1 Partisan Competition in Argentina. From Closed and Predictable to Open and Unpredictable Juan Abal Medina (h.) Universidad de Buenos Aires Universidad Nacional de General San Martín CONICET [email protected]Julieta Suárez Cao Universidad de Buenos Aires CONICET [email protected]Prepared for delivery at the 2003 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, Texas, March 27-29, 2003 This article is an attempt to describe the relation between a stable pattern of political competition and a context of unstable polyarchy in Argentina. The consecutive breakdowns in the political system linked to the polarized nature of movementism helped bring about party system freeze. Thus, this stable party system became an obstacle to the consolidation of democracy. Because continuous breakdowns suspended all electoral competition, they prevented both political actors and voters from learning from previous behaviors and judging political parties´ performance in office. Whereas the consolidation of democracy presents an open and unstable political game, political actors and parties cannot anticipate their future roles within the structure of party competition.
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Partisan Competition in Argentina.From Closed and Predictable to Open and Unpredictable
Prepared for delivery at the 2003 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association,
Dallas, Texas, March 27-29, 2003
This article is an attempt to describe the relation between a stable pattern of politicalcompetition and a context of unstable polyarchy in Argentina. The consecutive breakdownsin the political system linked to the polarized nature of movementism helped bring aboutparty system freeze. Thus, this stable party system became an obstacle to the consolidationof democracy. Because continuous breakdowns suspended all electoral competition, theyprevented both political actors and voters from learning from previous behaviors andjudging political parties´ performance in office. Whereas the consolidation of democracypresents an open and unstable political game, political actors and parties cannot anticipatetheir future roles within the structure of party competition.
The guiding questions of this analysis focus on the latter, and are critical within
Argentina’s extreme institutional uncertainty which registered five interruptions of
constitutional order during the XX century. How then, do these other institutions – namely
parties and party systems - act within a particular institutional configuration? Moreover, is
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it possible to find a pattern of behavior in a context as unstable as Argentina has been
throughout its history?
Beginning with a case study (Lijphart, 1971) in comparative perspective we will
present indicators of great stability in the party system within an extremely unstable
institutional context. Likewise, these indicators have undergone a radical change since the
process of democratic consolidation commenced in 1983, when party competition begins to
gravitates towards open and unpredictable patterns of interaction.
I-Unstable political regime and stable party system
The closed and predictable structure of the in party competition
As mentioned above, during the XX century, Argentina had only three periods prior to
1983 with minimum conditions of polyarchy as defined by Dahl. Free elections with
universal suffrage (only male vote until the presidential election of 1952) were held during
the years 1916-1930, 1946-1955 and 1973-1976. In the last period mentioned, we believe it
important to consider this a polyarchic regime until 1974, since in the eighteen later months
after the death of President Juan Perón, until the coup d'état in 1976, widespread violence
had removed all basic civil and political rights. That is, fairly free regimes were in effect for
less than half of the century, and Argentina was later subjected to an assortment of non-
democratic regimes, ranging from the competitive oligarchy of the beginning of the
century, until the authoritarianism of 1966-1973 and principally for their terrorist
characteristics, the authoritarianism of 1976-1983, visiting diverse forms of restricted
democracies (1932-1943, 1958-1962 and 1963-1966) and other short-lived attempts to
overthrow the government.
The Argentine case would seem to present a paradox of institutions that are not
distinguished by inertia and regularity1. In this institutional context, many authors may rush
to say it is inappropriate to speak of party systems. However, the fact that political parties
existed, played an important role and were linked to each other in different ways, justifies
1 One of the main characteristics of institutions is its regularity. The actors know the guidelines and act inconsequence with the outlook that this design will continue over time. Another core characteristic ofinstitutions is inertia, institutions tend to remain over time. Many of them becomes principle due to theirperdurability (O'Donnell, 1997).
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our considering it essential to understand the manner in which these inter-party
relationships were forged. What is more, we will maintain that these relationships, as well
as its model of competition, did in fact preserve patterns of regularity, comparable to more
consolidated and stable polyarchic systems.
In a first approach to our case study it is evident that, even during these brief
moments of democratic institutionality, Argentine parties acted by denying the idea of
system itself, failing to recognize their status as a mere part of a whole, deeming theirs the
only legitimate position. This vision, which we shall call movementist (Alberti and
Castiglioni, 1985), was clearly represented by the beliefs and practices of the supreme
leaders of the two largest parties of modern Argentina, Hipólito Yrigoyen (Rock, 1975) and
Juan Domingo Perón (Cavarozzi, 1989: 305 and Mc Guire, 1995:210 & 1997:59-66)2.
This meaningful characteristic, the constant negation of one’s opponent, has led
many important authors to affirm that there was no party system per se (Cavarozzi, 1989).
On the contrary, we believe this same quality and factors associated to it are proof, not only
of the existence of a party system, but of the permanency of the core elements of its
configuration in the three terms prior to democratization in 1983. This perdurability makes
the party system the most consolidated institution - in terms of its stability and
predictability - of the Argentine political system.
If a party system is, as defined earlier, a pattern of relationships among parties, in
Argentina, parties adhere to “patterns of competition and cooperation” (Ware, 1996:146)
with surprising precision. The behavior rules among parties may not have been desirable,
may have even conspired against the stability of the political system, but in no way does
that imply that the system does not exist, but simply that it works with a rationale that tends
to seek the uncertainty of a pluralistic political regime. In fact, the stability in the
competitive patterns during most of the last century operates as a necessary condition -
although not sufficient - to speak of the institutionalization of a party system.
2 “The UCR is not strictly a party (...) it is a conjunction of forces that has emerged from national opinion,born and associated in the heat of public vindication” (Yrigoyen, quoted in Rock, 1975:62) and “The UCR isthe Nation itself” (Manifest of the UCR, March 30, 1916, quoted in Rock, 1975:64). “The Peronist movementis not a political party; it does not represent a political group (...) it is a national movement that representsonly national interests” (Perón, quoted in McGuire, 1997:64)
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By institutionalization we mean the process whereupon political parties or the party
system acquire values and stability (Huntington, 1968). This concept also includes external
dimensions relating to their surroundings, the autonomy of the state apparatus and other
organizations of society. Hence we adopt a proposal (Abal Medina and Suárez Cao, 2002)
of two heuristic dimensions to measure institutionalization from the standpoint of existing
theories3. An internal dimension, associated with (i) acquiring values (Huntington, 1968)
and (ii) the organization of its parts and the level of acceptance, knowledge and application
of their regulated pattern of interactions (O´Donnell, 1997:310); and an external dimension,
which refers to (i) the relationships with their surroundings and autonomy, and to (ii) the
perception that one has of the system (Janda, 1980), how “reified in the public mind”
(Randall and Svasand, 2002: 11).
Also, we should not overlook that often the level of institutionalization of political
parties differs greatly from that of the party system, particularly in budding democracies
(Randall and Svasand, 2002). In our case study, an institutionalized and very stable party
system4 coexisted with movimientista parties that were barely institutionalized, with a
political game that found itself constantly censured.
The most important quality of a system, which helps distinguish it from others is
“the structure of inter-party competition, particularly competition for government” (Mair,
1997:206). This is in fact the one structure that remains stable throughout most of the 20th
century. In the case of Argentina, it is appropriate since the main parties are geared towards
obtaining the indivisible prize of the Presidency and the government under clear,
competitive conditions5.
3 This is a reformulation of the classification of political parties proposed by Randall and Svasand (2002),that in our understanding, captures the characteristics of contemporary Latin American party systems withgreater precision.4 According to the aforementioned dimensions, the Argentine party system gets low marks in state autonomy,maintaining high marks in the other regards we mention.5 The parties analyzed, UCR and PJ, are examples of actors that, when game rules allow, remain in thepolitical market to obtain votes and to procure the government. The form of Presidential governmentgenerates an institutional framework that motivates certain types of party organization and behavior differentfrom those in a parliamentary system. If we can categorize a party’s behavior in three groups: (a) parties thatpursue votes, (Downs 1957), (b) parties that pursue posts, as in Riker’s response (1962) to Downs, and (c)parties that attempt to create policies (Axelrod 1970), presidentialism motivates the pursuance of votes in theelectoral arena. Because of its condition as a unique and indivisible prize, the presidency represents the spaceto which one accedes by means of votes to control posts and implement policy (Samuels, 2000). Nevertheless,Argentine presidential parties have been historically structured in a system that was extremely predictable,
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The structure of competition within a party system can be explained by three
relevant factors: (a) alternating in government whether completely, partially or not at all;
(b) the innovation or familiarity of government formulas put into practice; and (c) access to
government restricted or not to some parties (Mair, 1997). The combination of these three
criteria displays two contrasting patterns of party competition structure: closed and
predictable or open and unpredictable. If competition is closed, one can predict the
succession of alternations that will vie for government. Thus, the emergence of new parties
is hindered, ceteris paribus, parties that are able to compete for the government. While in an
open competition, the alternation is expectable although unpredictable, especially where
new parties appear poised to comprise the government. Interestingly, although similarities
may be drawn between the elections of closed competition and those of party systems with
fewer important parties, or bipartyism, and between open competition and multiparty
systems, this conclusion must not be construed, particularly in parliamentary or semi-
presidential designs where competition for government may involve fewer parties than
those that are relevant in the parliamentary arena.
In Argentina, we observe that the three periods of polyarchy exhibit the exact same
structure of competition: closed with no alternation and absolute familiarity in government
forms (parties always govern alone).
closer to a parliamentarian party system than to the incentives that a presidential government system wouldcontain.
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Table 1Structure of competition in three polyarchic periods
Period Election Winner Percentage of Wind Government
1916 UCR 48% UCR (alone)
1922 UCR 55% UCR (alone)
1916-1930
1928 UCR 67% UCR (alone)
1946 Peronisma 52% Peronism (solo)
1951 Peronism b 62% Peronism (solo)
1946-1955
1954(vice-president)
Peronism b 63% Peronism (solo)
Mar. 1973 Peronism c 50% Peronism (solo)1973-1974
Sept. 1973 Peronism c 62% Peronism (solo)
Sources: Adapted from data supplied by Cantón, 1973; Fraga, 1990 and Jackish, 1990.
Notes:a Partido Laborista and Unión Cívica Radical Junta Renovadora.b Partido Peronista.c Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI) Partido Justicialista plus minor allies.d Percentage of votes.
Besides structure of competition, the other three dimensions that we mentioned as
being essential to the party system form (number of dimensions, parties and ideological
distance) are also constant during these three periods. There was always a single
outstanding political dimension that sets precedence above all others: first “Yrigoyenism /
anti-Yrigoyenism” and later “Peronism / anti-Peronism”. Additionally the political and
cultural chasm between leading parties is generally a large one and in all three cases
became more marked in each period until the system became so polarized that conditions
are created for its breakdown.
Lastly, the number of parties, as shown in Table 2, also demonstrates evident
continuity, although the election of 1973 was an exception, since the application of a
proportional electoral ballot allowed a greater number of parties to be represented in
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Congress. In all legislatures, the ruling party obtained most seats and there was only one
opposing party of importance.
Table 2Effective number of parliamentary parties and percentage of seats of ruling party in
three first polyarchic periods
Year Peronism UCRd Left-wing e
Centerf
Right-wing g
Others/Provin
cial h
1st. Partyplus 2nd
party
Total inchamber j
Number ofParties k
1916 48(41%)
9 8 45 6 80% 116 2.98
1918 64(56%)
6 14 30 1 82% 115 2.53
1920 94(63%)
10 19 21 6 77% 152 2.30
1922 101(67%)
10 14 19 6 80% 150 2.07
1924 89(59%)
18 14 23 8 79% 153 2.56
1926 87(58%)
19 9 27 9 75% 151 2.58
1928 111(70%)
4 6 37 0 98% 156 1.82
1930 109(71%)
1 18 26 0 88% 154 1.84
Average a 60.53% 81% 2.34
1946 106(68%)
49 0 0 0 0 100% 155 1.76
1948 109(70%)
45 2 0 0 0 99% 158 1.79
1950b 100(76%)
30 2 0 0 0 98% 155 1.60
1952 135(91%)
14 0 0 0 0 100% 149 1.20
1954 141(91%)
14 0 0 0 0 100% 155 1.19
Average a 79% 0 99.4% 1.631973c 123
(51%)51 13 22 20 18 72% 243 3.09
Sources: Adapted from data supplied by Dirección de Información Parlamentaria, Honorable Cámara deDiputados de la Nación and Canton, 1973.
Notes:a Average of compositions of Chamber during the period.b 23 empty seats that were not claimed by their occupants.c Distributed by system of proportional representation using D'Hont’s formula.d UCR tally includes so-called dissident deputies during first term. Dissidents numbered 27 in 1926 due todisputes within governing party.e Left-wing: Until 1973, only Partido Socialista.
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f Center: Until 1973, Partido Demócrata Progresista. In 1928, 1930 and 1932 also Partido SocialistaIndependiente.g Right-wing: Partido Conservador and conservative provincial parties such as the two from Corrientes, theUnión Provincial of Salta and the Partido Demócrata of Mendoza.h Others / Provincial: Until 1926: Unión Comercio y Producción, Concentración Popular, ConcentraciónCívica, Unión Democrática, Liga Sur and independents. In 1973, provincial parties formed with right-wingfactions that split from UCR and PJ.i Parliamentary bipartyism index, or percentage of deputies that belong to the two major parties.j Totals are variable, considering they do not include vacancies nor deputies not sworn in.k Effective number of parliamentarian parties according to the Laakso and Taagepera index. Thesecalculations are not entirely accurate since “parties” is meant to include what are actually groups of localparties. They cannot be analyzed otherwise, since these local parties, especially those labeled “right-wing”,are not really autonomous parties but rather part of a indeterminate national conservative confederation,similar to the confederation that went by the name of Partido National Autonomista prior to 1916.
By analyzing the four dimensions we have determined to be crucial, it is concluded
that the configuration which the Argentine party system assumed at the onset and
maintained throughout two subsequent democratic periods was a predominating and
polarized biparty system, in which the political rationale is a movementist pattern of
disregarding opponents, particularly the opposition. The political and cultural gap between
parties and the polarization this brings about affects the entire political scene.
II - Stable political regime and unstable party system
The open and unpredictable structure of partisan competition
Of the various characteristics common to the political game in each period we have
analyzed so far, the one meriting the most attention is the surprising regularity of their core
components: a party wins the election with close to fifty percent of the votes, obtains most
seats in the Chamber of Deputies and retains them, even increasing them, throughout the
whole period. In the following elections the ruling party becomes stronger at the polls while
the opposition radicalizes its protests. The system becomes more and more polarized until a
military coup d’état, supported by opposing parties, ousts the ruling party from the
government. Thus, we adopt Huntington’s (1968) concept of praetorian society: a
praetorian society is one in which levels of institutionalization are low, participation is
high, surpassing the former. Institutions cannot meet the demands of the society and so
social forces act “naked”, without institutional mediation. The weakness of political
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organizations, together with politicization of the military - one of the groups most affected
by modernization – bring about the intervention of the armed forces in the political sphere6.
As far as the party system is concerned, the structure of competition was distinctly
“closed and predictable”: no surprises at the polls, easily anticipated results, the same as the
logic behind successive competition. As stated by Botana “there was no alternation, strictly
speaking, among government parties and the opposition that rotated peacefully in the
exercise of presidential power. The alternation was imposed by a coup d'état, whether overt
or concealed” (1985:19). Three acts of the same drama that seem to mimic each other:
surprising stability in the conditions of relations among parties that led to chronic
uncertainty in the democratic regime.
The party system of the democratic period initiated in 1983 and still in effect today,
is entirely different from that of previous periods in key aspects. Firstly, the ideological
distance has shrunk a great deal and the system lost its polarized nature and now behaves as
a typical moderate system: centripetal competition, absence of anti-system parties, etc.
Secondly, the system has become more complex, there is no longer one single conflict that
imprints its logic on all others. Also, the effective number of parties changes qualitatively
as significant “third” parties emerge. Indeed, in 1995, one such party, the Frente
Grande/FREPASO, was able to displace one of the two historical parties to an
unprecedented third place.
6 See Rouquié, 1983.
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Table 3Effective number of parliamentary parties and percentage of government after
democratization
Year Peronism UCR FG /FREPA
SO
ARIa Left-wing b
Center c Right-wing
d
Provincial e
PJ +UCR
Total inchamber
Numberof Parties
f
1983 111 129(51%)
0 0 3 1 2 8 94% 254 2.22
1985 101 129(51%)
0 0 6 4 3 11 91% 254 2.39
1987 104 115(41%)
0 0 6 6 7 16 86% 254 2.64
1989 120(47%)
90 0 0 6 7 12 18 83% 254 2.79
1991 120(47%)
84 0 0 11 6 14 22 79% 257 2.96
1993 126(49%)
85 3 0 4 3 12 23 82% 257 2.75
1995 129(50%)
68 23 0 2 7 8 20 76% 257 2.96
1997 119(46%%)
66 38 0 0 5 6 23 73% 257 3.21
84 38 0 31999 101122 (48%)
0 17 14 72% 254g 3.39
66 18 8 42001 11984 (33%)
16 14 12 72% 257 3.40
Average of party in power 46%NEP Average 2.90
Sources: Adapted from the data supplied by Dirección Nacional Electoral (DINE), Ministerio del Interior andDirección de Información Parlamentaria, H. Congreso de la Nación.
Notes:a ARI: Alternativa por una República de Iguales, party created by factions separating from the Alianza,principally FREPASO.b Left-wing parties: Partido Socialista Popular and Partido Socialista Democrático only until 1995, later joinFREPASO. Partido Intransigente, Partido Comunista, Movimiento al Socialismo, Corriente Grande, Grupode los Ocho. In the 2001 election, Izquierda Unida, Autodeterminación y Libertad, Polo Social and Frentepara el Cambio.c Center parties: Partidos Demócrata Progresista, Partidos Demócrata Cristiano, PAIS.d Right-wing parties: UceDe, Fuerza Republicana, Acción Por la República, Modin, Partido Demócrata,Partido Unidad Federalista.e Provincial parties: various parties that ran in only one provincial district. f Effective number of parliamentary parties according to the Laakso and Taagepera index. These calculationsare not entirely accurate since “parties” is meant to include what are actually groups of local parties thatformed unified parliamentary blocs for some periods. The exact amount is virtually impossible to calculatedue to the complexities inherent to some parties in the first democratic period (1916-1930). (Please see pointsh and k in Table 2.) Of course, were the ENP expanded to include electoral parties, it would be higher.g Not included: three provincial legislators from Jujuy province.
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Lastly, as shown in Table 4, the structure of competition itself underwent radical
change. The UCR won the first two elections (in 1983 and 1985), and lost the third to PJ
which prevailed in the five that follow (1987, 1989, 1991, 1993 and 1995), losing to an
electoral alliance between the UCR and a new party, FREPASO, in both 1997 and 1999,
though it recovers and succeeds in the last elections of 2001.
Absolute majorities in Chamber of Deputies that ruling parties had obtained in these
three earlier terms is now an exception and not the norm7. Alternation goes from being
nonexistent to absolute (UCR/PJ/PJ/UCR-FREPASO), meanwhile the country was in the
unique situation of being governed by a coalition of parties from 1999 to late 2001. Finally,
the resignation of the elected president in 1999 culminated in a new government elected by
Congress by an bizarre parliamentary coalition of PJ, UCR and sectors of FREPASO.
Table 4Structure of competition in latest period of democracy
Period Election Winner Results of win Government
1983 UCR 51.75% UCR (alone)
1989 PJ 47.89% PJ (alone)
1995 PJ 49.89% PJ (alone)
1983 topresent
1999 UCR-FREPASO 48.37% UCR-FREPASO Coalition
PJa
(2002)Parliamentaryappointments
(81%)b
PJ with parliamentary andministry support from UCRand factions of FREPASO
Sources: Adapted from data supplied by Dirección Nacional Electoral (DINE), Ministerio del Interior and theHonorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Argentina.Notes:a PJ candidate Eduardo Duhalde obtained the majority of the votes in the Legislative Assembly and wasappointed president as stated in the Constitution (art. 75) and Law 20.972 for acephalous government.b In Legislative Assembly, Duhalde was elected by 262 votes out of a total of 324 deputies and senators.
The economic collapse seen with the end the peg of the Argentine peso to the dollar,
growing inflation in a period of recession (which brought unemployment, poverty and
7 Except in the first Legislature of polyarchic period of 1916-1918, see Chart 2.
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indigence rates to an all-time high in Argentina) accentuated the aversion of society
towards its political class, increasingly perceived as associated with corrupt and selfish
behavior. The parties themselves and their capacity to govern are called into question at a
national level, even more so in the case of radicalism inasmuch as their last two
administrations ended traumatically. On the other hand, subnational level party systems,
because of the more structured rules of competition they preserve, even consolidate, earn a
different social perception about the parties’ performance in office. It is probably at this
level where we can still find strong party organizations, such as the various provincial PJ
organizations who fulfill the hybrid definition of Under-institutionalized Mass Party
(Levitsky, 1998). Additionally, the national organization is beginning to resemble a
confederation of strong district parties, out of which leading names are exported, currently
the most outstanding candidacies vying for the 2003 elections. It is becoming more and
more evident that parties are unable to control the candidacies and to punish its separatists
(Lowi, 1985). If we underestimate this new weakness of the PJ - which reveals much on
their growing deinstitutionalization - we will mistakenly assess that the party has emerged
unscathed from the destructuring upheaval within the party system. The accurate definition
of PJ’s capacity to adapt “...facilitated by a distinctive configuration of organizational
features: an underinstitutionalized party hierarchy and an entrenched mass base.” (Levitsky,
1998: 445) holds true in those years, but decidedly becomes a weakness when disciplining
their own ranks.
Although it is typical of a moderate multiparty configuration to have alternation in
the government among parties and coalitions which share the ideological center of the
political spectrum and wield similar political programs, the uncertainty set in the structure
of interparty competition since the return of democracy cautions us to examine this
attentively in the future. Particularly given the frailty the coalition in power has shown and
growing social disfavor with the Argentine political class in its entirety 8.
8 Although to forecast the system’s future evolution is very difficult within a context such as this, it isinteresting to note that some recent elements may possibly suggest a “normalization” in the party system, inthe sense that it resembles the traditional organization of consolidated democratic systems, with a defining“left / right”-type axis. That is, a system that offers a central option, the alternative of a defined right and acenter-left option with nuances of social democracy. These last two are led by politicians from the three main
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Table 5Comparison of elections for national deputies of 1999 and 2001
(Percentage of votes)
Party 1999 Election 2001 Election DifferencePJ 33.01 37.4 +4.39
Alianza (UCR-FREPASO)
40.54 23.1 -17.44
ARI - 7.2 +7.2
Left-Wing a 2.4 12.2 +9.8
Right-Wingb 10.17 7 -3.17
Invalid votes(blank and void)
7.5 21.1 +13.6
Abstentions 7.59 27.2 +19.61
Sources: Adapted from data obtained from Dirección Nacional Electoral (DINE), Ministerio del Interior,Argentina and Political Data Base of the Americas. Legislative Elections of 1999 and 2001 [Internet].Georgetown University and Organization of American States. See:http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Arg
Notes:a Left-wing Parties: Polo Social, Izquierda Unida, Autodeterminación y Libertad, Partido Humanista,Partido Obrero, Partido de los Trabajadores y el Socialismo, Movimiento al Socialismo.b Right-wing parties: UceDe, Fuerza Republicana, Acción Por la República, Partidode Unidad Federalista.
III - Conclusions: democracy and uncertainty
Our readers may be surprised by our contention that a stable party system is able to exist in
a highly unstable political system. However, we believe that this analysis strengthens the
hypothesis and should not come as a surprise to specialists accustomed to seeing
extraordinary continuity in behaviors of competition and cooperation among parties within
contexts other than that of Argentina.
parties of the 1990s: PJ, UCR and FREPASO. This hypothesis was sustained by one of the authors of thispaper in his articles (Abal Medina, 1994 and 1995) and by Torcuato di Tella at several junctures (see, forexample, di Tella, 1998:193-197). The level of social dissatisfaction with today’s politicians may be what willdefine the system’s characteristics in the near future. If this discontent continues, it is to be expected thatpolitical options in the form of new personalities will be constituted, similar to the situation in Italy or evenVenezuela.
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As Mair has asserted, (1997:15) stasis is the norm for institutional frameworks.
Some analysts overlook the fact that parties have the ability to limit the options of voters,
who are not merely the objects of political activity, but also the subjects. (Sartori, 1969).
Although political parties tend to adapt to institutional modifications as much as individual
political actors do, their status as subjects of institutional structure should not be forgotten.
Once the parties are there, they establish a rough equilibrium, the laws of inertia are
put in place and the system freezes itself. Parties set the agenda for competition and
determine “the terms of reference whereby we, as voters and citizens, comprehend and
decipher the political world” (Mair, 1997:9).
Paradoxically, in the Argentine case, it may have been the institutional interruption
of polyarchy itself- fostered by its very movementist and polarized nature - that was a
factor in freezing the system and an obstacle for the regime to move forward to more
democratic forms. By banning all partisan activity, not only did these authoritarian
interregna prevent the actors from modifying their actions through trial and error, but also
precluded voters judging the performance of their party of choice over longer periods of
time. After all, we are analyzing periods of electoral predominance of under fourteen years,
when in many European countries a single party may be in office for longer. As a result, the
freeze in the Argentine case is so evident, as the experience of consolidated democracies
teaches in spite of what is set forth by Lipset and Rokkan’s freeze hypothesis, often times
we need “certain flexibility and plasticity for the system itself to remain the same” (Mair,
1997:16).
This observation is even more relevant if we consider that these patterns remain
independent of any changes in the electoral system. Theory is abundant with studies of the
influence of electoral systems on parties and their systems, on format as well as the
resulting competition (Duverger, 1992; Sartori, 1994; Cox, 1997). Elections for national
deputies in Argentina were regulated by a system of open lists9 from 1916 to 1950; and
later a plurality system in single-member districts was adopted in 1952 and 1954; and
9 Law 8871, better known as the Sáenz Peña Law, specified - among other regulations - the open list systemas follows: ballots being presented must include 2/3 of the positions at stake in the district. Two thirds of theseats were assigned to the winning list, the remaining third went to the list that followed in number of votes.
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finally, a D´Hondt formula of proportional representation was opted for in districts of
variable magnitude (the average of effective magnitude currently ranges between 4.9 and
5.7), in 1973 and again in 1983 to date. The presidential electoral system has also
undergone significant modifications. In the presidential elections of 1916, 1922, 1928 and
1946, elections were carried out indirectly through an Electoral College made up of
representatives elected through a closed list system; while the election of 1952 was decided
directly by a simple plurality of votes. Later on, a system of absolute majority was adopted
with two rounds for the 1973 election. With the return of the democracy in 1983, the use of
indirect elections was restored but this time with proportional representation to choose the
Electoral College. Following the Constitutional Reform of 1994, a particular run-off system
was designed (Castiglioni, 1994) which requires a percentage of votes greater that 45% or
40% plus 10 percentage points over the nearest competitor in the first round.
So in the case of Argentina, the influence of the electoral systems on partisan
competition would seem to be less significant as specified by political institutions theorists,
at least until the 1994 reform, when the party system changed its competition pattern
completely.
Table 6Configuration of parties in the four periods analyzed
Period Structure of competitionAlternatio
n in thegovernme
nt
Innovationor
familiarityin
candidates
Access togovernmentrestricted ornot to some
parties
Number ofparties
Numberof
dimensions of
politicalconflict
Polarization of
system(ideological distancebetween
mainparties)
Configurationof party system
Closed and predictable1st
1916 to1930
Nonexistent Familiarity Yes
Weak andpredominating
Bipartyism
One Yes Predominatingand polarizedBipartyism
Closed and predictable2nd
1946 to1955
Nonexistent Familiarity Yes
Strong andpredominating
Bipartyism
One Yes Predominatingand polarizedBipartyism
Closed and predictable3rd
1973 to1974
Nonexistent Familiarity Yes
Weak andpredominating
Bipartyism
One Yes Predominatingand polarizedBipartyism
Open and unpredictable ModerateBipartyism
4th
1983throughpresent
Complete Innovation No
First strongBipartyism andlater Pluriparty
More thanone
No
ModeratePluriparty
17
Sources: Dirección Nacional Electoral (DINE), Ministerio del Interior, Argentina.
In Table 6, we can observe all democratic periods in Argentine history and their
corresponding partisan configurations. Periods 1, 2 and 3 show the same basic features that
we call “predominant and polarized biparty.” The only important difference among these
periods is their number of parties: in periods 1 and 3, the fragmentation of the opposition is
much greater than in period 2.
The fourth period shows a completely different situation in the main dimensions,
and at least two different party configurations are visible: one, from 1983 to 1995, is
distinct traditional bipartyism and the other, moderate pluripartyism. Today this tendency
seems to be consolidating since the midterm elections of October 2001. The Argentine
party system becomes more dissipated, and is rapidly abandoning the intense concentration
of the past, obtaining the highest levels of abstentionism and negative votes (blank or void)
ever in the history of Argentine democracy. Among other factors, the appearance of new
political spaces that obtained parliamentary representation and the increase in votes for
traditional left-wing forces (which had never been historically remarkable) seemed to seek
the configuration of a new system, more plural and possibly more oriented to the extremes.
The increase in the number of parties does not necessarily indicate polarization of the
competition, “... the fragmentation in the party system may reflect a situation of
segmentation or polarization, in other words, ideological distance.” (Sartori, [1976]
1987:159). Interaction among a greater number of parties will take on different
characteristics from the ones with which we are familiar.
Few days before of the next presidential election of April the 27th, the electoral
scenary still appears with a great level of uncertainty. For the first time in history, the PJ
did not select an unified ballot, allowing thus the running of three peronist formulas to the
general election; one headed by former president Menem, another by Nestor Kirchner –who
is supported by Duhalde administration-; and a third one that postulates Adolfo Rodriguez
Saa -who held office as president for one week during 2001 institutional crisis-. The other
traditional party, the UCR, had to carry out primaries twice due to accusations of fraud and
intervention of justice. The winning formula, headed by the national deputy Leopoldo
Moreau, does not find a great number of followers and it is located in the surveys of
18
opinion with a little percentage of vote intention (much inferior to 10%). Smaller, by the
way, than the vote intention showed by other two formulas composed by ex- members of
the UCR, the one of the ARI (Elisa Carrió) and the one headed by the former De la Rúa
minister (Ricardo Lopez Murphy). The current state of uncertainty makes the statistical
forecasts of the surveys difficult since they locate the candidates in struggle to distances
smaller than those of the error margin. The only fact that seems clear is that, for the first
time in their history, the Argentineans will have to wait for the accomplishment of run-off
to know the name of their next president. The 2003 thus seems to come to verify the central
hypothesis of our work.
The consolidation of the democracy brought an open and unpredictable political
game to Argentina in which none of the actors can anticipate the place they will occupy
within the competition structure. Much of this weakening and destructurization in the party
system is probably due to the poor performance of Argentine parties in a government
capacity (Abal Medina and Suárez Cao, 2002). Although during the initial years of
transition a bad administration did not necessarily reflect badly on the democratic system, a
succession of differently hued governments that proved unable to satisfy civic expectations
favors an increase in the delegitimization of the regime in toto (Torre: 1991). As has been
pointed out in our discipline many times, in this case we can affirm that democracy and
uncertainty go hand in hand. Yet, in a historically unstable political system we should not
disregard the havoc this Damocles sword of growing uncertainty could wreak on a
democracy as vulnerable as that of Argentina.
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