Peace research perspectives onNATO 2030

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group

natowatch.org

February 2021

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 i February 2021

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group

February 2021

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NATO Watch

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NATO Watch...conducts independent monitoring and analysis of NATO and aims to increasetransparency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness andparticipation in a progressive reform agenda within NATO. This publication was madepossible through funding from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust.

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A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 1

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List of Contributors

Introduction: Shifting paradigms for a NATO that can deliver human and common security

Ian Davis

NATO and human security: Obfuscation and opportunity

Richard Reeve

Bending history, risking the future

Michael Brzoska

The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group

Ray Acheson

By embracing America’s strategic vision, NATO exposes Europe toincreased nuclear risk

Michael T. Klare

The importance of confidence-building between NATO and Russia

Ute Finckh-Krämer

Rethinking NATO’s China policy to avoid a new cold war

John Gittings

De-collectivize NATO’s nuclear weapons policy

Tom Sauer

NATO and the South: the need for de-securitised solutions

Martin Butcher

Hybrid warfare and NATO’s primary role

Hans-Georg Ehrhart

Concluding reflections on the value of false unity

Paul Ingram

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 2 February 2021

List of Contributors

Ray Acheson is the Director of ReachingCritical Will, the disarmament programmeof the Women’s International League forPeace and Freedom (WILPF). They alsorepresent WILPF on the steering group ofthe International Campaign to AbolishNuclear Weapons, the Campaign to StopKiller Robots, and the InternationalNetwork on Explosive Weapons. They areauthor of a forthcoming book about theTreaty on the Prohibition of NuclearWeapons, Banning the Bomb, Smashing thePatriarchy.

Michael Brzoska is an economist andpolitical scientist who until 2016 directedthe Institute for Peace Research and SecurityPolicy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg.He now is a Senior Research Fellow at theIFSH as well as an Associate Senior Fellow atthe Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute (SIPRI). He has published widelyon economic and political aspects of peace.Recently his research has focused on theconsequences of climate change for armedconflict as well as security in general.

Martin Butcher is a researcher and writerwho has followed developments in NATOsince the 1980s from London, Brussels andWashington DC. He is Oxfam Global PolicyAdvisor on International Humanitarian Law,Conflict and Arms.

Ian Davis is an independent human securityand arms control consultant, writer andfounding director of NATO Watch. He wasformerly Director of Publications at theStockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute (SIPRI) (2014-2016), where hecontinues to be employed on a consultancybasis as Executive Editor of the SIPRIYearbook. Before that he was ExecutiveDirector of the British American SecurityInformation Council (BASIC) (2001-2007).

Hans-Georg Ehrhart, M.A., PoliticalScience at Bonn University. His researchcareer includes: Fondation pour les Etudes deDefence Nationale, Paris (1988); Queen’sCentre for International Relations, Canada(1993); Institute for Strategic Studies of theEuropean Union, Paris (2001); ResearchFellow at the Research Institute of theFriedrich-Ebert Foundation (1987-1989);Senior Research Fellow at the Institute forPeace Research and Security Policy at theUniversity of Hamburg (IFSH) (1989-2018); and since October 2018 associatedSenior Research Fellow at IFSH.

Ute Finckh-Krämer PhD, was a GermanMP (SPD) from 2013 to 2017 and a memberof the Foreign Affairs Committee and theSubcommittee on Disarmament, ArmsControl and Nonproliferation of theGerman Bundestag. She is a supporter of theRecommendations of the Participants of theExpert Dialogue on NATO-Russia MilitaryRisk Reduction in Europe.

All authors are writing in a personal capacity.Institutional affiliation is provided for

identification purposes only.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 3

John Gittings began reporting from Chinain 1971 and was on the editorial staff of TheGuardian for many years, where he was alsoforeign leader-writer. His books include RealChina (1996), The Changing Face ofChina (2005), and The Glorious Art ofPeace (2012), and he continues to work onChina and on peace history. He is a ResearchAssociate at the China Institute, SOAS,London University.

Paul Ingram is an independentcommentator on nuclear deterrence anddisarmament and director of EmergentChange. He was Executive Director of theBritish American Security InformationCouncil (BASIC) 2007-2019, and is nowworking closely with the Swedish ForeignMinistry on the Stepping Stones Approach,the basis of the 16 state Stockholm Initiativeon global nuclear disarmament. He is also acore member of Middle East TreatyOrganisation (METO), the civil societygroup working to realise a WMD free zone.

Michael Klare is a professor emeritus ofpeace and world security studies atHampshire College and a Senior VisitingFellow at the Arms Control Association. Heis the author of 15 books, including Bloodand Oil and The Race for What’s Left.

Richard Reeve is the Coordinator of theRethinking Security network. He has workedin peace and conflict research in the UK,Africa and Western Asia for over 20 years,including as Chief Executive of OxfordResearch Group, Head of Research atInternational Alert, research fellow at King'sCollege London and Chatham House, andeditor/analyst at Jane's Information Group.

Tom Sauer is Professor in InternationalPolitics at the Universiteit Antwerpen(Belgium). He has written nine books,dozens of academic articles and more than150 op-eds, mostly on nuclear arms control,proliferation and disarmament. Sauer is anactive member of the Pugwash Conferenceson Science and World Affairs and receivedthe Rotary International Alumni GlobalService Award in 2019.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 4 February 2021

The ten essays in this volume are a criticalresponse to the expert group report, NATO2030: United for a New Era, that waspublicly launched by the NATO SecretaryGeneral on 3 December 2020 (see Box 1).The co-chair of the report, Wess Mitchell,described its main message as being that“NATO has to adapt itself for an era ofstrategic rivalry with Russia and China, forthe return of a geopolitical competition thathas a military dimension but also a politicalone’’. This approach, however, is likely tohelp entrench a systemic three bloc rivalrybetween China, Russia and NATO-EU-US,with all the attendant risks – from nuclearwar to missed opportunities to address theexistential threat of climate change andfuture pandemics.

This direction of travel is hardlysurprising given that the tenexperts that wrote theNATO report representwhat might broadly bedescribed as the so-calledrealist paradigm: a worldview that emphasises therole of the state, nationalinterest and military power inworld politics.1 It is a perspectivethat dominates thinking within mosttransatlantic security think-tanks, academicstudies of international relations and the‘defence establishment’ (the collection ofindustrial partners government officials andministers that are at the centre of security-related decision-making). This decision-making core has also been described as amilitary-industrial complex and in hisfarewell address in 1961, President DwightD. Eisenhower warned of the dangers of its“unwarranted influence”.

After six decades of ‘revolving door’practices, whereby senior officials, militarystaff and politicians rotate betweengovernment and arms and securitycompanies, the military-industrial complex isnow operating on steroids within the UnitedStates, with significant knock-on effectsthroughout NATO.

In contrast to the NATO report, the essaysin this volume are written by a group ofleading peace researchers, academics and civilsociety practitioners who broadly fall withina human security paradigm: a worldview inwhich the focus shifts from the state to a‘human–centric’ vision. It is a multifacetedconcept that embraces contemporarythinking from peace, post-colonial and

feminist studies, and internationalhumanitarian and human rights

law. In the opening essay,Richard Reeve outlines how

the human securityapproach emerged, how itrelates to armed conflictand how that meaning has

been co-opted andreshaped by military actors

like NATO. While theNATO expert group report has a

few things to say about human security(as well as climate change and gender), theseprogressive elements feel like add-ons withnarrow interpretations rather than beingapplied as guiding principles. They are alsolikely to be the issues that are squeezed andfurther marginalised as the NATOdocument is debated further upstreamtowards consideration of a new StrategicConcept.

Introduction: Shifting paradigms for a NATOthat can deliver human and common security

Ian Davis

a human securityparadigm: a worldviewin which the focus shiftsfrom the state to a‘human – centric’

vision.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 5

Human security may be understood as a wayof conceptualising or shaping a progressivepolicy agenda especially when traditionalapproaches to security are insufficient ordetrimental to the elaboration of viablesolutions to real world problems. RichardReeve asks whether civil society should getbehind NATO’s embrace of human securityor call it out as cynical co-optation. Heconcludes that, while NATO’s embrace ofthe term is opportunistic, there is room for aconversation with NATO “on what webelieve human security and wellbeing to beabout and which actors ought to beinvolved”. This collection of essays isintended to act as an entry point for such aconversation. A core thread is that aparadigm shift within NATO is now anurgent necessity.

In the second essay, Michael Brzoskadescribes the bias and omissions in the expertgroup’s analysis of past events and futuretrends, especially in relation to Russia, armscontrol and violations of international law.

These omissions include Russian oppositionto the extension of NATO to the East, theillegality of the Western wars in Kosovo andIraq and Western contributions to thedismemberments of arms controlarrangements. Brzoska concludes that suchone-sided analysis “leads to one-sidedpolicies, which are driven by the fear ofothers and ignorant of the threats imposedby one’s own behaviour”.

Brzoska also draws attention to the report’sinadequacies in relation to climate change.Rather than exploring options forcooperation on climate change mitigationand adaptation, the report primarily focuseson the resulting security risks and thepromotion of energy saving in memberstates’ armed forces. However, this ‘greeningof the military’ agenda not only results insuch absurdities as adding solar panels tobattle tanks, it shifts responsibility away fromNATO member states to do more to reducegreenhouse gas emissions for which they arecollectively responsible.

Box 1: The NATO 2030 Reflection Group

NATO leaders agreed at their December 2019 summitin London that Secretary General Jens Stoltenbergshould head up a "reflection process" aimed atstrengthening the alliance’s political dimension.Stoltenberg named a panel of ten experts on 31 March2020—five men and five women—to be co-chaired byThomas de Maizière, a member of the Bundestag andformer German defence minister and A. Wess Mitchell,a former assistant secretary of state for European affairsin President Trump's administration. In June 2020, theNATO Secretary General launched his outline forNATO 2030. The resulting expert group report,NATO 2030: United for a New Era, is expected tohelp frame further consultations over the comingmonths with allies, civil society, parliamentarians,young leaders and the private sector. Ultimately, theseare expected to lead to Stoltenberg tabling a number ofstrategic level recommendations for consideration bythe next NATO Summit in 2021, and then eventuallythe elaboration of a new Strategic Concept, asrecommended in the expert group report.

Among the report’s other 138 recommendations arethat NATO should continue the dual-track approachof deterrence and dialogue with a “persistentlyaggressive” Russia; devote “much more time, politicalresources, and action” to the security challenges posedby China; coordinate information-sharing andcollaboration on emerging and disruptive technologies;more explicitly integrate the fight against terrorism intoits core tasks; take a coordinated approach with the EUin addressing challenges to the South; reaffirm itssupport for arms control while maintaining an“effective nuclear deterrence”; build on efforts toinclude climate change and other non-military threatssuch as pandemics in NATO planning on resilience andcrisis management; reassert its core identity as analliance rooted in the principles of democracy;strengthen transatlantic consultation mechanisms,including between the EU and NATO; outline a globalblueprint for better utilising its partnerships to advanceNATO strategic interests; strengthen measures to reachand implement decisions in a timely fashion; and takemeasures to strengthen NATO’s political dimension.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 6 February 2021

The third essay also provides a broadcritique of the report—and it is a critiquethat is neatly summed up in Ray Acheson’sopening sentence: “The NATO reflectionreport has a patriarchy problem”. Achesonargues that the expert group has co-opted thehuman security and ‘women, peace andsecurity’ agendas in order to reinforce ratherthan challenge or change the patriarchalstructures and systems that have created themilitarised world order. The essay draws onthe concept of militarism—which seeks toexplain a disproportionate emphasis on themilitary in national and internationalaffairs—as well as highlighting how thepursuit of “cohesion” within the alliance hascentred around stamping out any internaldissent over nuclear policy. While Reeveremains open to the possibility ofengaging NATO on humansecurity, Acheson rules thisout, arguing that it “cannotbe achieved throughmilitarism and violence”and calls for nothing lessthan the abolition ofNATO—or itsreplacement with “a trulydemocratic, decolonised,denuclearised anddemilitarised global alliancefor collective security”.

Within NATO, militarism is arguablymost deeply embedded in the US nationalpsyche where it dominates domestic andforeign policy regardless of who is in theWhite House. This has enormousimplications for NATO, given the USmilitary leadership of the alliance. AnAmerican general is always Europe’s SupremeAllied Commander (SACEUR)—a fact onlypartly counterbalanced by the politicalleadership, the NATO Secretary General,always being a European—and it is USnuclear weapons that have traditionallyunderpinned the core alliance ‘deterrenceand defence’ posture.

NATO has been described as a “hegemonicAmerican protectorate”,2 and in the fourthessay Michael Klare examines the likelyconsequences of NATO adoptingWashington’s current pre-occupation withgreat power competition. The expert groupembraces this radical transformation in USstrategic thinking away from the post-9/11counter-terrorism agenda (Afghanistan andIraq are barely mentioned in the report)towards preparation for a “high-end fightagainst near-peer adversaries”, specifically warwith China and Russia. Klare warns that inadopting this agenda Europe will exposeitself to “enormous new risks”, including therisk of nuclear escalation. And even if a majorwar is avoided, Klare concludes that “thePentagon’s pursuit of permanent military

supremacy and its reliance of combatplans involving direct attacks on

Chinese and Russian territorywill produce an

environment ofunremitting tensioncoupled with anincreasingly costly anddangerous arms race”.

How then shouldNATO respond to Russia

and China? As regardsRussia, the expert group report

argues that NATO should continuethe dual-track approach of deterrence anddialogue, but offers no suggestions as to howtensions in NATO/US-Russian relations canbe lowered through measures designed toreduce uncertainty and build trust. To thisend, in the fifth essay Ute Finckh-Krämerstresses the importance of confidence-building between NATO and Russia. Thereis no shortage of proposals for de-escalatingNATO-Russia military risks, what appears tobe lacking is the political will to developthem.3

As regards China, in the sixth essay JohnGittings acknowledges the complexity indetermining policy towards Beijing, butemphasises that the focus should be ondialogue and the search for common ground.

militarism isarguably most deeply

embedded in the US nationalpsyche where it dominatesdomestic and foreign policyregardless of who is in the

White House.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 7

He also draws attention to the expert group’somission of nearly a decade of NATO-Chinamilitary staff talks and suggests that there is“nothing to lose, and perhaps much to gain,by actively seeking to re-open this agenda”.China is likely to be receptive to this. Whenasked about the NATO expert group report,Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson HuaChunying rebutted the idea that Chinaposed a threat to the alliance. “China hasnever practiced anything like ‘coercivediplomacy’ or ‘intimidating diplomacy,’”Hua told reporters at a daily press briefing on1 December 2019. “We hope NATO willuphold a correct view on China, look atChina’s development and domestic andforeign policies in a rational manner, and domore things that are conducive tointernational and regional security andstability. China stands ready toconduct dialogue andcooperation with NATO onthe basis of equality andmutual respect”, Huaconcluded.

Dialogue with Chinamight also include nuclearweapons and other strategicarms control policy, althoughthe issue would need to beseparate from the US-Russian talks.However, as Tom Sauer points out in theseventh essay, the expert group report blowshot and cold on these issues: on the one handit reaffirms support for arms control inprinciple while on the other it stresses thatNATO continues to have a critical role inmaintaining nuclear deterrence, includingcontinuing and revitalising the nuclear-sharing arrangements. Sauer points out thatthe group is wrong to claim that the nuclearban treaty will not affect international law.The treaty’s recent ratification means that itis now part of international law and is likelyto further embolden the public majorities in“host” NATO member states that opinionpolling suggest are in favour of withdrawingUS tactical nuclear weapons.

He argues that NATO should de-collectivizethe nuclear sharing policy and withdraw allremaining US tactical nuclear weapons fromEurope. This would enable NATO memberstates to be able to opt out of extendednuclear deterrence and sign the nuclear bantreaty.

The disregard for the perspectives of otherstates in the approach to nuclear policy ismirrored in NATO’s approach to buildingstability in the South. In the eighth essayMartin Butcher outlines how NATO’spartnerships in the South are largely based onself-interest and military security rather thanbeing rooted in the complex mix of problemsfaced by countries in North Africa and theSahel. Butcher argues that NATO memberstates need to look for bottom-up solutions

that involve local communities andthat are conflict sensitive.

The ninth essay by Hans-Georg Ehrhart discusses theissue of hybrid threats,which the NATO reportsuggests are central andimminent. As a starting

point he calls for sharperconsideration and definition

of hybrid threats or hybridwarfare, and later questions the

limited nature of the expert group’s call for aparadigm shift in countering hybrid threats:“the report falls far short in only identifyingparts of the shift and largely ignoring thevariety of tricky political, theoretical,conceptional, judicial, ethical and practicalquestions the phenomenon of postmodernwarfare raises for those that practice it,including NATO member states”. Ehrhartconcludes by arguing that the best remedy“to counter outside non-militaryinterventions is to strengthen the resilienceof our own societies by making them morefair, just and equal”.

Dialogue with China might also include nuclearweapons and otherstrategic arms control

policy

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 8 February 2021

In the final essay Paul Ingram turns theNATO call for unity on its head and makesthe case for greater diversity within thealliance, especially in relation to nuclearpolicy and towards Russia. In the NATO-Russia Council, for example, he argues thatthe effort invested in achieving NATO unitybefore issues are discussed with Russia creates“an experience for Russia of a take-it-or-leave-it, done-deal inflexibility” and as aresult there are rarely constructivediscussions. “As the stronger power in theuneasy relationship”, Ingram argues, “NATOis in a better position to change the tune”.He concludes by agreeing that whileNATO does indeed need aperiod of reflection to assess itsrelevance to the unfolding21st Century, the expertgroup “holds no hope ofany genuine reassessment”.

In the past 12 months theworld has changed in a waythat nobody anticipated, andwe are now in an unprecedentedglobal public health emergency on ascale not seen for a century. Although thescale of the impact from Covid-19 has takenmost governments by surprise there wereample prior warnings of the risks of a newglobal pandemic. Severe Acute RespiratorySyndrome (SARS-Cov-1) during 2002-04,Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-Cov) since 2012 and ongoing, and theWorld Health Organization has been listingcoronaviruses among the leading viral threatsfor many years.4

However, the level of preparedness as well asthe actual public health strategies adopted inmany countries appear to have beeninadequate or deeply flawed.

More broadly, the virus has revealedfundamental flaws in the strategies manystates employ to provide security for theirpeople. In the ‘new normal’ it might havebeen expected that the NATO expert groupwould have looked beyond old concepts ofnational security in favour of human-centricand cooperative approaches to address publichealth threats. However, there has been littleeffort to address the imbalances in strategic

thinking and allocation ofresources—the annual budget

for the US Centres forDisease Control andPrevention is less than $7billion, while the USdefence budget is over $700billion. To the contrary, the

NATO report calls for acontinuation of more of the

same. Arguably, above all else,new efforts are needed to reduce the

chances of nuclear war and achieve nucleardisarmament, address climate change andstrengthen defences against futurepandemics. Based on the expert group report,NATO is not up to this task, and is insteaddoubling down on the militarist approachesto security and conflict that have notworked. A more comprehensive and honestreflection of NATO is necessary by all of itsmembers.

A morecomprehensive

and honest reflection of NATO is necessary

by all of its members.

1 The literature on realism in international relations is vast. See, for example, Jonathan Cristol, ‘Realism’,Oxford Bibliographies, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0042.xml

2 David P. Calleo, ‘The American role in NATO’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1(Summer/Fall 1989).

3 See, for example, ‘Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia MilitaryRisk Reduction in Europe’, European Leadership Network, December 2020,https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/8-2a-Russia-NATO-Statement-Final-Draft.pdf

4 See, for example, Richard Horton, ‘Coronavirus is the greatest global science policy failure in a generation’,The Guardian, 9 April 2020.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 9

NATO and human security: Obfuscation and opportunity

Richard Reeve

Human security as a concept has beenaround for getting on three decades. Likemany post-Cold War ideas, it had become alittle stretched and stained during the Waron Terror and was beginning to lookdistinctly unfashionable by the time theresurgence of great power competition wasnoted in the 2010s. Yet the ripplingfailures of the ‘forever wars’,the looming existentialterror of the climatecrisis, and the veryimmediate concerns ofpandemic diseasehave all propelled aresurgence of interestin human security inthe last few years.

Neither NATO norindividual militaries havebeen immune to this secondwave of human security. Thisshort essay looks at how the human securityapproach emerged and how it relates toarmed conflict, how that meaning has beenco-opted and reshaped by military actors, andhow NATO specifically is engaging with theconcept. It concludes that, while it is rightthat NATO grapples with broaderunderstandings of security, it does not followthat NATO should be given either theresources or the responsibility to tackle realhuman security issues. Indeed, the alliancewould do well to consider how its corefunctions contribute to human insecuritybefore assuming that it is part of the solution.

What is Human Security?The human security approach came toprominence in 1994 when it waschampioned by the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) in itsannual report on human development. Itbegan as an effort by development

economists, social scientists,international lawyers and

feminists to move awayfrom the military security

of competing states andgeopolitical blocs (ofwhich NATO was bythen the sole survivor)and to present aframework for

understanding whatsecurity might mean for

individuals. It aimed tostimulate ideas of how

security practice and resourcescould be reshaped and redirected to promotewellbeing as much as provide protection.

So human security looked not just at howthe UN and national governments coulduphold freedom from fear, but also freedomfrom want, not least hunger, and freedomfrom the indignity of autocracy and rightsabuses. It broke security down into sevencategories: economic, food, health,environmental, personal, community andpolitical. Latterly, the UN has placedemphasis on four complementary principlesof people-centred security, comprehensiveapproaches to implementation, context-specific planning, and an orientation topreventing rather than resolving conflict andinsecurity.

the alliance would do well to

consider how its core functions contribute to human insecurity beforeassuming that it is part

of the solution.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 10 February 2021

Over time, different components of humansecurity have waxed and waned in globalthinking. Environmental security – whichwas originally conceptualised more aroundclean air and safe water – has had a steepascendancy in line with clear evidence ofclimate and environmental breakdown.Economic security hit critical mass with the2007-09 financial crisis, austerity and mind-bending inequality. UN action on foodinsecurity won last year’s Nobel Peace Prize.Health security is our current fixation. Noneof these insecurities are going away.Community security hasperhaps waned on theinternational agenda sincethe 1990s surge in inter-ethnic conflicts andatrocities, butMyanmar, Xinjiang,Tigray and Karabakhshow such concernsshould remainparamount.

Human security in the mouths of soldiersThe military world has come late to the ideaof human security but the terminology hasincreasingly been adopted by some Europeanarmed forces since the late 2010s. In theintervening quarter-century the term hasbeen filtered through a number of otherpolicy imperatives, including understandingthe “human terrain” of counter-insurgencyoperations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the riseand fall of the Responsibility to Protect(R2P) initiative, the growing significance ofthe Women, Peace and Security agenda sinceUN Security Council Resolution 1325 waspassed in 2000, and the realisation thatresponding to the threat of climate chaos is achallenge and opportunity for militaryplanners.

What has come out the other side is less anadoption than a co-optation of language,meaning something quite different. For theUK armed forces, which began using theterm in peacekeeping operations in 2014,human security has become shorthand forProtection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,including specific measures to protectwomen and children. It has also seeminglybecome conjoined with the militaryapplication of Women, Peace and Security,including responding to sexual violence in

conflict, a priority of the 2010-15UK coalition government.

The looking glass imageof militarised ‘human

security’ within the UKwas renderedludicrously real inApril 2019 as soon-to-be-sacked Defence

Secretary GavinWilliamson launched the

Ministry of Defence’s newCentre of Excellence for

Human Security, in the MoDpress office’s own words, “in front of a

backdrop of 100 personnel, armouredvehicles and AH-64 Apache AttackHelicopters”. Human security had essentiallybecome a muscular, patriarchal exercise inhumanitarian intervention to protect theweak (foreign women and children) fromtheir own menfolk.

NATO and human securityHuman security appeared in NATOvocabulary at much the same time that itwent mainstream in the British ArmedForces and appears to have superseded thealliance’s adoption of Protection of Civilians(PoC) policy and operating concept in 2016-18. In 2019 NATO set up a Human SecurityUnit in the Secretary-General’s office. It isheaded by his Special Representative forWomen, Peace and Security so, as in the UK,the two concepts are conjoined in NATOthinking.

What has come out the other

side is less an adoption than a co-optation of language, meaningsomething quite different.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 11

As in the UK, NATO also includes withinhuman security, Cultural PropertyProtection (i.e. protecting culturalmonuments like Nineveh, Palmyra or theBamiyan Buddhas from wanton destructionin war) and tackling human trafficking, aNATO commitment since 2004. Whereasthe former of these has some resonance withthe original human security focus oncommunity (or cultural) security, the latter ispotentially problematic in relation to humanwellbeing and development. The humantrafficking commitment began as part of azero-tolerance approach to sexualexploitation but has become, since the 2015-16 ‘migration crisis’, attached to theEuropean project to intercept, return anddeter movement of asylum seekersfrom Western Asia to Greece.Treating the flight ofrefugees as a criminalissue of humantrafficking is verymuch contrary to thehumanitarianprinciples from whichgenuine humansecurity derives.

The recent ReflectionGroup report on NATO’svision for 2030 adds little newto the idea of human securitywithin NATO but clearly recognises thatembracing and clarifying (sic) therelationship between human security andNATO’s core mission is likely to help boostits appeal to non-traditional audiences,including civil society, and thus promotewider political support for the alliance. Itrecommends that:

“NATO Public Diplomacy Division (PDD)should emphasise NATO’s ongoing work onhuman security into its public messaging tohighlight NATO’s positive impact andrelevance, especially to the concerns of theyounger generation” (p.43).

While the commitment to getting better atprotecting civilians and monuments duringviolent conflict seems sincere, and has itsown strategic rationale, it is hard not toconclude that the term human security isopportunistic window dressing that concealsor obfuscates more than it reveals ofNATO’s intent.

Obfuscation and Opportunity Should civil society, then, get behind

NATO’s embrace of human security or call itout as cynical co-optation? The answerperhaps depends on one’s strategy. As itstands, the human security terminology usedby NATO and the UK is confusing andthreatens to undermine the very different use

of the term by civilian academic anddevelopment workers. There is

nothing wrong withprotecting the most

vulnerable or reducingthe impact of violenceon civilians, but that isrightly calledProtection ofCivilians. Relabelling

PoC as human securitythreatens to turn a

transformative approachof promoting wellbeing,

freedom and development from apositive into a negative, static concept. It

is defensive rather than preventive. It bends‘freedom to…’ back on itself to become‘protection from…’.

Yet there is also an entryist opportunity inthe co-optation of human security by NATOand other military actors. Since we eachendorse it, there is room for a conversationon what we believe human security andwellbeing to be about and which actorsought to be involved. The expanding grab-bag of principles and agendas folded underthe military human security umbrellasuggests that the idea is far from fixed. Theremay be more useful approaches that can beincluded too.

it is hard not to conclude that

the term human security isopportunistic window dressingthat conceals or obfuscatesmore than it reveals ofNATO’s intent.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 12 February 2021

Or perhaps the end-point of theconversation that opens up is a recognitionthat real human security is not somethingthat a military alliance, let alone onecommitted to weapons of mass destruction,can reasonably be tasked with delivering. Yes, NATO should work to rapidly reduceits carbon footprint. Yes, troops may bringuseful expertise and labour to help respondto epidemics or natural disasters wherenormal resources fail.

But military actors should not be leadingresponses to threats and challenges that arenot military in nature. And if thosechallenges to our human security are farlarger than threats from militarised violence,NATO should not be competing forresources with those that really can protectus.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 13

Bending history, risking the future

Michael Brzoska

The reflection groups analysis containsnumerous statemens of facts and opinion onpast events and future trends. As it comesfrom a group of people with similarbackgrounds—mainstream politicians andacademics from NATO member countries—it is no surprise that opinions found in thereport are debatable. Thus, it is pretty riskyto claim that NATO’s involvement inAfghanistan stands out as one of theexamples to prove that NATO “stands ashistory’s most successful alliance” (p. 5).

But it is omissions even more than what isstated that reveals a worrying bias inthe group’s assessments. By notmentioning important facts,nor weaving them into theiranalysis, the groupmembers provide a one-sided picture of how wehave come to what thereport aptly describes as“uncertain times“ (p. 5).Unfortunately, this bodes illfor the future. It strengthensthe view, already widely accepted inmany NATO countries, of a Western world,with NATO as its “strategic anchor” (p. 5),that has been innocently drawn intoquagmires created by evil others. The groupmissed the chance to present a reflection—which originally can be defined as giving backone’s own image on a surface—based on afull assessment about how we have come tothe current sorry state of insecurity in theworld. Such an assessment by necessity needsto include a discussion of the responsibilityNATO and its member states bear for thedeterioration of global security that thegroup describes. It bodes ill for the future ofNATO policy and action.

Omissions and their consequences are mostobvious in the discussion of relations withRussia. The group members are justified incalling out Russia’s aggressions towardsGeorgia and the Ukraine, the illegalannexation of Crimea, the increasingauthoritarianism in Russia. But they aremissing important events driving the down-ward spiral of Western-Russian relations, arehypocritical with respect to violations ofinternational law and are biased in theirassessment of Russia’s relative military power.

Foremost among the events the report doesnot mention are Russian opposition to

the extension of NATO to theEast, the illegality of the

Western wars in Kosovoand Iraq and Westerncontributions to thedismemberments of armscontrol arrangements.

Post-Cold War NATOmembers clearly entered “at

these nations’ free request” (p.8). But did NATO enlargement

to the East represent “the closing ofthe geopolitical vacuum in Europe’s East” (p.8)? Russian leaders certainly thoughtdifferently. Already in December 1992 then-Russian foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrevwarned that Western arrogance in securitymatters would undercut liberals like him andstrengthen the positions of hardliners inRussia. During the first round of extensionthe NATO-Russia Council was established,but no similar offers for cooperation wereseen necessary by NATO members for laterrounds of enlargement.

Foremost among the events the report does not mentionare Russian opposition tothe extension of NATO

to the East,

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 14 February 2021

In 1998, NATO members decided to go towar against Serbia and Montenegro overKosovo. While defendable from a humanrights point of view, without UN SecurityCouncil authorization the war was illegalunder the United Nations Charter. Thesame illegality marks the Iraq war of 2003,led by the USA and the UK, even thoughtheir governments tried to find legalarguments supporting their attack.

Thus, Russia has not been alone inviolating international law. However, there isno reflection on this in the reflection groups’report and how it contributed to a Russianperception that big powers could ignoreinternational law as enshrined in the UNCharter if they come up with somealternative justification of their linking.

The reflection group repeatedlycalls on Russia to “return to fullcompliance withinternational law” (pp. 12,25, 26). That is as itshould be. But there isno similar call in thereport for NATOmember states’ to fullycomply withinternational law. Askingonly Russia for compliancewith international lawreenforces the impression of a doublestandard in the groups demands.

In addition to rightly lamenting Russianaggressions, the reflection group also justifiescontinuing the course of improvements inWestern military power by stating that“Russia maintains a powerful conventionalmilitary and robust nuclear arsenal that posesa threat across NATO territory” (p. 16). What the report does not mention is that thereverse is also true. NATO largely outspendsRussia, regardless of whether one uses SIPRIdata some alternative methods of estimation,such as purchasing power parities, or armedforces’ personnel.

There are some areas, particularly on theEastern flank of NATO, where the balance isdifferent. But there are more areas of conflictand competition where Russian leadershiphas to fear Western superiority. This isparticularly true for technology. While it isfair to state, as the report does (p. 18) thatRussia is “now dedicating significant andincreasing resources” into emerging militarytechnologies, Western investment is by fargreater. It is unfortunate that the group’smembers do not mention that Russia’s totaleconomy, which is dominated by oil, gas andother natural resources, is smaller thanGermany’s and less than one tenth the size ofthat of NATO member states. Again, thereflection group’s analysis is marked byomission of what is important for anunbiased perspective of the situation.

The same one-sidedness marksthe analysis of the

deterioration of armscontrol. Russia definitelyhas a share here, asdescribed in, partlydisputable but oftencorrect, detail in the

report (pp. 36-38). Butwhat about the Western

contributions? No mentionof the US withdrawal from the

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, theWestern failure to ratify the extended CFETreaty, the US lack of ratification of theComprehensive Test Ban nor the Trumpadministration’s withdrawal from the OpenSkies Treaty. It is commendable, that thereport’s authors conclude that “NATOshould reaffirm its support for arms control“(p. 14). However, how likely is it that newagreements will come about without a clear-eyed perception of the past record of bothsides?

there is nosimilar call in the report for NATO

member states’ to fullycomply with international

law.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 15

More than 60 years after the presentationof the concept of the “security dilemma” andalmost 40 years after the introduction of theconcept of “common security”, the membersof the reflection group seem to be ignorant ofthe fact that seeking security withoutconsidering the effects of this strategy on thesecurity of others is apt to be dangerous andfail.

Such one-sided analysis, which also marksother parts of the report, such as theassessment of Chinese aims and ambitions,has consequences. It leads to one-sidedpolicies, which are driven by the fear ofothers and ignorant of the threats imposedby one’s own behavior.

Another prominent example ofthis is the treatment of climatechange in the report. Thegroup paints a familiarlystark picture of thesecurity consequencesof climate change:“Climate change isbecoming a threatmultiplier. It is likely toaccelerate resourcescarcity and global foodand water insecurity. As ocean levels rise, and theworld’s habitable landmass isreduced, migration flows could acceleratetowards NATO territory. New theatres ofcompetition will emerge as icecaps melt andnew transport corridors open, such as theNorthern Sea Route in the High North,which geopolitical rivals are seeking tocontrol and exploit” (p. 19).

Such dangers obviously require a strongresponse. As the prime source of climatechange is human-induced emissions ofgreenhouse gases, reduction of suchemissions would seem as the first and mostimportant measure. The energy sector, whichproduces a large share of emissions, is anobvious candidate for major change.

And since climate change is a global problemand can only be mitigated in internationalcooperation, reflection on how this could beachieved in a new era of “geopoliticalcompetition” (p. 41) would have been verywelcome.

But that was not what the group hasprovided. There is no call for member statesto reduce emissions, rather, it is stated that“modulating emissions is primarily a nationalcompetency” (p. 14). The task of addressingthe underlying cause of climate change isshifted to some unnamed “otherinternational organisations” (p. 41). In thereport’s section on energy security (pp. 39-40), climate change and the beneficial effects

climate change mitigation efforts mighthave on the security of energy

supplies are not mentioned.Rather than exploring

options for cooperationon climate changemitigation andadaptation or specificissues such as theArctic, the danger for

confrontations arestressed.

Obviously, the groupcould only agree on a tiny

minimum of usefulrecommendations with respect to thechallenges of climate change. “NATO has arole to play in increasing situationalawareness, early warning, and informationsharing, including by considering theestablishment of Centre of Excellence onClimate and Security” (p. 14). Contrary toits silence on the need for comprehensivenew strategies of energy production tomitigate climate change, the report laudsNATO member states’ efforts to improveenergy efficiency in their military as well asNATO’s Green Defence strategy of 2014which it recommends revising andcontinuing.

Such one-sidedanalysis... leads to one-sided policies, which aredriven by the fear of others and ignorant of the threatsimposed by one’s own

behaviour.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 16 February 2021

While it is helpful that NATO promotesenergy saving in member states’ armed forces,it is obvious that this can only be a minorcontribution to what is necessary to avoidthe negative consequences of climate change.But expect no discussion of these needs inthe report.

There is a stark imbalance in the report’slack of acknowledgement of thesources of climate change onthe one hand and thestress on the securityrisks of climate changeon the other hand. Itshifts responsibilityaway from NATOmember states, whoare collectivelyresponsible for morethan half of globalgreenhouse gas emissions.By omission of the origin ofthe problem, the report locatesthe source of the security problems ofclimate change exclusively in poor countriesof the South. True, people in these countriesare most likely to suffer from resourcescarcity, food and water insecurity andclimate-related disasters. But the source oftheir troubles with climate change are thosecountries which produce greenhouse gases.

The recommendations in the report onhow to deal with climate change not only fallway short of what is needed they alsoreenforce an irresponsible view of its securityconsequences.

Instead of recognising the responsibility of itsmember states, they depict NATO as anorganisation that should not be concernedabout climate change until it produces large-scale humanitarian suffering or affectsNATO member states’ geopolitical interests.

In the end, the presentation of climatechange in the report is based on the same

premise as the discussion of therelationship with Russia. On

the one hand, there is thewell-intentioned and

flawlessly acting West,and on the otherthere are threateningforces. It largelyremains in the darkhow and why these

threats arose. There isnot even a suggestion

that the West hadanything to do with the

creation of these dangers.Strategy and policy that is based on such

grave omissions is guided by ignorance of thefull spectrum of the options to defusedangerous situations. Exploring the pastwithout fear to find mistakes one has madeoneself, and reflecting on their effect onothers, can help to identify ways to changedynamics which lead to security challenges.Neglect of such reflection carries the dangerof confounding causes and effects. Onlyseeing others as threats to security is a badguide for the preservation of peace andsecurity.

There is a stark imbalance inthe report’s lack of

acknowledgement of the sources of climate change on the one hand and the stress on the security risks of climatechange on the other

hand.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 17

The patriarchal militarism of NATO’s reflection group

Ray Acheson

The NATO reflection group report has apatriarchy problem. Given that NATO isprimarily a military alliance, this is notsurprising. But for a report that is lookingahead for the next decade, it offersretrogressive views not just on humansecurity and the so-called Women, Peace,and Security (WPS) agenda, but also in termsof how it addresses concepts such as“cohesion” what it considers to be the biggestthreats to NATO, and how it thinks thealliance should best deal with thosechallenges. Overall, the report embracespatriarchal approaches to “security”,dissention within NATO and where thealliance should go from here. Therecommendations further entrench NATOmembers in a militarist pursuit ofdominance, rather than true community andcooperation either internally orinternationally.

NATO members should reject thisapproach. The abolition of NATO would bethe most straightforward way to allow itsindividual members to pursue genuinecollective security with others. In theinterim, NATO members that authenticallycare about peace, justice, international law,human rights and dignity, and cooperationneed to renounce the violent masculinities1

espoused in this report, including byrejecting nuclear weapons and working toremove all weapons of mass destruction fromNATO’s doctrine. They could also withdrawfrom NATO and adopt feminist foreignpolicies, finding common ground with othermembers of the world community for thenonviolent pursuit of peace and justice.

NATO, WPS and human securityA one-page section in the 67-page reportdeals with “Human Security and Women,Peace and Security” (WPS). These subjectscome across as an afterthought of the report’sauthors, who were perhaps seeking to checkthe ‘gender box’ that is increasingly a stapleof checklists within many intergovernmentalagencies. This suspicion deepens whenreading the text, in which NATO bothsimultaneously positions itself as aprogressive leader in respecting “humandignity” while making it clear that any effortswithin these agenda items are exclusively forpublic point-scoring, not for serious policydevelopment.

The report urges NATO members topromote the alliance’s “work” on humansecurity by including it in public messaging,especially to the “younger generation”. Itsuggests NATO should “leverage existingpartnerships with civil society organisations”in order to “build a group of emissaries for itswork in human security and in WPS,including female role models from countrieswhere NATO has made a positivecontribution”. It goes on to assert, “Thepersonal stories, experiences, and engagementof such a group would provide NATO with astrong asset in ongoing efforts to raiseawareness of the Alliance’s constructive rolein promoting stability and addressing driversof conflict” (p.43).

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 18 February 2021

Note that it doesn’t suggest NATOactually address drivers of conflict—just thatit should spend more time telling people thatit does. However, NATO does not addressroot causes of conflict. NATO membersthemselves drive many of the ongoingconflicts in the world. Their individual andcollective policies of militarism, and theviolent masculinities these policies reflectand further entrench, are part of the rootcauses of conflict. Rather than workingwithin the human security and WPS agendasin order to prevent conflict, or seeknonviolent, non-militarised solutions toconflict, NATO reflexively turns again andagain to weapons, war, aggression, andthreats in order to promote and protect itsinterests.

The challenges posed byinstitutionalising WPS

The WPS agenda has, toa large extent, becomeabout strategicallyinstrumentalisingwomen’sparticipation inorder to legitimiseexisting practice.Academics MarieBell and Milli Lakehave well-articulated thisproblem, noting that“Adding certain excludedgroups into existing institutions willultimately reinforce the same patriarchal,capitalist, and militarist logics of hierarchyand exclusion that denied those groups accessto power in the first place”.2 While women’sparticipation—and gender diverse people—isimperative and should be automatic, the waythat the WPS agenda has been implementedover the past twenty years unfortunately hasreinforced rather than challenged or changedthe underpinnings of militarism throughoutsecurity discourse and practice.

Rather than challenging the patriarchalstructures and systems that have created themilitarised world order, once inside thesesystems, most women tend to activelymaintain it in order to maintain theirpositions. Nor do many of these womenbelieve they should have to “carry theburden” of changing policies or structures. Ina study from New America about women’sparticipation in the US nuclear weaponcomplex, for example, several womeninterviewed felt they were dismissed by malecolleagues on the assumption that theywould favour weapon cuts or disarmament.They had to prove, as former NATO DeputySecretary General Rose Gottemoeller said shesought to do, that “women aren’t afraid ofnuclear weapons”.3

As feminist scholar CynthiaEnloe says, “You can

militarise anything,including equality”.4

You can alsoapparentlywhitewashanything, includingNATO’s role as anaggressor in

internationalpolitics. In its section

on human security andWPS, the reflection

group’s report asserts that“emphasising the value of human

dignity and security differentiates NATOfrom authoritarian rivals and terroristgroups, which are among the world’s humanrights abusers” (p.43). Yet NATO membershave led and been involved in bombing raidsthat have killed civilians and destroyed citiesand towns leaving civilians without housing,hospitals, food, schools, or basic water andsanitation.5 NATO members are also, for themost part, hostile towards or lacklustre aboutthe current international political process toend the use of explosive weapons inpopulated areas, which is essential forprotecting civilians and achieving humansecurity.6

Rather than working within the humansecurity and WPS agendas inorder to prevent conflict, or seek

nonviolent, non-militarised solutionsto conflict, NATO reflexively turnsagain and again to weapons, war,aggression, and threats in orderto promote and protect its

interests.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 19

In keeping with this position, the reportrecommends that NATO continue toprioritise “military necessity” over protectingcivilians. It admits that NATO forces couldperhaps improve in terms of their “sensitivityto the need to protect vulnerable populationsand sites” (p.43), but falls far short ofsuggesting that NATO stop bombingpopulated areas, or that its members stopleading wars of aggression, carrying outextrajudicial killings through drone strikes,or allowing their soldiers and militarycontractors to commit war crimes withimpunity.7

If NATO wants to legitimately incorporatehuman security and WPS into its strategy, itcannot remain a military alliance. Humansecurity cannot be achieved throughmilitarism and violence. It is built throughequity, justice and safety for all; throughinvestments in housing, education, food,water and sanitation, and environmentalprotection; it is built through initiatives toend racism, sexism, homophobia and ableism.Rather than developing a cadre of “femalerole models” to propagandise about itscommitment to human security, NATOshould divest from weapons and war andsupport local women and gender diversepeacebuilders in their efforts to preventconflict and overcome institutional andsystemic oppressions and inequalities.

The patriarchal authoritarianism of “policy cohesion”In contrast, the reflection group reportargues exclusively for a more militaristicapproach to most of the challenges ithighlights, urging NATO members to spendmore on militarism and repeatedly assertingthat “cohesion” on issues is indispensable formembers’ collective security. Both of theseelements reinforce a patriarchal approach tosecurity.

Demands of unity as obedience in nuclear policy

The report’s authors assert that NATO hasalways unified its members behind a“common strategic vision” (p.7). This vision,crafted decades ago by a group unabashedlyreferred to as the “Wise Men Group”, set“strength and solidarity” as the pillars ofNATO. While economic and politicalcooperation are said to be important toNATO’s cohesion, militarism has come to beits reigning tenet.

When the report asserts that “politicaldivergences within NATO are dangerous”(p.9), it frames this primarily in the contextof perceived aggression from Russia andChina—which the authors argue seek toexploit differences between NATOmembers. It also frames this in the context ofnuclear weapon policy, which the authors seeas instrumental to NATO’s security. Theyargue that NATO has historically used“strategy and statecraft to forge compromisesand enable common action in a way thatserves the good of all Allies”. However, a lookat how NATO came to identify as a nuclearweapon alliance indicates that rather than“compromise” reached through “statecraft”,the process was more like obedience reachedthrough intimidation.

As Kjølv Egeland points out,8 NATO’sfirst strategic concept, adopted in 1950,“eschewed an atomic strategy”.9 Denmark’sforeign minister refused to accept anypositive references to nuclear weapons in theconcept and said it was imperative thatNATO not use any language “that could beargued to stand in the way of an effective banon nuclear war”.10

Over time, the US government cajoledother NATO members into supporting anuclear mission for the alliance, in large partto help legitimise US possession anddeployment of thermonuclear weaponsdeveloped in the 1950s.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 20 February 2021

While public opinion overwhelmingly stoodagainst nuclear weapons, NATO’sacceptance of the bomb was seen asparamount to “spreading the burden” formaintaining a policy of nuclear deterrence.11

The United States drafted a new strategicdocument for NATO that explicitlyendorsed the use of nuclear weapons byNATO forces, promising to respond to“Soviet aggression” with a “devastatingcounter-attack employing atomicweapons”.12 The document was quickly andquietly adopted in 1954 at a last-minutemeeting scheduled in Paris.

Not all NATO members were happy withthis development. The Canadiangovernment, for example, said thedocument “seemed at onefell swoop to undercutwhatever possibilityexisted withinNATO forconsultation inadvance of theatomic swordbeing unsheathed,to increase greatlythe potential ofthat sword beingused, and to sideswipeCanada’s own defenceposture”.13 Such concernswere dismissed. From here, theUS government urged the UnitedKingdom to help it convince NATOmembers of the “technical and moraljustification” of including nuclear weapons inthe new strategic concept in 1957.

As nuclear weapons became part ofNATO’s doctrine, some members expresseda willingness to host US nuclear weapons ontheir territories in “nuclear sharing”arrangements. Others, however, opposed theidea of NATO becoming so nuclearised.

The Danish and Norwegian prime ministers,for example, “declared nuclear weapons nongrata on their territories” and called fordisarmament talks with the Soviet Union, ahalt to all nuclear weapon testing, andpostponement of the decision in NATOabout stationing nuclear weapons in non-nuclear countries.14

When the Canadian government refused tohost US nuclear weapons, the USgovernment responded with a patriarchalattack against the Canadian prime minister,slandering his government with sexualisedslurs such as “impotency,” “coquettishindecision,” and desire to preserve Canada’s“nuclear virginity”.15 The next Canadian

government immediatelyaccepted the US warheads,

despite public protests.However, Canada,

along withDenmark, Portugaland Norway,continued tooppose NATObecoming anuclear force,

with the fourgovernments

insisting they wouldnot contribute human

or financial capital towardsit. Denmark, Iceland, Norway

and Spain refused to participate innuclear sharing, and Denmark issued“footnotes” to NATO communiqués in the1980s opposing nuclear weapons.

This dissention is what has led to themantra of the importance of “cohesion” inNATO. The 1991 strategic conceptpresented nuclear weapons as “a materialmanifestation of transatlantic bonds betweenEurope and North America”.16 This was adeliberate move by the United States toensure that dissent within NATO overnuclear weapons would no longer betolerated.

When the Canadian governmentrefused to host US nuclearweapons, the US government

responded with a patriarchal attackagainst the Canadian prime minister,slandering his government with

sexualised slurs such as “impotency,”“coquettish indecision,” and desireto preserve Canada’s “nuclear

virginity”

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 21

The technique of badgering your allies intoaccepting your position—despite their owninterests, or the opinion of their publics thatvote for them, or their own historical, moral,and political positions—is classic patriarchy.So is the assertion that dissent ordisagreement will undo the entire alliance.This scaremongering tactic alleges that it isthe dissenter’s fault if there is breakdownwithin the alliance, rather than it being thefault of the aggressor demanding to get theirway. This is not compromise or statecraft,this is bullying.

Similarly, when Germany consideredending its nuclear sharing relationship withthe United States in 2009, US and UKofficials said this was a “selfish gambitimplying that it wanted ‘others to risknuclear retaliation on its behalf’”.17 This waswhen NATO adopted its catch-22-esquemantra that as long as nuclear weapons exist,NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. Thelanguage came directly from US Secretary ofState Hillary Clinton in response to therequest from Belgium, Germany,Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norwayto have a serious debate within NATO aboutdenuclearisation.18

For the pro-nuclear states in NATO,reversing the nuclear sharing agenda wouldlead to NATO losing its “nuclear culture”and put the three nuclear-armed allies underincreased “moral pressure” to disarm.19 AsEgeland explains, “NATO’s organisationalidentity as a nuclear alliance has beenleveraged to discredit advocates ofdenuclearisation”.20 The nuclear-armedmembers of NATO are keen to ensure thatthe alliance remain nuclearised in order toguard against pressure for disarmament—andthe reflection group concurs with thisstrategy. “Maintaining political cohesion andunity must be an unambiguous priority forall Allies” (p.14) they argue.

Doubling down on militarism

While the report’s stated vision is of “a worldin which a plurality of worldviews andfundamental differences of opinion are noobstacle to dialogue and cooperation” (p.11),such a vision is at odds with the way thatNATO has handled its nuclear policy issues.It is also at adds with the rest of the report’sentrenchment of militarism as the primarysolution to emerging and persistentchallenges.

The reflection group sees NATO as amilitary alliance, not a security alliance. Itframes security in exclusively military terms,emphasising for example the importance ofthe 2014 pledge of NATO states to spendtwo per cent of GDP on militarism, and 20per cent of their annual military spending on“major new equipment”. The report urgesNATO members to compete “with effortsunderway by large authoritarian states”(meaning China and Russia) to achievedominance in “emerging and destructivetechnologies” (p.13). While the reportrecognises the risks posed by suchtechnologies, it doesn’t urge NATOmembers to work for their prohibition orregulation but instead urges them to “reapthe fruits” of these technologies and seize the“historic opportunities for strategicadvantage” (p.29).

The report also recommends NATOmaintain its nuclear catch-22, urging it to“reaffirm its support for arms control whilemaintaining an effective nuclear deterrence”.It suggests that in response to the “threatposed by Russia’s existing and new militarycapabilities”, NATO should “continue andrevitalise the nuclear-sharing arrangementsthat constitute a critical element of NATO’sdeterrence policy” (p.13).

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 22 February 2021

The reflection group recommends that anupdated NATO strategic concept shouldstrengthen “deterrence and defence,including nuclear deterrence” (p.23) arguing,“Nuclear weapons have been a critical pillarof NATO’s collective defence since itsinception” and that “nuclear sharingarrangements play a vital role in theinterconnection of the Alliance and shouldremain one of the main components ofsecurity guarantees and the indivisibility ofsecurity of the whole Euro-Atlantic area”(p.36).

Once again doubling down on the idea thatany dissent over nuclear policy is a threat tothe alliance as a whole, the report authors goon to assert that due to China and Russia’snuclear weapon modernisation (withoutacknowledging the modernisationprogrammes of France, the UnitedKingdom, or United States),and the deterioration ofthe Cold War-era armscontrol framework(withoutacknowledging theUnited States isresponsible for most ofsaid deterioration), “itis critical to sustainnuclear deterrence andconventional defencecapabilities in the 21st century asthe bedrock of NATO security” (p.37).

So basically, the report’s authors are sayingthat because there is a higher risk of the useof nuclear weapons and less constraints ontheir development and use, we should investmore in nuclear weapons, rather thancommit to their prohibition andelimination—which is the only way to ensurethese weapons are never used. The reflectiongroup even urges NATO members torecommit to the (nuclear-armed state)position on the Treaty on the Prohibition ofNuclear Weapons, “namely that it will nevercontribute to practical disarmament, nor willit affect international law” (p.37).

Of course, as of 22 January 2021, thistreaty is international law. There is nothingthat nuclear-armed or nuclear-supportivestates can say that will change that fact. Notliking a treaty does not undermine a treaty’sexistence—or its efficacy. The “practical”effects of the treaty are already being felt,including within NATO states, whereparliamentarians, cities and towns, andfinancial institutions have all begun tosupport the treaty and change policies andpractices in order to comply with itsprovisions.

Building communityBeyond the absurd position on the TPNW,however, the overarching problem with thereflection group’s report is that it asksNATO members to continue to invest in

militarism above anything else. Thisis the same strategy NATO has

employed for decades—butwhere has all of this

militarism gotten us?NATO has become awar machine; itsmembers have beenbullied into supportinga nuclear mission over

the opposition of theirown populations and

politicians; they have beencajoled into investing ever more

in weapons and preparedness for warthan in the pursuits of peace. The reflectiongroup approaches China and Russia asthreats that must be contained, accusingthem of violating international rules andnorms and manipulating other countrieswithin their spheres of influence. Yet, thesame can be said about many NATOmembers, which also engage in nuclearweapon modernisation, wars of aggressionand occupation, arms exports and sales,economic warfare, and border imperialism.

the overarching problem

with the reflection group’sreport is that it asks NATOmembers to continue to invest in militarism above anything

else.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 23

The gamesmanship reflected in thisdocument reflects the pursuit of Cold War-style hegemony by Russia and the UnitedStates. Meanwhile, other states are caught inthe middle—including NATO members. Dothey support one side or the other in thisThunderdome-esque match? Or can they getaround this polarising death match to pursuework that is actually in the interests of allhumanity? Can other NATO memberschallenge US hegemony to forge a lessmilitarised path for the alliance, or are theyforever beholden to the most violent oftheir members?

NATO’s obedience inboycotting the TPNWhas been a strategicerror. Joining theTreaty offers anopportunity forNATO membersindividually to embracecollective efforts forpeace and security, whilebringing the alliance as awhole towards a denuclearisedfuture. If NATO members were tojoin this Treaty, they would be signalling thatthey are determined to pursue a differentpath for the alliance—one where security andpeace are prioritised over militarism.

Abolish military alliances, build peace alliances

There are ways to achieve collective securitythat do not necessitate “military prowess”and rely on the threat of massive nuclearviolence. This involves building andmaintaining real community, which requiresreciprocity, trust, and understanding.

It requires us to live in relationship withothers, not simply to demand that everyoneelse obey our commands or conform to ourway of thinking.

Governments that say they believe in therule of law, in cooperation and dialogue—which is most NATO members—need toembrace plurality rather than unanimity.The reflection group asserts that without“cohesion”, NATO’s members will face allchallenges alone. But this is not how the restof the world operates; it’s not how activists

operate. The demand for unanimity isa patriarchal, authoritarian

approach to an alliance—and it will ultimately fail.

NATO should beabolished as aninstitution. It has beencorrupted by themilitary pursuits of its

most aggressivemembers; its framework

of operation, as is madeclear in this report, is one of

violence, fear, and patriarchy.But the members of NATO could seek

to establish a truly democratic, decoloniseddenuclearised, and demilitarised globalalliance for collective security if they sowished. They could do by withdrawing fromNATO and establishing feminist policies andpartnerships with countries committed tononviolence, equality, and global justice.They may find that in such a pursuit, theyhave more allies around the world—and lessthreats—than they currently see themselvesfacing.

Governments that say they believe in the ruleof law, in cooperation anddialogue—which is mostNATO members—need toembrace plurality rather

than unanimity.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 24 February 2021

Endnotes:1 The phrase violent masculinity does not refer to men but to gendered norms that idealise militarisation and

violence as imperative to strength and power.2 Marie Bell and Milli Lake, “On Inconvenient Findings,” Duck of Minerva, 5 January 2021.3 Heather Hurlburt, Elizabeth Weingarten, Alexandra Stark, and Elena Souris, The “ConsensualStraitjacket”:

Four Decades of Women in Nuclear Security, New America, 2019.4 Julian Hayda, “Women Now At Top of Military-Industrial Complex. A Feminist Reaction,” WBEZ 91.5

Chicago, 8 January 2019.5 For example, the US-led bombardment of Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria in 2016–17, which also included

other NATO members participating in the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. Seefor example Rasha Jarhum and Alice Bonfatti, We Are Still Here: Mosulite Women 500 Days After theConclusion of the Coalition Military Operation (Geneva: Women’s International League for Peace andFreedom, 2019).

6 Ray Acheson, “Impacts, not intentionality: the imperative of focusing on the effects of explosive weapons in apolitical declaration,” Reaching Critical Will, 14 February 2020.

7 For example, US and UK drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen have killed and injuredthousands of civilians, including children—see The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war. US contractors, such as Blackwater in Iraq,have murdered civilians with impunity—see Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s MostPowerful Mercenary (New York: Basic Books, 2008).

8 Kjølv Egeland, “Spreading the Burden: How NATO Became a ‘Nuclear’ Alliance,” Diplomacy & Statecraft31, no. 1 (2020): 143–67.

9 Andrew M. Johnston, Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945–1955(London, 2005), 133.

10 Poul Villaume, Allieret med forbehold (Copenhagen: Eirene, 1995), 503. Translation from Danish by KjølvEgeland.

11 Egeland, “Spreading the Burden”.12 NATO, “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Five Years” (MC 48) (1954),

§ 3(b).13 Brian Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000),

116.14 Egeland, “Spreading the Burden,” 151.15 Janice Cavell, “Like Any Good Wife,” International Journal 63, no. 2 (2008): 398.16 Egeland, “Spreading the Burden,” 157.17 Franklin Miller, George Robertson, and Kori Schake, “Germany Opens Pandora’s Box,” Centre for

European Reform, February 2010, 2.18 Egeland, “Spreading the Burden”.19 David S. Yost, “The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Deterrent,” NATO Defence College, Workshop (2010), 6

and David S. Yost, “The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011):1411.

20 Egeland, “Spreading the Burden,” 160.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 25

The high-level “Reflection Group” appointedby NATO Secretary-General JensStoltenberg to generate a new strategic visionfor the seventy-year-old Alliance wasinstructed to devise a blueprint that wouldunite all its members in a common mission,thereby ensuring NATO’s continued utility.Instead, the group produced a report,“NATO 2030: United for a New Era”, thatappears intended more to guarantee thecontinued participation of theUnited States than toprotect the best interestsof NATO’s Europeanmembers. Byembracing theAmerican military’spreoccupation with“great powercompetition”, thereport essentiallycommits all Alliancemembers to a costly,all-consuming militarycompetition with Russia andChina that will expose them to anever-increasing risk of nuclear war.

As indicated in the report, the greatestdanger facing NATO in the years ahead isnot terrorism or the threat ofChinese/Russian aggression, but ratherdisunity within the Alliance, and especiallythe divide between the United States andNATO’s European members.

“Recent years have seen Allies engaged indisputes that partly reflect anxietiesabout their long-term strategic futures”, itstates. “Some Europeans worry that theUnited States is turning inward – or that itscommitment to their continent will diminishas it increases focus on the Indo-Pacific”(p.5). It follows from this that to survive andflourish, NATO must embrace a long-term

mission that will unite its members andensure the continued

participation of the UnitedStates. But at what price?

For the ReflectionGroup, this meansadopting a securityposture that fullyaccords withWashington’sgeopolitical

interests but is ill-suited to Europe’s.

To fully appreciate thenature of this disjunction,

it is necessary to understandthe radical transformation of US

strategic thinking. When President Trumpentered the White House, the Americanmilitary was almost entirely focused ondefeating Islamic terrorists in North Africaand the Middle East, while devotingrelatively little attention to developments inEurope and Asia.

By embracing the American military’spreoccupation with “greatpower competition”, the

report essentially commits allAlliance members to a costly, all-consuming militarycompetition with Russia

and China

By embracing America’s strategic vision,NATO exposes Europe to increased nuclear risk

Michael T. Klare

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 26 February 2021

Under the prodding of Secretary ofDefense Jim Mattis, however, those prioritieswere completely reversed: Instead ofmaintaining its focus on counter-terroroperations, the US military was nowenjoined to prepare for all-out war withAmerica’s great-power competitors, Russiaand China. “Although the Department [ofDefense] continues to prosecute thecampaign against terrorists,” he told theSenate Armed Services Committee (SASC)in 2018, “long-term strategic competition –not terrorism – is now the primary focus ofU.S. national security”.1

Mattis’s new strategic outlook wasenshrined in the National Defense Strategy(NDS) of 2018, the Pentagon’s overarchingdoctrinal statement. According to the NDS,the United States must overcome two majorstrategic challenges: the emergence of great-power competitors intent upon challengingAmerica’s dominance of the global order;and a revolution in military technology,enabling those rivals to counter US forces onnear-equal terms.

“The National Defense Strategyacknowledges an increasingly complex globalsecurity environment, characterized by overtchallenges to the free and open internationalorder and the re-emergence of long-term,strategic competition between nations”, itavows. In particular, “China is a strategiccompetitor using predatory economics tointimidate its neighbors, while … Russia hasviolated the borders of nearby nations…”. Atthe same time, “the security environment isalso affected by rapid technologicaladvancements and the changing character ofwar”. Although the United States onceenjoyed uncontested superiority in all“domains” of warfare, its technologicaladvantage has been eroded as its competitorshave invested in advanced combattechnologies such as artificial intelligence(AI), robotics, autonomy, cyber, andhypersonics.2 (Emphasis in the original).

Given these challenges, the Pentagon’s taskwas clear: to gear up for full-scale, “multi-domain” combat with well-equippedadversaries, and to ensure America’scontinuing superiority in every field ofmilitary technology. “Our military remainscapable, but our competitive edge has erodedin every domain of warfare – air, land, sea,space, and cyber”, Mattis told the SASC.Accordingly, “the National Defense Strategyprioritizes major power competition and, inparticular, reversing the erosion of USmilitary advantage in relation to China andRussia”. This means, in particular:“modernization of nuclear deterrence forcesand nuclear command, control andcommunications (NC3) capabilities;additional missile defense capabilities; …continuing increased procurement of certainpreferred and advanced munitions; [and]investment in technological innovation toincrease lethality, including research intoadvanced autonomous systems, artificialintelligence, and hypersonics”.3

This outlook has governed US strategicthinking ever since the NDS was released in2018. Hence, in a September 2020 address atthe RAND Corporation, Secretary ofDefense Mark Esper reiterated many of thepoints outlined by Jim Mattis in his 2018SASC testimony. “Today, in this era of greatpower competition, the Department ofDefense has prioritized China then Russia, asour top strategic competitors”, he stated. As aconsequence, the US military must enhanceits capacity to succeed in “a high-end fightagainst near-peer adversaries”.4 (Emphasisadded).

Nor has this outlook changed under theincoming Biden administration. “I believethe 2018 NDS correctly identifies strategiccompetitions with China and with Russia asthe primary challenges animating the globalsecurity environment”, Lloyd Austin, JoeBiden’s nominee for Secretary of Defense,affirmed in written answers to questionssubmitted by the SASC in January 2021.5

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 27

In consonance with the National DefenseStrategy, each of America’s military services –the Army, Navy, Air Force, and MarineCorps – have revised their planning forfuture combat operations. In place of theirprior focus on counterinsurgency andcounter-terror operations, all are now laser-focused on great-power conflict, specificallywar with China and Russia.

Every weapon they buy is designed for usein that “high-end fight against near-peer adversaries”. Every majormilitary exercise they engagein is a preview of whatthey expect in a majorconfrontation withChinese and/orRussian forces. Everyinteraction with themilitaries of othernations, or with allianceslike NATO, is intended tointegrate them into US plansto fight and defeat China andRussia in all-out warfare.

This, essentially, is the vision that theNATO Reflection Group incorporatedwholly and uncritically in its November 2020report. “The main characteristic of thecurrent security environment is the re-emergence of geopolitical competition”, itstates. “In the Euro-Atlantic area, the mostprofound geopolitical challenge is posed byRussia…. The growing power andassertiveness of China is the other majorgeopolitical development that is changing thestrategic calculus of the Alliance” (pp.16-17).Read further, and the language appearsstrikingly familiar to that found in thePentagon’s 2018 National Defense Strategy.So, too, is the NATO report’s discussion of“emerging and disruptive technologies”,emphasizing the race to weaponize AI andother cutting-edge technologies. If youembrace that report, it means you haveembraced Jim Mattis’s plan for continuedUS military supremacy in an unendingpower struggle with China and Russia.

In so doing, moreover, Europe will exposeitself to enormous new risks. Until now, theEuropean powers have responded to Russianaggression in Crimea and eastern Ukrainethrough a mixture of diplomacy, economicsanctions, and, via NATO, the strengtheningof allied forces in exposed states like Estonia,Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. As far as can be determined, this has deterredMoscow from undertaking any further

aggressive moves, save thoseconducted in cyberspace. But

the US military, inaccordance with the

NDS, has been trainingand equipping itself fora future confrontationwith Russia that wouldentail attacks on high-

value targets withinRussian territory from

the very onset of battle –attacks that would most likely

be launched from bases in westernEurope, making them critical targets forRussian counterattacks.6 These missile andartillery exchanges would, in all likelihood,commence with “conventional”, non-nuclearweapons, but as the magnitude of destructionspiraled upward, there is no certainty thatthey could be contained at the conventionallevel; indeed, nuclear escalation would bemore likely than not.

To fully grasp this danger, it is necessary toexamine the US Army’s planning for a waragainst Russia in Europe, as spelled out in its2018 document, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations. While it is hard tosummarize a 100-page document in a fewwords, the basic plan calls for the Army toconcentrate its “long-range fires” (artilleryand ballistic missiles) on Russian commandcentres, troop concentrations, and “anti-access, area denial” (or homeland defencecapabilities) at the very onset of battle and,once those are destroyed, to employarmoured forces to smash through remainingRussian defences and occupy key sites inRussia, forcing Moscow to surrender.

Every interaction with the

militaries of other nations, or with alliances like NATO, is intended to integrate them into US plans to fight and defeat China and Russia in all-out warfare.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 28 February 2021

As indicated in the document, “In theevent of armed conflict…. Army long-rangefires converge with joint multi-domaincapabilities [air and naval strikes] topenetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-accessand area denial systems to enable Joint Forcefreedom of strategic and operationalmaneuver…. Convergence against theenemy’s long-range systems enables the initialpenetration [of Russian territory]. This setsthe conditions for a quick transition to jointair-ground operations in which maneuverenables strike and strike enables maneuver….Army forces, having penetrated and begunthe disintegration of the enemy’s anti-accessand area denial systems, exploit vulnerableenemy units and systems to defeatenemy forces and achievefriendly campaign objectives.As part of the Joint Force,Army forces rapidlyachieve given strategicobjectives (win) andconsolidate gains”.7

The problem withthis, as anyone whocan read between thelines will understand, isthat Russian leaders are notlikely to permit American orUS/NATO forces to “penetrate”Russian territory, demolish Russian militaryforces, and “win,” i.e., defeat the RussianFederation. Indeed, Russian military doctrinestates very clearly that in the event of anexistential threat to the Motherland, Russiawill respond with nuclear weapons – perhapswith so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons atfirst, aimed at US/NATO bases in westernEurope (but powerful enough to incinerateadjacent towns and cities), but just as likelyto involve strategic, city-busting bombs.8

As Vladimir Putin stated in a March 2018address to the Federal Assembly, “I shouldnote that our military doctrine says Russiareserves the right to use nuclear weaponssolely in response to a nuclear attack, or anattack with other weapons of mass

destruction against the country or its allies,or an act of aggression against us with the useof conventional weapons that threaten the veryexistence of the state”.9 (Emphasis added).

A similar strategy, it should be noted, hasbeen devised for a future conflict with China.In this case, however, US forces would fireballistic missiles – many of them expected topossess hypersonic velocities – at the Chinesemainland from ships and islands in thePacific.10 How China would respond toconventional attacks on its homeland cannotbe foreseen, but here, too, the risk of nuclearescalation is bound to be substantial.

Even if the US, China, and Russia manageto avoid going to war with one another

in the years ahead, the Pentagon’spursuit of permanent

military supremacy and itsreliance of combat plans

involving direct attackson Chinese andRussian territory willproduce anenvironment of

unremitting tensioncoupled with an

increasingly costly anddangerous arms race. This

will poison US relations withthose two countries and create a Cold

War-like ambience in which every incidentand dispute has the potential to ignite amajor crisis – and war. Normal traderelations and cooperation on issues of globalsignificance – climate change, pandemics,migrations – will prove increasingly difficult.The nations of Europe may wish to escapethis corrosive and dangerous environment,but by embracing the Mattis doctrine ofgreat-power competition with China andRussia – as suggested by the ReflectionGroup – they will become little more thanaccessories to America’s drive for globaldominance.

the Pentagon’s pursuit of permanent

military supremacy and itsreliance of combat plansinvolving direct attacks onChinese and Russian territorywill produce an environmentof unremitting tension

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 29

Endnotes:1 Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), 26

April 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mattis_04-26-18.pdf2 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of

America, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

3 Mattis, Statement for the Record, SASC, 26 April 2018.4 Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper, Speech at RAND Corporation, 16 Sept. 2020,

https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2350362/secretary-of-defense-speech-at-rand-as-delivered/

5 SASC, Policy Questions for Lloyd J. Austin, Nominee for Appointment to be Secretary of Defense, 19 Jan.2021, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Austin_APQs_01-19-21.pdf

6 See, for example, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Tests New All Domain Kill Chain: From Space To AI,”Breaking Defense, 5 Aug. 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/army-tests-new-all-domain-kill-chain-from-space-to-ai/

7 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations,TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 6 December 2018, p. 25,https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/pamphlets/TP525-3-1.pdf

8 For background on Russian nuclear doctrine, see Anya Loukianova Fink and Olga Oliker, “Russia’s NuclearWeapons in a Multipolar World: Guarantors of Sovereignty, Great Power Status & More,” Daedalus, Spring2020, pp. 37-55.

9 Vladimir Putin’s Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, 1 March 2018,http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58848

10 See, for example, Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Seeks New Mid-Range Missile Prototype by 2023,”Breaking Defense, 8 Sept. 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/09/army-seeks-new-mid-range-missile-prototype-by-2023/

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 30 February 2021

The members of the reflection groupdescribe the relationship between NATOand Russia in dark terms and are even morepessimistic with respect to the future (p. 25).Even though discussion of the rise of Chinagets much space in the report, it is said thatat least until 2030 Russia “will most likelyremain the main military threat to theAlliance” (p. 25).

The group recommends continuing the“dual-track approach of deterrence anddialogue” between NATO and Russia. Whatis largely missing, however, is a reflection ofwhat contributed to reduce what the groupsees as NATO’s main military threat in thepast and what might work in the future.

A case in point is the discussion, or ratherneglect of a discussion, of confidence andsecurity building measures. Except for onemention in a recommendation of what theNATO-Russia Council should message toRussia (p. 26), the report is silent on thisimportant instrument for threat reductionand political understanding.

Confidence-building measures as aninstrument for risk reduction andcontribution to security in Europe were acentral part of the Final Act of theConference on Security and Co-operation inEurope in Helsinki in 1975.1 Already in thisdocument from the Cold War era centralaspects of confidence-building are specifiedin the chapter on Questions relating toSecurity in Europe, in particular priornotification of major military manoeuvres,prior notification of other militarymanoeuvres, exchange of observers and priornotification of major military movements.

Arms control and disarmament are seen in aclose relation to confidence-buildingmeasures.

After the end of the Cold War the CSCEbecame the OSCE, which is the keyorganisation for confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe.2 TheOSCE played a central role in the 1990sduring the withdrawal of most of the UStroops and US nuclear weapons fromGermany and other European NATOmember states and during the completewithdrawal of former Soviet, then Russiantroops and weapons from the territory offormer non-Soviet member states of theWarsaw Pact, which was dissolved in 1991.Notable treaties supporting this process werethe Conventional Armed Forces in EuropeTreaty (negotiated already in the final yearsof the Cold war), the Vienna Document andthe Open Skies Treaty.

The CFE Treaty lost its significance whenthe post-Cold War troop reductions inEurope were finished. As NATO continuedto exist and former Warsaw Pact states andformer Soviet Republics applied formembership, these treaties werecomplemented in 1997 by the NATO-RussiaFounding Act.

Many experts hoped that the combinationof these treaties and documents would helpto prevent and de-escalate possible crises.The Ukraine war 2014 showed that thisexpectation was wrong. NATO countriessuspended contacts and regular meetingswhich were based on the NATO-RussiaFounding Act.

The importance of confidence-buildingbetween NATO and Russia

Ute Finckh-Krämer

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 31

The United States under President Trumpnot only withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, whichwas originally a bilateral treaty between theSoviet Union and the United States, but alsofrom the multilateral Open Skies Treaty(OST) despite urgent appeals from Europeanmember states including Ukraine to remain.The US withdrawal from the OST enteredinto force shortly before the end of thePresidency of Donald Trump (on 22November 2020). The Russian ForeignMinistry announced inversely on 15 January2021, that it would begin the domesticprocedure for withdrawal from the OpenSkies Treaty.3

The erosion of confidence-buildingmeasures and the withdrawal from importantarms control regimes alarmed not only peaceand conflict experts, but also Europeandiplomats and members of the armed forces.

From June to December 2020 a track IIdialogue of about 40 experts fromRussia, European NATOcountries and the UnitedStates—most of themscientists, formerdiplomats or seniormembers of themilitary forces—took place,focussing onmaintainingstrategic stability andrisk reduction.

They presented at thebeginning of December2020 a paper withrecommendations in seven categories:4

• Re-establishing practical dialoguebetween Russia and NATO, includingdirect contacts between the militarycommanders and experts of Russia andNATO member states.

• Developing common rules that willreduce the risk of unintended incidentson land, air and sea.

• Enhancing stability by increasingtransparency, avoiding dangerousmilitary activities, and providingdedicated communication channels thatwould avoid escalation of incidents thatmight occur.

• Utilizing (and possibly supplementing)the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Actto codify restraint, transparency andconfidence-building measures.

• Exploring possible limitations onNATO and Russian conventional forcedeployments in Europe to enhancetransparency and stability.

• Establishing consultations betweenRussia and US/NATO on the topics ofintermediate-range missiles and ballisticmissile defence, in order to prevent anew nuclear missile race in Europe.

• Preserving the Open Skies Treaty.

Conflict experts and many diplomats knowthat in times of conflict intensive

contacts are crucial for riskreduction and prevention

of escalation bymisunderstanding or

accident. It was aserious mistake ofNATO (and EU)member states tointerrupt contactsas a reaction to the

Russian annexationof Crimea and the

support of insurgentactors in Eastern Ukraine.

The proper reaction in a crisisis to use all official and unofficial

channels to de-escalate and discussconfidentially and publicly differentpositions and present explicitly and to thepoint the position of each side.

Conflict experts and many diplomats know that in times of

conflict intensive contacts arecrucial for risk reduction andprevention of escalation by misunderstanding or

accident.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 32 February 2021

At the moment the New START(Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) betweenRussia and the United States is extended byRussia and the United States for five years.The participation of the United States andRussia in the Open Skies Treaty is crucial forthe preservation of that treaty as a centralelement of confidence-building measures inEurope and between the two major nuclearpowers. President Biden and hisadministration should save this treaty just asthey are working with Russia to save the NewSTART treaty.

Preserving the existing arms control treatieswill be an important contribution toEuropean and international security and givea new chance for disarmament, arms controland nonproliferation in a world on whichBan Ki-Moon, who was at that timeSecretary-General of the United Nations,said in 2013, “The world is over-armed andpeace is underfunded“.

Endnotes:1 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf2 https://www.osce.org/arms-control3 Carnegie Moscow: Open Skies without Russia https://carnegie.ru/commentary/837274 Recommendations of the Participants of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Military Risk Reduction in

Europe, http://iskran.ru/wp-content/uploads/Statement-on-Russia-NATO.pdf

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 33

Policy towards China has always been acomplex matter to determine—as hasChinese policy towards the outside world forBeijing—and today this is even more so. Onthe one hand, there is widespread andjustified dismay at China’s behaviour inXinjiang and Hong Kong, and concern at thepossible consequences of the self-assertivenationalism increasingly displayed since XiJinping came to power. On the other, thereis—or there should be—disquiet at thesweeping hostility to China shown by someWestern politicians, and even more over theclaim by influential voices that a “new coldwar” is on the way or has already arrived, andby the failure to acknowledge that such a warcould lead to disaster. Chineseanalysts point from theirperspective to what theyregard as the demonizationof their country, and topolicies that appeardesigned to limit itslegitimate growth andinfluence. All of thispresents a challengerequiring careful and balancedcalculation, weighing those issueswhich may appear intractable againstothers where dialogue could be productive(and taking account of previous discussionsbetween NATO and Beijing).

Unfortunately, the comments on China inthis experts’ report tend towards the routineand do not appear to reflect sustainedthinking. It may be relevant that none of thelisted authors seem to have specialistknowledge of China.

As the report acknowledges, China was noteven mentioned in NATO’s 2010 StrategicConcept, and while there have beensubstantial changes since then in Chineseexternal and internal policies, several issuesnow regarded as of concern were alreadypresent then without attracting NATO’sattention.

US-China relations The question arises as to how far NATOpolicy is being dictated by shifts in thebilateral relationship between the US andChina which may now be in transitionfollowing the election of President Biden. Ithas been obvious since the victory of the

Chinese Communist Party thatpolicies towards Beijing of the

European NATO membershave often beenconstrained by USpolicy—most visibly inthe first two decades ofthe cold war. Though less

obvious, this is still afactor. It is no secret that

NATO was under pressurefrom the Trump administration

in 2019-20 to harden its policy onChina. Initial signs from Washington sincePresident Biden’s inauguration indicate amore judicious attempt to separate positivefrom negative elements in the relationship,and a matching effort from Beijing in anumber of recent statements. This is a trendthat should be reflected and encouraged inNATO policy, which indeed should help toadvance any such positive change rather thanmerely keep in step with it.

The question arises as to how farNATO policy is beingdictated by shifts in thebilateral relationshipbetween the US and

China

Rethinking NATO’s China policy to avoid a new cold war

John Gittings

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 34 February 2021

Strategic balance Some of the perceived problems arise fromthe fact that China has “joined the world” —as indeed Western policies from the Nixonvisit onwards encouraged it to do.Inescapably the time was bound to comewhen China would acquire the strength andself-confidence to present itself as a greatpower on equal terms, in a military as well aseconomic sense, thus challenging by thesimple fact of its existence the primacyassumed by the only power that haddominated since the end of the cold war.This is now an accomplished fact: thequestion is how best to find ways of workingwith a stronger China at home and abroad totackle those issues of common concern thatchallenge the entire globe, while notignoring areas of disagreement.

China under Xi JinpingChina as Number One?

Until the last decade, thedominant view in Beijingwas that China should becontent to “remain asnumber two”—and indeedthat the position of “numberone” was problematic, as the UShad discovered. This view was alwayschallenged by a vein of argument expressed inthe popular saying that “China Can Say No”and that Beijing should become moreassertive on the world stage. This was partlyfuelled by historical grievances about thedepredations of foreign imperialism,especially regarding Japan. Such views werealways strong in some social strata, and attimes received official encouragement. Whatwe are now witnessing is the domination ofthis second view, with more vocal supportfrom official opinion-formers, which is alsoexpressed in terms of a marked increase inChina’s military capability and the adoptionof a more forward strategic outlook, movingaway from the traditional emphasis ondefensive strategy.

This shift causes apprehensions amongChina’s immediate neighbours, but they arealso wary of ill-considered Western actionsthat would ratchet up tensions and causemore instability in the region. They wouldgenerally prefer to see these issues addressedthrough dialogue on Asia-Pacific security—asubject that Beijing has been willing todiscuss.

Human Rights

The most pronounced shift in recent years,as widely perceived and deplored, has been inthe greater constraints imposed on freedomof expression generally, and on human rightsfor minorities (we may now include theHong Kong people as well as the indigenous

populations of Tibet and Xinjiang inthe category of minorities). This

shift accentuated trends thatwere already there.

Freedom of the mainlandChinese press to exposecorruption and abuseswas at its greatest aroundthe turn of the century

and has declined sincethen. Advocates of

democracy were alwayssubject to arbitrary arrest and

imprisonment, although they did havesome access to legal defence which has nowbeen further curtailed. However, it has to beobserved that the most perfunctory passagein the present report is that dealing withhuman rights —one “boilerplate” sentenceand no more. It is a matter of record thatNATO members’ concern with humanrights outside (and sometimes even within)the treaty area has often been selective. It isadmittedly difficult to raise with Beijingthose issues which it regards as internalmatters, but they may be addressed lessdirectly in the context of their effect uponregional relations.

the question is how best to find ways of working with

a stronger China at homeand abroad to tackle those

issues of common concern

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 35

“Moderate” opinion in Beijing More moderate voices in the Chinesegovernment, media and foreign relationsestablishment have become circumspect andare now heard less often, but they still exist.There is evidence that the arguments are stillbeing made: within the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, for example, there are both “wolfwarriors” and those who adopt moreconstructive language. Calls for cooperationwith the US, and the suggestion that there ismore common ground than division betweenthe two powers, are being made morefrequently and positively following theinauguration of President Biden. This shouldnot be written off as tactical posturingalthough there is an element of that in alldiplomatic activity. As the past has shown,the dominant “line” in Beijing can changevery sharply, and future shifts are possibleagain if the external context also changes.

The future relationshipDialogue with China

The passage dealing with China in the reportconcludes with a brief acknowledgement ofthe need to “continue to seek relations withChina” in a number of vital areas includingthe climate crisis. However, the manner inwhich this is done amounts to relegating thesubject of dialogue to a footnote (althoughstatements by the Secretary-General at thetime of the 70th anniversary summit took aslightly more positive attitude). Remarkably,the report ignores altogether the record ofthe NATO-China military staff talksbetween 2010 and 2018, in which a widerange of subjects were addressed (as listed byNATO in 2018), including: “North Korea,the South China Sea, Maritime Security andCounter Piracy, the security perspective onCentral Asia - in particular in Afghanistanand Pakistan, the European securitylandscape, China’s defence and militaryreforms, NATOs partnership policy andfinally, possible areas for more practicalcooperation between NATO and China”.

There is nothing to lose, and perhaps muchto gain, by actively seeking to re-open thisagenda. Other issues worth discussing withBeijing could be identified in preliminaryand back-channel contacts. These mightinclude nuclear weapons policy, detachingthis from the US-Russian equation andlooking creatively at, for example, “no-first-use” and “non-use” options.

Proposed consultative body

The NATO report proposes the formationof a consultative body to “discuss all aspectsof Allies’ security interests vis-à-vis China”.This is a sensible idea: such a body shouldnot however limit its enquiry to identifyingsecurity issues, but should explore theopportunities for dialogue in these and otherareas, and seek to identify possible counter-parts in China. To do so effectively, themembership of the proposed body shouldcover a wide and varied range of Chinaanalysis and expertise.

Avoiding a “new cold war”It cannot be emphasised too strongly that anew cold war in East Asia would be a disasterfor all concerned. The potential flashpointsfor a conflagration which have been “leftover” from the old cold war in that region donot need to be enumerated. To accept such abarren relationship is not just a zero-sumgame but one that could lead to a lose-loseresult which every effort should be made toavoid. Some NATO members havehistorically attempted to play a bridging rolebetween the US and China, and in a multi-polar world the opportunity for a morenuanced approach is much greater than inthe past. Overall, at a time of rapid upheavaland change on the international scene in somany areas, this is a time for exploration andcreative thinking towards China that seeks toachieve results. The urgency for this isheightened by the dual challenge of globalpandemic and climate crisis that the worldnow faces.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 36 February 2021

There is a consensus that NATO should‘adapt’ to the changed circumstances. Thatwas also the main reason why NATOSecretary-General Stoltenberg ordered theNATO 2030 report, which was delivered byten external experts in November 2020.With respect to nuclear deterrence andnuclear arms control and disarmament, thereport blows hot and cold. On the one hand,it underlines that arms control has animportant role to play; on the other hand, itstresses “that NATO continues to have acritical role to play in maintaining bothconventional and nuclear deterrenceand defence through Alliedarsenals and via U.S. forwarddeployments in Europe”…”Nuclear sharingarrangements play a vitalrole in theinterconnection of theAlliance and shouldremain one of the maincomponents of securityguarantees and theindivisibility of security of thewhole Euro-Atlantic area”. Theserecommendations correspond to the existingNATO policy and will therefore not changeanything.

The external circumstances, however, didchange. The main novelty in the field ofnuclear deterrence and nuclear arms controland disarmament is the entry into force ofthe Treaty on the Prohibition of NuclearWeapons (TPNW) that forbids thedevelopment, acquisition, possession,transfer, testing, use and threat of use ofnuclear weapons.

Since 22 January 2021, nuclear weapons areillegal under international law, at least for the52 states that have signed and ratified theTreaty. The advocates of the Treaty expectthat the nuclear-armed states and their alliesunderstand the signal to take the pledge ofnuclear elimination—under art.6 of theNuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)—much more seriously. They expect nothingless than fundamental change on behalf ofthe nuclear-armed states and alliances in thedirection of nuclear elimination.

On the TPNW, the NATO 2030 reportwas again not able or willing to

recommend any change andstated that “the allies should

recall their position onthe TPNW, namely thatit will never contributeto practicaldisarmament, nor will itaffect international law”.

The latter is simplywrong: the TPNW is from

now onwards part ofinternational law, whether you

like it or not. And the former isimpossible to predict, and in all likelihoodalso wrong. By the way, did the NPT—thecornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament regime according to theopponents of the TPNW—contribute topractical disarmament ?

Another effect of the TPNW is that thesocietal interest in nuclear disarmamentaround the world, including in NATOmember states and in particular the so-calledhost nations (especially Belgium, theNetherlands and Germany), is on the rise.

Since 22 January 2021, nuclearweapons are illegal underinternational law, at leastfor the 52 states that havesigned and ratified the

Treaty.

De-collectivize NATO’s nuclear weapons policy

Tom Sauer

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 37

There have always been majorities in favor ofwithdrawing the US tactical nuclear weaponsstationed on their territories. But thepercentage of people in these countries infavor of signing the TPNW have nowreached the level of 75-80%. One wondershow long these democratic states willwithstand public pressure to adapt to thechanged circumstances.

The other change in the externalenvironment since the previous NATOStrategic Concept (2010) is the take-over ofCrimea by Russia in 2014. As a result, underpressure of the East European member statesthe emphasis on nuclear deterrence becamestronger at the NATO WarsawSummit in 2016. At the sametime, deterrence andreassurance was even morestrengthened in the formof conventional meansand troops, includingfrom the UnitedStates. As thecredibility of adeterrent depends onthe capabilities and theintention to use them,conventional deterrence ismuch more credible than nucleardeterrence. Each day that nuclear weaponsare not used on the battlefield, the normagainst using these weapons becomesstronger. And the TPNW makes theimmoral and illegitimate use (and even thethreat of use) of nuclear weapons illegal, andtherefore further strengthens the norm.Every day, it becomes more difficult for a USpresident to authorize the use of thesecatastrophic (and now also illegal) weapons.In addition, the Baltic states are so small thatusing nuclear weapons may simply annihilatethese states, hardly an attractive prospect fortheir citizens. President Putin is fully awareof this, which further undermines NATO’snuclear deterrent effect.

As a consequence, given the aversion ofpublic opinion in the host nations for thestationing of US nuclear weapons on theirterritory, and given the entry into force ofthe TPNW, and the lack of credibility ofdeterring Putin with nuclear weapons in theBaltic region, NATO should change itsnuclear weapons policy in the next StrategicConcept by diminishing and delegitimizingthe role of nuclear weapons—or morespecifically, by de-collectivizing the policyand withdrawing all remaining US tacticalnuclear weapons from Europe. De-collectivizing the policy means limitingNATO’s extended nuclear deterrence tothose nuclear-armed states who like to

continue to do so with nucleararsenals not deployed on

other’s territory and onlywith the explicit consent

of the receiving state.NATO member statesshould be able todeclare without anyconstraint that they do

not want to be coveredby the nuclear umbrella.

The existing footnotepolicy by NATO member

states Denmark, Norway, Spain,Iceland and Lithuania that states that

they do not want nuclear weapons on theirsoil could be enlarged to the demand not tobe covered by extended nuclear deterrence.The latter implies not attending the NuclearPlanning Group meetings anymore. All thiswould make it possible for those opting outto sign and ratify the TPNW, asrecommended by 56 former Prime Ministers,Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense(including two former NATO SG) as well asformer US Secretary of Defense WilliamPerry, and at the same time remain a memberof the alliance. Also a Harvard study showsthat NATO membership and supporting thetreaty are not incompatible.

NATO should change its

nuclear weapons policy in the next Strategic

Concept by diminishing anddelegitimizing the role of

nuclear weapons

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 38 February 2021

Here are some steps the allies could take vis-à-vis the TPNW in the interim phase:

• Change the rhetoric and tone vis-à-visthe TPNW from being dismissive to atleast a neutral or positive tone, like theBelgian government declaration of 30September 2020, and like a resolutionadopted by the Spanish parliamentaryForeign Affairs Committee inDecember 2020. The North AtlanticCouncil statement on the TPNW of 15December 2020 is the opposite example.

• Establish a “Group of Friends of theTPNW” in the Alliance.

• Be present as an observer at the firstmeeting of the States Parties in January2022 to engage with the TPNW StatesParties without committing themselvesto anything yet.

• Contribute (also financially) to theassistance of victims of nuclear weapontests, as demanded by the TPNW.

• Vote in favor (or at least abstain) onTPNW resolutions in the UN GeneralAssembly in the Autumn of 2021.

At an institutional level, NATO may stillpresent a united front about its status as a‘nuclear alliance’, but cracks in theNATO nuclear wall are becomingvisible. NATO’s nuclearweapons policy has alwaysbeen controversial. Themultilateral force debatein the 1950s and 1960sand the Euromissilescontroversy in the 1980sare just two historicalexamples.

Notice that the two NATOmember states causing most troubleright now—the Netherlands (by havingparticipated in the TPNW negotiations in2017 against US instructions but underpressure of the Dutch parliament and civilsociety) and Belgium—are host nations ofUS atomic bombs.

The longer these tactical nuclear weaponsstay on their territory, the more controversythey are likely to yield, especially after theentry into force of the TPNW that forbidsthe stationing of nuclear weapons on otherstates’ territory, a mechanism that is onlypracticed by one nuclear-armed state in theworld, namely the United States.

The proposed five-year extension of NewSTART will give the Biden administrationtime to start follow-up negotiations with theRussians. Ideally, the scope of thosenegotiations should be extended to tacticalnuclear weapons (as well as missile defenceand possibly long-range conventionalweapons). As the Russians have alreadywithdrawn their tactical nuclear weaponsfrom Eastern Europe in the beginning of the1990s, the Americans should withdraw theirtactical nuclear weapons to their homelandbefore starting the follow-up New STARTnegotiations.

Of course, the United States, the UnitedKingdom and France prefer the status-quo.The latter helps legitimizing their ownnuclear weapons policies at home, not onlyby pointing to the outside threats (Russia,China, Iran,…), but also to the demands ofthe allies. Without the European allies, US

advocates of the expensivemodernization program of the

B-61 bomb—costing morethan US $10 bn for 400bombs—may not havewon the debate. Andwithout Japan and theEuropean allies, the

Obama administration inall likelihood would already

have announced a no first useor a sole purpose doctrine.

Consequently, the allies are at least asmuch responsible for the current status-quowith respect to NATO’s nuclear weaponspolicy as the three NATO nuclear-armedstates. Is it not time for the allies to startacting as non-nuclear weapon states,according to their formal stature under theNPT ?

If NATO really wants to

differentiate itself from the authoritarian rivals, it should stop its practiceof nuclear deterrence

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 39

Ironically, and apart from arms control, theNATO 2030 report recommends toincorporate the concept of human security.It states that “emphasizing the value ofhuman dignity and security differentiatesNATO from authoritarian rivals” (p.43).But does permanently threatening to cause acombination of genocide and ecocide byfighting a nuclear war seem to be in line with‘human security’ ? If NATO really wants todifferentiate itself from the authoritarianrivals, it should stop its practice of nucleardeterrence, which corresponds to threateningto commit mass murder. From a Realistpoint of view, that is of course a non-starter.But the current status-quo with respect tonuclear arms control and disarmament is alsoin nobody’s interest, except for those whosejob or career depends on it.

To begin with, NATO could withdraw theUS nuclear weapons from Europe, announcea no first use policy, and de-collectivizeNATO’s nuclear weapons policy withoutendangering the security of its memberstates. On the contrary, the more nuclearweapons are delegitimized, the better. If not,we will in all likelihood end up with morenuclear armed states and more chance thatnuclear weapons be used again, either in anauthorized, unauthorized or accidental way.Most NATO citizens understand this logic.If NATO is not able or willing to change itscurrent nuclear weapons policy, which isregarded as illegal by many, its overalllegitimacy will further decline in its ownbase.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 40 February 2021

The vision process in the ‘NATO 2030:United for a new Era’ report traces a path forthe Atlantic Alliance into the future. The“out of area or out of business” debate of afew years ago is well and truly over. Africa, atleast the Mediterranean coast and the Sahelbeyond, is now seen as a completelylegitimate area for NATO engagement.NATO has identified two immediate threatsfrom the East and the South, and links thetwo in a number of ways.

The report says:

“When NATO’sneighbours are moresecure, NATO is moresecure. NATO haslong recognised theexistence of threatsand diffuse risks toAllied security fromthe ‘South’, in additionto threats from the ‘East’.A clear cut separationbetween the two flanks islosing relevance, however: theSouth and the East are joined at the seams(and geographically through the WesternBalkans) with regard to Russia, which isacquiring an increasing role in theMediterranean region. In the next ten years,therefore, the 360-degree approach tosecurity will become an imperative and theSouth will likely grow in importance forNATO” (p.34).

However, it is clear from a reading of thereport that NATO’s definition of securityfor its neighbours is one that serves theinterests of NATO itself, and is not rootedin the complex mix of problems faced bycountries in North Africa and the Sahel norin comprehensive, conflict sensitive longterm solutions to those problems. Theperspectives of women and girls, and of othermarginalised groups are missing.

The report is concerned only with thesecurity threats that NATO

perceives as emanating fromthere and military

preparations NATOconsiders necessary forthe defence ofEurope.

The report’sproposals build on

past decisions andanalyses. In 2016, at the

Warsaw Summit, NATOnoted events in the

neighbouring global South not asissues in their own right, but as security

threats to NATO. The Summitcommunique says:

“The continuing crises and instabilityacross the Middle East and North Africaregion… as well as the threat of terrorismand violent extremism across the region ..demonstrate that the security of the regionhas direct implications for the security ofNATO. .. We are adapting our defence anddeterrence posture to respond to threats andchallenges, including from the south.”1

NATO’s definition of security forits neighbours is one thatserves the interests of NATOitself, and is not rooted in thecomplex mix of problems faced

by countries in NorthAfrica and the Sahel

NATO and the South: the need for de-securitised solutions

Martin Butcher

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 41

This approach has been reiterated bySecretary General Stoltenberg, speaking at anonline event:

“.. NATO is ready and capable of dealingwith threats from whatever direction. Wecannot focus on one direction. We need tobe prepared for threats, challenges from theeast, from the south, from the west, from thenorth. .. I agree that that’s geographicaldirections, but from a security perspective,it’s a bit artificial to put that into thesecategories. Because when you speak about theeast, we often think about Russia.And we see a more assertiveRussia in the east, but we seethem also in the south.We see much moreRussian presence now inNorth Africa, in Libya,in other parts of NorthAfrica, in the MiddleEast, in Syria.”2

This approach is all tooredolent of NATO’s securitystrategy for North Africa duringthe Cold War, when the region was regardedas little more than a potential battlegroundwith the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact andtheir allies. France’s colonial war in Algeria,something which they sought to frame at thetime as a battle against communism andextremist fanatics was a foreshadowing ofpost-colonial wars in which western nationsseek to reduce complex situationscombatting violent extremism. The NATOintervention in Libya, framed initially as amission to protect civilians, led to acatastrophic outcome of state failure, endlesscombat and significantly worsened securityfor Libya, its region and Europe all. Thelesson should have been learned. A morenuanced approach is needed, but in NATO2030, that is not evident.

The framing of NATO’s southern flankstrategy is problematic in a number of ways,and is likely fail to provide security forAfricans or Europeans unless these flaws arecorrected. The assumption by NATO thatthe littoral African states and those to thesouth across the Sahel can be treated asnothing more than a source of variousthreats, and that those threats can be guardedagainst and even defeated without referenceto the situation in those states, and how theserious crises they face can be resolved, is

simply wrong.

NATO and its memberstates have to seek to work

cooperatively with thepeople and the states ofthe region to resolvetheir crises, and endtheir support for stateswhich are both

incompetent and abusersof human rights.

Otherwise, NATO’s South –as the 2030 paper describes it –

will continue indefinitely as a source ofinstability and armed violence. It is alsoimportant that the Maghreb and Sahel arenot seen primarily through a military lens,but that the multiplicity of economic, social,governance and other issues that haveproduced a complex mix of armed violenceand military conflict are addressed as theprincipal method of reducing the causes ofviolence. Combating inequalities in societyhas a far greater role to play in building peacein the region than military force.

The situation across the Sahel is spirallingout of control at an accelerating pace.Millions of people are displaced because ofescalating violence. They are affected bypoverty, hunger, poor governance and lack ofaccess to basic services and rights, furthercompounded by the effects of climatechange.

Combatinginequalities in

society has a far greater role to play in building peace in the region than military

force

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 42 February 2021

Millions are in a state of permanentinsecurity. Persistent droughts havecontributed to famines and to politicaldestabilisation with increasing conflict forland between pastoralists and farmers. Andthey are further exacerbated byenvironmental degradation in soil and waterresources. A fast-growing population makesthese issues worse. Large numbers of youngmen with little stake in society and lackingthe means to provide for themselves or afamily make easy pickings for militias andcriminal gangs, providing a large pool ofrecruits who can easily be armed, turningenvironmental, social and economic issuesinto security ones.

Across the whole of North Africa, a regionwith porous borders, these crises anddeveloping security issues cannot be confinedto one country. An obvious example is theNATO intervention in Libya in 2011, whichsaw well-armed and well-trained Touaregsoldiers return to Mali and begin a rebellion,which soon provided a battleground forextremist groups, and led to anotherintervention by NATO member states whichcontinues to this day. This situation benefitscriminals who smuggle people, drugs andother commodities, such as cigarettes andgold. A political or security crisis in onecountry too often becomes a source ofdestabilisation for neighbours. And whenpeople are displaced between countrieswhich are all desperately poor, the economicsituation is worsened throughout the region.Conflict and armed violence in the regioncompound the humanitarian crisis, in part bydisrupting supply routes and causing foodshortages. A lessening of humanitariansupport from governments undergoingdonor fatigue, and a populist lack ofsympathy for some of the world’s neediestpeople, only serve to makes things worse.

Poor, often dictatorial, governanceexacerbates an already bad situation left bycolonialism and a post-colonial settlementimposed from Europe. Disputes like thatbetween the Sahraouian people of theWestern Sahara and the Kingdom ofMorocco are sources of instability, andinstability in the region to NATO’s south istoo often met by violent repression whichitself feeds armed resistance. Support by NATO member states forgovernments which oppress their people,including arming security forces responsiblefor human rights abuses do nothing forNATO security, nor for those whosegovernments are armed. They reinforce thepower of the elites, but as has been obvioussince the Arab Spring, the elites lack anyform of legitimacy in the eyes of most oftheir people. The end result is to reduce thesecurity of Africans and of NATO. Thissituation is deeply unstable. NATO cannotsimply attempt to project stabilitysouthwards, as the report suggests, even if itcooperates with the more economicallyoriented EU.

Too often the complex issues of the regionare boiled down to one security issue forEurope, and that issue is migration. Throughthe lens of migration prevention—andwithin that lens, terrorism prevention—theanswer too obviously looks to European eyesasthe deployment of navies to prevent boatscrossing the Mediterranean. Or one thatinvolves paying the countries of the Africanside of the Mediterranean to prevent peopleleaving their shores. But these are stickingplasters on symptoms. Migration is a povertyand inequality problem, not a security one.

NATO should be concerned, the reportsays, with Russian and Chinese influence inits southern flank. But those countries largelyportray their engagement as supportive.China, for example, is often looking toeconomic engagement more than militaryengagement, although in eastern Africa thatis beginning.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 43

Beijing may be motivated by self-interest, butif it helps build prosperity then they arecloser to the roots of the issues facing thestates of the Maghreb and the Sahel than isNATO with its vision of military security asthe top priority, and the attraction ofalliances with China and Russia will bestrong.

If Europe truly wants toengage in activity andpolicy that will buildstability to its south, ithas to address thepanoply of economic,governance and socialissues exacerbated byclimate threats inpartnership with the peopleof the region. It has to look forbottom-up solutions that involvecommunities, and be truly comprehensiveand sensitive to the root causes of conflict.This means: (a) engaging with women andgirls as an integral part of those communities;(b) working with other marginalised groupsto ensure that policies work for all citizens,and within polities that have the support ofthe governed; (c) an end to propping upillegitimate regimes and facilitating conflictand human rights abuses through arms sales;and (d) long term development andsustainable economic growth done in a waythat reduces conflict between differentactors.

NATO’s 2030 paper has the appearance ofwanting to do more of the same. Looking at“the south” as a region where solutions tocomplex problems can be securitised andtreated simply as a counter-terrorist responseto extremist violence. But another decade ofpursuing these failed ideas will not make

things better, it will continue tomake the situation worse. If

NATO is to engage inAfrica, the alliance needs

to take a conflictsensitive approach to itswork in the south withlocal organisations,strengthen local capacity

to act for democracy,economic growth, enhance

human and civil rights andimprove governance. Doing this

will significantly reduce the pool ofthose ready to take up arms, or those wantingto flee for a better life, and do more to solvethe security problems that currently existthan all the military task forces NATO couldever put together.

It has to look for bottom-up solutionsthat involve communities,and be truly comprehensiveand sensitive to the rootcauses of conflict.

Endnotes:1 Warsaw Summit 2016, NATO Heads of State and Government Communique, para 25,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm 2 Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Sciences PO Youth & Leaders Summit,

NATO 2030 - Safeguarding peace in an unpredictable world, 18 January 2021,https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180707.htm

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 44 February 2021

Since its very existence, NATO has proved tobe flexible enough to adapt to new securitythreats and challenges. Nevertheless, itspurpose and legitimacy have been questionedby some recently, given urgent challengessuch as climate change, the coronaviruspandemic and authoritarian trends in somemember states. Historically, NATO hasassumed three main roles. Firstly, collectivedefence of the transatlantic region plus,following the Harmel report in 1967, détenteand arms control. Secondly, collectivedefence plus cooperative security and crisismanagement, following the end of the ColdWar. Thirdly, collective defence pluscounter-hybrid warfare, following Russia’sannexation of the Crimea and itsdestabilizing efforts in eastern Ukraine in2014.

In their report, the Reflection Groupmembers call for another paradigmshift in how to think aboutsecurity in NATO and for theorganisation to upgrade itsability to understand andmanage the transboundarythreats that will shape itsenvironment over the longterm (p.22). Hybrid threats areidentified as central and imminent(p. 11). However, the report remainsrather opaque as to what “hybrid” reallymeans. Over more than 60 pages the reportdwells on issues such as Russia, China,terrorism, climate change and so forth, andin one paragraph, hybrid and cyber threats. Itmentions three aspects of collective defence:conventional, nuclear and hybrid, whichshould be at the forefront of consultationand decision-making on security in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The report refers to the term “hybrid” 53times on 20 pages. There is talk about hybridwarfare, hybrid tactics, hybrid activities,hybrid threats, hybrid attacks, hybridincidents, hybrid conflicts, hybrid methods,hybrid tool kits and hybrid operations.Everything seems to be hybrid. Adding to theconfusion, the report on the one hand statesthat hybrid and cyberattacks “are not,themselves, threats”. But on the other, thatthey “may trigger Article 5” (p. 45). Whilethe members of the group come to thecorrect recommendation that it is importantto reflect “on the increasing role of hybridthreats by NATO adversaries” (p. 23), theyprovide more confusion than clarity fordoing so.

What should be included in a properreflection? The first step is to consider andseek to define the essence of hybrid threats or

hybrid warfare. While it is generallyunderstood as an exchange with

the objective of political gainsbetween adversaries with amixture of military and non-military means, there is noagreement between experts

about what hybrid warfarereally is. For some it is nothing

but the combination of regular(also called traditional or conventional)

and irregular warfare that has already beenexercised since the Peloponnesian War. Forothers it is just a buzz word with noexplanatory power. Others in turn think it isa new form of warfare. In its Wales SummitDeclaration, NATO described hybridwarfare threats as present when a “wide rangeof overt and covert military, paramilitary,and civilian measures are employed in ahighly integrated design”.1

the report remains ratheropaque as to what“hybrid” really

means.

Hybrid warfare and NATO’s primary role

Hans-Georg Ehrhart

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 45

If this is correct, it is nothing else than theapplication of a comprehensive approach forthe objective of political gains againstadversaries, i.e. an approach many modernstates and NATO itself are striving for. Thedifferentiation made by NATO SecretaryGeneral Stoltenberg when he spoke aboutRussia’s application of the comprehensiveapproach in Ukraine as ”the dark reflectionof our comprehensive approach“2 confirmsthis analysis.  

The second step necessary for a properreflection is to problematize the term ofhybrid warfare. For one, it is a vast, impreciseand unspecific term that is often usedsynonymously with hybrid threats. A threatmay lead to war, but it is nevertheless notequal with it. Furthermore, each war is moreor less hybrid because it involves political,economic, social and psychological aspects inaddition to military means. Anotherargument against the usefulness of thisnotion is that it is often used as a politicalterm to denounce Russia’s aggression againstUkraine rather than as a concept describingwarfare in general. As mentioned, Russia isnot the only actor using hybrid tactics and acomprehensive strategy.

That is why some prefer the notion ofpostmodern warfare. The prefix “post” isgenerally used when something is changingqualitatively but cannot yet be put under anappropriate single heading because it is partof a historical process. Postmodernism is acultural term that differs from modernitywith its attributions of rationality, state orderand truth. Attributes of Post-Modernismsuch as “anything goes”, “diversity”, “post-truth” or the “end of meta-narratives”describe the changing quality of postmodernwarfare more precisely. The social context ofpostmodern warfare is an emerging worldsociety that is trying to respond to securityrisks driven by the contradictions ofglobalization, evolving post-industrialsocieties and their transition to informationsocieties.

Against this background postmodernwarfare is characterized by asymmetric civil-military approaches, risk transfer policies anda more extensive application of informationpower. Four interlinked drivers play animportant role. Firstly, information powerwhich not only functions as a forcemultiplier but also as a force modifier.Secondly, networked approaches and formsof organization which make actors moreadaptable and agile. Thirdly, indirect andcovert approaches to minimize or transferone’s own risks. Fourthly, adequate militarytechnologies supporting postmodern warfaresuch as C4ISTAR3, precision guidedmunitions, drones, robotics and cyberattacks.Also to be added to the equation are the useof proxies and activities which are not acts ofwarfare per se, such as the support of externalprotest movements, training and materialbacking of insurgents, certain forms of cyberoperations, covert operations by specialforces or information operations andpropaganda. These so-called grey zoneconflicts take place on a continuum betweentraditional war and peace in which a vastvariety of methods, means and instrumentsare used in a coordinated way in order toachieve political and normative objectives.Hence, the way of warfare becomespostmodern. The specific postmodernquality is the coordinated and networkedapproach and its people-centric application,including the cognitive domain.

The third step of proper reflection is to askwhy there is an increasing preference forpostmodern warfare using the wholespectrum of military and non-military meansand methods, including by NATO memberstates. The answer is twofold: because of thevulnerability of modern societies, andbecause it can be done. Firstly, this kind ofwarfare is supposed to limit war or to keep itat bay by acting from a safe distance or tokeep it in a grey zone, at best under thethreshold of inter-state war by proceedingclandestinely or using plausible denial tactics.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 46 February 2021

Secondly, it is politically, financially and interms of own casualties much less expensivethan regular war.

This may contribute to a more “humane”way of warfare. Given the consequences ofregular warfare the postmodern way isobviously the lesser evil. Nevertheless, it isproblematic given the many contradictionsand negative consequences (includingincidental ones) it may cause. There is adialectic relation between limiting and de-bounding effects of postmodern warfare. So,it offers more room for manoeuvre byreducing risks and costs. But at the sametime, it contributes to blur existing limitssuch as between war and peace,front and hinterland, regularand irregular, state andnon-state, civil andmilitary, friend and foe,and internal andexternal security.

So, the fourth andfinal step is toexpound the problemsof postmodern warfareand ways to deal withthem. From a perspectiveof international law, war andpeace are a dichotomy grasping twocompletely different conditions. Experts haveput this binary perspective into questionalluding to today’s challenges. The Germanhistorian and political scientist HerfriedMünkler, for example, assumes that we mayhave to live with two notions of war. One inwhich peace is the contrary of war, and onein which war is permanently interwovenwith peace.4 Thus, do we have to look for adifferent understanding of peace in an era,“when wars never end”?5 One proposition isthat the traditional distinction between warand peace does not fit today’s realityanymore. If this were true, we would have tolive in a permanent state of conflict or war.

The modern achievement of internationallaw, such as the UN Charter and the law ofarmed conflict that are supposed to regulatewar, would be weakened if not discarded.

This is not to deny the ongoing changingway of warfare. The report’s request for aparadigm shift in how to think aboutsecurity is highly appropriate. However, thereport falls far short in only identifying partsof the shift and largely ignoring the variety oftricky political, theoretical, conceptional,judicial, ethical and practical questions thephenomenon of postmodern warfare raisesfor those that practice it, including NATOmember states. One important political

question for example is how toreduce the tension between

limiting and de-boundingtendencies of

postmodern warfare infavour of a newrestricting peace andsecurity order? Canliberal peace theoryhelp to solve the

problems ingrained inpostmodern warfare,

especially given its people-centric nature? Does

something “third” exist betweenpeace and war and, if yes, how can it be

grasped conceptually and tackled concretely?How does postmodern warfare influence theinternational law of armed conflict? Whatdoes it mean to behave ethically in apostmodern war? Which practical strategiesand means contribute to stop and overcomethe blurring of boundaries between peaceand war?

Whether NATO striving for acomprehensive approach leading topostmodern warfare is the right answer isquestionable. On the one hand, it is obviousthat regular war would lead to unacceptabledamages given the high vulnerability ofmodern societies.

Member states should respect

and strengthen internationallaw including the law of war,and, by this, evade the slipperyslope towards hybrid orpostmodern warfare.

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 47

On the other hand, even hybrid orpostmodern warfare may escalate into armedinter-state conflict. NATO’s primary roleshould be to prevent any kind of war.Member states should respect and strengtheninternational law including the law of war,and, by this, evade the slippery slope towardshybrid or postmodern warfare. NATO needsto be more self-reflective when it comes toassessing hybrid threats and promotingtransatlantic security because security shouldbe approached from a more differentiatedperspective.

Yes, there are looming threats out there inthe world and they have become morepeople-centric. While NATO countries needto have a strong enough defence postureagainst military threats in the transatlanticregion the best remedy to counter outsidenon-military interventions is to strengthenthe resilience of our own societies by makingthem more fair, just and equal.

Endnotes:1 NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, Press Release, Paragraph 13.2 Jens Stoltenberg, Key Note Speech, 15 March 2015,

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_118435.htm3 Command, Control, Communicate, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Targeting.4 Herfried Münkler, Kriegssplitter. Die Evolution der Gewalt im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert. Berlin: Rowohlt

Verlag, 2017, S. 329.5 Lawrence Freedman, Can There be Peace with Honor in Afghanistan? In: Foreign Policy, 26. Juni,2017,

http://foreignpolicy.com/author/lawrence-freedman/

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 48 February 2021

NATO statements frequently claim theorganisation’s success and adaptability tochanging circumstances. Yet it displays aninflexible continuity that survives majorchanges in context and disruptive populistleaderships. This tendency is supported bygiving prime airtime to those who reflectback the established internal perspectives.

The NATO 2030 report is a cold andfamiliar dish. It simply asserts the efficacy ofexisting or past practice, such as nuclearsharing arrangements (recommendation 11,p.38) offering little to no justification orevidence to back up its recommendations.When it claims that, “NATO shouldconduct a historical review of the Alliance’ssuccessful approach to nuclear détente anddeterrence policies during the Cold War era”(recommendation 5, p.37), it reveals deepand flawed assumptions that the approachwas successful, betraying a particular andcontentious perspective. That NATOcontained the Soviet Union and avoidednuclear exchange does not demonstrate itsapproach was any more successful thanalternatives that were not attempted, northat the risks involved were acceptable. Manyof the architects of the original strategies,including Henry Kissinger, acknowledge thatit involved a fearsome gamble, and that itwould be dangerous and deeply irresponsibleto return to Cold War dynamics. Some ofthese nuclear architects have been involved inthe efforts to move away from these practicesand redouble efforts to move towards aworld free of nuclear weapons.

It has been a decade since the last NATOStrategic Concept, years marked by repeatedreference to a deterioration in strategicrelations to justify raising military spend andpressuring those NATO allies reluctant to doso, modernising nuclear arsenals and to resistdisarmament. To read the ReflectionGroup’s report you would think that this isall down to a more aggressive Russia, a moreconfident China and to emerging disruptivetechnologies. But particularly the first. All ofus have a tendency to seek external blame forour misfortunes, but we do well to considermore complex explanations including ourown agency.

It is undeniably true that Russia is a sourceof friction within the internationalcommunity and appears willing to usemalicious and brutal measures thatundermine international law to gainadvantage over others. The report claims thatNATO’s objective should be to subdue thesethreats, to “break the stalemate with Russiaon NATO’s terms”, and “maintain atechnological edge” over any competitors(recommendation 8, pp.26-27). This ofcourse sets up the perfect conditions for anarms race.

There seems to be no attempt to assess thetrajectory that led to Russian behaviour, norany consideration of how NATO or itsmembers may have contributed to thesituation. NATO is the most powerfulmilitary alliance the world has ever seen.

Concluding reflections on the value of false unity

Paul Ingram

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 49

It is inevitable therefore that it will be seen asa severe threat to any states that resist itsoverwhelming influence, or those that seeNATO members using their power to skewthe rules or international outcomes in theirown favour. To describe resistance tooutcomes on NATO’s terms as aggression isitself aggressive. Instead, the Alliance needsto redouble its efforts to reach out andreassure other members of the internationalcommunity of its intentions, to listen to theirconcerns and treat them with respect. Theonus is on the Alliance, as the most powerfulparty, to do so.

The report claims that, “NATO’s attemptsto build a meaningful partnership andinvolve Russia in creating a post-Cold WarEuro-Atlantic security architecture havebeen rebuffed” (p.16), failing toreflect that the partnershipwas offered exclusively onNATO’s terms. Attemptsby Russia to create apost-Cold War Euro-Atlantic securityarchitecture on theirown terms have beenresoundingly rebuffed byNATO. Such one-sidedanalysis is not onlyirresponsible, but also dangerous.

In the field of arms control, the report layson thick the accusations of infractions byRussia, but many of the charges could equallywell be levelled at NATO’s nuclear weaponstates, all three of whom are heavily investingin new generations of nuclear weapons andnovel, disruptive technologies. It has beenthe United States more than Russia that hasconsistently walked away from thearchitecture over the last two decades. Thereport squarely lays the blame for the collapseof the INF Treaty on Russia, but it was theUnited States that prematurely withdrewfrom it having failed to exhaust its disputemechanisms.

This is not to reflect all the blame onto theUnited States, rather to encourage a moreopen and nuanced explanation for the jointchallenges we face in retaining anddeveloping the European arms controlarchitecture the report rightly identifies as acrucial element in stability, peace andsecurity. Russia is a challenging partner inthis endeavour that we must try harder toengage constructively. A hostile or prejudicedapproach will only drive furthermodernisation and resistance from a statethat sees itself as the bulwark against globalpolitical domination by NATO members.

Equally, whilst focused on external threats,there is no mention in the report of thethreat from within, a glaring omission when

NATO’s most powerful, lynchpinmember is only now starting to

recover from the trauma ofhaving a leader more

interested in sewingdivision and hatred athome and abroad. So-called populist and anti-democratic forces havebeen gathering public

support across NATOstates, and in some cases

are in government. This is amajor challenge with no easy

answers, but failing to identify theproblem is unconscionable.

The report claims, “the hard work ofachieving cohesion, which can often seemcumbersome and frustrating, is a trifle incomparison to the benefits that accrue fromit” (p.10). Effective military action demandsa clear mission and objectives, as well asstrategy, so the attraction of unity is sointuitively obvious that it can appear atautology when governing a military alliance.When you are a hammer everything lookslike a nail.

There seems to be no attempt to

assess the trajectory that led to Russian behaviour,

nor any consideration of howNATO or its members mayhave contributed to the

situation.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030 50 February 2021

As a military alliance focused on its own andpotential adversaries’ capabilities, threats areeverywhere, and when one in particularemerges and plays ball it becomes aconvenient rallying cry for more defencespending and greater unity. But whose unity,and what are its costs? More often than notit is a call to European allies, seen as theprincipal beneficiaries, to walk in lock-stepwith Washington, the principal sponsor.Those voices calling for higher Europeanmilitary spend and tough action againstRussian infraction are seen as loyal, whilstthose with more nuanced approaches toRussia divisive.

The report recommends that the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) should be used as the“main platform to deliver political messagesto Russia… underscoring the steadiness ofAllied defence and deterrence postures”(recommendation 6, p.26). The NRC wascreated to facilitate dialogue. In practice itsformat contributes to the problems.The effort invested in achievingNATO unity before issuesare discussed with Russiain the Council creates anexperience for Russia ofa take-it-or-leave-it,done-deal inflexibilityfrom a NATO unable tobreak its fragileconsensus. As a result,there are rarely constructivediscussions within the Council,more an exchange of opposingpositions and a stalemate. NATO has jointresponsibility for creating this system thathas perverse incentives for Russia to attemptto break consensus and exploit differences ofview between allies, or to engage inunconventional approaches as a means tocontaining Alliance power. As the strongerpower in the uneasy relationship, NATO isin a better position to change the tune. It ismore than talking that is needed here.

It may appear counter intuitive, but it maybe rational to reject the most fundamentalrecommendation and instead tone down therelentless push for unity within the Alliance.The report itself states that NATO isfounded upon a belief in “a world in which aplurality of worldviews and fundamentaldifferences of opinion are no obstacle todialogue and cooperation” (p.11). Yet itclaims that unity is essential otherwiseadversaries, explicitly named as Russia andChina, will seek to exploit differencesbetween allies and pick off individual states(p.9). This is a simple fallacy, and is theopposite of the truth. Papering overdifferences, forcing states into a one-size-fits-all policy creates a brittle position thatencourages adversaries to seek division.Celebrating diversity and making a virtue ofit not only strengthens the expressed valuesof the Alliance, but could deliver a morerobust Alliance, with greater flexibility and

sustainability in its processes. NATOcould more effectively develop a

shared understanding of theproblems arising from

Russia’s tactics whilstaccommodating verydifferent responses tothem from differentparts of the Alliance.

This would better reflectthe polarities within the

policy complexities.

Take, for example, NATO’sdual track approach—deterrence and

dialogue. The balance between the twoobjectives has dynamically divided memberstates according to their strategic position,legacy and politics, as well as theirrelationship with nuclear weapons, at times asource of internal friction within theAlliance because of the requirement of ajoint position.

there are rarely constructivediscussions within theCouncil, more an exchange of opposingpositions and astalemate

A response to the official NATO Reflection Group 51

Instead of insisting on unity the Alliancecould openly acknowledge these differencesas expressions of the inevitable tensionbetween the two approaches, and encourageits members to express their positions openlybut with respect for the differing positions oftheir allies.

The glaring problem in currentpractice is NATO’s enduringtrack record of placingoverwhelming emphasison deterrence (and inparticular nucleardeterrence) at theexpense of armscontrol anddialogue, andpressurising itsmember states toaccept this imbalance inthe name of unity. Thereport appears to endorse thisapproach, talking of the need toactively strengthen deterrence capabilitiesconsiderably, whilst “remain[ing] open todiscussing peaceful co-existence and toreacting positively to constructive changes”where possible and realistic (p.12). As if thepassive nature of the dialogue was notenough to downgrade it, the reportconditions it, such that, “to be productive,such dialogue must be firm on principles andconducted from a position of unity andstrength” (p.26).

As a result, and contrary to claims from theAlliance and this report, NATO has becomean enemy of progressive attempts to createthe global conditions for nucleardisarmament. The report’s recommendationto continue an antagonistic response to theTreaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons, for example, on the basisthat, “it will never contribute to

practical disarmament, norwill it affect international

law” (recommendation6, p.37), is deeplydisrespectful both tothose 122 countriesthat endorsed theTreaty and the 51

that have ratified (sofar).

Moreover, now that ithas entered into force, the

statement is factuallyincorrect. Whether we like it or

not, the TPNW is now part of internationallaw since 22 January 2021, one that directlybinds those states who have ratified.NATO’s continued refusal to recognise thisreality puts it and its members on the wrongside of the law, undermining any criticismsthey may have for others, such as Russia, thatappear to have a partial respect for it.

NATO does indeed need a period ofreflection to assess its relevance to theunfolding 21st Century, but the expert groupreport is regressive, and holds no hope of anygenuine reassessment. The Alliance needsinstead to consider how it can genuinelyimprove its contribution to global security ina manner that recognises theinterdependencies between states within theinternational community.

The glaring problem... is NATO’senduring track record of

placing overwhelming emphasis onnuclear deterrence... at the expenseof arms control and dialogue, andpressurising its member states toaccept this imbalance in the

name of unity.

Peace research perspectives on NATO 2030A response to the official NATO Reflection Group

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