Patterns of War

7/30/2019 Patterns of War

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Patterns of Conflict

John R. Boyd

Edited by Chet Richards and Chuck Spinney

Produced and designed by Ginger Richards

For information on this edition, please see

the last page. January 2007152


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Outline

Point of departure

Historical snapshots

Categories of conflict

Synthesis

ApplicationWrap-up

Epilogue

Sources

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Focus and direction

Mission

To make manifest the nature ofmoral-mental-physical

conflict

To discern a pattern for successful operations

To help generalize tactics and strategyTo find a basis forgrand strategy

Intent

To unveil the character of conflict, survival, and conquest

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Point of departure

Air-to-air

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Generalization

Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy

more quickly while outturning an adversary.

In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose

engagement opportunitiesyet has fast transient

(buttonhook) characteristics that can be used to either forcean overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a hard turning

defender.

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Idea expansion

Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we

should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our

adversariesor, better yet, get inside adversarys

observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or

loop.Why? Such activity will make us appearambiguous

(unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder

among our adversariessince our adversaries will be unableto generate mental images or pictures that agree with the

menacing as well as fastertransient rhythm or patterns they

are competing against.

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Examples

Blitzkrieg vs. Maginot Line mentality (1940)

F-86 vs. MiG-15 (1951-53)

Israeli raid (1976)

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New conception

Action

Exploit operations and weapons

that:

Generate a rapidly changing

environment (quick/clear

observations, orientation

and decisions, fast-tempo,fast transient maneuvers,

quick kill)

Inhibit an adversarys

capacity to adapt to such an

environment (cloud or

distort his observations,orientation, and decisions

and impede his actions)

Idea

Simultaneously compress own

time and stretch-out adversary time

to generate a favorable mismatch

in time/ability to shape and adapt

to change

Goal

Collapse adversarys system into

confusion and disordercausing

him to over and under react to

activity that appearssimultaneously menacing as well

as ambiguous,chaotic, or

misleading.

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A-to-A and A-to-G

Recipe for generating confusionand disorder

Observations

Quick/clear scanning sensors

Suppressed/distorted signatures

Activity

Fire Quick shoot fire control systems and high speed weapons

Movement

High speed (supercruise)

Rapid energy gain and rapid energy loss coupled with high

turn rates and low turn radii High pitch rates/high roll rates/high yaw rates coupled with

ease of control

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Historical snapshots

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Human nature

Goal

Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for

independent action.

The competition for limited resources to satisfy

these desires may force one to:

Diminish adversarys capacity for independent action, or

deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or

make it impossible for him to survive at all.

Implication

Life is conflict, survival, and conquest.

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In addressing any questions about conflict, survival, and

conquest one is naturally led to the

since both treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very

fundamental way. In this regard, many sources (a few on

natural selection and many on war) are reviewed; manypoints of view are exposed.

Comment

11

Theory of evolution by natural selection

andthe conduct of war


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Impression

In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion that:

It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied

rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish adversarys

capacity for independent action.

The simpler organismsthose that make-up man as well as man working

with other men in a higher level contextmust cooperate or, better yet,

harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organicsynthesis.

To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must

take the initiative.

Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the impression

that variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (and their interaction) seem to be key

qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing environment.With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside an

adversarys O-O-D-A loop we will proceed in our historical investigation.

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Historical pattern

Sun Tzu The Art of Warc. 400 B.C.

Theme

Harmony and trust

Justice and well being

Inscrutability and enigma

Deception and subversion

Rapidity and fluidity

Dispersion and concentration

Surprise and shock

Strategy

Probe enemys organization and

dispositions to unmask his strengths,

weaknesses, patterns of movement

and intentions.

Shape enemys perception of world

to manipulate his plans and actions.

Attack enemys plans as best policy.

Next best disrupt his alliances. Next

best attack his army. Attack cities

only when there is no alternative.

Employ chengand ch'imaneuvers to

quickly and unexpectedly hurl

strength against weaknesses.Desired outcome

Subdue enemy

without fighting

Avoid protracted war

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Historical pattern

Early commanders

Alexander

Hannibal

Belisarius

Jenghis Khan

Tamerlane

Impression

Early commanders seem

consistent with ideas of Sun

Tzu

Western commanders

more directly concernedwith winning the battle

Eastern commanders

closer to Sun Tzu in

attempting to shatter

adversary prior to battle

* Cheng/ch'imaneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary

vulnerabilities and weaknesses (a la cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via ch'i).

14

Action

Chengand ch'i*


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Historical pattern

Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and ourcomments about early commanders, lets take a

look at an early tactical theme and some battle

(grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the

different ways that the cheng/ch'igame has been

(and can be) played.

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Historical pattern

Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)

Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform reconnaissance,

screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to:

Unmask enemy dispositions and activities.

Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities.

Confuse, disorder enemy operations.

Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and shields:

Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemyformations generated by interaction with light troops; or

Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make

them vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops.

Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up isolated

remnants of enemy host.

IdeaEmploy maneuveraction by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse,

break-up, and smash enemy formations.

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Battle of MarathonSeptember 12, 490 B.C.

Persian Fleet

Greeks

Persian Army

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Battle of Leuctra~July 6, 371 B.C.

Thebans

Spartans

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V. YE. Savkin The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics

(1972) pages 7 and 203

Battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.)

At this battle Frederick Engels (according to Savkin)credited Epaminondas for having first discovered

and employed an unequal or uneven distribution

of forces across a front as basis to concentrate

forces for the main attack at the decisive point.

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Battle of Arbela*October 1, 331 B.C.

Parmenio Reserve

Line

Chariots

Alexande

r

Companions

DariusMazeus Bessus

*Also known as the Battle ofGaugamela

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Battle of Arbela (Phase II)

Parme

nio

Reserve Line

Alexander

Comp

anionsDariusMazeus

Be

s

sus

Persians FleePersians Flee

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Battle of CannaeAugust 3, 216 B.C.

Romans

Hannibal

Afidus

River

Opening Phase

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Battle of Cannae

Romans

Hannibal

Afidus

River

Final Phase

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Impression

Battles of Marathon, Leuctra, Arbela, and Cannae

emphasize an unequal distribution as basis for local

superiority and decisive leverage to collapse adversary

resistance.

on the other hand

The discussion (so far) provides little insight on how these

battle arrangements and follow-on maneuvers play uponmoral factors such as doubt, fear, anxiety, etc.

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Historical patternChingis Khan and the Mongols

Key asymmetries

Superior mobility

Superior communications

Superior intelligence

Superior leadership

Theme

Widely separated strategic

maneuvers, with appropriate

stratagems, baited retreats, hard-

hitting tactical thrusts, and swirling

envelopments to uncover andexploit adversary vulnerabilities and

weaknesses.

in conjunction with

Clever and calculated use of

propaganda and terror to play upon

adversarys doubts, fears, and

superstitions in order to undermine

his resolve and destroy his will to

resist.

Aim

Conquest, as basis tocreate, preserve, and

expand Mongol nation

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Mongol strategic maneuver(1219-1220)

Kizyl-Kum

KhawarizmState

Bokhara

Samarkand

Caspian

Sea

AralSea

Genghis Khan

Chagatai Jochi

Jebe

500 miles

OxusRiver

(Modern

Uzbekistan)

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? Raises nagging question ?

Even though outnumbered, why were Mongols able

to maneuver in widely scattered arrays without being

defeated separately or in detail?

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Historical patternsChingis Khan and the Mongols

MessageBy exploiting superior leadership, intelligence, communications, and mobility

as well as by playing upon adversarys fears and doubts via propaganda and

terror, Mongols operated inside adversary observation-orientation-decision-

action loops.

Result

Outnumbered Mongols created impressions of terrifying strengthbyseeming to come out of nowhere yet be everywhere.

hence,

Subversive propaganda, clever stratagems, fast breaking maneuvers, andcalculated terror not only created vulnerabilities and weaknesses but also

played upon moral factors that drain-away resolve, produce panic, and bring

about collapse.

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Battle of LeuthenDecember 5, 1757

Leuthen

Borna

Frederick

AdvanceGuard

ScheubergHill

Reserve

Austrians

Breslau

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Historical pattern

18th century theoreticians

Saxe

Bourcet

Guibert

Du Teil

Theme

Plan with several branches

Mobility/fluidity of force

Cohesion


Operate on a line to threaten alternative

objectives

Concentrate direct artillery fire on key

points to be forced

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Action

Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he applied these ideas

ofambiguity, deception, and rapid/easy movement to surprise and successively defeat fractions of superior forces. In

later campaigns (as emperor) he relied increasingly on massed direct artillery fire, dense infantry columns, and heavy

cavalry going against regions of strong, resistanceat an eventually crippling cost in casualties.

American colonists, Spanish and Russian Guerrillas, in unexpected ways, used environmentalbackground (terrain,

weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity as basis fordispersion and concentration to harass, confuse, and

contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.


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Historical pattern

18th century theoreticians

Saxe

Bourcet

Guibert

Du Teil

Theme

Plan with several branches

Mobility/fluidity of force

Cohesion


Operate on a line to threaten alternative

objectives

Concentrate direct artillery fire on key

points to be forced

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Action

Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he exploited theseideas ofvariety and rapidity with harmony for ambiguity, deception, and rapid/easy movement in order to surprise and

successively defeat fractions of superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he exchanged variety and harmony for

rigid uniformity via massed direct artillery fire, dense infantry columns, and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong

resistancethat resulted in an ever higher and crippling cost in casualties.

American colonists, Spanish and Russian guerrillas exploited variety and rapidity associated with environmental

background (terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity of small bands with harmony of common cause against

tyranny/injustice as basis to harass, confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.


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Impression

The ideas of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Bourcet, and Guibert

seem to be at home with either

regularorguerrilla warfare.

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Historical pattern

Napoleons art of war

Revolutionary army gifts to Napoleon

Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiersand new leaders generated by the revolution

and magnified by successes against invading

allied armies

Subdivision of army into smaller self-

contained but mutually supporting units

(divisions)

Ability to travel light and live-off countrysidewithout extensive baggage, many supply

wagons, and slow-moving resupply efforts

Rapid march associated with 120 instead of

the standard 70 steps per minute

Discontinued adherence to 1791 Drill

Regulations pertaining to the well regulated

and stereotype use of column and line

formations for movement and fighting

Beneficial asymmetry

Mobility/fluidity of force dramatically betterthan that possessed by potential

adversaries.

? Raises question ?

How did Napoleon exploit this

superior mobility/fluidity of force?

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Historical pattern


General features

Plan and resolution:

Evolve plan with appropriate variations each of which

correspond to probable or possible actions. Employ

Intelligence/recce units (spies, agents, cavalry, etc.) in

predetermined directions to eliminate or confirm

hypotheses concerning enemy actions thereby reduce

uncertainty and simplify own plans as well as uncover

adversary plans and intentions.

Security:

Generate misinformation, devise stratagems, and alter

composition of major formations to confuse and baffle

enemy agents, spies, etc. Employ screens of cavalry,

infantry, or both and make rise of natural features such

as terrain, weather, and darkness to mask dispositions

and cloak movements against enemy observation.

Strategic dispersion and tactical concentration:

Expand then contract intervals between force components in

an irregularand rapid fashion to cloud/distort strategicpenetration maneuvers yet quickly focus tactical effort

for a convergent blow at the decisive point.

Vigorous offensive action:

Seize initiative at the outset by attacking enemy with an ever-

shifting kaleidoscope of (strategic) moves and

diversions in order to upset his actions and unsettle his

plans thereby psychologically unbalance him and keep

initiative throughout.

Strategic theme

Use unified (or single) line of operations as basis formutual support between separated adjacent and

follow-on units.

Menace (and try to seize) adversary

communications to isolate his forces from outside

support or reinforcement and force him to fight under

unfavorable circumstances by the following actions:

Employ fraction of force to hold or divert

adversary attentionby feints,

demonstrations, pinning maneuvers, etc.

Exploit exterior maneuvers against

exposed flanks or interior maneuvers

thru a weak front to place (bulk of) forces

in adversarys flank and rear.

Set-up supporting centers (bases) of operation and

alternative lines of communication and keep (at least

some) safe and open as basis to maintain freedom of

maneuver.

Aim

Destroy enemy army

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35

Strategy of envelopment(idealized schematic)

corpsofobservation

curtain ofmaneuver

strategicbarrier

line

of

defense

Cheng

pinningforce

ch'i

maneuver force

LOCs

curtain ofmaneuver

strategicbarrier

line

of

defense

pinningforce

secondaryattack

mainattack

corpsof

observation

I. The Envelopment March II. The Reversed Front Battle

cavalry screen

corpsof

observation

cavalry screen

Source: David G. Chandler, Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.


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Axxxx

Bxxxx

xxx

xxx

base base

Nxxxx

xxx

xxxxxx

xxx

xxxxxx

xxx

xxx

LOCLOC

I. Advance to Contact

cavalryscr

een

The strategy of central position(idealized schematic)

Axxxx

Bxxxx

xxx

xxx

base base

Nxxxx

xxx

xxx xxx

xxx

xxxxxx

xxx

xxx

LOCLOC

xx

II. The Double Battle

Axxxx B

xxxx

xxx

base base

xxx

xxx

I

LOC

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

I

I

I

I

overnight forced march

III. The Coup de Grace

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Source: David G. Chandler,

Waterloo: The Hundred Days, 1980.


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Historical pattern


Early tactics

The action was opened by a cloud of sharpshooters,some mounted, some on foot, who were sent forward to

carry out a general rather than a minutely-regulated

mission; they proceeded to harass the enemy, escaping

from his superior numbers by their mobility, from the effect

of his cannon by their dispersal. They were constantly

relieved to ensure that the fire did not slacken, and they

also received considerable reinforcement to increase their

over-all effect Once the chink in foes armour had

been revealed the horse artillery would gallop up andopen fire with canister at close range. The attacking force

would meantime be moving up in the indicated direction,

the infantry advancing in column, the cavalry in regiments

or squadrons, ready to make its presence felt anywhere or

everywhere as required. Then, when the hail of enemy

bullets or cannon balls began to slacken The soldiers

would begin to run forward, those in the front ranks

crossing their bayonets, as the drums beat the charge; the

sky would ring a thousand battle-cries constantly repeated:

En avant. En avant. Vive la Republique.

Later tactics

At the outset, a heavy bombardment would be loosedagainst the enemy formations, causing fearful losses if

they failed to seek shelter, and generally lowering their

power of resistance. Under cover of this fire, swarms of

voltigeurs would advance to within musketry range and

add a disconcerting nuisance element by sniping at

officers and the like. This preliminary phase would be

followed by a series ofheavy cavalry and infantry

attacks. The secret of these was careful timing and

coordination. The first cavalry charges were designed todefeat the hostile cavalry and compel the enemy infantry

to form squares, thereby reduce fire in any one direction

and enable the columns to get to close grips before the

enemy could resume his linear formation. The infantry

(deployed or not) and accompanying horse artillery would

then blaze a gap in the enemy formation and finally the

cavalry would sweep forward, again, to exploit the

breakthrough.

Essential point

Early tactics, without apparent design, operate in a fluid, adaptable manner to uncover, expand

and exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses while later tactics emphasize massed

firepower and stereotyped formations working formally together to smash adversary strength.

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Historical pattern


Critique

Napoleon exploited ambiguity,

deception, and mobility at the strategic

level,

whereas,

He increasingly emphasized formal

battering ram methods and de-

emphasized loose, irregular methods(e.g. skirmishers) at the tactics level

via a return to, and increasingly heavy-

handed application of, the 1791 Drill

Regulations.

Why?

Napoleon emphasized the conduct of

war from the top down. He created and

exploited strategic success to procure

grand tactical and tactical success.

To support his concept, he set up a

highly centralized command and control

system which, when coupled with

essentially unvarying tactical recipes,

resulted in strength smashing into

strength by increasingly unimaginative,

formalized, and predictable actions at

lower and lower levels.

Result

Strategic maneuvers ambiguous and deceiving prior to tactical concentration; after concentration, maneuvers

stereotyped and obvious.

hence

Tactical maneuvers could not easily procure the victory because of their obvious, predictable nature.

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Which unveils

The Napoleonic spirit

Strategic fog followed by stereotyped and ruinous tactical

assaults.

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Historical pattern

Carl von Clausewitz On War1832

Character/nature of war

An act of policy to use violence to imposeones will upon another

Duel or act of human interaction directed

against an animate object that reacts

Uncertainty of information acts as an

impediment to vigorous activity.

Psychological/moral forces and effects

(danger, intelligence, emotional factors )either impede or stimulate activity.

Friction (interaction of many factors,

including those above) impedes activity.

Genius (harmonious balance of

mind/temperament that permit one to

overcome friction and excel at the complex

activity of war) changes the nature and

magnifies the scope of operations.

Strategy

Exhaust enemy by influencing him toincrease his expenditure of effort.

Seek out those centers of gravity upon

which all power/movement depend and, if

possible, trace them back to a single one.

Compress all effort, against those centers,

into the fewest possible actions

Subordinate all minor, or secondary,

actions as much as possible.

Move with the utmost speed.

Seek the major battle (with superiority of

number and conditions that will promise a

decisive victory).

Aim

Render enemy powerlesswith

emphasis on the destruction of

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Historical pattern


Critique

Clausewitz overemphasized decisive

battle and underemphasized strategic

maneuver.

Clausewitz emphasized method and

routine at the tactical level.

Why?

Clausewitz was concerned with trying to

overcome, or reduce, friction/uncertainty. He

failed to address the idea of magnifying

adversarys friction/uncertainty.

Clausewitz was concerned with trying to

exhaust adversary by influencing him to

increase his expenditure of effort. He failed toaddress, or develop, the idea of trying to

paralyze adversary by denying him the

opportunity of expend effort.

Clausewitz incorrectly stated: A center of

gravity is always found where the mass is

concentrated most denselythen argued that

this is the place where the blows must be aimed

and where the decision should be reached. He

failed to develop idea of generating many non-

cooperative centers of gravity by striking at

those vulnerable, yet critical, tendons,

connections, and activities that permit a larger

system to exist.

? Raises question ?

What does all this mean?

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Historical pattern


42

MessageClausewitz did not see that many non-cooperative, or

conflicting, centers of gravity paralyze adversary by denying

him the opportunity to operate in a directed fashion, hence

they impede vigorous activity and magnify friction.

Likely result

Operations end in a bloodbathvia the well regulated

stereotyped tactics and unimaginative battles of attrition

suggested by Clausewitz.


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Historical pattern

Jomini 1861

Secret of success

the narratives of Frederick the Great: commenced to

initiate me in the secret which had caused him to gain

the miraculous victory of Leuthen. I perceived that this

secret consisted in the very simple maneuver ofcarrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the

hostile army I found again, afterwards, the same

cause in the first successes of Napoleon in Italy, which

gave me the idea that by applying, through strategy, to

the whole chess-table of a war this same principlewhich Frederick had applied to battles, we should have

the key to all the science of war.

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Historical pattern

Jomini The Art of War1836

Key idea and supporting mechanism

Generalize oblique order associated with

Battles at Leuctra and Leuthen

Divide theater and its subordinate

components (zones, fronts, positions, etc.) into

three-subdivisionsa center and two wings

as basis to apply the Leuctra/Leuthen concept

in strategic and grand tactical maneuvers.

Set-up base(s) of operations and (alternative)

lines of communication for freedom to shape

and shift flow/direction of operations as basis

to apply Leuctra/Leuthen strategic and grand

tactical maneuvers.

Strategy/grand tactics

By free and rapid movements carry bulk of the forces

(successively) against fractions of the enemy.

Strike in the most decisive directionthat is to say

against the center or one wing or the center and one

wing simultaneously.

If possible, seize adversarys communications

(without losing ones own) and force him to fight on a

reverse front, by using bulk of forces to hit his flank

and take him in the rearwhile using detachments, as

needed, to block the arrival of reinforcements as well

as draw his attention elsewhere.

If the enemys forces are too much extended, pierce

his center to divide and crush his fractions separately.

To outflank and turn (envelop) a wing, hit enemy in

the flank and also contain him at the front.

An attack may be made simultaneously upon both

extremities but not when the attacking force is equal or

inferior (numerically) to the enemy.

Aim

To make evident a secret

for success in war

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Historical pattern

Jomini The Art of War1836

CritiquePreoccupation with form of operations, spatial arrangement

of bases, formal orders of battle, and tactical formations.

Lack of appreciation for the use of loose, irregular swarms of

guerrillas and skirmishers to mask own dispositions,

activities, and intentions as well as confuse and disorder

enemy operations.

Likely result

Operations become stereotypedunless one canappreciate Jominis ideas outside their formal underpinnings.

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Historical pattern

Napoleon, Clausewitz, Jomini

Key pointNapoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini did not appreciate

importance of loose, irregulartactical arrangements and

activities to mask or distort own presence and intentions as

well as confuse and disorder adversary operations.

? Why ?

Major flaw

Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini viewed the conduct of warand related operations in essentially one directionfrom the

top downemphasizing adaptability at the top and regularity

at the bottom.

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Emil SchalkSummary of The Art of War1862

There are three great maxims common to the whole science of war; they are:

1stConcentrate your force, and act with the whole of it on one part only of

the enemys force.

2ndAct against the weakest part of your enemyhis center, if he is

dispersed; his flank or rear, if concentrated. Act against hiscommunications without endangering your own.

3rdWhatever you do, as soon as you have made your plan, and taken the

decision to act upon it, act with the utmost speed, so that you may obtain

your object before the enemy suspects what you are about.

Caution

While these maxims by Schalk portray, in a general way, physical maneuvers

that can be used to realize ones purpose in war at the strategic level, they do not

address the non-adaptability and predictability (via the drill regulation mind-set)

that permeated 19th century maneuvers at the tactical level.

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Impact of 19th century technology on war

Key ingredientsRailroad/telegraph

Quick fire artillery

Machine gun

Repeating rifle

Barbed wire

Trenches

Early trendsEmphasis toward massed firepower and

large armies supported by rail logistics

Increased emphasis on a holding

defense and flanking or wide turning

maneuvers into adversary rear to gain a

decisionContinued use of frontal assaults by large

stereotyped infantry formations (e.g.

regiments, battalions), supported by

artillery barrages, against regions of

strong resistance

Result

Huge armies, and massed firepower and other vast needs supported through a narrow fixed logistics

network, together with tactical assaults by large stereotyped formations, suppressed ambiguity,

deception, and mobility hence surprise of any operation.

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f


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Technology and the art of war

The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jominis tactical regularity and the continued use of

large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large armiesand massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, telegraphed any punch

hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and mobility to generate

surprise for a decisive edge.

In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and

debilitating casualties on all sides during the:

American Civil War (1861-65) Austro-Prussian War (1866) Franco-Prussian War (1870) Boer War (1899-1902) Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) World War I (1914-18)

Point

Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and producedby 19th century technology.

? Raises question ?

Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better tactics to

avoid over a half century of debilitating casualties?

49

I t f 19th t it li


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Impact of 19th century capitalism oninsurrection/revolution

(with a Marxian flavor)Comment

A look back reveals that we have been speaking of conflict between social systems, rather thanwithin social systems. With the explosive expansion of capitalism in the 19th century we begin to see

the rise of much turmoil and attendant conflict due to opposing tendencies contained within capitalism

itself.

Trend

Without going into explicit detail we find (according to many investigators, including Karl Marx): that

the interaction of competition, technology, specialization (division of labor), concentration of production

in large scale enterprises, and the taking and plowing back of profits into this interaction produceopposing tendencies and periodic crises that leave in their wake more and more workers competing

for jobs in fewer and fewer, but larger, firms that increasingly emphasize (percentage-wise) the use of

more machines and less labor.

Result

Low paid wage earners exhibit discontent and hatred for a system that permits others to live in

comfort or luxury while they must live a life of toil, subject to strict and frequently harsh factory

discipline.Witnessing these unfolding circumstances disillusioned intellectuals, bankrupt owners, and others

take the side of the workers, as an enlightened vanguard, to mold them into a powerful opposition.

Raises question

How should such an unpleasant situation be corrected?

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Impact of 19th century capitalism on


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MessageAccording to Marx/Engels and their followers, the only way out is via revolution and dictatorship of

the proletariat (workers) to smash the capitalistic system and replace it with one that does not exploit

and oppress masses for the benefit of a ruling elite or class.

Necessary conditions for success

Crisis generated by discontent/misery of masses and vacillation by authorities who indicate

unwillingness or inability to come to grips with existing instability.

Vanguard, or disciplined hard core, that offers leadership, provides a way out, and has support of

masses.

Why

Crises represent height of confusion/disorder due to many opposing tendencies (centers of gravity)

that magnify friction, hence paralyze efforts by authorities to dominate such surges of turmoil. In this

sense, crises are periods of vulnerability/weakness that beg to be exploited.

Vanguards represent disciplined moral/mental/physical bodies focused to shape and guide massesas well as participate in action to exploit and expand confusion/disorder of crises that shake

adversarys will to respond in a directed way.

Key insight

Crises and Vanguards are the golden keys that permit us to penetrate to the core of

insurrection/revolution and, as we shall see later, modern guerrilla warfare.

51

p y pinsurrection/revolution

(with a Marxian flavor)

C it li t h l d


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Capitalism, technology andthe conduct of war

The creation of crises and vanguards, via 19th century capitalism,

make evident the foundations upon which to conduct

insurrection/revolution in order to destroy a society from within.

On the other hand

It is not yet clear how these notions change or fit into the way we

exploit technology and conduct war against societies from within

as well as from without. To gain such an appreciation we must

look at the period containing World War I, World War II, and theiraftermath.

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World War I

Plans and execution

Stagnation

Finale

53

S hli ff t t i


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Schlieffen strategic maneuver

Netherlands

Belgium

France

FranceGermany

Paris

LU

August 4 September 8, 1914

54

W ld W I


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World War I

ActionOffensives conducted on wide

frontagesemphasizing few, rather

than many, harmonious yet independent

thrusts.

Evenness of advance maintained to

protect flanks and provide artillerysupport as advance makes headway.

Reserves thrown in whenever attack

held-upagainst regions or points of

strong resistance.

ReactionDefense organized into depth of

successive belts of fortified terrain.

Massed artillery and machine-gun fire

designed to arrest and pin down

attacker.

Counter-attack to win back lost ground.

Result

Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of

hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to

reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry.

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W ld W I


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World War Ia way out

Infiltration tactics

Guerrilla tactics

Capt. Andre Laffargue

Gen. von Hutier?

Gen. Ludendorff

T.E. Lawrence

Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck

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Idea Authors

World War I


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World War Iinfiltration tactics

Action

Brief but intense artillery bombardment, that includes gas and smoke shell, todisrupt/suppress defenses and obscure the assault.

Stosstruppen (small teams or squads of thrust troops equipped with light machine-guns,

flame-throwers, etc.) thrust forward close behind rolling artillery barrage, without any

effort to maintain a uniform rate of advance or align formations. Instead, as many tiny,

irregular swarms spaced in breadth and echeloned in depth, they seep or flow into any

gaps or weaknesses they can find in order to drive deep into adversary rear.

Kampfgruppen (small battle groups consisting of infantry, machine-gunners, mortar

teams, artillery observers and field engineers) follow-up to cave-in exposed flanks and

mop-up isolated centers of resistance from flank and rear.

Reserves and stronger follow-on echelons move through newly created breaches to

maintain momentum and exploit success, as well as attack flanks and rear to widen

penetration and consolidate gains against counter attack.

Idea

Hurl strength (echeloned in great depth), via an irruption of many thrusts, thru

weaknesses along (many) paths of least resistance to gain the opportunity for

breakthrough and envelopment.

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World War I


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Note

Such classic descriptions, often repeated, create in listeners

or readers minds vivid images of the infiltration technique.

Critique

Unfortunately this depiction does not address how and why

infiltration fire and movement schemes work.

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World War I


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Key pointsFire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited to hold

adversary attention and pin him down hence

Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an

immediate and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads

down and dramatically obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators movements.

Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to welldefined line abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and

changing terrain features as they push forward.

Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the indistinct

character of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity

to picture what is taking place.

Result

Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru,

around, and behind disoriented defenders.

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World War I


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EssenceCloud/distort signature and improve mobility to avoid fire yet focus

effort to penetrate, shatter, envelop, and mop-up disconnected or

isolated debris of adversary system.

Intent

Exploit tactical dispersion in a focused way to gain tactical successand expand it into a grand tactical success.

Implication

Small units exploiting tactical dispersion in a focused wayrather

than large formations abiding by the Principle of Concentration

penetrate adversary to generate many non-cooperative (or

isolated) centers of gravity as basis to magnify friction, paralyze

effort, and bring about adversary collapse.

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? Natural question ?

Are infiltration tactics a rejection of the Napoleonic

methodsor are they application of these methods under

a different guise?

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Response

Infiltration fire and movement schemes can be viewed as Napoleons multi-

thrust strategic penetration maneuvers being transformed into multi-thrust

tactical penetration maneuvers down to the lowest

operational/organizational levelthe squad.

Point

Until the rise of the infiltration tactics (and the use of tanks by the allies) in

the latter part of WWI, neither the 19th century nor the 20th century

commanders were able to evolve effective tactical penetration maneuvers

that could offset the massive increase in weapons lethality developedduring this same period.

Why

The aristocratic tradition, the top-down command and control system, the

slavish addiction to the Principle of Concentration, and the drill regulation

mind-set, all taken together, reveal an obsession for control by high-levelsuperiors over low-level subordinates that restrict any imagination,

initiative, and adaptability needed by a system to evolve the indistinct-

irregular-mobile tactics that could counter the increase in weapons

lethality.

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World War I


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Result

Immediate success at platoon/company/battalion level coupled with ultimatefailure at corps/army level.

Why

Ludendorff violated his own concept by his tendency to use strategic reserves

to reinforce against hardened resistancehence, at the strategic level, heseduced himself into supporting failure not success.

Exhaustion of combat teams leading the assault.

Logistics too inflexible to support rapid/fluid penetration and deeper

exploitation of breakthrough.

Communications too immobile to allow command to quickly identify and

reinforce successful advances.Elastic zone defense, when used, (as developed by the Germans and

practiced by Ptain) that emphasizes artillery and flank attacks against

penetrations when they stretch beyond their own artillery support.

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World War I Guerrilla Warfare


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World War I Guerrilla Warfare(a la T.E. Lawrence)

Action

Gain support of population. Must arrange the minds of friend, foe andneutral alike. Must get inside their minds.

Must be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about

like a gas (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must be an

attack-in-depth.

Tactics should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes with use of the

smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place.

Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat

everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental

background (vast unknown desert) as basis for never affording a target

and never on the defensive except by accident and in error.

Idea

Disintegrate existing regimes ability to govern.

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Impression

Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to

irregular or guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence.

Why? Both stress clouded/distorted signatures, mobility and

cohesion of small units as basis to insert an amorphous yet focused

effort into or thru adversary weaknesses.

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Major advances between World War I and II


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Major advances between World War I and II

Soviet revolutionary strategy

Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea ofcrises and vanguardsthat arise out of Marxian contradictions withincapitalismto lay-out Soviet revolutionary strategy.

Result:

A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to destroy a regime from within.

Lightning war (Blitzkrieg)

Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with:

Tank

Motorized Artillery

Tactical Aircraft Motor Transport

Better Communications

Result:

Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using armor, motorized

infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.

Guerrilla war

Mao Tse-Tung synthesized Sun Tzus ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, and Napoleonic style mobile

operations under an umbrella of Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging modern (guerrilla) war.Result:

Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic, social and military framework for total

war.

by

J.F.C. Fuller

Heinz Guderian

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Soviet revolutionary strategy(a la Lenin/Stalin)

Tasks

Employ agitation and propaganda in order to exploit opposing tendencies, internal tensions, etc. Object is to bringabout a crises, to make revolution ripe as well as convince masses that there is a way-out. This is accomplished

when the vanguard is able to:

Fan discontent/misery of working class and masses and focus it as hatred toward existing system.

Cause vacillation/indecision among authorities so that they cannot come to grips with existing instability.

Confuse other elements in society so that they dont know exactly what is happening or where the

movement is going.

Convince proletariat class they have a functionthe function of promoting revolution in order to secure the

promised ideal society.Concentrate the main forces of the revolution at the enemys most vulnerable spot at the decisive moment, when

the revolution has already become ripe, when the offensive is going full steam ahead, when insurrection is

knocking at the door, and when bringing the reserves up to the vanguard is the decisive condition of success. To

quote Lenin on paraphrasing Marx and Engels:

Never play with insurrection, but, when beginning it, firmly realize that you must go to the end.

Concentrate a great superiority of forces at the decisive point, at the decisive moment, otherwise the

enemy, who has the advantage of better preparation and organization, will destroy the insurgents.

Once the insurrection has begun, you must act with the greatest determination, and by all means, without

fail, take the offensive. The defensive is the death of an armed rising.

You must try to take the enemy by surprise and seize the moment when his forces are scattered.

You must strive for daily successes, even if small (one might say hourly, if it is the case of one town), and

at all costs retain the moral ascendancy.

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Soviet revolutionary strategy(a la Lenin/Stalin)

Tasks

Select the moment for the decisive blow, the moment for starting the insurrection, so timed as to coincide with themoment when the crisis has reached its climax, when the vanguard is prepared to fight to the end, the reserves are

prepared to support the vanguard, and maximum consternation reigns in the ranks of the enemy. According to

Lenin the decisive moment has arrived when:

All the class forces hostile to us have become sufficiently entangled, are sufficiently at loggerheads, have

sufficiently weakened themselves in a struggle which is beyond their strength;

All the vacillating, wavering, unstable, intermediate elementsthe petty bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeois

democrats as distinct from the bourgeoisiehave sufficiently exposed themselves in the eyes of the

people, have sufficiently disgraced themselves through their practical bankruptcy;

Among the proletariat a mass sentiment in favor of supporting the most determined, supremely bold,

revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie has arisen and has. begun to grow vigorously. Then revolution

is indeed ripe. Then, indeed, if we have correctly gauged all the conditions indicated above and if wehave chosen the moment rightly, our victory is assured.

Pursue the course adopted, no matter what difficulties and complications are encountered on the road towards the

goal. This is necessary in order that the vanguard not lose sight of the main goal of the struggle and the masses not

stray from the road while marching towards that goal and striving to rally around the vanguard.

Maneuver the reserves with a view to effecting a proper retreat when the enemy is strong when, with the givenrelation of forces, retreat becomes the only way to escape a blow against the vanguard and retain the vanguardsreserves. The object of this strategy is to gain time, to disrupt the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order later to

assume the offensive.

Goal

Destroy capitalism as well as its offspring imperialism and replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat.

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Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy


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Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy

Infiltration and isolation

Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral fiber ofthe political, economic and social structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic, psychological, and

various sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby isolate intended victim

(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu, blitz, and guerrillas:

Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in order to unmask

strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.

Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., in

order to foment mistrust, sow discord and shape both adversarys and allies perception

of the world thereby: Create atmosphere of mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness,

panic Manipulate or undermine adversarys plans and actions. Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time of trial.

PurposeForce capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures

or

Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow.

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Blitzkrieg


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Blitzkrieg

Action

Intelligence (signal, photo, agent ), reconnaissance (air and ground), and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during

combat operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly situation to expose attractive, or appropriate, alternatives that

exploit adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape mission commitment and influence command intent.

Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt(focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary

strength and strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting efforts) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary

attention and strength (elsewhere).

Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means) enemy rear areas where, with agents already in place, they: seize

bridges and road crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or blow-up power stations, seize or blow-up fuel dumps, as well as

sow confusion/disorder via false messages and fake orders.

Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are focused in appropriate areas

to impede (or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divertattention.

Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate

adversary front to find paths of least resistance.

Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery

and air support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least

resistance uncovered by armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers.

When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift

when necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt

movement, paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources.Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the

breaches and secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack.

Idea

Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of

armored teams, with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of

adversary organism in order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist.

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ImpressionReflection upon discussion, so far, reveals that Blitzkrieg

generates many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well

as undermines or seizes those that adversary depends upon,

in order to impede vigorous activity and magnify friction,

thereby paralyze adversary by denying him the opportunity tooperate in a directed way.

? Raises nagging question ?

How do blitzers simultaneously sustain rapid pace andabruptly adapt to changing circumstances without losing

cohesion or coherency of their overall effort?

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Blitz operating philosophy


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Blitz operating philosophy

Key point

Each level from simple to complex (platoon to theater) has their own observation-orientation-decision-actiontime cycle that increases as we try to control more levels and details of command at the higher levels. Put

simply, as the number of events we must consider increase, the longer it takes to observe-orient-decide-act.

Idea

This brings out the idea that faster tempo, or rhythm, at lower levels should work within the slower rhythm but

larger pattern at higher levels so that overall system does not lose its cohesion or coherency.

Raises question

How do blitzers harmonize these differing tempos/rhythms so that they can exploit the faster rhythm/smallerpattern (of the lower-level units) yet maintain the coherency of the rhythm/pattern for the larger effort?

Response

Give lower-level commanders wide freedom, within an overall mind-time-space scheme, to shape/direct

their own activities so that they can exploit faster tempo/rhythm at tactical levels yet be in harmony with the

larger pattern/slower rhythm associated with the more general aim and larger effort at the strategic level.

Shaping agents

Shape overall scheme by using mission concept or sense of mission to fix responsibility and shapecommitment at all levels and through all parts of the organism. Likewise, use Schwerpunktconcept through all

levels to link differing rhythms/patterns so that each part or level of the organic whole can operate at its own

natural rhythmwithout pulling organism apartinstead of the slower pace associated with a rigid centralized

control.

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? Raises questions ?

What does an overall mind-time-space scheme imply

or presuppose?

How do mission and Schwerpunktconcepts give

shape to this overall scheme?

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Overall mind-time-space scheme


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Overall mind time space scheme

Message

According to General Gunther Blumentritt, such a scheme presupposes a commonoutlook based upon a body of professional officers who have received exactly the

same training during the long years of peace and with the same tactical education,

the same way of thinking, identical speech, hence a body of officers to whom all

tactical conceptions were fully clear.

Furthermore, a la General Blumentritt, it presupposes an officers training institution

which allows the subordinate a very great measure of freedom of action andfreedom in the mannerof executing orders and which primarily calls for independent

daring, initiative and sense of responsibility.

Point

Without a common outlook superiors cannot give subordinates freedom-of-action

and maintain coherency of ongoing action.

ImplicationA common outlook possessed by a body of officers represents a unifying theme

that can be used to simultaneously encourage subordinate initiative yet realize

superior intent.

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? Raises question ?

Very nice, but how do the German concepts of mission

and Schwerpunktgive shape to this scheme?

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Mission


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Mission

Message

The German concept of mission can be thought of as a contract, hence anagreement, between superior and subordinate. The subordinate agrees to make his

actions serve his superiors intent in terms ofwhat is to be accomplished, while the

superior agrees to give his subordinate wide freedom to exercise his imagination

and initiative in terms ofhow intent is to be realized.

As part of this concept, the subordinate is given the right to challenge or question

the feasibility of mission if he feels his superiors ideas on what can be achieved arenot in accord with the existing situation or if he feels his superior has not given him

adequate resources to carry it out. Likewise, the superior has every right to expect

his subordinate to carry-out the mission contract when agreement is reached on

what can be achieved consistent with the existing situation and resources provided.

Limitation

While this concept of mission gives form and expression to what is expected

between an individual superior and subordinate, it does not suggest ways to

coordinate or harmonize activities among many superiors and subordinates as a

collective group.

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? Raises question ?

With this limitation in mind how does Schwerpunktplay

into or add to this concept?

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Schwerpunkt


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Schwerpunkt(focus of main effort)

Message

Schwerpunktacts as a center or axis or harmonizing agent that is used to help shape commitment and convey or carry-out intent, at all levels from theater to platoon, hence an image around which:

Maneuver of all arms and supporting elements are focused to exploit opportunities and maintain tempo of

operations,

and

Initiative of many subordinates is harmonized with superior intent.

In this sense Schwerpunktcan be thought of as:

A focusing agent that naturally produces an unequal distribution of effort as a basis to generate superiority in

some sectors by thinning-out others,

as well as

A medium to realize superior intent without impeding initiative of many subordinates, hence a medium through

which subordinate initiative is implicitly connected to superior intent.

Implication

Schwerpunktrepresents a unifying concept that provides a way to rapidly shape focus and direction of effort as well asharmonize support activities with combat operations, thereby permit a true decentralization of tactical command within

centralized strategic guidancewithout losing cohesion of overall effort.

or put another way

Schwerpunktrepresents a unifying medium that provides a directed way to tie initiative of many subordinate actions

with superior intent as a basis to diminish friction and compress time in order to generate a favorable mismatch in

time/ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances.

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German operational philosophy


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Ge a ope at o a p osop y

Impression

The German operational philosophy based upon a common outlook and freedom-of-action, and realized through their concepts of mission and Schwerpunkt, emphasized

implicit over explicit communication.

which suggests

The secret of the German command and control system lies in whats unstated or not

communicated to one anotherto exploit lower-level initiative yet realize higher-level

intent, thereby diminish friction and reduce time, hence gain both quickness andsecurity.

Result

The Germans were able to repeatedly operate inside their adversarys observation-

orientation-decision-action loops.or as stated by General Blumentritt,

The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged upon rapid, concise

assessment of situations quick decision and quick execution, on the principle: each

minute ahead of the enemy is an advantage.

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Impression of the


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pBlitzkrieg penetration

Thrust and roll out/roll up tacticsJRB Comment:Bundles of multiple

thrusts inside multiple

thrusts

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Impression of the pincer envelopment


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p p p

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Impression of the envelopment


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p p

JRB comment: Even if the situation is thesame, do it differently. Gen Hermann Balck

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Typical impression of


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yp pBlitzkrieg envelopment

JRB comment: typical, but

incorrect. Should be multiple

thrusts, instead of a steamroller.

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Creation of the Blitzkrieg


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g

Envelopment(Leuctra,Cannae)

FlyingColumns

(Mongols)

Tank Attackwith

MotorizedVehicles

(J.F.C. Fuller)

Infiltration(Ludendorff)

Blitzkrieg(Heinz

Guderian)

Multiple,narrow thrusts

Armored recceCommanders

forwardExtensive

communicationsnet

Air in lieu of (orwith) artillery

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? Natural question ?

Why employ multiple thrusts, bundles of multiple thrusts, or

bundles of thrusts inside bundles of thrusts?

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Response


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p

Present many (fast breaking) simultaneous and sequentialhappenings to generate confusion and disorderthereby

stretch-out time for adversary to respond in a directed

fashion.

Multiply opportunities, to uncover, create, and penetrate

gaps, exposed flanks, and vulnerable rears.

Create and multiply opportunities to splinter organism and

envelop disconnected remnants thereby dismember

adversary thru the tactical, grand tactical, and strategic

levels.

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Which lead to:


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Essence of Blitzkrieg

Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunktmaneuver philosophy to generate ambiguity, realize

deception, exploit superior mobility, and focus violence as basis to quickly:

Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any moral or mental

inadequacies as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that open into adversarys vulnerable

rear and interior, hence-

Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate adversary organism, at all

levels (tactical, grand tactical, and strategic) and in many ways, in order to splinter,

envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out isolated remnants, thereby generate confusion and disorder,

hence- Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his system for communication, command,

and support, as well as undermine or seize those connections or centers that he depends

upon, thus shake his will or capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons,

operational reserves, and/or strategic reserves, thereby magnify adversarys confusion

and disorder and convince him to give up.

Intent

Create grand tactical success then exploit and expand it into strategic success for a decisivevictory.

Implication

Blitzers, by being able to infiltrate orpenetrate orget inside adversarys system, generate many

moral-mental-physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as undermine or

seize those centers of gravity adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, produce

paralysis, and bring about adversary collapse.

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World War II


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Blitzkrieg

Keys to success

Emphasis on a common outlook and freedom-of-action that are exploited by mission andSchwerpunktconcepts to fix responsibilities as well as to rapidly shape, focus, and shift

operations and support at all levels.

Flexible commandbased on a common outlook and freedom-of-action that are exploited by

mission and Schwerpunktthat encourages lower-level combat leaders (forward) to exploit

opportunities generated by rapid action within a broad loosely woven scheme laid down from

central command.

Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and duringcombat operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses, moves,

and intentions.

Broad use ofSchwerpunktconcept coupled with fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams

and air support permit blitzers to repeatedly reshape strength and rapidly shift it against, or

through, weaknesses thereby generate doubt and uncertainty which magnify into panic and

chaos.

Superior mobile communications to maintain cohesion of overall effort and to enable higher

command levels to allocate reserves and support and to reshape as well as shift focus of maineffort.

Essential and only essential logistics tail (using airlift when appropriate and necessary) to

support high-speed movement and rapid shift among routes of advance.

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Blitz results


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Poland

France

Balkans

Russia

North Africa

Russia

RussiaAdvance thru France

Manchuria

Middle East

Czechoslovakia

Middle East

19391940194119411941-42Summer 1942Feb-March 1943

19441945196719681973

Russia

Russia

North Africa

Russia

Ardennes

Winter 1941-42

Fall, Winter 1942-43

1942

Summer 1943

Winter 1944-45

Successful Unsuccessful

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Modern guerrilla campaign


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Action

Capitalize on discontent and mistrust generated by corruption (real or imagined), exploitation, oppression, incompetence, and unwanted presence of

existing regime to evolve a common cause or unifying theme as basis to organize and maintain mass popular support through a militant political program.Set-up administrative and military organization, sanctuary, and communications network under the control of the guerrilla political leadership withoutarousing regimes intelligence and security apparatus. Build-up a shadow government, with parallel hierarchies, in localities and regions that can be

made ripe for insurrection/revolution by infiltrating cadres (vanguards) who can not only subvert existing authority but also convert leaders and people to

guerrilla cause and organizational way.

Exploit subversion of government and conversion of people to guerrilla cause to create an alien atmosphere of security and intelligence in order toblind regime to guerrilla plans, operations, and organization yet make visible regimes strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.

Shape propaganda, foment civil disorders (such as rallies, demonstrations, strikes, and riots), use selected terrorism, perform sabotage, and exploitresulting misinformation to expand mistrust and sow discord thereby magnify the appearance of corruption, incompetence, etc., and the inability of

regime to govern.

Employ tiny cohesive bands for surprise hit-and-run raids against lines of communications to gain arms and supplies as well as disrupt governmentcommunication, coordination, and movement. Retreat and melt into environment when faced by superior police and armed forces.

Disperse or scatter tiny guerrilla bands to arouse the people (and gain recruits) as well as harass, wear-out, and spread-out government forces whilelarger bands, or mobile formations, concentrate to wipe-out his dispersed, isolated, and relatively weak fractions by sudden ambush or sneak attack.

Play upon the grievances and obsessions of people (via propaganda, re-education, and selected successes) as well as encourage government toindiscriminately take harsh reprisal measures against them in order to connect the government with expanding climate of mistrust, discord, and moral

disintegration. Simultaneously, show (by contrast) that guerrillas exhibit moral authority, offer competence, and provide desired benefits in order to further

erode government influence, gain more recruits, multiply base areas, and increase political infrastructure hence expand guerrilla influence/control over

population and countryside.

Demonstrate disintegration of regime by striking cheng/ch'ifashion, with small fluid bands and ever larger mobile formations, to split-up, envelop, and

annihilate fractions of major enemy forces.

Idea

Defeat existing regime politically by showing they have neither the moral right nor demonstrated ability to govern and militarily by continuously usingstealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of small bands and larger units in cooperation with political agitprop (agitation/propaganda) teams

as basis to harass, confuse and ultimately destroy the will or capacity to resist.

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Essence

Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their appearances) as basis to generate

atmosphere of mistrust and discord in order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime.

Simultaneously,

Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and punish corruption, remove

injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in order to

bind people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals.

Intent

Shape and exploit crises environment that permits guerrilla vanguards or cadres to pump-up guerrilla

resolve, attract the uncommitted, and drain-away adversary resolve as foundation to replace existing

regime with guerrilla regime.

Implication

Guerrillas, by being able to penetrate the very essence of their adversarys moral-mental-physical being,

generate many moral-mental-physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as subvertor seize those centers of gravity that adversary regime must depend upon, in order to magnify friction,

produce paralysis, and bring about collapse.

Yet,

Guerrillas shape or influence moral-mental-physical atmosphere so that potential adversaries, as well as

the uncommitted, are drawn toward guerrilla philosophy and are empathetic toward guerrilla success.

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Looking back

Now, if we look at the ingredients that make-up modern guerrilla

campaigns as well as refer back to our discussion about Soviet

revolutionary strategy and the impact of 19th century capitalism

on insurrection/revolution, we gain some insight into the strategic

philosophy that underlies todays guerrilla efforts.

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Underlying strategic philosophy

Guerrilla vanguards employ a variety of means to play-upon regimes

internal frictions, obsessions, etc., as well as stimulate discontent/mistrust

of people. In this way, vanguards sow discord that in turn magnifies

regimes internal frictions, obsessions, etc., thereby paralyze its ability to

come to grips with crises that further fan atmosphere of mistrust and

discord that feed criseshence push them out-of-control.Simultaneously,

Guerrilla vanguards share burden as well as help people cope with

turmoilthat vanguards keep fanning and enmesh people intoin order to

demonstrate ability to deal with surging crises as well as shape image that

only guerrillas offer a way-out of existing unpleasant circumstances.

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Insight


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Insurrection/revolution becomes ripe when many perceive an

illegitimate inequalitythat is, when the people see themselves

as being exploited and oppressed for the undeserved enrichment

and betterment of an elite few. This means that the guerrillas not

only need an illegitimate inequality but they also need support of the

people; otherwise, insurrection/revolution is impossible.

? Raises question ?

In the deepest possible sense what does it mean to have support of

the people?

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Message


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Guerrillas must establish implicit connections or bonds with people and

countryside.

In other words

Guerrillas must be able to blend into the emotional-cultural-intellectual

environment of people until they become one with the people.

In this sense

People feelings and thoughts must be guerrilla feeling and thoughts while

guerrilla feelings and thoughts become people feelings and thoughts;

people aspirations must be guerrilla aspirations while guerrilla aspirations

become people aspirations; people goals must be guerrilla goals while

guerrilla goals become people goals.

Result

Guerrillas become indistinguishable from people while government is

isolated from people.

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Keys to success

Ability to continuously demonstrate government weakness, erode government

influence, and cause government to alienate itself from people.

Support of people (both psychological and physical) for intelligence, recruits, shelter,

transportation, refuge, food, money, and medical aid.

Access to (more or less permanent) safe sanctuaries or base areas and/or fluid

bases that can be shifted from place to place, away from enemy forcesin order to

rest, recuperate, repair materiel, etc., as well as indoctrinate, train, and equiprecruits.

Use of stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action coupled with cohesion of guerrilla bands

as basis for:

dispersion, to arouse people, to avoid adversary strength, and to force

government to thin-out, or disperse, its strength;

concentration, to hit and wipe-out isolated fractions; shifting of effort (in these as well as other activities), in order to gain and

keep initiative.

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Guerrilla results


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American Colonies

Spain

Russia

German East Africa

Arabia

China

Russia

YugoslaviaIndochina

Algeria

Cuba

South Vietnam

1775-81

1808-14

18121914-

181916-

181927-

491941-

451941-

451945-

541954-

621956-

591958-

75

Philippines

South Africa

Greece

Philippines*

Malaya*

1899-

1902

1900-02

1944-49

1946-54

1948-60

Regime exercised particular care notto inflict casualties and to protectpopulation.

Successful Unsuccessful

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Blitz/guerrilla theme


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Essence

Avoid battlesinstead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, orseize

those connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion (e.g.,

psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of communication,

command and supply centers )

Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to

generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shockagain, again, again

Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the subversion,

surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure.

IntentExploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate

confusion, disorder, panic, etc., thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze

effort, and bring about adversary collapse.

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? Key question ?

Why have blitz and guerrilla tactics been so

extraordinarily successful?

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Message


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Blitz and guerrillas, by being able to operate in a directed, yet more indistinct, more irregular,

and quicker mannerthan their adversaries, can:

Repeatedly concentrate or disperse more inconspicuously and/or more quickly from or to

lower levels of distinction (organizational, operational, and environmental) without losing

internal harmony, as well as,

Repeatedly and unexpectedly infiltrate orpenetrate adversaries vulnerabilities and

weaknesses in order to splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm disconnected

remnants of adversary organism.

or put another wayBlitz and guerrillas, by operating in a directed, yet more indistinct, more irregular, and quicker

manner, operate inside their adversaries observation-orientation-decision-action loops orget

inside their mind-time-space as basis to penetrate the moral-mental-physical being of their

adversaries in order to pull them apart, and bring about their collapse.

Underlying idea

Such amorphous, lethal, and unpredictable activity by blitz and guerrillas make them appear

awesome and unstoppable which altogether produce uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion,

disorder, fear, panic and ultimately collapsea notion implied by Sun Tzu around 400 B.C. andmore recently by J.F.C. Fuller after observing the impact of Ludendorffs infiltration tactics in 1918.

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? Natural questions ?

How can we defend against or counter the blitz?

How can we defend against or counter the guerrilla movement?

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Where are the weaknessesf th blit ?


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of the blitz?

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Key point

Difficult to sustain fast-tempo and maintain cohesion of blitz effort

when forced to repeatedly and rapidly shift concentration of strength

against weakness.

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Counter-blitz(V i ti f G i d i WWII)


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(Variation of German experiences during WWII)

Posture

Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and patrols to

report on adversary activity and warn of any impending or actual incursions.Deploy, disperse, and frequently redeploy/redisperse reconnaissance and mobile antitank/infantry/armored

teams together with artillery in region behind screen, so that they can mask dispositions, as well as move

inconspicuously/quickly to focus and shift local main efforts against adversary thrusts.

Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, anti-tank/infantry/armor and artillery so that

they can easily focus effort, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthroughor push-off for a blitz

counterstroke.

Action

Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored reconnaissance teams to determine direction/strength of thrusts

and to continuously harass by repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks in order to slow momentum and

erode cohesion of blitz attack.

Inconspicuously move-in with high-speed mobile anti-tank/infantry/armored teams, together with air and artillery

support, to strengthen favorable sectors. Hit adversary thrusts and resupply efforts with ambuscades and with

repeated sudden/sharp flank and rear counter-thrusts to channel as well as drain-away momentum and break-up

cohesion of blitz thrusts.

Concentrate swift armored combat forces (held in reserve) and use with air to rapidly drive a shallow and/or

deep flank counterstroke in order to swing in behind and roll-up blitz offensive in detail (counterstroke launchedwhile adversary is moving forward).

Idea

Smash blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of counter-blitz

combat teams as basis forshifting of forces and quick focus of air and ground effort to throttle momentum,

shatter cohesion, and envelop blitz in order to destroy adversarys capacity to resist.

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Blitz and counter-blitz


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Main features and emphasis

Intelligence and recce action

Infiltration/penetration and isolation

Ambiguity, deception, speed, and violence to generate surprise and shock

Mission/Schwerpunktphilosophy

Acceptance of gaps and (related) risks in support of

mission/SchwerpunktphilosophyEchelon-in-depth (offense and defense)

Reserves reconstituted and accumulated (at all levels) to support or

generate success

Posture of positions, alternative positions, dummy positions and roving

positions to mask maneuvers and intentions

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Guerrilla/counter-guerrilla campaigns


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Key points

Guerrilla vanguards need cause and support of people that is dependent

upon regimes unwillingness/inability to come to grips with crises of its

own making.

or more simply

Crises and vanguards represent the marriage of instability and initiative

that create and expand guerrilla effort.

hence

The thought occurs that in order to dry-up a guerrilla upsurge one should

strike at those root causes or illegitimate inequalities that generate and

exacerbate crises as well as provide a favorable climate for vanguards to

form or operate in.

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Note

We have indicated again and again the importance of popular

support for guerrilla or counter-guerrilla success. Why?

Insight

Without support of people the guerri

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Patterns of War

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