THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION

TALCOTT PARSONS

The Structureof

Social ActionA STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY WITH SPECIAL

REFERENCE TO A GROUP OF RECENT EUROPEAN WRITERS

VOLUME I

THE FREE PRESS, New YorkCOLLIER-MACMILLAN LIMITED, London

Copyright, 1937, by the McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc. Copyright,1949, by The Free Press. Copyright 1968 by The Free Press, ADivision of The Macmillan Company. Printed in the United States ofAmerica. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproducedor transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage andretrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher.Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., Toronto, Ontario.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 49-49858FIRST FREE PRESS PAPERBACK EDITION 1968

printing number2345678910

INTRODUCTION TO THEPAPERBACK EDITION

For an author who has had the good fortune to survive theoriginal publication of his book for so long, it is gratifying thatpublication in paperback should occur just thirty years after theoriginal edition. That the decision of the Free Press is not whollywithout regard to financial matters is perhaps indicated by the factthat just under 1200 hard cover copies were sold in the year 1966,some eighty per cent of the number in the original McGraw-Hilledition, which was exhausted only after approximately 10 years.

Of course, the rise in sales is partly because of the immensegrowth of the American economy and, within it, the demand forthe output of books in the social sciences. The "survival value"of the book, however, judging by the numerous critical comments,is hardly accounted for by its seductive and charming literarystyle or by its constituting a simple popularization of the workof some famous European authors about whom many wished tolearn a little more without investing much intellectual effort.

It is perhaps a fair inference, then, that there is some moresubstantive basis for its continued survival; one we may explainpartly in the familiar terms of the "sociology of knowledge." Withthe general rise of the social sciences, sociology has become arelatively "fashionable" discipline within the modern intellectualcommunity. In approaching its present prominence, however, ithas certainly followed economics, psychology, and political science.As Nisbetl has recently shown, its rise has had much to do witha new concern for the integrative problems of modern society-aconcern which was conspicuously lacking in much of the economicand political thought of the nineteenth and the early part of thepresent century. In dealing with some prominent authors of theturn-of-the-century generation who were concerned with theseproblems, notably Durkheim and Weber, the Structure of Social

1 Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition, Basic Books, 1967.v

VI INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

Action perhaps helped introduce a narrow group of rather tech-nically minded American social scientists and a few other intel-lectuals to the analysis of some problems in this area. The bookhas, of course, been a beneficiary of the continuing growth of thistype of concern. In other words, the growth of sociology is a func-tion not only of the sheer scientific merits of the contributions ofits practitioners, but also of larger intellectual curren.ts of thetime, which have been in part "existentiallY" determined. Thisbeing the case, the author evidently "got in" at a relatively earlystage on a "good thing" and has been fortunate enough to ride onits "wave of success."

It is important to the story of the book that it dealt empiricallywith some of the broadest questions of the nature of modern in-dustrial society-notably the nature of capitalism. Moreover, itdid so at a time when the Russian Revolution, the Great Depres-sion, the Fascist movements, and the approach of World War IIwere events and phenomena that raised many fundamental socialquestions. On the theoretical side, the book concentrated on theproblem of the boundaries and limitations of economic theory. Itdid so in terms which did not follow the established lines of eitherthe theory of "economic individualism" or its socialist opponents,even the British democratic socialists to say nothing of theMarxists. These orientations were probably of considerable im-portance in getting early attention for the book, since many intel-lectuals felt caught within the individualism-socialism dilemma,and economics seemed at the time to be the most important theo-retical social science.

This does not seem to have been the case in more recent years,at least not to the same degree. Economic theory has become farmore technical in this period and a certain dissociation seems tohave emerged between the interests of economists in their tech-nical theory and in their special concerns with matters of publicpolicy and the interests of the other social sciences, especiallysociology. Only recently is a new kind of rapprochement perhapsbeginning to take shape, especially through collaboration amongthe disciplines with reference to the problems of development inthe so-called underdeveloped nations, where only with difficultycan even the economic aspect of a society be treated as a purelyeconomic problem in the analytical theoretical sense.2

2 It is perhaps a significant symptom of this shift of attenti~n that,among the books bearing my name, by far the least successful III sales

INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION Vll

If substantive considerations of the sort just noted-on bothbroad empirical and theoretical levels that go somewhat beyondideology in a crasser sense-have played a part in the survivalvalue of this book,a further interesting question is raised.Throughout most of the present century, if not before, there hasbeen in the social and behavioral sciences in this country a strongwish to be identified with the hard sciences. This has often goneso far as to generate rather extreme empiricist views of the phi-losophy of science that virtually relegate all theory to "soft-mindedness."3 The tendency is endemic to the culture of theAmerican behavioral sciences; indeed, one still hears very stridentvoices about the virtues of the sheerest empiricism-especially ifquantitative, and about the dangers of theoretical speculation-especially if tending to produce "grand theory."

I have always maintained that the Structure of Social Actionwas an empirical work in a double sense. First, it is very muchoriented to problems of the macroscopic developments in Westernsociety, especially as seen through the eyes of the four principalauthors discussed in the study. Secondly, it was an empirical studyin the analysis of social thought. The writings treated are as trulydocuments as are manorial court rolls of the Middle Ages, andas such, present problems of understanding and interpretation.Whether an interpretation of Durkheim's Division of Labor isdemonstrably valid is just as definitely an empirical question aswhether Durkheim's view of the relation between Protestantismand high suicide rates is correct.

Nevertheless, the Structure of Social Action is, and was alwaysmeant to be, essentially a theoretical work. It was written underthe aegis of a complex movement in the philosophy of sciencethat ran counter to the sharp insistence on the exclusive virtue ofhard science-especially, perhaps, as then expressed in the more

has been Economy and Society (with Neil J. Smelser, 1956), which Iconsider a more important theoretical contribution than several others.I think it literally "fell between stools" in that soc~ologists w~re p.ut offby the level of economics i~ seemed to presu1?e, whIle economIsts sImplywere not interested. Very lIkely most potentIal readers of E.conom.y andSociety thought that most of what I had to say: o~ the tOpIC wa~ III theStructure of Social Action anyway, thou/!;h thI~ IS far fr?m bemg thecase. On the contrary, it presented what I consIder a major new theo-retical advance. . .

3 In sociology, the high point of this trend was J?erh~ps Wlll~am ~.Ogburn's presidential address to the American SocIOlogICal SOCIety mthe 1930's.

Vlll INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

popular interpretations of Bridgman's operationalism. To me themajor prophet of this defense of theory was A. N. Whitehead,whose Science and the Modern World has remained an exceed-ingly important statement. In the background lay the work ofMorris Cohen, Reason and Nature. A more direct influence wasthe work of L. J. Henderson (himself a physiologist with impec-cable credentials as a hard scientist) on the importance of theoryin general and the concept of system in particular-the latter heheld to be Pareto's most important single contribution.

As noted in the book, I had also been impressed by two move-ments that opposed the empiricist atomism of the behavioristmovement in psychology, namely, Gestalt psychology and the"purposive" behaviorism of E. C. Tolman. Finally, the writingsof James B. Conant in the general area of the popularization ofscience constituted a factor of encouragement. One statement byConant which remains particularly salient is that the best meas-ure of the process of advancement in a science is "reduction inthe degree of empiricism."

The main thesis of the book was that the works of Marshall,Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber, related in complex ways to theworks of many others, represented not simply four special sets ofobservations and theories concerned with human society, but amajor movement in the structure of theoretical thinking. Againstthe background of the two underlying traditions of utilitarianpositivism and idealism, it represented an altogether new phasein the development of European-which could then be practicallyequated with Western-thought about the problems of man andsociety. In retrospect, the most serious deficiency in this interpre-tation of intellectual history is its understatement of the inde-pendent significance of the special French tradition, with itscomplex, often conflicting, intertwining of the ideas of the"liberals" (Rousseau, St. Simon, and Comte), the "conservatives"(Bonald and De Maistre, and, not least, Tocqueville).

In any case, the main outline that emerged was clearly "grandtheory," which put the analysis of social phenomena on a newtrack in the broadest possible terms.4 Within limits, I think we

4 Personal experience attested to its newness from the English-speakingpredominantly utilitarian perspective. In 1924-25 I spent a year as ~research student in sociology at the London School of Economics withoutso far as I can remember, ever hearing the name of M31X Weber, though all

INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION ix

may say that this perspective of "grand theory" had a certainappeal, most importantly to younger people, especially graduatestudents, though gradually it spread rather widely.

Nevertheless, the controversy over the virtues and vices of"grand theory" shows no sign of subsiding. A particularly impor-tant episode occurred at the meeting of the American SociologicalSociety in 1948 when Robert Merton began to put forward hisprogram for concentration on "theories of the middle range."5In retrospect this seems to have been a very constructive movethat was necessary to integrate the empirically minded with themore theoretical. This evaluation does not, however, imply theadvisability of abandoning a program of continuing work in thefield of general theory. On the contrary, throughout what has nowbecome a rather long career, I have held, with essentially com-plete constancy, a basic personal commitment to such a program.

This commitment began with my conviction of the unaccepta-bility of the common view of the time, especially as expressed inSorokin's Contemporary Sociological Theories (note the plural).He stated that the three sociologists in my study-Pareto, Durk-heim, and Weber-belonged in radically different schools, andthat Marshall, as an economist, belonged in a still different intel-lectual universe. I regarded their works not simply as four dis-crete and different alternative theories, but as belonging to acoherent body of theoretical thinking, understandable in terms ofthe major movements in the period's intellectual history.

The double concern, on the one hand with the status of economictheory as an analytical scheme, on the other hand with the inter-pretation of modern industrial society, carried the fruitful com-mon implication that each theory, as an analytical scheme, mustbe part of a larger and more generalized theoretical organon.Thus, Marshall, the most prominent economic theorist of his gen-eration, had to have an implicit if not explicit sociology. Pareto,who was explicitly both economist and sociologist, provided a mostuseful bridge. Weber, ail a German-style "historical" economistwho had a profound concern with the problem of "capitalism,"of his most important work had been published .by that t~me. l?urkheimwas of course known both in England and AmerIca, but dlscusslOns wereoverwhelmingly derogatory; he was regarded as the apostle of the"unsound group mind" theory.

5American Sociological Review, 1948, pp. 146-148; see also ChaptersII and III in his Social Theory and Social Structure.

x INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

could then be fitted in. Finally, after all the discussion of histheory of the "group mind," I really came to understand Durk-heim by grasping the significance of the fact that his point ofdeparture, at least in one primary respect, lay in his critique(and hence relativizing) of the very central conception in thetradition of the classical economics, the division of labor.

My concern here is not to recapitulate the theoretical argumentof the book. It is to call attention to the consequence of my deci-sion not to present summaries of the works of leading spokesmenof four schools of sociological theory, but to demonstrate in themthe emergence of a single, basically integrated, if fragmentary,theoretical movement. This made it necessary to work out inde-pendently the main structure of the theoretical scheme in termsof which the unity of the intellectual movement could be demon-strated. The general theory of the "structure of social action"which constitutes the framework of the book-and the justifica-tion for its title-was not simply a "summary" of the works ofthe four theorists. It was an independent theoretical contribution,incomplete and vulnerable, to be sure, but not in any simple sense"secondary." I do not think the survival value of the book couldbe explained without reference to it.

There is, however, an important further implication. It wouldbe most unlikely and incongruous if any such generalized theo-retical scheme should, as first formulated for a particular purpose,prove or claim to be definitive. If it were to be taken as morethan a table of contents for the presentation of material, it hadto undergo a continuing process of its own internal developmentand change. I think I can fairly claim that such a process has infact gone on continually and that it shows no signs of coming toan end; in fact, it seems bound to continue long after the presentauthor ceases to be involved in it.

It may be useful to distinguish three phases in this developmentin the thirty years since the publication of the Structure. Thefirst may be thought of as the phase of "structural-functional"theory. It was most fully documented in the two publications,Toward a General Theory of Action (with Shils and other col-laborators) and The Social System (both 1951). These works de-veloped a shift of emphasis in the concept of system from primacyof a model derived from economics and physics (via Henderson,Pareto, and Schumpeter), to one derived primarily from biologyand secondarily from anthropology (especially in W. B. Cannon's

INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION Xl

work and Radcliffe-Brown's interpretation of Durkheim). Withrespect to the conception of "action" in the narrower sense, thetheory became more Durkheimian than Weberian, thus givingrise to Martindale's aJlegation that I had abandoned the wholeWeber position, which surely was not the case.

This phase was also marked by a maj or coming to terms withtwo crucial neighboring disciplines, namely psychology, withspecial reference to the theory of personality, and social anthro-pology. The first led to a serious consideration of the implicationsof the work of Freud, mentioned in the preface to the second(first Free Press) edition of the Structure in 1949. I came toattribute great importance to the convergence of Durkheim andFreud in the understanding of the internalization of culturalnorms and social objects as part of personality-a convergencewhich extended in an attenuated sense to Weber, but very impor-tantly to the American sociological social psychologists, especiallyG. H. Mead. Secondly, I came to emphasize the relevance of thelate Durkheim (especially that of the Elementary Forms of theReligious Life) to the theory of an integrated socio-cultural sys-tem, as this had come to be emphasized in the "functional" schoolof British social anthropology; perhaps in particular, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, and Gluckman. A kind of "dialectic" relationof partial agreement and disagreement over these matters obtainedwith Clyde Kluckhohn and, somewhat more remotely, RaymondFirth, an old fellow student at London.

There was another central theme in this period which was onlyvery partially related to that of the integration of sociology withsocial anthropology and the psychology of personality. This themeled to a path out of the old individualism-socialism dilemma thathad come to dominate thought about modern society; it concernedthe phenomenon of the professions, their position in modern so-ciety, and their relation to the cultural tradition and to highereducation. More than any other interest, it provided the seed-bedof the pattern-variable scheme, only bare germs of which foundexpression in the Structure of Social Action. It was also the sourceof the perspective which made possible a new attack on the prob-lem of the status of economic theory; one which produced, Ithink, quite far-reaching results.

The second maj or phase of development in general theory afterthe Structure of Social Action was initiated by the book mentionedabove, Economy and Society (with Neil J. Smelser, 1956). In the

xii INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

ba~kground stood the Working Papers in the Theory of Action(wIth R. F. Bales and others), which among other things hadgrea.tly ~efi~ed t~e ,pattern-variable scheme. Economy and Society(whIch m Its ongmal form constituted the 1953 Marshall Lec-tures at the University of Cambridge) departed from the Paretanconception that economic theory was abstract and partial relativeto a theory of the social system as a whole. However, it proceededto show that the economy is a clearly and precisely definablesubsystem of a society that can be systematically related to othersubsystems. The key to this analysis was the application of the"four-function paradigm" to the old economic conceptions of thefactors of production and the corresponding shares of income(land-rent, labor-wages, capital-interest, organization-profit).

This conception of the economy as a societal subsystem provedcapable of generalization. In the first instance, such generalizationopened a n.ew appro~ch to the theoretical analysis of the "polity"by suggestmg that It be treated as an analytically defined sub-system of a society strictly~ parallel to the economy. This elimi-nat~d a very serious asymmetry within the general theory ofsocIal systems between the status of economic and political theory.These developments have been closely associated with the analysisof generalized media involved in social interaction, starting withmoney as a basic theoretical model, but extending to politicalpower and social influence. In turn, these extensions have entailedpressures to elaborate the analytical treatment of the other twoprimary functional subsystems of a society, the integrative-recently called the "societal community"-and the pattern-main-tenance. It is in the context of establishing the framework forthese .devel.opments that Economy and Society was not merely arecapItulatIOn of the discussion of the relations of economic andsociological theory in the Structure of Social Action, but repre-sented quite a new level of departure.

It was probably fair to criticise my theoretical work in its"structural-functional" phase for not adequately accounting forthe problems of political structure and process, although it ishoped that the developments just outlined mitigate the criticismsomewhat.6 Legitimate objections could also be raised about thesame phase with reference to the problems of accounting for

6 Cf: William C. Mitchell, Sociological Analysis and Politics' TheTheones of Talcott Parsons, Prentice-Hall, 1967. '

INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION xiiichange in societies and in their related cultural and psychologicalsystems. The third main phase of my "post-Structure" theoreticaldevelopment has come to center in these problem areas. Its key-note is a return to Weberian as distinct from Durkheimian inter-ests, because Weber was overwhelmingly the most important ofthe post-linear social evolutionists. In respects that first began totake shape in Economy and Society, and were developed muchfarther by Smelser in his Social Change in the Industrial Revo-lution, not only has a rather general evolutionary scheme emerged,but also a paradigm for analyzing rather specific patterned proc-esses of change. The paradigm has primarily to do with the rela-tions among the processes of differentiation, inclusion, upgrading,and value-generalization. A few articles and two small books-one published and the other nearly completed-document thisphase of development so far. 7

The Structure of Social Action was not meant in the first in-stance to be a study in intellectual history. I chose a rathernarrow sector within its time period and, except for backgroundpurposes, excluded previous contributions. In retrospect, in thebroad spectrum of relevant intellectual developments, it seemsthat two figures who were de-emphasized in my book have cometo influence the contemporary intellectual scene. Both belongedto the phase prior to the generation of my four principals; theywere, namely, Tocqueville and Marx.

In the most generalized sense, especially as focused on thesociety as the crucial type of social system, Durkheim and Weberseem to me to be the main founders of modern sociological theory.Both were in explicit revolt against the traditions of both eco-nomic individualism and socialism-Weber in the latter contextperhaps above all, because of the spectre of total bureaucratic"rationalization." In a sense, Tocquevilleand Marx provided thewing positions relative to this central core. Marx was the apostleof transcending the limitations of the partial "capitalistic" versionof rationalization through its completion in socialism. As Nisbet(op cit.) points out, this was to carry the doctrines of the Enlight-enment to a drastic conclusion. Tocqueville, on the other hand,represented the anxious nostalgia of the Ancien Regime and thefear that the losses entailed in its passing could never be replaced.

7 Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, Prentice-Hall,1966; and The System of Modern Societies, Prentice-Hall, forthcoming.

XIV INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION

Indeed, to a preeminent degree, Tocqueville was the apologist ofa fully aristocratic society. 8

Important as both of these authors have become in current dis-cussion, they were antecedents of the generation treated in theStructure of Social Action who did not attain a comparable levelof technical theoretical analysis. The appropriate characteriza-tion of Tocqueville's contribution seems to be insight rather thantheoretical rigor. Marx's technical economic theory must now beregarded as largely superseded; particularly by men like Marshalland Keynes. His "laws" of history and class struggle require, tosay the least, quite basic modification in the light of develop-ments in both modern social theory and modern societies. 9

Hence I still take the position that, given its European andmacrosociological references, the selection which was inherent inthe table of contents of the Structure of Social Action was in factappropriate to the core line of development in sociological theory.Important as they have been, the influences of Tocqueville andMarx still seem to belong properly on the wings rather than atthe core.10 I hope it can be said that my own enterprise in generaltheory, sketched briefly above, has produced authentic develop-ments from the potentialities present in this core, developmentssufficiently catholic not to skew the possibilities for sociologicaltheory too drastically because of positive preference or negativeprejudice.

TALCOTT PARSONSCAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

January, 1968

. 8 Thi,s paragraph shoul~ be understood in a theoretical, not a political-IdeologIcal sense. In partICular Tocqueville was very far from being asimple "conservative" defender of the Old Regime like Bonald andMaistre.

9 Cf. "Some Comments on the Sociology of Karl Marx," Chapter IVin my forthcoming Sociological Theory and Modern Society, Free Press,1967.

10 Along with the American social psychologists, notably Cooley, Mead,and W. 1. Thomas, the most important single figure neglected in theStructure of Social Action, and to an important degree in my subsequentwritings, is probably Simmel. It may be of interest that I actually drafteda chapter on Simmel for the Structure of Social Action, but partly forreasons of space finally decided not to include it. Simmel was more amicro- than a macrosociologist; moreover, he was not in my opiniona theorist on the same level as the others. He was mudh more a highlytalented essayist in the tradition of Tocqueville than a theorist like Durk-heim. Again, however, his influence on subsequent sociological thoughthas been a major one.

PREFACE TO SECOND EDITIONNearly twelve years have passed since the original publication

of The Structure of Social Act1:on. The post-war wave of interest intheoretical study and teaching in the relevant aspects of socialscience unfortunately found the book out of print, so that thedecision of The Free Press to bring out a new edition is most wel-come.

For a variety of reasons, it has been decided to reprint theoriginal book without change. There is, in this decision, no impli-cation that the book could not be substantially improved byrevision. Nothing could be further both from the spirit of the workand from a number of explicit statements* in it. The author's ownprocess of theoretical thinking has not stopped and if he were toundertake writing the book again at this time, it would come out asubstantially different and, let us hope, a better book.

To present a revised version which would at all closely resemblewhat the book would be like if newly written in 1949 would, how-ever, be a very heavy task. It would not only involve much actualrewriting, but, prior to that, a careful re-study and re-evaluationof the principal sources OIl which it was based. This would certainlybe highly productive, but the problem is to balance judgment ofthe 'productiveness of such work compared to alternative uses ofthe time and energy it would require.

The most important consideration involved in the balance is therelative advantage to be derived from further refinement of thecritical analysis of theoretical work done a generation and moreago as compared with the probable fruitfulness of proceeding withdirect analysis of theoretical problems in relation to presently goingempirical research interests without further refinement of criticalorientation. The decision not to embark on a thorough revision ofthe book represents the judgment that in the present situation ofsocial science, the latter constitutes the more fruitful channel fora major investment of time and energy.

The Structure of Social Action was intended to be primarily a* See Chapter I, pages 40-41.

xv

xvi PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION xvii

contribution to systematic social science and not to history, thatis the history of social thought. The justification of its criticalorientation to the work of other writers thus lay in the fact that thiswas a convenient vehicle for the clarification of problems andconcepts, of implications and interrelations. It was a means oftaking stock of the theoretical resources at our disposal. In theon-going process of scientific development, it constituted a pausefor reconsideration of basic policy decisions, on principles whichare serviceable in scientific work as in many other fields, namely,that "it is a good thing to know what you are doing," and thatthere may be resources and potentialities in the situation which inour absorption in daily work, we tend to overlook. The clarificationgained from this stocktaking has opened up possibilties for furthertheoretical development of sufficient scope so tha,t its impetus isas yet by no means exhausted. This is certainly true in a personalsense and it is reasonable to believe that it continues to be truefor others.

The Structure of Social Action analyzed a process of convergenttheoretical development which constituted a major revolution inthe scientific analysis of social phenomena. The three principalauthors treated in that study are by no means isolated but as con-tributors to the "sociological" side of the development, the addedperspective of another decade does not diminish their relativestature as high points in the movement. There is an elevated range,not just three peaks, but these three peaks loom far higher thanthe lesser ones.

This is true on the sociological side. A major one-sidedness of thebook is its relative neglect of the psychological aspects of the totalconceptual scheme-a balance which a thorough revision wouldcertainly have to attempt to redress. Here, at least, one figure inthe same generation as the others, that of Freud, looms up as hav-ing played a cardinal role in a development which, in spite of thedifferences of his starting points and empirical concerns, must beregarded as a vital part of the same general movement of thought.Psychology is probably richer in significant secondary figuresthan is true on the sociological side, but no other one seems closelyto approach the stature of Freud. So much is this the case that afull-dress analysis of Freud's theoretical development seen in thecontext of the "theory of social action"-and adaptation of therest of the book to the results of such an analysis-would Seem

indispensable to the kind of revision which ought to be undertaken.This would, of course, necessarily result in a substantial lengthen-ing of an already formidable work.

There may well bea difference of opinion whether there is anyfigure of comparable theoretical stature, who is classified as essen-tially a social or cultural anthropologist. It is the author's opinionthat there is not. Though Boas, for example, may be of comparablegeneral importance to social science and an equally great man, hiscontributions to systematic theoretical analysis in the same streamof development are not in the same category with a Durkheim ora Freud. In a diffuser sense, however, the contributions of anthro-pological thinking are, however, of first-rate importance and shouldreceive distinctly more emphasis than has been given them in TheStructure of Social Action. This is particularly true of the relationsof the structure of social action to the "structure of culture."Further clarification of these issues is one of the most urgent needsof basic social science at present.

In its fundamentals, this basic theoretical development hadtaken place by, let us say, twenty-five years ago. But the frames ofreference, the polemical orientations, the empirical interests andthe intellectual traditions surrounding the authors were so variousthat the actual unity of their work was accessible only with a greatdeal of laborious critical interpretation. Indeed, it was worse thanthat, for the actual differentiations had already become overlaidwith a welter of secondary interpretations and misinterpretations,which made the confusion even worse confounded. One of the prin-cipal services of The Structure of Social Action has been, I think, toclear away a great deal of this "underbrush" so that the bold out-line of a theoretical scheme could stand out with some clarity.

A better understanding of the psychological and cultural aspects,which an analysis of Freud's work and of anthropological thoughtmight have contributed would be desirable. Allowance should alsobe made for awkwardness of exposition. But even with qualifica-tions of this sort, the book reached a point on which furtherdevelopments can be built. Furthermore, gi.ven certain of the in-terpretive keys which it provides, the original works can be muchmore freely and fruitfully used. In a word, the outline of a theo-retical scheme and the contributions of some of its principal creatorshave become much more the public property of a professional grouprather than remaining the exclusive possession of a small coterie of

xviii PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION xix

Pareto, Durkheim, or Weber scholars, which would more likelythan not be rival coteries.

Assuming that, subject to the inevitable process of refinement,the basic theoretical outline developed in The Structure of SocialAction is essentially sound, to place its significance in better per-spective, something may be said about the nature and direction ofthe developments which can be built upon it.

lt was emphasized that the scheme had developed in directconnection with empirical interests and problems of the authors.This is true and of the first importance. But only at a few pointscould this empirical orientation have been said at this stage to haveapproached the level of being "operationally specific." One of themost notable of these, with all its crudity, was Durkheim's analysisof suicide rates. Another, on a totally different level, was Weber'sattempted test of the influence of religious ideas on economicdevelopment by the comparative analysis of the relationshipsbetween the relevant factors in a series of different societies. Buton the whole, the major relation to empirical problems remainedthat of a broad "clarification of issues," elimination of confusionand untenable interpretations, and the opening up of new possi-bilities.

A central problem, therefore, has been and is, how to bringtheory of this sort closer to the possibilities of guiding of andtesting and refinement by technical research, especially with theuse of technically refined instruments of observation, and of theordering and empirical analysis of observational data.

At least at many points, an important series of steps in thisdirection seems to be made possible by a shift in theoretical levelfrom the analysis of the structure of social action as such to thestructural-functional analysis of social systems. These are, ofcourse, "in the last analysis" systems of social action. But thestructure of such systems is, in the newer version, treated notdirectly in action terms, but as "institutionalized patterns" closeto a level of readily described and tested empirical generalization.

Th~s, in turn, makes it possible to isolate specific and manageable~ctlOn processes for intensive dynamic study. Such processes, thatIS, are treated as action in relation to institutionalized roles, inter~s of balances of conformity with and deviation from the expec-tatIons of the socially sanctioned role definitions, of conflictingrole expectations impinging on the individual, and the constella-

tions of motivational forces and mechanisms involved III suchbalances and conflicts.

The isolation of such problems to the point of empirical manage-ability can, however,within the framework of a structural-func-tional system of theory, be achieved with a relatively high level ofattainment of the advantages of generalized dynamic analysis.Treating dynamic problems in the context of their relation both tothe structure of a system and the relation of the processes to thefunctional prerequisites of its maintenance, provides a frame of ,reference for judging the general significance of a finding and forfollowing out systematically its interconnections with other prob-lems and facts.

The most promising lines of development of theory in the socio-logical and most immediately related fields, particularly the psycho-logical and cultural, therefore, seem to be two-fold. One majordirection is the theoretical elaboration and refinement of structural-functional analysis of social systems, including the relevant prob-lems of motivation and their relation to cultural patterns. In thisprocess, the structure of social action provides a basic frame ofreference, and aspects of it become of direct substantive importanceat many specific points. The main theoretical task, however, ismore than a refinement of the conceptual scheme of the presentlyreprinted book-it involves transition and translation to a differentlevel and focus of theoretical systematization.*

The second major direction is the development of technicallyoperational formulations and adaptations of theoretically signifi-cant concepts. The development of techniques of empirical researchhas been exceedingly rapid in the recent past and promises muchmore for the future. Such techniques can now accomplish impres-sive results even if the theory which guides their employment islittle more than common sense. But this is a minor fraction of theundertanding they promise if they can be genuinely integratedwith a really technical and generalized theoretical scheme.

It is the promise of the fruitfulness of developments in suchdirections as these which motivates the author not to undertake athorough revision of The Structure of Social Action at this time.Indeed, such a revision does not seem to be really necessary.Whatever theoretical progress the author has been able to make

* For a fuller account of this focus and what it involves see Talcott ParsonsEssays in Sociological Therapy (The Free Press, 1949), Chapters I and II. '

xx PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION

since its original publication* has been built solidly on the founda-tions it provides, starting, of course, with the insights providedby studying the great theorists whose works it analyzes. Thereseems to be substantial reason to believe that this is not merelyof idiosyncratic significance. Further dissemination of these con-tributions, even in their present form, should help to elevate thegeneral level of theoretical understanding and competence in ourprofession and to stimulate other contributors to develop the mostfruitful lines of theoretical advance of social science to a level somuch higher as to fulfill the promise in the work of their greatpredecessors of the turn of the century.

TALCOTT PARSONS.CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

March,1949

* See Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (The Free Press, 1949).

PREFACEIn a sense the present work is to be regarded as a secondary

study of the work of a group of writers in the field of social theory.But the genus "secondary study" comprises several species; ofthese an example of only one, and that perhaps not the bestknown, is to be found in these pages.

The primary aim of the study is not to determine and state insummary form what these writers said or believed about thesubjects they wrote about. Nor is it to inquire directly withreference to each proposition of their "theories" whether whatthey have said is tenable in the light of present sociologicaland related knowledge. Both these questions must be askedrepeatedly, but what is important is not so much the fact thatthey are asked, or even answered, but the context in which thistakes place.

The keynote to be emphasized is perhaps given in the subtitle ofthe book; it is a study in social theory, not theories. Its interest isnot in the separate and discrete propositions to be found in theworks of these men, but in a single body of systematic theoreticalreasoning the development of which can be traced through acritical analysis of the writings of this group, and of certain oftheir predecessors. The unity which justifies treating themtogether between the same covers is not that they constitute a"school" in the usual sense, or that they exemplify an epochor a period in the history of social theory, but that they haveall, in different respects, made important contributions to thissingle coherent body of theory, and the analysis of their worksconstitutes a convenient way of elucidating the structure andempirical usefulness of the system of theory itself.

This body of theory, the "theory of social action" is notsimply a group of concepts with their logical interrelations. Itis a theory of empirical science the concepts of which refer tosomething beyond themselves. It would lead to the worst kindof dialectic sterility to treat the development of a system oftheory without reference to the empirical problems in relation to

xxi

xxii PREFACE PREFACE xxiii

which it has been built up and used. True scientific theory isnot the product of idle" speculation," of spinning out the logicalimplications of assumptions, but of observation, reasoning andverification, starting with the facts and continually returningto the facts. Hence at every crucial point explicit treatment ofthe empirical problems which occupied the writers concerned isincluded. Only by treating theory in this close interrelationwith empirical problems and facts is any kind of an adequateunderstanding either of how the theory came to develop, or of itssignificance to science, possible.

Indeed though this volume is published as a study in theory inthe sense just outlined, the tracing of the development of atheoretical system through the works of these four men was notthe original intention of the author in embarking on intensivestudy of their works. It could not have been, for neither he norany other secondary writer on them was aware that there was asingle coherent theoretical system to be found there. The basison which the four writers were brought together for study wasrather empirical. It was the fact that all of them in differentways were concerned with the range of empirical problemsinvolved in the interpretation of some of the main features ofthe modern economic order, of "capitalism," "free enterprise,""economic individualism, " as it has been variously called. Onlyvery gradually did it become evident that in the treatment ofthese problems, even from such diverse points of view, there wasinvolved a common conceptual scheme, and so the focus ofinterest was gradually shifted to the working out of the schemefor its own sake.

Many of the author's debts, in the long history of the study,which in continuity of problems extends back into undergraduatedays, defy acknowledgment, because they are so numerous andoften so indefinite. An attempt will be made to acknowledgeonly those of most important direct relevance to the study as itnow stands.

Of these immediately relevant debts four are of outstandingsignificance. The least definite, but perhaps the most important,is to Professor Edwin F. Gay, who over a period of years has takenan active interest in the study, has been a source of encourage-ment at many points in the long and sometimes discouragingprocess of its development, and has consistently stimulated the

author to the highest quality of work of which he was capable.Secondly, the author's colleague Professor Overton H. Taylorhas contributed, in ways which would defy identification, atinnumerable points, largely through a long series of personaldiscussions of the problems, particularly those associated moredirectly with the status of economic theory. Both have alsoread parts of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions.Third, Professor Lawrence J. Henderson has subjected themanuscript to a most unusually thorough critical examination,which led to important revision at many points, particularly inrelation to general scientific methodology and to the interpreta-tion of Pareto's work. Finally, much is owed to the changinggroup of students, especially graduate, with whom the author hascarried on discussions of problems of social theory throughoutmuch of the period of incubation of the study. In the lively giveand take of these discussions many a fruitful idea has emergedand many an obscure point has been clarified.

Two other critics have been particularly helpful through thesuggestions and criticisms they have given after reading themanuscript, Professor A. D. Nock, especially in the parts dealingwith religion, and Dr. Robert K. Merton. Various others haveread the manuscript or proof in whole or in part, and have madevaluable suggestions and criticisms. They include ProfessorP. A. Sorokin, Professor Josef Schumpeter, Professor Frank H.Knight, Dr. Alexander von Schelting, Professor C. K. M.Kluckhohn, Professor N. B. DeNood, Miss Elizabeth Nottingham,Mr. Emile B. Smullyan and Mr. Edward Shils. To Mr.Smullyan and Dr. Benjamin Halpern, I am also indebted forresearch assistance.

The foregoing have aided this study in relation to the technicalsubject matter as such. But this is by no means all there is tothe completion of such a work. In other respects two other debtsare particularly important. One is to the Harvard UniversityCommittee on Research in the Social Sciences, which made pos-sible by its grants some valuable research assistance in bibliog-raphy and the secondary literature, and stenographic assistancein preparation of the manuscript. The other is to my father,President Emeritus Edward S. Parsons of Marietta College,who took upon himself the heavy burden of going through thewhole manuscript in an attempt to improve its English style.

xxiv PREFACE

Whatever of readability an unavoidably difficult work maypossess is largely to be credited to him.

For secretarial assistance in typing the manuscript I am muchindebted to Miss Elizabeth Wolfe, Mis!'! Agnes Hannay and Mrs.Marion B. Bil~ngs, and for assistance in preparation of thebibliography to Miss Elaine Ogden.

TALCOTT PARSONS.CAMBRIDGE, MASS.,

October, 1937.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION TO THE PAPERBACK EDITIONPREFACE TO SECOND EDITIONPREFACE

PART ITHE POSITIVISTIC THEORY OF ACTION

vxv

xxi

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTORY 3The Problem, 3. Theory and Empirical Fact, 6. Residual Cate-gories, 16. Theory, Methodology and Philosophy, 20. Types ofConcepts, 27. Note on the Concept "Fact", 41.

CHAPTER II. THE THEORY OF ACTION 43The Unit of Action Systems, 43. The Utilitarian System, 51.The Positivistic Theory of Action, 60. Empiricism, 69. Indi-vidualism in the Theory of Action, 72. Note A: On the Concept"Normative", 74. Note B: Schematic Outline of System Typesin the Theory of Action, 77. Note C: On the Content of Non-subjective Categories in Relation to the Theory of Action, 82.Note D: On the Relations of Psychology and Biology, 85.

CHAPTER III. SOME PHASES OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OFINDIVIDUALISTIC POSITIVISM IN THE THEORY OF ACTION 87

Hobbes and the Problem of Order, 89. Locke and the ClassicalEconomics, 95. Malthus and the Instability of Utilitarianism,102. Marx and Class Antagonism, 107. Darwinism, 110. OtherPaths to Radical Positivism, 115. Utility, 121. Evolution, 122.

PART IITHE EMERGENCE OF A VOLUNTARISTIC THEORYOF ACTION FROM THE POSITIVISTIC TRADITION

CHAPTER IV. ALFRED MARSHALL: WANTS AND ACTIVITIES AND THEPROBLEM OF THE SCOPE OF ECONOMICS 129

Activities and Utility Theory, 130. The Supplies of the Factorsof Production, 141. Real Cost, 146. Free Enterprise, 150. SocialEvolution, 155. The "Natural Order", 159. Economic Motives,161. The Problem of the Scope of Economic Theory, 165.

XXV

xxvi CONTENTS CONTENTS xxvii

CHAPTER V. VILFREDO PARETO, I: THE METHODOLOGY AND MAINANALYTICAL SCHEME 178

Methodology, 180. Logical and Nonlogical Action, 185. Resi-dues and Derivations, 196. The Two Structural Aspects ofNonlogical Action, 200.

CHAPTER VI. VILFREDO PARETO, II: EXTENSION AND VERIFICATIONOF THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 219

Pareto and Social Darwinism, 219. The "Logical" Aspect ofAction Systems, 228. The Theory of Social Utility, 241. TheNonlogical Aspect of Social Systems, 250. The Status of Eco-nomic Theory Again, 264.

CHAPTER VII. VILFREDO PARETO, III: EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONSAND CONCLUSIONS 269

The Ideology Problem, 269. Cycles of Social Change, 278. TheRole of Force, 288. General Conclusions, 293.

CHAPTER VIII. EMILE DURKHElM, I: EARLY EMPIRICAL WORK 301The Division of Labor, 308. Suicide, 324. Occupational Groupsand Socialism, 338.

CHAPTER IX. EMILE DURKHEIM, II: THE METHODOLOGY OF SOCI-OLOGISTIC POSITIVISM 343

The Utilitarian Dilemma, 344. The "Social" Factor, 350. Col-lective Representations, 359. Ethics and the Social Type, 368.

CHAPTER X. EMILE DURKHEIM, III: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THETHEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 376

The Changing Meaning of Constraint, 378. Ethical Difficulties,390. The Role of Institutions, 399.

CHAPTER XI. EMILE DURKHEIM, IV: THE FINAL PHASE: RELIGIONAND EPISTEMOLOGY 409

Religious Ideas, 411. Ritual, 429. Epistemology, 441.

CHAPTER XII. SUMMARY OF PART II: THE BREAKDOWN OF THEPOSITIVISTIC THEORY OF ACTION 451

The Positivistic Starting Points, 451. Marshall, 452. Pareto,454. Durkheim, 460.

PART IIITHE EMERGENCE OF A VOLUNTARISTIC THEORY

OF ACTION FROM THE IDEALISTIC TRADITION

CHAPTER XIII. THE IDEALISTIC TRADITION 473Methodological Background, 473. The Problem of Capitalism,487. Marx, 488. Sombart, 495.

CHAPTER XIV. MAX WEBER, I: RELIGION AND MODERN CAPITALISMA. PROTESTANTISM AND CAPITALISM 500

The Principal Characteristics of Capitalism, 503. The Spiritof Capitalism, 513. Calvinism and the Spirit of Capitalism,516. Note on the Role of Ideas, 533.

CHAPTER XV. MAX WEBER, II: RELIGION AND MODERN CAPITALISM(Continued) B. THE COMPARATIVE STUDIES 539

China, 542. India, 552. The Systematic Typology of Religion,563. Protestantism and Capitalism: Schematic Summary, 575.

CHAPTER XVI. MAX WEBER, III: METHODOLOGY 579Objectivism, 581. Intuitionism, 586. Natural and Social Sci-ence, 591. The Ideal Type and Generalized Analytical Theory,601. The Logic of Empirical Proof, 610. Adequacy of Explana-tion, 624. Action and Complexes of Meaning, 635.

CHAPTER XVII. MAX WEBER, IV: SYSTEMATIC THEORY 640The Types of Social Action, 640. Modes of Orientation ofAction, 649. Legitimate Order, Charisma and Religion, 658.Ritual, 673. Matters of Taste, 677. Note on Gemeinschaft andGesellschaft, 686.

PART IVCONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

Follows page 470, numbered xxxi-xli

xliii-Ixv

End of Volume I

CHAPTER XVIII. EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED CONCLUSIONS 697Summary Outline of the Structure of Action, 698. Rationalityand Utilitwrianism, 698. Marshall, 702. Pareto, 704. Durkheim,708. Weber, 714. Verified Conclusion, 719.

xxviii CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIX. TENTATIVE METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 727Empiricism and Analytical Theory, 728. The Action Frameof Reference, 731. Systems of Action and Their Units, 737.The Role of Analytical Elements, 748. The General Status ofthe Theory of Action, 753. The Classification of the Sciencesof Action, 757. The Place of Sociology, 768.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

Follows page 776, xxxi-xxxvii

xxxix-Ixi

J ede denkende Besinnung auf dieletzten Elemente sinnvollen mensch-

lichen Handelns ist zunachst gebundenan die Kategorien "Zweck" und " Mittel."

Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsatzezur Wissenschaftslehre, p. 149.