Why did the CCF fail? A Swedish Answer
Patrik Marier
Canada Research Chair in Comparative Public Policy
Department of Political Science
Concordia University
Paper Presented to the 8th Biennial ECSA-C Conference, April 29-May 1st 2010
April 22, 2010
Introduction
In his study of Sweden, the poster child of comparative welfare state development, Rothstein (1996)
claims that power resource analyses (Stephens, 1986, Korpi, 1983, Esping-Andersen, 1985), focused
primarily on the combined power of unions and social democratic parties to counter the power of
capital, neglect the multiple difficulties associated with the implementation of a socialist program once
in power. Winning an election is the first step in a long journey within the policy making process; key is
the ability of the governing party to have its policy goals implemented by the civil service, which is
daunting task. Controlling and/or capturing the state machinery remain highly difficult for any
government (Rothstein, 1996: 8), but more particularly for parties who seek a “radical” departure from
earlier practices such as socialist parties (Lipset, 1950).1 Actually, German thinkers such as Weber and
Michels feared that the bureaucracy would eventually capture the social democratic parties (Michels,
1999, Beetham, 1985).
This contribution aims to identify the necessary conditions for a government to alter the values of
the bureaucracy and to present and test three hypotheses on what can lead to a reversal. This is
facilitated by the analysis of a negative case, one in which hegemonic dominance by a social democratic
party did not result in the creation of a socialist or social democratic state in spite of a radical
transformation of the bureaucracy. This case is Saskatchewan, which is a province in Canada. It is
analysed and compared to the Swedish case, which represents a positive case of bureaucratic capture
(Rothstein, 1996) despite representing a most similar case.
The election of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government in 1944, the first
socialist government in North America, gathered substantial interest among academics for decades
(Johnson, 2004, Lipset, 1950, Young, 1969, Whitehorn, 1992, McLeod and McLeod, 2004). For example,
Lipset’s study of Saskatchewan formed the basis of his reflections on “American exceptionalism” when it
comes to the absence of a strong left wing party in his country (Lipset, 1983). Like its Swedish
counterpart, the Social Democratic Party (SAP), the CCF succeeded in creating a broad based coalition
that included agrarian interests; a consequence of the predominance of agriculture and the late
1 By radical, the authors imply the introduction of policies and programs that are contrary to those currently advocated by the bureaucracy, which represent, to a large extent in the early 1900s, the ideals advocated by Liberal and Conservative governments. The defeat of a Liberal government by a Conservative one, or vice versa, did not challenge the views held by the bureaucracy.
industrialization of the province.2 The Premier, Tommy Douglas, was fully aware of the bureaucratic
hurdle. He was reported as saying that: "No matter how good legislation is, if those in charge of
administering it are unsympathetic or incapable of a new approach, little good will come of it" (cited
from Brownstone, 1971: 5). Like Sweden, the CCF devoted a lot of energy into the creation of a
bureaucratic apparatus to implement their ideas. As such, it actually went further than Sweden, which
targeted departments that were deemed important to establish core demands from union supporters at
the time (Rothstein, 1996), by creating a host of institutions at the executive level to facilitate planning.
Many of these ideas and practices would later be implemented in other provinces and in Ottawa (Dunn,
1995).
The similarities with Sweden do not end there. The CCF is renowned for having introduced multiple
innovative social policies and programs, many of which would later be adopted by other provinces and
the federal government. These include the introduction of universal health care, a compulsory public no
fault automobile insurance place, trade union legislations and Canada’s first Bill of Rights (Johnson,
2004: 66). The first CCF government (1944-1964) “is now regarded as Canada’s most socially innovative
government of the twentieth century” (Marchildon, 2004 :xvi). In addition, like the SAP, the CCF/NDP3
would become a hegemonic party having ruled Saskatchewan for 47 out of 65 years between 1944 and
2009.
Herein lies the puzzle: contrary to Sweden, the hegemonic power of the CCF/NDP did not result in
the entrenchment of the most generous welfare state in Canada despite the development of a
bureaucracy tailor-made to achieve these objectives. This outcome is explained by the actions taken by
the Devine governments (1982-1991) to alter this legacy. Specifically, it succeeded in eliminating the
bureaucracy as a source of policy influence and in reducing substantially the source of funding for
current and future social programs. Subsequent NDP governments have been unable to re-establish a
distinctive socialist agenda and the capacity of the civil service to make it possible. The bureaucracy is no
2 The CCF succeeded in integrating agrarian interest within its own party while the SAP formed a parliamentary coalition WEIR, M. & SKOCPOL, T. 1985. State Structures and the Possibilities for Keynesian Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States. In: EVANS, P. B. (ed.) Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , ESPING-ANDERSEN, G. 1985. Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power., Princeton, Princeton University Press.. 3 The CCF changed its name to the New Democratic Party in 1961. This occurred as a result of a merger with other leftist parties at the Federal level. After the 1967 elections, the provincial authorities in Saskatchewan adopted this name as well.
longer considered to be a source of policy innovation (Rasmussen, 2001) and a group of authors even
claim that the NDP has moved firmly to the right by adopting neo-conservative policies (Brown et al.,
1999) while a more optimistic account claims that the NDP has embraced the third way (McGrane,
2007).
This contribution presents a critical assessment of the bureaucratic thesis, inspired by the work of
Rothstein (1996), and it is divided into four sections. First, the role of the bureaucracy in the expansion
of the welfare state and the ways in which a government can create a left-wing bias are analysed.
Second, a brief description of the rise of the CCF and its impact on public administration is introduced
followed by an analysis on its influence in the development of the Saskatchewan welfare state. Third,
based on the evidence that the province seized to be a generous welfare state leader by the end of the
Devine mandate in 1991 and by the end of four consecutive NDP mandates ending in 2007, three
explanations are introduced to address this puzzling outcome in light of the Swedish experience. Fourth,
the conclusion assesses the evidence and discusses the limitation of the bureaucratic power thesis.
The Bureaucracy: An understudied element in welfare state research.
As a result of its generous welfare state, Sweden is often used as a key case, if not the benchmark, in
comparative analysis (Korpi, 1983, Bonoli, 2007, Esping-Andersen, 1990, Baldwin, 1990). Researchers
have focused on explaining the causal relationship resulting in the Swedish outcome with the hopes of
also determining why others countries failed to achieve a similar result. For example, it is with the
Swedish experience in mind that the power resource school argues that the road to a generous welfare
state requires a strong union/social democratic nexus (Stephens, 1986, Korpi, 1983, Esping-Andersen,
1985).
While these studies have generated a wealth of insightful comparative contributions, few have
integrated the bureaucratic thesis within their analysis (but see Weir and Skocpol, 1985, Heclo, 1974,
Rothstein, 1996, Lindqvist, 1990, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1996).4 Beyond the expert knowledge of
civil servants, their tenure results in a thorough understanding of policies and programs within their
departmental unit and in a propensity to learn from previous policy experiences (Lindblom, 1959). With
these assets, bureaucrats have performed the role of innovative policy makers (Heclo, 1974, Derthick,
1979, Peters, 1995, Campbell and Szablowski, 1979) and they have also played a vital role in
4 Its dismissal is often related to a lack of concepts that could be quantifiable. Thus, it is easier to discuss the role of the state by analyzing veto players and veto points and ignore the organization of the civil service.
implementing and adapting social policies on the ground (Lipsky, 1980, Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).
Nonetheless, the role and importance of bureaucrats continue to be understated in the political science
literature (Meier and O'Toole Jr., 2006a). This is particularly true of the current literature on the
retrenchment of the welfare state where bureaucrats have vanished (Marier, 2005).
The public administration is far from being neutral in the various phases of the policy process. In
some extreme cases reminiscent of the popular TV series Yes, Minister, bureaucrats have sought to
ignore openly the wishes of new ministers by running their department as they saw fit. Probably the
most famous episode related to the Minister of Finance, the German Social Democrat Rudolf Hilferding,
who suffered a nervous breakdown while attempting to oppose his bureaucrats (Beetham, 1985).
Within the formulation of policy, the options presented by civil servants tend to be limited and reflect
clearly the preferences of their department (Peters, 2001). This is accentuated by the increasing
specialisation of civil servants. Already in the mid 1950s, Titmuss (1958) feared that the increasing
specialization and knowledge utilized to provide social services would result in a privileged position
within the policy making for occupational groups involved in their delivery (27).
Within countries where ministers cannot rely on an extensive political staff, as in the Westminster
model, it is extremely difficult for a new minister to challenge them (Macdonald, 1991), which is
fundamental considering that the presence of a new minister is the rule rather than the exception in
parliamentary democracies. Ministers are often replaced even when the government is very stable
(Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). For example, in the UK, the average tenure for a Minister is 26.9
months (Berlinski et al., 2007). Entrepreneurial politicians who choose to engage in debates with civil
servants, do so despite the fact that the later possess key advantages such as a thorough understanding
of the techniques and tools utilized to assess policies and programs (Peters, 2001).
The case for bureaucratic power is even more obvious in the implementation stage. The higher the
number of individuals involved in the implementation of a policy, the less likely are the wishes of
politicians being fulfilled (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Moreover, multiple social services provided
by civil servants involve a lot of discretion, which can result in power being vested in street-level
bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980). The introduction of substantial policy and administrative change is
particularly challenging when it requires the cooperation from SLBs (McDermott, 2006, Brodkin, 1997).5
5 It is important to note that the difficulty of controlling the bureaucracy has not only been faced by left wing parties. The conservative bias of the bureaucracy also challenges parties on the right side of the political spectrum.
Bureaucratic “capture” by socialist governments and its impact on social policies
What conditions facilitate the “capture” of the bureaucracy and enhance strongly the likelihood that
the policy agenda of a socialist government (or any other government that is ideologically opposed to
the prevailing values of the civil service) will be implemented? The control of the bureaucracy is a mean
to an end, albeit a crucial one, with the enactment of socialist policies as the primary objective
(Rothstein, 1996). While there is a body of literature that emphasises the importance of the
organizational structure and its impact on policy (Egeberg, 1999, Gulick, 1937, Whitford, 2002), this is
not sufficient to create long lasting changes in the political orientation of policies since it ignores the
importance of the values of the bureaucracy (Meier and O'Toole Jr., 2006a, Meier and O'Toole Jr.,
2006b). A profound transformation and re-organization of the civil service, to alter policies in line with
the agenda of the governing party, must be done in concert to change their values and organizational
culture.
The bureaucracy is unlikely to change its way of thinking and operation when facing a new
government. Actually, there is a lot of evidence suggesting that newly elected governments are prime
candidate to be captured by the bureaucracy. It is within these circumstances that most complaints
about the partisan nature of the bureaucracy are often heard. For example, the Swedish right-wing
coalition was highly critical of the bureaucracy once it took power in 1976 and in 1991 claiming that it
opposed both the reassessment of previous policies and change (Pierre, 1995). Canadian accounts
reveal a similar level of frustration by the Conservatives who criticised the bureaucracy of being biased
in favour of the Liberals. Diefenbaker, a Conservative who became Prime Minister after a 22 year Liberal
rule, even referred to senior civil servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs as “Pearsonalities” in
For example, contrary to the CCF in Saskatchewan, the right wing government W. R. Bennett in British Columbia established and/or strengthened central agencies, cabinet committees, and central department to facilitate the implementation of austerity measures DUNN, C. 1995. The institutionalized cabinet: governing the Western Provinces, Montreal, McGill Queens University Press.. In the UK, the introduction of New Public Management by Thatcher was caused partly by the belief that bureaucrats had gained too much power at the expense of political executives AUCOIN, P. 1990. Administrative Reform in Public Management: Paradigms, Principles, Paradoxes and Pendulums. Governance, 3, 115-137.. There is a strong consensus among academics that the changed she introduced in the public administration have been considerable relative to other industrialized countries SAINT-MARTIN, D. 2000. The New Managerialism and the Policy Influence of Consultants in Government: An Historical-Institutionalist Analysis of Britain, Canada and France. Governance, 11, 319-356, SAVOIE, D. J. 1994. Thatcher, Reagan, Mulroney : in search of a new bureaucracy, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, POLLITT, C. & BOUCKAERT, G. 2004. Public management reform: a comparative analysis, New York, Oxford University Press..
reference to the previous Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson (Hilliker, 1984). Recently, one of the first
actions taken by the new Japanese Prime Minister was to introduce a new central agency, the National
Strategy Bureau, to curb the power of bureaucrats with claims that they are strongly attached to the
LDP the party who ruled Japan since the end of World War II (Reuters, September 16 2009). It is
therefore not surprising that Lipset (1950), based on an analysis of the first five years of the CCF in
power, concludes that relatively little had changed with regards to the bureaucracy.
There is one important lesson from all the cases presented above. In order to facilitate the
transformation of a bureaucracy, the party in power must hold the reign of government over a long
uninterrupted period because it is very difficult to alter the deeply embedded values and culture of
departments and agencies within bureaucracies. As such, one party must be hegemonic or dominant by
winning consecutive elections. In addition, as stressed by Rothstein (1996), the governing party must
devote a lot of energy to achieving the task of transforming the bureaucracy. Otherwise, it will continue
to exhibit the same bias regardless of the policy preference of the government. The strength and power
of the CCF/NDP bureaucracy stems from cumulative actions undertaken by successive CCF governments
(1944-1964), which were enhanced by the NDP in the period 1971-1982.
The Rise and Fall of the Saskatchewan Bureaucracy as the Engine of Policy Making – The Creation of
the CCF/NDP Bureaucracy
The Liberal Party dominated provincial politics following the entry of Saskatchewan into the Canadian
federation in 1905 until World War II. The public service was primarily utilized as a tool of patronage.
The centre of activity remained with the Highway department where the Minister tended to be in
charge of party organization and the distribution of favours. At the local level, highway inspectors were
the eyes and ears of the party. “The alacrity with which such appointments were made reflected both
low esteem for the public service and strong conviction that party supporters deserved recognition”
(Smith, 1975: 29). Partisan appointments to the civil service were challenged by a Liberal Premier in the
early 1920s (Martin) and by the creation of a Public Service Commission (PSC) during the Cooperative
government, where a coalition of Progressives, Independents, and Conservatives ruled the province for
one mandate (1929-1934) (ibid, McLaren, 1998: 67-90). However, following the election of the Liberals
in 1934, the Premier replaced the PSC with a single commissioner, dismissed individuals appointed by
the previous government and patronage practices were re-introduced vigorously (Smith, 1975: 201,
Johnson, 2004: 6).
The election of the CCF government headed by Tommy Douglas in 1944, the first socialist
government in North America, had a profound impact on Saskatchewan. The party, which originated
from a coalition between labour and an agrarian social movement, gained momentum in the 1930s with
the deteriorating conditions of farmers in what would eventually be called the “dirty thirties” (Lipset,
1950). Moreover, federal policies accentuated the hardship on the farmers. While the price of wheat
was highly volatile and dependent on world market, the price of equipment remained stable and
artificially inflated due to high tariffs on such goods (Eisler, 2006).6 Core CCF beliefs were spelled out
clearly in the so-called Regina Manifesto. It included popular propositions such as the introduction of
state health insurance, public pension plans, and an expansion of crown corporations, but it also
included more radical elements such as the eradication of capitalism and socialised planning (McLeod
and McLeod, 2004: 60-1, Praud and McQuarrie, 2001: 145-6). Following defeats to the Liberals in the
1934 and 1938 elections, alterations to the CCF platform were made. For example, references to
socialism and the nationalization of the land were omitted from the CCF program to mitigate Liberal
attacks and more emphasis was placed onto social security (Lipset, 1950: 151, Smith, 1975: 233).
Prior to the 1944 election, extensive planning was undertaken to present a strong platform to the
electorates. As stated by Johnson (2004), “(t)he planning was done almost as if the participants had
already formed the government” (37). In light of the dismissal of the Civil Service Commission and the
patronage practices of the Liberals, the question of the bureaucracy was front and center in the
development of a governmental strategy. Moreover, CCF guidebooks on economic theory made it clear
already in 1936 that “more concentration of power in the cabinet and the bureaucracy was unavoidable
in the socialist state” (McLeod and McLeod, 2004: 162, Brownstone, 1971) and a central planning
agency responsible to the Cabinet and the Premier was necessary to plan the economic development of
the province (Johnson, 2004: 56). Other evidence suggests that the increasing activities undertaken by
the government during World War II combined with the creation of multiple Crown Corporations also
resulted in the need for a central agency (Dunn, 1995: 27-8).
6 Based on the evidence presented at the Rowell-Sirois Commission, Saskatchewan benefited the least among Canadian provinces from the tariff subsidies. While Ontario received close to $65 per capita, individuals in Saskatchewan obtained $0.55 (Eisler, 2006: 78).
Contrary to the expectation of many CCF members and supporters, the Douglas government did not
engage in a drastic transformation of the civil service immediately after the CCF victory even though it
was filled with individuals appointed by the Liberal Party on a patronage basis. With the exception of the
Minister of Natural Resources, who laid off fifteen individuals, “(m)ost other ministers kept their staffs
almost intact” (McLeod and McLeod, 2004: 164). Even in the case of newly created departments, such as
Labour and Social Welfare (both first in Canada), three of the four deputy ministers nominated were
directors in another department and, therefore, previously affiliated to the former Liberal government
(ibid). This inaction on the part of the government fuelled strong criticism from the CCF grassroots with
the introduction of multiple motions at congresses to fire Liberal supporters in favour of CCF
sympathizers or proven socialists (Lipset, 1950: 255-7). However, the decision to retain many senior civil
servants was hardly surprising: not a single member of the cabinet had been involved in any government
prior to their election in 1944. Thus, cabinet members were in dire needs of civil servants – regardless of
their political stripes - who could guide them immediately upon taking the reins of government.
These accounts, based mostly on evidence collected shortly after the electoral victory of 1944, fail to
acknowledge the daunting task faced by the CCF government and the long-term impact of key measures
such as the creation of the Economic Advisory Planning Board (EAPB) and the recruitment of trained
professional civil servants from outside the province with George Cadbury, recruited from the Labour
Party in the UK to build the EAPB, being the most notable. The bureaucracy inherited by the government
was ill-equipped to tackle most routine functions. There was simply no governmental machinery
coordinating the activities of individual department and no budgetary machinery either. The first priority
was the rapid introduction of new policies, but it was quickly followed by a focus on organizational
matters in the second part of the mandate (Johnson, 2004: 103) with a Premier, Tommy Douglas
“determined to lead Saskatchewan into the big leagues of public administration” (McLeod and McLeod,
2004: 163).
The cumulative actions taken by the CCF during the course of their consecutive mandates (1944-
1964) resulted in a fundamental alteration of the bureaucratic structure and a de facto replacement of
the civil service (Brownstone, 1971: 66). Beyond the EAPB, the creation of the Budget Bureau to
facilitate the budgetary process while considering future endeavours and the Government Financial
Office, with the primary function of overseeing the Crown corporations, led to the development of a
strong expertise at the center of government. In his account of the Liberal Party in opposition, Smith
(1975) states that none of the social and political innovations compares to the “administrative
revolution” that accompanied the new CCF government (257-8).
By the time the CCF lost an election, in 1964, the bureaucratic structure had shifted from an unaided
cabinet, in which there is little coordination across departments and overall planning, to an
institutionalized cabinet where horizontal coordination took place (Dunn, 1995). This infrastructure
remained largely in place during the Thatcher years (1964-71), albeit far less utilized. However, as stated
by Rasmussen and Marchildon (2005), “the planning tradition was entrenched deeply enough in the civil
service that it readily sprang back into action upon the re-elections of NDP administrations” (187). This
was probably facilitated by the creation of planning units and policy expertise within individual
ministers, which was a key achievement of the CCF during its last ten years in power (Johnson, 2004).
Thus, the election of Allan Blakeney as Premier in 1971 with the planning tradition of the bureaucracy
intact sparked another 9 years of policy innovations spearheaded by an active civil service (Glor, 1997).
As stated clearly by Michelmann and Steeves (1985), “The civil service...especially at the highest level,
was a corps of officials conscious of their role, proud of their achievements and generally in agreement
with the activist philosophy of the NDP” (4).
What are socialist policies?
It is primordial to define the variable “socialist policies” to assess the extent to which a socialist
government succeeded in defeating the conservative bias of the bureaucracy. Socialist parties such as
Labour in the UK, the Social Democrats in Sweden, and the CCF/NDP in Saskatchewan originally
proposed solutions to eradicate capitalism. These typically involved the control of the economy, often
via the nationalisation of enterprises, planning, and a predominant role for the state. In all these cases,
many of these ambitions were abandoned early once in office. Entire economies were not nationalised
and the capitalist system was not reformed drastically. In Saskatchewan, the control of the economy
was quickly dismissed in the 1930s following electoral defeats and the acknowledgement that this would
not be feasible by a small province within a federation that sets core fiscal and monetary policies.
The failure to achieve these objectives should not mask socialist efforts to expand and develop the
welfare state; the establishment of a generous and universal welfare state, such as Sweden’s, represents
a significant shift from the previous laissez-faire policies of the early 20th century (Esping-Andersen,
1985, Stephens, 1986, Korpi, 1983). In order to assess the extent to which similar changes occurred in
Saskatchewan, few caveats are in order. Due to its status as a province, Saskatchewan does not have the
same ability as a country to introduce socialist policies; the federal government has the power of the
purse and it is also responsible for unemployment insurance and public pensions following lengthy
negotiations with the provinces (Banting, 1987, Simeon, 2006). Nonetheless, Canada remains the most
decentralised country within the OECD (Dion, 1992) and provinces continue to have the primary
responsibility for social policies. In addition, provinces have multiple tools to raise their revenues to
finance new policy initiatives. Therefore, if the CCF/NDP succeeded in capturing the bureaucracy in ways
akin to the Swedish Social Democrats we would expect the province to have, at least, the most generous
welfare state within the country since no other left wing party was this successful over such a lengthy
period of time and recognised for having transformed the provincial bureaucracy. With these
restrictions in mind, three key elements of socialist policies are scrutinised in this contributions: 1)
labour rights, 2) public enterprises, and 3) social policy.
First, the introduction of legislation facilitating the creation of unions and minimum labour standards
has been a cornerstone of socialist demands. Without the ability to form a union and expand
membership, there would be no potent partnership between unions and socialist parties as theorised by
the power resource theory. In addition, within the Canadian context union regulations matter greatly
since unemployment insurance is managed by the federal government. As a result, unions cannot utilise
the Ghent system to increase their appeal. However, the expansion of collective bargaining makes it
more difficult for employers to fire employees, acting as a protective measure against unemployment. In
accordance with expectations, the CCF was very active on this front. It enacted multiple legislations in
labour affairs and created a Department of Labour to ensure their implementation (Government of
Saskatchewan, 1944). In fact, one of the first bills adopted was the Trade Union Act in 1944. This bill had
overarching consequences. It allowed employees to organize and form a union of their choice and
instituted collective bargaining. In addition, it placed restrictions on employers such as the use of lock
out during any deliberation concerning them by the Labour Relations Board (Johnson, 2004: 81-2).7
Interestingly, civil servants were also allowed to form a union in 1944 (Frankel, 1960). Indicative of the
CCF’s willingness to implement its policies in spite of very different practices in the rest of the country,
federal civil servants obtained the right to form a union in 1967 (McLaren, 1998: 89). Other labour
7 Indicative of its commitment to the respect of this new legislation, the government expropriated a box factory that refused to address complaints of unfair labour practices brought up by a recently formed union in 1945 (Johnson 2004: 83).
legislation included a mandatory two-week vacation and a forty-four work week. New membership
within the Minimum Wage Board also led to a significant increase in minimum wages. The floor was
raised from $8 to $16 per week (Johnson, 2004: 82).
Moreover, a second spurt of labour reforms is associated with the Blakeney years (1971-1982). The
Saskatchewan government continued to innovate by being the first province to introduce measures such
as maternity and paternity leave (albeit unpaid), provisions for equal pay for equal work, and an
occupational health law allowing workers to refuse to perform tasks they deem too dangerous (Snyder,
1997). In the later case, this rights-based approach was more developed in Scandinavia and it
represented a first in North America (Sass, 1997). Reminiscent of similar achievements in Sweden, an
attempt to increase the power of workers within management boards were also studied by civil
servants, but these were abandoned following the sceptical reception it faced from unions (Snyder,
1997: 145). Akin to the types of program needed to tackle ‘new’ social risks (Taylor-Gooby, 2004, Bonoli,
2007, Midgley, 1999), a labour market training program (the Employment Support Program) was also
instituted for long-term unemployed and individuals on social assistance, which involved local
communities (Stewart and Flynn, 1997). The generosity of pre-existing legislations was also improved
substantially. For example, the minimum wage was raised substantially to the point of being the most
generous in Canada by 1981 and annual vacations were extended (Blakeney, 2008: 92-4).
Second, the development of Crown Corporations was a central plank of the CCF program for multiple
reasons. It fulfilled the need to diversify the Saskatchewan economy, which was too strongly dependent
on its farming industry. It generated another tool for the provincial government to control its own
economy without having to rely on the federal government. It also provided the necessary resources to
finance the welfare state (Pitsula and Rasmussen, 1990: 72, McLaren, 1998, Johnson, 2004). Two waves
of reforms occurred. During the Douglas years (1944-64) priorities was given to utilities resulting in the
creation of public enterprises such as SaskTel (telephone) and SaskPower (electricity), but also in the
expansion of royalties for the extraction of non-renewable resources. In the Blakeney years (1971-1982)
the expansion of the Crown Corporations occurred primarily in natural resources, with the
establishment of SaskOil, the Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation (SMDC) and the Potash
Corporation of Saskatchewan (PCS). By the 1970s, the crown corporations were considered to be the
principle source of wealth to finance the welfare state (McLaren, 1998: 159, Harding, 1991a). This is very
important considering that the NDP has been strongly committed to having balanced budget, which was
originally sought to alleviate the fears that a socialist government would generate large scale deficits. In
fact, in the entire 1944-1964 and 1971-1982 periods, the CCF/NDP experienced only one deficit despite
being left with a substantial debt in 1944 (MacKinnon, 2003: 15).
Third, in the field of social policy, provincial initiatives are primarily confined to health, education and
social services because of the important role played by the federal government in the field of
unemployment and pensions. The CCF’s key contribution is the expansion of health coverage
culminating with the introduction of universal health insurance in 1965 amidst vivid opposition from
medical doctors that even featured a strike. Its model served as the template upon which Ottawa
assisted provinces to finance free and universal health care. Funds were also assigned to the University
of Saskatchewan to open a college of medicine (Johnson, 2004).
In the field of education, the Douglas government raised the minimum teachers’ salary by 30% and
re-organized the school administration by creating significantly larger school units with a new
equalization formula to ensure sufficient funding for rural school units (Government of Saskatchewan,
1944). Providing similar standards across a sparsely populated province represented a difficult challenge
and the reform faced strong opposition from localities. It nearly resulted in an electoral defeat in 1948
(Johnson, 2004: 86). Beyond the implementation of the larger school unit reforms, the department
created a new system of school grants and introduced a new high school curriculum (ibid, 147). With
regards to social services, in a noticeable shift from providing welfare as a form of poor-relief in favour
of a more universalistic notion of citizenship, a Department of Social Welfare was created with new
powers to spend money “as a matter of justice, equity and right” and to distribute “social aid”, which
replaced the term “relief” (Government of Saskatchewan, 1944: 32).
The Blakeney years built upon the Douglas legacy by fostering multiple innovations in social policy
(see Glor, 1997, Harding, 1991b). Two new programs, a prescription drug plan and children dental plan
were among those implemented. The Saskatchewan Prescription Drug Plan covered the entire
population (only British Columbia and Manitoba had a similar coverage) and the fixed dispensing fee
was waived for individuals on social assistance and it contained a cost-containment strategy by fostering
competition among drug suppliers with limited term contracts making it unique in Canada. (Burry,
1997). The Saskatchewan Dental Plan led the training of dentist therapists who then practiced in school-
based clinics resulting in services throughout the province (Wolfson, 1997). These programs were
supplemented by additional efforts in the health sector, including the construction of new hospitals in
rural areas. In the field of education, the most noticeable contribution was the transformation of the
Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan into a full fledge university.
By the end of Blakeney’s third mandate in 1982, Saskatchewan was clearly identified as being a
leader with regards to welfare state generosity. Not only did Saskatchewan labour standards provided
more generous conditions and protections on most indicators than other provinces, such as higher
minimum wage and vacations, but they also introduced novelties such as maternity and paternity leave.
In terms of program coverage and costs, Saskatchewan was one of few provinces that did not levy
health premiums or payroll tax in Canada and its income tax system, utilise partly to finance health care
expenditures, was among the most progressive. While the combined provincial tax & health premiums
for income at the poverty line represented 7.5% of earnings in Ontario and 5.3% in British Columbia, it
was 1.6% in Saskatchewan (National council of welfare, 1982: 47-51). Moreover, the creation of
additional crown corporations added long-term financing for social programs. In less than 10 years, the
Devine government (1982-91) altered this outcome and subsequent NDP governments never succeeded
in restoring its place as a leader in Canada.
A Disappearing Legacy?
At stake with bureaucratic transformation is not only the implementation of change, but its
entrenchment over a substantial period of time. As demonstrated by Rothstein (1996), the
transformation of the underlying values promoted by the bureaucracy facilitates strongly the latter
objective. A remarkable feature of the Swedish welfare state has been its enduring stability despite its
vulnerability to external influence such as economic openness and EU membership. It continues to be
considered among the most generous welfare state (Lindbom, 2001, Korpi and Palme, 2003). This legacy
is largely absent in the case of Saskatchewan. This section analyses changes to the three core elements
associated with the socialist policies of the CCF/NDP.
First, multiple reforms were undertaken by the Devine government to curb the powers of unions and
modify labour standards to favour business interests. For example, the government introduced Bill 104
making it more difficult to unionize and Bill 73, which introduced more business friendly labour
standards (Pitsula and Rasmussen, 1990). Moreover, increases in the minimum wage lagged behind
other provinces pushing Saskatchewan among the least generous provinces.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Conservative government targeted unions and labour standards,
the key question for this contribution is whether these measures had long lasting effects. Evidence
suggests that it did not. While unionization rates experienced a noticeable decline in Canada averaging
6.7% between 1981 and 2004, Saskatchewan’s decrease of 2.6% was the second lowest behind
Manitoba at 2.5%. In the commercial sector, Saskatchewan experienced the lowest decline with a 5.5%
change compared with a national average of 9.8% (Morissette et al., 2005). In addition, in spite of a poor
performance with minimum wage legislation, a comparative study of labour standards in Canadian
performed by Brock and Roberts (2000) ranks Saskatchewan very favourably relative to other
jurisdictions. It is the most or second most generous when it comes to overtime, paid time off, workers’
compensation, collective bargaining, employment equity, and advance notice of plant closings (or large
scale layoffs). Only British Columbia is considered to have more generous labour standards. An updated
version of this study, which included other labour related benefits also ranked Saskatchewan quite
favourably with the exception of minimum wage legislation (Brock, 2005).
Second, the Conservative government was strongly committed to laissez-faire economics and crown
corporations were often a target for what was wrong with government. Following its re-election in 1986,
the Conservative government brought two former Thatcher advisers (Madsen Pirie and Oliver Letwin) to
Saskatchewan to engineer the sale of crown corporations (Pitsula and Rasmussen, 1990: 139-40).
Multiple crown corporations were sold and those recently established were a prime target: SaskOil,
Saskminerals, PCS, SMDC, Saskatchewan Computer Utility Corporation, Saskatchewan Government
Printing, Saskatchewan Forest Products, and part of SGI were all privatized. Saskatchewan crown
corporations were extremely important for a government seeking to retrench the welfare state since
they provided a key source of revenues to finance existing and new social programs introduced in the
1970s. None of these companies were later re-nationalised. Royalties on natural resources extracted by
private entrepreneurs, such as oil, were also reduced (Stobbe, 1991a). In addition, large scaled
public/private partnerships, where most of the risk was assumed by the government, were undertaken
with disastrous consequences for public finances since most of them never generated the expected
benefits, partly due to a lack of analysis and oversight (MacKinnon, 2003). Towards the end of the
second mandate of the Devine government, attempts were made to privatise the public utilities
established by the Douglas government. However, large scale demonstrations and protest resulted in
the abandonment of these plans (Pitsula and Rasmussen, 1990, Stobbe, 1991b).
Third, it is first important to note that most reforms to social policies occurred during the second
mandate of the Devine government (1986-1991) when reducing the deficits became a priority. Welfare,
however, did not fit this pattern. Breaking up with the legacy of previous CCF/NDP governments, the
Devine government initiated reforms targeting individuals on social assistance via the introduction of
workfare. A 35% cut in benefit for employable people served as incentive to join work programs and
accept low paying jobs, which enterprises offered via subsidy. Recipients also experienced a noticeable
decline in purchasing power ranging from 28% to 54% during the period 1981-88 (Riches and Manning,
1991). In health, the children dental program was eliminated and the 400 civil servants delivering the
program were fired (MacKinnon, 2003: 39). Reforms were made to the prescription drugs plan resulting
in deductible for everyone, including the poor and senior citizens (Harding, 1991c: 112-3). Budget for
education were frozen or raised below inflation rates.
The reforms introduced by Devine were followed by other retrenchment measures taken by
successive NDP governments to reduce the size of the debt and balance the yearly budget. The
cumulative effects have led Saskatchewan to become an average province when it comes to the welfare
state. Its social spending priorities are not very different from other provinces (Atkinson and Bierling,
1998). The Romanow government introduced one of the most extensive health care reform in the
country closing many hospitals in the process. Once the provider of a very generous drug plan, a recent
study reveals that Saskatchewan seniors pay more annually for drugs than all other provinces with the
exception of Manitoba (Demers et al., 2008). Moreover, it fares poorly on a key social outcome
associated with jurisdiction with dominant left wing governments : It has among the highest income
inequality in Canada (Breau, 2007, Osberg and Xu, 1999).
What Explains the Saskatchewan Reversal in light of the Swedish Experience?
This section presents three hypotheses to explain the puzzling difference between Swedish and
Saskatchewan socialist experiences. The first hypothesis focuses on the capacity of the opposition to
undermine the bureaucratic transformation implemented by socialist governments. The second tackles
the role of political appointees within the civil service and their ability to curb the influence of the
bureaucracy within the policy making process. The final hypothesis rests on the institutional elements
necessary to maintain a generous welfare state.
H1 – Once a radical change to the bureaucracy has been implemented, the likelihood of reversal is
strongly associated with the ability of a right-wing party to gain a majority of seat in parliament and
form its own government.
While it is necessary for a socialist government to be firmly in control in order to undertake a
profound transformation to its bureaucratic structure and its values, the contrary is true for these
changes to have long lasting effects; the ability of subsequent right-wing governments to reverse this
outcome matters. This is a key difference between Sweden and Saskatchewan. Once a strong social
democratic influence was embedded in many Swedish agencies, it was particularly difficult for a right
wing government to implement changes that would challenge this bias. A key issue is the lack of a
cohesive alternative. The right wing coalitions have been quite divided and ill equipped to mount a
challenge to both bureaucratic structure and values. In addition, Sweden also never faced a government
strongly committed to ‘eradicate’ the bureaucracy. In fact, there are even some contributions
supporting the thesis that its most right wing party in coalition governments, the conservative party,
also had a well developed social agenda (Ljunggren, 1992) or that it has accepted that the “welfare state
is irreplaceable” (Lindbom, 2008).
The Saskatchewan situation was quite the opposite. One party governments are the norm and once
in power, few hurdles prevent the adoption of a radical agenda. In stark contrast with the Swedish
Conservatives, the Conservative Party of Saskatchewan was strongly committed to a neo-conservative
agenda à la Thatcher, which would restore private initiatives. The bureaucracy, strongly associated with
the CCF/NDP, was targeted throughout electoral campaigns and once in government. This led to a
profound transformation of the province and its future capacity to revert to previous policies. In the
aftermath of Devine: “What was once considered Canada’s most progressive province has become one
of the most right wing” (Pitsula and Rasmussen, 1990: 5).
It is far more difficult to alter the bureaucracy than bypassing it. In the case of left wing
governments, it needs a well functioning and committed bureaucracy to expand the role of the public
sector. Thus, it must ensure that the bureaucratic will is altered and/or created to facilitate the
achievement of these objectives (Lindqvist, 1990, Rothstein, 1996). In the case of Saskatchewan, this
was well understood by Premiers Douglas and Blakeney and a key element associated with the
expansion of the welfare state was that the bureaucratic will was geared towards introducing
expansionary policy innovations (Glor, 1997, Brownstone, 1971, Johnson, 2004). In the case of neo-
conservative governments, the role of the public bureaucracy is usually considered to be negative; it is
targeted as a reason why government is failing and continues to grow in importance (Niskanen, 1971).
Within this context, the political control of the bureaucracy becomes a key goal of neo-conservative
governments (Aucoin, 1990, Boston et al., 1996, Savoie, 1994). Therefore, efforts will be made to avoid
utilising the bureaucracy in favour of external expertise and reliance on the markets, which lead us to
the second hypothesis.
H2 – The public administration needs to conform to the principles associated with a professional civil
service. As such, recruitment needs to be based on merit and civil servants are granted tenure following a
brief probationary period. While a strong expansion of the civil service combined with strong persuasion
efforts are required by a socialist government to convert or capture the bureaucracy, all these efforts will
be in vain if the following government can dismiss or fire easily civil servants associated too closely with
the previous governments and/or its policies.
Patronage policies were effectively eliminated early in Sweden. By the mid 1800s, the civil service
was already operating with the principles of tenure and hiring on merit. The institutionalisation of the
policy making process, with its strong reliance on parliamentary inquiry where bureaucratic experts
from the civil service play a vital role (Arter, 1990, Premfors, 1983), has also cemented a strong
relationship between political actors and civil servants in the conduit of policy. In addition, most of the
civil service is employed by state agencies (styrelse or verket) whose primary responsibility is to
implement policies and manage programs. These operate at arms-length from ministries, which have a
very small staff (Pierre, 1998). Within such a setting, it is extremely difficult to sidestep the bureaucracy.
In contrast, the Douglas government had to create a professional civil service capable of servicing the
need of an interventionist government. Had it not done so, the British experience tells us that he would
have probably not been able to do much in terms of expansionary social policies (Heclo, 1974). There
was no well established expertise within the public administration and an institutionalised policy making
process as in Sweden. The Douglas government was quite successful in attracting qualified individuals
with expertise in public administration because Saskatchewan provided opportunities to innovate and
develop concrete programs and to diversify one’s skill set via employment in the crown corporations. In
addition, the working conditions were very generous with a public service commission, a collective
agreement, educational leaves, and pension schemes (Brownstone, 1971).
Saskatchewan, like other Canadian provinces, operates under the Westminster model. However,
contrary to the United Kingdom, its bureaucracy does not follow completely the principles associated
with the traditional Whitehall model of public administration. The Whitehall model stipulates that: (1)
recruitment is strictly merit based with tenure granted to civil servants; (2) the civil service forms a
single body; and (3) the politicians depend on the civil service for both policy implementation and policy
advice (Wilson and Barker, 2003). The professionalization of the civil service within this model makes it
very difficult to fire civil servants and avoid their influence within the policy making process.
There are two main streams of appointment within the Saskatchewan civil service. First, the vast
majority of civil servants are recruited on merit and granted tenure under the auspice of a collective
agreement, which is managed by the Public Service Commission. Second, civil servants can be appointed
by the cabinet. Two categories of civil servants fall under this category, partisan staff and senior civil
servants. Originally, in the 1906 Public Service Act the recruitment of civil servants were “at the pleasure
of the Crown” and were thus appointed directly by Cabinet, which facilitated patronage (McLaren, 1998:
8-9). In spite of the 1947 Public Service Act and the establishment of a merit based bureaucracy with a
Public Service Commission (PSC), civil servants can still be hired “at the pleasure of the Crown”. These
appointments, however, can be very precarious since “government employees may be dismissed
summarily without severance pay in the absence of protective legislation” (Neilson, 1984). While
partisan staff is expected to resign following an electoral defeat, the situation is much more problematic
in the case of senior civil servants because nominations may not have been politically motivated. In
these cases, it is the interpretation of the new political masters that matters.
A somewhat standard practice has been developed in Saskatchewan concerning the dismissal of key
senior civil servants (Rasmussen, 2001). In the event of a lost election, one of the last orders of business
for the outgoing government is the termination of contract for political staff. Recently, in 2007, the NDP
fired 150 top political staffers at its last cabinet meeting (Star Phoenix, January 18, 2008). However, the
newly elected government has the last say concerning who can stay and who else should be terminated.
The current government headed by the Saskatchewan Party has fired an additional 70 civil servants,
some of whom were clearly not appointed on a partisan basis by the previous government (Leader-Post,
January 25, 2008). As a result, observers have stated that Saskatchewan, and other provinces, have
much more in common with the appointment practices of the United States than with the Whitehall
tradition of internal promotion for senior civil servants, as practiced in Canada, at the federal level, and
the UK (Michelmann and Steeves, 1985: 18). As in the United States, the creation of a transition team
with an eye on civil service appointments and dismissals is now a common practice. While these
appointments affect less than 3% of civil servants,8 they involve those at the very top of the service.
This is not very different from Swedish practices, however, where 4.5% of individuals working within
Ministries are political appointees and they perform similar functions. For example, the equivalent of
the Deputy Minister, Statssekreterare, is also chosen by the government (Dahlström and Pierre, 2010).
The key difference is that Swedish ministries might be becoming more politicized, they remain relatively
small. For example, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs has 200 employees, 30 of which are
politically appointed (Socialdepartementet, 2009). The implementation of policies occurs within boards
and agencies that operate at arms-length from ministries. They are well staffed and highly influential.
For example, the Social Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan), one of the many boards under the
supervision of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, has 13 500 employees and no political
appointees beyond the Director General and members of the administrative council (styrelsen) . It is the
buffer between the ministries and the agencies/boards that protects civil servants from strong political
interference rather than the actual politicization of ministries. Such a setting is absent in Saskatchewan.
These transitional practices have an important impact since they can curb the underlying values of
the civil service and effectively introduce new input that is more in line with the political ideology of the
newly elected government. The election of Russ Thatcher from the Liberal Party in 1964 resulted in the
departure of a core group of civil servants associated with the administrative revolution orchestrated by
Douglas and the CCF, although most did so voluntarily (MacKinnon, 2003: 15). Throughout its time in
opposition, Thatcher gathered substantial interest and publicity for his criticism of the CCF civil service
and its infusion of foreign experts (Smith, 1975: 275). First, in spite of a strong rhetoric against the civil
service and the centralisation of power within the hands of the Premier, few structural changes
occurred during the Thatcher years (1964-1971) (Dunn, 1995). Some departments also continued to
expand their activities. For example, a Special-care Services Division was established within the
Department of Welfare to oversee the development of subsidized day-care (Department of Welfare,
1971). The EAPB would be dismantled and it reappeared later in a modified form, but played a
substantially reduced role within the policy making process. Second, and more importantly, a high
number of senior civil servants operating in central offices resigned. This affected particularly the EAPB
office. However, the Budget Bureau had a high retention rate (McLarty, 1979). As a result, the influence
8 According to Rasmussen (2001), there are 11 000 civil servants in Saskatchewan. There are usually 200 to 300 dismissals when a new party wins an election.
of the Budget Bureau grew tremendously during the Thatcher and Blakeney years, while the EAPB
became a highly politicized office whose influence faltered across successive governments.
While the election of Thatcher did not result in a significant changes within the civil service (Dunn,
1995, Michelmann and Steeves, 1985) making it possible for the Blakeney government to pursue an
expansion of the welfare state with the support of a strong civil service, the election of the Devine
government in 1982 proved remarkably different. The Devine government ignored most of the advice
given by civil servants and undermined their authority by substantially increasing the number of political
appointees, eliminated multiple positions, and even sought to decentralise radically the civil service with
its very controversial Fair Share program. The latter, which was only implemented in a few cases, sought
to decentralise the civil service by moving multiple offices from Regina to rural areas.
The number of dismissals in the early days of the Devine government was approximately two
hundred, which did not include the sixty nine officials who had already resigned (Michelmann and
Steeves, 1985). The most intriguing question, which is not addressed anywhere in the literature, is why
did the Blakeney government hired more than 1000 civil servants at the pleasure of the crown instead of
regular process in place by the Civil Service Commission? Dismissal of appointed civil servants aside, the
Devine government went further by targeting civil servants appointed on the basis of merit by the Civil
Service Commission. It sparked a series of legal action against the government. Much to the dismay of
civil servants, the penalty for these actions did not dissuade the government from continuing the
practice: the Courts ordered a one year severance pay (with benefits) and court costs even for cases
where firing occurred without cause (Norman, 1990).
Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to assess clearly the extent to which Devine succeeded in
reducing the size of the bureaucracy, which explains why so many accounts focus on individual
experiences. McLaren (1998) provides the best evaluation. Although the official numbers indicate a
reduction of 26% (4067) in the number of civil servants during the 1982-1991 period, some were simply
moved to semi-independent agencies. For example, the Civil Service Commission indicates that 2400
jobs were eliminated in 1987-88, but this was never did not result in changes to the payroll (175).
Interestingly, 1000 civil service jobs were eliminated during the later part of the Blakeney mandate,
which represented a “real” 7% reduction (Saskatchewan, 1980: 25). Another key difficulty in this kind of
exercise is that one does not know how many civil servants were simply replaced. For example,
following the victory of the NDP in 1991, the new Minister of Social Services was shocked to discover
that her department was filled with accountants and political appointees instead of social workers.
Many individuals hired originated from out of department appointments (MacKinnon, 2003: 38-9 and
69).
Once it returned to power in 1991, the civil service had faced a profound transformation and its
policy capacity was at an all time low. Despite facing extraordinary financial pressures, the first order of
business for the Romanow government was to “revitalize the civil service” (MacKinnon, 2003: 61) but it
never succeeded in re-connecting with the civil service in ways akin to the Blakeney era because there
was so much mistrust within the civil service (and between the civil service and the government)
sparked by suspicions vis-à-vis senior civil servants who were not fired during the Devine years (73-4).
The special relationship between the NDP and the civil service changed and the later was not longer
considered to be the creative engine for the government.
“The NDP did not engage in the inflamed rhetoric of administrative reform, and
avoided language which portrayed the bureaucracy as wasteful, incompetent, out of
control and unresponsive to political control. But while avoiding a reform agenda the
NDP government has not attempted to rely on the public service as a major
institution of social and economic innovation as was the case in the past. As a result
the public service in Saskatchewan has entered a period of stasis in which is has
neither become a policy innovator working closely with a government with clearly
articulated goals, nor has it become a leader in the development of new techniques
and practices of public management” (Rasmussen, 2001: 97).
H3 – The nature of the elements linked to the development of the welfare state matters. The dynamic
surrounding the long term impact of retrenchment measures vary. Among the three elements studied,
regulations are the easiest to reform and restore, the privatization of crown corporations and losses of
revenues are quite difficult to reverse and it has strong financial consequences on the future of social
programs. In line with the politics of the ‘new’ welfare state, the maturation of social programs also
increases the difficulty of reforming them.
Successive Saskatchewan governments were very active introducing and reforming labour standards
and union legislation. Accounts of the Devine period suggest a substantial alteration of both labour
standards and union legislation. However, as indicated by the comparative assessments of Brock and
Robert (2000) and Brock (2005), subsequent NDP governments were able to restore Saskatchewan’s
status as one of the most labour friendly province within Canada.
Contrary to redistributive programs and social services, regulations do not require strong financial
commitments on the part of governments because the costs are (mostly) externalised. In fact, this is a
core reason behind the use of this instrument by the European commission to expand the role of the EU
in social policy (Cram, 1993). Therefore, the re-introduction of generous labour standards and pro-union
legislation can be easily achieved by a majority government headed by a socialist government.
The legacy of crown corporation privatizations represents major long-term obstacles in the
restoration of generous social policies. This represents a substantial systemic retrenchment because this
reshapes the political economy surrounding the welfare state by reducing the financial ability of future
governments to maintain and develop future social programs (Pierson, 1994: 15). This is crucial in the
case of Saskatchewan because it is a province within a federation that has extensive fiscal powers. The
CCF/NDP developed this practice as a mean to obtain a reliable source of revenue, which is particularly
important in a province where most individuals’ income are dependent on world prices for agricultural
products, to undertake a rapid and generous expansion of social program. In the Blakeney years, this
was adopted aggressively following actions by the federal government to contest provincial authority to
levy royalties (Blakeney, 2008). Nonetheless, royalties on non-renewable resources continued to provide
a substantial amount of revenue. “The Blakeney government saw resource revenue, not federal cash, as
the means to expanding the province’s welfare state” (McGrane, 2007: 282). Revenues from crown
corporations represented the key element that made it possible for Saskatchewan to have more
progressive social policies than other Canadian provinces. This is akin to the comprehensive and efficient
Swedish tax system, which allows the Swedish government to spend more on public programs than
other countries (Steinmo, 1993).
It is difficult to assess how much future governments have lost in revenues as a result of these
privatizations and the lowering of royalties. Financial data were not available from Saskatchewan
Minerals and SaskOil underwent multiple mergers making it difficult to project the amount of revenue
lost. This is not the case, however, for Potash.9 The company has remained very similar and Potash still
has the characteristics of a public good due to a lack of competition (McLean). On average net revenues
9 Need to account for the fact that the sale of the corporation resulted in the collection of new royalties….
have represented close to 3% of total revenue during the period 1990-2006.10 To make matters worst,
the Devine government ignored the advice of bureaucrats by selling the Potash Corporation at a later
date resulting in a much lower selling price costing the province $361 million (MacKinnon, 2003: 101).
Royalties were also significantly reduced in an effort to attract more business. While close to 65% of the
sale value of oil went to government coffers, the amount dropped significantly to 21.5% in 1989. While
substantial reduction in gasoline taxes and a mortgage subsidy to cover interest payments in excess of
13.25% contributed to the deficit, the re-structuration of oil royalties was the most significant fiscal
decision. The loss of revenues from this alone represented close to $4 billion (Stobbe, 1991a).11
The loss of assets and royalties, risky partnerships on megaprojects with the private sector, interests
on the debt all contributed to a $14.8 billion debt. This represented 180% of the province annual
revenue compared with an average of 115-120% for other Canadian provinces (MacKinnon, 2003: 101-
2). As such, Saskatchewan went from one of the most fiscally sound province to the worst in Canada.
Within this context, a reversal of policy was simply too expensive. In addition, beyond the cost a re-
nationalization would require, such action would contravene the North American Free Trade Agreement
between Canada and the United States (McGrane, 2007). As a result, it is not surprising to notice that
Saskatchewan is now very similar to other Canadian provinces when it comes to social spending.12
Conclusions
There are three main contributions related to the analysis of the transformation of the bureaucracy
by the CCF/NDP and the establishment of a socialist program. First, confirming earlier findings
(Rothstein, 1996), the transformation of the bureaucracy was a key element in the successful
implementation of a socialist agenda. As such, the bureaucratic apparatus was clearly designed to
support the expansionist social policies promoted by the CCF/NDP (Johnson, 2004). There is strong
10 Calculated from the official publication of the new corporation and the revenue figures were obtained from Statistics Canada. 11 It should be noted however that this amount assume that oil would have been extracted at the same rate in spite of the higher royalties, which is unlikely.
12 ADD? It is worth stressing that the Devine government was successful in selling recently established public companies, but failed to do so with the public utilities that were established in the 1950s (SaskTel, SaskPower, and SGI). In the later case, the opposition to the sale was easier to mobilize because they represented well-established provincial symbols and the unions were entrenched strongly within these companies (ADD REF).
evidence supporting the thesis that a socialist bias permeated the bureaucracy until the early 1980s. The
bureaucracy will was considered a key element in the multiple innovations introduced during the
Blakeney years (Glor, 1997) and the bureaucracy was a constant source of criticism by both the Liberal
and Conservative Parties.
Second, the socialist legacy was seriously compromised following the election of the Conservative
Party in 1982. By the end of their second term in 1991, the bureaucracy had been radically altered
eradicating decades of socialist transformations. The Devine government successfully dismissed a high
number of civil servants and marginalised the role of the civil service within the policy process. An
important conclusion is that it is easier to transform a bureaucracy when a government is seeking to
dismiss its influence rather than trying to alter its bias to achieve specific policies. The limited likelihood
for a single party government firmly anchored on the right, the presence of well established agencies at
arms-length from ministries, and the strong powers of parliamentary committees explain why the
Swedish bureaucracy has not faced a similar challenge.
Third, the most important measures taken by the Devine government to retrench successfully the
welfare state were the sales of crown corporations established by the previous government. These
affected the revenues needed to finance the Saskatchewan welfare state. The lack of revenues from
crown corporations and bulging deficits made it impossible for successive governments to re-establish
as generous a welfare state. In fact, it prompted them to make substantial cuts to existing social
programs.
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