Pathfinder Vol 1

Air Power Development Centre

CANBERRA

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© Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2005This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without permission from the publisher.

DisclaimerThe views expressed in this work are those of the contibutors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force or the Government of Australia. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included.

ISBN 1 920800 05 0

Edited by Chris Clark and Sanu KainikaraCover design based on the painting Better Late Than Never by Steven HeyenLayout and design by Michelle Lovi

Published and distributed by:Air Power Development CentreLevel 3, 205 Anketell StreetTuggeranong ACT 2900Australia

Telephone: +61 2 6266 1433Facsimile: +61 2 6266 1041E-mail: [email protected]

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FOREWORD

In June 2004 the Air Power Development Centre commenced publication of a fortnightly bulletin called Pathfinder. The purpose of the new bulletin was to canvas issues of current interest to the community involved with air power and RAAF history. In addition to alternating historical and contemporary topics, the format adopted—1000 words, or two sides of an A4 sheet of paper—was expressly intended to ensure that the contents of each bulletin was easily read and digested over a cup of coffee.

The Pathfinder title was chosen as a tribute to the World War II Pathfinder Force that operated within RAF Bomber Command from August 1942, forming an elite navigational group which preceded each raid and accurately illuminated the target area with incendiaries to permit visual bombing by the main force. The emblem adopted was the ‘Fiery Mo’ insignia that unofficially adorned the Hudson aircraft of No 6 Squadron, RAAF, in New Guinea during 1943.

Since its appearance, Pathfinder has maintained its steady rate of appearance, and gained a surprising and steadily widening readership around the Air Force and among air power specialists. Now, nearly 18 months on, it is felt that the time has come to put the collected bulletins into a more permanent format for ease of reference. It is hoped that the bulletins, or at least a significant proportion of them, thereby maintain their relevance and ongoing interest. To that end, a collected edition will continue to be produced at regular intervals.

Group Captain Mike BennettDirectorAir Power Development Centre

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THE AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

The Air Power Development Centre, formerly the Aerospace Centre, was established by the Royal Australian Air Force in August 1989, at the direction of the Chief of Air Force. Its function is to promote a greater understanding of the proper application of air and space power within the Australian Defence Force and in the wider community. This is being achieved through a variety of methods, including development and revision of indigenous doctrine, the incorporation of that doctrine into all levels of RAAF training, and increasing the level of air and space power awareness across the broadest possible spectrum. Comment on this publication or inquiry on any other air power related topic is welcome and should be forwarded to:

The DirectorAir Power Development CentreLevel 3205 Anketell StreetTuggeranong ACT 2900Australia

Telephone: +61 2 6266 1355Facsimile: +61 2 6266 1041E-mail: [email protected]

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CONTENTS

AIR POWER PAGE NO

The Changing Face of Air Power (2)* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3There is no Substitute for Air Power (10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7The Ongoing Debate – Why an ‘Air First’ Approach? (16) . . . . . . 11The Shape of Things to Come (18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Air Power in Urban Operations (20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Which Air Power Capability is Most Important? (6) . . . . . . . . . . . 23Ten Air Power Pointers From Iraq 2003 (12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Precision – The Coming of Age of Air Power (15) . . . . . . . . . . . . 31The Coarse Art of Air Force Experimentation (26) . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Air Force Experiment Headway – Some Insights (28) . . . . . . . . . . 39Enablers – The Critical Factor (32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43Cruise Missiles – A Double-Edged Sword (24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Are Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles Coming of Age? (8) . . . . . . 51Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles – Challenges for the Future (36) . 55Aerospace? Don’t You Mean Air and Space? (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Space Power and the RAAF (22) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63Future Space Capabilities (30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67Weapons in Space? (34) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

* Number in brackets denotes the original issue number of Pathfinder in which each article appeared

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HISTORY PAGE NO

Iraq – The First Time Around (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth (25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85The RAAF in Antarctica (19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89The Difference One Man Makes (11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Why the Red Centre Vanished (27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Chindits – A Reappraisal (14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101Bomber Command Memorial (7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Airborne Forward Air Control – A First for the RAAF (5) . . . . . . 109Defeating Germany’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (33) . . . . . . 113Aerial Torpedoes – A Weapon System Failure (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Australian Contibution to D-Day Operations (13) . . . . . . . . . . . . 121A Family of ‘War Loan’ Beaufighters (17) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125The RAAF Experience of National Service (21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129Meteors Versus MiGs (9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133Exploring the Nuclear Option (29) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137Butterworth: The RAAF’s Only Overseas Base (35) . . . . . . . . . . 141Phantoms of the Past (23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145Award Winning Heritage (31) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

AIR POWER

National safety would be endangered by an Air Force whose doctrine and techniques are tied solely on the equipment and process of the moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress, and any Air Force which does not keep its doctrine ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security.

– General Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, USAAF, 1945

PATHFINDER COLLECTION VOLUME 1

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THE CHANGING FACE OF AIR POWER

I t is certain that even the most ardent exponent could not have envisaged the rapid progress that aviation would make in a little

over a century from the first manned flight. The words of Rudyard Kipling, ‘We are at the opening verse of the opening page of the chapter of endless possibilities’, were indeed prophetic. In a little less than a decade, aviation was converted to military use heralding the advent of air power. From humble beginnings, when firepower was restricted to the carriage of small arms in the cockpit, air power now is capable of bringing to bear devastating and accurate firepower under all weather conditions.

This unprecedented and rapid improvement in capabilities is unique to air power when compared with other means of force projection. Such rapid changes can be advantageous, but if not carefully harnessed can also become a liability. Currently, the characteristics of enhanced reach and rapid, precise and overwhelming response have made air power the weapon of ‘first choice’ in most contexts. While considered and appropriate employment of air power will more often than not achieve the desired aim, there are a number of factors that, if not cohesively appreciated, will be inordinately detrimental to the success of not only a particular mission, but also the entire campaign.

The primary ethos that must be the corner stone in the application of air power is the unchanging basic principle of its employment—the need to gain and continuously maintain control of the air throughout the duration of the campaign. This factor has to be addressed


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comprehensively before any campaign plans are formulated. It is worthwhile noting here that ever since World War II, the forces of the United States (unarguably the most potent military force in the world today) have not engaged in combat without the assurance of absolute control of the air. Historically, it is seen that whenever control of the air has been contested, even to a minor extent, the restrictions placed on all operations have been dramatic. Ever since the first Gulf War, control of the air has been a constant in the planning process of all campaigns. Any unforeseen contest by the adversary will therefore likely put the planning process in disarray.

Control of the air is the fundamental factor that has to be borne in mind when any campaign planning is undertaken by air forces around the world. There can be no reason to believe that control of the air will be uncontested even when smaller air forces are involved in the conflict. So the basic dictum of air power, the need to gain and then fight to maintain control of the air, remains unquestioned as a universal truth even today.

If the basics have remained unchanged over a century, what changes have taken place? It is indeed a fact that the absolute necessity to control the air made it the primary role of air power. Technology has, however, conspired with air power’s inherent competencies to move it to a place of primacy in the hierarchy of military capabilities. This observation is not made with any intention to lessen the importance of other forms of force projection, but to emphasise the absolute need, in all types of conflicts, for adequate and timely air power capabilities to be made available.

The changes in air power capabilities have been revolutionary. The doctrinal and theoretical developments have, however, been such that the changes in air power application have been subtle and evocatively evolutionary.

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The entire spectrum of air power roles can now be encapsulated in four major groupings: strike, command of the air, airlift and enabling operations. This doctrinal change has been made possible with the gradual acceptance of air power as the primary repository of strike capabilities at least in the initial stages of a conflict. Strike as the primary role of air power could not have been envisaged as a conclusive air power responsibility even in the late 1980s. The rapid and incremental technological improvements that have been made available in the past decade have catapulted air strike capabilities to the forefront of considerations in conflict. However, the downside of such changes has been twofold.

Firstly, air power at its optimum high-tech form has become far too costly for the less industrialised nations to obtain and maintain. This has forced a number of nations to rethink, in a realistic manner, the level of air power that they can afford. As a result some nations have reluctantly accepted the inevitable decline of their indigenous air power capabilities. Secondly, there is now a clear distinction that can be observed when a holistic view is taken of air power capabilities—that there are two types of air power: that of the United States, and the rest of the world!

These two factors at times tend to overshadow the entire spectrum of air power and its development. It is, therefore, important to understand the implications of resource constraints and the technological background required to enhance the growth of indigenous air power. The drawbacks can be ameliorated by a robust overview that combines a high level strategic outlook with a clear underpinning at the operational level and adequate tactical understanding. The need is to recognise important core competencies and supporting technologies and to develop doctrinal changes accordingly.

Air power competencies, capabilities and roles have evolved over time while remaining fundamentally the same in a number of core areas. The changes have taken place in such a short span of time that it is clearly


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visible even to a casual observer of military matters. It is incumbent on the practitioners of military art to clearly fathom these changes so that they do not falter in the application of this extremely sophisticated force projection capability. Only a concise and articulated doctrine that is amply supported by closely studied theory, innovative practice and high-end technology can ensure cost effective optimisation of this scarce yet critical warfighting capability.

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THERE IS NO SubSTITuTE FOR AIR POWER

The end of the Cold War saw a period of time when military power was employed in half-hearted ways to achieve objectives that were

not always clearly defined. Most of the developed world resorted to arbitrary military budget cuts that left the armed forces with strategies that the emerging force structures were unable to sustain. The imbalance between force structure and force requirements was the greatest at this time. Then came the events of September 11.

The military imperatives of the global war on terrorism are now being considered as the primary capability driver. This is an incorrect assessment. The capabilities required to combat terrorism have to be catered to in addition to, not as a substitute for, capabilities identified and embedded in the defence forces earlier. The first use of air power against terrorist threats, in Afghanistan, painted a wrong picture—it was presumed that all future military actions would be against technologically inferior adversaries with limited warfighting capabilities.

In Afghanistan, circumstances permitted the unhindered and effective use of legacy fighters and Cold War era bombers. This situation will not repeat itself. Declining defence budgets and shrinking force structures have eroded the technological advantage that traditionally assured success in air power missions. The need to shore-up the technological advantage has never been greater.


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Warfighting is in the process of being radically changed, brought about primarily by the explosion in information technology and the advent of long-range precision strike capabilities. The combination of these two capabilities is epitomised in the holistic application of air power to achieve national security goals. It also provides the decision-makers at the highest level with a viable alternative to the attrition model of war characterised by the clash of large scale conventional military forces and the resultant heavy loss of life on both sides.

Although the assured reduction in loss of life as a concept should receive whole-hearted support, incredibly there is more than token resistance to it. Concepts such as effects-based operations that underpin the new way of thinking are greatly resisted by those with vested interest in traditional forms of warfare. These groups accuse air power proponents of claiming that air power can win wars by itself. Nothing could be further from the truth. No claims are being made that air power can win wars all on its own! However, it has to be accepted that the relative burden in warfare has clearly shifted. Air power carries much more of the total load than it ever did before and it can no longer be automatically assumed that the land battle is, or will ultimately become, the focal point in winning the war.

When carefully optimised, close integration of air and space power with land and maritime forces provides the greatest combat capability to a nation. Strategies that rely on single dimensions are not only inflexible, but in a wider perspective too risky to be applied in support of national security imperatives. While accepting that it may not always be possible to achieve complete victory by the employment of air power alone, it is also necessary to emphasise that victory of any kind will prove to be elusive without adequate air assets. It is now a reality that time sensitive precision targeting and long range systems make it increasingly possible to achieve the effects of mass and concentration of force without the actual massing of forces within the range of enemy firepower.

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In the past two decades space has emerged as yet another dimension to be considered in warfighting. There is now a clearer understanding and acceptance of space power than in the past. Clearly discernible trends strongly indicate the migration of more and more military missions to space. The functions of information, surveillance and reconnaissance are now increasingly conducted by space-based assets and space systems are already extensively used to support and accentuate military operations on earth. It is only a matter of time before other missions will also be routinely conducted from space.

Within the foreseeable future, command of space will become as critical as command of the air is today. It can also be safely assumed that when the security of the nation is threatened by actions originating from or using the medium of space, the defence forces will be expected to counter it. Command of space in the years ahead will have to stem from seminal work that should be done today. Although air and space are independent mediums, there is a sense on continuum between them. It is therefore imperative that air commanders and air power strategists look to addressing the pros and cons of the application of space power to military missions on a regular basis.

The war on terrorism is at the forefront of the current global strategic scenario. The modus operandi of the adversary does not permit foolproof defence of one’s own assets, even within home territory. The strategy that is thus being advocated is to fight on the adversary’s turf in order to neutralise enemy assets. This is almost completely reliant on situational awareness, mobility and long-range precision strikes, capabilities that form core competencies of air power. It is apparent that air power would have to be the lead in all such endeavours.

The arena of national security is more complex than ever before and needs rapid response capabilities at times of crises. Such rapid and appropriate responses can only be effectively achieved by constantly striving to have total situational awareness, adequate resources to provide the necessary reach and well-trained and reactive force projection capabilities.


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Superiority in air and space becomes a prerequisite for the nurturing of these capabilities. It is therefore obvious that these are the forces that the nation will look to first when faced with a threat. Other forms of force projection will always be second level options when time critical action is of paramount importance.

There is no substitute for air and space power!

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THE ONGOING DEbATE – WHY AN ‘AIR FIRST’ APPROACH?

Enough has been written, discussed and analysed about the 1991 Gulf War, on how that campaign exorcised the ghosts of Vietnam

for the United States armed forces (and by implication for all other Allied forces); on how it was a vindication of bold planning; how the theories of air power long derided as wishful thinking came to be validated; and how the entire world now saw the invincibility of Allied (read American) military power.

The reality is that, while all of the above may be true, the most important factor to be recognised is that it fundamentally changed the way in which we approach the conduct of war. In the theory of warfare, it has been an age-old paradigm that land operations, by virtue of capturing the enemy assets, determine the outcome of major wars. By a straightforward logical extension, this can then be further developed to the theory that, since the outcome of land operations are almost completely determined by the Army, the Army will determine the outcome of all major wars. At the conceptual level the 1991 Gulf War challenged this premise. At the operational level it graphically highlighted the primacy of air power in combat operations who can forget the widely transmitted image of the impact of a precision weapon on a hardened shelter that became the symbol of the ‘new’ air power? The fall-out was the dismissal of the notion that the air and maritime elements of the defence forces were intended fundamentally to ‘support’ land forces.


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From this turning point in the history of warfare, air power has continued to evolve into a holistic force projection capability, able to create a number of effects that have both strategic and immediate tactical impact. The conduct of recent conflicts is instructive in demonstrating this newfound confidence in air power capabilities. In Operation Allied Force, NATO forces brought about the surrender of the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia purely by air attacks on strategic targets. The Yugoslav army suffered very little damage and was not the centre of gravity. The NATO ground forces were never employed, since a ground invasion of Kosovo would have been politically untenable. In addition, although it took 78 days of gradual escalation, air power achieved NATO’s political objectives.

Yet again in Afghanistan, air power supported by Special Forces and other control units removed the Taliban from power in a very short time. It was only in March 2002 that conventional land forces were deployed in actual combat missions, in order to mop up the remnants of the Taliban and also to support the new regime.

Of course, the success or otherwise of air power employment will always be highly contextual. There would have to be clear understanding of the specifics of the situation, which in turn will determine the tactics that could be utilised. The underpinning lesson is that air power was used in a fundamentally different way each time and with great success.

Operation Falconer (Iraqi Freedom) was a sort of summing up of the lessons learned from the employment of air power in 1991 and since. In the first instance, some Allied land forces deliberately manoeuvred in such a way as to draw out Iraqi forces into the open so that they could then be destroyed by air power—a great example of the synergy of land and air forces acting in conjunction. Almost like a replay, air power was also used in a similar manner to Afghanistan in the Kurdish area north of Baghdad to destroy Iraqi strongholds with the help of indigenous and Special Forces. The third example was the use of extremely sophisticated technology resident within air power to inflict

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severe damage (estimated as high as 86 per cent) on Iraqi Republican Guard divisions that were relocating under cover of a sandstorm. The common denominator and success-enabler for all the operations that have been discussed above is the ability to deliver precision-guided munitions at will to complete the cycle of reconnaissance, target identification and assured target destruction within a span of time that does not degrade the tactical or strategic importance of the target.

So, what are the reasons for this sudden reliance on air power to achieve aims and goals from the tactical to the political? The capability of air power to find targets, process information and carry out devastating attacks with precision has been steadily growing. The improvement in the quality of the information and its processing, as well as the precision that is achievable, has been paralleled by the risk-averseness of senior leadership, both political and military. The primary reason for an ‘air first’ decision is therefore the propensity to avoid risking land forces when the same result could be achieved with precision strikes. As a corollary, even if the political or operational aims are not achieved by air strikes and the involvement of land forces become imperative, precision strikes would have greatly reduced the enemy capacity to resist.

Secondly, the potential difficulties that are faced by multinational coalitions in obtaining unhindered access to staging areas and base facilities make the choice of employing air power, in the opening stages at least, an attractive proposition. This is further reinforced in the current strategic environment when ‘coalitions of the willing’ may not have international approval. The advantages of long-range air power are thus re-emphasised.

With the improved accuracy that air power now has, it may not be necessary for the land forces to engage in direct-fire encounters with enemy armour, especially in open terrain. The old saying that the best weapon against a tank is a tank is no longer valid; the best weapon against a tank now is coordinated air power. The chances of any


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land force having to engage any armour opposition that has not been severely degraded by air power is very remote.

Air power has outgrown the cliché of having to provide indirect fire support to land forces in manoeuvre warfare. Conceptually, it has now transformed into wielding the sword, rather than being the shield! This is the key point: the effective employment of air and space power has to do not so much with airplanes and missiles and engineering as with thinking and attitude and imagination.

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THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

There is a very clear commonality in the thinking of all air power theorists, starting from the pronouncements of Douhet and

Mitchell, leading to the assertions of Warden and others in recent times. The commonality is their implicit belief in the capabilities of air power and what it can provide to the larger aims in a war. Theories of air power have usually transcended national boundaries and implementation of these ideas was within the capabilities of several nations, as witnessed by the strategic bombing campaign during World War II. This trend has carried on and now perhaps there is even greater global consensus about air power theory. However, air power capabilities now encompass a large and divergent spectrum such that it is necessary to qualify air forces with appropriate adjectives like ‘emergent’, ‘small’ etc., to ensure that it is correctly understood within the context of a discussion.

Even with these limitations, air power has become accepted internationally as an instrument of national policy, but its effectiveness is dependent on a number of factors. The level of national technological literacy, resource availability (both the ability and inclination of the government to allocate it), industrial base and the size of the standing air force itself will directly affect the capability that it can bring to bear. Currently, only the USA excels in all the above conditions and even a very cursory look at some of the other modern air forces around the world will indicate the overwhelming pre-eminence of US air power.

Even with a clear understanding that the complete spectrum of capabilities may be well beyond their grasp, nations continue to nurture different levels of air power capabilities. This is because the basic


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attributes of speed, flexibility, reach and the ability to transcend natural barriers make air power a principal element in any multi-dimensional strategy, if carefully nurtured and optimally employed. These basic attributes are now complemented by accuracy of weapon delivery, stealth, network centricity, and space-based capabilities. Essentially this combination of inherent characteristics and evolving technology enhances air power’s already large envelope of operational utility.

So what does the future hold for air power? As with any prediction, one way to gauge the future of a capability is by analysing the trends that are clearly apparent now and then projecting them further into the required timeframe. Since air power is very clearly reliant on technology for its competence, evolutionary changes taking place in the field of aviation-related technologies would give a clear indication of the probable way forward. Looking at the history of aviation, it has also to be accepted that technology also produces revolutionary changes that sometimes have disruptive fallouts at the strategic conceptual level of air power employment. Fortunately such instances have been few and have happened only at irregular intervals.

Crystal gazing within the currently available indications provides a fairly easily understandable future progression for air power. It can safely be assumed that air power will soon be thought of as air and space power. This has resource and technological capability implications for all air forces. Space equipment is expensive to obtain and maintain and also needs a fairly advanced technological base for sustenance. But there is also a discernible trend of commercial assets being made available for military purposes, even though they may not have the ideal security and bandwidth. Irrespective of the resource implications, air power will become steadily more reliant on space-based assets for its communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as well as electronic warfare capabilities. The inescapable truth is that only air forces with ready and secure access to space capabilities will be able to perform to the required level in a modern battlespace.

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The second evolution that is already under way is the increased employment of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and their weaponisation to make them combat capable. The nations on the forefront of this process are also the ones that have a great aversion to accepting own casualties. The advantages of Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) are fairly simple to understand. Along with these advantages, their employment will also bring with it challenges to international bodies that try to regulate the use of armed forces in operations other than war. The use of UCAVs in anti-terrorism operations and their legality is already being debated. Despite the legal implications, UCAVs will make their operational debut sooner rather than later and will enter the armoury of nations that have the technological capability to produce them or the resources to procure them. Integrating these combat assets into the spectrum of air power will prove to be interesting.

An air force of consequence will need to be networked in more ways than one. It is already an accepted fact that response to threats will have to be multifaceted and multi-pronged. Under these circumstances, instantaneous communications and dissemination of information become war-winning capabilities. By virtue of their inherently larger perspective, air power assets are the best suited to become nodes as network enablers at all levels. The latest combat aircraft that are being fielded have built-in capabilities to switch from being purely combat-capable platforms to becoming the nodal communication points for a networked and data-linked ensemble of platforms. This transformation can take place even while the basic combat capabilities are still being effectively utilised. Essentially the requirement is to make sure that the commanders (at all levels) see first so that they can decide first and thereby ensure that they act first. Air power is and will continue to be the biggest enabler of this process.

So, the future air force will be networked not only within itself, but to all national security agencies, and will then be able to provide appropriate and instant response to emerging threats. These responses


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could extend from deterrence at one end of the spectrum to the lethal application of force, if necessary, at the other. The essence of air power in the future will be speed for rapid response and precision-lethality for adequacy of response to threats on a global scale.

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AIR POWER IN uRbAN OPERATIONS

There is a prevalent thought that the zenith of air power glory has been achieved, and that now the capabilities that made it so

pertinent in combat have lost their effectiveness. This has come about because there is pervasive evidence that threat trends have changed over the past few years and that a conventional or traditional conflict is highly unlikely to occur. It is generally agreed that today a nation’s security forces will be faced with challenges emanating from adversaries employing unconventional methods to neutralise and counter traditional advantages that a regular defence force enjoys—irregular threats. The security situation becomes extremely complex when these threats combine with the disruptive challenges that an adversary’s use of advanced and breakthrough technologies may bring about. Under these circumstances security imperatives almost completely move out of the overarching umbrella of traditional combat power.

It is gradually becoming apparent that these threats are more likely to manifest in urban areas rather than in areas that are more traditional battlegrounds. Dealing with the complexity of applying judicious military force in a complex urban environment while ensuring minimum or no collateral damage is a daunting prospect. There is a school of thought within the strategists that this basic requirement rules air power out of the equation completely. But recent developments have proved otherwise.

In theatres of ongoing conflict it is seen that air power, when employed in an innovative manner, is capable of carrying out missions that only


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a few years ago would have been fully undertaken by land forces. Within the urban context air power is now used effectively for anti-infiltration and curfew enforcement duties. The very use of air power capabilities in low intensity conflicts challenges the traditional notions of ground warfare. This could not have happened even a decade ago. It is a combination of factors that have brought about this evolution.

Urban combat, even against a traditional adversary, is fraught with complications. When the adversary relies more on terrorist and guerilla tactics, the problems are amplified by a magnitude. Three elements combine to enable air power to assist and relieve the burden so far shouldered almost entirely by ground forces. They are:

• the increasing availability of advanced technology that provides the wherewithal to have adequate ISR capabilities, C2 networks and precise, responsive, lethal strike capabilities;

• unique operational concepts that bring together the responsive characteristics of air power to produce significant effects; and

• the seamless coordination of the process of intelligence collection, collation and dissemination.

In the case of low intensity conflicts, the biggest advantage that the use of air power bestows is that it overcomes the need for prolonged occupation of neutral or adversary territory by ground forces. International opinion currently does not approve of such an action, even if it is accepted as a necessity from a security perspective, since the legitimacy of positioning ground forces in foreign territory is questionable.

The key to success in urban operations is the ability to have an almost unlimited loiter time to observe and react to emerging threats. Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles, both unarmed as well as armed, are ideally suited for this purpose. By having uninterrupted reconnaissance capabilities and combining them with time-sensitive strike options, air power brings a completely new dimension to the conduct of urban,

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asymmetric warfare. The escape route for irregular threat perpetrators, that of merging into the complex terrain, is almost completely blocked if this concept is effectively employed in conjunction with high calibre intelligence. In this manner it is possible to close many loops in a matter of minutes or even seconds and successfully prosecute extremely elusive targets.

The principal contribution of air power to urban conflict is the greatly improved perspective that it brings to the arena. Air power is able to ‘see’ more with greater clarity, analyse and understand the evolving threat faster and strike more rapidly and precisely at a far greater range than with the use of only ground forces. This enhanced perspective makes air power a winning element in operations against irregular threats in complex terrain.

Long-range strike capabilities of air power produce significant strategic deterrent effects even when ground forces do not occupy the area of operations. In reality, when these capabilities are optimally merged with other air and space power capabilities, maritime capabilities and ground force projection (where it is a viable option), threats in complex urban terrain can be effectively contained. Theorists are already coining terms such as ‘Environmental Air Control’ and ‘Envelope Force’ to encapsulate this forward-thinking concept.

From a security perspective, the world is going through changes at a pace faster than ever before. Internationally, it is now an age where society has become so sensitive to loss of human life that it does not look kindly on any nation that does not minimise collateral damage and avoid casualties. This is also a period of rapidly altering security threat scenarios wherein entire defence forces may be forced to reconstitute themselves in ways never tried before, to ensure the achievement of national security paradigms.

It is also a fact the world over that defence forces are being pushed to do more, at further ends of the conflict spectrum, within stringent


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resource allocations. Air power has always been a dynamic concept! It has always been the harbinger of change and has been at the forefront of positively innovative concept development. Today, air power is in the process of embracing new ideas and is once again proving its flexibility by effectively adapting to a fast-changing warfighting environment.

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WHICH AIR POWER CAPAbILITY IS MOST IMPORTANT?

Which air power capability is most important? Take 1: Control of the Air. As argued in Issue 2 of Pathfinder, control of the air is

an essential prerequisite for all other military endeavours. If we fail to achieve and maintain control of the air, the adversary’s air power could pick off our forces at will. Not only would this nullify friendly air power, such as our own strike, information and mobility aircraft, but also all friendly land and maritime forces. Our military bases, population centres, and industrial facilities would also be easy targets for adversary air power. We would thus be unable to achieve anything, and must surely be defeated.

So the most important air power capability is clearly that which is an essential prerequisite to the success of all other military endeavours: the most important air power capability is control of the air. Without control of the air, we are naked.

Which air power capability is most important? Take 2: Strike. An effects-based approach to warfare stresses that our ultimate aim is to achieve effects on the adversary that result in a cessation of unacceptable behaviour. From a military point of view, only the threat or use of force can directly achieve such effects. (Other actions may be taken that may be successful in achieving the same ultimate effect, but the use of force is the only action that is solely a military responsibility.)

Strike is overtly offensive. Is it right to adopt an offensive capability as our highest priority? We must consider whether a conflict could


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actually be won using purely defensive means. This is akin to trying to win a football match by using all of our players to guard our own half of the field, but having nobody who is able to score. We could certainly make it hard for the opposition to score, but we could never score. Unless our defence was perfect, the opposition would still manage to sneak through occasionally, so we would be guaranteed of a loss. So it is only through an offensive capability that we have a chance of success. And the only offensive air power capability is strike.

So the most important air power capability is clearly that which actually achieves a useful effect directly on the adversary and gives us the means to prevail: the most important air power capability is strike. Without strike, we are toothless.

Which air power capability is most important? Take 3: Information. We are in the information age. The ADF’s adoption of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) reflects the criticality of information to the modern way of warfighting. Without accurate and timely information, we could not achieve control of the air because we could not know where the threats are. Neither could we achieve useful effects through strike because we could not know about target importance, location, defences, and so on. And we could not coordinate our operations without the effective communication of information between all relevant forces and decision-makers.

Air power can contribute very significantly to the ADF’s information requirements. It is able to undertake surveillance and reconnaissance over great distances and at high speeds. With AEW&C, we will be able to process such information and control aspects of the battle with greater alacrity. So the most important air power capability is clearly that which allows us to make smart use of the other capabilities: the most important air power capability is information. Without information, we are blind and ignorant.

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Which air power capability is most important? Take 4: Mobility. We cannot expect adversaries to mount their attacks where it would be most convenient for us. Even if that were their plan, it would be safer for us to confront the adversary at some distance from our population centres and industrial assets. Australia’s interests also involve us in off-shore operations with increasing frequency.

Therefore, we must be an expeditionary force. Most, if not all, of our combat and information aircraft cannot perform their roles from their home bases. Nothing useful can happen until they, and their support, have been relocated to appropriate expeditionary air bases. Once there, regular resupply is necessary to keep them going. The need for rapid mobility is equally important for the deployment and sustainment of land forces.

Due to its speed, reach and capacity, air power can provide a quality of mobility that cannot be achieved by any other means.

So the most important air power capability is clearly that which puts our other capabilities where they can be most efficiently used: the most important air power capability is mobility. Without mobility, we are legless.

Which air power capability is most important? Take 5: Combat Support. All of the air power capabilities described above require air bases. Without secure and functional air bases, nothing could leave the ground. Our aircraft could not move forward, and there would be nowhere to move them to. Our ability to acquire information would be severely hampered, we could not achieve control of the air, and we could not strike.

So the most important air power capability is actually that which never leaves the ground: the most important air power capability is combat support. Without combat support, we have no feet.


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Which air power capability is most important? Take 6: none of the above—or all of the above. Without any one of the capabilities, air power cannot succeed in warfighting. Various arguments can be used to assert one capability over the others; for example, strike is what actually wins the war, or combat support has to happen before anything else. It is often helpful to consider which capabilities support which other capabilities; for example, mobility obviously supports control of the air. However, such dependencies actually tend to be circular; for example, without adequate control of the air, there can be no mobility. In general, we find that all capabilities depend on all other capabilities.

What does this mean? It means that we must strive for a balanced force, with sufficient individual capabilities to allow the others to be fully utilised. If we try to maximise one capability at the expense of the others, we could actually end up with an overall deterioration in total capability.

Of course, we should ask, ‘balanced for what?’ The capability proportions required for warfighting are quite different to those required for peacekeeping or natural disaster relief. By considering the contribution of each capability to each of the ADF’s responsibilities, we can optimise our capability balance and thus maximise our air power.

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TEN AIR POWER POINTERS FROM IRAQ 2003

In the aftermath of a campaign, attempts to analyse its events can be useless unless the correct pointers are drawn from it for use in

future operations. Iraq 2003 is no different, but the urgency to learn from the conflict is reinforced by the rapid technological changes that are in turn altering the concepts of operations themselves. In addition, the context of employing air power in an ambiguous battlespace makes the understanding of its complexities much more important for future applications.

Iraq is perhaps the precursor of a new and emerging battlespace where the entire spectrum of conflict, from high intensity warfare to peacekeeping operations, will be carried out in close proximity to each other, both geographically and in terms of timeframe. The entire campaign will be one of dynamic changes in intensity, location and complications. Historically, air power has responded to such challenges by rapidly adapting to the evolving situation, more often than not by leveraging emerging technologies.

Even in this changing scenario, a few air power pointers can be clearly discerned.

Pointer 1. In the past five decades Western forces have usually operated with almost complete control of the air. The fact that such control was very easily obtained in all cases has injected a notion into the thinking process of a number of planners that one does not have to fight to obtain and maintain control of the air. Developments in


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surface-to-air missile technology that permit the targeting of airborne platforms at ranges in excess of 350 kilometres will change the equation drastically. The challenge will be to ensure control of the air under these circumstances.

Pointer 2. Air power has normally been employed in the ‘centralised command and decentralised execution’ concept. The advantages of network centric forces cannot be fully exploited if this command and control structure becomes too rigid. A basic minimum fluidity in centralised control will have to be built-in to optimise the effectiveness of air power assets. Complex rules of engagement and the increasing need to prosecute timesensitive targets further emphasise the need for flexible command and control functions.

Pointer 3. The indelible, but invisible link between command and control and tempo of operations was underlined in Iraq 2003. The impact of air power in clearly moving away from traditional attrition to a more effects-based approach, even while applying lethal force, now becomes fundamental to future operations. The effectiveness of such an approach will determine the tempo of operations and depends directly on air power’s capabilities to neutralise identified critical vulnerabilities of the enemy. This in turn is a function of an assertive yet flexible command and control structure.

Pointer 4. The ability to generate and then sustain the required tempo of operations is also facilitated by air power assets. Higher tempo of operations normally involve higher risks, but air power can mitigate much of the risk involved in generating high tempos of operation that spike at irregular intervals. The ability of air power to regulate the tempo with minimal risk was demonstrated in the campaign.

Pointer 5. The battlespace in Iraq was and continues to be without clearly demarcated front lines, enemy areas and comparatively safe rear areas. This necessitates the development of accurate, adequate and timely intelligence as well as the capability to disseminate it.

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Training of the personnel involved in these activities, even though they are not at the ‘sharp end of the spear’ assumes great importance, more so in situations wherein the information is collected, collated and analysed in a short time-span. Realistic and collective training of the entire team, especially in the employment of air power for efficiency, when operating in complex battlespaces and to avoid the pitfalls of fratricide, was prominently demonstrated.

Pointer 6. Air power assets will have to be truly multi-role capable, with the ability to data link between assets and employ precision firepower capabilities. Technology of tomorrow will have to be harnessed today to ensure the effectiveness of weapon systems in an ongoing manner and to avoid short-term redundancy. Capability acquisition of the future will need to take these factors into account to avoid having to go into battle with already outdated technology.

Pointer 7. The nature of war is changing, making it very difficult for planners to forecast weapon capability and quantity requirements. This situation is further complicated in the case of air power because the precision weaponry is very expensive because of its extreme complexity in design and manufacture. Realistic usage rates of these in different types of operations will be difficult to ascertain and may become a limiting factor.

Pointer 8. Sustainability of air operations in far-flung theatres will become more difficult in terms of positioning the support infrastructure like fuel, ammunition, spares etc. Fuel particularly will become a constraining element. Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia was using 4.5 million gallons of aviation fuel per day and there was no fuel available for even one more aircraft. The impact, in operational terms, if further effort is required is self-explanatory.

Pointer 9. Contrary to some of the ideas being floated about regarding the efficacy of ‘unmanned robotic air warfare’, it is certain that moral compulsions and legal considerations within the international


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community will restrict their usage even if technology does not. The need will still be for a ‘person’ in the loop, for fool-proof identification of each target and for the ability to abort a mission at the last possible minute. Robotic warfare is still not a reality.

Pointer 10. Close Air Support in urban areas will become even more complicated as requirements for assessing the legality of targets, and limiting the ensuing collateral damage increase. Iraq 2003 illustrated the need for urban CAS, but it equally demonstrated the need for integrating this firepower with other elements of the combat force.

At the strategic level, Iraq once again demonstrated that Effects-Based Approach to a conflict is still an evolving science. The identification of the centres of gravity will continue to be the weak-link in an otherwise admirable concept that utilises the unique characteristics of air power to achieve laid down objectives.

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PRECISION – THE COMING OF AGE OF AIR POWER

Strike capabilities of air power took a hard knock during the Vietnam War, when the ‘high-tech juggernaut’ that was the US Air

Force could not avoid humiliation by a low-tech opponent. During this war, a number of technology-led innovations dramatically increased the effectiveness of aerial strikes, none more prominently than the so-called ‘smart bomb’. Although portrayed as some sort of a ‘magic weapon’, and the answer to all problems of accuracy in air attacks, there was really nothing very complicated about them.

As early as mid-1945 American scientists were working on a number of guided-bomb projects. In fact, other than for laser and navigational satellites, every other means that would eventually be used to guide weapons was already being trialed. Radio-steered bombs were successfully used in Burma and subsequently in Korea, both times to destroy bridges that were vital to enemy operations. However, with the nuclear standoff that developed immediately after the Korean War, the need for precision to be measured in dozens of feet was pushed to the background.

Although laser-guidance was stunningly effective in the Vietnam War, the necessary budgetary approval to progress further was not forthcoming. The Paveway series of bombs, of which the American forces dropped 28,000 in Vietnam, cost only US $8000 a-piece but were as effective as 25 unguided bombs of equivalent weight. The most famous success of Paveways was the destruction of the Thanh Hoa bridge, which carried the only railroad and principal highway across


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the Song Ma River south of Hanoi. After 871 sorties had already flown against the bridge, with 11 aircraft lost but no tangible damage done, on 13 May 1972, 14 fighters carrying 2000 and 3000-pound Paveways attacked and destroyed it completely.

The overall success rate of the Paveways was very close to a one bomb–one kill ratio, and also permitted attacks on targets that were off-limits for fear of collateral damage and repercussions. For the first time, precision capability nullified what had from the earliest days of the concept of strategic bombing been its most profound limitation: the public opinion backlash of unintended civilian casualties. Even then the revolutionary implications of precision guidance were lost in the realignment of political forces and the review of defence and foreign policies that saw the curtailment of the development of advanced conventional weapons systems.

During the 1970s and 80s, 80–90 per cent of budgets were spent on developing higher quality aircraft and only the remainder used for weapons research. The potential of advanced weapons was readily apparent to only a few people who appreciated that precision guidance meant that an aircraft would have to make fewer passes over heavily defended targets, and also that weapon release could be accomplished from greater distances and altitudes, keeping the aircraft out of harms way. In the early 1980s it was calculated that 100 fighters carrying precision weapons could destroy as many as 800 tanks per day, more than ten times the number that could be achieved by a force of 2500 World War II bombers. Fortunately, several new developments reinvigorated research into precision weapons.

The foremost impetus was Soviet numerical superiority in the European theatre that seemed to assure a ‘nuclear escalation’ if there was a conflict, since NATO forces would be forced to use tactical nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet advance, and hence risk provoking nuclear retaliation. The NATO doctrine that emerged incorporated conventional tactical air strikes into Army doctrine as never before.

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The F-117 stealth fighter was the result of this rethinking and, in the words of RAND analyst Benjamin Lambeth, in retrospect it proved to be ‘one of the most pivotal contributions of the 1980s to the revolution in lethality and effectiveness of American air power’.

Two other technological developments underscored the connection between precision strike and accurate intelligence for targeting. One was the introduction of the Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infra-Red by Night (LANTIRN) external pods that gave fighter aircraft the capability to autonomously carry out precision attacks at night. The other was the testing of an ambitious concept to locate real-time targets in the battlefield, the prototype of which system was named JSTARS. Throughout the 1980s these two projects were strapped for resources so that on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War there were only two prototype JSTARS and a handful of LANTIRN pods in the USAF inventory.

The First Gulf War demonstrated vividly and graphically the new meaning that technology gave to the concept of precision. The image of a precision-guided weapon plunging down the airshaft of a government building in Baghdad, impacting precisely in the crosshairs of an infra-red targeting system, became emblematic of air power. Precision guidance made it possible to destroy 41 of the 54 road and rail bridges between Baghdad and Kuwait in just 450 sorties and brought about the almost complete destruction of the Iraqi military (at the start of the conflict, numerically the world’s fourth largest).

Precision attack in the Gulf War changed the perceptions and reality of air strikes. It made air power the weapon of choice not only to prepare the battlefield for the ground advance, but to destroy more than 50 per cent of the enemy’s equipment. Although the victory for air power in this campaign was unprecedented, thereby exorcising the ghosts of Vietnam, it also made the task of air power even harder by creating an incredibly high expectation of perfection in its strike capabilities.


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There was also the worry in air force circles that the abnormally low casualty rate would once again put air power into unsavoury situations with higher than deliverable expectations. This worry seemed to be coming true in the peculiar air war that was fought over Serbia in 1999. Although, in the end, the effect required the capitulation of Milosevic was achieved with minimal civilian casualties, the use of air power in this campaign was less than optimum. From a purely precision attack perspective, however, the campaign once again proved the new capabilities brought on by a new generation of guided weapons. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) had a 30-foot accuracy, had a steering system that was launch-and-leave and could be fed target coordinates up to moments before release, and had all-weather day and night capability.

The combination of such precise weaponry with real-time targeting capability provides air power with the ability now to conduct a new kind of warfare in which it can locate engage and destroy enemy ground forces across the entire spectrum of operations. Tactical application of such awesome power has also kept pace with capabilities and thereby increased the efficacy of air power. Douhet and Mitchell had predicted that air power would eradicate entire battle fronts: their prophecy has indeed come true. Air power had always to bear the brunt of ridicule for the passion with which advocates predicted its capabilities while its actuality fell short. New technologies in precision guidance and information dissemination have finally laid to rest these objections.

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THE COARSE ART OF AIR FORCE EXPERIMENTATION

In recent times a new term has entered the ADF’s lexicon—Experimentation. Like most new terms it is often misunderstood

and misused and therefore, there is a perceivable need to de-mystify it by explaining what it means from a RAAF perspective.

Viewed in a very generic manner, experimentation can be used to support almost every phase of a concept-led or -informed force development process, from the initial formulation of conceptual ideas through to the development of detailed descriptions of the processes, organisations, systems and equipment needed for their application.

Because of its extreme utility, Military Experimentation is rapidly becoming entrenched as a vital part of the ADF’s concept-led capability development process. Military experimentation can be defined as, ‘the application of the principles of experimental science to the process of exploring innovative methods of operation, especially to assess their feasibility, evaluate their utility and determine their limits’.

CDF’s ‘Force 2020’ vision statement makes it clear that experimentation will be crucial in ‘turning the vision into reality’, and that single-Service experimentation has a key role to play in that process. Within the ADF, experimentation is used to support concept and capability development by using methods that integrate professional judgement, mathematical modelling and historical experience. It is a means of gathering evidence when situations, organisations and technology to


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support a concept do not yet exist and provides an independent test and audit process.

In practise, experimentation is used in conjunction with a number of other tools and information sources to develop a consolidated picture of future capability requirements. Some of the tools and information sources, which compliment experimentation, include project-related studies, Rapid Prototype Development and Evaluation (RPDE), Concept Technology Demonstrators (CTDs), technology reviews and intelligence assessments.

In keeping with ‘Force 2020’, the role of experimentation is also highlighted in the Air Force Plan 2005, where it is described as a ‘key factor’ in ‘building a seamless, integrated and networked air and space force to fight and win’. The Plan goes on to assert that ‘Air Force will continually aim to reshape the future force through actions such as experimentation, concept development and strategic planning’.

RAAF experimentation contributes to the concept-led force development process in two main ways. Firstly, it forms part of Air Force’s internal concept development process, where it is used to inform, test and evaluate air and space power concepts emanating from the Air Power Development Centre (APDC). Once ‘validated’ through experimentation, these concepts can be used to provide context and guidance to the capability developers. Secondly, Air Force experiments can provide a means of assessing the suitability of planned force structures and organisations, thereby identifying possible capability gaps and further opportunities for exploitation.

To achieve these aims, Air Force experiments are always conducted in a Joint Force context, generally set 10 to 15 years into the future. These experiments can take many forms, with their exact nature being governed by the issue(s) being examined and the questions being posed. However, there are a number of basic principles that should

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be adhered to and limitations that must be carefully considered in the design and conduct of any experiment.

An experiment is generally designed to establish cause-and-effect relationships between the ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of a process. This is achieved by systematically varying selected inputs and observing changes in the outputs. However, the nature of military experimentation demands some relaxation in the strict principles of classical experimental science.

Military operations are essentially human endeavours that take place in a chaotic and constantly changing environment. The number of variables that may have a significant effect on outcomes is innumerable, and many will be uncontrollable. The situation is further complicated by the fact that many of the variables could be interdependent. While it is possible to introduce plausible simplifying assumptions to bring some of these factors under control, there is a limit to which this can be done without undermining the validity and credibility of the experiment. In addition, many of the observations and performance measurements will be subjective in nature, thus affecting the replication of the experiment and confounding attempts to produce statistically significant samples.

These limitations must be borne in mind throughout all phases of the experiment, from initial problem definition through to the way in which the results are interpreted and used. The aim of Air Force experimentation is therefore not to produce scientific certainty, but to reduce uncertainty when making force development decisions. Under these circumstances, a more pragmatic approach to experimentation becomes acceptable.

Of necessity, the nature of most RAAF experiments will be either be exploratory or hypothesis-based. An exploratory approach is employed when the process being examined is not well understood and the likely outcome cannot be predicted. It is used to answer questions of the form ‘what happens if...?’. Observations and data collection from


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this type of experiment have to be broad based, and assessment of the outcomes will be generic in nature. The technique has particular utility in military experimentation, which is characterised by having to contend with highly complex situations that are influenced by a vast range of possible variables.

An exploratory experiment can be used to gain a better appreciation of the main factors and influences, which govern the outcome of a particular process. Follow-on work will then be able to concentrate on examining the precise influence of these factors. For this reason, an exploratory experiment will normally be conducted as a pre-cursor to hypothesis-based activities.

Most issues to be examined through experimentation will be too large and complex to be adequately addressed through a single experiment. The general philosophy in the RAAF therefore is to develop experimentation campaigns comprising an integrated set of experiments, with each activity designed to provide part of the overall answer.

The current focus for RAAF experimentation is a four-year campaign with the theme of ‘Networking the Air Force’. The main aim is to examine the Planned Force to assess its suitability for NCW under representative operational conditions. This in turn will assist in identifying any capability gaps and also in the development of appropriate Air Force concepts for exploiting the capabilities provided by the networked force.

Over the coming weeks, follow-on Pathfinders will describe some of the insights that have been gained through the Air Force experimentation process.

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AIR FORCE EXPERIMENT HEADWAY – SOME INSIGHTS

The first formal Air Force experiment, Headway 03/1, took place over the period May–July 2003. The experiment was designed as

a preliminary investigation into the characteristics required of a future Australian Defence Force strike capability, with particular emphasis on assessing whether the planned Air Force of 2020 is likely to possess the necessary attributes to mount an effective strike campaign.

The experiment comprised a series of workshops aimed at identifying the more important characteristics for an ADF strike capability. These were then tested in a seminar war game to determine the characteristics with the greatest utility.

The nature and objective of strike operations are changing. Even though a ‘deep strike’ capability to attack targets of strategic importance will be needed well into the future, the most likely form of ADF strike campaign will be a ‘shaping’ operation to set the pre-conditions in the battlespace for follow-on action by surface forces. Future strike operations will not only have to contend with high-end active defence systems but also counter the greater emphasis placed on passive defences. In the future, adversary forces will use techniques such as dispersion, mobility and signature management to operate close to or below our battlespace awareness threshold, making it more difficult for air and space assets in particular to detect, identify, track and target the adversary. Furthermore, the adoption of an effects-based approach to operations will require us to expand our understanding of the range


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of possible strike targets and the spectrum of effects we may wish to create.

These developments have a direct impact on the characteristics required of an effective strike capability.

In the future, good reach will continue to be an essential characteristic of an ADF strike capability. Our geography demands it. However, there is a change in the conduct of strike operations. Until now the strike platform was required to penetrate to the target, deliver its weapons and vacate the battlespace as quickly as possible. In the future, it will more commonly be necessary for at least some elements of the strike system to persist in the battlespace for extended periods since the adversary will provide only fleeting opportunities for detection and engagement. Both battlespace awareness and engagement assets will have to be on-call in the target area to ensure optimum response to these opportunities. This requirement also implies that all platforms operating in this hostile environment must have adequate survivability.

The range of potential strike targets, coupled with the spectrum of effects that may need to be generated, will require battlespace awareness and engagement systems to be highly flexible, and will place a high demand on the capacity of the force to generate and sustain the required rate of effort.

Finally, generating the desired effects against an adversary intent on blending into complex physical and human environments will increase the need for precision in terms of target discrimination and avoidance of collateral damage.

Despite their changing nature, strike operations still lend themselves well to the application of air power. Air Force is therefore likely to remain the main provider of both the battlespace awareness and engagement elements of the strike capability. Naval forces could provide a useful adjunct to Air Force’s engagement capabilities by

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providing increased capacity and creating additional effects. The ability of adversaries to hide from air and space based sensors also indicates the increasing importance of human intelligence to provide targeting information. This issue is further compounded by the vulnerability of many battlespace awareness assets to ground fire.

The experiment found that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter should be able to provide the ADF with a highly capable strike platform, which will possess most of the required characteristics. However, its flexibility and precision may be impaired by limitations in available weapon options. The effects generated through the application of ‘soft kill’ options are difficult to assess and led to this option not being considered to be sufficiently effective. The availability of alternate platforms for strike operations, such as the multi-mission maritime aircraft, was largely limited due to concurrent tasking requirements.

Long-range stand-off weapons have excellent utility against large fixed targets but lack the flexibility for use against a wide range of targets and their time-offlight limits their effectiveness against fleeting targets of opportunity presented by a highly mobile, dispersed adversary. Their prime purpose is as a ‘first strike’ weapon that will make the battlespace more accessible to other platforms and weapons.

General purpose, direct attack munitions such as the small diameter bomb are likely to find the greatest utility in future strike campaigns, particularly in urban environments. Indeed, an even smaller weapon that would enable greater numbers to be carried by the JSF may have even further utility.

The air force strike capability of the future will have greater reach and persistence, particularly in the realm of battlespace awareness, with the advent of long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles. However, the ability of the engagement elements to meet the persistence and reach criteria will often be contingent on the Air Force’s ability to mount high intensity combat operations from an off-shore forward


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operating base—even with support from air-to-air refuelling. This type of operation will have implications for combat support, logistics and force protection that need careful examination.

Lack of adequate capacity was seen as the greatest weakness of the future ADF strike force. The adversary could employ strategies that attempt to extend the duration of the operation, to test the ADF’s sustainability. Of course, this implies that the adversary would have the capacity to sustain operations for the period required.

In conclusion, although some weaknesses were highlighted throughout the experiment, it was found that with sufficient effort in realignment of capacities and strategies, Air Force of 2020 will be able to deliver the necessary strike capability.

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ENAbLERS – THE CRITICAL FACTOR

Although the youngest of force projection capabilities, air power has carved a distinct niche for itself not only as a purely military

capability but also as an asset that can be brought to bear in disparate situations in support of national policy. This rise to prominence, in a short span of a century, has been made possible because of two complimentary factors. First, the continuous push by the commercial scientific community to enlarge the envelope of technology that provide air power with its operational capabilities and second, the willingness of the practitioners of air power to experiment with emerging technology in order to refine such capabilities. The combination of these two factors has created a cascading enhancement of air power capabilities, especially in the past few decades.

There is also a downside to this success story. As technology has continued to enhance air power capabilities and provide planners with increased options for its application, the cost factor has also surged, at times in a disproportionate way. This has resulted in a balanced force of high-end air power capabilities moving beyond the reach of even comparatively rich nations. Capabilities ranging from the benign use of airlift in humanitarian assistance to the forceful application of precision strike have become far too expensive to procure and maintain. The outcome has been the selective maintenance of particular capabilities by most of the air forces around the world. Maintaining the complete suite of capabilities in adequate measure is now prohibitively expensive and governments around the world are questioning the need for such expenditure.


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While the core function of air power remains force projection in a military sense, in this scenario, capabilities that have been traditionally viewed as supporting the core function assume critical importance. These support capabilities are known variously as ‘force multipliers’ and ‘enablers’. Irrespective of the designation, what they achieve is a tangible improvement in capabilities while ensuring that the number of assets remains within the resource availability thereby achieving a great deal of cost-effectiveness. These enablers are more technology reliant than most air power applications. The major enablers are space-based assets, early warning devices, electronic warfare assets and air-to-air refuelling capabilities.

Space-based assets cover a large swath of capabilities. Currently the majority of surveillance and reconnaissance functions are done from space and this leads to targeting functions. Another area where space assets are almost omnipresent in their usage is communications. From being sparingly used even a decade ago, space communications have become the centrepiece of all military communication systems. It can be said without any doubt that military operations of any magnitude are now heavily reliant on space-based communications for their success. From an air power perspective, these communications in conjunction with navigational systems like the Global Positioning System (GPS) are vital to the success of any mission. Further, the accuracy of targeting and the precision of weapon strike are both direct functions of these enablers. The exactness of air power application, which has become its signature and the primary reason for its preference as a force of first choice and a tool of political deterrence, is achieved through the appropriate application of space-based assets.

Even when air power is not being employed in an offensive or coercive manner, there is a need to deploy adequate defensive capabilities. The improvements in Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) capabilities now provide a measure of assurance to air defence capabilities and greatly enhance offensive applications. Some form

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of AEW&C is now considered a baseline requisite for effective air control, even when such control is delineated in time and space.

The advent of such capabilities is based on the availability of advanced technology and therefore Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities have assumed increased importance. Effective EW can create a zone of complete silence that can be exploited to great advantage by an efficient adversary. The need to have sufficiently capable EW and also the capability to counter enemy action in the EW sphere is a necessity in the modern battlefield. Appropriate application of EW can make even a large force blind and ineffective. The importance of EW assets will only increase in the future with reliance on communications and other space-based assets becoming a prerequisite for effective air power application.

Historically range and reach have been a weak link in the employment of air power. The advent of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) has neutralised this perceived disadvantage. With AAR air power now has truly global reach. The outcome is the capability for a force to project air power anywhere and deliver the necessary force, whether it is the deployment of Special Forces or a direct strike on some centre of gravity. The rapidity with which air power can achieve such a strike has greatly increased the flexibility in its employment in support of national security requirements.

While the major enablers discussed above have become critical to the successful employment of air power, it must also be borne in mind that all of them by themselves are expensive capabilities to obtain, maintain and operate. Their cost-effectiveness is apparent in the enhancement of air power capabilities that they bring about and is a comparative assessment. The quantum of enablers needed and the types that an air force should aspire to acquire will be a direct function of the role that air force is expected to play in the pursuit of national security. The only hard fact is that without adequate enablers, no air force can be expected to deliver air power in a cost-effective manner for any given time.

Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile in flight.

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CRuISE MISSILES – A DOubLE-EDGED SWORD

In the past few years, air forces around the world have expressed increasing interest in the potential of cruise missiles. In the past,

cruise missiles were almost exclusively the prerogative of ‘super powers’. This was not so much a reflection of the complexity of the technology involved in the weapon itself but the limited availability of adequate navigational and targeting data. The reason for the increased interest is the availability of commercial imagery with sufficient accuracy at affordable prices to make the employment of cruise missiles a distinct possibility for a larger number of countries.

‘Cruise missile’ is a generic term for self-propelled guided weapons that fly like normal aircraft for much of their flight. In military terms, they are comparatively cheap, simple to build and can be launched in large numbers from sea, land and air. Cruise missiles are designed for use against high-value, hardened targets that are located in well-defended areas, where the risk to aircrew would be untenable. They have been used in a number of operations in the recent past with great success, being extremely accurate and effective. In the 2003 Iraq conflict some targets of high importance were attacked by two missiles from different directions consecutively with devastating effect.

Conventionally, cruise missiles are carried on board fighter/bomber aircraft and are used as stand-off weapons, but initiatives are being taken by a number of air forces to integrate them with non-penetrating platforms like the Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and even standard airlifters. This will greatly increase the utility of the missiles


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while giving an added operational envelope to these aircraft. The versatility of these missiles in their capability to do both land attack and anti-ship missions makes them an attractive option to military planners.

The latest cruise missile program in the United States is the Lockheed Martin AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile). This has a 450-kilogram warhead and uses imaging Infra-Red (IR) guidance. The missile has a range of over 460 kilometres even in its low-cost version and is expected to be compatible with all US fighters and bombers except the F/A-22. The JASSM also has the capability for retargeting and impact assessment through dedicated datalink. Improvements being made in the engine and fuel carrying capacity are likely to give the JASSM-Extended Range (ER) missile a range in excess of 1100 kilometres.

Currently the only combat-proven new generation cruise missile is MBDA’s long-range cruise missile produced as Storm Shadow for the UK, Italy and Greece; SCALP-EG for France; and Black Shaheen for the United Arab Emirates. The importance attached to the possession of proven cruise missiles has been a crucial factor in the selection of aircraft such as the Mirage-2000 by some of the air forces since the US was unwilling to integrate Storm Shadow with the F-16. The Storm Shadow has a range in excess of 250 kilometres at low levels and is all weather capable. The weapon is basically stealthy and is designed to be operational for 25 years.

The RAAF is expected to select a new cruise missile, the follow-on stand-off weapon (FOSOW), under the Air 5418 project by the end of 2005. The three short-listed contenders are the Boeing AGM-84K SLAM-ER (Stand-off Land Attack Missile Extended Range), EADS/Saab Bofors Taurus and the AGM-158 JASSM.

While legitimate forces around the world are in the process of acquiring these sophisticated weapon systems, there is also a looming

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security problem associated with these missiles. The low cost cruise missile, which can be assembled with minimum technology and which would provide a fair modicum of accuracy, would have to be viewed as a potential terrorist weapon. Even if the range were only 100–150 kilometres, the missile would be extremely difficult to detect and destroy. The implications are very clear.

The term ‘cruise missile’ conjures up images of high-tech, expensive Tomahawk type missiles graphically shown on television sets across the globe during Desert Storm, and several times thereafter. However, the essential fact is that it is nothing but an uninhabited aircraft that carries out a one-way mission. In fact it can be low, slow flying, simple, effective and affordable. Therein lies the worry for military tacticians and strategists. The open availability of GPS has dramatically simplified the major problem that restricted the proliferation of these missiles so far.

However, the proliferation and use of cruise missiles has to be taken for granted. The inherent casualty aversion of political decision-makers ensures that cruise missiles will always be looked at as a preferred first option in any kind of conflict. The assured accuracy of the missile also makes it an option to be used in deterrent action as a warning of further intent.

From an air force perspective, cruise missiles have the potential to disrupt their activities by targeting air bases and making them unavailable for crucial periods of time. The difficulties in neutralising these missiles give them a disproportionately high capability in this role. Even if they do not achieve actual destruction of air assets, their nuisance value would more than adequately create the desired effect of disruption and could deter forward deployment.

What planners must now contend with is the certainty that any air power deployment would have to cater for unforeseen cruise missile attacks on bases and other infrastructure from undetectable positions.


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The current passive and few active defence measures that are being practiced will not provide the necessary assuredness of protection. This will add to the already complex scenario and give the adversary an extra option in terms of asymmetry. The time has perhaps come to look at cruise missiles as a system entity rather than yet another weapon in order to develop a cohesive and practical concept of operations as well as an effective defence.

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ARE uNINHAbITED COMbAT AIR VEHICLES COMING OF AGE?

In late November 2002, a Predator Uninhabited Air Vehicle (UAV) created history of sorts. This UAV—armed with two Hellfire

missiles; controlled by commanders in Saudi Arabia; fed data from Washington; piloted from the ground in French-garrisoned Djibouti; cued by observers on the ground—attacked and killed a top Al Queda leader and four of his aides as they drove along an isolated road in north-west Yemen. Does this indicate the beginning of a radical shift in the way aerial attacks on targets of opportunity will be carried out?

Although the term Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) was coined barely a decade ago, a great deal of work is being poured into its further development. The largest single effort is the Pentagon-led Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS), budgeted at more than US$4 billion over the next five years.

The original concept of the UCAV was of a small aircraft, stealthy by virtue not only of its shape but also its size, and inexpensive enough to be expendable in high-risk missions. The employment concept was one of being airlifted into theatre from long-term storage for use as the ‘first day of the war’ assault equipment in short-duration missions, aimed at breaking down enemy air defences to ensure survivability of manned aircraft that would follow.

Recent experiences have impacted on these concepts, mainly because of the difficulty in obtaining convenient air bases. This situation necessitated the UCAVs being designed to have long range and


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endurance to be able to provide the required persistence over the target area. The classic design feature of small size to enhance stealth, and cost-effectiveness to the extent of it being expendable, were both somewhat diluted in this effort. In addition, UCAVs are also being considered for electronic attack missions, which further increases the overall weight while making them some of the most sophisticated air vehicles—inhabited or uninhabited.

Boeing is working on the X-45C and the X-45CN (US Navy derivative) and Northrop Grumman is developing the X-47B. Both the vehicles are scheduled for their maiden flights in 2006, with operational assessments to commence in 2007. The X-45C is a 16,300 kilograms flying-wing vehicle with a wingspan of 15 metres, powered by a General Electric F404-GE-102D engine, and capable of carrying a weapon load of just over 2000 kilograms. The X-47B is larger, with a 19,050 kilogram gross weight and a Pratt & Whitney F100 engine.

An interesting concept that is common to almost all UCAV development is that they do not carry any defensive sensors, active countermeasures or decoys. They are designed for range and endurance rather than speed and agility, and are completely dependent on stealth for their survival. There are technological difficulties in enhancing stealth in small vehicles, especially with the positioning and design of inlet and exhaust systems. Another potential problem that is being addressed is in-flight refuelling of UCAVs, because the fidelity (accuracy and responsiveness) of the automatic flight control systems in use with UCAVs is not as good as in manned aircraft. In-flight refuelling tests are not expected to commence before 2007–09.

Currently there are no plans that have been disclosed by any non-US defence agency to produce UCAVs, but in mid-June this year Dassault and EADS have announced plans to collaborate in the development of a European UCAV demonstrator to be named Neuron. Saab and Hellenic Aerospace Industries have also signed agreements with Dassault to be part of the program. While the technological developments are

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proceeding at a reasonably fast pace, there are some philosophical and moral problems that operational deployment of the UCAVs will bring out.

From a warfighting perspective, it can be seen that a UCAV will produce data and images that are at the tactical level—live, but at the ‘small world’ lowest level. There will be an inherent problem of determining how high the data should be allowed to flow upward, considering the purely tactical resonance of the information. Conversely, there will also be a tendency for senior commanders to interfere with the lower levels and operate ‘down in the weeds’. This is a philosophically difficult dilemma that will need to be clearly addressed.

From a moral perspective, the first requirement is to be able to assess the proportionality of an attack in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which is currently done by the human being at the end of the delivery chain. This basic necessity may place a natural limit to the uninhibited independent development of UCAVs as well as their operational employment. The basic question that needs very clear articulation is the quantum of human oversight that is required for the unhindered operational employment of a UCAV, and how this can be achieved.

The commander of today is perpetually wrestling with ambiguity, despite the increased situational awareness that is provided to him by a plethora of sensors. Conflict has moved on to become a complex arena requiring constant human interference and interface with artificial intelligence. This is ever more important in offensive missions. The level of human interaction required with UCAVs may be different, dependent on the mission vis-a-vis its basic defensive and offensive content. Answers have to be found to both the philosophical as well as the moral issues that will come up with the increased use of UCAVs.

Another human factor issue that designers are grappling with is how to allow one operator to control several vehicles, rather than having


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multiple people to one vehicle as is the current situation. The legal factors associated with determining the onus of responsibility for misdirected attacks are yet another unresolved debating point. Speeding up the kill-chain while reducing the analysis of available information may have very serious repercussions.

With the enormous amount of resources being made available for developmental work on UCAVs, some of these problems may be solved in the near-term. But a majority of them will take several years to be ironed out, and even then some may continue to be contentious in the operational employment of these vehicles.

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uNINHAbITED COMbAT AIR VEHICLES – CHALLENGES FOR THE FuTuRE

Currently there are a number of programs being pursued by a host of countries to demonstrate the technical feasibility of an

Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) to effectively prosecute lethal strike missions with an acceptable level of autonomy, within the existing and possible future battlespace. Even though they apply force, these systems are being envisioned more as force enablers to the core force providers at least for the next two decades and are then expected to evolve into the broader range of combat missions, dependent on the maturation of emerging technologies.

Although the UCAVs operationally fielded to date are only the first-generation, their advent into the combat arena has initiated a subtle transformation in the conduct of operations not only in the air environment but also of the entire military force. However, this transformation is neither fully apparent nor is it clearly charted in terms of the end state, mainly because there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the delineation of the roles and missions that can be performed by these systems. The current thinking indicates that UCAVs would be allocated missions that are categorised as ‘the dull, the dirty and the dangerous’.

Unmanned airborne systems have been traditionally used as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets; their performance envelope being constantly improved with breakthroughs


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in sensor technology. Even though they still have some serious limitations to overcome, it is now acknowledged that these systems have primacy in the ISR role over manned and space-based assets. Sensor technology is very advanced, but it still has not developed sufficiently to facilitate the autonomous conduct of complex battlespace management functions, and therefore manned systems still have the core role to play. Since manned systems are very costly and need self-protection measures to assure their safety, affordability and expendability become the two main factors that support further development in sensors to increase effectiveness of unmanned systems. However, there are lingering doubts and problems regarding the employment of these vehicles in a completely autonomous manner.

Based on the success of a few time-sensitive strikes, a definitive role that has emerged for the UCAVs is that of Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), although these are not time-sensitive targets in the normal sense unless they are mobile defences. The improvements in surface-to-air missiles in the recent past have made the SEAD role almost suicidal for manned aircraft and UCAVs are seen as the panacea for this situation. However, it has also to be borne in mind that attrition of the UCAV could be considered acceptable only when the alternative is the loss of a manned aircraft, since they are expensive assets to be considered totally expendable. This situation argues for the development of a more sophisticated SEAD strategy that should incorporate low-cost decoys to make the location of air defences simpler, followed by the use of stand-off weapons, manned aircraft and/or UCAVs for the strike. The bottom line is that even in this most-dangerous role, the UCAV still cannot operate autonomously with the desired effectiveness.

It is not difficult to imagine this strike role of the UCAV being enlarged to Counter Air missions, once again in a combined strike package that will have the benefit of a manned platform to make the complex decisions and intuitive changes needed to successfully lead and complete complicated multi-aircraft missions. Once again

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the challenge is for technology to answer the need to have adequate decision-making capability built into the UCAV to permit it to operate with the desired level of autonomy. Development of decision-making artificial intelligence has been ongoing for a number of years, but it has still not reached sufficient maturity, and there is no indication of the time needed to field it operationally. However, this is the key to autonomous performance of UCAVs.

There is a great deal of speculative debate regarding the use of UCAVs in the air superiority role necessitating their employment in air combat missions. This will have to remain in the realm of futuristic thought at least for the next few decades since it requires a number of elements that artificial intelligence currently does not possess and is unlikely to develop cohesively anytime soon.

Yet another factor that inhibits the autonomous employment of UCAVs, even in strike missions, is the reluctance of the political and military leadership to leave the final ‘kill’ decision to artificial intelligence. To let a machine make the decision to kill a human is an inherent anathema to human authority. The prospect of even a single such strike going awry would almost completely negate the granting of such autonomy for the foreseeable future. Therefore, command and control of UCAVs will always rest with a manned element within the mission package. If this is the case, then the question begs to be asked as to whether or not more emphasis should be placed on further development of decision-making artificial intelligence or whether the emphasis should be on developing the wherewithal for seamless interoperability between manned and unmanned systems.

UCAVs are a reality and there is no doubt that their mission envelopes will continuously be pushed outwards. It is also a reality that, although a great amount of research and development is currently being undertaken in this field, the fidelity required for independent decision-making using artificial intelligence will not be available in the near future. There is also no certainty regarding the timeframe within which


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the necessary fidelity would be developed. This uncertainty provides the only certainty that can be deduced from this analysis: that a manned system will continue to form the nucleus in command and control of the battlespace as well as in hard combat situations wherein instinctive and intuitive decision-making will be the winning factor.

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AEROSPACE? DON’T YOu MEAN AIR AND SPACE?

‘Aerospace’ is a popular word in the RAAF these days. From relative obscurity ten years ago, it has become ubiquitous

throughout RAAF publications of the past decade. Our single-Service doctrine now describes us as proponents of aerospace power rather than just air power. We have directorates that are charged with aerospace development. Operational doctrine now describes aerospace battle management in place of air defence and airspace control.

So when did ‘aerospace’ become the most accurate word to use in describing our doctrine, who we are and what we are hoping to achieve? What has changed such that aerospace is in fact a better word to use rather than air or aeronautical? In many instances the simple answer seems to be ‘not much.’ We seem to have chosen to use ‘aerospace’ simply because it sounds more exciting and technologically advanced—or to put it in somewhat less subtle terms, because it sounds sexier.

Sexier, yes, but what does ‘aerospace’ actually mean? There certainly is an implied connection with space. In fact the Macquarie dictionary states that ‘aerospace’ is ‘the earth’s envelope of air and the space beyond.’ Thus by the use of ‘aerospace’ a direct link to space is established, along with all the trappings associated with space operations—big budgets, high risks and cutting edge technology. Small wonder then that aerospace has greater appeal than the term ‘aeronautical’ or just plain old ‘air’.


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The term ‘aerospace’ apparently first came into use in the late 1950s when applied by US Air Force senior leadership. The term was used as a means of presenting air and space as a seamless continuum, thus supporting the claim of the USAF for operational primacy in space over and above the growing claims of the US Army and US Navy. Specifically, USAF leadership actively propounded that ‘air and space are not two separate media to be divided by a line... They are in truth a single indivisible field of operations.’ And thus, goes the implication, should be the responsibility of a single service—the USAF.

In essence, it appears that ‘the “aerospace” idea’ was advanced by past USAF leadership ‘almost entirely by fiat, with little serious analysis or prior systematic thought given to it’ in order to fight a turf war. Despite this somewhat questionable origin, the word ‘aerospace’ has survived and prospered, fostering a growing mindset that air and space can actually be viewed as one environment. The RAAF seems to have adopted this view wholeheartedly, doctrinally stating that the aerospace is the ‘third dimension... above the surface of the earth’.

While technically defensible—air and space certainly represent the third dimension above the earth—this single environment view is inappropriate. A comparison of the environmental characteristics of air and space clearly indicate that space is a distinct environment, as different from the air environment as the air environment is from land or sea. These differences drive fundamental dissimilarities between operations carried out in the two environments. Put simply, the laws of aerodynamics govern operations in the air environment, whereas orbital mechanics govern operations in space.

Definitions aside, does the presentation of the ‘aerospace’ as a single continuum really matter? The answer unfortunately is ‘it depends.’ In general usage, for all its inappropriate application, no, the use of the term aerospace does not seem to represent the source of any major problems.

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When used by a military organisation to describe roles and responsibilities, however, as has been done by the RAAF, the use of ‘aerospace’ must be viewed more critically.

Current RAAF attempts to use the aerospace-as-a-single-continuum construct appear to be driving a belief that one doctrine can adequately account for the physical differences between air and space. This flies in the face of conventional practices. Military forces that operate in different environments have always had fundamentally different characteristics and thus different doctrines. This is reflected in the current structure of the ADF, comprising the three distinct services, with each service focused on the development of operational expertise in one given environment.

Traditionally, the single Services have existed in order to develop environment specific expertise and capabilities. Specifically, the Navy is the maritime environment expert, the Army is the land environment expert and the Air Force—at least in the past—was the air environment expert. The services accordingly have developed doctrine to support operations in their specific environments. Current Navy and Army single-Service doctrine publications, titled ‘Australian Maritime Doctrine’ and ‘The Fundamentals of Land Warfare’ respectively, reflect this single environment focus. Previous editions of RAAF doctrine likewise focused on a single environment, air, with this focus implicit in the title of ‘The Air Power Manual’.

With the release of the fourth edition of AAP1000 the RAAF seems to have attempted to maintain this single domain focus, but has chosen to define its environmental responsibility as the ‘aerospace’, rather than the air environment. The real danger of this approach is that, by failing to recognise space as a distinct environment, existing air power doctrine may then be inappropriately applied to the space environment.

Inappropriate doctrine will always handicap the employment of current competencies and any attempts to develop capabilities for the future.


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Recognising this fact, the USAF seems to have now acknowledged the error of its original aerospace construct, stating that ‘Attempts to combine space and air operations—the aerospace philosophy—have served to retard the development of space doctrine.’

Without the acknowledgment of space as a separate environment, the RAAF will never be able to develop meaningful space power doctrine and capabilities. With this in mind the RAAF must acknowledge that ‘aerospace’ does in fact mean ‘air’ and ‘space’, and move to develop doctrine and capabilities accordingly.

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SPACE POWER AND THE RAAF

These are interesting times in the evolution of space power within the RAAF. While the space environment is distinct from air, space

systems enable or improve many air capabilities. The capabilities of space systems are continually increasing, so the value of space to the RAAF is increasing commensurately.

Space power can be described as the use of space capabilities to enable the pursuit of national objectives. Although military power is only one element of national power, the part that the RAAF has to play in furthering Australian economic and military objectives through the use of space is steadily growing.

Compared to land, sea or air systems, the primary advantage offered by space systems is improved perspective. A space vehicle has a field of view of a large portion of the Earth, and can be viewed from large areas on the Earth. It is costly and reasonably difficult to send physical objects into orbit or recover them, but it is cost effective to use space systems to gather, relay or distribute information over broad areas. Thus the current space systems are predominantly information systems.

From the point of view of air forces, the value of space is in force enhancement to improve air capabilities. Force enhancement can be divided into the following four activities: surveillance and reconnaissance, precision navigation and timing (PNT), environmental observation and communications. Environmental observation is the least well understood activity; it provides meteorological data, digital terrain elevation and land usage data. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, space provided allied combat forces with a range of


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products that improved and in some cases combined the basic force enhancement activities. Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy reports included analysis of jamming and interference to allow the best use of precision guided munitions. Satellite reconnaissance advanced notification reporting provided information on friendly and other satellite overflights. The combination of digital terrain elevation data with other satellite imagery provided a means for route planning, target detection, and mission rehearsal. The combination of PNT and satellite communications provided support to friendly force tracking, which reduced fratricide. Ballistic missile warning added to the protection of friendly forces. Space capabilities bring so much military advantage that adversaries will inevitably challenge them. Indeed, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi forces tried to jam GPS.

Apart from the military advantages described earlier, space systems are now vital to Australia for civil and commercial reasons. For example, mobile telephone network infrastructure relies on PNT for timing synchronisation, and many financial transactions rely on satellite communications for authorisation. Space control consists of measures to allow friendly freedom of action to effectively utilise space, while denying such freedom of action to adversaries. Space control to protect both military and civil national interests is an ADF concern. Space control is analogous to air control. It requires situational awareness of an adversary’s space capabilities and surveillance of adversary space systems to enable counterspace operations. The RAAF’s heritage in air control will stand us in good stead to adapt to this new role.

Future space systems will bring both opportunities and threats. The number of nations with space capabilities is growing due to the increased use of existing systems and the proliferation of relatively inexpensive small satellites. Surveillance and reconnaissance is advancing rapidly through the deployment of more Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellites and improved imagery intelligence satellites. PNT will improve as the US upgrades its GPS, Russia completes its Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) constellation and

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Europe deploys its Galileo system. Communications satellites are increasing in capacity with on-board switching and laser links. Some space-like capabilities will be provided at a much lower cost by near-space systems operating above 65,000 feet. All of these developments will make space more versatile and more important to ADF operations. The RAAF is the logical custodian of such capabilities.

The RAAF approach to the opportunities and challenges of space has several aspects. Firstly, the process of improving our use of existing space systems continues with activities such as integrating GPS and datalinks into aircraft. Secondly, the RAAF readily engages with the Directorate of Defence Space (DDS) which allows input to Defence Space policy. Thirdly, various units within the RAAF support specialist space education and training (in addition to DDS funded space courses). Finally, the RAAF actively supports the development of space power doctrine. Consideration of the current and future situation in an academic sense replaces intuitive understanding with a conceptual framework.

One area that could be further improved is the integration of space capabilities at the operational level. Consider the case of the US, where space capabilities are incorporated very well. A space specialist is embedded in every team within the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) staff to advise the Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander (JFACC) and other staff regarding the use of space to enhance air operations. The space staff also serve as a conduit to the Fourteenth Air Force AOC, commonly known as the ‘Space AOC’, which directs space operations in all theatres and conducts combat planning and space-strategy development.

Within the RAAF Air Operations Centre (AOC), specialist teams reach out to external organisations in order to use space force enhancement. However, the RAAF AOC does not have a space specialist in each team, although some staff have coincidental space experience. Consequently, not all systems are fully exploited. For example, GPS


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accuracy prediction is conducted routinely by the USAF and yet is not a standard procedure in the RAAF AOC. If we wish to better integrate current force enhancement or utilise new capabilities, then it is necessary to embed at least one space specialist within the RAAF AOC staff.

The AOC concept is relatively new for the RAAF and will undoubtedly mature. Space will continue to increase in importance with the introduction of new capabilities, and so the role of space in the AOC will evolve significantly. AOC function and manning will reflect this change, bringing benefits in operational-level interoperability. By becoming a knowledgeable and valued partner at the operational level, the RAAF could engage the US and other allies in dialogue on how to legally and ethically wield what will be an impressive and growing source of military power.

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FuTuRE SPACE CAPAbILITIES

As space systems develop, their utility in enabling or improving air capabilities will inevitably increase. In the coming decade

the RAAF will make better use of space data to improve situational awareness, apply effects precisely, and attempt to ensure our use of space systems while denying their use to adversaries. Other nations will attempt to do the same things. Non-state actors will also be able to access many space capabilities commercially. Our challenge is to ensure that the RAAF gains more than our potential adversaries do from future space system capabilities.

In order to understand future space capabilities, we should examine other nations’ advances in the space power roles of space support, space control, and force enhancement. Force application by ballistic missiles transiting through space is not a role being pursued by the RAAF and so will not be discussed further. Space support comprises activities to deploy and sustain space systems. Other nations are trying to produce responsive launch systems that can quickly launch satellites on demand, including some proposals to air-launch small satellites from fighter aircraft. More ground stations will be established, as delivery of space data much closer to the end user will contribute to the tactical use of assets that were previously considered to be strategic. A developmental ‘on-orbit servicing’ capability will soon be fielded, which will extend the service life of satellites in a way similar to how air-to-air refuelling extends aircraft endurance.

Space control consists of measures to allow friendly freedom of action to effectively utilise space, while denying such freedom of action to adversaries. The foundation is space situational awareness—knowing


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where space objects are and what they are doing. Research in this area includes terrestrial and space-based radars and telescopes to not only detect but also image orbiting objects. The resulting knowledge of the orbital parameters and missions of spacecraft operated by other agencies allows defensive or offensive counterspace measures to be taken. Operational prototypes of deployable systems are being fielded that can jam satellite communication and navigation systems temporarily. Systems are also being developed to detect and geolocate jamming or unintended interference so countermeasures can be used. Research continues into the means to permanently deny the use of space systems to adversaries, including a variety of anti-satellite weapons. Anti-ballistic missile systems are being developed to counter adversary force application by intercepting ballistic missiles in the boost, mid-course or terminal phase.

Force enhancement describes space power activities that improve or enable military capabilities. Technological advances are influencing a number of these activities such as environmental observation, surveillance and reconnaissance, precision navigation and timing, and communications.

Environmental observation includes meteorological, terrain elevation and land usage data from satellites. Meteorology is always vital to air operations, and the ADF currently gets its meteorological data from Japanese, Chinese and US satellites. The instruments being fielded on meteorological satellites are continually improving our knowledge of factors such as sea and land surface temperatures, and cloud and aerosol density profiles, allowing better weather prediction.

Surveillance and reconnaissance systems are improving due to advances in sensor technology. In 2008, a commercial service will place a satellite in geostationary orbit to collect a moving real-time colour image covering 40 per cent of the earth—from India to Hawaii—with great benefit for maritime surveillance and meteorological reporting. Research into extremely large electronically scanned antennas in

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space is likely to eventually bring vast improvement in the sensitivity of space-based electronic intelligence and synthetic aperture radar (SAR). A constellation of radar satellites could offer frequently updated SAR imagery and ground moving target indicator (GMTI) detection. Hyperspectral sensors allow the visible and infra-red radiation components in each pixel of a scene to be separated into over 30 frequency bands, and in some systems over hundreds of bands, giving objects that may look similar to the eye unique signatures. Military applications include detecting and classifying camouflage nets, and in future detecting certain chemical vapours such as those emitted by explosives or chemical weapons.

Precision navigation and timing (PNT) will continue to become more accurate and more reliable. The Global Positioning System (GPS) is being progressively upgraded, as each new satellite launched into the constellation is more capable than the one it replaces. Galileo, the European global navigation satellite system (GNSS), will be deployed within five years or so, offering another source of PNT information. Dual system GPS/Galileo receivers are likely to enter ADF service within a decade, giving redundancy if one system is jammed. Russia is striving to complete GLONASS, its own independent GNSS system, which will be another potential source of data. Many nations are deploying land and space based augmentation systems that will improve the accuracy and reliability of GNSS data. GPS is already widely used within the RAAF, but assured GNSS service will become absolutely vital with the introduction of GPS guided weapons. The ADF must strive for adequate navigation warfare capability—the capacity to preserve our ability to use GNSS and deny its use to adversaries.

Satellite communication systems are currently undergoing a period of transformation led primarily by an increase in processing power. Mainbeam anti-jam signal processing and coding help improve performance in hostile electronic warfare environments. The new generation of satellites use onboard switching of user signals to


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continuously reallocate bandwidth to each link on a basis of need, maximising efficiency. In legacy systems, transmissions over very long distances require the signal to pass through multiple satellites and ground stations. Laser links directly between satellites will vastly reduce this ‘multi-hop’ burden on radio frequency uplink and downlink bandwidth. Laser uplink and downlink should become feasible for some applications, further boosting capacity and minimising the chance of intercept or interference.

Many of the advances listed above will also be applicable to near-space platforms that give some space-like capabilities at much lower cost. Near-space platforms operate in the little used altitude band between 65,000 feet and approximately 325,000 feet (100 kilometres). Possible designs include balloons, airships, or solar powered fixed wing aircraft. These options offer a persistent, cost-effective and responsive presence for surveillance and reconnaissance, communications or perhaps carrying weapons. While largely invulnerable to current anti-air weapons, a counter to near-space platforms will inevitably arise; yet their low cost means they can be considered ‘semi-expendable’. Given their capability and low cost compared to satellites, near-space capabilities warrant consideration by the RAAF.

The future space capabilities discussed will not be readily apparent to most RAAF personnel. To a large extent the space services already in use, and possibly taken for granted, will simply become more effective. Space technology will inevitably improve. It would be a wise military that took maximum advantage of that improvement.

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WEAPONS IN SPACE?

In August 2004, the US Air Force released its doctrine document 2-2.1 - Counterspace Operations. In the foreword to the document

the Chief of Staff of the USAF, General John P. Jumper, stated ‘Counterspace operations have defensive and offensive elements, both of which depend on robust space situational awareness.’

Chapter five of the document very clearly enunciates Offensive Counterspace Operations, in which the use of direct methods to destroy space systems of the enemy is briefly enumerated. Does this mean that the only Super Power of the world will weaponise space in order to maintain the unassailable military advantage that it currently enjoys that mainly stem from the optimum use of space based assets?

The international community dealing with arms-control has already raised the alarm, since the document is the air force’s blueprint for the use of space-based weapons systems to deny an adversary the use of space for any purpose. This has greater implications than the benign use of force, if there can be such a possibility, to thwart military intentions of a potential enemy. Since the threat perceptions have radically changed in the past five years, this assertion of the intent to deny the use of space could also mean that purely commercial satellites that provide communication capabilities to unconventional adversaries could also be targeted for neutralisation. The implications in terms of international freedom as well as sovereignty of the owner-nations would be very convulsive.

The US Air Force has gone to great lengths to explain the offensive counterspace activities as being almost completely reliant on terrestrial-


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based weapons that could create reversible, temporary effects, in a reiteration of effects-based operations. However, the official acceptance of this new mission is itself indicative of the conceptual developmental process within the US military establishment of the need to place some kind of weapon in space, even if it is meant for use as a last resort. The fall-out is almost certain to be the crossing over of the rest of the space-capable nations to accepting the need for space combat capabilities. Is this the beginning of another arms race, this time in space?

The factor that worries arms-control experts is not so much the concept of taking human combat into space, but the dangers that such a move would have on the myriad of peaceful applications of space. The international economy, and through it almost all national security imperatives, has been increasingly globalised and is now almost completely reliant on secure communications for its robustness. This communications system is almost completely space-based. Any deterioration in the capacity, both quality and quantum, of communication would have disastrous consequences in a number of different fields—security issues being the most affected. Considering that space debris of even one centimetre diameter can cause catastrophic damage to a satellite, the destruction of space systems with the attendant scattering of debris could well prove to be untenable in the larger global context.

This view of the absolute need to keep space as an arena of global peace and goodwill has already been negated by the use of satellites as integral parts of the warfighting machinery. Although the two thought processes are somewhat in disconsonance, there is perhaps consensus within the debate for the need to protect these assets both in times of war as well as in peace. It is the means to achieve this central aim that makes it almost impossible to contain the placement of weapons in space.

Undoubtedly the United States is the leading nation in the exploitation of space. Combined with its inherent and basic doctrine of absolute and overwhelming dominance of the battle area it is almost certain

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that, irrespective of the international community’s misgivings, the US would deploy weapons in space to ensure that a space attack is not perpetuated on it.

Currently there are no ‘rules’ or multilateral treaties that govern the conduct of military space activities. It is the fervent hope of arms-control advocates that space can be spared the spectre of human combat and war. The reality, however, seems to be less promising. The United States is the world’s leading ‘space-faring’ nation and it would not want to lose this clear advantage. Therefore, it is certain that it would not wait for a disruptive attack on its systems before putting in place counterspace measures. The situation now is more likely to be of when, not if.

The United Nations may be the only agency that could effectively bring the space nations to a discussion, but unfortunately its powers of persuasion has been steadily declining in the past decade. The UN’s Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been almost completely gridlocked since 1999, with the United States and China not willing to compromise on separate issues. There is a committee within the CD called the Prevention of an Armed Race in Outer Space (PAROS) that has not been able to even have a formal exchange of ideas between the space nations. All resolutions regarding space that have been passed at the UN have been non-binding and are therefore unlikely to be of any value other than academic.

Where does this leave the world community of nations? The answer is complex. It will certainly lead to a situation wherein the greatest military and economic power to straddle the world for the past half century will be forced to take unpalatable steps to ensure its ascendancy and place weapons in space. The complexity will emerge from the less predictable repercussions from other space-capable nations, which could be both covert and overt. There are clearly no direct answers, nor are there likely to be any clear winners.

International Space Station: how long before the weaponisation of space?

Whispering Death by Lindsay Stepanow: Art First Prize, 2005 Heritage Awards.

Wedgetail AEW&C aircraft in 2 Squadron colours.

F/A-18 Hornets dropping ordnance during training.

MQ-9 Predator with GBU-12.

X-45A UCAV on test flight, December 2002.

RAAF Dakota employed in Antarctica in 1959–61.

F-4E on display in RAAF Museum.

SAS passing wrecked Iraqi aircraft at Al Asad airbase.

Aerial refueling of RAAF Hornet during Iraq operations.

HISTORY

For good or ill, air mastery is today the supreme expression of military power. And fleets and armies, however necessary and important, must accept subordinate rank. This is a memorable milestone in the march of man.

– Winston Churchill, 1949


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IRAQ – THE FIRST TIME AROuND

Australia’s off-and-on military involvement in Iraq over the past decade or so has given that country a focus in public awareness

that it never had before, yet 2003 (or even 1991) was not the first time that Australian Defence personnel had an active role in warlike operations there. In fact, Iraq was the scene of the very first campaign undertaken by Australian airmen nearly 90 years ago.

Back in 1915, Iraq was known as Mesopotamia and the country was under the control of Turkey, a German ally in World War I. After British forces seized Basrah to secure the oil pipeline terminal there, authorities in India planned to mount an invasion to drive the Turks out of Baghdad. Because the home government in London was preoccupied with the Western front, raising and equipping such an expeditionary force would have to be done locally. For this reason Australia and New Zealand were asked to assist in raising an aviation unit.

Although Australia had recently opened a military flying school, it then had only a few qualified pilots and no aircraft to spare. It nonetheless agreed to supply a contingent of four officer pilots and 41 other ranks, including 18 mechanics. On arrival at Basrah in May 1915, this group—dubbed the ‘Mesopotamian Half Flight’—joined an 18-strong party of Indian Flying Corps personnel (just two pilots), and the sole pilot sent by New Zealand. Thus the ‘Mesopotamian Flight, Royal Flying Corps’ came into being.

The aircraft initially available to get the unit airborne were three frail and under-powered Maurice-Farman biplanes suitable for reconnaissance work, but little else. A month later came two Caudron aircraft, which


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had bigger engines but were only marginally more reliable. Later still (August), the Flight received single-seat Martinsyde scouts—still not much better—and was designated ‘No 30 Squadron, RFC’. Some Short 827 seaplanes also arrived, forming a separate flight for artillery spotting. Not until the long-promised delivery of four BE2c machines at the end of October did the squadron finally possess effective aircraft.

During a long advance up the Tigris River that by October brought the British expeditionary force to within 50 kilometres of Baghdad, the Australian pilots flew repeated reconnaissance missions. On some of these a limited bombing role was added, as during the battle of Qurna (31 May–1 June), when 2-pound hand-bombs were thrown out over the side to cause panic among the enemy. When 20-pound (9 kilogram) bombs were duly received, it was found that the bomb-racks supplied were useless, so that on later occasions bombs were generally dropped through a hole cut in the cockpit floor.

Ground-fire proved to be a lesser danger to the airmen than the heat and sand-laden winds, which created constant risk of engine failure. Forced landings behind the Turkish lines resulted in the capture of several pilots, including one Australian on 16 September. An earlier such incident, on 30 July, resulted in the death of another Australian and his New Zealand colleague at the hands of hostile Arabs near Abu Salibiq. Yet another Australian was captured on Baghdad’s north-western outskirts on 13 November, during a daring mission that involved landing to blow up the main telegraph line out of the city.

Landing accidents also reduced the number of aircraft that were available to keep check on enemy movements and map their positions. By the time the British made the attempt to turn the Turks out of Ctesiphon on 22 November, just two serviceable aircraft remained.

When the British attack failed, the expeditionary force was obliged to fall back to Al Kut where the bulk of it was duly surrounded by more numerous Turkish columns. After the town had been invested, all

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undamaged aircraft were ordered away; one of the two remaining land planes that left on 7 December was flown by the last Australian pilot, Captain H.A. Petre. Left behind were several pilots and observers, and 44 NCOs and men of No 30 Squadron—including nine Australian mechanics.

Throughout the siege, attempts were made to keep the garrison resupplied by air, despite the limited payload possible with the available aircraft. Captain Petre was among the pilots who flew such missions, and the air bridge was ably supported by the Australian mechanics back at the Basrah base who made linen parachutes for the safe dropping of medical supplies and other breakables. One Corporal also worked out how to mount multiple machine-guns to an aircraft undercarriage, an arrangement which became especially important after German Fokker machines appeared from the end of December and helped tighten the Turkish stranglehold.

Kut surrendered in April 1916, after a five-month siege. Only two of the nine Australians who fell into Turkish hands there survived their ordeal, which was as bad as anything endured by a later generation of prisoners on the Siam-Burma railway. Indeed, of the 13,000 troops who went into captivity at Kut, only 2000 were eventually recovered alive. Both officer pilots captured before the fall also made it home to Australia after the war.

Early in 1916, while the Kut siege was still underway, the Australian mechanics at Basrah were sent—with Petre—to Egypt to join a new unit of the Australian Flying Corps that had been raised for operational service. The Mesopotamian campaign continued, without any further Australian involvement in air operations, but with the presence of Australian Army signallers. These ensured that the number of Australians who served in the theatre during World War I eventually reached around 670.


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The trials of the Mesopotamian Half Flight have since entered the annals of the Royal Australian Air Force, principally on account of its members who subsequently achieved senior rank in the new air service formed in 1921—men such as the future Sir Thomas White (a RAAF group captain and federal government minister) and Air Vice-Marshal G.J.W. Mackinolty. In a sense, the experiences of No 75 Squadron in Iraq during 2003 is a modern replay of the Air Force’s first operational deployment.

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LOOKING A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOuTH

World War I ended abruptly when an armistice halted fighting in November 1918. Until then, allied planners had been expecting

that German resistance would prolong hostilities into 1919, possibly even 1920. In Britain, industrial output supporting the war effort had accordingly continued at full pace, which meant that there was suddenly a vast accumulation of surplus war stocks. The Royal Air Force alone had more than 22,000 aircraft on strength; many more were in storage awaiting delivery.

It was in this climate that, in June 1919, the Imperial authorities offered a gift of 100 aircraft (sufficient for four service squadrons) to the governments of Britain’s dominions—India, Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand—to assist each in establishing a viable air force of their own. During negotiations which followed, it seems that Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Williams, who would soon head the new air service in Australia, suggested to British colleagues that aircraft on their own were of little value without the spares and other equipment needed to actually form units.

Williams’ argument was accepted, with the result that what became known as the Imperial Gift of 1920 ended up entailing a huge array of items valued at £1 million (perhaps $35 million at today’s value). From the end of March 1921, shipments arrived in Melbourne every 10–14 days, each consisting of 500–700 packages. At the end of 12 months some 19,000 cases had been delivered, many weighing two or three tonnes; as many as 30,000 different kinds of articles,


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running to hundreds of thousands of individual items, were received. Included were 258 motor vehicles, 191 aircraft engines and spare parts, workshop plant, hangars, instruments, armaments, clothing and many other items.

Amongst the gift equipment were actually 128 aircraft, the additional machines being replacements for aircraft purchased through public and private subscription in Australia and ‘donated’ to the war effort. The total finally comprised thirty-five Avro 504K trainers, thirty-five SE5A fighters, thirty DH9A and twenty-nine DH9 day bombers (an additional bomber having been added to the tally to replace a DH9A lost in September 1920).

There is no doubting the value of the Imperial Gift to Australia, or that the Royal Australian Air Force which came into being during 1921 was kept supplied with machines until nearly the end of the decade. This not unreasonably raises the question: would there have been a RAAF without the Imperial Gift? In fact, it is clear that Australia was intent on maintaining some form of air arm within its defence forces long before the end of the war, and such a development would probably have occurred irrespective of whether the Imperial Gift was ever made.

Australian authorities had been taking an active interest in aviation for military purposes even before World War I, having set up the Central Flying School at Point Cook in 1913 and commenced flying operations there in March 1914, nearly six months before the war began. The school continued throughout the war, using a miscellany of aircraft types. Early in 1919 a number of the school’s well-worn machines were sold off, in anticipation of these being replaced by newer types—twenty Avro 504Ks and twelve Sopwith Pup Scouts—ordered by the Defence Department late in 1918. These aircraft reached Melbourne during the first half of 1919, and became the primary equipment of the Australian Air Corps; an Army unit set up at Point Cook from January 1920.

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When the RAAF was formed 15 months later, it simply took over the aircraft holdings of the AAC—or rather, what was left of them. During the brief period of the AAC’s existence, seven of the Avros had been written off (most in crashes during two Peace Loan campaigns), along with one of the Sopwith Pups. Also at Point Cook was a Bristol Scout, sole survivor of the wartime CFS’s equipment, and the Vickers Vimy heavy bomber in which the Smith brothers made their epic England–Australia flight in 1919. The reality was that it was the 26 aircraft passed across from the Air Corps that were the initial mainstay of the infant RAAF. Added to this number were six Fairey IIID floatplanes that the RAN had purchased in 1920 for use with its warships; when these arrived in November 1921, they also went to the RAAF.

Although a small number of each aircraft type in the Imperial Gift were uncrated and assembled for use, the bulk of the gift machines stayed in storage until required. Official statements in July 1922 make clear that 101 machines were still being stored at that time in wheat sheds at Spotswood, Melbourne, rented from the Victorian Railways. The often repeated claim that at its birth the RAAF was in the extraordinary position of having more aircraft than men—149 officers and men (some sources say 151) as against 154 aircraft—is true only in a technical sense.

The chief benefit of having the gift aircraft lay in the fact that the Australian government was able to defer the expense of purchasing new or additional machines for the RAAF for a good number of years. Apart from a few locally constructed Avro 504s bought in 1922–23 as an incentive to local manufacturers, no new types were ordered until 1925; there were only nine of these anyway, three of which were non-combat types, while six were Seagull III flying boats to meet Navy needs. If anything, the gift proved to be an impediment to the technical development of the Air Force. Only when it was discovered that the machines still in storage had deteriorated, to such an extent that they were effectively unsafe to fly, could the government be convinced to find money for new combat types delivered in 1929.


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Not only is it clear that the RAAF had never been dependent on the Imperial Gift to function, but it also seems certain that the RAAF owed its creation to factors other than simply aircraft availability. The evidence suggests that it was the desire of the Australian government in September 1920 to establish an air mail service across the continent that provided the final impetus towards setting up a separate air force. Delays in establishing trials for such a service, using the aviation resources of the Defence Department, finally compelled the issuing of instructions on 3 February 1921 for ‘the immediate establishment of an Air Force, and to initiate an experimental aerial mail service’. Fortunately, the new force was quickly relieved of the need to carry the mail and allowed to shift its focus to meeting defence requirements.

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THE RAAF IN ANTARCTICA

The Royal Australian Air Force has operated in a wide range of geographical areas and climatic conditions in both peace and war.

Given the current international situation, operations in and over desert terrain are prominent and readily identifiable. However, it is a little known fact that the Air Force has been involved in operations in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic area for over 50 years.

The Air Force has had an important role in assisting with defining Australia’s territorial and scientific aspirations in the Antarctic. On 13 January 1930, Sir Douglas Mawson claimed the area of land between 73 degrees east longitude and 47 degrees east longitude in the name of King George V. Two RAAF pilots, Flying Officer S.A.C. Campbell and Sergeant G.E. Douglas, were present at this historic event. They had been seconded from the RAAF as pilots of the Moth floatplane that Mawson had insisted on being part of the expedition equipment. The little aircraft was used for ice reconnaissance, photographic and geographical survey flights.

The same two RAAF fliers (Douglas now a pilot officer) joined Mawson’s next expedition in November 1930, undertaking a large program of exploration and coastal survey during January–February 1931 despite constant bad sailing and flying weather. On 27 January Douglas and Mawson suffered a mishap while preparing the Moth for lifting back on board the expedition’s ship. An unexpected roll of Discovery in the swell left the Moth bumping into the ship’s side at the end of the lifting cradle, with both occupants dangling from it. Fortunately no one was hurt and the aircraft was repairable.


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Late in 1935 Douglas was selected to lead a six man RAAF party to accompany an expedition sent south to assist in the rescue of American explorer Lincoln Ellsworth and his English pilot, after they were presumed to have gone missing while attempting to fly across Antarctica. Douglas’ second in command was Flying Officer Alistair Murdoch, later to become Chief of the Air Staff in 1965–70. Accompanying the airmen in Discovery II were two machines this time: a Wapiti and a DH60X Gipsy Moth floatplane. On 15 January 1936 the mission succeeded in locating Ellsworth, who—despite insisting he was neither lost nor in need of rescuing—returned in Discovery II as a guest of the Australian government.

After World War II, Campbell was appointed director of the Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE) and influenced the decision to involve the RAAF in the Australian return to Antarctica. In 1947 a Vought Kingfisher was embarked in HMAS Wyatt Earp (Ellsworth’s former support ship), and a Walrus aircraft aboard HMAS Labuan, to assist with survey, photographic and reconnaissance tasks. The Walrus was destroyed in a gale at Heard Island on 5 January 1948. Incidentally, after being recovered and rebuilt, the aircraft is now on display at the RAAF Museum, Point Cook.

The value of aircraft in such an environment was well recognised. In 1955 the Antarctic Flight was formed with two Auster Mk 6 aircraft. This flight deployed with the annual ANARE expedition (with the exception of 1961) until 1963. During this period the flight supported scientific parties and flew survey missions that added to the geographical knowledge of the continent. Until 1959–60 the flight remained on the continent with the ANARE members, but that season a Dakota was lost during cyclonic winds and that practice ceased. During 1962 and 1963 two DHC Beaver floatplanes were embarked on the annual ANARE resupply vessels to fly communications, photographic and survey tasks.

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The RAAF commitment to the ANARE was significant. (In 1959 consideration was even given to the development of an airfield, capable of handling heavy four-engine transport aircraft, adjacent to the station at Davis.) Logistic support was supplied through RAAF sources so that a total of one Kingfisher, one Walrus, two Auster Mk 6, four Beavers and a Dakota were operated by RAAF airmen in the Antarctic. The savage natural conditions in which they operated are exemplified by the material losses: the Walrus, one Auster, three Beavers and the Dakota all fell victim to the harsh conditions. This was a significant impact on the RAAF, but there was another factor that affected the military role on the continent.

The Antarctic Treaty was signed by representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1959. The Treaty came into effect in 1961, with Poland and West Germany becoming additional signatories during 1977 and 1981 respectively. Parties to the Treaty agreed to drop all territorial claims to Antarctic territories for a 30-year period and to ban the use of the continent for the testing of nuclear weapons or the storage of radioactive waste. Additional environmental safeguards were implemented that protected a wide variety of species and feeding grounds.

The Antarctic Treaty attempted to depoliticise the continent and adjacent waters. Seven nations, including Australia, have made territorial claims to areas of the Antarctic continent. National pride, scientific study, and the potential benefits of exploiting Antarctica’s natural resources combined to fuel claims and raise issues that may result in contention and political tension between nations. By defining the area below 60 degrees south latitude a demilitarised zone, the Antarctic Treaty limits the impact of military aviators.

It must be noted that the Antarctic Flight was a formal RAAF unit, and that the aircraft that it operated were obviously military aircraft. They


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were all painted with the RAAF roundel (except the Beavers, which were painted with the ‘Boxing Kangaroo’, not the official ‘Kangaroo in Motion’ image) and had military serial numbers. This may also explain why the deployments of 1962 and 1963 were not long-term, nor were visits made by Hercules aircraft at McMurdo Sound in 1978 or the annual resupply missions to Macquarie Island by Hercules until the mid-1980s. Anecdotal evidence that these flights were curtailed due to environmentalist pressure, based on the path of the aircraft overflying a penguin colony on Macquarie Island, also suggest an Australian commitment to environmental protection in the area.

Australia has declared a 200-mile economic resource zone about the Australian continent and the sub-Antarctic islands, Heard and Macquarie. In addition, Heard, Macquarie and the McDonald islands, and 1362 hectares of the Australian Antarctic Territories, have been declared as protected areas due to their unique geography, flora and fauna. These declarations have placed a legal responsibility on Australia to monitor and protect them against any environmental deprecations or illegal economic exploitation. The dramatic interception of the Uruguayan fishing boat Viarsa 1, which was illegally harvesting Patagonian Toothfish adjacent to Heard Island during October 2003, is an example of the importance Australia places on its obligations in this field.

RAAF Orion aircraft, with long range, endurance and sensor fit, could be deployed to monitor, report and coordinate action against any similar incursions. In the future, long range UAVs could be economically deployed in this role. However, the international legalities of military action in such areas are moot. The geographic location of the sub-Antarctic islands could result in a merging of the demilitarised zone and economic resource zone that may further complicate national economic aims and the spirit of the international agreement.

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THE DIFFERENCE ONE MAN MAKES

Inevitably, air forces ‘lose’ people in the course of their activities—either to combat in war, or to accidents in the air and on the ground

at other times. One of the most unusual fatalities ever suffered by the RAAF was Squadron Leader William Palstra, who perished in the 1930 crash of the British airship R101. His death was not only unique but carried profound consequences for his service back in Australia, albeit a fact little realised at the time or long afterwards.

The R101 was one of a pair of giant new rigid-frame lighter-than-air craft with which British hoped to answer the challenge of airship development programs being undertaken by Germany and the United States for international trade. It was making the inaugural flight of a new air service from England to India when, shortly after 2am on 5 October, it ploughed nose first into the Beauvais Ridge in northern France and exploded in a hydrogen fireball. Only eight of the 52 people on board were spared. Among the dead were Britain’s Secretary of State for Air, Lord Thomson, and the Director General of Civil Aviation, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Sefton Brancker.

At the time, the RAAF had been in existence barely ten years and comprised less than 100 officers and little more than 700 other ranks. The loss of one of its members in such high profile and sensational circumstances not unnaturally sent shock waves around the service, and indeed the country. But in a sense that was surprising, since Palstra himself was not a very well-known figure—even to his fellow officers.


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The reality was that Palstra only joined the RAAF in August 1925 and had spent nearly all of the next three years at RAAF Headquarters in Melbourne, rather than at any of the service’s three airbases. From the end of 1928 he had been out of the country, attending the yearlong course at the RAF Staff College at Andover, and on finishing that he was posted to the staff of Australia House in London as the air liaison officer (ALO) to the British Air Ministry.

In fact, though, Palstra deserved to be better-known around the RAAF, because he was plainly a man destined for bigger and better things. The staff appointments he held at headquarters, even in the junior ranks of flying officer and (from March 1927) flight lieutenant, were the important posts of Deputy Director of Personnel Services (or Director of Manning as it was renamed in March 1928) and Director of Personnel Services. From April 1927 until June 1928 he was also Staff Officer to the Chief of the Air Staff, Group Captain R. Williams.

Reports on Palstra’s performance make clear that he was a highly capable officer whose abilities deeply impressed his superiors. Perhaps this ought not to have been the source of any surprise, since he came to the RAAF with an educational and administrative background unmatched at the time within the service. He was, for a start, the first (and, for several years, only) university graduate in the officer ranks, having received a BA degree from the University in Melbourne in December 1924. During the period that he was studying from 1920, he had also been employed as an assistant to the university’s Registrar and assisted the future Professor Sir Douglas Copland in establishing the Commerce Faculty at Melbourne.

Combined with these superior credentials, Palstra also possessed two other qualifications which were critical for any ambitious officer in Australia’s air force of the period: pilot training, and war service. During World War I he had enlisted as a private in the 39th Battalion, AIF, and by early 1917 had been commissioned. In the Battle of Messines he not only survived (being the only officer left in his unit,

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apart from the CO and adjutant, when it was relieved), but also won the Military Cross and was twice mentioned in dispatches. Later that year he transferred to the Australian Flying Corps, and by September 1918 was flying R.E.8s in the corps reconnaissance role with 3 Squadron, AFC, over the Western Front.

With everything going so strongly for him, Palstra probably knew his prospects in the RAAF were outstanding. In 1928 he was selected for the prestigious and career-enhancing course at Andover, without having to sit the obligatory entrance examination. The other RAAF officer selected to attend the 1929 course there was Squadron Leader George Jones, who noted rather sourly in his 1988 autobiography From private to air marshal that Palstra had been exempted from this requirement as a ‘special case’—one presumes on the basis that his BA had already established his capacity to handle the educational side of the Staff College course.

Palstra’s rapid progress nearly came unstuck at this point, however, when a question arose over whether or not he was a British subject. Although his father was English-born (Yorkshire), he himself had been born at Zwolle, Holland, in 1891—as a consequence of his father being a prominent figure in the Salvation Army who moved around while running that organisation’s operations in various countries. Young ‘Bill’ had accordingly lived for five years in Belgium, followed by nine years in Transvaal (South Africa) and three years in England, before finally arriving in Melbourne in October 1914. Although he had taken a New Zealand-born wife in 1920, and had three children born in Victoria, it was to clarify his nationality that Palstra hurriedly sought and was granted British nationality in November 1928.

Ironically, as part of a program of industry visits by Staff College students, during the last months of 1929 Jones and Palstra had toured the Royal Airship Works at Cardington where R101 and its sistership R100 were being built. On completion of their course, it was usual for the new graduates to stay in Britain for another year of duty. In


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Jones’ case this meant a series of training appointments to RAF units, while Palstra went to the ALO job with promotion to squadron leader rank in July 1930. It was while here that the question arose of him accompanying the R101 on its maiden flight to India.

According to Williams, this was a decision in which he had played some part as CAS. In his 1977 autobiography These are facts, Williams recorded that because the new air service was planned to be extended to Australia he was prompted to suggest ‘that our liaison officer in London, ... Palstra, travel on the first flight. It is possible that we were offered a place in it but I cannot remember this with certainty.’ For his part, Jones was greatly miffed by this, and wrote in his autobiography that he (Jones) ‘fully expected to be chosen since I was the senior officer in England at the time’.

That Jones was not aboard the R101 when it struck the French hillside was his great fortune. He went on to become a famous figure in RAAF history, retiring in 1952 as an air marshal after ten years as CAS—a term only second to Williams’ own record in the post; he was knighted a year later. Whether Jones deserved such a distinguished part in history, and whether his legacy for the air force was worthwhile, will long be debated. But at least he lived to fulfil his potential—unlike Palstra.

Although it is impossible to know to what heights Palstra might have risen, it seems clear that he had the capacity to reach the top ranks of his service. This is not to say that he might have become CAS instead of Jones, but of one thing there is no doubt. If it had been Jones who died in the R101 instead of Palstra, the history of the RAAF from the 1940s might have been very different indeed.

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WHY THE RED CENTRE VANISHED

On 26 June 1942, a Catalina flying boat of 11 Squadron RAAF was about to alight on Havannah Bay, New Hebrides (now Vanuatu),

to refuel. The ‘Cat’ had called in there on its way to bomb Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, and was then on the return flight to Noumea having completed its mission. Despite its presence being expected, the American ground control at Havannah Bay had, as a precautionary measure, ordered a US Marine Wildcat fighter into the air to identify the incoming aircraft.

Geoff Pentland, in his book RAAF Camouflage & Markings 1939–45 – Vol. 1, takes up the story:

This the US pilot did, but though the shape of the Catalina was no doubt disturbingly familiar, the red in the upper wing roundels [national insignia] seemed to him so distinct—as he later said—that he mistook them for Japanese markings and immediately attacked. Bullets passed through the Catalina’s main crew compartment, fuel tanks, and ailerons, but fortunately no one was hurt and the aircraft was able to land safely.

Flying Officer Robert Seymour and his crew were undoubtedly shaken by this close call, but the incident had a more far-reaching consequence. It was decided that operational and second-line RAAF aircraft were henceforth to have the large red centres of their upper-wing roundels painted out in white. This was formalised in Aircraft General Instruction C11, Issue 4, dated 31 July 1942. Within a few months, the order was extended to all roundels on all RAAF aircraft.


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Ironically, the Americans had already foreseen the problem. Firstly, prior to Pearl Harbor and again in 1943, the US national insignia was deleted from the upper right and lower left wing surfaces in a similar attempt to differentiate its aircraft from Japanese (the latter displaying the red Hinomaru disc on all four wing surfaces). It was believed that the position of a marking could be the first indicator of friend or foe.

However, in practice, colour appears to have been the more important signifier. From a distance, red can be seen more easily than other colours—often, in fact, before other details of a marking can be made out. Cases of mistaken identity led, in March 1942, to the red disc inside the US national star being deleted. On 27 March the operations diary for 13 Squadron RAAF reported:

Orders issued by the US Air Staff to the effect that the red circle in the American insignia on all United States aircraft was to be immediately painted white to avoid mistakes in recognition, particularly by ground troops.

Considering the above, one might ask why red was still in use on RAAF aircraft six months into the Pacific War. Perhaps the RAAF was simply reluctant to distinguish its roundel from that of the RAF. The British red, white and blue roundel had been used on Australian Flying Corps aircraft during World War I, and the adoption ‘without difference’ of the RAF Ensign (which included the roundel) for the RAAF had been recommended by the RAF Chief of Air Staff and accepted in 1922. This decision presumably had some bearing on the fact that the roundel was still in use when World War II began.

However, even after the red centre had been removed, American aircrew continued to have trouble identifying RAAF aircraft. A year after the Catalina incident, a US Navy Liberator bomber based at Guadalcanal shot down a RAAF Beaufort, a type that was ‘out of home waters’ in the Solomons area. The US crew had earlier sighted what they believed to be a Japanese Betty bomber. The Beaufort then appeared and, at

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just 100 feet above the sea, reportedly turned towards them before both aircraft began firing at 1000 yards. The Beaufort was hit from the Liberator’s upper and bow turrets, and soon ditched in the sea. It was only when crewmen emerged that the Liberator crew realised they were ‘white men’ (whom they assumed to also be Americans), and dropped a life raft and supplies. On closer examination, they thought the floating Beaufort to be a Mosquito. Tragically, the crew subsequently perished in a storm.

With the war’s end, the reason for deleting the red centre no longer existed, and it saw a brief return. During the Korean War, RAAF and RAN aircraft went into action with red-centred roundels.

Then, on 2 July 1956, Australia followed the lead of Canada and South Africa in replacing the red centre with a national emblem. Designs submitted for consideration included the Southern Cross, a boomerang, and a sprig of wattle. It was decided that the ‘kangaroo in motion’ was the most distinctively Australian symbol.

As an aside, Qantas aircraft had sported the red kangaroo as depicted on the penny coin since World War II, and even the present RAAF kangaroo roundel had seen an earlier incarnation: as an unofficial unit insignia on the Mosquito night fighters of 456 Squadron RAAF in Europe.

CAC Boomerang with WWII blue and white roundel.

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CHINDITS – A REAPPRAISAL

The 1942–45 campaign in Burma was a complex amalgam of political priorities between the Allied participants: Great Britain,

the United States of America, China and India. It is also a striking illustration of the way in which all military campaigns since the 20th century have become critically dependent upon air power. Exemplifying this point are two operations undertaken in February 1943 and March 1944, which bear critical analysis. Both were carried out by troops trained in jungle raiding and guerilla tactics known as Chindits—Chindit being a corruption of Chinthe, the Burmese name for the griffon-like lions that protect Buddhist temples—under their charismatic commander, Charles Orde Wingate.

The concept behind both operations was simple: the insertion of a mobile force, supplied by air, behind enemy lines to disrupt communications. Described as Long Range Penetration (LRP), it was a type of warfare devised in the Western Desert. To implement his idea in Burma, in 1943 Brigadier Orde Wingate took 3000 troops of 77 Brigade overland from the Imphal Plain to operate between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers. The force was organised in various columns with the object of cutting the Japanese north-south railway between Myitkyina and Indaw. The railway was demolished near Bonchaung on 6 March, and the columns operated behind enemy lines until May. But the cost in personnel was high. Of the 2182 survivors, 600 never recovered to be fit for further active duty.

For political, publicity and morale reasons, the efforts of 77 Brigade found the approval of the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of South-East Asia


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Command, Lord Louis Mountbatten. As a consequence of this patronage, and decisions taken at the Quadrant conference held in Quebec, Canada, in August 1943, Wingate was promoted to major general and his command expanded to a 23,000-strong formation called Special Force.

Wingate began planning Operation Thursday, involving a refinement of his original concept. On 5 March 1944 six columns from Nos 3, 23 and 77 Brigades were inserted by air beyond the Chindwin River. A seventh column, Brigadier Bernard Fergusson’s 16 Brigade, marched overland from Ledo. Six ‘strongholds’ (codenamed Broadway, Piccadilly, Blackpool, Aberdeen, White City and Chowringhee) were to be seized and developed as secure bases from which the columns could launch attacks aimed at severing the enemy lines of communication and neutralising focal points between Myitkyina and Mandalay. It was imperative that an airfield capable of operating Dakota aircraft was constructed within each secure perimeter.

Statistics over the first six days of the 1944 fly-in indicate Special Force’s dependence on air support: 579 Dakota and 74 glider sorties delivered 9052 troops, 1359 animals and 254 tonnes of supplies and equipment. Ironically, Wingate was himself killed when the aircraft carrying him crashed near Imphal during a storm on 14 March. The Special Force operation he had set in train continued under Brigadier Walter Lentaigne.

In planning for Thursday, Wingate had been aware that success depended on Allied aerial supremacy, and that Special Force would be reliant on No 1 Air Commando—a specialised USAAF unit that had been established under the command of Colonel Phil Cochrane to support his operations. Each column had with it a RAF Section, comprising an officer and two radio sergeants. The role of the officers (many of whom were Australian) was to arrange for air supply, and act as forward air controllers for Cochrane’s Mustang and Mitchell aircraft that provided the Special Force with close air support. Another

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important role involved the use of light aircraft for casualty evacuation, and it was during this campaign that a helicopter (the force had ten Sikorskis) was first used for such work.

Despite Wingate’s faith, in many respects he expected too much from air power—especially given the other factors (weather, unreliable communications) involved. Believing that aircraft could deal with any targets that needed to be engaged, he sent in his columns without organic artillery (apart from four 25-pounder guns deployed for the defence of each stronghold). Wingate is quoted as telling his units: ‘The planes are our artillery. They will bomb and destroy the targets you produce.’

While there is no doubt that most targets could usually be successfully hit from the air, unfortunately this did not always prove to be the case. The classic example was in late April when a column cut the Burma Road at Nalong, 45 miles south of Myitkyina, trapping an accumulation of more than 300 enemy vehicles. Pleas for a strike against this massive target—perhaps the outstanding prize thrown up during the whole operation—went unanswered, and the ground troops lacked the firepower to destroy it themselves.

While Thursday was undoubtedly a military innovation, questions remain as to whether it was necessary or worthwhile. The Special Force insertion coincided with the Japanese Assam offensive, but there is little evidence that the presence of Wingate’s force diverted any effort from the enemy attacks on Imphal and Kohima. It took Special Force eleven days to cut the rail and road communications south of Myitkyina, after Brigadier Mike Calvert’s 77 Brigade destroyed a Japanese garrison at Mawlu and established the stronghold known as White City.

It might even be argued that Special Force operations were a misuse of air resources. The 1944 campaign was one in which an Army formation was given strategic mobility, but suffered from tactical immobility.


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The bulk of Special Force was inserted 200 miles behind enemy lines in a matter of hours. Once the strongholds had been consolidated, however, the tactical deployment of the men was restricted by a reliance on mules and the physical fitness and sustainability of the troops. To provide essential sustenance, four Dakota squadrons had to be diverted from the Assam fighting to supply the logistic requirements of Special Force.

On balance, perhaps it would have been more efficient and economical to send only small parties behind enemy lines to conduct long-range reconnaissance, leaving it to Cochrane’s Mustangs and Mitchells to destroy targets that these identified. It is argued that the dislocation of enemy lines of communication in Burma could have been achieved just as well by intelligent targeting by the Allied air forces as it was by special operations.

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bOMbER COMMAND MEMORIAL

During World War II, thousands of young Australians joined the RAAF and served with squadrons in the Royal Air Force in the

United Kingdom. The vast majority served in Bomber Command.

The strategic bombing offensive carried out by Bomber Command in Europe played a significant role in the Allied victory over the Axis powers, Germany and Italy. Bomber Command gave Britain the capacity to strike directly at industrial centres and other strategic points, inflicting devastating damage to the enemy’s war-making capacity. Although these heavily defended targets were attacked predominantly under cover of darkness, the Bomber Command crews suffered fearsome losses. At the peak of the bombing campaign, up to 1000 heavy bombers would attack on any one night, but up to ten per cent of aircraft and crews could fail to return from such operations.

So high was attrition during 1943-44 that crews had less than a 50 per cent chance of surviving a ‘tour’ of 30 operations. The men of the RAAF who fought with Bomber Command amounted to fewer than two per cent of all Australians who enlisted in World War II, yet the 3486 who died accounted for almost 20 per cent of all Australian deaths in combat. Many others were wounded. The RAAF’s most distinguished heavy bomber unit, No 460 Squadron, alone lost 1018 aircrew—meaning that, in effect, the entire squadron was wiped out five times over.

Australian airmen flew in every major operation. Most of the aircrews who trained under the Empire Air Training Scheme in Australia and Canada were posted to Bomber Command. There were five


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main RAAF squadrons: No 460 Squadron (flying Wellingtons, then Lancasters), Nos 463 and 467 Squadrons (Lancasters), and Nos 462 and 466 Squadrons (Halifaxes). Other squadrons were also part of Bomber Command for a time, including Nos 455 (Hampdens), 458 (Wellingtons) and 464 (Venturas).

Many of the Australians in Bomber Command logged up tens of thousands of operations and sorties in non-RAAF units. Two such men were awarded the Victoria Cross after performing outstanding acts of courage. They were: Flight Sergeant Rawdon Middleton, who in November 1942 lost his life captaining a crippled Stirling bomber of No 149 Squadron, RAF, all the way back to England from a raid on Turin, Italy; and Wing Commander Hughie Edwards, who had completed pilot training at Point Cook in 1936 before transferring to the RAF, and in July 1941 led a near-suicide mission by Blenheim light-bombers of No 105 Squadron against the German port of Bremen.

The idea for a memorial to the RAAF personnel who served with Bomber Command dates back to the early 1990s. However, it was not until 1997 that a formal process was commenced which resulted in the development of a design. An advisory committee representing the Bomber Command Association and the Australian War Memorial was established, and a design brief was developed. In September 1998, the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs made an initial pledge of $100,000 to support the development and construction of a suitable memorial. This funding allowed a design competition to proceed in 1999.

The advisory committee unanimously recommended that a design proposal by the noted New Zealand sculptor, Neil Dawson, be adopted for the memorial. Mr Dawson’s design was selected because of its aesthetic and artistic merit, the cost effectiveness of the construction and installation of the sculpture, the suitability of the siting in the Memorial’s grounds and a reasonable length of time for completion.

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The design and development of the memorial has been approved by the Australian War Memorial Council and the RAAF Association. ‘In principle’ approval also has been given by the National Capital Authority. The total cost of the project, covering design, fabrication, transport and installation is in the order of $550,000. To date, donations totalling over $500,000 have been received, including $250,000 provided by the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs.

The Bomber Command Memorial will be a very dramatic sculpture, located prominently in the grounds of the Australian War Memorial. It will be one of the first commemorative elements encountered by most visitors as they walk from their cars to the main entrance to the Memorial. It will also be illuminated at night, and very visible from the major traffic routes that pass the Australian War Memorial.

Neil Dawson’s design for the Bomber Command Memorial commemorates the service and sacrifice of those who served as aircrew and also the dedicated work of the ground support personnel. Specifically, the design incorporates:

• a symbolised searchlight beam comprising a perforated stainless steel column, 16 metres high with a circumference of 90 centimetres at the base, expanding to 1.2 metres at the top;

• representations of the air and ground crew as silhouetted figures in uniform, in the form of a 2 metre high screen wall;

• a frosted glass plate at the base of the searchlight beam with brass stencils of seven of the aircraft flown by Bomber Command—Halifax, Wellington, Lancaster, Mosquito, Stirling, Blenheim and Whitely; and

• paving and a granite element surrounding the base of the sculpture, incorporating an engraved reflective text outlining the memorial’s commemorative purpose.


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The Bomber Command Memorial is to be fabricated in New Zealand, where the sculptor, Neil Dawson, lives and works. It is anticipated that the perforated stainless steel column will be manufactured as one piece and then transported to Australia. Work on the sculpture has already started and current plans are for it to be dedicated and unveiled in May 2005. Confirmation of the actual date and details of the dedication ceremony will be publicised by the RAAF Association and the Australian War Memorial closer to the date.

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AIRbORNE FORWARD AIR CONTROL – A FIRST FOR THE RAAF

In early February 1943 during the battles around Wau in northern Papua, No 4 Squadron RAAF carried out what is essentially the

first recorded Forward Air Control (FAC) mission in the history of military aviation. On the ground at Wau, troops of the Australian 2/6th Battalion and 2/5th Independent Company had contacted a significant Japanese force. Air support was requested and in response Nos 4 and 30 Squadrons RAAF were tasked by No 9 Operational Group RAAF to carry out an attack on the enemy.

No 4 Squadron was a specialist Army Cooperation squadron trained in land reconnaissance, artillery spotting, message dropping, ammunition resupply and other general support tasks. The squadron flew the Wirraway aircraft, which was ideal for ground reconnaissance and observation. The Wirraway’s very low stall speed gave it the ability to fly so slowly that it could almost hover over the battlefield. The Wau task was recorded as a land reconnaissance mission, though a new term—tactical reconnaissance—was created for future missions of this type.

No 30 Squadron was to supply the striking power with its Beaufighter aircraft. Each Beaufighter was equipped with four 20mm cannons and six .303 machine guns that produced a heavy volume and weight of fire. The Beaufighter was one of the fastest aircraft at very-low levels, in contrast to the slow Wirraway. While high speed was an advantage in


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many tactical situations, it was a disadvantage when trying to visually acquire ground targets for attack. The concept of how this problem could be overcome, and the attack carried out, was contained in the tasking order sent to 30 Squadron.

WAR.42 3 FEB. 9OG/C1/3. ‘Flight Beaufighters rendezvous with Wirraway over Wau at 1430L/3 FEB. Follow Wirraway who will indicate target by firing tracers into it. Beaufighters will follow Wirraway in and straffe [sic].’

At 1320 hours the Australian Army personnel at Wau saw the 4 Squadron Wirraway circling overhead their location, and indicated their positions to the aircraft by firing flares. Once the Wirraway had determined the relative positions of friend and foe it departed and returned at 1439 with three Beaufighters in company. The Wirraway then indicated the target area to the Beaufighters by firing tracer rounds into the enemy positions and the Beaufighters then delivered their attack to the same area.

All the essential elements of the FAC role were present in this mission—communication with the local ground forces, acquisition of friendly and enemy locations, and finally, the indication of the target to the attacking aircraft.

The renowned American air historian, Richard P. Hallion, referred to this pioneering work of the RAAF in his 1989 book Strike from the Sky when discussing international efforts to more effectively control close air support missions.

The Australians went further, and developed airborne strike coordinators and controllers, anticipating the post-World War II forward air control system utilized in Korea and Southeast Asia. Using two-seat Commonwealth Wirraway tactical reconnaissance and liaison aircraft, Royal Australian Air Force pilots and observers led strike flights to ground targets. Subsequently, the RAAF introduced the Commonwealth Boomerang, a specialized

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army cooperation and ground support fighter which operated like a ‘fast FAC’ over the edge of battle, leading strikes and marking targets for attacking aircraft.

After Wau this style of mission became a feature of the operations of Nos 4 and 5 Squadrons, the RAAF’s two army cooperation units in the South-West Pacific Area. The skills acquired by these two squadrons in this specialised role resulted in the RAAF possessing the world’s most advanced method of providing accurate and safe close air support.

In May 1944 the Americans in Italy would develop a similar method of controlling close air support missions. In that theatre a light aircraft, the Piper L-5, was used to locate and indicate targets to strike aircraft. The codename ‘Horsefly’ was given to this type of operation. The marking method usually involved the dropping of a smoke bomb on the target from the Horsefly’s operating altitude of 3000–4000 feet. Horsefly techniques were also used in the invasion and subsequent operations in southern France, continuing until the end of the war in Europe.

The FAC role had to be rediscovered in the Korean conflict in 1950. Strike aircraft speeds had significantly increased since World War II, and a way had to be found to accurately mark targets. L-5 and AT-6 Texan aircraft were modified to replicate the Horsefly operations of World War II. A new radio call sign resulted in these FAC flights being called ‘Mosquitoes’. The Korean conflict also saw the introduction of specialised smoke rockets as target markers and these became the primary tool of FACs in Korea and for the future.

The FAC role figured prominently in the training given to the Vietnamese Air Force in the period 1960 to 1965. The use of FAC grew considerably with the introduction of American combat forces to South Vietnam in 1965 and over the ensuing years. One of the most intense periods of FAC operations centred on the Battle of Khe Sanh in 1968. During the battle 1600 FAC sorties were used to control 25,000


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tactical sorties which dropped 95,000 tonnes of ordnance. It is the American use of FAC in Vietnam that usually comes to mind when the term FAC is used.

Although the American use of FAC on such a large scale dominates the history of this important air power role, it is instructive to remember where it originated. The innovativeness, ingenuity, skills, and resourcefulness of RAAF personnel in an under-resourced and overlooked theatre of World War II produced a new concept of operations that was used for the first time with great efficacy.

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DEFEATING GERMANY’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRuCTION

The search for weapons of mass destruction is not a new phenomenon. Some of the most important individual targets

attacked during the strategic bombing offensive of World War II were those associated with the German V-weapons program. This program included the German Army’s V-2 rocket (known initially as the A-4) and the Luftwaffe’s V-1 Flying Bomb. The V stood for Vergeltungswaffe or retaliation weapon—a somewhat hypocritical title considering that design work on the V-2 first started in 1936, well before the war. The V-2 was capable of being launched from a mobile platform from any hard surface, and had a maximum speed of 3600 miles per hour (or Mach 4) and a range in excess of 220 miles. The rocket had greater destructive potential than the V-1, due to its speed on impact and the effect of its bow wave.

Unlike their modern-day counterparts, British Intelligence had irrefutable evidence that German scientists were carrying out developmental and research work on these weapons. In May 1943 Flight Officer Constance Babington-Smith, a Women’s Auxiliary Air Force photo interpreter, noticed a black shadow on a photograph of Peenemunde on the German Baltic coast. She interpreted the shadow as a ramp with a cockpitless airplane on it. Agents in France had also confirmed the existence of launching sites at Watten in the Pas de Calais. As if any further proof was required, on 15 June 1943 the Germans launched a flying bomb offensive in earnest, with London


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as the main target. Of 244 missiles fired, 45 exploded on or just after take-off destroying nine of the launching sites; however, 73 got through to Greater London. On 2 August 1943, the Germans launched their heaviest attack with 97 flying bombs exploding in the London area. Plans were in hand for the production of 2000 V-1s per month by the end of 1943.

After the attacks began, radar stations were used to track the flying bombs and for controlling intercepts by Tempests and Spitfire XIV fighters. On 1 July 1944, Flying Officer G.P. Armstrong, an Australian airman in 165 Squadron, RAF, closed on a flying bomb after his fire appeared to be without effect. He was at a distance of only 50 yards when the missile suddenly exploded, covering his Spitfire with a sooty substance and partly burning away its elevators and rudder. Analysis of successful intercepts showed that damage from a flying bomb exploding in mid-air was negligible at ranges over 150 yards, and at least 638 V-1s were shot down by fighter intercepts. Australian fighter pilots Flight Sergeant H.J. Bailey and Flight Sergeant D.J. Mackerras serving with No 3 (Tempest) Squadron each accounted for 11 missiles.

Another intercept method known as ‘Tip and Run’ was based on the premise that the V-1 could be upset by the airflow over the top of the wing. The method involved a fighter formating alongside and sliding the wing tip of the aircraft underneath that of the missile. Understandably, pilots had to have nerves of steel to crab towards the flying bomb while maintaining speeds of 380 miles per hour until the wing of the V-1 lifted and it heeled over in a dive earthwards.

Until the attacks started, the expected speed and heights of the bombs were a matter of speculation. Speeds were obtained by analysing film and plotting pictures taken at a time interval of 20 seconds, making corrections for changes in azimuth and the wind. Heights were more difficult to obtain. Radar gave no measurements, as the flying bombs were too low, so the bulk of information on heights came

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from the Royal Observer Corps. The tracks of flying bombs were also analysed to determine their points of origin in occupied France. Photo-reconnaissance was also carried out, and if launching sites were detected they were put on a list of targets to be attacked by heavy bombers.

A force of 597 heavy bombers from RAF Bomber Command took off on the evening of 17 August 1943 to attack Peenemunde. Two Australian Squadrons participated in the attack, with No 460 squadron contributing 24 Lancasters and No 467 Squadron ten Lancasters. The operation set back the V-2 experimental program and resulted in a reduction in the scale of production of the V-1s. Ten days later, on 27 August 1943, the US 8th Air Force mounted the first of more than a dozen attacks on Watten. On 19 June, Bomber Command attacked Watten for the first time. This was followed up with round-the-clock attacks on a number of V-sites in northern France during the following months.

In all, 2340 V-1 flying bombs reached London and 5475 people were killed. Fortunately, the development of V-2 rockets was curtailed by the bombing raids on launching sites by the RAF and the US 8th Air Force. Nonetheless, between 8 September 1944 and 17 March 1945, 1054 rockets fell on British soil, about half of these in the London region. The worst attack occurred on 26 January 1945 when 13 rockets landed. The destructive power of a single V-2 was evidenced by an attack on 8 March 1945 when 173 houses were destroyed in a housing estate in Ilford. The suffering of those made homeless was made worse by the harsh winter of 1944–45. Despite these setbacks, Londoners were still able to enjoy themselves under fire. On 29 July 1944, the RAF and Army were playing cricket at Lord’s when a flying bomb cut out overhead, dived and threatened to land near the pitch. Fortunately, it carried on a little further and exploded on a nearby road. The players and umpires picked themselves up and play resumed. The last attack was carried out on 30 March 1945.


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The targets were chiefly in enemy occupied territory and it was essential that precision bombing was carried out so that bombs did not scatter among surrounding houses. The success of the bombing raids and fighter intercepts kept production of the flying bombs and rockets to a minimum and hampered further scientific research. Planning and execution was enhanced by sourcing reliable and accurate intelligence and making sound analytical decisions based on fact and not speculation. Indeed, it is not too much to argue that good intelligence was the key to success in the campaign to destroy these first weapons of mass destruction.

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AERIAL TORPEDOES – A WEAPON SYSTEM FAILuRE

On 4 December 1943, six Beaufort torpedo bombers of No 8 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, attacked Japanese

shipping in Blanche Bay, Rabaul harbour. As the aircraft piloted by Squadron Leader N.T. Quinn (the unit’s commanding officer) was tracking to release its torpedo, it hit either a ship’s mast or a cable and crashed. Quinn and his observer survived, but both were taken prisoner. This was the 19th—and last—operation undertaken by the RAAF torpedo strike force. Why was it that the aerial torpedo had failed as a weapon system?

The RAAF had devised a theoretical basis for the development of its torpedo bomber strike force, in a 1936 Air Staff Memorandum that presented rudimentary operational-level doctrine. Despite this, no effort was made to establish a torpedo bomber organisation for some years. Australia had committed itself in mid-1939 to local manufacture of the Beaufort general reconnaissance aircraft, and torpedo bombing was one of the secondary roles that had been considered in the design. But it was only in June 1941—just two months before the first Australian-built Beauforts were delivered—that the intention of fitting the type with a torpedo, as an alternative to a semi-armour piercing bomb, was made known.

In the meantime, no steps had been taken to allow any RAAF personnel to acquire expertise in maritime strike operations. Even after it was decided to create an Australian torpedo bomber strike force, it was only in late January 1942 that Nowra, New South Wales, was selected


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for development as the site for training of this arm. It was not until 29 August that 15 crews from No 100 Squadron commenced training in the torpedo bomber role. On 7 September they undertook the first RAAF torpedo bomber attack in the South-West Pacific Area, at Milne Bay.

Given the short time between the commencement of training and the first operational employment of the torpedo bomber force, it was no surprise that the Beauforts had little success. Their initial showing, however, highlighted two of the inherent weaknesses in the deployment of the force—training and the weapon system itself.

Although aircrew training was undertaken at Nowra, it was not until June 1943 that a dedicated Operational Training Unit was formed. Three squadrons (Nos 7, 8 and 100) were converted to torpedo bomber units, but No 7 never flew in the role. At least 13 per cent of the 145 pilots and their crews who attended courses were subsequently posted to other than torpedo bomber units. Even where trained aircrew went to one of the two operational torpedo bombing units, only 30 per cent actually participated in one or more missions. Within the operational squadrons themselves, priority was given to reconnaissance and ordinary bombing tasks—a clear indication of the unsuitability of the torpedo weapon system against small, shallow draught Japanese vessels in the theatre, as well as the commander’s lack of faith in the efficacy of the torpedo bombing role. On these statistics, aircrew would also have been hard-pressed to remain current in the skills required of an effective torpedo bomber force.

The other facet of the training question was that of producing technicians that were capable of maintaining the weapon. Over 450 students graduated as Fitter Torpedo and Aircrafthand (Torpedo) from the base Torpedo Unit at Nowra between May 1942 and June 1944—forming a specialist trade group with restricted promotion and posting prospects. The torpedo was technically complex, and required many man-hours to maintain. It was not a weapon that could be deployed effectively to the rudimentary airfields from which the RAAF operated

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in New Guinea. To help overcome this operational restriction, Mobile Torpedo Sections were raised to support squadrons in the field, and thereafter fought an ongoing battle to protect their sensitive charges from the insidious effects of tropical heat, mud, rain, and humidity.

The major reason for the ineffectiveness of RAAF torpedo bombers was the weapon system itself. The Beaufort had been designed to carry the British 18-inch Mk XII torpedo, but when British suppliers could not meet a RAAF order for 360 of these weapons, Australia was forced to make a costly resort to local manufacture. The decision to build a million-pound facility was taken in 1941, but it was not until September 1943 that the first Australian torpedoes were delivered.

In the meantime, the RAAF was forced to turn to the American Mk XIII torpedo, which was not fully compatible with the Beaufort, being larger in circumference than the British version. The bomb bay doors of the Beaufort therefore could not be fully closed, which increased drag and degraded the aircraft’s performance. Apart from this, the American torpedo performed erratically, and there were still supply problems associated with its provision from US Navy sources.

In addition to the physical difficulties with the weapon system one must look at the intangible factors of mind-set and experience. Both the RAAF commanders intimately involved with the Beaufort torpedo bomber operations, Group Captain W.H. Garing (Air Commander, Milne Bay) and Air Commodore J.E. Hewitt (AOC No 9 Operational Group), were well versed in maritime operations, but neither was knowledgeable in strike operations. Equally, the torpedo was not the weapon of choice of American air commanders in the South-West Pacific.

A lack of understanding and the operational imperatives that prevailed in 1942 combined to ensure that the aerial torpedo was put into Australian service and deployed prematurely. At the operational level, the incompatibility of the American Mk XIII with the aircraft system, combined with its unsatisfactory performance, was the major reason


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for the failure of the weapon system failure. However, the lack of foresight and intellectual rigour when introducing the system led to the concept itself failing at the strategic level.

There is a stark lesson that can be drawn from this episode in the development of the RAAF, which is valid even today. For a weapons system to be effective, it is necessary to have a clear vision for its operational use, guaranteed supply of all essential components, and a well considered training program that is economic and ensures the flexible use of available manpower.

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AuSTRALIAN AIR CONTRIbuTION TO D-DAY OPERATIONS

After two years of planning and preparation, the Allied invasion of northern France on 6 June 1944 returned ground forces to

European soil from where they had been ignominiously ejected in 1940. ‘Operation Overlord’ involved the landing of five infantry divisions on the first day, at Normandy beaches adjacent to Varreville and Ouistreham codenamed (from west to east) Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno and Sword. To ensure that the lodgement of these forces would not be seriously impaired by enemy reinforcements, a combined air campaign was launched to isolate the battlefield. Although no ships of the Royal Australian Navy or formed units of the Australian Army took part in the great invasion effort, the story was very different in the air.

During the early morning of 6 June, seven Australian ‘Article-XV’ squadrons contributed to the Bomber and Fighter Command attacks on various targets on the Normandy beaches and surrounding areas. Two formations of 13 Lancaster aircraft from 460 Squadron each attacked Fontenay-Crisbecq and St Martin de Varreville, while 463 and 467 Squadrons struck at gun emplacements at St Pierre du Mont that covered the Omaha beach. Thirteen Halifax bombers from 466 Squadron bombed a German battery at Maisy. The Spitfire-equipped 453 Squadron undertook 43 sorties in support of the landing forces on the first day. The Mosquito night fighters of 456 Squadron flew 18 sorties on the night of 5/6 and 6/7 June, and shot down a German He-177. The other Mosquito squadron, 464, mounted 20 sorties on the night of 5/6 June that successfully interdicted enemy rail and road communication, bridges, and enemy troop convoys.


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Other Australian airmen serving in RAF squadrons are known to have played a part in the various operations that supported the landing. Some were involved in deceptions undertaken as part of the aerial ‘cover’ plan, while others jammed enemy early-warning radar. At least one Australian pilot from 139 Squadron was involved in Mosquito ‘Intruder’ operations to secure the eastern flank of the landing operation from enemy air interference. Many more transport crews with Nos 38 and 46 Groups, RAF, took part in the large-scale airdrops that also occurred on 5/6 June. Still others were in RAF squadrons of Bomber Command flying alongside the nominally ‘Australian’ units in the attack on Maisy, and against similar targets at La Pernelle, Longues and Mont Fleury.

Even after the Allied beachhead was secured, 453 Squadron was intimately involved in follow-on operations. From 11 June the squadron staged through an advanced landing ground in newly captured territory, before occupying another known as ALG B.11 a fortnight later. On 25 June the Spitfires flew 35 sorties. The next day, two patrols engaged in combat with German FW-190 fighters, resulting in the squadron claiming two FW-190s probably destroyed and five damaged. When not preventing incursions by German fighters, the unit flew armed reconnaissance missions and attacked enemy motor transport. During June, 453 Squadron flew 720 operational sorties in which it destroyed three, probably destroyed three and damaged five enemy aircraft. As a result of ground strafing operations it claimed the destruction of one tank, one armoured car, and 16 enemy motor vehicles. It also had some success against maritime targets—a merchantman and a flak ship were damaged.

Air operations continued at a similar tempo during July. In support of both ‘Operation Goodwood’ (the failed British attempt on 18 July to advance from Caen) and ‘Operation Cobra’ (the American Army breakout from the lodgement area at St Lo scheduled for 20 July), the Allied strategic bombing force attacked enemy tactical positions. The Australian squadrons with Bomber Command participated in this

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effort. Twenty 460 Squadron Lancaster and 14 Halifax aircraft from 466 Squadron attacked Caen on 7 July. From 18 July, 463, 466 and 467 crews were included in the formation of over 200 aircraft that each bombed Colombelles, Mondeville and Cagny during ‘Goodwood’.

The Australian Spitfire squadron remained based in the continent until 29 September, when it departed from Deurne, near Antwerp, bound for Coltishall. The squadron had operated from various landing grounds in support of the northern thrust of the Allied armies, which had forced the German forces to retreat to the Dutch-Belgian border, where a combination of logistic deficiencies and discussion on strategy halted the advance. The bold attempt to break the strategic impasse—the landing of the American 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions at Eindhoven and Nijmegen and the British 1st Airborne Divison at Arnhem, to seize and hold bridges over the Rhine and establish an axis of advance that the British 30 Corps could exploit to cross into Germany—was supported by the Tactical Air Force squadrons.

Australian Squadrons based in Great Britain were also involved after the D-Day landing. The two Coastal Command anti-submarine squadrons, 10 and 461, operated to prevent any interference by the German Navy. The anti-ship strike squadron, 455, attacked German E and R boats that were a threat to the naval force deployed off the beachhead, as well as enemy convoys. In addition, the Mosquito intruders of 464 Squadron targeted German rail traffic and communication facilities.

Official figures indicate that, all told, there were 986 Australian aircrew in the ten RAAF squadrons operational on D-Day, while a further 1816 Australian aircrew were assigned to RAF squadrons involved in the invasion campaign. Even if not all of these 2800 Australians flew in operations on 6 June or immediately after, most would have participated in the campaign in some way. Although not numerically large, Australian airmen nonetheless made a significant contribution to the success of D-Day and subsequent operations.

War loan Beaufighter and crew at Morotai, 1944.

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A FAMILY OF ‘WAR LOAN’ bEAuFIGHTERS

Australia produced thousands of aircraft for the RAAF during World War II to complement those supplied by Britain and

the USA. The Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation started with the Wirraway, and later expanded its production lines to include the indigenous Boomerang. De Havilland Australia produced Tiger Moths, then Mosquitoes. The Department of Aircraft Production set up its Beaufort Division to build an Australian version of Britain’s Bristol Beaufort bomber, and then in 1944 put its resources into producing a more potent Bristol offspring: the heavily-armed, agile Beaufighter attack aircraft.

How did the Curtin Government pay for this massive undertaking, bearing in mind Australia’s small population and the infancy of its aircraft production industry? Apart from tax-funded revenue, a large contribution came from the war loans scheme, whereby Australians were encouraged to buy war bonds which would mature with interest after the war. War loan (also known as the liberty loan and, from 1944, victory loan) drives became a part of life, with people regularly being asked to ‘dig deep’ to help fund the war effort.

The connection between war loans and flying was not entirely new. During World War I, a number of Australian Flying Corps ‘presentation’ aircraft were ‘paid for’ by communities and organisations, earning each group the right to have its name painted prominently on the side of the aircraft. War loans were organised to include touring aircraft crewed by prominent airmen who gave rousing speeches at each stopover.


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People were asked to give up some of their comforts in consideration of the men in the trenches.

During World War II, the Commonwealth War Loan Office was established to administer the scheme. Many communities had a war loans committee to ensure that its population met its quota, and to handle local administration such as publicity visits.

The Beaufighter—the ‘whispering death’ which had the look of potency about it—was a popular aircraft on which to focus war loan drives. In June 1945, over 20 towns had their names recorded on the nose of newly built Beaufighters, in recognition of having met or exceeded their subscription quota. One such town was Narromine, in central NSW, whose residents reportedly subscribed a record number of bonds per head of population to purchase one of the first ‘war loan’ aircraft. In recognition of this, and as a publicity opportunity, a Beaufighter was flown up from its Melbourne factory for a town ceremony in October 1944.

After taxiing along the highway from Narromine Aerodrome, the aircraft (serial no A8-19) was driven down the main street under its own power, to the amazement of locals. Mayoress Mrs Tancred was called upon to christen it Miss Narromine with a bottle of champagne broken over its propeller hub. According to some reports, an engine overheated during the long taxi back to the aerodrome, and had to be replaced; then a tyre burst on takeoff, delaying its departure to the war zone by a couple of days. Its crew, at least, enjoyed their extra time by touring the local sights.

Miss Narromine was met at Coomalie Creek, Northern Territory, by Squadron Leader Rob Bowman—a No 31 Squadron pilot from Narromine who had also instructed at the RAAF flying school there. Bowman wrote to Narromine’s mayor to ‘thank the people of Narromine for their generous contributions to the victory loan, which

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made it possible for us to have an aircraft in this squadron named after the town’.

Bowman and his navigator, Flight Sergeant Johnny White, took Miss Narromine to Morotai from where they flew it on a number of strike missions against Japanese positions. As luck would have it, it lasted less than two months in action before suffering an undercarriage collapse on landing at Morotai, and was converted to spare parts. The townspeople of Narromine, understandably, were not told of the ignominious fate of Miss Narromine until after the war, but Bowman souvenired the control wheel to bring home with him.

There is, however, a detailed record of the brief operational life of Miss Narromine. Squadron Leader Bowman records that it made a dozen attacks before the accident-missions reflecting the Beaufighter’s versatility. Varied ordnance including 25- and 60-pound underwing rockets, 300-pound high-explosive bombs, 500-pound fragmentation bombs, and 20mm cannon were used against buildings, huts, installations, airfields, anti-aircraft batteries, jetties, stores and enemy personnel in the Celebes region. Even depth charges were carried, for use against water targets.

In January 1945, Bowman named Beaufighter A8-32 Miss Narromine II. Its career involved 16 strike missions, but its life was shorter than that of its sibling. On 1 February, A8-32 was bombing Tomohon in the Celebes when it was shot down by enemy anti-aircraft fire. For three days extensive searches were made, but the Beaufighter was not found. Post-war, it was revealed that its navigator, Flight Sergeant Alan Lewis, died in the crash, and its pilot, Warrant Officer Bill McGuigan, survived being shot down only to be bayoneted to death by the Japanese some months later. A Navy passenger aboard, Alec Hill, was presumed to have also been executed.

That month, February 1945, was a bad month for 31 Squadron, with nine Beaufighters either lost or crash-landed. However, many missions


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had been successfully carried out. Claims against the enemy included seven small ships destroyed, 25 damaged, 11 buildings and two fuel dumps destroyed.

A8-32’s replacement, A8-68 Miss Narromine III, made 26 strikes and was ‘still going strong’ by the time Squadron Leader Bowman left the squadron at the end of June. It, at least, survived the war, but in September suffered the same fate as its first sibling. It was crashlanded at Morotai, and converted to components.

The story of the ‘Miss Narromines’ casts light on a number of aspects of the wartime RAAF in the air war against Japan. First, it tells us of the public contribution of funds for war production, and the resulting benefits for publicity and morale when an aircraft could be claimed by a community as its own. Secondly, it highlights the effectiveness of the RAAF’s tactical ground attack force in ‘mopping up’ the enemy positions in the Celebes during the final year of the war. Lastly, we see graphically how dangerous those operations were, with one of these three aircraft shot down and a second written off in a crash-landing.

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THE RAAF EXPERIENCE OF NATIONAL SERVICE

Australia has used compulsion to help fill the ranks of its armed services on four occasions during its history: in 1911–1929 (the

universal military training scheme); 1940–45 (wartime conscription), 1951–57 (the first national service training scheme) and 1965–1973 (the second national service scheme). Of these, only the third occasion involved the Royal Australian Air Force.

In 1950 it was proposed, largely in response to a deteriorating international situation, that 15,000 Australian men aged 18 would be trained annually for the Army, along with 1000 for the Royal Australian Navy and 5000 for the RAAF. It was not envisaged, however, that this scheme would be implemented before 1 January 1952. The government was actually preparing to withdraw its forces involved in the occupation of Japan since 1945, to help provide the regular instructors needed for the new training scheme, when the Korean War began in June 1950.

The RAAF already had a transport unit assisting Britain to deal with the Malayan Emergency, and indeed a fresh commitment of a bomber squadron was made to that theatre at the same time as No 77 Squadron joined the fighting in Korea. Despite the pressures this created in terms of finding an adequate supply of training staff, during September 1950 the decision was made to bring forward the start-date for introducing the National Service scheme to 1 May 1951, in line with government fears that Australia faced the prospect of becoming involved in a third world war within three years.


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The National Service Act 1950 establishing the scheme required all 18-year-old males who were British subjects resident within Australia to register for National Service in one of the three armed services. Trainees could nominate in which service they wished to do their training, but those going to the RAN or RAAF had to volunteer to serve outside Australia if necessary. Initially, trainees were obligated to undertake an active training commitment of 176 days, and those joining the RAN or RAAF had to complete this in one continuous block. After their initial training period, all trainees would be transferred to the Reserve of their chosen service for five years after their call-up date.

The scheme underwent several adjustments after its commencement. In September 1953, the total period of training was reduced to 154 days for the RAN and RAAF, and 140 days for Army trainees. In May 1957 compulsory training for the RAN and RAAF was discontinued, while the Army’s annual intake was more than halved and drafts were decided by a ballot system based on random selection of birth dates. Those actually called-up into the Army received only 77 days full-time training initially, and were then required to serve three years in the Citizen Military Forces.

By the time the scheme ended in 1959, some 227,000 young Australian men had passed through the services—the great majority of these through the Army. It is not possible from surviving records to determine the precise number who performed their National Service in the RAAF. Calculations that the RAAF’s two intakes annually produced only about 3300 trainees once the scheme reached maturity suggests that the figure would not have exceeded 20,000. Based on the number of intakes, and the fluctuating size of these, the actual number was more likely between 15,000 and 18,000.

And what did the National Service experience mean for the RAAF as a whole? The declared objectives of the scheme were twofold: to contribute to the defence of Australia by providing a resource of trained manpower for the armed services; and to develop national discipline

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and physical fitness as part of a wider preventative and remedial health strategy. Commendably ‘humanistic’ as the second objective was, it patently had little to do with the primary role of any of the services.

Did the scheme contribute significantly to the efficiency and readiness of the armed services? Probably not in the case of the RAAF, which—like the RAN—had greater need for technically-trained personnel rather than simply men in the ranks. Five or even six months was too short a period to usefully impart skills to new trainees, let alone reap any economical return from their training in terms of useful service.

Roughly 20 per cent of trainees in each intake might have been third or fourth year apprentices with sufficient prior training to be employed at aircraft depots, or had first aid experience sufficient to become medical or dental orderlies, or the necessary aptitude and academic qualifications to be considered for pilot training. (It is claimed that each year up to 175 National Servicemen were trained to private pilot licence standard at RAAF expense at selected aero clubs.) The rest, however, were rated as general hands—virtually unskilled recruits—and employed in a variety of menial and non-productive activities, like painting kerbs, stripping down obsolescent aircraft, or digging firebreaks. Many found themselves allocated to aerodrome defence, where they were used as the equivalent of the Army’s basic infantryman.

The question of employment quickly became a significant problem area. One CO even took to ordering ‘nashos’ on his base to stencil silver stars on the back of their blue overalls—so that he could identify at a distance an idle permanent airman from an idle nasho (it being okay, of course, for the latter to be caught being idle). This deficiency in the NS scheme very quickly attracted adverse publicity for the RAAF, with press reports appearing in May 1953 of trainees ‘wasting their time’ and being ‘left to idleness’, denied even organised sport to improve their physical fitness. The RAAF leadership had little to say in the face of this onslaught, hinting only that the solution lay with


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government policy makers. It was not surprising, though, that major changes were instituted within a few months.

Not only was the length of the initial commitment of continuous training reduced in September 1953, but the conduct of this training in the RAAF—previously carried out within existing base units—was transferred to newly created National Service Training Units. Five such units were raised in November–December 1953, at Amberley (No 1), Canberra (3), Laverton (5), Point Cook (6) and Pearce (7); two more—at Richmond (No 2) and Wagga Wagga (4)—followed in March and May 1956. All closed in the last days of June or first week of July 1957.

The reality was that the scheme posed a significant drain on the RAAF, which was already a relatively small service (15,200 in 1958) heavily stretched with maintaining its operational commitments, and with little in the way of compensating benefits. For example, it was found that few RAN or RAAF trainees joined the permanent forces as a result of their experience. Because the RAAF simply could not find all the extra 850 bodies needed to train and administer the National Service scheme, some of the instructional work had to be sub-contracted out to civilian entities in Sydney and Melbourne. Small wonder, then, that the scheme was quietly buried in favour of increasing the ceiling for the regular forces and lifting recruitment by improving conditions of service.

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METEORS VERSuS MIGS

During the Korean War, the RAAF’s No 77 Squadron was the sole unit within the United Nations Command which operated

the British-built Gloster Meteor Mk 8 jet fighter. In April 1951 the squadron withdrew its P-51 Mustangs from operations to re-equip with the Meteor, returning to Korean skies in July, and remaining until the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. During this period, the Meteor flew in the air-to-air, bomber escort, combat air patrol and ground attack roles. Its performance in the air-to-air role, in which it was pitted against the Russian-built MiG-15 flown by the Chinese Air Force, is a controversial subject that bears critical assessment.

Before the Australians flew their first combat mission in the new aircraft, comparative (but not extensive) trials had been undertaken at Iwakuni, the RAAF base in Japan, between the Meteor and the USAF F-86 Sabre. These trials indicated that, under certain circumstances, the Meteor was equivalent in performance to the American fighter. As the F-86 was proving to be effective in combat with the MiG-15, when the first Meteor fighter sweep departed from Kimpo on 29 July 1951, the pilots had high expectations of how their aircraft would perform. Expectations and reality did not coincide.

In the first three combats, between 29 August and 26 September, a single MiG-15 was claimed as damaged, for the loss of one Meteor and three others damaged. This was taken to show that the RAAF aircraft was outclassed in the fighter combat role. A further large-scale clash on 1 December 1951 appeared to reinforce this belief: the success ratio was 3:2 in favour of the MiG-15. The next day, after discussions between the CO of 77 Squadron and the Director of Operations, USAF


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Fifth Air Force, the aircraft was withdrawn from fighter sweeps into ‘MiG Alley’ and reassigned to bomber escort and combat air patrol over Allied fighter-bombers.

This decision has been the basis of considerable contention ever since, with even some of the pilots concerned later asserting that the change was made with undue haste and that, if the combat pilots had been given the standard of fighter combat instruction that was later applied, the Meteor could have been more successful in the air-to-air role.

In the context of the fighter pilot training scenario of the early 1950s, those making such criticisms appear to have a point. In the years immediately following World War II the RAAF had paid little attention to air combat training, and it was not until March 1952 that No 2 Operational Conversion Unit was raised to address training shortfalls that were recognised in Korea.

Pilots posted to 77 Squadron flew about 45 hours in Mustangs and single-seat Vampires before arriving in Japan and converting to the Meteor at Iwakuni. There they were expected to complete 20 training procedures: six sorties to gain familiarity with the aircraft, three ground control radar recoveries, three instrument flying sorties, and the remainder aimed at formation flying. Only two exercises were related to air-to-air combat, and one pilot who arrived in April 1952 recalls that none of these involved firing the Meteors’ guns. The unit did not have any fighter combat instructors in those days to impart tactics to newcomers, and it does not appear that pilots who began the initial conversion to Meteors in April 1951 received any better preparation.

Also appearing to support the contention that the RAAF might have been too quick to bail out of the air-to-air role with the Meteor are the final shoot-down statistics. These show that in total 77 Squadron only lost four Meteors to the MiG-15, all of them on or before the aircraft was pulled from unrestricted air combat on 1 December 1951, against five MiGs confirmed as destroyed—all after that same date.

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One 77 Squadron pilot who actually accounted for a MiG-15 later had the opportunity to practice in the Meteor against Sabres while on exchange with the RAF in Europe. Based on his observations, he remains convinced to this day that at lower altitudes (up to 6000 metres) an aggressively flown Meteor could out-turn and out-accelerate the Sabre. Another 77 Squadron pilot had earlier expressed the view that the Meteor’s manoeuvrability meant that no RAAF pilot should have been shot down by a MiG-15 below 9000 metres unless he made a mistake.

Lack of air combat training and tactics quite probably did limit the ability of 77 Squadron pilots to initially achieve success against the MiG-15. But the contention that extra time spent in the air-to-air role would have enhanced the ability of the pilots still seems questionable. The operational lessons and a critical assessment of the performance of the Meteor and MiG-15 make it obvious that an unacceptably high attrition rate in aircraft and pilots could have been expected if air-to-air operations had continued.

Compared to the Meteor, the MiG-15 was far superior in performance. The initial climb rate of the Russian aircraft was 2900 feet per minute faster than the Meteor, and it was 73 miles per hour faster in level flight; the comparative power to weight ratio (based on empty weight) was 1.76:1 for the MiG-15 and 1.45:1 for the Meteor. These latter figures support the assumption that the MiG-15 would have faster acceleration than the Meteor. Another performance figure that clearly identifies the difference between the two fighters was their critical Mach number. The Meteor was rated at 0.87, after which it developed compressibility problems, a phenomenon that was not so evident in the MiG-15.

The basic difference between the two aircraft was that the Mark 8 Meteor was the ultimate single-seat fighter development of an obsolescent design incorporating the technology of the early 1940s, while the MiG-15 belonged to an entirely new generation of design considerations. The Meteor’s twin-engine layout recognised the low


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power of the pioneer turbojet engines with which it was fitted, and its wings were straight and thick, whereas the MiG-15 (and the Sabre) incorporated later German thin swept wing technology.

The MiG-15 formations tactically controlled air combat over Korea. They initiated combat on their terms, and the performance of the MiG-15 enabled them to break contact in a like manner. No matter how well trained the Australian pilots may have been, the performance of the Meteor always placed it at tactical disadvantage in the air-to-air role. Analysis of the individual actions when MiGs were shot down by Meteors strongly suggest that these were simply situations where Chinese pilots made the mistakes.

The lesson of Korea was therefore twofold—pilots must be trained to the highest possible standard to give them the personal ‘edge’, but the aircraft they fly must be at least comparable in performance to potential adversaries.

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EXPLORING THE NuCLEAR OPTION

For a time during the 1950s, the RAAF explored the idea of becoming a nuclear force. The move to acquire nuclear weapons

did not last long, barely two years, and ultimately resulted in the service remaining a conventional force. But the episode is informative for showing the RAAF wrestling with the problem of defining its role in the turbulent and confusing period that followed the end of World War II, and trying to ensure that it possessed capabilities that were relevant and meaningful.

Since 1952 the government led by R.G. Menzies had been supporting Britain’s nuclear weapons program by allowing testing to be carried out on Australian territory, partly in the belief that such cooperation would get Australia a foot in the door when it came to acquiring weapons that the RAAF would eventually need. By 1956 the Minister for Air, Athol Townley—no doubt acting on the advice of the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger—believed that the moment had arrived to transform the RAAF into a nuclear force.

The stimulus for this initiative stemmed from belated realisation that the fleet of Canberra jet bombers that Australia acquired from 1953 was actually a limited defence asset. There were only 48 of these aircraft in the RAAF inventory and—considering their small bomb load, the small radius of effect of high-explosive bombs, and the large margin of error resulting from bombing operations at medium and high altitude—it dawned on RAAF planners that an impossibly high number of sorties


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would have to be mounted to achieve any worthwhile results in real strike operations.

At the time that the Canberra was evaluated for acquisition by the RAAF, it had been noted that the type was capable of carrying either a conventional bomb load or a single ‘special’ (ie. nuclear) device of between 2300 and 4500 kilograms. It was not unreasonable, therefore, for Townley to propose to his Cabinet colleagues in September that arming the Canberra with a tactical nuclear weapon was one way of increasing the effectiveness of the bomber force. He also suggested that the RAAF’s Sabre jet fighters might be fitted to carry nuclear bombs, too, for use in the ground attack role.

Since it would be years before Australia was in a position to build its own nuclear bombs, it was obvious that any such weapons would have to be acquired from its allies: Britain or the US. An overture to the Americans was forestalled by a policy announcement by Washington that it was willing to supply allies with nuclear-capable systems, such as aircraft, but intended to keep control of weapons themselves in American hands. Accordingly, Townley was authorised to approach Britain instead, on an ‘exploratory, non-committal basis’.

This invitation was taken up by Air Marshal Scherger, who wrote to his RAF counterpart to explore the likely response to an official Australian request to ‘purchase some atomic bombs in the kilotonne range’. Scherger was personally enthusiastic about the idea, seeing it as an important step towards keeping the RAAF at the leading edge of air power technology. He had also been trying to convince the government to supplement the RAAF’s Canberras with a squadron of British-built Vulcan strategic bombers, preferably nuclear-armed, which he envisaged would form part of a Commonwealth deterrent force in South-East Asia.

During 1957, Menzies declared that his government’s immediate plans for defence remained in the ‘conventional field’ only, but there were

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nonetheless further discussions about the nuclear option during a visit to Australia by Britain’s PM, Harold Macmillan, early the next year. Menzies was not persuaded that Australia needed to enter the strategic nuclear arena, but he did accept that eventual acquisition of some tactical weapons was probably ‘inescapable’. It was on this basis that he subsequently wrote to Macmillan, seeking assurance that Britain would, if the need arose, provide Australia with a nuclear capability, by supplying either ready-made weapons or else manufacturing data to enable local production. Even so, his preference was that the RAAF stay conventional for as long as possible, if only out of concern at the likely costs of making it a nuclear force.

Notwithstanding Menzies’ reservations, when Scherger visited Britain in September 1958 he was authorised to continue discussions with British defence officials. It was only at this stage that some of the practical problems of the proposal began to emerge. For a start, the dimensions of the only tactical weapons that the RAF had to offer were far too big for carriage on a Sabre. Moreover, these bombs produced a 15–20 kilotonne blast, equal to those dropped on Japan in 1945, which meant they were not ‘tactical’ weapons at all. Finally, at a cost of £500,000 per bomb, acquisition was clearly going to be very expensive. (The budget for the entire RAAF in 1962/63 amounted to only £67.5 million.)

This appears to have been the end of the RAAF’s nuclear ambitions, since by 1960 the tide was swinging decidedly against Australia exercising the nuclear weapon option. Changes in geo-strategic circumstances were causing even the existing Western nuclear powers to have doubts about the viability of employing tactical nuclear weapons in any showdown with communist opponents. By June 1961 Australia’s Chiefs of Staff Committee formally agreed that there was no immediate need for an independent nuclear capability. The RAAF was accordingly obliged to refocus on improving its conventional capabilities. For the Canberra fleet this meant a shift in thinking from strategic to tactical roles, especially army cooperation tasks.

Mirages overfly service housing near Butterworth.

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buTTERWORTH: THE RAAF’S ONLY OVERSEAS bASE

During its 84-year history, the RAAF has frequently had units based overseas on operational deployments, but only once has

it had a permanent or long-term base outside Australia that it ran and administered as a RAAF station. This was at Butterworth, on the north-west coast of the Malayan peninsula opposite the island of Penang. Formerly a Royal Air Force airfield, the base was handed over to the RAAF in 1955 on free loan from the British government, which then administered Malaya as a colonial possession.

Australian airmen actually had an association with Butterworth stretching back to 1941, when the base—then being used for care and maintenance purposes—provided respite for a day for the RAAF’s 21 Squadron (equipped with Brewster Buffalo fighters) as it fell back before advancing Japanese forces. Japan took control of the base for the duration of the war, but the RAF reclaimed it after the surrender of enemy forces in 1945. Butterworth thereafter became an important refuelling point for RAF aircraft deployed to Singapore, and was essential to the maintenance of the imperial lines of communication. During the Malayan Emergency of 1948–60, the base went onto an operational footing and hosted a variety of RAF units launching attacks against communist terrorists in their jungle camps as part of Operation Firedog.

In the mid-1950s Britain, Australia and New Zealand agreed to set up a ‘Commonwealth Strategic Reserve’ on the Malayan peninsula with the primary aim of countering a growing communist threat across South-East Asia. It was the reserve, rather than the need for


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additional forces to support ‘Emergency’ operations, that prompted the British government in 1955 to offer Australia the use of Butterworth. Accordingly, 2 Airfield Construction Squadron (accompanied by 478 Maintenance Squadron) was deployed that year to refurbish facilities, and further prepare the base for jet operations.

On 15 January 1958 the RAAF Butterworth Base Squadron was formed at Amberley. It commenced duties in Malaya on 1 May despite the fact that work was still being undertaken on the construction of the control tower. The RAAF formally took control of the base on 30 June. Shortly thereafter a headquarters, 114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit, 78 Wing (Sabre fighters) and 2 Squadron (Canberra bombers) were deployed. These units would enjoy a much longer, and fortunately less harrowing stay at Butterworth than did the first RAAF users of the base. The only operational experience the squadrons would gain while there came, in fact, by way of four Firedog missions undertaken by 2 Squadron in the second half of 1958.

The importance of Butterworth particularly emerged in the 1960s. It provided aircraft and maintenance personnel in support of the deployment of 79 Squadron to Ubon in Thailand, along with medical and transport support facilities during the Vietnam War (in which 2 Squadron was also committed from 1967). The base became especially crucial between 1963 and 1966, during the period of ‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia over the creation of Malaysia. Not only did it give both the RAAF and RAF the capacity to conduct air defence operations, it would have been essential in the mounting of offensive operations against Indonesia had that become necessary.

The end of Confrontation allowed the British government to announce plans shortly thereafter for the withdrawal of its forces from the east of Suez. In line with an earlier Anglo-Malayan agreement, ownership of Butterworth was transferred to the Malaysian government in 1970, but the RAAF was immediately given joint control over the base. After a change of government in London it was decided that some units

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from Britain, Australia and New Zealand should remain in Malaysia/Singapore following the signing of a ‘Five Power Defence Agreement’ (FPDA). The RAAF contribution to this arrangement would remain largely unchanged from the previous 15 years, although 78 Wing (now composed of 3 and 75 Squadrons) had recently been equipped with the Mirage IIIO. Because the new agreement emphasised air defence, there was no need for 2 Squadron’s Canberras to re-deploy to Butterworth on the unit’s return from the Vietnam War.

Despite the fact that Butterworth was of less strategic importance than in the previous two decades, the base reached its peak strength during the 1970s. The number of personnel at Butterworth in this period was approximately 1200, excluding some 3500 dependants accompanying the RAAF servicemen. Another 1000 local Malay, Indian and Chinese employees also worked on base at this time. The recreation/support facilities for servicemen and their families—including a school, hostel (the hostie), radio station (RAAF Radio Butterworth) and hospital (No 4 RAAF Hospital)—were a central feature of life at the base. The latter was particularly important in view of the fact that it reportedly facilitated the delivery of 150 babies in one year.

But the continued economic and political stabilisation of the region partly removed the requirement for a permanent RAAF detachment at Butterworth. On 31 March 1979 the base was transferred to the Royal Malaysian Air Force, although it continued to be controlled through Headquarters Operational Command situated at Glenbrook, Australia. In 1983 both 75 Squadron and 478 Squadron were withdrawn from Malaysia (the latter being disbanded), while three years later 3 Squadron was transferred to Williamtown. The same composite unit that was deployed to Ubon in 1962 also returned to Butterworth in 1986, but was equipped with only eight pilots and ten Mirages formerly belonging to 3 Squadron—which was then converting to the F/A-18A/B Hornet. The end of the RAAF association with Butterworth was sealed the following year with the release of a new White Paper that stressed defence of Australia over forward defence.


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For the next year and a half the base was progressively drawn down. The hospital was closed on 1 July 1987, followed six months later by the celebrated RAAF Radio Butterworth. The Mirages of 79 Squadron completed their deployment in May 1988, and the following month both the headquarters and base squadron at Butterworth departed. But that was not the end of the RAAF presence in Malaysia. A detachment from 92 Wing remains to conduct maritime patrols, along with 324 Combat Support Squadron and some Army sub-units, while regular deployments of other RAAF aircraft are made as part of the Australian commitment to the FPDA.

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PHANTOMS OF THE PAST

After 15 years of service, the Canberra bombers of 82 Wing’s 1 and 6 Squadrons at Amberley, Queensland, were retired in

late 1970. However, the plan to replace the Canberra with the F-111C encountered an obstacle when serious technical problems in the USA delayed the timely introduction of the new type. As a stopgap, two dozen F-4E Phantoms were ferried to Amberley. To date, it was the RAAF’s only use of an ‘interim’ strike aircraft.

In addition, the F-111C was a ‘hybrid’ version specifically tailored to RAAF requirements, and needed a long gestation period. In fact, the US had foreseen delays and earlier suggested the six-engined B-47 Stratojet as an interim RAAF bomber—an offer which was declined.

At the time the F-4s arrived, it was by no means certain how long they would be needed. No one could be sure how soon the F-111C’s problems would be solved, nor whether new ones might arise. The F-4 lease arrangement included an option to purchase, should the F-111C program be cancelled. As events transpired, 82 Wing flew the Phantom for two and a half years.

As early as 1963, the F-4C had featured among five aircraft types being considered by the RAAF as Canberra replacements. Interest switched to the emerging F-111, but it was not long before the problems with its cutting-edge technology began to appear. A series of crashes and in-flight failure of its world-first ‘swing wing’ grounded the US Air Force’s F-111 fleet. The cause turned out to be weaknesses in the wing-box structure. The problem was eventually solved (although more


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wing problems were to emerge in later years), in part by Australians working with the Americans, but that is another story.

The then Minister for Defence, Malcolm Fraser, met with US Defence Secretary Melvin Laird in early 1970 to plan the way ahead for a solution. The Fraser–Laird agreement outlined a ‘recovery program’ for the F-111Cs, which had already been signed over to Australia and were held in USAF storage; now they had to go back to the factory for modifications. The agreement also provided for the loan of 24 Phantoms in the interim.

An F-4 training program for RAAF air and ground personnel commenced at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Deliveries of the brand-new Phantoms came just three months after the deal was announced by Fraser and Senator Tom Drake-Brockman, Minister for Air, in June 1970, and they were operational almost immediately. The arrangements, and the subsequent air-refuelled flights from the USA, were hailed by the senator as an example of the RAAF’s efficiency and flexibility. While in some respects not meeting RAAF needs as fully as the F-111C would, he said, the F-4 ‘will make a most significant contribution to air defence capability’.

The F-4 was arguably the premier multi-role fighter of its time. In US service it flew in many guises: high-altitude interceptor, attack platform for conventional (and, potentially, nuclear) weapons, and reconnaissance. In the close air support role it carried a wide variety of bombs and missiles, and as ‘wild weasel’ carried out suppression of enemy air defence systems. After operational experience had shown the folly of not fitting a gun to the Phantom, the USAF installed a 20mm cannon—firstly on the F-4C in an underslung pod, and then as a fixture in the F-4E beneath its nose radar unit. Surprisingly, US units were still flying the Phantom in Iraq in 1996—38 years after the type’s first flight.

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In the RAAF, though, the Phantom’s role was that which was intended for the F-111C: ground strike. Crew skills were honed at Evans Head bombing range, New South Wales, and on day and night exercises with Mirages and Navy Skyhawks. With RAF Vulcans they formed an integral component of the strike force which ‘attacked’ Darwin in 1972’s Exercise Top Limit.

The F-4E’s level of technology, between that of the Canberra and F-111, also made for a useful transition between the two. It was not overly complex, but did introduce a modern radar system. It also suffered its share of accidents and technical problems, some minor and some more worrying, such as fatigue cracks in control surfaces.

The Phantom was a real crowd pleaser during its brief RAAF career. In seven public air shows packed into a month during the Air Force’s golden jubilee year, 1971, formation fly-pasts of Phantoms and Mirages heightened public awareness of the RAAF’s potency in the strike and air superiority roles.

Despite an Australian assessment of the F-4 as superior to both the Mirage and Skyhawk, a US offer to sell the loaned aircraft to the RAAF was turned down. Late in 1972, when the arrival of the F-111Cs seemed imminent, half of the F-4 force returned to the USA. The following June, before a crowd of 3000, the first six F-111Cs finally touched down at Amberley, and the last of the Phantoms were soon gone. (In fact only 23 of the 24 delivered were returned, one unfortunately having been lost with its crew off Evans Head in 1971. The problem of how to pay for a leased aircraft was solved when the US government agreed to write it off against a P3 Orion.)

Today, the RAAF Museum displays an F-4E in kangaroo roundel markings, though not one of the original RAAF examples, as a reminder of our ‘interim’ strike aircraft. The Phantom could well have seen much longer RAAF service than it did, as the F-111C program came close to cancellation during its decade-long incubation. In a


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speech at Amberley commemorating the 25th anniversary of the first F-111C delivery, the former RAAF project manager Group Captain Milt Cottee (retired) said, ‘I suppose if that had happened, you may still be operating F-4s.’

The Vietnam experience1970 did not mark the start of RAAF experience with the F-4, as several Australians had already flown the aircraft with the USAF in Vietnam. Wing Commander Lyall Klaffer served as an operations officer for a RF-4C reconnaissance squadron there in 1965. Squadron Leader Alan Reed made 100 reconnaissance missions, including some into North Vietnam—a strict ‘no-go’ zone for the other four Australian F-4 pilots who later flew in the offensive air support role with US 12th Tactical Fighter Wing. The Australian government policy of allowing only in-country (ie. South Vietnam) operations was ‘at best inhibiting, and at worst unworkable’, recalled Group Captain Lindsay Naylor at the 1998 RAAF History Conference. However on occasions, he continues, ‘only after plotting the positions in mission debriefs did [the pilots] realise they had been on the ‘wrong side’ of the border’.

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AWARD WINNING HERITAGE

Since 1987 the RAAF has awarded prizes for works in the fields of arts, literature and photography, which have furthered appreciation

and recorded knowledge of the Service’s history and heritage. By virtue of the Heritage Awards Scheme, a substantial body of artworks and photographs has been added to the catalogued collection of the RAAF Museum at Point Cook, although normally displayed around Air Force Headquarters in Canberra. Winners of the Literature category, and some runners-up, have made their way into print as part of the RAAF Heritage Series of books.

After a one-year gap, during which competition was in abeyance while the scheme’s goal and success was reviewed and assessed, the Heritage Awards were again held in 2005. The Chief of Air Force and his committee of judges and advisers decided to make no award for Photography this year, but in addition to the normal first and second prizes in the Art category, a special award was made to another outstanding entry in the Literature section in addition to the major prize winner. Both manuscripts will be published in the Heritage Series over the next 12 months.

While each of the prize-winning entries in all categories has a story to tell with regard to their subjects, often there is an equally interesting tale that surrounds the circumstances in which the works were created and why, and by whom.

Heritage Art WinnersFor instance, the winner of First Prize in the Art category is Lindsay Stepanow from Ballarat, Victoria. Although he is a semi-professional


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artist, he is also a pilot who owns a Victa Airtourer and has worked as an aircraft engineer. In his art, Stepanow specialises in abstract aerial landscapes, but ‘dabbles’ in aircraft too. His entry titled Whispering Death is a superb watercolour featuring two Beaufighters during a ground strike on Japanese positions in the South-West Pacific in 1943. He has no special connection with this aircraft type, but was impressed by its appearance and wartime exploits, and thought it would make a good aircraft to illustrate speed at low level. The painting was meticulously planned using sketches to perfect the composition. Stepanow has previously won a RAAF Heritage Award, for Photography in 1992.

Multi-award winning Sydney artist Steven Heyen won Second Prize with an elegant oil painting titled Better Late than Never. This work depicts two Short Sunderland flying boats, A26-1 and A26-3, overflying Sydney’s North Head on 12 March 1944, after a 45-day delivery flight from England via Africa and America. Aircraft of this type had been first ordered by Australia in 1939, but were detained in Britain on anti-submarine and patrol duties with No 10 Squadron, RAAF, until six were finally released late in the European War. In their new role with No 40 Squadron, the Sunderlands transported troops and supplies around Australia and New Guinea.

Working exclusively now in oils and with a focus on traditional Australian landscape as well as wildlife and aviation, Heyen has been a regular entrant in the Heritage Awards over the years; he has taken prizes on five occasions, including First Prize in 2003 and Second Prize in 2002. His interest in aviation art derives from having a father who was a commercial pilot and an artist mother. Also a pilot, he was one of the founding members of the Australian Society of Aviation Artists, and is a member of the American society. He is represented in art galleries in Sydney and Victoria, and has been published in Australian Artist magazine in their Master Painters section. His works can also be found in collections in New Zealand and the USA.

HISTORY

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Heritage LiteratureThe winner of the main prize for Literature was Adelaide author A.J. (‘Jack’) Brown for his manuscript Kata Kana Man. This is an account of his war service in 1942–46 with the RAAF’s top secret wireless units (WU), which worked on intercepting coded Japanese radio transmissions for Central Bureau, General MacArthur’s signals intelligence outfit based in Brisbane for most of the Pacific War. Beginning his work as a kana operator (katakana being symbols in the Japanese alphabet or syllabary representing Japanese and Chinese sounds) with No 1 WU at Townsville, Brown moved to New Guinea in 1943, serving at Port Moresby and subsequently Nadzab, Biak and then Hollandia. In October 1944 he joined the nucleus of a new unit, No 6 WU, which was headed to the Philippines and the Leyte landings.

Battling ill health after the war, Brown took a sales job with Harris Scarfe Ltd. before moving into the plastics business and eventually into wholesale jewellery. It became a matter of sore grievance for him that there was little official recognition given within Australia to the major contribution made by Allied signals intelligence to helping to win the war or at least shorten its duration. In part this occurred precisely because of the highly secret nature of the work in which the WUs (with Australian and American Army signals units) had been engaged, which meant that little documentation had found its way into the records.

Specially Commended in 2005 (and awarded a special prize of $2000) was Jeffrey Pedrina of Brisbane, who wrote about his 12 months’ service with Caribou transports in Vietnam during 1966–67 in his entry titled Wallaby Airlines. The RAAF Transport Flight Vietnam was the first Australian air unit committed to the war, in 1964, and only changed its name to No 35 Squadron in June 1966 at the time that the Australian Task Force arrived. Pedrina had made his career in the air force eight years before he went to Vietnam, following in the footsteps of his father, Squadron Leader W.A. Pedrina, DFC, who joined in 1938


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but was killed by ground fire in a Hudson making a low-level supply drop near Buna, New Guinea, in December 1942.

In Vietnam, Jeff Pedrina flew 1200 hours in Caribous including a record total in March 1967 and was awarded a mention-in-dispatches. He left the RAAF in 1973 and joined the Department of Civil Aviation as an airways surveyor, serving with the department and its successor organisations until 1989. After flying with Ansett Airlines for two years, he ran an independent aviation consultancy in 1991–2001 and also lectured in aviation management at Griffith University in Queensland.

The Heritage Awards continue to provide a significant avenue for recording the rich history of the RAAF across the diverse spectrum of its service to Australia over 84 years, in both peace and war. The entries in all categories cover a range of subjects and eras, and provide an excellent cross-section of the service of the men and women who are or have been its members. The next Awards competition will be in 2007.

CONTRIbuTORS


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155

LIST OF CONTRIbuTORS

Ashton, Mr Luke – 35Brent, Wing Commander Keith – 7Briese, Squadron Leader Stuart – 22Clark, Dr Chris – 1, 11, 21, 29, 31Kainikara, Mr Sanu – 2, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 24, 32, 34, 36Lacey, Wing Commander Neil – 26, 28McLennan, Wing Commander Peter – 6Miller, Wing Commander Chris – 30Nelmes, Mr Mike – 17, 23, 27Post, Squadron Leader Alex – 5Sims, Squadron Leader Dominic – 4Whiting, Wing Commander Mary-Anne – 33Wilson, Dr David – 3, 9, 13, 14, 19, 25


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INDEX


158

INDEX

159

Fokker, 83FW-190, 122Halifax, 106, 121Hampden, 106Hercules, 92Hornet F/A-18, 75, 78, 143Hudson, iiiLancaster, 106, 115, 121Liberator, 98Martinsyde, 82Maurice-Farman, 81Meteor, 133-6MiG-15, 133-6Mirage IIIO, 140, 143-4, 147Mirage 2000, 48 Mitchell, 102Mosquito, 121, 125Mustang, 102, 133-4Orion P-3, 92, 147Phantom F-4E, 77, 145-8Piper L-5, 111Sabre F-86, 133, 138-9, 142 SE5A, 86Seagull III, 87Short 827, 82Sikorski helicopter, 103Skyhawk, 147Sopwith Pup, 86Spitfire, 114, 121Stirling, 106Sunderland, 150Tempest, 114Texan AT-6, 111Tiger Moth, 125Vampire, 134Ventura, 106Vickers Vimy, 87

aerial refueling, 42, 44, 45, 78

aerospace, 59

Air power: characteristics, 3, 15, 30; capabilities, 3-5, 8, 12-13, 15, 17, 19-20, 23-6, 39, 43

Airborne early warning & control (AEW&C), 24, 44-5, 75

Aircraft (types):Auster Mk 6, 90-1Avro 504K, 86BE2c, 82Beaufighter, 109-10, 124, 125-8, 150Beaufort, 98, 117-19, 125Betty, 98Blenheim, 106Boomerang, 100, 110, 125Brewster Buffalo, 141Bristol Scout, 87Canberra, 137-9, 142-3, 145, 147Caribou, 151Catalina, 97Caudron, 81Dakota, 77, 90-1, 102, 104DH9, 86DH9A, 86DH60X Gipsy Moth, 90DHC Beaver, 90-2F-16, 48F-22, 48F-35 JSF, 41F-111, 145-8F-117, 33Fairey IIID, 87


160

Vought Kingfisher, 90-1Vulcan, 138, 147Walrus, 90-1Wapiti, 90Wedgetail, 75 Wellington, 106Wildcat, 97Wirraway, 109-10, 125

airlift, 5

Afghanistan, 7, 12

Amberley, 142, 145, 147

Antarctica, 77, 89-92; Treaty, 91

Armstrong, Flying Officer G.P., 114

Arnold, General H.H., 1

Assam campaign, 103-4

asymmetric warfare, 21

Australian Air Corps, 86-7

Australian Army, 129-30

Australian Defence Force, 24, 26, 35, 39, 41-2, 61, 64-5, 69

Australian Flying Corps, 95, 125

Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition, 90

Australian War Memorial, 106-7

Babington-Smith, Flight Officer Constance, 113

Baghdad, 33, 81-2

Bailey, Flight Sergeant H.J., 114

Basra, 81, 83

Bomber Command (RAF), iii, 105, 115, 122

Association, 106Memorial, 105-8

Bowman, Squadron Leader Robert, 126-8

Brancker, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Sefton, 93

Britain, 85, 93, 98, 119, 125, 138, 141-3

Brown, A.J. (Jack), 151

Burma, 31, 101-4

Butterworth, 140, 141-4

Calvert, Brigadier Mike, 103

Campbell, Flying Officer S.A.C., 89-90

Canada, 85, 99, 102, 105

Central Bureau, 151

Central Flying School, 86-7

Chindits, 101

Chinese Air Force, 133, 136

Churchill, Winston, 79, 101

close air support, 30

Cochrane, Colonel Phil, 102, 104

Cold War, 7

combat support, 25-6

INDEX

161

command of the air, 5, 23, 26, 27

Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation, 125

Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, 141

communications, 44, 63

Confrontation, 142

Coomalie Creek, 126

Cottee, Group Captain Milton, 148

counter air missions, 56

cruise missiles, 47-50types:

AGM-84K SLAM-ER, 48AGM-158 JASSM, 46, 48Storm Shadow, 48Taurus, 48

Dawson, Neil, 106-8

De Havilland Australia, 125

Department of Aircraft Production, 125

Discovery (ship), 89

Discovery II (ship), 90

Douglas, Pilot Officer G.E., 89-90

Douhet, General Giulio, 15, 34

Drake-Brockman, Senator Tom, 146

Edwards, Wing Commander Hughie, 106

effects-based operations, 8, 30, 39-40

electronic warfare, 44, 45

Ellsworth, Lincoln, 90

Empire Air Training Scheme, 105

enablers, 17, 43-5

enabling operations, 5

Evans Head, 147

experimentation, 35-8, 39-42

Forward air control, 109-12

Fergusson, Brigadier Bernard, 102

Firedog (Operation), 141-2

Five Power Defence Agreement, 143-4

force multipliers, see enablers

France, 111

Fraser, Malcolm, 146

Galileo system, 65, 69

Garing, Group Captain W.H., 119

Germany, 81, 85, 93

Glenbrook, 143

Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), 64, 69


162

Global Positioning System (GPS), 44, 49, 64-5, 69

guided bombs, 31

Gulf War (First), 4, 11, 33, 49; (2003) 27, 47, 63

Hallion, Richard P., 110

Havannah Bay, 97

Headway 03/1 (experiment), 39

Heard Island, 90, 92

Hewitt, Air Commodore J.E., 119

Heyen, Steven, 150

Hill, Alec, 127

Imperial Gift, 85-88

India, 85, 93

Indian Flying Corps, 81

intelligence, 16, 20-1, 24, 28-9, 36, 55

Iraq, 12-13, 27, 47, 63, 78, 81-4

Italy, 106, 111

Japan, 98, 133-4, 141

Jones, Air Marshal Sir George, 95-6

Jumper, General John P., 71

Khe Sanh (battle), 111-12

Klaffer, Wing Commander Lyall, 148

Korean War, 31, 99, 111, 129, 133-4, 136

Kosovo, 12

Kut (siege), 82-3

Labuan, HMAS, 90

Laird, Melvin, 146

Lambeth, Benjamin, 33

Law of armed conflict, 53

Lentaigne, Brigadier Walter, 102

Lewis, Flight Sergeant Alan, 127

Mackerras, Flight Sergeant D.J., 114

Mackinolty, Air Vice-Marshal G.J.W., 84

Macmillan, Harold, 139

Macquarie Island, 92

Malayan Emergency, 129, 141-2

Malaysia, 142-3

Mawson, Sir Douglas, 89

McGuigan, Warrant Officer W., 127

McMurdo Sound, 92

Menzies, R.G., 137-9

INDEX

163

Mesopotamia, see Iraq

Middleton, Flight Sergeant Rawdon, 106

Milne Bay, 118-19

Milosevic, Slobodan, 12, 34

Mitchell, General W. (“Billy”), 15, 34

mobility, 25-6

Morotai, 124, 127-8

Mountbatten, Lord, 102

Murdoch, Air Marshal Sir Alistair, 90

Narromine, 126-7

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), 12, 32

National service, 129-32NS Training Units, 132

Naylor, Group Captain Lindsay, 148

navigation, 63-4, 69

networked operations, 17, 24, 28, 38

New Guinea, iii, 109-10, 151-2

New Zealand, 81-2, 85, 108, 141, 143

Normandy invasion, 121-3

Nowra, 117-18

Nuclear weapons, 137-9

Palstra, Squadron Leader W., 93-6

Pathfinder Force, iii

Paveway bombs, 31-2

Pedrina, Jeffrey, 151-2

Pedrina, Squadron Leader W.A., 151-2

Peenemunde, 113, 115

Petre, Captain H.A., 83

Philippines, 151

Point Cook, 86, 106

precision munitions, 32-4, 40

Qantas, 99

Quinn, Squadron Leader N.T., 117

Qurna (battle), 82

R101 (airship), 93, 95-6

Rabaul, 117

reconnaissance, 16, 20, 44, 55, 63, 68

Reed, Squadron Leader Alan, 148

robotic warfare, 29-30

Royal Air Force, 85, 105, 122-3, 141


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Royal Australian Air Force, 35, 48, 59-62, 63, 65-7, 70, 84, 86-8, 89-91, 93, 105, 109-12, 117, 129-32, 137-9, 141-3

Association, 107-8Heritage Awards, 149-52roundel, 92, 97, 100Units:

1 Squadron, 1451 Wireless Unit, 1512 Airfield Construction Squadron, 1422 Operational Conversion Unit, 1342 Squadron, 75, 1423 Squadron, 1434 Hospital, 143-44 Squadron, 109-115 Squadron, 1116 Squadron, iii,1456 Wireless Unit, 1517 Squadron, 1188 Squadron, 117-189 Operational Group, 109, 11910 Squadron, 123, 15021 Squadron, 14122 Squadron, 9730 Squadron, 10931 Squadron, 126-735 Squadron, 15140 Squadron, 15075 Squadron, 84, 14377 Squadron, 129, 133-578 Wing, 142-379 Squadron, 142-482 Wing, 14592 Wing, 144100 Squadron, 118

114 Mobile Control and Reporting Unit, 142453 Squadron, 121-2455 Squadron, 106, 123456 Squadron, 99, 121458 Squadron, 106460 Squadron, 105-6, 115, 121, 123461 Squadron, 123462 Squadron, 106463 Squadron, 106, 121, 123464 Squadron, 106, 121, 123466 Squadron, 121, 123467 Squadron, 106, 115, 121, 123478 Maintenance Squadron, 142-3Air Operations Centre, 65-6Air Power Development Centre, 36Antarctic Flight, 90-1Butterworth Base Squadron, 142, 144Museum, 77, 90, 147, 149Torpedo Unit, 118Transport Flight Vietnam, 151

Royal Australian Navy, 40, 87, 129-30, 132

Royal Flying Corps, 81-3, 98

Royal Malaysian Air Force, 143

Royal Observer Corps, 115

satellites, 64, 67, 69

Saudi Arabia, 29, 51

INDEX

165

Scherger, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick, 137-9

sensors, 41, 56

Serbia, 34

Seymour, Flying Officer Robert, 97

South Africa, 85, 99

Soviet Union, 32

Space power, 9-10, 16, 44, 60-1, 63-6, 67-73, 74

Special Force, 102-4

special forces, 12, 45, 78

Stepanow, Lindsay, 74, 149-50

strategic bombing, 15, 32

strike, 5, 8, 20-1, 23-4, 26, 39-42, 44, 55

suppression of enemy air defences, 56

sustainability, 29

synthetic aperture radar, 64, 69

Taliban, 12

technology, 5, 7-8, 16, 20, 29-30, 43, 56

tempo of operations, 28

Terrorism, war on, 7

Thomson, Lord, 93

Torpedo attack, 117-20

Townley, A.G., 137-8

Turkey, 81

Ubon, 142-3

uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAV), 17, 20, 51-8

types:Neuron, 52Predator, 51, 76

uninhabited combat air vehicles (UCAV), 17, 51-8

types:X-45C, 52, 76X-47B, 52

United Nations, 73, 133

United States of America, 4, 5, 11, 15, 31, 51, 60, 71, 73, 93, 97-8, 111, 119, 125, 138, 145-6

urban operations, 19, 21, 30

V-1 rocket, 113-15

V-2 flying bomb, 113, 115

Viarsa I (fishing boat), 92

Victoria Cross, 106

Vietnam War, 11, 31, 33, 111-12, 142-3, 148, 151-2

War loans, 124, 125-6

Warden, Colonel John, 15

Wau, 109-10


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Watten, 113, 115

White, Flight Sergeant J., 127

White, Sir Thomas, 84

Williams, Air Marshal Sir Richard, 85, 94, 96

Williamtown, 143

Wingate, Major General Charles Orde, 101-3

Wyatt Earp, HMAS, 90

Yemen, 51

Yugoslavia, 12

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