th e mo

ment

when we are actually making a

decision we necessarily act under th e

idea

of freedom ? Isn t t ha n a n essential

aspect

of

facing up to adecision?

Parfit: Some people

have

t ho ug ht t ha t t ha t w e

can t at the time of making adecision

believe in determinism. Others of whom

I m one see no

tension

here.

When

I con

sider

wh

at it s like to make adecision I

d on t t hi nk I am presupposing the falsity of

determinism.

I would

no w

d is ti ng ui sh t wo ways

in

which metaphysics

ca n

m ak e a di ffe rence .

In the clearest cases there is one intelligible

metaphysical view

whose

t ru th w ou ld jus

tify s om e

attitude

or moral belief of ours

an d

another metaphysical view w ho se tru th

would

show t ha t ou r

attitude

is unjustified.

In such cases whether the

attitude

is

justified

depends

on which metaphysical

vie w is true.

S om e ca ses are m or e c om pl ic at ed . Thus

in the case of free

will

an d

time s

passage

there is one metaphysical view whose truth

would

undermine some

of

ou r attitudes.

f

determinism

is true there ca n be no desert;

and if time s passage is an illusion we

cannot

justify

ou r

bias t ow ard s t he future.

In both cases there are

other metaphysical

views whose truth might seem to justify ou r



AN INT ER VIEW W IT H DEREK

P A R F I T

attitudes. But I m i nc li ne d to be lie ve that

this is

no t

so. I agree

with

those

w ho t hi nk

that

even

if

determinism

is false there

could be no ba si s for dese rt.

An d

I doubt

whether

even

if

time s

passage were

not an

illusion we cou ld justify ou r bias towards

th e

future.

In

such

cases

it

may seem t hat

metaphysics doesn t make a difference

since

th e

justifiability of our attitudes

doesn t depend on which

metaphysical

view

is tr ue .

Mark Johnston defends a view that is

s ha rp ly o pp os ed to mine. On his view

which he

calls

Minimalism

metaphysics

is always irrelevant to ou r p ra ct ic al c on-

cerns. It would support that view if we

decided

that

whichever

metaphysical

view

is true o ur a tt it ud es or moral beliefs re

justified. But in th e cases I ve just men-

tioned

my conclusion

is

t ha t ou r

attitudes

ren justified. A nd that means that

in

a

different way

metaphysics

s ti ll m ak es a dif-

ference.

Th e

justifiability o f t he se a tt it ud es

ma y

not depend on which metaphysical

view is true. But we need to

think

about

metaphysics to see tha t

on an y

o f t he poss-

ible views the se a ttitudes are no t justified.

ogito Ca n we return to th e cases in which

on

one metaphysical view

ou r

attitudes are

justified but

on another

view

they

are not?

In such cases some people might say ou r

v ie ws a bo ut m et ap hy si cs are likely to de-

pend

on

our

views about ethics rather

than

vice versa.

Parfit Some

people

have

said

this;

but

I

think

that

in

so me ca ses this c le arIy gets t hi ng s

the

wrong

way round. Suppose

someone

argued We ca n deserve

punishment

for

what

we

do; but we

couldn t

deserve pun-

ishment if determinism

were true; therefore

determinism

is no t true . As it stands

this

argument seems to

me

useless since it s

hard to see

ho w we

could

be

sure

that

we

di d

deserve

punishment

for ou r crimes if

we thought that this could not

be

true

un -

less

determinism

were false

an d

w e w er en t

sure that determinism wa s false. We might

ad d

an extra premise to th e argument. We

might believe that God treats

us

as d ese rv -

ing

punishment

for

ou r

crimes

an d

that

God

wouldn t

treat us unjustly. Then we

would

have

a useful argument against deter-

m in is m. B ut i t

w ould now

be another

meta-

physical premise about th e existence

an d

nature of God w hic h w hic h

would

give us

reason to accept th e metaphysical con-

clusion. At

the moment

I n1

inclined

to

doubt

whether it s ever

th e

case

that

we ca n

believe b ot h t ha t some mora l belie f

presup-

poses some metaphysic al belief

an d that

th e meta physica l belie f must be true be-

cause

th e

moral

belief

is tr ue .

ogito

That

suggests that

yo u

think t ha t as a

g en er al r ul e

t he gr ou nds

of metaphysic al

a rgume nts provide

a better or firmer basis

than th e

sorts of attitude

that

lead

people

to

h ol d t he moral convictions that they do.

Parfit That

isn t

quite it. My view is

rather

that

when ou r

moral beliefs appeal to cer-

tain facts

they

rest

on

t ho se facts. Sin ce

that s so we can t

decide

whether those

facts obtain

b y a pp ea li ng

to t ho se beliefs.

That

isn t exactly

wishful

thinking

bu t

it

involves th e same kind of mistake.

ogito Yes

but w ha t we ve

got to compare

are th e grounds for ou r beliefs in metaphys-

ical facts

on

th e one side against th e

grounds for a cc ep ta nc e o f ethical convic-

tions

on

th e ot he r. F or what

you re

saying

y ou n ee d to be c on vi nc ed t ha t t he grounds

for metaphysical views are of a sort

that

gives

them

greater strength

than th e

grounds

for ou r ethical attitudes ca n give to those

attitudes.

Parfit

N ot q uite

because

I agree

t ha t t he re

ma y

be

areas where as Johnston claims

metaphysics is irrelevant. In

such

cases

perhaps

we can

b e c on fi de nt of our moral

beliefs an d justifiably confident that these

beliefs

c annot be threat ened by

metaphys-

ics.

Al l

I wa s s ay in g w as that we couldn t

usefull

y argue both that our moral

belief

requires some metaphysical

view

to

be

true

an d

that

since

ou r moral

belief

is t ru e th e

metaphysical

view

must be

true.

ogito Perhaps

we

ought to shift at this

point an d discuss in a little more detail

your

views a bo ut p er so na l identity. Ho w

di d

yo u c om e to ta ke

such

a special interest

in this

particular subject?

Parfit It s n ot h a rd to

explain that

interest. It s

easy to

be

specially concerned about ou r

own continued existence over time. But per-

haps

I

could

sa y this. Consider Wiggins s

imagined case in

which

m y brai n will

be

divided

an d

e ac h h al f w il l be successfully

transplanted into the e mpt y

skull

of some

other

body.

An d

s up po se w e

agree as

most

people would

that there are two resulting

p eo pl e. I f that is so these tw o

people

can t



Severing

the

corpus callosum separates the two

hemispheres

of the

brain

n seems

to create two

distinct centres of consciousness

e ac h b e

on e

an d

th e

same person

me

And

since there s

no

reason

to believe

that

I

would

be one of these people we ought to

concl

ude that I would

be

neither

of thes e

people

and

that

I

would

t he re fo re c ea se to

exist.

This

case seemed to

me

to

s ho w t ha t

what

we

have reason

to c ar e a bo ut in caring

about

ou r future isn t that

w e o ur se lv es

should

continue to exist. If we were about

to

divide

in

this

way we

should conclude

that our relation to each of the resulting

people

though

it

wouldn t be personal

identity

would contain everything that mat

ters in our ordinary survival. If

that

is so it

seemed to me

ou r reason

to

b e s pe ci al ly

c on ce rn ed a bo ut o ur future

can t

be as

we

assurne

that

this will

be our

f ut ur e. Pe r

sonal identity

is

n ot w ha t

matters.

Bu t that s

very hard

to believe.

ogito

It mi gh t h el p some of our readers if

you co ul d relate y ou r v ie w to th e famous

d is cu ss io n o f p er so na l i de nt it y in Locke s

Essay Locke

argued

for psychological conti

nuity

as

th e

real

criterion

o f p er so na l i de nt

ity or a s what

makes

us

on e

an d

th e

same

person over

time. I

suppose

yo u

would

sa y

2

left fi l right fi l

~ t t l orpus llosum

C O GI TO : S U M ME R

1995

that his theory

can t adequately handle

cases of division?

Parfit Locke does

mention

a case of

division

though

it

involves

curiously th e

continuity

of

consciousness in

a severed toe. I like to

think

that

Locke

could have

b ee n w on

over

to

t he vi ew t ha t

what

matters

is

no t

identity

bu t psychological

continuity.

Because he

thought that

both

of

these mattered

he

wa s

le d to

claim

that

if

we are

conscious

of

some

past act

it

must

have been us who

d id t ha t

act an d if we

cannot

remen1ber it we can t

have done

it.

T ha t c an t be

right.

ogito It s central to y our vi ew th at what we

should

care about is n ot p er so na l

identity.

So it s

puzzling

that you nonetheless spend

a gre at

deal

of

t ime discussing identity

and

rather less

time

on

those t hi ng s th at on

your view we

should

care about.

Parfit T he m ai n

reason

for that is t ha t it s so

hard

to b eli eve

that

identity-or ou r own

continued

existence-isn

what matters.

Another

related point

is

th e

following. It

seems

to

me

well

worth

considering

th e

bizarre problem cases

that

Locke intro

duced an d that still dominate the literature.

By

considering these

cases we

discover that

we are deeply

inclined

to hold certain be

liefs

about

ourselves an d

ou r identity.

If

we

imagine

t ha t w e

are

about

to

undergo

on e

of

these

bizarre operations we may not know

wh

at we should

expect to happen: whether

for

example we

should

expect ever

to wake

up again. But if we ask Will t he pe rs on

wh o

wakes

up

be

me? it ca n s eem

that

this

question must

have an answer which

n1ust

be either

yes or no. We

take o ur c on ti nu ed

existence to be a kind of fact that

must

be

determinate

and all-or-nothing. If someone

willlater be

in

pain

we

assurne

that

person

must either

be

or not be uso

That a ss um pt ion c oul d

only be

true

I

believe on something like a Cartesian vie V .

On such a view w e e it he r have

or

a re p er

sisting

i nd iv is ib le i mm at er ia l

entities

souls or

pure

egos-whose identities must

be determinate. I m not claiming

that most

of

us accept tha t

kind of

view.

Most

of

us

nowadays

reject such views.

Bu t we

con

tinue

to think a bo ut ou r

identity in

a

wa y

t ha t c ou ld only be justified if some

such

view

were

true. In order to come to se e that

identity

i sn t w ha t

matters

we

need

to

be

shown

that

w e c on ti nue to think in

that

w a y - t h a t we

believe t ha t o ur

own

contin-



AN INT ERV IEW W IT H DEREK

P A R F I T

ued existence does have this very special

character. That belief, I think, under lies ou r

v ie w t ha t i de nt it y

must be what matters.

ogito I s now ten years

since th e

appear

ance of Reasons n Persons How have

your

views about personal

identity

changed

in

the intervening

decade?

Parfit

Th e main

c ha ng e is

th e

following.

In

my book I was inconsistent in my attitude

to th e criteria

of

pers on al identity. I n the

first printing, I argued in favour

of

a

purel

y

psychological criterion. I

no w

t hi nk t ha t it s

amistake to

s pe nd m uc h t ime discussing

the choice between the

different criteria.

W ha t s m or e

important

is to see that, when

these criteria conflict, que stions a bout

ou r

identity

are what I c al l empty Even without

answering

these

questions

,

we

c ou ld k no w

th e

full

truth about what wa s

going to

hap

pen. And I n ow t hi nk that, even in ordinary

cases,

where

questions

abo ut ou r id entity

h ve

answers, these

questions

are, in a wa y,

empty. If

we

know all

th e

facts

about

physi

cal an d psychological co nt in ui ty , w e k no w

what s going to happen. Q ue st io ns a bo ut

ou r

identity are merely questions about ho w

we can

redescribe what s g oi ng to

happen.

They

are,

in

asense,

m er el y c on ce pt ua l

questions.

ogito If these questions are merely concep

tua I, d oe s it follow that t he an sw er s can t

provide

reasons for

having

son1e

particular

attitude

o r o th er ?

Parfit That doesn t stric tly follow, bu t I think

it s true. Let

me

give

another

example, to

illustrate

th e

difference

be twe en que stions

about reality and conceptual questions.

Suppose

I learn

th at m y

b ro th er s p la ne h as

c ra she d. I ask, Is

he

still alive? This

might

be

a

question about

reality,

since

I

ma y

have

no idea

whether

my brother

is

quite

all

right, or ha s b ee n b lo w n to p ie ce s . Su

ppose

n ex t t ha t

I

le arn that

my

brother

is in hospi

tal,

an d t ha t b ec au se o f

dan1age to

h is b ra in

he is irreversibly unconscious. His heart is

still beating, and h is o th er organs ar e s ti ll

functioning, but

that

is o nly becaus e h e is

attached

to some

machine.

Once again, I

ask, Is

m y b ro th er

sti ll alive?

But t hat

is

no w

a

q ue st io n o f

a

quite

different

kind.

I

know

wh

a t s ta te my brother is in. My ques

tion

is

no longer a bo ut t wo

different possi

bilities, e it he r o f which

might

be true. It is

only

about ho w

we

ca n re-classify

my

brother s state , or about

o ur c on ce pt

of be

in g alive.

Suppose that, given our use of that con

cept, there is

no d oub t

that someone whose

heart

is stil l beating,

an d w ho se o th er

or

ga ns ar e s ti ll f un ct io ni ng , is s ti ll a liv e. Th e

fact

that this person

s

heart

is

beating

doesn t

cause

it to be

true

that

this pe rson

is

still alive. The relation

between

these facts

is c lose r than that. In such a case,

that

s

wh t

it

is for

this

person to be still alive.

M an y p eo pl e assurne that, i f su ch a person

is sti ll alive, it n1ust be wrong to stop his

heart

from beating,

since

we

w o ul d t he n

be

killing hirn. On my view, if w e d ec id e that,

in itself, i t is morally unimportant

that

this

person

s

heart

is still beating,

we

should

conclude that i1 s unin1portant that he is

sti ll alive. Tha1 s because, in th e s en se I ve

sketched, that is a

conceptual

fact. Concepts

like alive and kill have, we assurne, great

rational an d moral significance. But, on

my

view,

it

doesn t

matter

that such a

concept

applies. What matte rs is why

it

applies. In

t hi s i ma gi ne d case,

even

if

my

brother is

still alive,

he

is irreversibly

unconscious.

If

h is b ei ng

sti ll alive

just

consists in

th e

fact

that his heart is s ti ll be at in g, it is

no t

mor

ally significant that

he

is still alive. Nor is it

significant that,

if

we

stopped

h is h ea rt

from

beating,

we

would be k il li ng hirn. If that s

wh

at he

would have

wanted,

that is what

we should do.

ogito Th e

philosophical

literature

on

per

sonal

identity

often

sounds,

to th e outside,

like a wild excursus into science fiction.

Y

ou

have

played your part in

t hi s t re nd.

Recently, however, there has been a reac

tion

in t he l it er at ur e against

th e

use of

bizarre

thought-experiments.

Kathy Wilkes,

for example, in h er b oo k Real Persons tries

do do without thought-experiments an d

us e

only

real examples. An d

Bernard

Willian1s,

though

he ha s used biz arre thought-experi

ments in

th e

past

to argue for a criterion

of

p ers on al id ent ity bas ed on bodily

conti

nuity, no w warns that yo u ca n tell what is

e ssentially the same story in different ways

to generate different

and

conflicting

intu

itions.

Parfit People a ppe al to b iz ar re examples for

different reasons.

S om e p eo pl e h op e

to v in

dicate one

p ar ti cu la r v ie w a bo ut

th e

true

c ri te ri on o f p er so na l i de nt it y. I agree that

can t be achieved. I also agree that, as



Williams says

we can produce

different in

tuitive responses by giving different de

s cr ip ti on s o f t he same case. But 1 appeal to

such

c ase s for a di ff er en t r ea son .

That

is to

get us to see as W il li am s

was the

first to

argue in his wonderful article T he s el f

and

th e future

that

we

are

inclined

to b el ie ve

that

our identity must be determinate. Sup

p os e w e i ma gi ne ourselves about to undergo

s om e b iz ar re operation and we ask Will

th e resulting

person b e me?

Or am 1 about

to

di e? Is

this

t he e nd ? As I ve said

i t s n at u

ral to assurne

that this

question

must have

an

answer.

1 appeal to

such

cases to show

how compelling

that

assumption s

On my view

ou r

question would be

empty.

If

we

knew what was

go in g t o

hap

pen

to

our brain

and

body

a nd w ha t k in d

of

experiences would l at er o cc ur we would

know

e ve ry th in g t he re is to

know.

We

w ou ld kn ow everything even though we

didn t

k no w w heth er we were about to die

or would wake up

again.

Instead of

asking

Would

th e resulting person be me?

it

would be

clearer

t o a sk Would i t b e c or re ct

to call that

person

me? That reminds us

that there ar e

no t

here at the level of what

happens

tw o

different possibilities.

There

are

merely two ways of

redescribing

what

will

happen.

If

we come

to

understand that

fact

we

ought to conclude 1 believe that

o ur i de nt it y is

no t

what m at te rs . To us e a

slogan that 1

no w

find tempting

what

mat

t er s is r ea li ty

no t

how

it

is described.

Cogito S om eo ne m ig ht try to resist your

views at this point by admitting that

in

some of

th e bizarre cases

there

is

no

deter

m in at e a ns we r to t he q ue st io n Will it be

me? but insisting

that in

almost a ll or di

nary cases t hi s q ue st io n h as a clear an swe r.

Such a p er so n mi ght ask Wh y should 1

take

th e

s ub ve rs iv e P ar fi ti an m es sa ge

on

board by g en er al iz in g f rom

th e

bizarre

cases?

Parfit That

d ep end s on w ha t

th e message s

M y c la im is that what matters isn t personal

identity bu t certain other facts which nor

mally go along with personal identity. 1

advance two different kinds of argument for

this claim. The first appeals to imagined

cases

in which personal

identityand

these

other facts

come

apart.

When

we

think

about

such

cases

we

can

be

le d

to see

believe

that

it is

th e

other facts which mat

ter. S om eo ne m ig ht say agree that

in

C O GI T O: S U M M ER 1 9 9 5

those bizarre cases identity i sn t w ha t mat

ters. But it what matters

in

al l ordinary

cases . That response is 1 think unreason

able. I m

appealing

to a

kind of

inference

that

we

often make. If X

and

Y

always

go

together an d we

think that

X -a nd -Y to

gether have a

certain

significance

we

ma y

wonder

whether

both matter or only one of

them matters. The obvious move is to im

agine cases i n w hi ch X and Y come apart . If

we decide

that

in these

cases it

would be

Y

that mattered we

h av e g oo d

reason to con

clude that even in ordinary cases

it

is Y

that matters. This is l ik e

th e

us e

of

artificial

experiments in s ci en ce . W e c re at e a purified

situation

in

which tw o factors come apart

a nd t he n

extrapolate

o u r ans wer

to

th e

ordi

nary

cases

in w hic h

these

factors

hold

to

gether.

The other a rgun1e nt I v e

mentioned

is

quite different. T ha t a pp ea ls to the general

claim that when

we

know th e facts about

physical an d

psychological

continuity

there

is a

sense in which

we

know

what

would

happen. G ive n a knowledge of

those

other facts claims a bo ut p er so na l i de nt it y

do

no t

give f ur th er information about re

ality but merely tell us how given ou r

concepts

w ha t h ap pe ns c an be redescribed.

then

appeal

to

t he c la im

t ha t w ha t

matters

is reality

no t

how reality ca n be described.

T hi s a rg um en t does no t appeal to b iz ar re

examples. It

appeals

to

th e implications of

what

1 call a

Reductionist

view.

On my

view though facts a bo ut p er so na l i de nt it y

are no t t he s am e as facts about physical and

psychological continuity they just consist

in those other

facts.

W he n we

see how

that

is t rue we

should

conclude believe

that

it can only be the other facts which matter.

Cogito You are a revisionary metaphysician

in t he s en se that yo u th in k that

we

al l hold

certain de eply held bu t

incorrect vie\vs

about

reality.

Many such

philosophers

adopt a

twofold

strategy. First

they

explain

wh y

our deeply held views

in

some area are

incorrect; then they go on

to

provide an

e rr or t he or y : an account

of

ho w people

come to h ol d s uc h incorrect beliefst Do yo u

have an error theory to account for what

ar e- on your v i e w - o u r

mistaken beliefs

about personal

identity

an d

its in1portance?

Parfit

have

some thoughts

on

this

subject

but they re

no t

original. A partial expla

nation is

that

we are

m is led b y

our concep-





4

time.

That seems

to

me

amistake. I think we

should recognize that

there

ca n be alterna-

tive conceptual

schemes

which are

both

ad-

equate

an d whi ch both make true

claims

about reality. That s why

I m n ot t em pt ed

to

d en y t ha t t he re

are

persons.

Th e

B ud dh is t no s el f v ie w c ou ld

b e i nt er

preted like this. As I ve said we are in-

clined to

h av e c er ta in

strong beliefs

abou

t

personal

identity

such as t he b el ie f t h a t o ur

identity must be

determinate.

We might re-

gard

such b el ie fs as

entering into ou r

con-

cept of

aperson.

That

would

e xp la in t he

claim that there are no persons. That

would

be a way of

claiming

that

there

are no enti-

ties with th e

special properties

t ha t w e take

persons to have: subjects of

experience

w ho se i de nt it y

must

b e d et er min at e. B ut

I

prefer

to

sa y that

we are

no t entities

like

that.

ogito One of the

uses

to which th e tra-

ditional

conceptual scheme

ha s

been put is

to provide a

rational

grounding for

pru

de nc e. I f

we

believe that

we have a

special

relation

to

ourselves

in

th e

future which

we

don t have to

other

people that

ha s

been

thought to

make

prudence a pre-eminently

rational

form

of practical concern.

What im-

plications do your views

of identity hold for

this

subject?

Parfit That question raises son1e difficult

and

complicated issues. Butler said

of

Locke s

theory

that if it

were true we would

have

no

reason to

c ar e a bo ut ou r

future . I

don t

think

that s right. We do have reason I

b el ie ve t o c ar e

about

ou r future.

Bu t

we

ma y

no t

have as mu

reason

as

some of

us

think

we

have. We

have

several

kinds of

c on ce rn a bo ut o ur future.

O ne k in d

which

we might call nticip tory

concern

we

can t

have

about

other

people s future. If we

know

that ou r child

will later

be in

pain we

ma y care

more

about

that

p ain than we care

about our own future

pain;

but we

can t

anticipate ou r c hi ld s pain. This kind of

concern may I think be in s om e w ay s tied

to certain false beliefs

about personal ident

ity or what is involved in ou r ow n

contin

ue d existence. If we lose

those

beliefs

that

concern might

be

weakenBd a nd sh ow n to

be

g ro un dl es s. B ut t he re

are

o th er r ea so ns

for

special concern

which might

be

unaf-

fected.

ogito W ha t o th er sorts of reasons are yo u

thinking of?

COGITO: SUNINIER 1995

Parfit On e

class of

reasons

are those de-

scribed by Perry in hi s article T he import

ance of

being

identical . These reasons

appeal

to o ur p re se nt desires projects or

an1bitions. As

Perry points

out

we

are

likely to be the

people

wh o are

best

ab le to

fulfil

some

of

these

desires.

That

gives

us

a

derivative reason to want to remain alive

and weIl. But such concern is

very

different

from o ur ordinary

concern.

Suppose we

know that we

shall

be

destroyed

but

that

scientists

willlater make an

exact

replica

of

u

T ho ug h t ha t replica

will

no t e

us

hi s

similarity to us

would

make hirn just as

good at fulfilling many of our plans and

projects. T hus he c ou ld finish

th e

book that

we were

writing.

Perry claims

that we

would

have

as

much

reason

to

be specially

concerned about th e future of our

replica.

ogito W ha t i f t he re w as someone completely

different-not a

replica-who

would be as

good or better at carrying

ou t

ou r projects?

Parfit That would also give

us on Perry s

account

less

reason

to want to

survive

our-

selves.

ogito So th e big change here is

that

ou r

reason

to

be

prudent

or

to care specially

a bo ut o ur

ow n

future becomes something

entirely contingent?

Parfit

That s

true

on

P erry s account.

But as

I ve said that account explains only one

kind

o f r ea so n

for

s pe ci al c on ce rn .

There

a re o th er s.

Thus

as se ve ra l writers

claim

most o f u s

care

specially about

certain

other

people-such as ou r f am il y o r friends-and

w e might care

specially

about ourselves in

th e

same kind

of way. Since

ou r

family an d

friends are

no t

identical to us such

concern

would

also be in a wa y contingent and

would not be

founded on the fact of our

identity o ve r t im e.

This

concern is unlike

Perry s

since

it would also

no t

b e f ou nd ed

o n o ur

present projects. If

we

care about

ou r

friends

that

need

no t be

because

we and

they

ar e

trying

to

achieve th e same

things.

Bu t

i f w e cared about ourselves in th e future

only in the kind of way in w hic h we care

about

certain

other

people

s om e e le me nt s

in our

ordinary concern

would

I think

be

missing. T he m os t

obvious

element is

antic

i

patory concern.

ogito

Is

ou r

concern about

ou r friends based

on

reasons at

all?

Isn t this more

like a

Humean concern that exists

independently

of

reasons?



AN I NT ER VI EW W IT H DEREK PARFIT

Parfit

That s a disputed question. Some writ

ers such as Whiting defend Aristotle s

view

that

our friendshi

p

should be b as ed o n

ou r friends admirable qualities. Others in

sist that love is

no t

based

on

reasons

an d

that

we

should go

on loving people however

much

they c ha nge

for

th e

worse. It s

hard

to

dec ide when an d how

we

have

reasons for

caring about ou r

friends.

Cogito But when we do have such reasons

some of these

don t

look as

if

they

would

also justify

ou r

caring

about

o ur o wn

future.

Parfit Williams suggested that on Aristotle s

view th e ideal friend

would be

a three

d im en si on al m ir ro r image of ourselves.

An d some suggest that

on

such a view

w e adm ire and

love

such

friends

because

t he y h av e

th e

qualities

that we

admire an d

love in ourselves. But this seems

no t

to

capture much o f o ur o rd in ar y

self-concern.

We

can be specially

concerned

abou t ou r

ow n future even if

we

don t

admire our

selves.

Cogito

W ha t o th er ch ang es in

ou r

thoughts

an d attitudes might flow from this different

w ay o f thi nk in g ab ou t

persons?

Parfit

Another a ttitude

worth

mentioning

is

our a ttitude to ou r death. 1 know that after

a few

more

years

1

shall

no t

exist.

That

fact

c an s ee m

very disturbing. But on my view

it can be redescribed. It is th e fact that after

a certain time none

of

th e experiences that

occur wi ll be

connected

in c ertain ways

to

my present e xperie nc es. That does no t seem

so bad. In that

redescription my dea th

se ems to disappear.

Time s passage is also relevant. When

we

are

depressed by

th e

t ho ug ht o f

ageing

an d

th e

approach

of death we are depressed

by

th e

fact that

we shall have

less

and

less to

look forward to.

That

seems

so

ba d

because

o f o ur

bias towards th e future. If

we

lost

that

bias perhaps

because

we concluded that

time s passage wa s an illusion t ha t w ou ld

make a great difference. 1 imagined someone

5

wh o

was temporally neutral an d

wh o

cared

in

th e

same w ay abo ut good or ba d experi

ences whether

th ey were

in the future or

th e past. Such a person would not be dis

t urbed if

he

wa s

about

to die.

Though

he

would h av e n ot hi ng

to

look

forward to

he

would

h av e h is

whole

life to l oo k

backward

to. His

position would be no

worse than if

he

ha d

only

just

started

to exist

an d

ha d

nothing to l oo k backward to. Wherever he is

in

hi s

li h e w ou ld have

h is w ho le

life to

look

either backward

o r f orw ard to.

Cogito

B ut y ou r i ma gi ne d ma n could still be

u ps et t ha t hi s life is less long than it

could

otherwise have

been?

Parfit Yes. If

he ha d j us t c om e i nt o

existence

he might regard it as ba d news that

he

ha d

only

years to look forward. He

might

p re fe r to l ive for s ev er al c en tu ri es . E ve n so

if

he was temporally neutral he would re

gard it as

no

worse

w he n b ec au se h e

is

about

to die

he ha s

not in to l oo k f or wa rd

to no t even th e pleasures o r lo ok in g ba ck

ward. He would still

have

ye ar s to look

backward

to. If we

ha d this a ttitude

to time

that would change o ur att itud e to ageing

and

death.

These

remarks overlook those many atti

tudes of ours which involve o ur p lan s or

projects.

Since we

can t

affect

th e

past look

in g

backwards

cannot

be just

l ike looking

forwards. But that s no t what affects u s m os t

when

we

think we have

nothing

to look

f or wa rd to.

That

is an attitude no t to th e

fulfilment of our plans bu t to ou r experi

e nc es . E ve n a fte r ou r death

our plans may

be fulfilled. What disturbs us is that

shall no t exist.

Cogito We

traditionally

close

these interviews

by

asking

ou r

in terviewees about their

extracurricular

activities.

Parfit

have

1

t hi nk o nl y o ne d is ti nc ti ve

activity: a rc hi te ct ur al p ho to gr ap hy in

colour. My subjects are Venice

in

all weath-

ers an d Oxford an d S t P etersburg in mist

an d

snow.

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