of 28
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
1/28
J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld,and Ted Robert Gurr
Peace and conflict 2008
E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
2/28
Te Center or International Developmentand Conict Management (CIDCM) is aninterdisciplinary research center at the Universityo Maryland. CIDCM seeks to prevent andtransorm conict, to understand the interplaybetween conict and development, and to help
societies create sustainable utures or themselves.Using the insights o researchers, practitioners, andpolicy makers, CIDCM devises eective tools andculturally appropriate pathways to constructivechange.
For more than twenty years, scholars andpractitioners at the Center have sought ways tounderstand and address conicts over security,identity, and distributive justice. CIDCMsprograms are based on the belie that peacebuilding and development-with-justice are twosides o the same coin (Edward Azar, CIDCM
ounding director). CIDCMs accomplishedscholars, its expertise in data collection andanalysis, and its direct involvement in regionalconict management eorts make the Center aunique resource or discovering enduring solutionsto the worlds most intractable conicts.
Research Data Collections
CIDCM collects, analyzes and links data relevantto the study o the dynamics o societal conicts.Te aim is to expand data capabilities to acilitatecross-disciplinary research among scholars andpolicy analysts concerned with aspects o societalconict, state ailure, and minority rights. TeCenter hosts several major international databaseson societal conict, including Minorities at Risk,Polity, and International Crisis Behavior.
Training and Education
Te Center provides on-the-ground training orparties to specic conicts, as well as programsthat eature conict resolution training orstudents and government ofcials. Te Partnersin Conict program has provided training in
citizens diplomacy and conict resolution in morethan 15 countries, and the ICONS Project createsinteractive tools or teaching and training innegotiation, leadership, and conict managementtechniques. CIDCM also oers an undergraduateMinor in International Development and Conict
Management.
Policy Analysis
Strategically located at the nexus o theory andpractice, CIDCM seeks to oster a conversationamong scholars and policy makers, and to use globalanalyses as a basis or concrete recommendations orthe policy community. Extensive eld experience,subject matter expertise, and command o bothquantitative and qualitative methods provideCIDCM researchers with a strong oundationor advancing cutting edge policy analysis. In thisregard, its biennial publication Peace and Confict
reports major global and regional trends in societalconict, development, and governance issues.Other recent examples o analyses oered by thecenters researchers include assessments o policyregarding the use o inormation technology indevelopment, democratization, strategies orconict mitigation and resolution, and approachesor sustainable development and peace.
In addition, two CIDCM endowed chairs, theAnwar Sadat Chair or Peace and Development andthe Bahai Chair or World Peace, seek to bridgethe gap between the academic and policy worldsand develop alternatives to violent conict.
Jonathan WilkeneldDirector
Paul HuthResearch Director
J. Joseph HewittDirector o Government Relations
About CIDCM
0145 ydings HallUniversity o MarylandCollege Park, MD 20742
(301) [email protected]
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
3/28
P e a c e a n d c o n f l i c t 2 0 0 8
e x e c u t i v e s ummar y
J. Joseph Hewitt
Jonathan Wilkeneld
ed Robert Gurr
Center or International Development and Conict Management
Us M
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
4/28
Cpgh Us M
A ghs s. Is w p p hs E S h ps s.Rqss p sb p ps h s b sb @...
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
5/28
c o n t e n t s
1 I 1ed Robert Gurr, J. Joseph Hewitt, and Jonathan Wilkeneld
Regular Features
2 T P C Isb Lg: Rkg Ss F Rsks 4J. Joseph Hewitt
3 s Gb C, 19465 12J. Joseph Hewitt
4 s Dz: A Fs Isb As 13Amy Pate
5 S-D Ms T Os 14
David Quinn
Challenges to the Stability of States
6 Gb s F Ss 15Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan, and Susan Fahey
7 Ehp V s h M Es 16Victor Asal, Carter Johnson, and Jonathan Wilkeneld
8 Usb Ss I Css 17Jonathan Wilkeneld
9 Mss Kg Cs W, 1945 18Paul Huth and Benjamin Valentino
10 I Pkpg: T UN ss Rg Ogzs 19Peter Wallensteen and Birger Heldt
In Focus
11 Upkg Gb s V C, 19465 20J. Joseph Hewitt
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
6/28
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
7/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
Te modern age demands that we think in terms o human securitya concept that acknowledges the inherentlinkages between economic and social development, respect or human rights, and peace.Until we understandand act accordingly, we will not have either national or international security.
Mohamed ElBaradei, October 24, 2006Sadat Lecture or Peace, University o Maryland
1 . i n t r o d u c t i o n t o P e a c e a n d c o n f l i c t 2 0 0 8
Ps s Peace and Conictp ss ps-C W swh ss gwg p ss, g sg , ws. Ts hs sh s . Nw , s k , sggss h h ws
gb w p h 199s s h 1s , hs s. S ps s s b h s b w hgs. Ts hgs p conict syndrome sh p h sb ss h s h s. kgh, h sss hs p sps hs s.
Hs h g ? T sw s s wh jg b g bs ws
h g h-s ss h s s. B wh w b h b ss gg s, h h w ws s Iq Aghs, h g- s p. A g p h gb ss s w h h h ps s s (s hp 11).A h hs w 19 gg s 4 ws w b s 5 5.
A s b w h h ps? I ss, whh h ps wh g ss, h b s h -19s (s hps 3 ). Msps s h b , sp g-sg s k hs Nh I IssAh p (s hp 5). B w s h b pg gh h s p h ps 6 s. M, s g b w s bg 56, s w b h ps p psss, s S Lk Azbj.
Hs h h w z s? F s h b b s h
-199s (77 6) p wh w h 4 gs (34 6). D gs h h 1s b s gs h g gg gs wh h h s (hp 4). T s 49 ps 5 s p bs, s gp, h h sspb hh s s p sb (hp ), s ks(hp 6), ss (hp ).
Is s ? Wh h gb s sg w h sg h pps sb g ss, Peace and Conict s h gs pps hs ss hs s s gzs (s hp 6). Eq g s hkh h hs ss w b pps ss h h g gb sg. A sggg77 p ss h ps-C W h s sb g s(s hp ). As Mh EB (6) hs bs, w s kwg h h kgs
bw s p, sp h ghs, p.
Hw s h spg w hgs? S , h b pkpg ps hs b h b h b p g h C W. T b q bw UN ps hs b g gzs. I -h 16 sssk s 194 h ws p kp, s pkps h s p. Sss
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
8/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
s h b b q g UN g sss, sbs hgh h g b skps(hp 1).
A s s ? T g h w hs hs gh p b, b s g ws. O 1 ss h gh g-s sgs 1945 , h s ss kg s hgh spp h bs. T g h spp gs h g h gs h h g, h k gs hs
b p ss kg (hp 9). Sh p g h sg hs s s q- hs Ss D g h s h s. A wk A U pkpg wh h bs h sg. D s h ws h spsb p s s h Rw g 1994.
L g hs p g s pp h gb ps. F 19 5 hw sg s, p w, s w h As ( h Agh w 19763 s) h M Es (g h I-Iq w 19). A p g , p h Cg- ws h 199s . I Ep h ws pg h bkp Ygs s h shp pw 1. O h As shw s sg g h 5- sp (hp 11).
Rg s hp pg sp hgs s. T Peace and ConictIsb
Lg hp sssss h s sks p sb bs s s s 4.T g , hgh , k g h gb , hgh s z, w ghbg ss. O h 5 s wh h hghs sks p sb w s g h h g sks h OECD s19 A, w h M Es(Iq Lb), h As (Aghs, I, Bgsh, wh Cb js bw h hsh), h As (H, hgh Bz B bh). S hs s, gI Ehp s w s Iq Aghs, gg sgs. T sk s s bkgs, p p s, s psps p hs s g sp s s.
C sks sb sh : Mzbq, I, P w g h hghs-sk ss b w h w s skpp bs s p hgs I w , P w s . Cg Rw,
bh s b w ss kgs h 199s, s w s sk, ppb w hs h ghbs (s hp ).
s, sp b Isss, s s h s w gs. Ts ss Peace and Conictps w w pjs h h s p gzs b gb g ps . O ss, hp 7, s sp h gs s h MEs ps w p skg gs. Fs, s h 11 gzs psg s hsg s s bw 19 4h p b h s. Ts h p h g ps, ps, psg s sgs ss. ss s, , b pg p ss. S, z h M Es hs ss both ps s. I s b s whh hs ps s w bbs h w gs.
Chp 6 ps s- gb s h s s s s. C s 197 1997 s bg h ps. O s p b sh pp s s shg . I h 197s s ws Ep pb, h 19s ss h L A, h 199s As A hg (hp 6). Wh s w b h pp h s s w s , k g , h Is w.
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
9/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
A conict syndromeposes the gravest danger.High-risk states are simultaneously politically
unstable, challenged by rebels and terrorists, tempted to resort to mass killings o civilians, andenmeshed in international crises. Tere are predictable pathways into these syndromes but noclearly marked exits.
L s s ss s b M Msh Rb G h ss h 3 5 sPeace and Conict. Wh hs b h p hgg US p s gb g s? Ts ps sggs . T US ss Aghs Iq b ss p ss b ps bh s. T h Iq hs hhs pps s. Ts ws s p ps gs s ks h US s s. Hw hs ks w sp pss s b h h s. M hUS p hs w s ps sp ps ps b h gs
gps b s, p, ss sks s. I s pkpg p, hhghs h ps h-, s b s h US ss s h h ps-CW s s s g s. US ps hb h pb b h spp h , US pks, pg g ws g ss.
P s shg gs. A s hs w 19 4 s hwg s. Nw s bg, s s g s hss w ws. Dgs g g s k j pjs g, b w p s p sb. T s p b s wh,wh p hg, w p s pss.
B s, s s k b h s ss hg s. Rh, h s
p h h s s sb s h p s ss hzs, conict syndrome,h pss h gs g. T ps hs s s h hgh-sk ss ss p sb, hg b bs ss, p s ss kgs s, sh ss. T pb phws hs ss b k s.
Rb GJsph Hw
Jh Wk
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
10/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
2 . t h e P e a c e a n d c o n f l i c t i n s t a b i l i t y l e d g e r :
r a n k i n g s t a t e s o n f u t u r e r i s k s
Whh s gs sk sb? A sw h qsw h g p-ks. Wh b wg b h ss gs sk, sss b g. Is p ss hgh-sk ss s pb
gg h sqs s . Ts sqs s sph. I h wk s , h ss s gs h h . F ss k p hs s gzs. T gg ss. Sps sbzb ss gs. T ss b ss g, whh ss h ss sk b s h s s pss swh. E wg ks k h hs ss b h hsh sqs g.
Hws hp pss h wPeace and ConictIsb Lg kg 16 s s hrisk o uture state instability. T sg ss pps h hs s (s pp. 711). As w pss b h w g, w g s p s . T sk s h wsb sg ss bs s bs kw b sg h s sbs ( ). Ts h h h gg g, hgh s, k g wh h gb , h z s, h ps ghbg
ss. F h , h g pss sg s h ps h sk sb. I ,h g gs b h ss spg h sk s. Ts b js s p s h pg h s s. A hgh b s s sk p p h bss pzg ss h s.
Fg .1 pss gb p h szsh ss ss. Cs h hghssk g p , wh swh sk shw g. T w-sks sh gh b. A s s h p s s w-kw ps b hgs s k b b p sb( hs h ). F p, s As q hgh sk. Nspsg, s wh w-fs wh ps sb (.g., S, H, Aghs) h b h hgh-skss sb. A, s, h ss h Ws s wh , ps-s s h w sk sb. C, s whwh h hss s s h bs sb p sb ww, b h gs hs sh w b g wh s w-kw. p s h
gs p bw, w s b sp hw h ss ws s.
Hws ss ss s s s psg b gs s s s:h p , h , h s , h s . Isb g s h hs s, s k bs h. Is s w p h q s s s hs s wg h g h h hp s.
Fig. 2.1: Risk of Future Instability, 2007
Moderate RiskHigh Risk Low Risk
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
11/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
T ss ws hs s, g s h s h s psb. F h p , h g s h p institutional consistency. Rgs kgs sspssssg bh s k psb. T g s h p h b g economic openness, whh s h whh s s g wh h gb . Cs h gh gb ks h b p ss sb. F h s , h g s h pinant mortality rates, h ss s p s p h
s w p. h s , h g ss s level omilitarization neighborhood security. Isb s s k s wh hgh s z. As,h kh sb ss sbs wh ghbg s s pg .
T g s bs h ss sg ss h s h hs ps 16s wh g pss p sb h ps s s. T ss h ssshp bw h kh sb h h s sss b. Dsb wh p sb w bs pz p sb p hghh wk h P Isb sk F (PIF). F h , h PIF hs b p sb h psss w s h sg hgs h sb ss.Ts ws, h ws, s g hgs, gs ps. T s hs ps pss s ks h bgg sb p. Usg h ss h swgh ssg h , w s 4, h s whh p b s, p h- s g h sk sb 7.
F h , h g pss b h sks sb. T s hs kh sb s ps s risk ratio. T sk gs h sk sb p h g s kh sb b s h Ogz E Cp Dp (OECD). F p, Gs s 7.3 sh b p sg h h sk sb h s h s s g h h g h OECD.Cs wh ss h p 5h p gz s hghsk ( wh h g). Cs wh ssg bw h gb s w sk ( wh g ). T g s ss s sk( wh g ). F, h g ps
g s s. Ss spkg, h sk sb s wh hs g wh 95 p pbb.Rs s b h s h gsh s h s h h sgs.
T ss p h s s gs h b sz p h. Ag, w spsh s h s sg ss. b .1 ss h5 ss wh h hghs s sk s. App h-hs (19 5) hs ss A, h h pbs h g. N g s A s h b ss h hghs sk sb. O h 51 A ss h ss, h hghsk g. M hs q sk, g js sss h qg h ws sk.
T hg s g h kgs h g sb s k sssss b pgss . s, w p sk s sg , g s h kh sb 3. b . pss h 1
Table 2.1: Top 25 Highest Risk for Instability
Rank Country Risk Ratio
1 Afghanistan 39.3
2 Iraq 29.9
3 Niger 29.7
4 Ethiopia 25.7
5 Liberia 21.1
6 Sierra Leone 20.9
7 Mali 20.7
8 Tanzania 18.9
9 Central African Republic 18.4
10 Djibouti 17.1
11 Ivory Coast 17.0
12 Zambia 14.8
13 Somalia 13.7
14 Nigeria 13.4
15 Bangladesh 13.1
16 Malawi 13.1
17 Benin 13.0
18 Kenya 12.9
19 Mozambique 12.7
20 Lebanon 12.1
21 Haiti 11.7
22 Chad 11.2
23 Burundi 11.1
24 India 10.7
25 Angola 10.5
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
12/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
s wh h hghs sk 3 gsh 1 hghs-sk s ss. S , s (P, I,Mzbq, G-Bss) h ssf p h ss p h p 1. Hws hps sp ps h
hs s z h sh hs sk. W b h hw s P hgs ss sk.
T shp p Ps sk sb s g s sg sps w s, ps
s w p, s g wh h gb . I , s gs p ss h ghs bss, Ps Ab Fj hs sg hs f. A h Fjs 199, P h j sb . Hs , hw, wss w b ss ss g s Fj sg h ss wh g sg h . B , g sss b psss h hs sg. F 199 , Ps ss g ss p s s sb, s g wh b s, g sk 14.9. S Fjs p h s Ps Aj 1 AG 6, bs h sgh sb P, g s hgh ss g ss. S , P hs s s 5 p s , gg ss pg s w ss h . As, Ps s pg GDP s s 4, gwg g wh gb ks sg p g hs p. I , ps ps h hs h s (g ss, , pss) w s sk sb P (5.5). Pk h h w sk sb . , s kg ps sq h h pkg L A s.
, w h h ss s h wg pgs bs ss g, s sh g h pssbs sb g . Ts ss sh b p b h -wg ss h s b hgh-sk s h b p wk h s. T g s h sp hghgh hgh-sk ss. I ps b h h sssss, whh s s bss kg ss g ss wh ghq sk s. M p, h pph ws s ssss h pgss ss s h hgh ps s. Ts hs g p bs, g , shs h s k ss sks sb. I h , w w hw hgs hs ss sssss hgh-sk ss, s w s ss wh b ss. W w s b s g h s h b ps sb. Ts w s p g b h g b ps sghg h q ss.
Table 2.2: Top 10 Highest Risk Countries in 2003 and 2007
2003 Forecast 2007 Forecast
Rank Country RiskRatio Country
RiskRatio
1 Ethiopia 26.6 Afghanistan** 39.3
2 Niger 23.0 Iraq** 29.9
3 Tanzania 18.8 Niger 29.7
4 Central African Rep. 17.6 Ethiopia 25.7
5 Sierra Leone 16.4 Liberia** 21.1
6 Iran* 16.3 Sierra Leone 20.9
7 Djibouti 15.8 Mali** 20.7
8 Mozambique* 15.3 Tanzania 18.9
9 Peru* 14.9 Central African Rep. 18.4
10 Guinea-Bissau* 14.8 Djibouti 17.1
* Falls out of top 10 in 2007, ** New to top 10 in 2007
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
13/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
The Peace and Conict Instability Ledger
T P C Isb Lg ks ss g h s sk sb. S s pp. 111
sp h s h s p h g ( 1).
Recen
tInstability
Country Regim
eConsistency
InfantMortality
Econo
micOpenness
Milita
rization
Neigh
borhoodWar
RiskCategory
Risk
Score Confdence Range
Africa
Niger l l l l l l 29.7 17.7 44.4
Ethiopia l l l l l l 25.7 16.1 39.5
Liberia l l l l l l 21.1 11.4 36.9
Sierra Leone l l l l l l 20.9 11.5 35.2
Mali l l l l l l 20.7 11.8 32.5
Tanzania l l l l l l 18.9 12.3 27.9
Central African Rep. l l l l l l 18.4 10.4 29.1
Djibouti l l l l l l 17.1 8.4 31.3
n Ivory Coast l l l l l l 17.0 9.7 27.7
Zambia l l l l l l 14.8 9.1 23.1
n Somalia l l l l l l 13.7 8.6 21.6
Nigeria l l l l l l 13.4 7.6 21.5
Malawi l l l l l l 13.1 7.3 21.8
Benin l l l l l l 13.0 8.4 19.3
Kenya l l l l l l 12.9 7.4 20.7
Mozambique l l l l l l 12.7 7.3 20.9
Chad l l l l l l 11.2 5.4 20.7
Burundi l l l l l l 11.1 6.5 18.0
Angola l l l l l l 10.5 4.7 20.6
Guinea-Bissau l l l l l l 9.3 4.8 16.6
Botswana l l l l l l 9.1 4.7 15.1
Madagascar l l l l l l 9.1 5.3 14.6
Senegal l l l l l l 8.8 5.0 14.1
Burkina Faso l l l l l l 8.3 5.0 12.9
Guinea l l l l l l 8.1 4.6 12.8
Lesotho l l l l l l 7.7 3.7 14.2
Ghana l l l l l l 7.5 4.1 12.1
Rwanda l l l l l l 7.5 4.5 11.6
Namibia l l l l l l 7.3 4.4 11.3
n Dem. Rep. of Congo l l l l l l 6.9 3.7 11.8Cameroon l l l l l l 6.8 4.2 10.5
South Africa l l l l l l 6.5 3.8 10.3
Togo l l l l l l 5.9 3.3 9.9
Eritrea l l l l l l 5.2 2.3 9.9
Mauritania l l l l l l 5.1 3.1 7.5
n Uganda l l l l l l 4.9 2.8 8.1
Equatorial Guinea l l l l l l 4.5 3.0 6.6
Comoros l l l l l l 4.0 2.5 5.8
n Sudan l l l l l l 3.7 2.2 5.6
Gambia l l l l l l 2.8 1.6 4.5
Congo l l l l l l 2.7 1.5 4.5
Zimbabwe l l l l l l 2.5 1.6 3.9
Gabon l l l l l l 2.3 1.3 3.8
Swaziland l l l l l l 2.2 1.0 4.3
Cape Verde l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.5
Mauritius l l l l l l 0.8 0.4 1.5
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
14/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
RecentInstability
Country RegimeConsistency
InfantMortality
EconomicOpenness
Militarization
NeighborhoodWar
RiskCategory
Risk
Score Confdence Range
Asia
n Afghanistan l l l l l l 39.3 26.5 56.3
Bangladesh l l l l l l 13.1 9.1 18.7
n India l l l l l l 10.7 6.5 16.5
Cambodia l l l l l l 7.9 3.8 14.0
Tajikistan l l l l l l 7.3 3.6 13.4
North Korea l l l l l l 7.2 2.6 16.0
n Nepal l l l l l l 6.4 3.8 10.0
n Myanmar (Burma) l l l l l l 6.2 3.9 9.3
n Pakistan l l l l l l 5.2 3.3 7.9
Papua New Guinea l l l l l l 5.1 2.5 9.3
Indonesia l l l l l l 4.4 2.7 6.8
Sri Lanka l l l l l l 4.4 2.3 7.8
Fiji l l l l l l 3.6 1.9 6.0
n Philippines l l l l l l 3.5 2.0 5.7
Kyrgyzstan l l l l l l 3.5 1.7 6.2
Kazakhstan l l l l l l 3.2 1.8 5.3
Laos l l l l l l 3.2 1.9 4.8
Malaysia l l l l l l 3.1 1.3 6.2Turkmenistan l l l l l l 2.8 1.5 4.9
Bhutan l l l l l l 2.8 1.6 4.6
Mongolia l l l l l l 2.7 1.2 5.2
n Thailand l l l l l l 2.4 1.2 4.0
Vietnam l l l l l l 2.3 0.6 5.8
Uzbekistan l l l l l l 2.2 1.3 3.8
China l l l l l l 1.5 0.8 2.8
South Korea l l l l l l 1.3 0.5 2.5
Singapore l l l l l l 0.9 0.3 2.6
Taiwan l l l l l l 0.6 0.3 1.2
Japan l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1
New Zealand l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
Australia l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
Eastern Europe
Armenia l l l l l l 9.4 5.7 15.3
Georgia l l l l l l 8.2 4.7 12.9n Russia l l l l l l 5.0 2.8 8.1
Yugoslavia l l l l l l 4.5 2.4 8.0
Albania l l l l l l 4.5 2.6 7.3
Moldova l l l l l l 4.3 2.3 7.5
Romania l l l l l l 3.8 2.2 6.1
Ukraine l l l l l l 3.7 1.8 6.5
Bosnia l l l l l l 3.6 1.6 6.9
Azerbaijan l l l l l l 3.4 1.9 5.7
Bulgaria l l l l l l 2.8 1.5 4.8
Latvia l l l l l l 2.3 1.1 4.2
Croatia l l l l l l 1.9 0.8 3.7
Estonia l l l l l l 1.8 0.7 3.6
Slovakia l l l l l l 1.4 0.6 2.8
Lithuania l l l l l l 0.8 0.4 1.6
Poland l l l l l l 0.7 0.4 1.4
Belarus l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.6Hungary l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.4
Slovenia l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
Czech Republic l l l l l l 0.4 0.2 0.9
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
15/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
RecentInstability
Country RegimeConsistency
InfantMortality
EconomicOpenness
Militarization
NeighborhoodWar
RiskCategory
Risk
Score Confdence Range
Latin America and the Caribbean
Haiti l l l l l l 11.7 6.7 18.3
Bolivia l l l l l l 7.6 4.5 12.1
Brazil l l l l l l 7.5 5.1 10.9
Guatemala l l l l l l 7.3 4.8 11.0
Honduras l l l l l l 6.6 3.9 10.1
Ecuador l l l l l l 6.3 3.8 10.0
Guyana l l l l l l 6.0 2.9 10.4
Nicaragua l l l l l l 5.9 3.4 9.5
El Salvador l l l l l l 5.5 3.2 8.8
Peru l l l l l l 5.5 3.4 8.4
Mexico l l l l l l 4.9 3.0 7.9
Venezuela l l l l l l 4.6 2.6 7.8
Dominican Republic l l l l l l 3.8 2.3 6.2
n Colombia l l l l l l 3.6 2.2 5.8
Paraguay l l l l l l 3.2 1.9 5.1
Argentina l l l l l l 2.9 1.6 4.9
Jamaica l l l l l l 2.2 1.2 3.9
Panama l l l l l l 1.6 0.8 2.8Chile l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.7
Uruguay l l l l l l 1.1 0.6 1.8
Costa Rica l l l l l l 1.0 0.4 1.8
Trinidad and Tobago l l l l l l 1.0 0.5 1.6
Cuba l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.2
Middle East and North Africa
n Iraq l l l l l l 29.9 20.0 43.2
Lebanon l l l l l l 12.1 6.4 21.4
n Turkey l l l l l l 7.2 4.6 11.0
n Yemen l l l l l l 7.2 4.2 11.5
Jordan l l l l l l 4.0 1.9 7.2
Algeria l l l l l l 3.7 2.2 6.1
Tunisia l l l l l l 2.8 1.4 5.1
Morocco l l l l l l 2.4 1.3 4.0
Iran l l l l l l 2.1 1.1 3.5
Egypt l l l l l l 2.0 1.0 3.4Syria l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.5
Libya l l l l l l 1.4 0.7 2.5
Saudi Arabia l l l l l l 1.0 0.5 1.8
Kuwait l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.6
Bahrain l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.4
Qatar l l l l l l 0.7 0.4 1.1
Oman l l l l l l 0.6 0.3 1.1
n Israel l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1
UAE l l l l l l 0.3 0.1 0.7
North Atlantic
Macedonia l l l l l l 2.9 1.5 5.0
United States l l l l l l 1.0 0.4 1.9
Cyprus l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.4
Greece l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.3
United Kingdom l l l l l l 0.7 0.3 1.3
France l l l l l l 0.6 0.2 1.4Canada l l l l l l 0.6 0.3 1.2
Italy l l l l l l 0.6 0.2 1.2
Portugal l l l l l l 0.6 0.2 1.1
Denmark l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1
Germany l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1
Netherlands l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.1
Austria l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
16/28
0 P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
RecentInstability
Country RegimeConsistency
InfantMortality
EconomicOpenness
Militarization
NeighborhoodWar
RiskCategory
Risk
Score Confdence Range
North Atlantic (cont.)
Ireland l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
Switzerland l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
Spain l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
Norway l l l l l l 0.5 0.2 1.0
Belgium l l l l l l 0.4 0.2 0.9
Sweden l l l l l l 0.4 0.1 0.9
Finland l l l l l l 0.4 0.1 0.9
Notes and Explanations for the Ledger
The ledger is based on a model that estimates the statistical relationship between the future likelihood of instability and each of the
ve factors in the chapter. We estimated the model based on data for the period 19502003 and found that each of the ve factors
were strongly related to the future risk of instability. Using the model estimates for the causal weight assigned to each factor, we
used data from 2004, the last year for which complete data are available for all ve of our factors, to produce a three-year forecastindicating the risk of instability in 2007. The color codes used in the ledger to present a countrys standing on each of the ve factors
are based on the values in 2004. The notes below explain the various color codings.
(1) Recent Instability -This column indicates (with a red square)
whether the country has been coded by the Political Instability
Task Force (PITF) as being involved in an instability event as of the
end of 2005. The countrys risk score (see column 9) provides an
assessment of the likelihood of the countrys experiencing future
instabili ty. One might interpret the risk score for countries currently
experiencing instability as the risk of continued instability, but we
caution readers that the causal factors that drive the continuation
of instability are likely not the same as the factors that drive the
onset of instability.
(2) Country - The ledger examines only those countries with
populations greater than 500,000 in 2004.
(3) Regime Consistency The risk of future instability is
strongly related to the extent to which the institutions comprising
a countrys political system are uniformly and consistently
autocratic or democratic. Political institutions with a mix of
democratic and autocratic features are deemed inconsistent,
a common attribute of polities in the midst of a democratic
transition (or a reversal from democratic rule to more autocratic
governance). We expect regimes with inconsistent institutions
to be more likely to experience political instability. In the ledger,
highly consistent democracies (Polity score greater than or
equal to 6) and autocracies (Polity score less than or equal to
-6) receive a green marker. A red marker has been assigned
to regimes with inconsistent characteristics that also qualifyas partial democracies according to PITF. Regimes with these
characteristics have been found to have the highest risk for
instability. We assign a yellow marker to partial autocracies
because the propensity for instability in these regimes is
somewhat less than in partial democracies.
(4) Infant Mortality Infant mortality rates serve as a proxy
for overall governmental effectiveness in executing policies and
delivering services that improve social welfare in a country. High
infant mortality rates are associated with an increased likelihood
of future instability. The states with the best records are indicated
with a green marker (scoring in the bottom 25th percentile of
global infant mortality rates). States with the worst record
(scoring in the highest 25th percentile) are indicated with a red
marker. States in the middle 50th percentile are indicated with a
yellow marker.
(5) Economic Openness Closer integration with global
markets reduces the potential likelihood of armed civil conict
and political instability. Policies that integrate global and domestic
markets can produce higher growth rates and sometimes reduce
inequality. To that extent, economic openness can remove or
weaken common drivers for civil unrest related to economic
grievances. We focus on the proportion of a countrys GDP
accounted for by the value of all trade (exports plus imports)
as a measure for economic openness. The countries with the
lowest score for economic openness are considered to be at
the highest risk for instability. We designate these states with
a red marker. The highest 25th percentile of states receive a
green marker in the ledger. The middle 50th percentile receives
a yellow marker.
(6) Militarization - Instability is most likely in countries where
the opportunities for armed conict are greatest. In societies
where the infrastructure and capital for organized armed conictare more plentiful and accessible, the likelihood for civil conict
increases. The ledger measures militarization as the number of
individuals in a countrys active armed forces as a percentage
of the countrys total population. Countries with militarization
scores in the bottom 25th percentile are indicated with a green
marker. Countries in the top 25th percentile are presented with a
red marker. The middle 50th percentile is indicated with a yellow
marker.
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
17/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
(7) Neighborhood War The presence of an armed conict in
a neighboring state (internal or interstate) increases the risk of
state instability. The contagion effects of regional armed conict
can heighten the risk of state instability, especially when ethnic
or other communal groups span across borders. We use conict
data from the Uppsala Conict Data Project at the International
Peace Research Institute (Gleditsch et al. 2002) to determine the
conict status of states in 2004. For a neighbor to be considered
involved in armed conict, we further require that the conictproduces 25 or more battle-related fatalities per year. A red
marker indicates when two or more neighbors are involved in
armed conict. A yellow marker indicates the presence of armed
conict in only one neighboring state. A green marker indicates
the absence of armed conict in all neighboring states.
(8) Risk Category - States have been placed in one of three
categories corresponding to their risk score. Any state with a
risk ratio in the top 25th percentile of all states qualies for high
risk (denoted with a red marker). A risk ratio greater than 7.3
places a state in the top 25th percentile. Any state with a risk
ratio less than the global median (3.56) qualies for the low-risk
category (denoted with a green marker). Any state with a ratio
between 3.56 and 7.3 qualies for moderate risk (denoted with
a yellow marker).
(9) Risk Score - The risk score gives a three-year forecast of
the relative risk (compared to an average member of the OECD)
of experiencing instability. The score is computed based on the
results of estimating a statistical model using global data from
the period 1950-2003. Then, using the model estimates, data
from 2004 were used to obtain the three-year forecasts for each
country for 2007.
(10) Condence Range - The condence range provides
information about the degree of uncertainty corresponding to acountrys estimated risk score. Statistically speaking, the true
risk of instability lies within this range with a 95 percent probability.
The width of the condence range is drawn to scale. The widest
condence range observed in the data has been set to the
width of the full column with all other condence ranges drawn
accordingly. When the bar is one color, the condence range is
conned to a single risk category. In cases where the condence
range spans multiple risk categories, the different colors of the
bar reect the extent of the overlap with those categories. Using
a sample country (Ghana), the key below illustrates how to
read the information contained in the graphic for each countrys
condence range. The color green indicates the low-risk range,
yellow indicates the moderate-risk range, and red indicates the
high-risk range.
4.1 12.1
Low value of
condence rangeHigh value of
condence range
The location of the risk score estimate (from Column 9) within
the condence range is depicted with a vertical white line.
In this example, the estimate is approximately 7.5. Note, the
location of the risk score estimate does not necessarily fall inthe midpoint of the condence range.
Portion of the condence rangein the high-risk category
Portion of the condence rangein the medium-risk category
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
18/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
3 . t r e n d s i n g l o b a l c o n f l i c t , 1 9 4 6 2 0 0 5
Ths hp ps b w s . Hws ss s bg gsh sggs s p ss h ww h bg h w h ps-C W .
A ss h b s
ww (s Fg 3.1) shws ww h b s. T ww ,whh hs b ps s P C, bgs s h C W s w.Hw, s h gph s, h b s h s p (5) sshp h ps 4, sbg h s h p s s sps.
A s k wh hpp 5 s hh h w h w hs s h h sg ps s. F s, 5 bk S Lk, pg s- g bw h g h Lb gs E (LE).I Azbj, sp shs bk hsp g Ng-Kbkh, sghss h h b q b
s. S ws M (B) I. T sg hs ssss p hs b h h w. I g , s h s h b gg s s.
Hw bs hs bss b psg
s w ss h h h ww s h s p w s. Rh, h ww s h s s s h h b gg s s.Fg 3. ss wh hs s h s. O hs h ps-C W p, h b s h h b gg pss ps sbs. O h s p, hs sb h b sh w w h . I, hps 6 s, h whh w s
g h hs b ss hg.O p hs ss s h s p h bk g bh s s sg s. T g s hp b pks shs p b hqs -wg p.
0
10
20
30
40
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
Number of Conflicts
Fig. 3.1: Global Trends in Violent Conict, 19462005
Internal ConflictTotal Conflict Interstate Conflict
0
10
0
30
40
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
Number of Conflicts
Fig. 3.2: Trends in Ongoing and New Conict, 1946-2005
New OnsetsOngoing Conflict
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
19/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
4 . t r e n d s i n d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n :
a f o c u s o n i n s t a b i l i t y i n a n o c r a c i e s
I 195, h w ws s q g s, s ( hb gs), s. I h wg w s,
h p pws A Ass ps h b ps. Wh w p s ws s k p ss sh ss, h s s b p pg pws s s s , q -p, . B 1977, h whh h b gs pk, h w 9 s,16 s 35 s. T, bgg h 197s g hgh h 19s, w z k p. I 1991, sh h C W , h w s(66) h h s (47) s (44). Tsp hgh h 199s, b 6, h w 77 s, 49s, 34 s h w.
As P shws Fg 4.1, s h h w-s . Hw, h j s g, hg h ss ss h g. Rg, phps, k s hs g s, h g P s s h ps-C W s g hgh s sg w h h g gh C W . S, wh h sp s g ws h , h swp s g s b . As s h g b s h ss g gs hg h
s s.
Mp ss shp bw p sb g p. D h P Isbsk F, p hgh 5, shw h s g s k hgh h 1955 p h p sb. Ps ss shw h s w h w s k pg/p s w h s s k p s g hg.
T k p sb g g ps s . Ds h s p s ss sb. Ts s sp h h h b g s s hgh. Ts sg ws. Ashgh s sspb sb h h s sh s
gs ss sb h ps-C W . Ts s s g ws. Hw, h hgs h s h s p s ss wh s g ps s s.
0
20
40
60
80
100
20052000199519901985198019751970196519601955
Number of Countries
Fig. 4.1: Global Regimes by Type, 19502006
DemocraciesAutocracies Anocracies
Anocracies were more than twice as likely to experience genocide/politicide events and nearlytwo and a hal times as likely to experience adverse regime change.
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
20/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
5 . s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e i r o u t c o m e s
Th qs gs pps s-g hs shp h p sp ss s g s. S ss s gs wh ss h b s s sh s. S h ws h ss h s 5 s h b ss wh
h sggs bw h gps ss h g sph s sg.
Q s h s 6, 6 s- s w gg, g hAsss, Ksh Mss, Khss/Js, Ms,ps, Sh bs I; h Ch/Zs Ks, K, Sh M; hPss Is; h Os Ss Ehp; h Css F, h Chhs Rss. Dsp ss g w, h sw s h wss ps p: s h 199s h hsb ss h b s- s g sh
w s (s Fg 5.1).
F 1 6, s s-s w s 15 w .Ss w h h ghg As Djb; Abs M; Ess,Nb, -Ms Bk As shS. I , s w 56 . Pps Is Bsqs
Sp ss 6 b h gg , g p gs. Ahs Is Cbs Ag g s p ps s p h sss hss.
S s g ss pgss ps ,
, g, s, ss, p sh. M , hw, s h ss pgss, s h b hw b pss ps, -z b gsss, h s b w shp, s spss s, s.A s h h b , s, s.
T s s- s sss s bw g gppss; ss gp gs b ss g s-kg g . S- s s s wg bs, b h pw wg bs wh sg ss.
Wh h ww h b w gg s- s s h hC W s gg, w ps-W W II s- s b s. I h bs gs h 15 s p w. I hs ss,p s s pkpg s sh b b kp hg ps g w g ( qk s) w hss. Sh s spsb g h s s- ws, wh h ss s.
While the downward trend in the number o new and ongoing armed sel-determinationconicts since the end o the Cold War is encouraging, relatively ew post-World War II sel-determination conicts can be confdently considered ended.
Fig. 5.1: Trends in Conicts for Self-Determination, 1956-2006
Number of Wars Ongoing
at End of Period
Change in the Number of Wars:
New Armed Conflicts
Change in the Number of Wars:
Conflicts Contained
Change in the Number of Wars:
Conflicts Settled or Won
0
12
24
36
48
0
5
10
15
20
2001-2006
1996-2000
1991-1995
1986-1990
1981-1985
1976-1980
1971-1975
1966-1970
1961-1965
1956-1960
before 1956
Number of Ongoing Wars Changes in the Number of Wars
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
21/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
6 . g l o b a l t e r r o r i s m a n d f a i l e d s t at e s
As b s hs gw, shs pks h sg sgh ss b kg h s, , p
hss s. LF, Dg, Fh s bw w b s s ks
h Gb s Dbs (GD) g h p bw197 1997 s , b h P Isbsk F s g s, p ss, ssh ghs s h p ss wh sbkw.
GD pss 7, s s, s b s h s s s p-s ss. I s s s h h s g p, , gs, s g hgh , , . Nh h U.S.S Dp h FBI s s hs
. Y s B H ps , s s s hb h h s h s.
T hp s h ps p ps h, g s s s h h, gs, ps ks wps s, g sbs , h p 5 s k s, p 5 sgps b .
Fg 6.1 pss s g s . Tgph ss hw h ggph s s hs sh . I h s h p, s ws g Ep pb. B h 197s, s ks L A
spss h s h gb gs. M , L A hs , wh ks As h sg.
N spsg, h ss h bh sks h ks s g hs p.L A s h gs bh s ks s. Wh Sb-Sh A As hz b s h s, h s hs Ep Nh A.
LF . gwg shp bw s s (Fg 6.). M, h s sg hhs shp hgs . Dg h 197s, ss h h
p h hgh s ks s;s h, ss h h s h h hgh s s ks. Ds sp g wh sp bs s. s sk pps b h s s h s ss.
* T s p ss hs hp h b p s pb. F b h s s, ps h hs h SAR C (s@s..) s http://www.start.umd.edu.
Number of Attacks
0
500
1000
1500
2000
199519901985198019751970
Fig. 6.1: Regional Terrorist Activity, 1970-1997
Asia
Europe
Latin America
Mideast/N. Africa
North America
Sub-Saharan Africa
0
50
100
150
200
250
199519901985198019751970
Average Fatalities per Country
In Failure Out of Failure
Average Attacks per Country
0
20
40
60
80
100
199519901985198019751970
Fig. 6.2: State Failure and Terrorism, 19701997
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
22/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
7 . e t h n o P o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e a n d t e r r o r i s m i n t h e m i d d l e e a s t
I hs hp, As, Jhs, Wk s h hs s h s bs h s b
z, s gzs, s ps ps
s. Fsg hM Es, h Ms Rsk OgzBh (MAROB) pj ps h hss hs hp gps gzs s k p s h ps h p gs wh , , hss.
Ts pj hs 1 gzspsg h ss 9 hpgps h M Es Nh A, pg
bw 19 4. Wh h j hsgzs ss psg hgs, -h p s s sg s g hs p.
T p h ps h M Es hss sg hgs g hs p (194). Isg, h pp gzssg s p h p hs p w ws (s Fg 7.1), wh h s pkg 196 wh 5. p gzs s, wh g hgh 199 (1.6p s ), w b s w h
pk 1 (.6 p s ), wb h 1.4 p. Ts hb gzs sg hs h s h b gzs (39 19; 96 4). I sh b, hw, h hs , whh 4, p h ps Iqs h U.S. s.
T ss s shws sh g :wh h b gzs -
gh p hs sb, h b gzs breligion (.., h
ps h p g pb ), nationalism ( s sg h p gp pp), democracyhs s (s Fg 7.). T b M Es gzs hsk p g pb hs s 19 3 4. Ts p gs shw spp shp bw gs s.
P hp hs b h p s gzs h spp , wh s 17 19 6 4. Wh s gzs h s s s sg, h sg ss k s h hs h b .
Percent of Organizations
Using Strategy
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
20001995199019851980
Fig. 7.1: Strategies of Ethnopolitical Organizations, 19802004
Electoral PoliticsViolent Politics Domestic Protest Politics
0
20
40
60
80
100
20001995199019851980
Number of Organizations
Fig. 7.2: Shifts in Ideological Motivation, 19802004
Total
Democratic
Nationalist
Religious
Leftist
Rightist
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
23/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
8 . u n s t a b l e s t at e s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s e s
A-sk ss w ph,b h ps h ps-C W s hs sh ss
h h h b h s. Wk ps h p s
s sb gb ss gsbss s.
S sb s s bks h w, s g hg, g. T hsp sp ph wks hss whh h sh, b s ks hg gb sss s. Wk sb ss gh gg s s s h pp g s h, wh s, b h sp
pps, gps wh h gss h h, h s skg sgg b , gh gs ss . T hs s s hs sb ss p b ss .
S-s p ss h ps-C W (1995) sss s sb, g, h h ss, p p h bp wg WW II, 56 p h p p (1963-199). Ts s h hs ss p sbzg s , b h s pssss pps b sbzg s, .., ss.
Ts s h gs sb h s h s g hs
h ss, h bs s s. A ps p h p sbshgsb wh ss, s h h p hs sg ss wh h s s sh h g ss s h.
T hp ps s s g whh jgs b b ss sb h sqs h ss sb, ., w hs sb g ss h h ss p s ss. Ts Crisis Vulnerability Indexs ss ps p wh p sb ss. T ps ss gs pg whh h sp sb / ss p g h 5 p (s Fg .1).
F, h j bs h 17 66 p h bh sbs ss. Sp ss gs h gb, hsss s h bss h sb h ss s g sbsss. T ghbhs sbh Ep h Ws Hsphwh s gs s wh p g wh b h h .
B h w w b s h sb ss, kg h s wh s, bs p h ss.
Fig. 8.1: Crisis Vulnerability Index, Geographic Distribution
Unstable and recent
crisis or PC
Unstable and no
recent crisis or PC
Stable and recent
crisis or PC
Seventy-seven percent o all international crises in the post-Cold War era (19902005)include one o more actors classifed as unstable, ragile, or ailed at the time o the crisis.
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
24/28
P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
9 . m a s s k i l l i n g o f c i v i l i a n s i n t i m e o f W a r , 1 9 4 5 2 0 0 0
Th kg s s sq . Hh V s h bw 1 5 s h , ,
ws s 1945 (s b 9.1 s ws wh h hghss). T g h q hs g w
js h s g b p b p gg b pps. Wh s ws s h ss, kg pps?
T hs s h sg s gg s b s b. T g h h kg s g w s sgsg pw g sgs. Uk bs, gs h pp gs spp. D g g, w-gz g b f bs gs hss s sk s ggs wh
ppsg s. As s, sg s hs g h gs bs spp h pp, whh h kg ss bs s.
T s s 1 ss h h g-s gsgs bw 1945 , g 7 ss ss kgs. Ass h ss s p, hss sg spp h hs h g w ss kg. G w p h hgh sg pw s h kh ss kg. Eps bh hss g ws w s sg spp. Tg h spp s w hgh sg s j sbs s h pbb
ss kg sgs h ss. Rg p s psg, sppg h g b h p g g h sks ss kg.
Ss k sp g sgs whss wh h gs ps j h h g. Mss kg sg w s g sg sp g s h spp wk h pp.
T ss sks ss kg, g s p pk g pps, spps, wh ps h , wgh s s sg sg. Mss kg kp gs b, b s sf s ss-bs sgs.
I hs s s, wh ss p hs k sg g ws? T hs b h ss gpw pp g pps h s ss kg bs ss sgs sg h p q s p . Rgs g w-gz g ppswh sg spp h w ps g hs h. Fw gs pssss h ss p sgps h s s s zs. F s wg k j p sss h pps, ss kg sp pp h s h g s hgh ps.
Table 9.1: Mass Killing in Wars, 19452000
GuerrillaWar Civil Wars
StartYear
EndYear
l China-Communists 1946 1949
l Colombia 1948 1962
l China-Tibet 1956 1959
l Vietnam, Rep. of 1960 1975
l Iraq-Kurds 1961 1975
l Sudan 1963 1971
Nigeria-Biafra 1967 1969
China-Cultural Revolution 1967 1969
l Cambodia 1970 1975
l Pakistan-Bangladesh 1971 1971
Burundi 1972 1973
l Guatemala 1974 1984
l Ethiopia (Eritrea) 1974 1991
l Ethiopia (Tigre-Ideology) 1974 1991
l Angola 1975 1991
l Indonesia-East Timor 1975 1982
l Ethiopia (Ogaden) 1977 1982
l Afghanistan 1978 1992
l El Salvador 1979 1991
l Uganda 1981 1986
l Sudan 1983 1999
l Iraq-Kurds 1985 1988
lSomalia (Barre vs. SNM
Isaaqs and others)1988 1991
Rwanda 1990 1994
l Burundi 1991 1999
Yugoslavia-Bosnia 1992 1995
l Russia-Chechnya 1994 1996
GuerrillaWar Extra-systemic Wars
StartYear
EndYear
l Franco-Indochinese of 1945 1945 1954
l Franco-Algerian of 1954 1954 1962
GuerrillaWar International Wars
StartYear
EndYear
Korean War 1950 1953
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
25/28
E x ec u t i v e Su m m a ry
1 0 . i n t e r n a t i o n a l P e a c e k e e P i n g :
t h e u n v e r s u s r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s
Whh p gz s bs s pkpg ps? Ws H p h
p sp hs qs, pgs ps g pkpg ps b h UN hs b ggzs h s ss. T s szs b sss s s s ss h sg hgz wk .
Gb pkpg gzs g hsg sg w, ss gbss (s, ps, gss), p,wg h -h s--s h g ps s
h w. Ts, gb gz s p p, p wkg s.
Rg gzs h s h kwg hs pb g wh s, h qp p s, qk h ss p, s h s bp qk h h UN.
G h sp gs, s ph h b pkpg ps s
h p gz wks: 194 5 -UN s 67ps, wh h UN h spgb s 59. As Db 5, h w 13gg -UN ps wh h UNws g 15 ps. (S Fgs 1.1 1.)
O h p, bh ps sss h s bs sg, b g s s ss h s s pkpg sss s
s, whs h UN hs b p s ps wh s s. Rg sss h b p phss , wh p s. H, h h g bg b hh UN, p wh s s ss sg. UN sss, hw, bs sgs , wh h fs g h s qs hgh. Csg hUNs g p pkps s w s ss, sh s b pps b sb. E s,h sss s bw h gz wks.
0
2
4
6
8
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
Number of Peacekeeping Operations
Fig. 10.1: Peacekeeping Operations-Interstate, 19482005
Non-UN PeacekeepingOperations
UN PeacekeepingOperations
0
5
10
15
20
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
Number of Peacekeeping Operations
Fig. 10.2: Peacekeeping Operations-Intrastate, 19482005
Non-UN Peacekeeping
Operations
UN Peacekeeping
Operations
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
26/28
0 P ea c e a nd C o n l i c t 2008
1 1 . u n P a c k i n g g l o b a l t r e n d s i n v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t, 1 9 4 6 2 0 0 5
I hs hp, Hw s s . T hp s ss hpph h ssss s s psps.
w s h spp h sg g hs kg.
T sh s wh s hss sw s h W W II (s Fg 11.1). I ,h h s g h hghs pg ss w h C W . T ss s p h s sg g,s ps s b bs sh s hUN NAO (.g., Ks Aghs). Ag, h s sb p sss h s s wsg gb . Hw, Hw s sgs hs. T bz ps g s sws wgh . T h ss
s , h p sks s wh s ps b, wh h s s p.
T w gphs ps Fg 11. hp s h s g h hp. T pp gph shws h s gg w. A s b hsh b g s s h W W II. Hw, s p h h ww b hs s b h p p h spsg js p h s h h s 1946. Ts s : h Chs C W (19461949),h K W (1951953), h V W (19551975), h
Agh C W (197), h IIq W (1919).As s h w gph, h h 9 p h s,h s sb pw ww .
T gs s h f kg q sssb - s bs h p w ss. Ts s s pbs sggss h h p h s hsw ps: h pps j ws h h pps ss s, b , s.
Hws ps s s h ss, sw. Ts ss g s s,
ss ps ss ps , ss hgs h g s p .
T gs ps hs hp sggs s pg s h hws pp bgg sg pks shs h ggh ss sqs sh p.
0
10
20
30
40
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
% of Countries
Involved in Conflict
Fig. 11.1: Percentage of Countries Involved
in Conict, 1946-2005
% Countries Involved in
ConflictEstimated Trend
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
Fatalities (in 10,000s)
Fatalities (in 10,000s) Estimated Trend
Fatalities (in 10,000s)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
200520001995199019851980197519701965196019551950
Fig. 11.2: Battle Death Totals, 19462005
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
27/28
Peace and Confict Editorial Advisory Board
ed Robert Gurr, ChairDistinguished University Proessor Emeritus
University o Maryland
Mary CaprioliAssistant Proessor
Department o Political ScienceUniversity o Minnesota at Duluth
Nils Petter GleditschEditor, Journal o Peace Research
International Peace Research Institute (PRIO)Oslo, Norway
Krishna KumarSenior Social Scientist
U.S. Agency or International Development
Mark Irving LichbachProessor and Chair
Department o Government and PoliticsUniversity o Maryland
Will H. MooreProessor and Director o Graduate Studies
Department o Political ScienceFlorida State University
Alex Peter SchmidDirector, Center or the Study o Terrorism and
Political ViolenceSt. Andrews University, Scotland
Monica Duy otAssociate Proessor o Government
Kennedy School o GovernmentHarvard University
Contributors
Victor Asal
University at Albany,State University o New York
Laura DuganUniversity o Maryland
Susan FaheyUniversity o Maryland
ed Robert GurrUniversity o Maryland
Birger HeldtFolke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
J. Joseph HewittUniversity o Maryland
Paul HuthUniversity o Maryland
Carter Johnson
University o Maryland
Gary LaFreeUniversity o Maryland
Amy PateUniversity o Maryland
David QuinnUniversity o Maryland
Benjamin ValentinoDartmouth University
Peter WalensteenUppsala University, Sweden
Jonathan WilkeneldUniversity o Maryland
8/8/2019 Peace and Conflict Ledger 2008 Exec Sum
28/28
P E A C E A n d C o n f l I C T 2 0 0 8
J. Jseph Hewitt, Jatha Wikee, a Te Rbert Gurr
Peace and Conflict 2008 is an essential tool for scholars and policymakers seeking the facts behind theheadlines about the nature and extent of conflict around the world. It provides a systematic, empiricallygrounded, and highly nuanced assessment of the darker aspects of human nature and underscores, yetagain, the inescapable truth of our interconnected world and intertwined fate.
Vartan Gregorian, President, Carnegie Corporation of New York
Across the globe governments are now trying to make sense of, and cope with, breakdowns in globalorder of unprecedented complexity. Widening gaps between rich and poor; multiplying failed states;spreading threats from non-state actors using more deadly forms of terrorism as tools against settledsocieties; and storm clouds labeled ideological and religious war all challenge scholars and policy mak-ers alike with many questions, and few answers. Peace and Conflict 2008 provides crucial clues aboutthis uncertain future, and points governments as well as international and nongovernmental organizationstoward better intervention strategies. Its excellent introduction highlights the main conclusions for thepolicy community. In short, Peace and Conflict 2008 is a tour dforce!
The Honorable Samuel Lewis, Past President, United States Institute of Peace
The most authoritative source of information on violent conflicts around the world, Peace and Conflict2008 is a biennial publication of the University of Marylands Center for International Development andConflict Management in partnership with Paradigm Publishers.
Features the Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger, ranking the status and progress of 160 countriesbased on their forecasted risk of future instability.
Presents a global survey of all international and domestic terror events since 1970. Focuses on the 2008 special theme of Challenges to the Stability of States. Dedicated to the use of open source data to further research and replication. Linked to a suite of data analysis tools appropriate for students and policy analysts:
www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc Includes large format, full-color graphs, tables, maps, and appendices throughout.
J. Joseph Hewitt is Director of Government Relations at the Center for International Development andConflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, where he specializes in quantitative analysis ofinternational conflict.
Jonathan Wilkenfeld is Director of CIDCM and one of the principals of the Maryland Center for the Studyof Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. He also directs the International Crisis Behavior Project (withMichael Brecher) and the Minorities at Risk Project. His most recent publication is Mediating InternationalCrises (Routledge 2005).
Ted Robert Gurr is founder of the Minorities at Risk and Polity Projects and Distinguished University Pro-fessor in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland (Emeritus). He is authorof numerous books and articles, including the award-winning Why Men Rebeland, most recently, Peoplesvs. States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century(U.S. Institute of Peace Press 2000).
Center for International Development and
Conict Management
University of Maryland
www.cidcm.umd.edu
Peace and Conflict 2008 is available in hardcoverand paperback editions from Paradigm Publishers(www.paradigmpublishers.com).
144 pages 710
ISBN 978-1-59451-400-5 (hc) $75ISBN 978-1-59541-401-2 (pb) $19.95
An electronic copy of this executive summary is available at www cidcm umd edu/pc