PAS Update - NERC Highlights and... · 3/7/2018 · oSOR report analysis and content ... Draft is...

PAS Update

Paul Kure, Chair, NERC Performance Analysis Subcommittee Meeting Planning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018

RELIABILITY | ACCOUNTABILITY2

PAS update

• PAS and working group work plans updated Working groups addressing:o SOR report analysis and contento Data reporting instruction revisionso Training on the databases

PAS to review SOR and metrics for future revision after SOR report published

PAS Update


Tim Fryfogle, RAS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018

Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeStatus Report


Summary• 2018 Summer Reliability Assessment • 2018 Long Term Reliability Assessment• Probabilistic Assessment Working Group• Schedule• April Meeting Overview Essential Reliability Services Measure 6 Parameter Update

Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeOutline


Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2018 Summer Reliability Assessment


Reliability Assessment Subcommittee2018 Long-Term Reliability Assessment


• Technical Reference Report on Probabilistic Adequacy and Measures On track, March 2018 deliverable

• 2018 Core ProbA High priority in 2018 RAS Approval on Scenario, April 2018 Base Case Integration into LTRA RAS Full Report Review by November 2018 PC Approval 4Q, 2018

• Data Collection Approaches and Recommendations Report Moderate priority in 2018

PAWG Work Plan


2018 ProbA Schedule


Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeSchedule

July 17-19 Toronto, Canada • LTRA Peer ReviewAugust 21-22 Possible WebEx or PJM• Review ProbA dashboards• WRA kickoffNovember 13-15 San Antonio, Texas• Review LTRA • ProbA comprehensive report


• Review 2018 Summer Reliability Assessment• Approve 2018 Winter Reliability Assessment schedule• Essential Reliability Services Measure 6 Parameters

• NERC Special Assessment on Accelerated Retirements

Reliability Assessment SubcommitteeApril Meeting Overview


SPCS Work Plan

Mark Gutzmann, SPCS ChairNERC Planning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018


• PRC-023 Implementation Guidance document Approved at December PC meeting

• PRC-024 Implementation Guidance document Draft is completed and reviewed, remanded at December PC meeting Draft revised from feedback, PC approved on February 8th

• PRC-019 Implementation Guidance document Planning and prioritizing work Anticipated Q2, 2018 completion

• Reactive Generator undesired tripping analysis/tracking Tracking is not ongoing, and SPCS is probably not the proper group for this.

• Support ERO Misoperations Task Force on DRI Providing several SMEs; reviewing final product

SPCS Work Plan


System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (SAMS) UpdateSAMS, LMTF and PPMVTF

Michael R. Lombardi, SAMS ChairPlanning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018


• Monitoring IEEE 1547 – Completed Dec. 2017 - Submitted to IEEE Review Committee (RevCom)

• NERC-NATF Modeling Workshop 2018: Scheduled June 20-21, 2018

• Node-Breaker Representation in Planning Models – Ongoing Gather Experience and Lessons Learned Small-scale pilot of node-breaker implementation Wide-scale construction of planning base case with full node-breaker

capability by MOD-032 Designee

• Modeling Notifications – Ongoing Second generation renewables models Generator protection GP1/GP2 models Composite load model benchmarking Modeling Momentary Cessation (IRPTF) - New

SAMS Update March PC MeetingSAMS Work Plan


• NERC Acceptable Models List – Ongoing• Generator Protection Model Implementation – On track; Q2

2018• Assessment of Case Creation for Development of

Interconnection-wide Models and Planning Practices – On track; Q3 2018

• Governor Deadband Modeling – On track; Q3 2018• Applicability of Transmission-Connected Reactive Power

Resources – New; On track; Q3 2018• 2018 NERC State of Modeling Report – New; On track Q1 2018

SAMS Update March PC MeetingSAMS Work Plan


• Load Model (Software) Benchmarking – Ongoing Phase 1 complete; additional work on track

• Robust (Default) Data Sets (guidance on reasonable load model parameters) – On track; Q2 2018 Two data sets posted; 3rd data set with relaxed protection setting is

underdevelopment

• System Impact Assessment – Ongoing• Dynamic Load Modeling in Real-Time Stability Analysis – On

track; Q4 2018 (re-scheduled)• Progressive Protection System Modeling – On track; Q4 2018

(re-scheduled)• Improved Single-Phase Motor Model – On track; Q4 2018 (re-

scheduled)

SAMS Update March PC MeetingLMTF Work Plan


• Improved Three-Phase Motor Model – On track; Q4 2018 (re-scheduled)

• Efficient Data Format & Model Management – On track; Q4 2018 (re-scheduled) PSLF and Powerworld already capable, PSS/E will need major version

release (Version 35)

• Modeling Notifications: Composite Load Model Benchmarking –On track Q3 2018 (re-scheduled)

• Load Composition Analysis (e.g Buildings, end uses) – New; Ongoing

• Power Electronics Load, adjustable drive (VFD, ECM) electric vehicle charger – New; Ongoing

• Load Model Data Management Tool – New; Ongoing

SAMS Update March PC MeetingLMTF Work Plan


• Power Plant Modeling & Verification Forum – Ongoing• Power Plant Model Review – On track; Q1 2018• Plant Auxiliary Modeling Practices – On track; Q1 2018• Reliability Guideline: MOD-032-1 Generator Data Requests – On

track; Q2 2018• Reliability Guideline: Power Plant Model Verification for

Inverter-Based Resources – On track; Q2 2018• Inverter-Based Resource Short Circuit Representation – On

track; Q2 2018• Inverter-Based Resource Modeling & Verification Forum –

Ongoing

SAMS Update March PC MeetingPPMVTF Work Plan


Methods for Establishing IROLs Task Force (MEITF) Update

Ryan Quint, MEITF Staff CoordinatorPlanning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018


• Reliability Guideline Comment period closed > 300 comments received MEITF addressing comments Edits/tweaks to guideline language for alignment

• Proposed IROL Framework Provided recommended IROL Framework to SDT after endorsement from

PC/OC at last meetingso Framework + definitions

• Risk Assessment Inventory of existing IROLs Assessment of impacts to existing IROLs for any proposed changes to IROL

framework

MEITF Updates


• Definition of Reliable Operation “Operating the elements of the bulk-power system (Bulk-Power System)

within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cybersecurity incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements.”

• Considering Revisions to Proposed IROL Framework Alignment with Reliable Operation definition

MEITF Updates


Essential Reliability Services Working Group Mark Ahlstrom, Vice President, Renewable Energy PolicyNERC Planning and Operating Committee Meetings March 6-7, 2018


Summary

• Approval of ERS summary documents ERS Measures 1, 2 & 4 – Forward Looking Frequency Trends o Technical Briefo Brief for Regulators and Policymakers

ERS Measure 3 Disposition – Synchronous Inertial Response at the BA Level ERS Measure 6 – Forward Looking Net Demand Ramping Variabilityo Technical Brief

Data Collection Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resourceso Technical Brief

• Approvals complete current ERSWG charter


• Interconnection level evaluation • Technical brief describes evaluation approaches ERCOT and Hydro Québec – current operational approach EI & WI – NERC reliability assessment processo EI – EIPC modeling with MMWG planning caseso WI – WECC modeling with using planning cases including dynamic governor

response characteristics Repeat EI and WI studies every 2-3 years using 5 year future planning cases Analyses included in NERC LTRA

ERS Measures 1, 2 & 4 – Forward Looking Frequency Trends


• Brief for Regulators and Policymakers High-level overview explaining: o Importance of frequency supporto Changes in resource mix will alter inertial and frequency response o Prudency in forecasting future trends to anticipate changeso Need to allow time for planning/implementing o Basic description of proposed analyses for ERCOT, Hydro Quebec, EI and WI

Analyses part of the NERC reliability assessment process and included in NERC LTRA

ERS Measures 1, 2 & 4 – Forward Looking Frequency Trends


• Proposed compilation of BA synchronous inertial response data to build-up interconnection level data set

• Disposition rationale: Other processes evolved providing needed data ERS Measure 4 provides holistic evaluation

• ERSWG recommends no further action on ERS Measure 3

ERS Measure 3 - Disposition


• BA level evaluation of potential balancing and ramping concerns• Technical Brief Describes screening tools RAS defines screening parameters, allowing for BA-specific differenceso Focus on non-dispatchable and flexible resources and load requirements

RAS determines if further evaluation warranted

• RAS will include anonymized results in NERC LTRA

ERS Measure 6 - Forward Looking Net Demand Ramping Variability


• Technical Brief Focus on the transmission-distribution (T-D) interface Identifies information that may need to be shared between:o Balancing Authoritieso Distribution Providerso Transmission Operators, Planners, and Planning Coordinatorso Distribution Operators, Planners, and Protection Engineers

Recommends need for ongoing DER coordinating group

Distributed Energy Resources – Data Collection Recommendations


PC Advisory CommitteeNERC Recommendations

Noman Williams, Planning Committee Vice Chair Planning Committee Meeting March 6-7, 2018


• NERC, with industry support should enhance its Reliability Guidelines and/or standards as necessary to include additional planning and operating requirements for analyzing disruptions to the natural gas infrastructure and their impact on the reliable operation of the BPS. The standards should include developing and deploying mitigation plans to address reliability risks caused by outages of significant natural gas infrastructure.

SPOD Recommendations


• NERC along with the PC Advisory Group will determine whether additional standards and/or guidelines are necessary to ensure adequate planning has been conducted around the loss of critical natural gas infrastructure. Possible courses of action could include a technical conference or workshop with industry panelists providing recommendations and insight for PC Advisory Group action.

• PC/PC Advisory Group will report back to the BOT and MRC

SPOD – Next Steps


• DER - In areas with expected growth in DERs system operators and planners should gather data about the aggregate technical specifications of DERs connected to local distribution grids to ensure accurate system planning models coordinated system protection, and real time situational awareness.

• ERS - Regulators should consider the reliability and resilience attributes provided by generation to ensure that the generation resource mix continues evolving in a manner that maintains a reliable and resilient BPS.

LTRA


• NERC should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of its Reliability Standards to ensure compatibility with nonsynchronous and distributed resources as well as for completeness related to essential reliability services, generator performance, system protection and control, and balancing functions.

LTRA cont’d


• The DER Task Force Report identified the need for a revision to the MOD-032 Standard to ensure applicability of distribution providers and their obligation to share any pertinent data related to distributed resources with Transmission Planners and Planning Coordinators.

• The Inverter-Based Resources Task Force was established in the second half of 2017 to explore the performance characteristics of utility-scale inverter-based resources (e.g., solar photovoltaic and wind power resources) directly connected to the BPS.

LTRA Next Steps


• Under the direction of the Operating Committee, the Resources Subcommittee is actively addressing potential changes to the BAL-003 Reliability Standard to ensure sufficient generator and system performance during frequency excursions. A Standard Authorization Request (SAR) is in place and a project is identified within the Reliability Standards Development Plan for 2018-2020.

LTRA Next Steps Cont’d


ERO Reliability Risk Priorities ReportBrian Evans-Mongeon, PC ChairJohn Moura, NERCPlanning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018


• Strategically defines and prioritizes risks to the reliable operation of the bulk power system (BPS)

• Supports ERO Enterprise strategic and operational planning• Key inputs Reliability Issues Steering Committee’s (RISC’s) subject matter expertise Reliability Leadership Summit FERC Technical Conference Pulse point interviews Review of a number of NERC technical studies Department of Energy grid study

Purpose and Process


Risk Mapping


• Risk Profile #1: Changing Resource Mix• Risk Profile #2: BPS Planning• Risk Profile #3: Resource Adequacy and Performance• Risk Profile #4: Increasing Complexity in Protection and Control

Systems• Risk Profile #5: Human Performance and Skilled Workforce • Risk Profile #7: Extreme Natural Events• Risk Profile #9: Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities

RISC Focus Areas for Planning Committee


1. Effective guidance to evaluate and improve controllable devices and interaction with BPS

2. Gather data to support DER modeling3. Implement ERS recommendations 4. Use assessments to expand collaboration with stakeholders to

promote reliability needs and policy alignment5. Complete the IRPTF work and implement the recommendations

Risk Profile #1: Changing Resource MixRecommendation for Risk Mitigation

Near-Term (1-2 Years)


1. Identify DER data needs to improve load forecasting, generator modeling, etc.

2. Develop guidelines for enhancing models to represent ERS characteristics

3. Collaborate with Planning Coordinators to assess the impact on reliability from natural gas fuel delivery issues and how to assess them in long-term planning studies.

4. Coordinate with Planning Coordinators to continually review planning considerations and tools needed to respond to the changing system

Risk Profile #2: BPS PlanningRecommendation for Risk Mitigation


Mid-term (3–5 years):


1. Address recommendations from the NERC Special Reliability Assessment: Impacts Due to Disruptions on the Natural Gas System

2. Expand the use of probabilistic approaches to develop resource adequacy measures including off-peak conditions.

3. Improve load forecasting as a result of DER4. Assess vulnerabilities from fuel availability as part of evaluating

resource adequacy

Risk Profile #3: Adequacy and PerformanceRecommendation for Risk Mitigation



1. Promote development of industry guidelines on protection and control system management to improve performance

2. Determine if enhancements are required to the current family of protection and control (PRC) standards or related guidance

1. Provide the technical basis for BPS resilience enhancements

1. Identify risks of shorter technology lives for protection and control system components and the need to implement replacement programs

Risk Profile #4: Increasing Complexity in Protection and Control Systems

Recommendation for Risk Mitigation


Mid-term (3–5 years)

Long-term (5+ years)


Risk Profile #5: Human Performance and Skilled Workforce

Recommendation for Risk Mitigation


1. Encourage industry and trade associations to identify skill gaps and develop recommendations to address them (e.g., curricula, programs, industry support, and educational pipeline programs), including those which may be associated with protection and control schemes.

2. Promote the use of NERC cause codes to establish a common understanding of HP triggers, collect and evaluate trends in data, and develop metrics as needed.

3. Develop a near-miss database to leverage data sources such as event analysis, TADS, GADS, DADS, relay misoperations, EOP-004/OE-417 Reports, and AC equipment failures to identify patterns and risk.


Risk Profile #7: Extreme Natural Events Recommendation for Risk Mitigation


1. Study multiple simultaneous limitations on natural gas deliveries during extreme weather

2. Plan coordinated workshop with federal agencies and governmental authorities to address high-impact low-frequency event response, recovery, and communications vulnerabilities.

1. Analytic trends and assessment regarding resilience

1. Analyze GMD events to further the understanding of GIC effects 2. Preparing sensitivity analyses to simulate most extreme natural events

experienced


Long-term (5+ years)


Risk Profile #8: Physical Security Vulnerabilities Recommendation for Risk Mitigation


1. Assess physical attack scenarios on natural gas pipelines2. Determine the need to develop Reliability Standards, reliability

guidelines, industry webinars, or additional analysis to address EMP events as necessary.

1. Conduct a special regional assessment that addresses natural gas availability and pipeline impacts under physical attack scenarios



1. Facilitate planning considerations to reduce the number and exposure of critical cyber facilities to attack

Risk Profile #9: Cybersecurity VulnerabilitiesRecommendation for Risk Mitigation



• PCEC review of Report Recommendations Revise PC Strategic and Work Plan as needed

• PC Input

Next Steps


Resilience Framework

Brian Evans-Mongeon, PC ChairJohn Moura, NERCPlanning Committee MeetingMarch 7, 2018


• Develop common understanding and definition of the key elements of bulk power system (BPS) resilience

• Understand how key elements of BPS resilience fit in the existing ERO framework

• Evaluate whether additional steps are needed to address key elements of BPS resilience within the ERO framework

Framework


• National Infrastructure Advisory Council’s (NIAC’s) resilience framework includes four outcome-focused abilities: Robustness – absorb shocks and continue operating Resourcefulness – skillfully manage a crisis as it unfolds Rapid Recovery – get services back as quickly as possible Adaptability – incorporate lessons learned from past events to improve

resilience

Understanding and Defining Resilience


• Robustness Risk, event, and performance monitoring Reliability and emerging risk assessments Technical committee work Operator training and certification Reliability Standards and Reliability Guidelines E-ISAC information-sharing programs

• Resourcefulness Situational awareness and industry coordination Government coordination Cross-sector information sharing Reliability Standards and Functional Model

ERO Enterprise Activities Supporting NIAC Framework


• Rapid Recovery Situational awareness and industry coordination Government coordination Cross-sector information sharing

• Adaptability Reliability assessments Event analysis and forensics Reliability Guidelines Technical committee work

ERO Enterprise Activities Supporting NIAC Framework


• Request standing committee input to the RISC• Provide recommendations at the May 2018 Member

Representatives Committee meeting • Monitor FERC proceedings

RISC Next Steps


Robustness

NIAC Resilience Constructs Key Programs and Activities

Specific Efforts\Tools

Robustness—The ability to continue operations in the face of disaster. In some cases, it translates into designing structures or systems to be strong enough to take a foreseeable punch. In others, robustness requires devising substitute or redundant systems that can be brought to bear should something important break or stop working. Robustness also entails investing in and maintaining elements of critical infrastructure so that they can withstand low probability but high consequence events.

• Reliability and Emerging Risk Assessments

• Risk, Event and Performance Monitoring

• Technical Committee work

• Reliability Standards

• Reliability Guidelines

Operator Certification and Training

• E-ISAC

• Alerts• State of Reliability Report

o GADS/TADS/DADSo Protection system

misoperationso FR Performance

• LTRA• TPL, EOP Reliability

Standards• GridEx• Security conferences and

information sharing (e.g. GridSecCon)


Resourcefulness



Resourcefulness—The ability to skillfully manage a disaster as it unfolds. It includes identifying options, prioritizing what should be done both to control damage and to begin mitigating it, and communicating decisions to the people who will implement them. Resourcefulness depends primarily on people, not technology.

• Situational Awareness and Industry Coordination

• Government Coordination

• Cross-Sector Information Sharing

• Mandatory Reliability Standards/Functional Model

• BPSA information sharing tools and processes

• E-ISAC information sharing tools and processes

• Formation of a Crisis Action Team to support industry and governmental coordination

• Standards requirements


Rapid Recovery



Rapid recovery—The capacity to get things back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster. Carefully drafted contingency plans, competent emergency operations, and the means to get the right people and resources to the right places are crucial.

• Situational Awareness, Industry Coordination

• Government Coordination

• Cross-Sector Information Sharing

• Support for Electric Sector Coordinating Council activities


Adaptability



Adaptability—The means to absorb new lessons that can be drawn from a catastrophe. It involves revising plans, modifying procedures, and introducing new tools and technologies needed to improve robustness, resourcefulness, and recovery capabilities before the next crisis.

• Reliability Assessment

• Event Analysis • Event Forensics

• Technical Committee Recommendations

• Reliability Guidelines• Lessons Learned• Event Analysis,

Investigations• Audit

Recommendations• Reliability

Assessments• State of Reliability

Report


Probabilistic Assessment Working Group (PAWG)Probabilistic Adequacy and Measures Technical Reference Report

Noha Abdel-Karim, PhD. Manager, Reliability Assessment, NERCPlanning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018


• Develop a collective understanding of existing applications of probabilistic techniques used for reliability assessments and planning studies.

• Identify what emerging reliability issues that could be addressed with probabilistic studies.

• Review existing Reliability Risk Metrics (RRMs): Provide a common understanding of their definitions

and use and recommendations for future enhancements and applications.

• Provide guidance on the development of probabilistic methods for ensuring resource adequacy and reliability to allow better risk-informed decisions for planners and policy makers.

Objectives


The foundation of the report is based on results from a NERC survey on probabilistic studies, as well as data and information gathered by NERC from Regions and Assessment Areas.Survey Objectives:

• Review the ongoing probabilistic analyses and future plans.• Understand the choice of probabilistic methods, tools, and

selection of acceptable reliability levels used by NERC regions and the industry at large to assess resource and transmission adequacy.

• Provide recommendations on the application of commonly used RRMs in assessing system adequacy.

Survey Objectives


• Explore probabilistic approaches used amidst a BPS undergoing unprecedented changes.

• Identify how members of industry define, and apply RRMs.• Explore applications of commonly used RRMs and how each

RRM can measure different aspects of a system’s reliability, depending on how the metric is defined and applied.

• Provide recommendations on the application of commonly used RRMs in assessing system adequacy.

Survey Objectives -Continued


• Introduction Background NERC Survey on Probabilistic Studies

• Reliability Risk Metrics Definitions Calculation methods Consideration and recommendations on the use of RMMs

• Applications• Probabilistic Studies Assessing Emerging Reliability Issues The Use of Probabilistic Studies to Assess Emerging Issues Industry Application of Reliability Metrics into Emerging Issues

• Conclusions

Main Chapters


• There are variations in how a reliability criterion is defined and interpreted in existing practices across the U.S. and Canada.

• The majority of entities conducting resource adequacy studies primarily use Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE) metric to establish a single resource adequacy on criterion.

• Expected Unserved Energy (EUE) metric is widely used to provide insight to the impact of energy limited resources on a system’s reliability.

• The choice of probabilistic methods and selection of acceptable adequacy levels are still matters of judgment and differ from Region to Region and from assessment area to assessment area and even utility to utility in some cases.

• Most Assessment Areas are already using or are considering probabilistic approaches to assess emerging reliability issues.

Major Key Findings

Survey-Based Results on the Use of Reliability Risk Metrics


• Entities may leverage other metrics and factors in their criteria development to determine a sufficient reserve margin to maintain an adequate level of system reliability, especially for systems with a diverse generation mix and variable energy resources.

• NERC should continue to incorporate more probabilistic approaches into its assessments, and continue to review and provide guidance on the development of probabilistic methods for ensuring resource adequacy and reliability.

• NERC should continue conducting periodic reviews on RRMs and criteria used to assure they are clear and properly structured for existing and emerging risks.

• As entities and system planners identify emerging reliability issues or large changes on their system (e.g. change in size, resource mix, etc.), they should evaluate whether the incorporation of additional RRMs could improve their assessment of risks to reliability.

Note: Detailed recommendations on RRMs are included in the report

General Recommendations


• Seek PC Review and Approval of the report• PAWG leadership roles• New Chair and Vice chair will be assigned in

December, 2018 for a two-years term. PC Nominations or suggestions for leadership roles and membership are welcomed

Request Actions by the PC


Geomagnetic Disturbance Mitigation Work PlanEmanuel Bernabeu, PJM InterconnectionPlanning Committee MeetingMarch 6-7, 2018


Background

FERC Order 830Approved TPL-007

EPRI Research Project 2017

TPL-007-2January 2018

Data RequestComment Period

March 2018

Updated Research PlanApril 2018


Research Objectives

Improved Earth Conductivity

Models

Improved Harmonic Analysis

Capability

00.20.40.60.8

11.21.41.61.8

2

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4

pu fl

ux

Current, pu

Per Unit Saturation Curve

Harmonic Impacts

Transformer Thermal Impacts

Spatial Averaging

Latitude Scaling Factor

Geoelectric Field Evaluation• Work is underway on all Order

No. 830 research objectives

• Support TPL-007 standard

• EPRI will publish technical reports for each objective


• Objective: Improve the accuracy of earth conductivity models used for GIC modeling

• Issue: Deep earth structure strongly affects GMD risk to the BPS Earth conductivity models referenced in TPL-007 are

based on historical published information Measurements of earth conductivity are now

available

• Outcomes: Improved beta scaling factors where needed

• Initial EPRI report in Q2 2018 / Final report at conclusion of GMD project

Priority Tasks

Improved Earth Conductivity

Models


• Objective: Develop guidelines and tools for system-wide GMD harmonics assessment

• Issue: GIC-related harmonics can impact transformers and equipment needed for voltage support during GMD events GMD Vulnerability Assessments required by TPL-007

include harmonic impacts Industry needs tools and guidelines for wide-area

harmonic impact assessments

• Outcomes: Open source software tool• Beta-version expected Q4 2018

Priority Tasks

Improved Harmonic Analysis

Capability

00.20.40.60.8

11.21.41.61.8

2

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4

pu fl

ux

Current, pu

Per Unit Saturation Curve


• Objective: Analyze transformer thermal impacts from the benchmark GMD event

• Issue: Additional transformer models and approaches may be needed to accurately assess thermal risks to transformers Transformer thermal models used in TPL-007

assessments are limited by existing measurements and data

GIC signature is complex and affects heating levels and durations

Priority Tasks

Transformer Thermal Impacts

• EPRI, utilities, and manufacturers are collaborating to collect field data and enhance models

• Outcomes: EPRI report on transformer thermal screening and assessment


• Transformer thermal assessment tool in final development Entities can use it to perform transformer thermal assessments required

by TPL-007-1 Requirement R6 Release in March 2018

• Section 1600 Data Request developed by NERC and GMDTF Posted for 45-day comment period through March 26, 2018

• …other activities that will help entities implement TPL-007 GMD-related harmonic assessment best practices GMDTF roundtable topics (Data collection, GIC modeling, etc)

Other GMDTF Activities




TPL-007-1 Implementation

January 1, 2017*

July 2017•R1•Identify Responsibilities

July 2018•R2•System Models

January 2019

•R5•GIC Flow Information

January 2021

•R6•Thermal Assessment

January 2022

•R3, R4, and R7•GMD Assessment•Corrective Action Plan

*January 1, 2017 is the first day of the calendar quarter after Order No. 830 became effective. For more info see the Implementation Plan posted on the project page.

http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Project201303GeomagneticDisturbanceMitigation/tpl_007_1_implementation_plan_20141205_clean.pdf


• TPL-007-2 filed January 22, 2018 Includes Supplemental GMD Event

Description for locally-enhanced GMD event assessment

Establishes deadlines for Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) and mitigating actions

Requires processes of obtaining GIC and magnetometer data

• Implementation of TPL-007-1 continues while revised standard is pending approval

Revisions to TPL-007

FERC Docket RM 18-8

Accelerated Conventional Generation RetirementsSpecial Assessment Update

Mark Olson, Senior Engineer Reliability AssessmentsPlanning Committee Meeting March 6-7, 2018


• Inform policymakers, regulators, and industry about reliability impacts resulting from accelerated conventional generation retirements Potential resource adequacy System performance

• Do accelerated retirements result in an exposure period during which BPS reliability could be degraded?

• Does the future resource mix pose a reliability risk?

Assessment Purpose


• Examine the potential impacts of accelerated synchronous generation retirements on Resource and transmission adequacy BPS reliability in event scenarios (extreme weather, generator fuel supply

disruptions)

• Review regional processes for managing reliability impacts of generation retirements and develop recommendations

Objectives


• Participating Utilities/RTOs developing tailored approaches• Focus on areas with significant coal-fired and nuclear resources PSE&G and PJM ERCOT

• Develop an accelerated retirement case Removal of coal-fired and nuclear generation Addition of generation in the connection queue…scale up if needed

• Assess resource adequacy and system performance• Assess potential impacts of natural gas disruption and polar-

vortex conditions

Assessment Approach


• Describe regional processes for review and approval of generator retirements What studies are performed to assess potential reliability impacts? What options are available when a retirement would impact reliability? What factors can impact the planning and approval process for new

facilities?

Regional Management of Generator Retirements


• Initial studies by participating utilities are in progress• Preliminary results will be reviewed with regional entities and

assessment areas• NERC staff will continue to coordinate with PC and RAS

Coordination


Project 2015-10Single Points of Failure

Delyn Kilpack, LG&E and KUBill Harm, PJMPlanning CommitteeMarch 6-7, 2018


• Project 2015-10 - TPL-001-5 – Single Points of Failure (SPF)• This is the third posting One informal posting One formal posting

• TPL-001-5 addresses: FERC Order 754 (Single Points of Failure) FERC Order 786 (Maintenance Outages in the Near Term Transmission

Planning Horizon; stability analysis for loss of long lead time equipment)

• Separate ballot for standard and implementation plan• Point of contact Latrice Harkness, Senior Standards Developer

Status of Project 2015-10

mailto:[email protected]


• Changes to TPL-001-5: “Revision to Table 1 – Steady State and Stability Performance Planning

Events” Modified Category P5 event to include SPF Added a new Category P8 planning event Footnote 13 – describes the non-redundant Protection System

components considered for Category P5 and new Category P8 events Table 1:o Performance requirements for new Category P8

– System shall remain stable, no cascading or uncontrolled islanding, for a 3-phase fault and failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System

– When analysis indicates an inability to meet Performance Criteria, assessment must include Corrective Action Plan (CAP)

FERC Order No. 754


• New P8 planning event defined for SPF to include a 3-phase fault and failure of a non-redundant component of a Protection System

• Creates a “Bright Line” distinction between Planning and Extreme events

• SPF P8 Planning Event: 3-phase fault are low probability – single phase not properly cleared often

evolves to a 3-phase fault The specific locations of SPF are known

Reasons for New P8 Planning Event


SPF role in system disturbances – 1,600 data request results – System Protection Control Subcommittee (SPCS)/System Analysis and Modeling Subcommittee (SAMS) recommendation

Lower probability event is reflected in the P8 performance requirements

• Extreme Events unchanged with SPF codified as a Planning Event in Category P8

Reasons for New P8 Planning Event


• Changes to Requirement R1 is not a prescriptive, continent-wide procedure

• Entity must have a process and procedure that conform with a technical rationale which must be made available Consistent with other requirements in TPL-001-4, such as Voltage Criteria,

Low Voltage Ride Through, etc.

• Removed the six month time horizon for significant outages occurring within the period of the Near-Term Assessment studies (Year 1 or 2 and Year 5)

• Categories P3 and P6 do not sufficiently cover planned maintenance outages

• Proposed revisions to Requirement R2 also include stability studies for long lead equipment that does not have a spare equipment strategy

FERC Order 786 (Maintenance Outage)


• The issue is “raising the bar” on a continent-wide basis Close coordination between Protection and Planning Some entities may require extensive coordination efforts that involve

multiple substation outages

• “Raising the bar” issue was addressed in TPL-001-4 by: 5 year time period for those requirements that “raised the bar” Providing temporary relief from the performance requirements by

permitting Operating Procedures during the phase in period to include Non-Consequential load loss and curtailment of Firm Transmission Service that would not otherwise be permitted by the requirements of TPL-001-4

Implementation


• The relief provided in TPL-001-4 is not portable to TPL-001-5 In TPL-001-4, a P5 (non-redundant relay failure) event which does not

meet performance requirements must have Operating Procedure until the redundant relay is installed

Options provided in bullets under Requirement 2 Part 2.7.1 may cause a BES reliability issue that is more severe than a low probability P5 event

There is not time to install the added redundancy of the protection system for P5 or the added P8

• The performance requirements in Categories P5 and P8 (Relay Failure) are achieved in the dynamic time frame

• The solution to a relay issue is often to implement the CAP• Another reliability concern is the potential impact of a lower

probability event (P8) vs. scheduling outages required for the CAP

Implementation


• The implementation plan is being balloted separately and contains: 3 year study period to perform the “raising the bar” events in P5 and P8 2 year period to identify CAPs

Implementation


Advanced Modeling Grid ResearchAli Ghassemian

NERC Planning Committee, March 2018

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• OE leads the Department of Energy’s efforts to ensure a resilient, reliable, secure, and flexible electricity system.

• OE accomplishes this mission through research, partnerships, facilitation, modeling and analytics, and emergency preparedness.

• OE also works to bolster the resiliency of the electric grid and assists with restoration when major energy supply interruptions occur.

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability(OE)

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OE consists of 4 Divisions (https://www.energy.gov/oe/mission):1. Advanced Grid Research and Development (AGR&D) Division:

• responsible for the development and management of projects for “next generation” electricity delivery technologies and supporting activities to accelerate their introduction to the marketplace.

2. Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) Division:

• leads the Department's efforts to provide technical assistance to states, regional entities, and tribes to help them develop and improve their programs, policies, and laws that will facilitate the development of reliable and affordable electricity infrastructure. It also authorizes the export of electricity, issues permits for the construction of cross-border transmission lines, and is leading efforts to improve the coordination of Federal transmission permitting on Federal lands.

3. Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) Division:

• leads efforts for securing the U.S. energy infrastructure against all hazards, reducing the impact of disruptive events, and responding to and facilitating recovery from energy disruptions, in collaboration with all levels of industry and State and local governments.

4. Cybersecurity and Emerging Threats Research and Development (CET R&D) Division:

• mitigate the risk of energy disruption resulting from cyber incidents and other emerging threats within the energy environment

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability(OE)

https://www.energy.gov/oe/mission

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Key Trends Driving Electricity System Changes

Growing supply- and demand-side opportunities for

customers to participate in electricity systems

The emergence of interconnected electricity, information and control

systems

Aging Infrastructure and

work force

Increase in variety of electric generation

and load

Growing demands for a resilient, reliable,

efficient, secure, and economic grid

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Key Characteristics of a Modernized Grid

• ResilientSmaller scale and shorter duration of disruptions if/when they occur

• ReliableNot prone to outage or disruption

• SecureAble to survive physical or cyber attack

• AffordableGenerated & Delivered at an economically-competitive price

• FlexibleActively respond to the variability and uncertainty of conditions at various timescales

• SustainableEnabling cost-effective utilization of generation resources.

Grid Modernization

Reliable

Resilient

Secure

Affordable

Sustainable

Flexible

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• Advanced Grid Research and Development (AGR&D) Division:• Activities include:

• accelerate discovery and innovation in electric transmission and distribution technologies

• create "next generation" devices, software, tools, and techniques to help modernize the electric grid

• Projects are planned and implemented in concert with partners from other Federal programs; electric utilities; equipment manufacturers; regional, state, and local agencies; national laboratories; and universities.

• Coordination is critical to focusing Federal efforts and ensuring that projects are properly aligned with public, private, local, and national needs.

Advanced Grid Research and Development (AGR&D)

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Advanced Grid R&D Programs At-A-GlanceG

ridCo

mm

unic

atio

ns

and

Cont

rols Smart Grid

Advanced Distribution Management SystemsMicrogridsTransactive EnergyLow-Cost Sensors

TransmissionReliability

Synchrophasors

Advanced Grid Modeling

Grid

Sys

tem

s and

Co

mpo

nent

s

TransformerResilience and Advanced Components

Advanced Power Grid Components

Energy Storage Systems Energy Storage

Grid

Com

mun

icat

ions

an

d Co

ntro

ls Smart Grid



Synchrophasors


Grid

Sys

tem

s and

Co

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Grid

Com

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an

d Co

ntro

ls Smart Grid



Synchrophasors


Grid

Sys

tem

s and

Co

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nent

s




Grid

Com

mun

icat

ions

an

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ls Smart Grid



Synchrophasors


Grid

Sys

tem

s and

Co

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nent

s




Grid

Com

mun

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an

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Transmission & DistributionReliability

Synchrophasors


Grid

Sys

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States/Territories

Distribution Automation and Management

Dist

ribut

ed E

nerg

y Re

sour

ces

Microgrids

Electric UtilitiesMonitor and operate distribution and transmission network.

Energy Storage

RTO/ISOsCoordinates, controls and monitors transmission grid and wholesale market.

Electricity Consumers

Communities

Wide Area Sensors Measurement and

Monitoring

Transformers, Protection, Power Control Devices

Advanced Electric Power Grid

Electric Power Grid

Centralized Electricity Producers

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Advanced Modeling Grid Research (AMGR) Objectives

To address these challenges, OE's AMGR Program objectives are:

• Support the transformation of data to enable preventative actions rather than reactive responses to changes in grid conditions;

• Direct the research and development of advanced computational and control technologies to improve the reliability, resiliency, security, and flexibility of the nation’s electricity system;

• Help system operators and utilities prevent blackouts and improve reliability by expanding wide-area real-time visibility into the conditions of the grid;

• Support improvement of the performance of modeling tools and computations that are basis of the grid operations and planning; and

• Support the tracking and expansion of the use of quantitative risk and uncertainty methods by federal and state level energy system decision makers regarding energy infrastructure investments.

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AMGR Program Vision

Deliver validated decision support for state and federal

grid regulators about the effect of new policy or

technology adoption in their state or region

Manage and understand the impact of changes in the grid amid increasing

complexity and accelerated grid

technology deployment

Develop accurate computational and

analytical algorithms, and grid scale models that can inform system operation and planning about the

current and future needs of the grid and assist them

in managing it

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AMGR Program Objectives

• Increase pace to information• Reduce computational strain

Reduce barriers to data employment by utilities, research community and

policy makersMathematical Methods &

Computation

• Facilitate data standards• Create an environment for

data sharing• Build capability at scale to

handle Big Data

Data Management & Analytics

High quality, accurate data for utilities, research community

and policy makers

Models & Simulation

• Rapid• Accurate• Precise• Interfacing

More useful, predictive information for better grid

operation and planning

Operator Tools & Decision Support

• Human interface• Application development• Adoption

Tools that deliver real-world value to utilities,

research community and policy makers

Program Areas Objective Goal

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AMGR Program Areas

1. Data Management & Analytics• Focus on the way data is collected, used, stored, and archived to improve

applicability of large, multi-source datasets for real-time operations and off-line planning studies.

2. Mathematical Methods & Computation • Address emerging mathematical and computational challenges arising in

power systems by increasing pace of data creation, proving the data, and providing valid, useable information

3. Models & Simulations • Research on a new class of fast, high fidelity capabilities that underpin

better grid operations and planning in a large-scale, dynamic, and stochastic environment.

4. Operator Tools & Decision Support• Address the enormous amount of data today’s grid produces to better

enable grid operators to make sense of and manage a large quantity of grid state and customer data in near-real time.

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Road Map (Courtesy of PNNL)

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Partnerships

Funded by DOE to support critical research and development in the AGM subprogram

Load ModelingContributes toward developing and validating mathematical model structure, capturing emerging load dynamic behaviors. Research is required to develop physics, math, and economic (if applicable) representations suitable for analytical assessments that run on a range of computational platforms from desktop to high-performance computing systems.

ProtectionEnhance protection system (mis-operation) modeling capabilities to study and coordinate protection devices and approaches. Applications could include regional system concerns (e.g., cascading event mitigation, special protection systems/remedial action schemes) or local objectives (e.g., feeder-level adaptive protection, intentional islanding/microgrids).

SolversCreate, maintain, and enhance a scalable math solver library for grid planning and operations tools that work on a variety of computational platforms intended for research community & policy makers

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Resilience

• Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience

• “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats of incidents.”

• NERC definition of Resilience

• “Infrastructure resilience is the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or enterprise depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event.”

• “As an enhanced yardstick of reliability, resilience is reflected throughout NERC’s programs. For instance, NERC’s definition of “adequate level of reliability” includes a performance outcome providing for expeditious recovery from major system disturbances. NERC has a family of emergency preparedness and operations standards covering such topics as blackstart capability, system restoration coordination, and geomagnetic disturbance operations.” (Testimony of NERC's President and Chief Executive Officer Before the Subcommittee on Energy, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives; September 14, 2017)

• Resilience complements Reliability

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Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium (GMLC)

• There are many causes for failure such as Physical and Cyber Attack, Drought, Extreme Hot or Cold Weather, Earthquake, Flood, Wild Fire, GMD, Hurricane and Tornados to name a few.

• It is challenging to accurately model these and to develop Metrics to measure the Resilience.

• Department of Energy announced funding in September 2017 of up to $32 million over three years to the GMLC and their partners to advance resilient distribution systems, focusing on the integration of clean distributed energy resources (DER), advanced controls, grid architecture, and emerging grid technologies at a regional scale.

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GMLC Project Selections

• Grid Resilience and Intelligence Platform (GRIP)

• The objective of this project is to anticipate, absorb, and recover from grid events by demonstrating predictive analytics capabilities, combining state-of-the-art artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques, and controlling DERs.

• Resilient Alaskan Distribution System Improvements using Automation, Network Analysis, Control, and Energy Storage (RADIANCE)

• The objective of this project is to enhance the resilience methods for distribution grids under harsh weather, cyber-threats, and dynamic grid conditions using multiple networked microgrids, energy storage, and early-stage grid technologies.

• Increasing Distribution Resiliency using Flexible DER and Microgrid Assets Enabled by OpenFMB

• The objective to this project is to accelerate the deployment of resilient and secure distribution concepts through the flexible operation of traditional assets, DERs, and micogrids using OpenFMB.

• Resilient Distribution Systems

• This activity will focus on effective integrated resource planning and metrics, control systems, inverter-dominated islanding with storage and regional consortia

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GMLC Project Selections

• Integration of Responsive Residential Loads into Distribution Management Systems

• The objective of this project is to research and validate open-source home energy management systems (HEMS) to support distribution resiliency use cases and end-to-end interoperability.

• CleanStart-DERMS

• The objective of this project is to validate and demonstrate at scale a DER-driven mitigation, blackstart and restoration strategy for distribution feeders with integration of applied robust control, communications and analytics layer, and coordinated hierarchical solution.

• Laboratory Valuation Analysis Team

• This team will provide efficiency and consistency in performing valuation analysis across the entire GMI portfolio of field validation projects using appropriate metrics. Using a cross-cut approach will provide a consistent framework and approach in conducting the benefit/cost analysis of each project, impacts analysis (e.g. potential benefits to region) and broader synthesis of results from this project call. This team will facilitate information sharing on consistent application of metrics & valuation framework in field validation projects to various audiences.

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National Academies of Sciences . Engineering . Medicine(NAS)

• In July 20, 2017 NAS released the “Enhancing the Resiliency of the Nation’s Electricity System” study report recommending how to improve the resiliency in electric power grid. The study was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy.

• Full report can be found at: https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24836

• The report recommends that DOE and DHS to work closely with utility operators and other stakeholders to improve cyber and physical security and resilience.

• The reports make several recommendations to improve resilience such as:• Distribution automation• Enhanced modeling and simulation• Wide area monitoring and control• Intelligent load shedding / adaptive islanding• Reducing criticality of individual components• Reducing dependency on supporting infrastructures• Cyber resiliency• Better control/coordination of Distributed Energy Resources (DER)

https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24836

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Program Leadership

Ali Ghassemian Ph.D., [email protected]

Ali is the Program Manager for the Advanced Modeling Grid Research Program in the Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability at DOE. Ali has over 20 years of experience in the Electric Power Industry. His areas of interest include power system operation and planning; reliability & resiliency analysis; state estimation; dynamic stability analysis and control; parallel processing; optimization; and microgrids. He is a graduate of University of Maryland at College park and Virginia Tech.

mailto:[email protected]

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