Part 2 of Outline

7/27/2019 Part 2 of Outline

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Tapiador vs Office of the Ombudsman and Ledesma -EUNICE

DOCTRINE:

the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more

particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987

Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found

to be at fault, to the public official concerned.

FACTS:

Walter H. Beck, a US citizen, filed a complaint against petitioner Renato Tapiador, BID Special

Investigator ans assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then Associate Commissioner Bayani

M. Subido, Jr.. The complaint alleged that petitioner Tapiador demanded and received from Walter Beck

the amount of Php10,000 in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of registration which was

subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite repeated demands by Beck, unless the latter

pay additional amount of Php7,000.

Petitioner categorically denied it and he stated that he never received any amount of money from Walter

Beck. In fact, petitioner, in his flow of facts, Monica Beck came to the office to follow up on his visa

application. When petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first of all the requirements for a visaapplication, Beck and his wife made a scene and charged petitioner with having demanded money from

them. Petitioner was prompted to file a criminal case against them for oral defamation. The BID resident

Ombudsman Ronaldo Ledesma found petitioner guilty for violating existing civil service rules and

regulations as well as penal laws, and thus, recommended that criminal and administrative charges be

filed against the petitioner.

Upon review of the case, the criminal charge was DISMISSED by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence,

however, the Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative aspect of

the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the government service.

ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to directly dismiss petitioner from the government

service? NO.

HELD:

the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Commenton February 20,

1998 which essentially recommended that the petitioner be exonerated from the subject administrative

charge on the ground that the assailed resolution of the Ombudsman was rendered in violation of

procedural due process and that it was not supported by substantial evidence.

the Ombudsman asserts that the sworn statements of Walter Beck a and his witness, Purisima Terencio,

substantially established the administrative liability of the petitioner for grave misconduct by demanding

from complainant Beck a sum of money in exchange for the issuance of the latters ACR; and for that

offense, petitioner should be imposed the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the government

service.

The petitioner reiterated that the Office of the Ombudsman found no evidence against him in itsinvestigation of the criminal aspect of the case and thus, he argued that the instant administrative charge

should also have been dismissed.

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the

allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence

as is required in an ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion


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A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were

not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation conducted by the BID

Resident Ombudsman at the BID office in Manila. Neither did they appear during the preliminary

investigation to identify their respective sworn statements despite prior notice before the investigating

officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the charge against

the petitioner was not supported by any evidence. Hence, Becks affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible in

evidence. On this basis alone, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman

should have dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.

Nonetheless, a perusal of the affidavit executed by Walter Beck does not categorically state that it was

petitioner Tapiador who personally demanded from Beck the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos

(P10,000.00) in consideration for the issuance of the latters ACR. On the other hand, it appears that

Walter Beck and his wife sought the assistance of Purisima Terencio sometime in the later part of 1992 in

facilitating the issuance of his ACR and in the process, Terencio allegedly informed the couple that Beck

could be granted the same and would be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently with the help of

the petitioner and a certain Mr. Angeles who was also with the BID, for a fee of Ten Thousand Pesos

(P10,000.00). Hence, Beck and his wife did not appear to have any direct or personal knowledge of the

alleged demand of the petitioner except through the information allegedly relayed to them by Terencio.

Likewise, although Beck claimed to have subsequently paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), hisaffidavit is silent as to the identity of the person who actually received the said amount from him.

Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount directly to the petitioner

if it were indeed the latter who actually received the same, but he did not.

Anent the affidavit of Purisima Terencio, the Ombudsman gave full faith and credit to her statement that

the spouses paid the full amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) on February 23, 1992 to Mr.

Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with the promise for the immediate release of

the same on the mere assumption that there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements

against the petitioner who is employed with the government for more than thirty (30) years. On the

contrary, the rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until proven otherwise does not apply to the

case at bar for the reason that Terencio had the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of

the Beck spouses for reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The Ombudsman

should have been more prudent in according credence to the allegations of Terencio coming as they do

from a supposed fixer.

Besides, Purisima Terencio was adroit enough to make it appear in her affidavit that the Beck spouses

had paid Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) in grease money to the petitioner on February 23, 1992

even without categorically stating that she had personal knowledge or had actually witnessed the alleged

pay off. A close scrutiny of the allegations in her affidavit show that the alleged pay off had taken place as

early as February 23, 1992. However, Beck claimed in his own affidavit that he was informed by Terencio

only between the period from September to October 1992 that the processing of his ACR could be

facilitated through the assistance of the petitioner and a certain Mr. Angeles. This glaring inconsistency

more than sufficiently impeached Terencios credibility thereby belying the assessment of the

Ombudsman in the assailed resolution.

In view of the foregoing, it is not necessary anymore to pass upon the other grounds raised by thepetitioner in his petition. The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to

prove the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial evidence. Besides, assuming

arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss

the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section

13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Cons titution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the

removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.


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*Ledesma vs CA - JEROME

Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry

(BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio

with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, an investigation

was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs)

of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions

tainted with similar irregularities.

As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau

(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against herein petitioner. Also charged

administratively were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board Member and Executive

Assistant, respectively, in petitioners division. With respect to petitioner, the complaint was treated as

both a criminal and an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect), for nine

(9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of public documents,

and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038 (administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,

Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved the administrative cases filed against petitioner,

Caronongan and Ang, as follows

Petitionersuspended 1 year

Carnonganmoot and academic

Angdismiss case lack of evidence

Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which was

approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto

In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent Ombudsman approved a Resolution[8] dated June 22,

1999 of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges against

petitioner for insufficiency of evidence

In an Order[11] dated February 8, 2000, Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for

reconsideration which was approved by respondent Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but reduced the

period of suspension from one (1) year to nine (9) months without pay.

On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which included a

prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary

restraining order to enjoin public respondents from implementing the order of suspension. The Court of

Appeals issued the TRO on April 19, 2000.

In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but

reduced the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.

Hence this caseISSUE: WON the approval of the BOC ratified the irregularities made by petitioner?

WON the findings of the ombudsman is merely recommendatory?

HELD: Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned applications for the extension

of the TRVs. He denies that he misled or deceived the BOC into approving these applications and

argues that the BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct when it approved the


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subject applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and the government did not suffer any

damage as a result of his alleged administrative lapse.

We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape liability, petitioner undermines his position in the

BID and his role in the processing of the subject applications. But by his own admission,[14] it appears

that the BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extension and its supporting documents, but more

importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates their papers before making a recommendation to

the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in order, it executes a Memorandum

of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and propriety of the applications.

2nd

issue:

Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals pronouncement that the findings of the Ombudsman may not

be said to be merely recommendatory upon the Immigration Commissioner. He argues that to uphold

the appellate courts ruling expands the authority granted by the Constitution to the Office of the

Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, particularly Tapiador v. Office of

the Ombudsman.[16] Petitioner submits that the Ombudsmans findings that the TRV applications were

illegal constitutes an indirect interference by the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over

immigration matters.

We do not agree. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987

Constitution.[17] The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to actpromptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or

of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled

corporations.

The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the Office of the

Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987

Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

...(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at

fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure

compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that the Ombudsmans

action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect as held in the case of

TAPIADOR blabla scra

For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word recommend

must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance therewith. The proper

interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority to

determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the

head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely

concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal

interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the

main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to provethe charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the power of the

Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is

susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be

cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.

*Garcia-Rueda vs Pascasio - EUMIR


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FACTS - Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda,

underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a stone

blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr. who was the

surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the anaesthesiologist. Six

hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of complications of unknown

cause, according to officials of the UST Hospital.[2]Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an autopsy on her husbands

body. Consequently, the NBI ruled that Florencios death was due to lack of

care by the attending physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to

its findings, the NBI recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda

Balatbat-Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the

Office of the City Prosecutor.

During the preliminary investigation, what transpired was a confounding

series of events which we shall try to disentangle. The case was initially

assigned to Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself becausehe was related to the counsel of one of the doctors. As a result, the case

was re-raffled to Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however, disqualified

on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and

jurisprudence regarding preliminary investigation. The case was then

referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a resolution recommending

that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against

Dr. Antonio be dismissed.

The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor Josefina

Santos Sioson, in the interest of justice and peace of mind of the parties,

recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that Prosecutor Carisma

was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was transferred to ProsecutorLeoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte face occurred again with the endorsement

that the complaint against Dr. Reyes be dismissed and instead, a

corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba.

Pending the resolution of petitioners motion for reconsideration regarding

Prosecutor Dimagibas resolution, the investigative pingpong continued when

the case was again assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who

recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in the criminal information of

Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of Prosecutor

Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor

Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing,

a resolution which was approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg

and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of

Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019[3]against Prosecutors Guerrero,

Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before

the Office of the Ombudsman.
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In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the

Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government prosecutors and to

approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for,

allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there exists

probable cause to hold public respondent City Prosecutors liable for

violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

While the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a

criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the

Ombudsmans action when there is an abuse of discretion, in which case Rule

65 of the Rules of Court may exceptionally be invoked pursuant to Section I,

Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution[E1] .[6]In this regard, grave abuse of discretion has been defined as where a

power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or

personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive

duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of

law.[7]

From a procedural standpoint, it is certainly odd why the successive

transfers from one prosecutor to another were not sufficiently explained in

the Resolution of the Ombudsman. Being the proper investigating authority

with respect to misfeasance, non-feasance and malfeasance of public

officials, the Ombudsman should have been more vigilant and assiduous in

determining the reasons behind the buckpassing to ensure that no

irregularity took place.

Whether such transfers were due to any outside pressure or ulterior motive is

a matter of evidence. One would have expected the Ombudsman, however, to

inquire into what could hardly qualify as standard operating procedure,

given the surrounding circumstances of the case.

While it is true that a preliminary investigation is essentially

inquisitorial, and is often the only means to discover who may be charged

with a crime, its function is merely to determine the existence of probable

cause.

In the instant case, no less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an

autopsy that there was indeed negligence on the part of the attending

physicians in administering the anaesthesia.[11]The fact of want of competence

or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be

passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to

ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without extensive

investigation, research, evaluation and consultations with medical experts.

Clearly, the City Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass

judgment on such a technical matter, especially when there are conflicting

evidence and findings. The bases of a partys accusation and defenses are

better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.
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Why did the complainant, petitioner in instant case, elect to charge

respondents under the above law?While a party who feels himself aggrieved is at liberty to choose the

appropriate weapon from the armory, it is with no little surprise that this

Court views the choice made by the complainant widow.

To our mind, the better and more logical remedy under the circumstances would

have been to appeal the resolution of the City Prosecutors dismissing the

criminal complaint to the Secretary of Justice under the Department of

Justices Order No. 223, [21] otherwise known as the 1993 Revised Rules on

Appeals From Resolutions In Preliminary Investigations/Reinvestigations, as

amended by Department Order No. 359, Section 1 of which provides:

Section 1. What May Be Appealed. - Only resolutions of the Chief State

Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor dismissing

a criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of

Justice except as otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.

What action may the Secretary of Justice take on the appeal? Section 9 of

Order No. 223 states: The Secretary of Justice may reverse, affirm or

modify the appealed resolution. On the other hand, He may motu proprioor

on motion of the appellee, dismiss outright the appeal on specified grounds.[22]

In exercising his discretion under the circumstances, the Ombudsman acted

within his power and authority in dismissing the complaint against the

Prosecutors and this Court will not interfere with the same.

Power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute

Uy v Sandiganbayan

Facts: Petitioner was Deputy Comptroller of the Philippine Navy. He was designated by his

immediate supervisor to act on the latters behalf, during his absence, on matters relating

to the activities of the Fiscal Control Branch, O/NG. This included the authority to sign

disbursement vouchers relative to the procurement of equipment needed by the Philippine

Navy.

On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official documentsand one (1) information for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, were

filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and nineteen (19) co-accused. On

September 20, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order[2]directing a comprehensive re-

investigation of the cases against all the twenty (20) accused.

After conducting the re-investigation, the Special Prosecutor issued an Order[3] dated

November 14, 1991 recommending that the informations for estafa through falsification of
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official documents be withdrawn and in lieu thereof, informations for violation of Section 3

(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, be filed against eleven (11) accused,[4]which included

the petitioner.

In a Memorandum[5] dated December 5, 1991, Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto

reduced the number of those to be charged under R.A. No. 3019, as amended, to five 5 ,

[6]

including petitioner.

Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the five (5) remaining accused, the

Special Prosecutor issued an Order[7] dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2) more

names[8] from the five (5) officers recommended for prosecution, and recommending that

six (6) separate informations for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. 3019, as amended, be filed

against the petitioner and to another. Thereafter, the six (6) amended informations [10]was

filed by Special Prosecutor Officer III Roger C. Berbano, Sr.

On April 21, 1992, the petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the

informations on the following grounds:1. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of

the accused.

2. The officer who has filed the informations had no authority to do so.

On June 10, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued the now-assailed Resolution denying

petitioners motion to quash for lack of merit. It passed upon the grounds set forth by

petitioner in this wise:

On the first issue raised by accused-movant, we are not inclined to rule that this

Court has no jurisdiction over the person of accused-movant or over the offenses

charged herewith. As intimated by the prosecution, this Court has several casespending before it involving crimes committed by military officers in relation to their

office. Unless and until the Highest Tribunal rules otherwise, this Court has no

judicious recourse but to entertain and try the various criminal cases filed by the

Office of the Special Prosecutor involving military officers and men accused of

committing crimes in relation to their office, and those involving violation of

Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act. Be that as it may, being prosecuted for violation of R.A. 3019, as

amended, Accused-movant axiomatically is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

We cannot likewise sustain accused-movants stance that the officer who has filed

the informations in the cases at bar had no authority to do so. Both the offensecharged and the person of accused-movant being within the exclusive jurisdiction of

this Court, it stands to reason that the preliminary investigation and prosecution of

the instant criminal charges belong to, and are the exclusive prerogatives of, the

Office of the Ombudsman, as provided for in Section 15(1) of Republic Act No.

6770.

Issue:
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(1) whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person and over the

offense contained in the information filed before it

(2) whether or not the special prosecutor who filed the information in this case has

the authority to do so (issue related to the topic assigned)

Held:

(1) We rule that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the time of

the filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law.

Republic Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to P.D. 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan

(otherwise known as the Sandiganbayan Law), provides the prevailing scope of the

Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law

read:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,

Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are

officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a

permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

x x x x x x x x x

(d.) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher

rank;

x x x x x x x x x

It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the nature of the offense and the

position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua nonbefore the Sandiganbayan can

validly take cognizance of the case.

In the instant case, while petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.

3019, as amended, which is an offense covered by Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, his

position as Lieutenant Commander (LCMDR.) of the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than

naval captains and all officer of higher rank as prescribed under sub-paragraph (d) of

Section 4. Under the Promotions System in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the

hierarchy in the position/rank of the officers of the Philippine Navy is as follows:

1. Admiral

2. Vice-Admiral

3. Rear Admiral

4. Commodore

5. Captain

6. Commander


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7. Lieutenant Commander

8. Lieutenant Senior Grade

9. Lieutenant Junior Grade

10. Ensign

Thus, not falling within the rank requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdictionover petitioner is vested in the regular courts pursuant to the provision of Section 4 of the

Sandiganbayan Law, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that In cases where none

of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as

prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,

exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,

metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case

may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,

as amended.

Consequently, it is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

(2) In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority

to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The

Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

*Office of the Ombudsman vs Enoc - JEZ

Doctrine: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and

unqualified. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and

those cognizable by regular courts.

Facts: Respondents were employed at the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), Davao

del Sur, Provincial Office, Digos, Davao del Sur with salaries below grade 27

They were charged with 11 counts of malversation through falsification, based on alleged purchases of

medicine and food assistance for cultural community members, and one count of violation of R.A. No.

3019, 3(e), in connection with the purchases of supplies for the OSCC without bidding/canvass. As

none of the respondents has the rank required under R.A. No. 8249[3]

to be tried for the said crimes in

the Sandiganbayan, the informations were filed by the Ombudsman in the Regional Trial Court of Digos,

Davao del Sur. Respondents moved to quash the informations invoking the ruling inUy v. Sandiganbayan

that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular

courts. This motion was granted by the RTC and the cases were dismissed without prejudice, however,

to their refiling by the appropriate officer.

Hence the case

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate, file information, and prosecute cases

before the regular courts.
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Held: No, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan[4]

and held that the

Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.

It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to

be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable

by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any

illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public

officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1)

giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section

11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute

criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the

scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

First in Sec 15 of RA 6770, the law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to

take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of suchcases. The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases

involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts.

Second, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority

of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Special prosecutor is merely a proponent of

the ombudsman. It cannot be the intention of the lawmakers that the same limitations is limited to the

Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and

employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case

where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his

office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special

investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.

The Ombudsman therefore has the authority to prosecute the cases of the respondents.

*Gozos vs Tac-an - WIL

G.R. No. 123191 December 17, 1998OSCAR L. GOZOS, Presiding Prosecutor of Batangas, EDNA DYOGI, et al., petitioners,

vs.

HON. PATERNO C. TAC-AN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Batangas City; SPO2

JAIME V. BLANCO, SPO3 PEDRO CASTILLO, SPO3 CIRIANO S. SULIT, SPO4 ANIANO ATIENZA, and

SPO1 ILDEFONZO CASTILLO, respondent.

G.R. No. 123442 December 17, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas, petitioner,

vs.

HON. PATERNO C. TAC-AN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 84, Batangas City, and

SPO2 JAIME V. BLANCO, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:
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FACTS:

On February 9 1995, during a school party by the Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, several men who

appeared drunk came to the school premises and were forcing their way through the gate. The police

(respondents) soon arrived where they asked one of the men (vicitm, who was armed) to surrender his

weapon and produce the license and permit. He did so willingly but when he asked for his weapon and

documentation back, the police refused to return the same.

What exactly followed is unclear. Before long the two were grappling for possession of the gun.

Apparently, Blanco pulled out his sidearm and fired at Gilbert Dyogi twice.

In connection with the fatal incident, Gerald Varez, Investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman for the

Military, charged private respondents with murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of

Batangas City.

Private respondents Blanco, Pedro Castillo, Sulit, Atienza, and Ildefonso Castillo filed a Motion to Hold

Issuance of Warrant and Motion to Quash with Motion to Set Incidents for Hearing in which they prayed

that the court first dermine whether or not there is probable cause.

Petitioner Edna Dyogi opposed the motion. She maintained that there was probable cause for the filing of

the case against private respondents. Respondent Tac-an heard the parties on their motion after which,

in an order dated October 18, 1995, he ruled in favor of the Ombudsman and Petitioner and found

probably cause but declared it to be Homicide. Petitioner Dyogi moved for a reconsideration, arguing that the crime committed was murder, and not

homicide, and that there was probable cause to believe that private respondents were guilty of the

offense. In his order, dated November 22, 1995, respondent judge partially reconsidered his order by

directing the inclusion of respondent Pedro Castillo in the information not as principal but only as an

accomplice. In all other respect, he affirmed his previous order. The dispositive portion of his order.

On December 8, 1995, petitioner Edna Dyogi filed another motion for reconsideration, contending that the

power to determine the nature of the offense to be charged was vested in the Provincial Prosecutor and

not in the Regional Trial Court. However, petitioner's motion was denied by the court in its order, dated

January 3, 1996, on the ground that it was actually a second motion for reconsideration which is not

allowed to be filed. Hence, these petitions for certiorari filed by the Solicitor General and by the

complainant in the criminal case, Edna Dyogi.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he conducted a

preliminary investigation in a proceeding to determine probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of

arrest. (YES)

2. Whether or not Respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the

amendment of the crime charged from murder to homicide and the nature of the particiation of the

accused. (YES)

HELD:

We find both petitions to be meritorious.

Rule 112, 1 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary investigation as "an inquiry or proceeding for thepurpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime

cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty

thereof, and should be held for trial." Rule 112, 2 of the Rules of Court enumerates the officers

authorized to conduct preliminary investigations, as follows:

The following may conduct a preliminary

investigation:

(c) xxx


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(d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all

crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial

Jurisdictions.

Thus, as provided in Rule 112, 2(d), other officers may be authorized by law to conduct preliminary

investigations. Indeed, under R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,

investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman may conduct preliminary investigations of cases involving

public officers. Thus, 15 (1) of the said law provides:

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions

and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person,

any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,

when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,

in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from

any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such

cases.

The investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman have concurrent jurisdiction with public prosecutors toconduct preliminary investigations in all cases involving public officers, whether falling under the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts. For this purpose, Administrative Order No. 8,

dated November 8, 1990, of the Office of the Ombudsman provides:

For purposes of investigation and prosecution. Ombudsman cases

involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes to

wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling

under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. . . .

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation in any

Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of

the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City

Prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as

deputized Ombudsman Prosecutors.

Thus, while the power of an investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is undoubted, no

similar authority is vested in judges of Regional Trial Courts as they are not among those mentioned in

Rule 112, 2 as authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.

As explained in Salta v. Court of Appeals, the preliminary investigation proper is,

therefore, not a judicial function. It is a part of the prosecution's job, a function of the

executive.

Hence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the judge regarding the designation of the offense

committed, for as long as he finds probable cause for the offense charged, he should issue a warrant of

arrest against the accused for the crime charged in the information.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the orders, dated October 18, 1995, November 22,

1995, and January 3, 1996, of respondent Judge Paterno Tac-an are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Deloso vs Domingo - ALI

QUICKIE: Governor Deloso was charged with multiple murder. In this petition, Deloso wants to stop

Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman from conducting a preliminary investigation. Deloso argues that the

Ombudsmans jurisdiction is confined to the investigation of acts or omissions that are connected with the


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performance of his duties as governor. His petition was denied. The clause any [illegal] act or omission

of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public official. It does not

require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official

duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

FACTS:

DelosoGovernor of Zambales

DomingoDeputy Ombudsman for Luzon

Delosos convoy of 3 motor vehicles was allegedly ambushed. Deloso jumped out of the car and

during a lull in the shooting was rushed home by his official staff. Deloso later learned that 3 supposed

ambushers were killed while his own group suffered no casualties.

However, according to testimonies of eyewitnesses, the governors group was not ambushed but was

the ambusher.

The military servicemen in the Governors security service force were charged with murder in the

Judge Advocate Generals Office; the civilian security men were investigated by the Provincial Fiscal of

Zamboanga

Deloso was charged with multiple murder before the Special Prosecutor Raul M. Gonzales who,

without a referral from the Ombudsman, supposedly handpicked Juan Templonuevo to conduct thepreliminary investigation of the case.

Albeit reluctantly, it may be imagined, Special presecutor Gonzales referred the case to the

Ombudsman for preliminary investigation.

Feb 20, 1989 = Deloso filed motion to dismiss (Ombudsmans jurisdiction is limited to crimes related

to or connected with an officials discharge of his public functions)

June 19, 1989 = Domingo denied Delosos motion to dismiss because the Constitution empowers

the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of any official without any qualification that the said

act or omission must have been committed or incurred in relation to his office.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate the charge of multiple murder allegedly

committed by Deloso as provincial governor

HELD:

YES. The clause any [illegal] act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any

crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of

the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or

omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law

does not distinguish, neither should we.

The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all

kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or

employeeduring his tenure of office.

The murder of 3 persons is without any doubt, an illegal act. Since it was allegedly committed by the

petitioner as provincial governor of Zambales, the crime lies within the pale of the Ombudsmans

investigative authority.

The Ombudsman Act of 1989 which took effect on December 7, 1989 vests in the Ombudsman primary

jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.


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The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty

prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional. The murder charge against Deloso

carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death hence it is cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.

Concurrent authority of the Ombudsman

*Quinon vs Sandiganbayan - VANESSA

TOPIC: Concurrent Authority of the Ombudsman

Quinon v Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE: The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and

other investigation agencies of the government in the prosecution of the cases of the government in the

prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.

FACTS:

CRIMINAL CASE 16279

1. November 5, 1990An Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan against Pablo Quinon, then

Station Commander of Calinog, Iloilo PC/INP, charging him with the felony of Malversation of Public

Properties under Article 271 of the RPC.

2. The Information alleged that came into his possession and control in his official capacity 2 pistolsand magazines and 1 shotgun, he applied and converted the firearms to his personal use and benefit to

the damage and prejudice of the Government.

3. On Arraignment: He pleaded NOT GUILTY.

4. The Court issued an Order which, observing that Quion had put in an appearance only once, at

his arraignment, and had been absent during all the 6 times that the case had been set for pre-trial and

trial, required him to show cause in 10 days why he should not be held in contempt for failing to appear;

and reset the case for pre-trial and trial subpoena was served on Quion, again through both his wife,

Leticia, and his bondsmen.

5. November 5, 1992 - Quion put in an appearance, but without his lawyer. Quion advised the

Court that his lawyer was down with typhoid feverThe Sandiganbayan acceded.

6. Quion failed to present himself adverting to his "severe dizziness".

7. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order dated February 24, 1993, in which it deemed the affidavit to

be "in fact ** a request for postponement of the case on account of an alleged illness of the accused;"

noted the prosecution's objection thereto; recalled that in prior "settings, accused and counsel had asked

for postponement of trial on the same ground;" agreed with the prosecution's observation that "it takes

time, energy and great expense for witnesses to come all the way from Iloilo and so, if they come only to

find that the accused has asked for postponement of trial, it engenders disappointment to the prosecution

and embarrassment to the Court;" remarked that "the excuses put up by the accused ** were flimsy and

obviously designed to delay trial;" considered the accused "to have waived his presence during trial

today" and authorized the "prosecution ** (to) proceed to present evidence in accordance with law."

8. The prosecution presented its proofs and then rested its case, after which the Sandiganbayan

issued another Order to the effect that "the accused Pablo Quion may present evidence in his defense

on July 22 and 23, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning." 9. Neither Quion nor his counsel came to the Court on the appointed date. The Sandiganbayan

issued an Order in open Court declaring the case submitted for decision, Quion's "failure to appear

notwithstanding ** that notice was given to him and that he was given the opportunity to present evidence

today ** (being) considered a waiver of his right to present evidence;" directing the prosecutor "to present

a memorandum for the prosecution within ten (10) days;" and commanding that Quion be arrested, his

bond confiscated, and his bondsmen required to produce him within thirty (30) days and "show cause in

writing why judgment on the bond shall not be rendered under the circumstances." As directed, the


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prosecution filed on July 28, 1993 a memorandum recommending conviction of Quion of the felony

charged.

10. Ten weeks or so afterwards, or on October 8, 1993, Quion filed a motion seeking reconsideration

of the Sandiganbayan's Orders claiming denial of due process. 11. Quion filed with this Court a petition for certiorariand prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 13908. The

petition alleged:

i. That the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to try the case

against him;

ii. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and

iii. That the Sandiganbayan was gravely abusing its jurisdiction

"in denying petitioner's motion to re-open the case and present evidence after the prosecution ** rested its

case.Criminal Case No. 19561

12. Another event occurred. This was the filing in the Office of the Iloilo Provincial Prosecution of

another criminal complaint against Quion, resulting in the filing by the Office of the Ombudsman, after

preliminary investigation, of an information dated August 2, 1993 also charging him with "malversation of

public property."

13. Quion filed a motion to quash the on the ground that:a. the information did not charge an offense as it did not allege that he was an accountable public

officer having "custody of subject firearms and in-charge of their safekeeping," and not being an

accountable officer, he may not be charged with malversation under Article 217 of the RPC;

b. the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to try the felony because the complaint was originally filed

with the Iloilo prosecution office which consequently acquired jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of the

Ombudsman; and

c. under Section 4, Rule 112 of the ROC, it was not the Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan,

but the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor that had authority to file the information.

14. Quion thereafter submitted a "Supplemental Motion to Quash" dated March 3, 1994, invoking

another ground for dismissal of the case against him: that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction in

view of Section 46, R.A. No. 6975 conferring jurisdiction over the crime in question on "regular

cour ts," thus excluding the Sandiganbayan which is a "specia l cour t."15. The Sandiganbayan denied both motions.

16. Consolidation of G.R. Nos. 114819 and 113908.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the cases?YES!

HELD:Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction Over Offenses Charged.

17. Petitioner's first contention is that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the cases

because under the law, R.A. 6975, criminal actions involving members of the Philippine National

Police are "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts;" and since the Sandiganbayan is not

a regular, but a special, court, it follows that it is not competent to take cognizance of the accusations

against petitioner, a member of the PNP.

18. The termscivil courtsand regular courtswere used interchangeably or were considered assynonymous hence, the termregular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts. There

could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purposes of the law is to remove from

courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the

courts within our judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from courts-

martial, are the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system; they

pertain to the executive department of the government and are simply instrumentalities of the

executive power. Otherwise stated, courts-martial are not regular courts.


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19. 'Regular courtsare those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme

Court and such lower courts as may be established by law.

20. The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 pursuant to the mandate of section 5, Article XIII

of the 1973 Constitution. This was revised by P.D. No. 1606. The latter was amended by P.D. No. 1861.

Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, 'the Sandiganbayan has ** (e)xclusive original

jurisdiction in all cases involving:

** ** **(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,

including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed

with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correctional or imprisonment

for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 ** .'

21. "Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term

regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975."

Informations Filed By Proper Authorized Officers

22. Petitioner next theorizes that the complaint which initiated Criminal Case No. 16279 was originally

filed with the Iloilo prosecution office; consequently, this office acquired jurisdiction over it to the exclusion

of the Ombudsman; and under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, it is not the Special Prosecutor

of the Sandiganbayan, but the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor who had authority to file the information. UNTENABLE!23. It is confuted by relevant provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) which inter alia

a. confers on the Office of the Special Prosecutor -- "an organic component of the Office of the

Ombudsman . . . under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman" -- the power to "conduct

preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" (Sec.

11), and

b. recognizes the "primary jurisdiction" of the Office of the Ombudsman "over cases cognizable by

the Sandiganbayan and (its power) in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, ** to take over, at any

stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases" (Sec. 15).

24. Moreover, pursuant to Department Circular No. 50, it is the Ombudsman's responsibility and

prerogative to approve the resolution of the investigating prosecutor who conducts the preliminary

investigation of a crime cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and to file the corresponding information with

said court.

25. Administrative Order No. 8 of the Ombudsman:

"For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may

be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those

falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the

category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to prosecute, such cases.

26. "The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation in any Ombudsman case may

be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or

City Prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman

prosecutors.

27. "The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusivecontrol and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular courts,

the control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the

sense defined above. The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the

Ombudsman and other investigation agencies of the government in the prosecution of the cases of

the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts."

28. In light of the broad powers conferred by law on the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor, it is

thus completely inconsequential that the complaint by which Criminal Case No. 16279 was instituted --


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charging a crime cognizable by the Sandiganbayan -- might have been originally filed with the Iloilo

Prosecution Office, or the preliminary investigation therein conducted.Information in Either Case Adequately Charges Offense

29. Next, petitioner Quion postulates that the informations in both cases do not charge an offense.

30. The information in Criminal Case No 16279 dated November 5, 1990 pertinently alleges that

a. Quion "was a public officer, being then the Station Commander of Calinog, Iloilo PC/PNP;"b. that "by reason of the duties of his office ** (he was) accountable for public properties that come to

his possession and control;"

c. that he "received in his official capacity ** (specifically described) firearms;" and

d. that thereafter, "with grave abuse of confidence, (he) did then feloniously apply and convert to his

personal use and benefit the said firearms to the damage and prejudice of the government in total amount

of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00), Philippine currency."

31. On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case No. 19561 dated August 2, 1993 relevantly

avers that:

a. Quion was the station Police Commander at Janiuay, Iloilo;

b. by reason of his office, there were issued to him government properties consisting of particularly

described firearms;

c. once in possession of the above-described properties, ** (Quion), with abuse of trust andconfidence, malversed, misappropriated and converted to his own personal use and benefit said

properties ** thereby causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforementioned sum of

P16,000.00, Philippine Currency.

32. It can hardly be doubted that the first indictment (in Criminal Case No 16279) explicitly and

adequately sets out all the familiar elements of the felony of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised

Penal Code, viz.:

a. That the offender be a public officer.

b. That he had the custody of control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.

c. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.

d. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated, or consented or, through abandonment or

negligence, permitted another person to take them."33. The second information states that there were issued to Quion by reason of his office as Police

Station Commander of Janiuay, Iloilo, government properties consisting of particularly described firearms.

The delivery to Quion, by reason of the duties of his office as PNP Station Commander, of the firearms

belonging to the Government, necessarily and inescapably entailed the implicit obligation on his part to

safely keep the firearms, use them for the purposes for which they were obviously entrusted to him, and

to return them to the proper authority at termination of his tenure as commander, or on demand by the

owner: the duty, in other words, to account for said firearms. And his act -- also expressly stated in the

information -- of malversing, misappropriation and converting the firearms to his own personal use and

benefit, with abuse of trust and confidence -- completed the basic description of the crime of malversation

attributed to him.

No error can therefore be imputed to the ruling of the respondent Sandiganbayan.

*Sanchez vs Demetriou - EM

DOCTRINE: The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to

investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we held only two

years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a

shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the offense charged."


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FACTS:

On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges

against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen

Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.

Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a

preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by

his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to

appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the

morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III

Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of

Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the

Department of Justice in Manila.

The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador

Panelo as his counsel.

After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August 13,

1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection withCriminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of R.A.

No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains

confined.

On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,

seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin

Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all

the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.

The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said

cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in

favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. This

Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they

were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.

On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as

an aggravating circumstance.

On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds

now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied

the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer

for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.

The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because: 1) he

was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the

competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore

not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death ofonly two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and

Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the

investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.

HELD:

The Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any public

official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the


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Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an

exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e.,

the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does

not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute

the information or amended information.

In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the Department of Justice, in connection

with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth

cases, may conduct the investigation.

*Fabian vs Desierto - EUNICE

DOCTRINE:

Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the

Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art.

VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

FACTS:

Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation

(PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbentDistrict Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was

administratively charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. PROMAT participated in the

bidding for government construction projects, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his

official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the

course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in

problems concerning the same in his office. Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed

between the parties and when Fabian tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted

her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She

eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually led

an appeal to the Ombudsmanwho inhibited himselflater the case led to the deputy Ombudsman. The

deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed the case

to the SC. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989)1 [Effective

November 17, 1989.] pertinently provides that -In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives

or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition

for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or

denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.

HELD:

The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought

through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courtsenumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now

required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review, under the requirements and conditions

in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate

procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.

Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the

Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art.


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VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing

argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That

constitutional provision was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its

appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate

jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

*Panlilio vs Sandiganbayan - JEROME

REBECCO E. PANLILIO and TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,

vs.

SANDIGABAYAN, Second Division, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,

respondents.

DOCTRINE: the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate ill-gotten wealth cases. The

Ombudsman, however, may decline in exercising its primary jurisdiction, as in the case at bar, thereby

giving the concurrent government agency concerned, the PCGG, the task of conducting the preliminary

investigation

On August 10, 1989, the PCGG filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an information against petitioners

Rebecco E. Panlilio and Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez for violation of Section 4 (b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act,The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 13784.

After posting bail, petitioners filed a motion to quash the information on the grounds that (1) the facts

charged do not constitute an offense: (2) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the

accused, nor over the offense charged; (3) the preliminary investigation of PCGG I.S. No. 056 has not

been terminated, and (4) the PCGG had no authority to file the information.

In a resolution promulgated on November 29, 1989, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' motion to

quash but granted their prayer for reinvestigation, ordering (1) the PCGG to conduct the reinvestigation,

(2) allow petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and supporting evidence within a reasonable period

under the circumstances, and (3) submit the proper resolution and/or manifestation as to the results

thereof on January 4, 1990. The arraignment of petitioners scheduled on December 8, 1989 was reset to

January 4, 1990 in the event of an adverse resolution.

On December 26, 1989, petitioners filed with the PCGG a "Motion for Extension of Time to Submit

Counter-Affidavit" on several grounds, among which, petitioners would seek a clarification from the

Sandiganbayan as to whether the PCGG had jurisdiction to reinvestigate the case in view of the

enactment of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

On January 2, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Clarification" with the Sandiganbayan seeking to

determine whether the PCGG had the jurisdiction to reinvestigate their case. In an Order dated January

4, 1990, the Sandiganbayan held that the PCGG retained the jurisdiction to file and prosecute the instant

case, there being no showing that the Ombudsman had indicated its authority to take over the

prosecution of the same pursuant to Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

In a letter dated January 9, 1990, petitioner Panlilio requested the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct

the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 13784 pursuant to Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act. In its

reply dated January 19, 1990, the Ombudsman denied the request, stating that the exercise of itsauthority over the aforementioned case is inappropriate.

On February 15, 1990, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan Order dated

January 4, 1990. During the hearing on petitioners' motion, the PCGG did not appear but asked time to

react to the motion. On February 20, 1990, petitioners received a copy of PCGG's Order dated February

19, 1990 holding that for failure of petitioners to file their respective counter-affidavits, the reinvestigation

of the case is deemed terminated.

ISSUE: On March 6, 1990, petitioners filed the instant petition, averring that (1) the Ombudsman, and not

the PCGG, has the primary jurisdiction to reinvestigate Criminal Case No. 13784; (2) PCGG does not


22/35

possess "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" and is incompetent in proceeding with the

reinvestigation; and (3) petitioners did not waive their right to reinvestigation.

HELD:

While Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gave the Ombudsman the primary jurisdiction over cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan it did not specifically revoke the PCGG's power of investigation. In

Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 1 We held that said provision merely

gave the Ombudsman concurrent authority to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees

with similarly authorized agencies or the government, such as the PCGG, with the qualification that the

Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

The authority of the PCGG to conduct preliminary investigation in ill-gotten wealth cases is provided for in

Section 2 (b) and 3 (a) Executive Order No. 1 and Sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 14. In

Cojuangco, supra, We have held that these provisions grant the PCGG

. . . the power to investigate and prosecute such ill-gotten wealth cases of the former President, his

relatives and associates, and graft and corruption cases that may be assigned by the President to the

PCGG to be filed with the Sandiganbayan. No doubt, the authority to investigate extended to the PCGG

includes the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation.

We also noted in the aforementioned case that under Section 15 (11) of Republic Act No. 6770, the

Ombudsman was vested only with the power to investigate and to initiate the proper action for therecovery of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the

prosecution of the parties therein, thereby implicitly maintaining the authority of the PCGG to conduct

preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed before February 25,

1986.

This does not mean, however, that the Ombudsman does not have primary jurisdiction over ill-gotten

wealth and/or unexplained wealth amassed before February 25, 1986, It has, and We reiterate Our ruling

in Cojuangco, that despite Section 15 (11) of Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman has primary

jurisdiction to investigate such cases. The Ombudsman, however, may decline in exercising its primary

jurisdiction, as in the case at bar, thereby giving the concurrent government agency concerned, the

PCGG, the task of conducting the preliminary investigation

Regarding the issue of whether PCGG possessed the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," We find for

the petitioners.

We agree with the petitioners that it is impossible for the PCGG to possess the cold neutrality of an

impartial judge in conducting the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 056 when the PCGG itself gathered

the evidence in said case and filed the complaint against petitioners. It cannot both be a prosecutor and a

judge at the same time.

Moreover, the PCGG has already shown a marked bias against petitioners when it abruptly terminated

the preliminary investigation and resolved the case against them without even notifying petitioners of its

adverse resolution, thereby preventing petitioners from filing a motion for reconsideration or moving that

they be given additional time to file counter-affidavits and supporting evidence. This is the primary reason

why the Sandiganbayan granted the petitioners' request for the reinvestigation of the case against them.Therefore, to ensure a just and fair administration of justice, the PCGG should be disqualified from

conducting a reinvestigation of PCGG I.S. No. 056 and should transmit the records of the same to the

Ombudsman.

On the issue of whether petitioners had waived their right to a preliminary investigation, We likewise find

for the petitioners.

The Sandiganbayan erred in considering that the petitioners have waived their right to a preliminary

investigation for their failure to submit their counter-affidavits on December 28, 1989. Petitioners' failure to


23/35

submit their counter-affidavits was because of the pendency of their "Motion for Clarification" with the

Sandiganbayan at the time. When said motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Order dated

January 4, 1990, the petitioners went directly to the Ombudsman to ask for its intervention. It was only

when the Ombudsman declined, did the petitioners seek a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's Order

of January 4, 1990. During all this time, petitioners repeatedly told the PCGG Prosecutor that they would

submit their counter-affidavits and supporting evidence once the issue of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction

over the case had been determined with finality. Clearly, there is no waiver of petitioners' right to

preliminary investigation.

*Office of the Ombudsman vs Valera - EUMIR

FACTS - Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by

the Office of the Ombudsman and Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio, in his capacity as

the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, seeking the reversal of

the Decision[1]dated June 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP

No. 83091. The assailed decision set aside the Order dated March 17, 2004

issued by petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio[E1] in OMB-C-A-03-0379-J placing respondent Atty. Gil A. Valera, Deputy Commissioner, Office of

the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group, Bureau of Customs, under preventive

suspension for a period of six months without pay.[E2]

Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs

by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of

office on August 3, 2001 and assumed his post on August 7, 2001

On August 20, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint

dated July 28, 2003 filed by then Director Eduardo S. Matillano of the

Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-

CIDG). In the said sworn complaint, Director Matillano charged respondent

Valera with criminal offenses involving violation of various provisions of

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[2]the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines

(TCCP), Executive Order No. 38,[3]Executive Order No. 298[4]and R.A. No.

6713[5]as well as administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct and Serious

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn

complaint was respondent Valeras brother-in-law Ariel Manongdo for violation

of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.

Prior to Director Matillanos sworn complaint, criminal and administrative

charges were also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Atty. Adolfo

Casareo against respondent Valera. The complaint of Atty. Casareocontained similar allegations as those in the complaint of Director

Matillano.

The cases against respondent Valera before the Ombudsman were docketed as

follows:........... On November 12, 2003, Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo issued

a Memorandum[9]inhibiting himself from the foregoing criminal cases as well as
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