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Not glass but diamond:An evaluation of thegeopolitical world view ofSaul B. CohenGeoffrey Parker aa University of Birmingham, UK

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To cite this article: Geoffrey Parker (1998): Not glass but diamond: Anevaluation of the geopolitical world view of Saul B. Cohen, Geopolitics, 3:2,113-124

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Not Glass But Diamond: An Evaluationof the Geopolitical World View of

Saul B. Cohen

GEOFFREY PARKER

Saul Bernard Cohen, born in 1925, has been an active and influentialgeographer since the 1950s (Nijman, 1994, 46-7). While his work hascovered a wide spectrum of geographical study, he can be regarded as beingfirst and foremost a political geographer and he was one of those whoplayed an important role in the revival of the sub-discipline following theSecond World War and the trauma of German Geopolitik (Nijman, 1994,46-7.). He was a student of Derwent Whittlesey, whom he acknowledges asboth his guide and mentor and who inspired him to pursue his work inpolitical geography (Cohen, 1964, vi). Cohen's view of political geographyand of what is deemed to constitute the 'geopolitical' clearly owes much toWhittlesey's thinking on the subject (Whittlesey, 1939, 1-2 ).

An important theme running through Cohen's work has been the holisticexamination of the nature of the world as viewed from a geopoliticalperspective. In so doing he is in the ranks of those political geographerswho, since the time of Halford Mackinder, have engaged in the study ofglobal geopolitics and have essayed to present what Mackinder termed a'world outlook'. Cohen has attempted to throw fresh light on that intriguingand diverse area where geography and politics meet. The fact that it had sorecently proved to be an academic minefield was no deterrent to him.

Cohen's global view was first clearly enunciated in Geography andPolitics in a Divided World (1964) which was republished with extensiverevisions a decade later (1973). Subsequently Cohen worked further on hisideas, refining and modifying his original concepts and, as he thoughtnecessary, introducing new ones. These saw the light in a number of articles,papers and contributions to books. Particularly significant among these asbenchmarks in Cohen's thinking are 'A Geographical Model of PoliticalSystems Analysis' (with L.D.Rosenthal, 1971); 'A New Map of GlobalPolitical Equilibrium' (1982); 'Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-ColdWar Era' (1991a) and 'The Emerging World Map of Peace' (1991b).

Geoffrey Parker is at the University of Birmingham, UK.

Geopolitics, Vol.3, No.2 (Autumn 1998) pp.113-124PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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Thus over a period of some three decades Cohen presented anddeveloped on his geopolitical ideas. In international terms this covered theperiod from the relative stability of the middle years of the Cold War, thefall of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the first tentative stepsin the direction of a 'new world order'. In this article an attempt will bemade to assess the extent to which Cohen's writing over this periodrepresents a coherent body of work. Does it presents a consistent - ifevolving - world view or is it a series of related world views. This will befollowed by an examination of the nature and importance of thedevelopments of his geopolitical thinking and the extent to which thesewere related to changes on the overall world scene. Finally, there will be anevaluation of the long-term significance of Cohen's work in this field.

Cohen's initial proposition is that 'ours is a politically divided world'.The title of his book, Geography and Politics in a Divided World (Cohen,1964) makes clear the weight which he gives to what he considers to be thisfundamental 'geopolitical reality' (1964, xiii). He went on to assert: 'It isdivided because man wills it and because nature reinforces this will.' Thedivisions are the states which have arisen out of an inherent desire forseparation. 'Aspiring to be unique, groups of people organise themselveswithin politically ordered societies. These societies are territorially framed.The edges of the frame are political boundaries' (1964, xv). Nevertheless,Cohen went on to assert that, despite so many appearances to the contrary,there is an inherent order. He quoted Jung's view that 'In all chaos there iscosmos, in all disorder a secret order' (Cohen, 1991a: 557). He thereforelikened the geopolitical surface to 'not glass but diamond' (1973). Nearlytwo decades later he repeated this analogy in his review of the post-ColdWar world when he again asserted that "The world can be likened to adiamond, not a pane of glass'. He went on to elaborate on this as being '...not spatially random or independent of lines provided by nature... Itsgeopolitical cleavages occur along specific fault lines which are drawn froman array of optional boundaries provided by nature' (1991a, 557-8).

The order of which Cohen speaks is conceived as arising out of awidespread desire to attain it. The aspiration towards uniqueness wasbalanced by an aspiration towards association. Quoting Schutz he assertsthat there is 'a rage for order' and that 'Humankind does fear a world ofdisorder or Manicheanism' (1991a). This all takes the form of an attempt tocreate more satisfactory units of organisation than the states themselvesprovide. The states are the products of division and the aspiration totranscend them takes the form of the desire to create larger territorialframeworks. These are envisaged as coming into being in a more 'natural'way than states which are thus implicitly seen as being artificial as well asunsatisfactory. It is this search for a more widespread order which drives

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'the regional processes' (Cohen, 1964, xviii) which Cohen envisagesunfolding in a developmental manner. These do not entail the creation ofnew watertight divisions of the world - that would be merely to replicate theexisting divisions on a larger scale - but are conceived of as being part of ahierarchy of different kinds of structures. Each of these has its ownparticular functions which are appropriate to that particular level oforganisation. At the top of the hierarchy are the two great 'geostrategicregions' which consist basically of the Communist and Western blocs. TheCommunist bloc was termed the 'Eurasian Continental Power' and theWestern bloc the 'trade-dependent Maritime World' (1964, 63). The centreof the former is the Soviet Union and of the latter the United States andgrouped around each is a cluster of smaller states which together form theextended spheres. However, while in 1964 Cohen considered therelationship between the two to be still a confrontational one, he stated that'The clear-cut division that existed after the Second World War between the"Free" and the "Iron Curtain" worlds no longer exists' (1964, xvii). He hadembarked on the study of the international scene at a time when theideological rigidities of the decade following World War II were givingplace to a greater willingness to confront reality and to make compromises.The paranoid confrontation typified by Stalin and McCarthy had givenplace to the 'peaceful co-existence' aspired to by Khrushchev and Kennedy.Centrifugal movements within each bloc were also leading to thebeginnings of a de facto decentralisation of power and authority away fromthe two superpowers. In particular in the Maritime World there was a shiftof power taking place towards Europe and in the Communist World towardsChina. New power cores had begun to emerge in both blocs and thisdevelopment was indicative of another level of grouping, termed by Cohenthe 'geopolitical region'. In general such regions were conceived of asrepresenting major autonomous centres of political and economic powerbut, despite this, they were on the second rung of the hierarchy andremained very much part of the two great geostrategic realms. They thusrepresented devolution of power within the existing blocs rather than thecomplete replacement of them.

This picture of a still basically binary - if no longer bi-polar - world,with the emergence of pluralism at the middle levels, is balanced by anotherfactor which Cohen also identified in 1964. This is the emergence of a 'thirdworld' separate from the two geostrategic regions and neutral in theconfrontation between East and West. There is a certain implied equalityamong these three 'worlds', the boundaries among which are perceived asbeing subject to fluctuation as the balance of power shifts. Cohen uses theterm 'groupings' which implies a certain cohesiveness within all three andimplicitly elevates the 'third world' to the same level as the other two. This

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third region is not labelled 'geostrategic' and its rationale arises from thestrength of such developments as the non-aligned and 'Third World'movements rather than from the emergence of a third strong power core(Parker, 1998, 128).

The global disposition of the three groupings has a geopoliticalcoherence which is germane to the changed and changing positions of thegeostrategic regions themselves. The West had been forced to review thepost-war policy of the tight encirclement of the communist world which hadbeen particularly associated with the ideas of George Kennan (Nijman andO'Tuathail, 1994, 133-7). On the other hand the communist world hadfailed to maintain that ideological cohesiveness and automaticsubmissiveness to the Soviet Union which had been its major raison d'etre.The neutral grouping had therefore emerged out of a crumbling around theedges of both blocs and a loosening of control which had resulted from this.Cohen maintained that its existence had a profound effect on the world asviewed geopolitically. 'Today we can liken the political world to a series ofconcentric rings, with the Communist bloc in the Eurasian center, the Westpartly surrounding this region, and the neutral grouping taking upintervening positions between the two' (Cohen, 1964, xviii). However, thisemerging three-fold world is by no means to be conceived of as being a shiftin Cohen's views away from Mackinder and towards Spykman. The latter'sworld view is firmly rejected by Cohen as containing 'grave strategic errors'which had been largely responsible for 'a frenzy of effort to plug all possibleleaks in the Rimland dyke' (1964,59). This in turn led to ill-conceived ideasof 'Containment-Massive Retaliation' which produced the over-extensionof American power into the Rimlands of Eurasia (1964, 86-7). It is a 'soft'not a 'hard' Third World which Cohen envisages and one in which the twogreat poles of power continue to confront one another, but in a far moreflexible and therefore less dangerous manner.

However, Cohen gave the tri-polar (trinary) concept another intriguingtwist by the singling out of South Asia as being itself a potential thirdgeostrategic region. This he calls 'The Indian Ocean Plateau realm' whichwill 'arise from the ashes of the British Commonwealth' (1964, 64). Thissuggests the possibility that the world that would emerge out of the currentflux would be a tri-polar one in which the Indian subcontinent could play aworld role analogous to those of America and Russia. China, on the otherhand, despite its enormous size and potential power, and the flexing of itsmuscles which was very much in evidence, was seen as remaining firmlypart of the continental geostrategic region. However, this all suggests thatthere was nothing sacred about 'two' opposing blocs and the door wasopened towards the possibility of a wider pluralism at the highest level.

In the fluctuating and indeterminate area located between the

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geostrategic regions lay the world's two major 'shatterbelts' of the MiddleEast and South-East Asia. They were regarded by Cohen as having a crucialgeostrategic significance and as representing an updating of JamesFairgrieve's 'crush zone of small states' (Fairgrieve, 1932, 330). They werethe prinicipal regions in which the two great poles of power contented forinfluence and global hegemony. Subsequently the size and nature of thesewere modified, but the concept of the 'shatter belt' remained an essentialcomponent of Cohen's world view (1991a, 553).

While the world was thus seen as being ordered in a particular way, theexistence of 'an order' is not something which fits at all easily into Cohen'sworld view. It carries far too many implications of the fixed and the staticand consequently does not accord well with the idea of change as afundamental characteristic. Such change is not conceived of as beingconfined to those disruptive but limited periods between 'orders' but ratheras being something which is continuous and evolutionary. It is a processwhich is ongoing and which underlies everything else. There may beperiods when the process is accelerated but it is still seen as beingsomething continuous rather than being something limited and specific.Even seemingly crucial events, such as the end of the Cold War, are put intothe longer perspective. Historians may accord them a special significance,but in Cohen's geopolitical thinking they are not to be elevated to animportance which they do not deserve. Periods of great change are to beregarded as being 'historic milestones in a continuing process that hasmarked the evolution of our geopolitical world' and 'No single event, nomatter how cataclysmic, is likely in itself and of itself to be the definingevent' (1991a, 551).

The whole process is given substance within the developmental modelCohen proposes. It is a hierarchical model, and in it the geostrategic andgeopolitical regions are part of a wider scheme which includes states andsub-state regions. The ongoing process extends from the global to the localand all levels are mutually interdependent. The process unfolds in fourstages which Cohen calls 'undifferentiation, differentiation, specialisationand hierarchical integration' (1982). As the stages unfold it becomesapparent that what at the outset appears to have little coherence becomessteadily more structured and integrated. All are subjected to changes andchange at one level inevitably affects the situation at all the other levels. Asthe extent of complexity increases so the existence of a functioning wholebecomes more apparent. The overall tendencies are towards greaterfunctional specialisation, devolution of power from the centre towards theperipheries and greater systemic integration.

The process of the unfolding of the stages of geopolitical developmentis by no means a random one. As has been seen, the whole has been likened

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to a diamond. It is not 'spatially random or independent of lines provided bynature' (1991a: 558). These lines are seen by Cohen as being the essentiallinks between geography and politics. 'Geopolitical cleavages occur alongspecific fault lines' and these are chosen 'from an array of optionalboundaries provided by nature' (1991a). Such a statement is clearly in thetradition of vidalien possibilism, and through the dialectic of powerunderpins the 'dynamic equilibrium' by which the process works.Equilibrium in this sense is defined as being 'a condition of equal balancebetween arrays of opposing forces operating at different geographicalscales' (1991a, 551). This Cohen 'assumes' is 'the desired state'.

Finally, Cohen essayed to link together the various ideas and to developfurther on his developmental priniciple so as to produce what he termed 'thefoundations for a spatially-structured geopolitical theory' (1991a, 561). Hetermed this as being 'holistic... concerned with order and process ofinterconnecting parts' (1991a). In producing it he drew on the works ofHerbert Spencer, Heinz Werner and Ludwig von Bertalanffy. He uses the'organic growth analogy', in which Spencer argued that 'socialorganisations evolve from a state of indefinite, incoherent homogeneity toone of relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity' (1991a). This is also thefundamental characteristic of the developmental model already outlined.Cohen then goes on to argue that by reaching the stage of specialisation,together with its attendant hierarchical integration, a complex world ofoverlapping functional spheres had come into being. In 1973 he hadasserted that 'the world is hierarchical in its poly centric nature', and in 1991he coined the term 'polyocracy' for this situation. It was subject to theprocess of constant changes and 'the parts-to-whole relationships within thesystem.... require rebalancing' (1991a, 554). The keynotes were the evergreater integration of the whole together with multi-level and overlappingareas of competence. The whole was maintained by an 'overarching set ofequilibrial forces' and the search for '.... new levels of equilibrium' (1991a,558-60).

In envisaging both specialisation and integration, Cohen addresses thequestion of the proliferation of new states which had been so characteristicof the period from 1945 to 1990. From the end of the European worldempires to the end of the Cold War the number of states had greatlyincreased and with it the divided world had become ever more so. Whilesuch proliferation appeared to emphasise the features of the division ratherthan facilitate the operation of the developmental model, Cohen examinedthe nature of the states which were coming into being and saw that therewere considerable differences in the way in which they functioned withinthe overall geopolitical environment. He identified the emergence of oneparticular type of state which was different in kind from the standard idea

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of the state and which had a number of particular characteristics which gaveit a potential to move forward from the current international divisions. Onaccount of its limited size and resources this could not realistically aspiretowards that power and autonomy which underpinned that 'aspiration to beunique' traditionally underlying the territorial states. The emphasis onuniqueness had been responsible for the fragmentation and division of boththe past and present and it now threatened to carry on into the future. Thesestates which Cohen identified, on the other hand, as a consequence offactors such as location in relation to wider regions and the nature of theireconomic arrangements, were far better placed to act as links among largerstates and regions. Their vocation was to look outwards rather than inwards;it was to represent inclusivity rather than exclusivity. Such states weretermed by Cohen 'gateways' or 'gateway states' (1991b: 29-30) . In termsof the overall geopolitical theory, their function is that of linking togethergeopolitical and geostrategic regions in a way that discourages thedevelopment of isolationist tendencies and the entropy which is theirinevitable concomitant. They are thus well placed to act as catalysts and toreact to the exigencies of greater complexity. If the 'world divided' were tobe successfully replaced by integrative processes and operationalframeworks, then Cohen considered that these 'gateway states' had animportant part to play in this.

While Cohen's ideas have evolved in many ways since 1964, the basictheme has remained clearly identifiable: the conviction that order isinherent, but that greater order is not attainable in the form of a staticsituation. It is instead a process of change motivated by the search for amore satisfactory order through the attainment of new levels of equilibrium.However, amidst all the flux, the binary world of the geostrategic regionsremained. While in the 1960s and 1970s a tri-polar world was seen as beinga distinct possibility, by the 1990s the bi-polar principle appeared to havere-asserted itself. Yet it was subject to a continuing process, the keynotes ofwhich were the devolution of power and the emergence of new geopoliticalcore regions. This was leading towards the attainment of a more polycentricworld at all levels in the hierarchy. Thus hierarchy, binarism andpolycentrism continued to coexist and were the major constituents of theproposed geopolitical theory.

What can certainly be observed from the beginning in Cohen's work isa sensitivity to the world situation at the time of writing. This was noted byVan der Wusten and Nierop in their review of Cohen's work when theycommented that Cohen 'rather neatly captures the spirit of the times as seenby western policymakers' (Van der Wusten and Nierop, 1990: 221).Certainly modified pluralism within an overall bipolarity describes, andgives a geopolitical dimension to, developments taking place on the

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international scene in the 1960s. The introduction of a third potentialgeostrategic region also accords with the emergence of an Afro-Asian blocled first by Indonesia and then by India (Parker, 1998: 138).

However, in 1989-90 Cohen was faced with a major unheaval in theinternational situation - 'widely heralded as a sea-change in world history'- and he acknowledged that 'the search is on for new structures to restoreglobal stability' (1991a: 551). The basic question which he then addressedwas 'can equilibrium be restored?' In response to the magnitude of thechanges, Cohen modified his position but did not fundamentally alter hisbasic premises. He gave short shrift to the world-systems approches ofWallerstein and Modelski which were coming to be widely perceived asproviding the most satisfactory explanatory framework for putting thechanges into a wider historical context. The world-systems approach wasseized upon by many geographers as providing the necessary theoreticalbase for a geopolitical interpretation of the post-Cold War scenario (Taylor,1993: 1-11). Although now adopting the terminology of systems analysis,Cohen rejected the idea of a western-dominated world-order which heconsidered to be far too simplistic and not to allow for the true complexityof what had happened. He expressed the opinion that, 'Wallerstein'seconomic dialectics and Modelski's long-cycle model based upon ahegemonic explanation of world political economic forces do not matchcurrent realities'. On the contrary, 'what we are witnessing is the evolutionof the global system in which new powers are emerging' (1991a: 559-560).Cohen then addressed the question 'whether the concept of a Eurasiangeostrategic realm still has validity' and he answered in the affirmative. Heconsidered it as a geopolitical reality which possessed an existence quiteindependent of the fortunes of any particular country or countries. As aresult of the basic facts of its geography, which had not changed, Russiaretained the elements of its great power status and it was inevitable that itwould eventually reassert its power. 'Realms are defined by"Continentality" and "Maritimity"' he asserted; 'These not only define landcharacteristics ; they also define and describe outlooks'. Thus in Cohen'sview, despite the great changes 'the basic framework of the two geostrategicrealms remains' (Ibid: 565). China was still part of the continental realm,and while India was given the status of an independent geopolitical region,there was no further mention of its being a geostrategic one.

Despite these elements of consistency in the basic framework, it isnevertheless possible to detect a divide, perhaps a kind of fault line, runningthrough the middle of Cohen's work. This fault line does not specificallyrelate to the profound changes which have taken place in the world situationover the years. No new - or even radically modified - theory was putforward to explain the cataclysmic events of 1989-90. The collapse of the

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Soviet Union and all that followed from this was incorporated into theexisting theoretical framework as an event in a continuing process. As theclouds of dust settled, Cohen observed that the foundations of the worldsystem were still untouched and he judged that the need for equilibriumwithin the 'dynamic global system' was as important as ever. The fault lineis rather to be found within the overall body of his ideas. On one side is thehierarchical world view built on realms, geopolitical regions, states andsub-state components; on the other is the developmental theory. The generalgeopolitical theory is not entirely successful in bridging the gap betweenthem or resolving their inconsistencies. While the world view is afundamentally bi-polar one, the developmental theory postulates evergreater global integration. The bi-polar world appears to be a given, andeven shows some signs of becoming more strongly delineated. Although theinternal geopolitical arrangements of the two great blocs are subject toconsiderable change their existence is not in question. They may no longerbe rigid but they appear to have a permanence. However, the developmentaltheory postulates an ongoing process which does not appear to have fixedco-ordinates and does not contain the idea of a basic binary divide. In factthe drive is towards ever greater forms of integration and specialisation inwhich 'Manicheanism' is feared as much as is disorder (1991a: 556).

The basic framework of Cohen's geopolitical world view can, of course,be tested against past and present realities. It is a view which clearly derivesmuch from Mackinder who himself used the broad canvas of history inorder to demonstrate its credentials as an explanatory framework. Since,after nearly a century, the extent to which the Heartland theory provides asatisfactory explanation of historical processes remains controversial, thesame must apply to its derivatives. Tested against the realities of thegeopolitical world, the evidence can be used in support of differentviewpoints and much depends on the particular criteria chosen and theparticular outcome which is envisaged (Parker, 1985: 135-138). While atthis turbulent period in history the jury is still out on the whole question ofthe fundamental nature of the geopolitical world, it can be demonstrated thatthe conflict of 'mighty opposites' has been an enduring theme throughouthuman history (Parker, 1998: 96-117). Cohen's particular contribution inthis area was to adapt the bi-polar theory to the particular circumstances ofthe Cold War and then to give it a dynamic and a potential for multi-polaritywhich pointed in the direction of the resolution of the confrontation and theend of the Cold War. Cohen was one of the few bold enough to conceive ofthe possibility of at least the partial disintegration of the Soviet Union andYugoslavia at a time when, for more conventionally minded scholars, suchpossibilities were virtually unthinkable (1991b). What he produced was akind of model for a Cold war end-game but the last moves were rendered

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uncertain and unsatisfactory by the difficulty of clearing away entirely theinherited ideological perceptions.

In contrast to this, the developmental model presents a theory of thewhole process of geopolitical change. This takes place in clearly identifiablestages and according to a particular set of rules. It is based upon theproposition that there is order and that this is to be found in the search for anew equilibrium. The evidence on which this model are based is certainlypartial, to say the least. Van der Wusten and Nierop dismissed it as being notsusceptible to detailed analysis and commented that 'Cohen's views hardlystand on their own' (Van der Wusten and Nierop: 220). Its main problem asa theory is that it proposes an ongoing process which, in fact, appears tohave only just started and the evidences for the existence of which are as yetquite tentative. It seeks to impose a certain structure on events whichaccords with the idea of the extension of order and, through this, of aprogress from the disordered and primitive to the ordered and complex. It isvirtually impossible to verify the existence of such.a process in somescientific way against an existing reality since there are no other similarprocesses to compare it with or to test it against. By its very nature it isbound to be unique and, as was established at the outset of scientificpolitical geography, there can be no science of the unique (Vallaux 1911:18). Since the developmental process is one of 'becoming' what it willeventually become must be a matter of conjecture and hope. The 'rage fororder' is certainly in evidence in the attempt to impose a developmentaltheory upon a turbulent and all too frequently irrational world. Far frombeing some kind of progress towards the attainment of the desired greatergoals, contemporary reality, particularly in the decade since the end of theCold War, has shown itself to be far more backward looking than theacademic geographer allows for. One could be tempted to formulate a'regression theory' which might prove to be a more useful explanatory toolin addressing the present day world scene.

It is significant that in arguing his developmental theory, Cohen hasresorted less to historical evidence than to the use of a terminologystemming from the natural sciences, and particular from geology andbiology. There is much use of such terms as 'fault lines'; 'global shift';'plates' and 'tremors'. Everything is underlain by the search for an 'isostaticbalance' while the whole is likened to an 'organism' ('organismic') and theprocess itself to an 'evolution'. 'Nature', it seems, underlies the wholeprocess and acts as a kind of Keynesian 'hidden hand'. Cohen clearly hasrecourse to the ideas of Herbert Spencer in promoting the links of thenatural and the human in geography. Van der Wusten and Nierop sawCohen's world view as capturing 'rather neatly' the world of his times.Similarly the use of geological concepts capture 'rather neatly' the

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geopolitical theory by leaving the overall impression that the process is, insome way, a 'natural' one and should be viewed from this perspective.

An overall assessment of Cohen's geopolitics must conclude that it iscertainly optimistic. It presents a world scene in which things are gettingbetter and better. Despite so many appearances to the contrary, in thedivided world there is order and this order is gradually prevailing overdisorder and chaos. Everything may not be always for the best in the best ofall possible words, but the overall direction appears to be the best one. Hehad seen improvement in the world of the 1960s and extrapolated from thisthat it would continue. The scenario is one in which progress triumphs overbackwardness and ignorance and the theory presents the progress ofmankind from the undifferentiated morass to ever greater sophistication.Even the great shocks of the end of the Cold War do not shake this basicconviction. It is the geopolitics of progress. But while the world view isfirmly rooted in the Realpolitik of the Cold War, the developmental theoryis basically an Idealpolitik which invokes nature and natural processes as itsmodels. Taylor's comment that 'Cohen's is very much an American view ofthe world' (Taylor, 1993: 62) although an oversimplification, contains morethan a grain of truth. While Cohen rejects firmly the explicit idea of the 'PaxAmericana' he elevates a kind of implicit 'America felix' as model for amore desirable world. While firmly rejecting Spykman, the American'insula fortunata' of which Spykman wrote becomes, consciously orunconsciously, a kind of model for a possible future 'orbis fortunata'.

However, in addressing the ever greater integration which underlay histhinking, it was the 'gateway states' which emerged as having the mostimportant role to play. In a world which was becoming, on the surface atleast, ever more divided they were seen as having the potential for reversingthe 'nationalistic Balkanisation' and resuming the movement towards co-operation and integration. It is certainly possible here to detect a movementin Cohen's thinking away from the geostrategic towards the geopolitical;from the realm to the region; even possibly from Mackinder's grand canvasto Schumacher's 'small is beautiful'. The developmental model, heconcluded, may, after all, not have general applicability and the existence ofwhat he termed the 'Quarter-Sphere of Marginality' was indicative of theoperation of other global forces (1991a: 553), This more pragmaticapproach is not something entirely new in Cohen's thinking but hasresonances in his earlier work. From the outset he envisaged thedeconcentration of power to new poles and the consequent emergence ofgreater pluralism. The perception of the state in a more flexible manner thenopens up new and more useful ways of tackling international problems thana persistent view of the world which is fundamentally, and permanently,Manichean.

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124 GEOPOLITICS

Cohen presented a picture of the world scene in the 1960s and thentransformed it into a dynamic model for the resolution of confrontation andconflict by means of steady and gradual change. While the extent of theupheaval of 1989-90 had not been predicted by anyone, Cohen was amongthe few who were prepared to contemplate the strong possibility of radicalrather than superficial change taking place and to adapt his geopoliticalideas accordingly. While the upheaval when it came overtly increased thedivisions in the world, Cohen saw the integrative possibilities in it and hedid so by reviewing the nature and the role of the state in this context. Hisexamination of new forms of inter-state relationships, including hisconsideration of the Hanseatic League as 'a valid model', is highlysignificant and is an indication that the dynamism of his model wascertainly reflected in that of his own thinking (1991b: 32). In the long run itis this, rather than the overall geopolitical world view, that may prove to bethe real diamond in Cohen's geopolitical legacy.

REFERENCES

Cohen, S.B. (1964) Geography and Politics in a Divided World (London: Methuen).Cohen, S.B. and Rosenthal, L.D. (1971) 'A Geographical Model of Political Systems Analysis',

Geographical Review, 61/1.Cohen, S.B. (1973) Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York: Random House).Cohen, S.B. (1982) 'A New Map of Global Political Equilibrium: a Developmental Approach',

Political Geography Quarterly, 1.Cohen, S.B. 'Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era', Annals of the Association

of American Geographers, 81/4. (1991a).Cohen, S.B. (1991b) 'The Emerging World Map of Peace', in Kliot, N. and Waterman, S. (eds),

The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace (London: Belhaven).Cohen, S.B. (1991c) Geopolitics and the Shaping of a New Middle Eastern Region'

Ellen Churchill Semple Lecture, Worcester, Clark University.Fairgrieve, J. (1932) Geography and World Power, 2nd ed. (London: University of London Press)Nijman, J. 1994. 'Cohen, Saul Bernard', in O' Loughlin, J. (ed.), Dictionary of Geopolitics.

(Westport CN and London: Greenwood Press).Nijman, J. and O'Tuathail, G. (1994) 'Kennan, George Frost', in O' Loughlin, J. (ed.), Dictionary

of Geopolitics (Westport CN and London: Greenwood Press).Parker, G. (1985) Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom

Helm).Parker, G. (1998) Geopolitics. Past, Present and Future (London: Pinter).Taylor, P. (1993) Political Geography. World-Economy, Nation-state and Locality. (London:

Longman).Vallaux, C. (1911) Le Sol et L'Etat (Paris: Doin.)Whittlesey, D. (1939) The Earth and the State: A Study in Political Geography (Henry Holt: New

York).

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