Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-50283-84 April 20, 1983DOLORES VILLAR, ROMEO PEQUITO, DIONISIO RAMOS, BENIGNO MAMARALDO, ORLANDO ACOSTA, RECITACION BERNUS, ANSELMA ANDAN, ROLANDO DE GUZMAN and RITA LLAGAS,petitioners,vs.THE HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, as Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Labor, AMIGO MANUFACTURING INCORPORATED and PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),respondents.Aniceto Haber for petitioners.Roberto T. Neri for respondents.GUERRERO,J.:Petition for review by certiorari to set aside the Order dated February 15, 1979 of respondent Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong affirming the Decision of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 dated October 14, 1978 which jointly resolved RO4-Case No. T-IV-3549-T and RO4-Case No. RD 4-4088-77-T.The facts are as follows:Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly registered labor organization which, at the time of the present dispute, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private respondent Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company). The Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a collective bargaining agreement governing their labor relations, which agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last sixty (60) days of the CBA, events transpired giving rise to the present dispute.On January 5, 1977, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company, including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (hereinafter referred to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter's Office, Regional Office No. 4 of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. The petition was, however, opposed by the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (hereinafter referred to as PAFLU) with whom, as stated earlier, the Amigo Employees Union was at that time affiliated. PAFLU's opposition cited the "Code of Ethics" governing inter-federation disputes among and between members of the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as TUCP). Consequently, the Med-Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before any such action could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR from continuing the petition for certification election for which reason FUR withdrew the petition.On February 7, 1977, the same employees who had signed the petition filed by FUR signed a joint resolution readingin totoas follows:Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan1. TUMIWALAG bilang kasaping Unyon ng Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) at kaalinsabay nito, inaalisan namin ang PAFLU ng kapangyarihan na katawanin kami sa anumang pakikipagkasundo (CBA) sa Pangasiwaan ng aming pinapasukan at kung sila man ay nagkasundo o magkakasundo sa kabila ng pagtitiwalag na ito, ang nasabing kasunduan ay hindi namin pinagtitibay at tahasang aming itinatakwil/tinatanggihan;2. BINABAWI namin ang aming pahintulot sa Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) na katawanin kami sa Petition for Certification Election (RO4-MED Case No. 743-77) at/o sa sama-samang pakikipagkasundo sa aming patrons;3. PANATILIHIN na nagsasarili (independent) ang aming samahan, AMIGO EMPLOYEES' UNION, alinsunod sa Artikulo 240 ng Labor Code;4. MAGHAIN KAAGAD ang aming Unyong nagsasarili, sa pamumuno ng aming pangsamantalang Opisyal na kinatawan, si Ginang DOLORES VILLAR, ng Petition for Certification Election sa Department of Labor, para kilalanin ang aming Unyong nagsasarili bilang Tanging kinatawan ng mga manggagawa sa sama-samang pakikipagkasundo (CBA);5. BIGYAN ng kopya nito ang bawa't kinauukulan at ang mga kapasiyahang ito ay magkakabisa sa oras na matanggap ng mga kinauukulan ang kani-kanilang sipi nito.1Immediately thereafter or on February 9, 1977, petitioner Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the authorized representative of the Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for certification election in the Company before Regional Office No. 4, with the Amigo Employees Union as the petitioner. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved for the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Dolores Villar, citing as grounds therefor, viz: (a) the petition lacked the mandatory requisite of at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit; (2) Dolores Villar had no legal personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the local union; (3) there was a pending case for the same subject matter filed by the same individuals; (4) the petition was barred by the new CBA concluded on February 15, 1977; (5) there was no valid disaffiliation from PAFLU; and (6) the supporting signatures were procured through false pretenses.Finding that the petition involved the same parties and causes of action as the case previously indorsed to the TUCP, the Med-Arbiter dismiss the petition filed by herein petitioner Villar, which dismissal is still pending appeal before the Bureau of Labor Relations.In the meantime, on February 14, 1977, the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution was thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation by the PAFLU national president, pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for "continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not only the incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;" spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely appointees of the management', and for causing divisiveness in the union.Pursuant to the Resolution approved by the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU, the PAFLU, through its national President, formed a Trial Committee to investigate the local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty inimical to the interest of the local union, as well as directing the Trial Committee to subpoena the complainants (Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU) and the respondents (herein petitioners) for investigation, to conduct the said investigation and to submit its findings and recommendations for appropriate action.And on the same date of February 15, 1977, the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which, besides granting additional benefits to the workers, also reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA, including the union security clause reading, to wit:ARTICLE IIIUNION SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO PRESENT MEMBERSAll members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be dismissed from his employment upon written request of the UNION to the Company.2Subsequently, petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation of the charges filed against them by the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Petitioners, however, did not attend but requested for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges, which charges were stated by the Chairman of the committee as follows:1. Disaffiliating from PAFLU and affiliating with the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR).2. Filling petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations and docketed as Case No. R04-MED-830-77 and authorizing a certain Dolores Villar as your authorized representative without the official sanction of the mother Federation- PAFLU.3. Maligning, libelling and slandering the incumbent officers of the union as well as of the PAFLU Federation.4. By spreading false propaganda among members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU that the incumbent union officers are 'merely appointees' of the management.5. By sowing divisiveness instead of togetherness among members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.6. By conduct unbecoming as members of the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU which is highly prejudicial to the union as well as to the PAFLU Federation.All these charges were formalized in a resolution of the incumbent officers of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU dated February 14, 1977.3Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners again refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and conducted on March 9, 1979. Instead, petitioners merely appeared to file their Answer to the charges and moved for a dismissal.Petitioners contend in their Answer that neither the disaffiliation of the Amigo Employees Union from PAFLU nor the act of filing the petition for certification election constitute disloyalty as these are in the exercise of their constitutional right to self-organization. They further contended that PAFLU was without jurisdiction to investigate their case since the charges, being intra-union problems within the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, should be conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the local union's constitution and by-laws.The complainants, all of whom were the then incumbent officers of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, however, appeared and adduced their evidence supporting the charges against herein petitioners.Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial committee, the PAFLU President, on March 15, 1977, rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of the charges and disposing in the last paragraph thereof, to wit,Excepting Felipe Manlapao, the expulsion from the AMIGO EMPLOYEES UNION of all the other nine (9) respondents, Dionisio Ramos, Recitation Bernus, Dolores Villar, Romeo Dequito, Rolando de Guzman, Anselma Andan, Rita Llagas, Benigno Mamaradlo and Orlando Acosta is hereby ordered, and as a consequence the Management of the employer, AMIGO MANUFACTURING, INC. is hereby requested to terminate them from their employment in conformity with the security clause in the collective bargaining agreement. Further, the Trial Committee is directed to investigate Felipe Manlapao when he shall have reported back for duty.4Petitioners appealed the Decision to the PAFLU, citing the same grounds as before, and in addition thereto, argued that the PAFLU decision cannot legally invoke a CBA which was unratified, not certified, and entered into without authority from the union general membership, in asking the Company to terminate them from their employment. The appeal was, likewise, denied by PAFLU in a Resolution dated March 28, 1977.After denying petitioner's appeal, PAFLU on March 28, 1977 sent a letter to the Company stating, to wit,We are furnishing you a copy of our Resolution on the Appeal of the respondent in Administrative Case No. 2, Series of 1977, Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU vs. Dionisio Ramos, et al.In view of the denial of their appeal and the Decision of March 15, 1977 having become final and executory we would appreciate full cooperation on your part by implementing the provision of our CBA on security clause by terminating the respondents concerned from their employment.5This was followed by another letter from PAFLU to the Company dated April 25, 1977, reiterating the demand to terminate the employment of the petitioners pursuant to the security clause of the CBA, with a statement absolving the Company from any liability or damage that may arise from petitioner's termination.Acting on PAFLU's demand, the Company informed PAFLU that it will first secure the necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. By letter dated April 28, 1977, PAFLU requested the Company to put petitioners under preventive suspension pending the application for said clearances to terminate the petitioners, upon a declaration that petitioners' continued stay within the work premises will "result in the threat to the life and limb of the other employees of the company."6Hence, on April 29, 1977, the Company filed the request for clearance to terminate the petitioners before the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4. The application, docketed as RO4-Case No. 7-IV-3549-T, stated as cause therefor, "Demand by the Union Pursuant to the Union Security Clause," and further, as effectivity date, "Termination-upon issuance of clearance; Suspension-upon receipt of notice of workers concerned."7Petitioners were then informed by memorandum dated April 29, 1977 that the Company has applied for clearance to terminate them upon demand of PAFLU, and that each of them were placed under preventive suspension pending the resolution of the said applications. The security guard was, likewise, notified to refuse petitioners entry into the work premises.8In an earlier development, on April 25, 1977, or five days before petitioners were placed under preventive suspension, they filed a complaint with application for preliminary injunction before the same Regional Office No. 4, docketed as RO4-Case No. RD-4-4088-77-T, praying that after due notice and hearing, "(1) A preliminary injunction be issued forthwith to restrain the respondents from doing the act herein complained of, namely: the dismissal of the individual complainants from their employment; (2) After due hearing on the merits of the case, an Order be entered denying and/or setting aside the Decision dated March 15, 1977 and the Resolution dated March 28, 1977, issued by respondent Onofre P. Guevara, National President of respondent PAFLU; (3) The Appeal of the individual complainants to the General Membership of the complainant AMIGO EMPLOYEES UNION, dated March 22, 1977, pursuant to Sections 2, 3, 4 & 5, Article XI in relation of Section 1, Article XII of the Union Constitution and By-Laws, be given due course; and (4) Thereafter, the said preliminary injunction be made permanent, with costs, and with such further orders/reliefs that are just and equitable in the premises."9In these two cases filed before the Regional Office No. 4, the parties adopted their previous positions when they were still arguing before the PAFLU trial committee.On October 14, 1977, Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of Regional Office No. 4, rendered a decision jointly resolving said two cases, the dispositive portion of which states, to wit,IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered granting the application of the Amigo Manufacturing, Inc., for clearance to terminate the employment of Dolores D. Villar, Dionisio Ramos, Benigno Mamaraldo, Orlando Acosta, Recitacion Bernus, Anselma Andan, Rolando de Guzman, and Rita Llagas. The application of oppositors, under RO4-Case No. RD-4-4088-77, for a preliminary injunction to restrain the Amigo Manufacturing, Inc. from terminating their employment and from placing them under preventive suspension, is hereby DISMISSED.10Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. By Order dated February 15, 1979, the respondent Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister of Labor, dismissed their appeal for lack of merit.11Hence, the instant petition for review, raising the following issues:A. Is it not error in both constitutional and statutory law by the respondent Minister when he affirmed the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge allowing the preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of petitioners by reason of the exercise of their right to freedom of association?B. Is it not error in law by the respondent Minister when he upheld the decision of the RO4 OIC which sustained the availment of the respondent PAFLU's constitution over that of the local union constitution in the settlement of intra-union dispute?C. Is it not error in law amounting to grave abuse of discretion by the Minister in affirming the conclusion made by the RO4 OIC, upholding the legal applicability of the security clause of a CBA over alleged offenses committed earlier than its conclusion, and within the 60-day freedom period of an old CBA?12The main thrust of the petition is the alleged illegality of the dismiss of the petitioners by private respondent Company upon demand of PAFLU which invoked the security clause of the collective bargaining agreement between the Company and the local union, Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Petitioners contend that the respondent Deputy Minister acted in grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the decision granting the clearance to terminate the petitioners and dismissed petitioners' complaint, and in support thereof, allege that their constitutional right to self-organization had been impaired. Petitioner's contention lacks merit.It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution.13But this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.14In the case at bar, it appears as an undisputed fact that on February 15, 1977, the Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with a union security clause provided for in Article XII thereof which is a reiteration of the same clause in the old CBA. The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non- union membership. Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion from the general membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on March 15, 1977 pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.We reject petitioners' theory that their expulsion was not valid upon the grounds adverted to earlier in this Decision. That PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in the local union and after finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the local union was affiliated. And pursuant to the security clause of the new CBA, reiterating the same clause in the old CBA, PAFLU was justified in applying said security clause. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 in upholding the validity of the expulsion and on the part of the respondent Deputy Minister of Labor in sustaining the same. We agree with the OIC's decision, pertinent portion of which reads:Stripped of non-essentials, the basic and fundamental issue in this case tapers down to the determination of WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL THEM FROM THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMIGO EMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU.Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the laws and regulations of the parent organization. Thus, the Honorable Secretary of Labor, in the case of Amador Bolivar, et al. vs. PAFLU, et al., NLRC Case No. LR-133 & MC-476, promulgated on December 3, 1973, declared-When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under whose authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable contract between the parent body and the subordinate union, and between the members of the subordinate unioninter se. (Citing Labor Unions, Dangel and Shriber, pp. 279-280).It is undisputable that oppositors were members of the Amigo Employees Union at the time that said union affiliated with PAFLU; hence, under the afore-quoted principle, oppositors are bound by the laws and regulations of PAFLU.Likewise, it is undeniable that in the investigation of the charges against them, oppositors were accorded 'due process', because in this jurisdiction, the doctrine is deeply entrenched that the term 'due process' simply means that the parties were given the opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and unmistakable evidence exists to show that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to present their evidence, but they themselves disdained or spurned the said opportunity given to them.PAFLU, therefore, correctly and legally acted when, pursuant to its Constitution and By-Laws, it conducted and proceeded with the investigation of the charges against the oppositors and found them guilty of acts prejudicial and inimical to the interests of the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU, to wit: that of falsely and maliciously slandering the officers of the union; spreading false propaganda among the members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU; calling the incumbent officers as mere appointees and robots of management; calling the union company-dominated or assisted union; committing acts unbecoming of the members of the union and destructive of the union and its members.Inherent in every labor union, or any organization for that matter, is the right of self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore, sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as members of the union which they seek to destroy. Prudence and equity, as well as the dictates of law and justice, therefore, compelling mandate the adoption by the labor union of such corrective and remedial measures in keeping with its laws and regulations, for its preservation and continued existence; lest by its folly and inaction, the labor union crumble and fall.Correctly and legally, therefore, the PAFLU acted when, after proper investigation and finding of guilt, it decided to remove the oppositors from the list of members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, and thereafter, recommended to the Amigo Manufacturing, Inc.; the termination of the employment of the oppositors.15We see no reason to disturb the same.The contention of petitioners that the charges against them being intra-union problems, should have been investigated in accordance with the constitution and by-laws of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and not of the PAFLU, is not impressed with merit. It is true that under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code, in case of intra-union disputes, redress must first be sought within the organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by-laws. However, it has been held that this requirement is not absolute but yields to exception under varying circumstances. Thus, inKapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa MRR vs. Hernandez, 20 SCRA 109, We held:In the case at bar, noteworthy is the fact that the complaint was filed against the union and its incumbent officers, some of whom were members of the board of directors. The constitution and by-laws of the union provide that charges for any violations thereof shall be filed before the said board. But as explained by the lower court, if the complainants had done so the board of directors would in effect be acting as respondent investigator and judge at the same time. To follow the procedure indicated would be a farce under the circumstances, where exhaustion of remedies within the union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or would be illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon, particularly where property rights of the members are involved, as a condition to the right to invoke the aid of a court.The facts of the instant petition stand on all fours with the aforecited case that the principle therein enunciated applies here as well. In the case at bar, the petitioners were charged by the officers of the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU themselves who were also members of the Board of Directors of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Thus, were the petitioners to be charged and investigated according to the local union's constitution, they would have been tried by a trial committee of three (3) elected from among the members of the Board who are themselves the accusers. (Section 2, Article 11, Constitution of the Local Union). Petitioners would be in a far worse position had this procedure been followed. Nonetheless, petitioners admit in their petition that two (2) of the six (6) charges, i.e. disaffiliation and filing a petition for certification election, are not intra-union matters and, therefore, are cognizable by PAFLU.Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to self-organization. They contend that these acts were done within the 60-day freedom period when questions of representation may freely be raised. Under the peculiar facts of the case, We find petitioners' insistence untenable.In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any effective consequence because they constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10), were among the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" whereas there are two hundred thirty four (234) union members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not denied or disputed by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over that of the minority members.16Neither is there merit to petitioners' contention that they had the right to present representation issues within the 60-day freedom period. It is true, as contended by petitioners, that under Article 257 of the Labor Code and Section 3, Rule 2, Book 2 of its Implementing Rules, questions of exclusive bargaining representation are entertainable within the sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of an existing CBA, and that they did file a petition for certification election within that period. But the petition was filed in the name of the Amigo Employees Union which had not disaffiliated from PAFLU, the mother union. Petitioners being a mere minority of the local union may not bind the majority members of the local union.Moreover, the Amigo Employees Union, as anindependent union, is not duly registered as such with the Bureau of Labor Relations. The appealed decision of OIC Leogardo of Regional Office No. 4 states as a fact that there is no record in the Bureau of Labor Relations that the Amigo Employees Union (Independent) is registered, and this is not disputed by petitioners, notwithstanding their allegation that the Amigo Employees Union is a duly registered labor organization bearing Ministry of Labor Registration Certification No. 5290-IP dated March 27, 1967. But the independent union organized after the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" executed February 7, 1977 could not have been registered earlier, much less March 27, 1967 under Registration Certificate No. 5290-IP. As such unregistered union, it acquires no legal personality and is not entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration. Article 234 of the New Labor Code specifically provides:Art. 234.Requirements of Registration.Any applicant labor organization, association, or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration. ....InPhil. Association of Free LaborUnions vs.Sec. of Labor, 27 SCRA 40, We had occasion to interpret Section 23 of R.A. No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) requiring of labor unions registration by the Department of Labor in order to qualify as "legitimate labor organization," and We said:The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section17is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the 'rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations.' The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union or workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected.Simply put, the Amigo Employees Union (Independent) Which petitioners claim to represent, not being a legitimate labor organization, may not validly present representation issues. Therefore, the act of petitioners cannot be considered a legitimate exercise of their right to self-organization. Hence, We affirm and reiterate the rationale explained inPhil Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Sec. of Labor case, supra, in order to protect legitimate labor and at the same time maintain discipline and responsibility within its ranks.The contention of petitioners that the new CBA concluded between Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and the Company on February 15, 1977 containing the union security clause cannot be invoked as against the petitioners for offenses committed earlier than its conclusion, deserves scant consideration. We find it to be the fact that the union security clause provided in the new CBA merely reproduced the union security clause provided in the old CBA about to expire. And since petitioners were expelled from Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on March 28, 1982 upon denial of their Motion for Reconsideration of the decision expelling them, the CBA of February 15, 1977 was already applicable to their case. The "closed-shop provision" in the CBA provides:All members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement shall remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be dismissed from his employment upon written request of the UNION to the Company. (Art. III)A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. (Manalang, et al. vs. Artex Development Co., Inc., et al., L-20432, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 561). Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who cease to be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations. (Seno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124).Finally, We reject petitioners' contention that respondent Minister committed error in law amounting to grave abuse of discretion when he affirmed the conclusion made by the RO4 OIC, upholding the legal applicability of the security clause of a CBA over alleged offenses committed earlier than its conclusion and within the 60-day freedom period of an old CBA. In the first place, as We stated earlier, the security clause of the new CBA is a reproduction or reiteration of the same clause in the old CBA. While petitioners were charged for alleged commission of acts of disloyalty inimical to the interests of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU in the Resolution of February 14, 1977 of the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU and on February 15, 1977 PAFLU and the Company entered into and concluded a new collective bargaining agreement, petitioners may not escape the effects of the security clause under either the old CBA or the new CBA by claiming that the old CBA had expired and that the new CBA cannot be given retroactive enforcement. To do so would be to create a gap during which no agreement would govern, from the time the old contract expired to the time a new agreement shall have been entered into with the union. As this Court said inSeno vs. Mendoza, 21 SCRA 1124, "without any agreement to govern the relations between labor and management in the interim, the situation would well be productive of confusion and result in breaches of the law by either party. "The case ofSeno vs. Mendoza,21 SCRA 1124 mentioned previously needs further citation of the facts and the opinion of the Court, speaking through Justice Makalintal who later became Chief Justice, and We quote:It appears that petitioners other than Januario T. Seno who is their counsel, were members of the United Seamen's Union of the Philippines. Pursuant to a letter-request of the Union stating that they 'had ceased to be members in good standing' and citing a closed shop clause in its bargaining agreement with respondent Carlos A. Go Thong & Co., the latter dismissed said petitioners. Through counsel, petitioners requested that they be reinstated to their former positions and paid their backwages, otherwise they would picket respondents' offices and vessels. The request was denied on the ground that the dismissal was unavoidable under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. ...We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the CBA.WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order appealed from affirming the joint decision of the OIC of Regional Office No. 4 in RO4-Case No. T-IV-3549-T and RO4 Case No. RD-4-4088-77-T granting clearance to terminate petitioners as well as dismissing their complaint with application for preliminary injunction, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.Paulino Bugay filed against the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company before the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for moral damages arising out of an unfair labor practice allegedly committed by said union which was the subject of a decision rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations finding said union guilty as charged. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The action for moral damages is based upon the allegation that "having become the victim of an unfair labor practice act by the officers of the defendant under Republic Act 875 as found by the Court of Industrial Relations and the Supreme Court, plaintiff has suffered moral damages for mental anguish, anxiety, social humiliation and besmirched reputation specially among the thousands of employees of the Manila Railroad Company, amounting to P20,000.00." Consequently, it is prayed that judgment be rendered against defendant awarding plaintiff damages in the aforesaid amount. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in that neither the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations nor that of the Supreme Court contain any statement that the unfair labor practice act imputed to the defendant was false or fabricated as in fact the decision of the Supreme Court ordering plaintiff's reinstatement was merely based on "the regularity and validity of the proceedings and the means adopted by the union and its officers in effecting (his) expulsion." This contention having been sustained, the lower court dismissed the complaint with costs against plaintiff. Hence, the present appeal. 1wph1.tIt appears that appellant was formerly an auditor of the defendant union. He was at the same time payroll clerk of the Manila Railroad Company. Sometime in March, 1953, he was requested by the secretary-treasurer of the company to deliver certain documents which were in his possession belonging to the union and in compliance therewith he delivered them without consulting the officers of the union. Making use of these documents, the management of the company filed with the City Fiscal of Manila against Vicente K. Olazo, president of the union, a charge for falsification of commercial document. The City fiscal, after proper investigation, dismissed the charge. Subsequently, charges for disloyalty and conduct unbecoming a union member were preferred against appellant, and later the corresponding investigation, appellant was expelled from the union. As a result, appellant filed a charge for unfair labor practice against the union before the Court of Industrial Relations which, after due hearing, rendered decision holding that appellant's expulsion was illegal it appearing that the same has not been approved by the majority of the chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws. Hence, the court ordered the reinstatement of appellant as union member and the restoration to him of all his rights and privileges. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The finding that defendant union was guilty of the unfair labor practice preferred against it by plaintiff, the Court of Industrial Relations made the following comment: .It is to be noted that both in the investigation held by the investigation committee of the Kapisanan and in the board meeting of June 14, 1953, where the committee's report recommending expulsion was approved, Bugay was not present. As has been pointed out earlier, the reason for Bugay's failure to attend the investigation does not appear of record. On the other hand, during the board meeting, the committee of three board members assigned to summon Bugay failed to serve notice upon him because he was then in Lucena, Quezon. Why all these proceedings were continued by the respondents inspite of Bugay's absence remains unexplained in the record. But one thing is certain, whatever might be the merits of the charge filed by respondent Olazo against him, Bugay did not have sufficient opportunity to defend himself. Such proceedings, being violative of the elementary rule of justice and fair play, can not give validity to any act done pursuant thereto. Besides, the contention that majority of the chapters voted in favor of Bugay's expulsion is not borne by the evidence. An examination of the chapters to the Kapisanan board of directors (Exhs. 7 to 28) shows that all of the votes, except those of the Hondagua Chapters and Engineering Manila Yard Chapter (Exhs. 14 and 17) were not validly cast. Under the Kapisanan's constitution and by-laws, relied upon by the parties, before a resolution of general application may be enforced, and a resolution terminating union membership is one, it must receive the sanction of majority of the chapters within ten (10) days (Section 4, Art. VII, Kapisanan's Saligang Batas). In other words, action thereon, whether favorable or otherwise, must be taken by the chapters within a period of ten days from the time they receive the resolution. According to respondent Olazo's testimony, the resolution passed on June 14, 1953, was transmitted to the chapters on June 17, 1953. To make it effective, the resolution had to be affirmed by the chapters on July 1, 1953, at the latest. The additional time of four days is allowed for transmittals made by mail. Only the two abovenamed chapters, however, acted on the resolution within the prescribed period. For this reason, even under the assumption that the proceedings against Bugay were not irregular, the resolution in question never had any valid effect on his union membership. In short, his affiliation with the Kapisanan was never terminated. That being the case, Bugay is entitled to all the rights and obligations appertaining to every member of the Kapisanan. Considering that he has been unduly and discriminatorily deprived of such rights and obligations, the Court finds, and so holds, that the respondents, by their act and conduct, have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practice in violation of Section 4(b) (2) of the Act. The above findings were affirmed by the Supreme Court though with some modification. It is now contended that because the decisions of both the Court of Industrial Relations and the Supreme Court do not contain any intimation nor statement to the effect that the charges filed against Paulino Bugay which resulted in his separation from the union were "trumped up" or fabricated but were solely based on procedural defects in the matter of his expulsion appellant cannot ask moral damages inasmuch as there is no showing that to effect his expulsion the officers of the union have acted in bad faith. As a matter of fact, it is contended, he did not lose his employment as payroll clerk in the Manila Railroad Company as a result of his expulsion, nor did he suffer any change in his status as a consequence thereof. In effect, he was not awarded any damages by he industrial court. It should, however, be observed that the main basis of appellant's action is his claim that because of the unfair labor practice committed by the officers of defendant union as found by the Court of Industrial Relations and the Supreme Court he has suffered moral damages because of the mental anguish, anxiety, social humiliation and besmirched reputation he has been subjected among the thousands of employees of the Manila Railroad Company, which claim finds support in our new Civil Code. Thus, Article 2217 of said Code provides as follows: .ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. It is true that the decisions both of the Court of Industrial Relations and the Supreme Court do not contain any statement that the charges preferred by the officers of the union against him which resulted in his expulsion were "trumped up" or fabricated, or that said officers acted maliciously or in bad faith, but the fact remains that the two courts have found that his expulsion was illegal because of the irregularities committed in his investigation. In effect, it was found that not only has he not been given an opportunity to defend himself but his expulsion was not submitted to the different chapters of the union as required by its constitution and by-laws. The result was that because of his expulsion he was subjected to humiliation and mental anguish with the consequent lose of his good name and reputation. This is especially so considering that the members of the union from which he was expelled amounted to around 20,000 more or less. It is, therefore, an error for the lower court to hold that the complaint does not state sufficient cause of action for the relief claimed by appellant. With regard to the contention that this claim for moral damages should have been included by appellant in his charge for unfair labor practice filed against the union with the Court of Industrial Relations, suffice it to state that the same does not come within the jurisdiction of that court. This is a matter that has to be looked into by the regular courts. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against defendant. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 78131 January 20, 1988EDUARDO TANCINCO, OSCAR E. BARTOLO, DANIEL DE LEON, EDDIE POE, VIRGILIO SAN PEDRO, MA. LUISA QUIBIN, FE MUDLONG and HENRY MADRIAGA,petitioners,vs.DIRECTOR PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, EDWIN LACANILAO, BOYET DALMACIO, JOSEFINO ESGUERRA, TESSIE GATCHALIAN, LITO CUDIA and DING PAGAYON,respondents.GANCAYCO,J.:This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the Resolution of February 12, 1987 and the Decision of December 10, 1986 of the Bureau of Labor Relations*in BLR Case No. A922186, setting aside the order of July 25, 1986 which decreed the inclusion and counting of the 56 segregated votes for the determination of the results of the election of officers of Imperial Textile Mills Inc. Monthly Employees Association (ITM-MEA).Private respondents are the prime organizers of ITM-MEA. While said respondents were preparing to file a petition for direct certification of the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of ITM's bargaining unit, the union's Vice-President, Carlos Dalmacio was promoted to the position of Department Head, thereby disqualifying him for union membership. Said incident, among others led to a strike spearheaded by Lacanilao group, respondents herein. Another group however, led by herein petitioners staged a strike inside the company premises. After four (4) days the strike was settled. On May 10, 1986 an agreement was entered into by the representatives of the management, Lacanilao group and the Tancinco group the relevant terms of which are as follows:"1. That all monthly-paid employees shall be United under one union, the ITM Monthly Employees Association (ITM-MEA), to be affiliated with ANGLO;2. That the management of ITM recognizes ANGLO as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the monthly-paid employees;3. That an election of union officers shall be held on 26 May l986, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.;4. That the last day of filing of candidacy shall be on l9 May l986 at 4:00 p.m.;5. That a final pre-election conference to finalize the list of qualified voters shall be held on 19 May 1986, at 5:00 p.m.;"1On May 19, 1986, a pre-election conference was held, but the parties failed to agree on the list of voters. During the May 21, 1986 pre-election conference attended by MOLE officers, ANGLO through its National Secretary, a certain Mr. Cornelio A. Sy made a unilateral ruling excluding some 56 employees consisting of the Manila office employees, members of Iglesia ni Kristo, non-time card employees, drivers of Mrs. Salazar and the cooperative employees of Mrs. Salazar. Prior to the holding of the election of union officers petitioners,2through a letter addressed to the Election Supervisor, MOLE San Fernando Pampanga, protested said ruling but no action was taken. On May 26, 1986, the election of officers was conducted under the supervision of MOLE wherein the 56 employees in question participated but whose votes were segregated without being counted. Lacanilao's group won. Lacanilao garnered 119 votes with a margin of three (3) votes over Tancinco prompting petitioners to make a protest. Thereafter, petitioners filed a formal protest with the Ministry of Labor Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga3claiming that the determination of the qualification of the 56 votes is beyond the competence of ANGLO. Private respondents maintain the contrary on the premise that definition of union's membership is solely within their jurisdiction.On the basis of the position papers submitted by the parties MOLE's Med Arbiter4issued an order dated July 25, 1986 directing the opening and counting of the segregated votes.5From the said order private respondents appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) justifying the disenfranchisement of the 56 votes. Private respondents categorized the challenged voters into four groups namely, the Manila Employees, that they are personal employees of Mr. Lee; the Iglesia ni Kristo, that allowing them to vote will be anomalous since it is their policy not to participate in any form of union activities; the non-time card employees, that they are managerial employees; and the employees of the cooperative as non-ITM employees.6On December 10, 1986, BLR rendered a decision7holding the exclusion of the 56 employees as arbitrary, whimsical, and wanting in legal basis8but set aside the challenged order of July 26, 1986 on the ground that 51**of 56 challenged voters were not yet union members at the time of the election per April 24, 1986 list submitted before the Bureau.9The decision directed among others the proclamation of Lacanilao's group as the duly elected officers and for ITM-MEA to absorb in the bargaining unit the challenged voters unless proven to be managerial employees.10Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.Dissatisfied with the turn of events narrated above petitioners elevated the case to this Court by way of the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners allege that public respondent director of Labor Relations committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the Med-Arbiter to disregard the 56 segregated votes and proclaim private respondents as the duly elected officers of ITM-MEA whereas said respondent ruled that the grounds relied upon by ANGLO for the exclusion of voters are arbitrary, whimsical and without legal basis.The petition is impressed with merit. The record of the case shows that public respondent categorically declared as arbitrary, whimsical and without legal basis the grounds11relied upon by ANGLO in disenfranchising the 56 voters in question. However, despite said finding public respondent ruled to set aside the Resolution of July 25, 1986 of the Med-Arbiter based on its own findings12that 51 of the 56 disenfranchised voters were not yet union members at the time of the election of union officers on May 26, 1986 on the ground that their names do not appear in the records of the Union submitted to the Labor Organization Division of the Bureau of Labor on April 24, 1986.The finding does not have a leg to stand on. Submission of the employees names with the BLR as qualified members of the union is not a conditionsine qua nonto enable said members to vote in the election of union's officers. It finds no support in fact and in law. Per public respondent's findings, the April 24, 1986 list consists of 158 union members only13wherein 51 of the 56 challenged voters' names do not appear. Adopting however a rough estimate of a total number of union members who cast their votes of some 33314and excluding therefrom the 56 challenged votes, if the list is to be the basis as to who the union members are then public respondent should have also disqualified some 175 of the 333 voters. It is true that under article 242(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, only members of the union can participate in the election of union officers. The question however of eligibility to vote may be determined through the use of the applicable payroll period and employee's status during the applicable payroll period. The payroll of the month next preceding the labor dispute in case of regular employees15and the payroll period at or near the peak of operations in case of employees in seasonal industries.16In the case before Us, considering that none of the parties insisted on the use of the payroll period-list as voting list and considering further that the 51 remaining employees were correctly ruled to be qualified for membership, their act of joining the election by casting their votes on May 26, 1986 after the May 10, 1986 agreement is a clear manifestation of their intention to join the union. They must therefore be consideredipso factomembers thereof Said employees having exercised their right to unionism by joining ITM-MEA their decision is paramount. Their names could not have been included in the list of employee submitted on April 24, 1986 to the Bureau of Labor for the agreement to join the union was entered into only on May 10, 1986. Indeed the election was supervised by the Department of Labor where said 56 members were allowed to vote. Private respondents never challenged their right to vote then.The Solicitor General in his manifestation agreed with petitioners that public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the issue on the basis of the records of membership of the union as of April 24, 1986 when this issue was not put forward in the appeal.It is however the position of private respondents that since a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) has been concluded between the local union and ITM management the determination of the legal question raised herein may not serve the purpose which the union envisions and may destroy the cordial relations existing between the management and the union.We do not agree. Existence of a CBA and cordial relationship developed between the union and the management should not be a justification to frustrate the decision of the union members as to who should properly represent them in the bargaining unit. Neither may the inclusion and counting of the 56 segregated votes serve to disturb the existing relationship with management as feared by herein private respondents. Respondents themselves pointed out that petitioners joined the negotiating panel in the recently concluded CBA. This fact alone is conclusive against herein petitioners and hence will estop them later if ever, from questioning the CBA which petitioners concurred with. Furthermore, the inclusion and counting of the 56 segregated votes would not necessarily mean success in favor of herein petitioners as feared by private respondents herein. Otherwise, could this be the very reason behind their fears why they made it a point to nullify said votes?WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 13, 1987 is hereby made permanent. The questioned Resolution of February 12, 1987 and the Decision of December 10, 1986 are hereby set aside for being null and void and the Order of July 25, 1986 of the Mediator Arbiter is hereby declared immediately executory.Cost against private respondents.SO ORDERED.Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-62306 January 21, 1985KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PINAGYAKAP (KMP), ISAGANI GUTIERREZ, FLORENCIA CARREON, JOSE FLORES, DENNIS ALINEA, ELADIO DE LUNA and CRISANTO DE VILLA,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE CRESENCIANO TRAJANO, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, CATALINO SILVESTRE, and CESAR ALFARO,respondents.Jose C. Espinas for petitioners.Balagtas P. Ilagan for private respondents.RELOVA,J.:Petitioners seek to annul the resolution and order, dated August 13 and October 19, 1982, respectively, of public respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor and Employment, in BLR Case No. A-0100-82 (RO4-A-LRD-M-9-35-81), entitled:"Catalino Silvestre, et al., vs. Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor Union and its Officers"affirming Med-Arbiter Antonio D. Cabibihan's order dated April 28, 1982, directing the said Union to hold and conduct, pursuant to its constitution and by-laws and under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations, a general membership meeting, to vote for or against the expulsion or suspension of the herein petitioner union officers.Records show that on June 30, 1981 a written request for accounts examination of the financial status of the Kapisanan ng Manggagawang Pinagyakap (KMP) Labor Union (Union for brevity), the existing labor union at Franklin Baker Company in San Pablo City, was filed by private respondent Catalino Silvestre and thirteen (13) other employees, who are also members of the said Union. Acting on said request, Union Account Examiner Florencio R. Vicedo of the Ministry of Labor and Employment conducted the necessary investigation and, thereafter, submitted a report, with the following findings:A. Disallowed expenditures P1,278.00, as reflected in the following breakdown:1. January 9, 1980 Excess claim for refund P1.002. March 13, 1980 Payment for sound system P90.003. March 12, 1980 Picture taking, entrance fee in Manila Zoo with Atty. Delos Santos P75.004. March 24, 1980 Payment for sound System P90.005. July 16, 1980 Jeep hired P264.006. August 30, 1980 Partial payment of traveling expenses disallowed P68.007. October 30, 1980 Representation expenses P180.008. May 31, 1981 Payment for long distance call P10.009. May 31, 1981 Payment for legal expenses P500.00TOTAL.............................................................P1,278.00B. Respondent union officers failed to keep, maintain and submit for verification the records of union accounts for the years 1977, and 1978, 1979, or purposely suppressed the same;C. Respondent union officers failed to maintain segregated disbursement receipts in accordance with the five (5) segregated union funds (general fund, educational funds, mutual aid fund, burial assistance fund and union building fund) for which they maintained a distinct and separate bank accounts for each.D. The Union's constitution and by-laws is not ratified by the general membership hence, illegal. (pp. 27-28, Rollo)Based on the foregoing revelations, private respondents filed with the Regional Office No. IV-A, Quezon City, Ministry of Labor and Employment, a petition docketed as R04-ALRD-M- 9-35-81, for the expulsion of the union officers on the ground that they committed gross violation of the Labor Code, specifically paragraphs (a), (b), (g), (h), (j) and (k) of Article 242; and, the constitution and by-laws of the Union, particularly the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 thereof.In their Answer, the union officers denied the imputation and argued that the disallowed expenditures were made in good faith; that the same conduced to the benefit of the members; and, that they are willing to reimburse the same from their own personal funds. They likewise asserted that they should not be held accountable for the non-production of the books of accounts of the Union for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 because they were not the officers then and not one of the former officers of the Union had turned over to them the records in question. Further, they averred that the non-ratification of the constitution and by-laws of the Union and the non-segregation of the Union funds occurred before they became officers and that they have already been correcting the same.On April 28, 1982, Med-Arbiter Antonio D. Cabibihan ordered the holding of a referendum, to be conducted under the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations, to decide on the issue of whether to expel or suspend the union officers from their respective positions.Petitioners appealed the said order of Med-Arbiter Cabibihan to herein public respondent Director Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor, Manila, claiming that the same is not in accordance with the facts contained in the records and is contrary to law. They pointed out that the disallowed expenditures of P1,278.00 were made in good faith and not used for the personal benefit of herein union officers but, instead, contributed to the benefit of the members. On the alleged failure to maintain and submitted the books of accounts for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979, they argued that they were elected in 1980 only and, therefore, they could not be made responsible for the omissions of their predecessors who failed to turn over union records for the questioned period. Anent their alleged failure to maintain segregated disbursement receipts in accordance with the five (5) segregated funds, petitioners maintained that the same did not result to any loss of funds and such error in procedure had already been corrected. They also demonstrated that there would be a general election on October 4, 1982, at which time, both the election and the desired referendum could be undertaken to determine the membership at minimum expense. They prayed that the resolution on the issue be held in abeyance.Private respondents, on the other hand, claimed that the Med-Arbiter erred in calling a referendum to decide the issue. They reiterated that the appropriate action should be the expulsion of the herein union officers.On August 13, 1982, public respondent Director Trajano dismissed both appeals of petitioners and private respondents and affirmedin totothe order of Med-Arbiter Cabibihan.Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 13, 1982 of Public respondent Director Trajano, reiterating their arguments in their appeal and further clarifying that what the Union Account Officer Florencio R. Vicedo found was that the amount of P1,278.00 was not supported by official receipts and therefore should not be allowed as disbursement from the union funds; and that he did not say that the amount was converted by them for their own personal benefit. They, likewise, informed public respondent Director Trajano that in the general election held on October 4, 1982, all of them, except petitioners Ambrocio dela Cruz and Eliseo Celerio, who ran for the positions of Vice-President and member of the Board of Directors, respectively, were elected by the overwhelming majority of the members, while private respondents Catalino Silvestre and Cesar Alfaro who also ran for the position of Auditor, lost. Thereafter, they moved for the dismissal of the appeal for having been rendered moot and academic by their re-election.On October 19, 1982, public respondent Director Trajano issued the second questioned order denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.Hence, this petition which We find meritorious for the following reasons:1. If herein union officers (also petitioners) were guilty of the alleged acts imputed against them, said public respondent pursuant to Article 242 of the New Labor Code and in the light of Our ruling inDuyag vs. Inciong, 98 SCRA 522, should have meted out the appropriate penalty on them, i.e., to expel them from the Union, as prayed for, and not call for a referendum to decide the issue;2. The alleged falsification and misrepresentation of herein union officers were not supported by substantial evidence. The fact that they disbursed the amount of P1,278.00 from Union funds and later on was disallowed for failure to attach supporting papers thereon did not of itself constitute falsification and/or misrepresentation. The expenditures appeared to have been made in good faith and the amount spent for the purpose mentioned in the report, if concurred in or accepted by the members, are reasonable; and3. The repudiation of both private respondents to the highly sensitive position of auditor at the October 4, 1982 election, is a convincing manifestation and demonstration of the union membership's faith in the herein officers' leadership on one hand and a clear condonation of an act they had allegedly committed.By and large, the holding of the referendum in question has become moot and academic. This is in line with Our ruling inPascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 471, which We quote:The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave Ms faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.ACCORDINGLY, the resolution and order, dated August 13 and October 19, 1982, respectively, of public respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor, Manila in BLR Case No. A-0100-82 (RO4-A-LRD-M-9-35-81) are SET ASIDE and, the petition for expulsion of herein union officers in R04-A-LRD-M-9-35-81 is hereby DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic by the election of herein union officers in the general membership meeting/election held on October 4, 1982.SO ORDERED.SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 115949. March 16, 2000]EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA, RODOLFO EUGENIO, ISAGANI MAKISIG, and DEMETRIO SALAS,petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON SARMIENTO, JESUS CARLOS MARTINEZ III, ALBERT NAPIAL, MARVIN ALMACIN, ROGELIO MATEO, GLENN SIAPNO, EMILIANO CUETO, SALOME ATIENZA, NORMA V. GO, JUDITH DUDANG, MONINA DIZON, EUSEBIO ROMERO, ISAGANI MORALES, ELISEO BUENAVENTURA, CLEMENTE AGCAMARAN, CARMELITA NOLASCO, JOVITA FERI, LULU ACOSTA, CAROL LAZARO, NIDA ARRIZA, ROMAN BERNARDO, DOMINGO B. MACALDO, EUGENE PIDLAOAN, MA. SOCORRO T. ANGOB, JOSEPHINE ALVAREZ, LOURDES FERRER, JACQUILINE BAQUIRAN, GRACIA R. ESCUADRO, KRISTINA HERNANDEZ, LOURDES IBEAS, MACARIO GARCIA, BILLY TECSON, ALEX RECTO III, LEBRUDO, JOSE RICAFORTE, RODOLFO MORADA, TERESA AMADO, ROSITA TRINIDAD, JEANETTE ONG, VICTORINO LAS-AY, RANIEL DAYAO, OSCAR SANTOS, CRISTINA SALAVER, VICTORIA ARINO, A.H. SAJO, MICHAEL BIETE, RED RP, GLORIA JUAT, ETHELINDA CASILAN, FAMER DIPASUPIL, MA. HIDELISA POMER, MA. CHARLOTTE TAWATAO, GRACE REYES, ERNIE COLINA, ZENAIDA MENDOZA, PAULITA ADORABLE, BERNARDO MADUMBA, NESTOR NAVARRO, EASTER YAP, ALMA LIM, FELISA YU, TIMOTEO GANASTRA, REVELITA CARTAJENAS, ANGELITO CABUAL, ROBERTA TAN, DOMINADOR TAPO, GRACE LIM, GADIANE JEMIE, CHRISTHDY DAUD, BENEDICTO ACOSTA, JESUSA ACOSTA, MA. AVELINA ARYAP, EVELYN BENITEZ, ESTERITA CHU, EVANGELINE CHU, BETTY CINCO, RICARDO CONNEJO, MANULITO EVALO, FRANCIS LEONIDA, GREGORIO NOBLEZA, RODOLFO RIVERAL, ELSA SIA, CLARA SUGBO, EDGARDO TABAO, MANUEL VELOSO, MARLYN YU, ABSALON BUENA, WILFREDO PUERTO, FLORENTINA PINGOL, MARILOU DAR, FE MORALES, MALEN BELLO, LORENA TAMAYO, CESAR LIM, PAUL BALTAZAR, ALFREDO GAYAGAS, DUMAGUETE EMPLOYEES, CEBU EMPLOYEES, OZAMIZ EMPLOYEES, TACLOBAN EMPLOYEES AND ALL OTHER SOLIDBANK UNION MEMBERS,respondents.C alrscD E C I S I O NQUISUMBING,J.:Before us is a special civil action forcertiorariseeking to reverse partially the Order[1]of public respondent dated June 3, 1994, in Case No. OS-MA-A-8-170-92, which ruled that the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the professional services of a lawyer in connection with the collective bargaining negotiations and that the reimbursement for the deductions from the workers should be charged to the unions general fund or account.The records show the following factual antecedents:Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly recognized collective bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of Solid Bank Corporation. Private respondents are members of said union.Sometime in October 1991, the unions Executive Board decided to retain anew the service of Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina (now deceased) as union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Accordingly, on October 19, 1991, the board called a general membership meeting for the purpose. At the said meeting, the majority of all union members approved and signed a resolution confirming the decision of the executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel.As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total economic benefits that may be secured through the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as attorneys fees. It also contained an authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off said attorneys fees from the first lump sum payment of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty. Lacsina and/or his duly authorized representative.[2]The new CBA was signed on February 21, 1992. The bank then, on request of the union, made payroll deductions for attorneys fees from the CBA benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the abovementioned resolution.On October 2, 1992, private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the union counsel before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of attorneys fees as well as for quantification of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.[3]Petitioners, in response, moved for the dismissal of the complaint citinglitis pendentia, forum shopping and failure to state a cause of action as their grounds.[4]Sccal rOn April 22, 1993, Med-Arbiter Paterno Adap of the DOLE- NCR issued the following Order:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Respondents Union Officers and Counsel are hereby directed to immediately return or refund to the Complainants the illegally deducted amount of attorneys fees from the package of benefits due herein complainants under the aforesaid new CBA."Furthermore, Complainants are directed to pay five percent (5%) of the total amount to be refunded or returned by the Respondent Union Officers and Counsel to them in favor of Atty. Armando D. Morales, as attorneys fees, in accordance with Section II, Rule VIII of Book II (sic) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code."[5]On appeal, the Secretary of Labor rendered a Resolution[6]dated December 27, 1993, stating:"WHEREFORE,the appeal of respondents Evangeline Gabriel, et. al., is hereby partially granted and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 22 April 1993 is hereby modified as follows: (1) that the ordered refund shall be limited to those union members who have not signified their conformity to the check-off of attorneys fees; and (2) the directive on the payment of 5% attorneys fees should be deleted for lack of basis.SO ORDERED."[7]On Motion for Reconsideration, public respondent affirmed the said Order with modification that the unions counsel be dropped as a party litigant and that the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the attorneys services. Accordingly, the reimbursement should be charged to the unions general fund/account.[8]Hence, the present petition seeking to partially annul the above-cited order of the public respondent for being allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.The sole issue for consideration is, did the public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the challenged order?Calrsp pedPetitioners argue that the General Membership Resolution authorizing the bank to check-off attorneys fee from the first lump sum payment of the benefits to the employees under the new CBA satisfies the legal requirements for such assessment.[9]Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that the check-off provision in question is illegal because it was never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called for the purpose and that it failed to meet the formalities mandated by the Labor Code.[10]In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latters wages and remits them directly to the union.[11]It assures continuous funding for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees.[12]The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241 (o) of the Labor Code.Article 222 (b) states:"No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union:Provided, however, that attorneys fees may be charged againstunion fundsin an amount to be agreed upon by the parties.Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void." (Underscoring ours)Article 241 (o) provides:"Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorneys fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employeewithout an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction."(Emphasis ours.)Article 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretarys record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the employees concerned.Sce dpClearly, attorneys fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without his written consent.After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General Membership Resolution of October 19, 1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and representation expenses. There were no individual written check off authorizations by the employees concerned and so the assessment cannot be legally deducted by their employer.Even as early as February 1990, in the case of Palacol vs. Ferrer-Calleja[13]we said that the express consent of employees is required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. In Stellar Industrial Services, Inc. vs. NLRC[14]we reiterated that a written individual authorization duly signed by the employee concerned is a conditionsine qua nonfor such deduction.These pronouncements are also in accord with the recent ruling of this Court in the case ofABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, et. al.,[15]which provides:"Premises studiedly considered, we are of the irresistible conclusion and, so find that the ruling inBPIEU-ALU vs. NLRCthat (1)the prohibition against attorneys fees in Article 222, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code applies only when the payment of attorneys fees is effected through forced contributions from the workers; and (2) that no deduction must be take from the workers who did not sign the check-off authorization,applies to the case under consideration." (Emphasis ours.)We likewise ruled in Bank of the Philippine Island Employees Union-Association Labor Union (BPIEU-ALU) vs. NLRC,[16]" the afore-cited provision (Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code) as prohibiting the payment of attorneys fees only when it is effected throughforced contributionsfrom workers from their own funds as distinguished from the union funds. The purpose of the provision is to preventimpositionon the workers of the duty to individually contribute their respective shares in the fee to be paid the attorney for his services on behalf of the union in its negotiations with management.The obligation to pay the attorneys fees belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to the workers as their direct responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may require the individual worker to assume the obligation to pay attorneys fees from their own pockets.So categorical is this intent that the law makes it clear that any agreement to the contrary shall be null and voidab initio." (Emphasis ours.)Edp scFrom all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly the reimbursement should be charged to the unions general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated June 3, 1994, of respondent Secretary of Labor signed by Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena,andDe Leon, Jr., JJ.,concur.Ed p

[1]Rollo, pp. 22-24.[2]Id. at 25.[3]Id. at 26-29.[4]Id. at 30-36.[5]Id. at 11, 201.[6]Id. at 201-209.[7]Id. at 209.[8]Id. at 22-24.[9]Id. at 18-19.[10]Id. at 496-499.[11]Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. vs. Joaquin, 263 SCRA 358-359 (1996).[12]Ibid.[13]182 SCRA 710-711 (1990).[14]252 SCRA 323, 325 (1996).[15]G.R. No. 106518, March 11, 1999, p. 15.[16]171 SCRA 556, 569 (1989).Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 70067 September 15, 1986CARLOS P. GALVADORES, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU), PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE COMPANY (PLDT), and JOSE C. ESPINAS, respondents.Dante A. Carandang for petitioners.Jose C. Espinas for respondents.R E S O L U T I O NMELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:Petitioner employees of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers Union, now the Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (simply referred to hereinafter as the Union), question the legality of the check-off for attorney's fees amounting to P1M, more or less, of respondent Atty. Jose C. Espinas (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent Counsel") from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees in a deadlocked collective bargaining agreement negotiations between the PLDT and the Union.The case stemmed from the following facts:Respondent Counsel has been the legal counsel of respondent Union since 1964. For his services, he was hired on a case to case contingent fee basis. On September 7, 1983, he received a letter from the Union President reading:The Free Telephone Workers Union once again request you to appear as counsel in the on going labor dispute at PLDT. In consideration of your services therein, the union binds itself to compensate you for your fees and expenses therein on a contingent basis. The amount shall be 10% of any improvement, with retroactive effect, of the PLDT's last offer to the deadlock in CBA negotiations which we know will result in a compulsory arbitration. A supporting board resolution will later confirm the letter.1PLDT's "last offer" referred to on the wage increases was: P230 for the first year of the proposed CBA; P100 for the second year; and P90 for the third year.2On September 9, 1983, the Minister of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over all unresolved issues in the bargaining deadlock between PLDT and the Union and proceeded to resolve the same by compulsory arbitration.On October 23, 1983, the Minister of Labor awarded across-the-board wage increases of P 330/month effective November 9, 1982; P155/month effective November 9, 1983, and P155/month effective November 9, 1984, in addition to the Christmas bonus of 1/2 month pay per employee effective December, 1983, and other fringe benefits. As will be noted, there were improvements obtained from PLDT's "last offer."On October 29, 1983, the Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution requesting PLDT to deduct P115.00 per employee for the legal services extended to the Union by respondent Counsel.On November 2, 1983, petitioners initially numbering 600 and finally 5,258, filed a letter-complaint before the MOLE through their authorized representative, petitioner Carlos Galvadores assailing the imposition of P130.00 (later corrected to P155.00) per employee as attorney's fees of respondents counsel. Annexed to the complaint were the written statements of the employee authorizing Galvadores to act for and in their behalf. Petitioners took the position that the attorney's fees of respondent counsel were not only unreasonable but also violative of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that he deductions cannot given legal effect by a mere Board resolution but needs the ratification by the general membership of the Union.Respondents Union and Counsel, on the other hand, proferred the argument that the attorney s fees being exacted pertained to his services during compulsory arbitration proceedings and cannot be considered as negotiation fees or attorney's fees within the context of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code and that contrary to petitioners' claim that Respondent Counsel surfaced only as lawyer of the Union when the employees themselves engaged in mass action to force a solution to the deadlock in their negotiations, he appeared continuously from September 8, 1983 until the decision in the case was rendered on October 23, 1983. Petitioners proposed a solution offering to pay P10.00 per employee, but Respondent Counsel refused.In the meantime, on November 4, 1983, PLDT filed notice that assessment had been withheld from the differential pay due petitioners but that the same would not be turned over to the Union without prior MOLE authority so as not to involve management in the intra-union disagreement.February 13, 1984, the Minister of Labor referred the dispute to the Bureau of Labor Relations for being intra-union nature. Several hearings were held by that Bureau.On March 22, 1984, the Union filed a Manifestation to the effect that about 6,067 members of the Union ratified the October 29, 1983 resolution of the legislative council in a plebiscite called for that purpose. On the basis thereof, Counsel moved for the payment of his legal fees under the September 7, 1983 contract.Petitioners questioned the plebiscite on the ground that Question No. 2, which reads:Question No. 2. Do you approve of the use of P1 million (P500,000.00 to be withdrawn from PECCI and another P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our CBA negotiation fund together with the attorney's fees (P1 million) that was collected and to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU as our counterpart of the seed money to start the housing program as agreed by the PLDT management and our union panel and included in the award of the MOLE?was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute regarding the deduction of attorney's fees from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees.On February 18, 1985, respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of merit reasoning that "the outcome of the plebiscite negates any further question on the right of the union counsel to collect the amount of P115 from each of the employees involved."It is this Decision that is assailed by petitioners principally on the ground that the individual written authorization of an the employees must first be obtained before any assessment can be made against the monetary benefits awarded to them pursuant to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that assuming that Respondent Counsel is entitled to attorney's fees, the same should be taken from Union funds.In their Comment, respondents Union and Counsel argue that compulsory arbitration is a "mandatory activity" and an exception to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code, and that the Union members approved the questioned deduction in the plebiscite of January, 1984, under the condition that P lM of the same would be made available for the Union's housing project.In his Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with petitioners that the issue presented is squarely covered by Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 1691 so that attorney's fees, if legally payable, can only be charged against Union funds.The Court resolved to give due course.Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides:Article 222. Appearance and Fees.xxx xxx xxx(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.While Article 242 of the same Code reads:Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization:xxx xxx xxx(o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off "from any amount due an employee without individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction.The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that deductions from wages of the employees may only be made by the employer in cases authorized by law, including deductions for insurance premiums advanced by the employer on behalf of the employees as well as union dues where the right to check-off is authorized in writing by the individual employee himself.3The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the employee specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed that there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees.Contrary to respondent Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits awarded to PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations although placed already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the "mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individual written authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle should be borne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent.4ACCORDINGLY, the assailed Decision of February 18, 1985 rendered by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, is hereby SET ASIDE. The attorney's fees herein involved may be charged against Union funds pursuant to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as may be agreed upon between them.SO ORDERED.Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.Cruz, J., took no part.THIRD DIVISIONEMILIO E. DIOKNO, VICENTE R. ALCANTARA, ANTONIO Z. VERGARA, JR., DANTE M. TONG, JAIME C. MENDOZA, ROMEO M. MACAPULAY, ROBERTO M. MASIGLAT, LEANDRO C. ATIENZA, ROMULO AQUINO, JESUS SAMIA, GAUDENCIO CAMIT, DANTE PARAO, ALBERTO MABUGAT, EDGARDO VILLANUEVA, JR., FRANCISCO ESCOTO, EDGARDO SEVILLA, FELICITO MACASAET, and JOSE Z. TULLO,Petitioners,-versus-HON. HANS LEO J. CACDAC, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, DOLE, MANILA, MED-ARBITER TRANQUILINO C. REYES,EDGARDO DAYA, PABLO LUCAS, LEANDRO M. TABILOG, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, JOSE VITO, ANTONIO DE LUNA, ARMANDO YALUNG, EDWIN LAYUG, NARDS PABILONA, REYNALDO REYES, EVANGELINE ESCALL, ALBERTO ALCANTARA, ROGELIO CERVITILLO, MARCELINO MORELOS, FAUSTINO ERMINO, JIMMY S. ONG, ALFREDO ESCALL, NARDITO C. ALVAREZ, JAIME T. VALERIANO, JOHNSON S. REYES, GAUDENCIO JIMENEZ, JR., GAVINO R. VIDANES, ARNALDO G. TAYAO, BONIFACIO F. CIRUJANO, EDGARDOG. CADVONA, MAXIMO A. CAOC, JOSE O. MACLIT, JR., LUZMINDO D. ACORDA, JR., LEMUEL R. RAGASA, and GIL G. DE VERA,Respondents.G.R. No. 168475Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.Chairperson,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CHICO-NAZARIO, andNACHURA,JJ.Promulgated:July 4, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the nullification of the Decision[1]and Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83061, dated17 June 2004and10 June 2005, respectively, which dismissed petitioners Petition forCertiorariand denied their Motion for Reconsideration thereon.The FactsThe First Line Association of Meralco Supervisory Employees (FLAMES) is a legitimate labor organization which is the supervisory union of Meralco.Petitioners and private respondents are members of FLAMES.On1 April 2003, the FLAMES Executive Board created the Committee on Election (COMELEC) for the conduct of its union elections scheduled on7 May 2003.[3]The COMELEC was composed of petitioner Dante M. Tong as its chairman, and petitioners Jaime C. Mendoza and Romeo M. Macapulay as members.Subsequently, private respondents Jimmy S. Ong, Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valerianofiled their respective certificates of candidacy.On12 April 2003, the COMELEC rejected Jimmy S. Ongs candidacy on the ground that he was not a member of FLAMES.Meanwhile, the certificates of candidacy of Nardito C. Alvarez, Alfredo J. Escall, and Jaime T. Valeriano were similarly rejected on the basis of the exclusion of their department from the scope of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The employees assigned to the aforesaid department are a