PEACEBUILDING CENTRE No. 1 September 2009 Noref Policy …. 1, Sep 2009.pdftheir history. Islamic...

Executive Summary

Pakistan and Afghanistan are at a critical juncture in their history Islamic militancy has made rapid advances in these countries and if unchecked will gain control of them Its rapid advancement has been fuelled as much by state weaknesses in the two countries as by the seemingly open-ended American presence The current Pakistani action in the North-West Frontier Province and in the tribal areas indicates that the Pakistani army may have now awakened to the consequences of collaborating with militant Islamic groups No less urgent are governance issues that threaten stability in Baluchistan where insurgency is an indigenous problem and requires political compromises for an effective response

Islamabad needs a paradigm shift in its national security thinking Above all it should send clear signals to the Pakistani people and militants by sanctioning those who wage militancy both within and outside the state International pressure could help Islamabad to make this shift and reinforce its campaign against Islamic militancy Regional stability depends on two im-portant conditions external forces must vacate the region as soon as possible yet at the same time they must not leave a power vacuum in Afghanistan and Pa-kistan The spectre of a hostile Afghani-stan abetting secessionist political ele-ments in Pakistan will push Pakistan into the arms of the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul At the same time In-dia and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage in a fierce struggle over estab-lishing influence in the new Afghanistan

Abdul Hameed Nayyar

Dr A H Nayyar is a prominent Pakistani physicist who retired from Quaid-i-Azam Univer-sity Islamabad after teaching there for over 30 years Currently he is a Senior Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute Islamabad where he does policy research in the areas of education and energy He is also a Visit-ing Research Scientist in the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University US a position he has held since 1998 At Princeton he works on technical issues related to nuclear dis-armament He is associated with several global peace movements and is also President of the Pakistan Peace Coalition a national network of peace and justice organizations

Abdul Hameed Nayyar

No 1 2009

Pakistan and Islamism

NORWEGIANPEACEBUILDING CENTRE

Noref Policy BriefNo 1 September 2009

- 1 -

Pakistan and Afghanistan are at a critical juncture in

their history Islamic militancy has made rapid

advances in these countries and if unchecked

will gain control of them This would signifi-

cantly boost the strength of international Islamist

movements and pose a threat to much of the world

The genie of Islamic militancy let out of the bottle

in the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s

is proving difficult to push back in Its rapid ad-

vancement has been fuelled as much by state weak-

nesses in the two countries as by the seemingly

open-ended American presence generally seen in

the region as imperial expansionism An equally

important factor is festering regional disputes

Pakistan has entered a defining phase in this

respect The authority of the state has been

directly challenged by Islamic militancy in the

Frontier Region1 as well as elsewhere in the coun-

try Civil and military leadership are finally con-

fronting this challenge Is this a passing episode in

the statersquos love-hate relationship with the militants

1 The semi-autonomous tribal lands consist of seven parts called ldquoagenciesrdquo Bajaur Mohmand Khyber Orakzai Kurram and North and South Waziristan There are also six smaller zones known as frontier regions in the transitional area between the tribal lands and the North-West Frontier Province to the east See Jayshree Bajori ldquoPakistanrsquos Tribal Areasrdquo Council on Foreign Relations httpwwwcfrorgpublication11973p2 accessed 17 September 2009

or has a paradigm shift finally occurred Can

Islamic militancy be defeated and defeated for

good What are the roles of the governments

of Pakistan Afghanistan and India In what

manner can the international forces assist the

regional governments so as to clear a path toward

exiting Afghanistan How important is it to address

the question of festering disputes in the region

Regional stability depends on two important

conditions external forces must vacate the

region as soon as possible yet at the same time

they must not leave a power vacuum in Af-

ghanistan and Pakistan as this would clear the

way for the organised forces of Islamism These

two conditions make the task very difficult

Pakistan finally acts

It seems that the Taliban advance has finally been

halted by the Pakistani army Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan (TTP) had spilled over from the Feder-

ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the

settled areas of Swat Dir and Malakand rout-

ing out local governments The TTP defeated the

police and paramilitary forces that came to help

those administrations then enforced sharia laws

on citizens at gunpoint and extended the ad-

vance further into other districts coming to

Noref Policy Brief No 1 September 2009

- 2 -

within only 70 kilometres of the capital Islamabad

The provincial government had earlier hoped that

the deal it had struck with the religious group

Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Sharia Muhammadi (TNSM) to

administer an Islamic judicial system (Nizam-

e-Adl) in some areas under the provincial ad-

ministration would help stem the Taliban ad-

vance but this plan failed Indeed the TNSM

itself proved unable to influence the Taliban

As of now the army claims to have cleared

these areas of the Taliban and the government

has been quick to assure the

public that it has regained its

authority in the region The local

population that had fled en masse

to safer areas following the military

offensive have started to return to their homes and

jobs Schools over four hundred of which (main-

ly girls schools) had been destroyed by the Tali-

ban have reopened In spite of the governmentrsquos

claim of defeating the Taliban however warnings

of militant attacks on military posts and convoys

and on government buildings continue This would

appear to indicate that only those who had a great

deal to lose by staying away from their homes have

returned Others are still living in large numbers

in refugee camps in distant cities and provinces

The government of Pakistan has also directed its

attention to the tribal areas of North and South

Waziristan where militants had earlier driven out

Pakistanrsquos paramilitary forces (the Frontier Corps)

Since then the area has become a firm stronghold

of the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda

and a source of inspiration for religious militant

forces elsewhere in the country It is the head-

quarters of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

a movement that emerged along the lines of the

Afghan Taliban bringing various warlord mullahs

under a loose confederation of tactical alliances

Before he was killed in Au-

gust TTPrsquos leader Baitullah

Mehsud was responsible for

many suicide bombings and

slayings in Pakistan the most

notorious of which was the murder of former

prime minister Benazir Bhutto It seemed initial-

ly that the succession issue would lead to bloody

internal contests with several contenders vying

to get hold of the huge resources of the Taliban

leadership It was expected that with Mehsudrsquos

death the Pakistani army would make rapid gains

inside the Waziristan agencies but this has not

happened The leadership tussle has not created

serious fissures in the TTP nor has the army been

able to make any major headway on the ground

Since militants have been able to move quickly and

freely within the 400 kilometre-long tribal belt

Waziristan has become a

stronghold of the Pakistani

Taliban and al-Qaeda


- 3 -

mostly controlled by TTP a final thrust in Waziristan

would first require establishing government control

in other tribal agencies in the north and the frontier

regions of the adjoining settled districts The army

therefore targeted Orakzai and South Waziristan

Agency in June 2009 The most recent thrust of

the government is in the Khyber agency which

was hitherto under full control of Lashkar-e-Islam

The current Pakistani action in the North-

west Frontier Province and in the tribal areas

will have a significant impact on the future of

the region It indicates that the Pakistani estab-

lishment especially the army may have now

awakened to the deadly consequences of collabo-

rating with and patronizing militant Islamic groups

Pakistanrsquos limitations

Pakistanrsquos options against militants in areas where

security forces have been pushed back are very lim-

ited Given that the terrain does not allow for the

large-scale movement of soldiers the Pakistan army

has been forced to rely on long-distance shelling on

roughly defined targets which too often spares the

intended target and alienates the local population be-

cause of indiscriminate damage to life and property

Since mid-2008 when Pakistan failed to stop al-

Qaeda and Taliban attacks from the Federally Ad-

ministered Tribal Areas (FATA) against the al-

liance and Afghan troops the United States has

used unmanned drone aircraft with precision-guid-

ed missiles against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan

from across the border in Afghanistan But the

attacks clearly violate Pakistanrsquos sovereignty

While protesting over the US drone attacks

on North and South Waziristan2 Pakistan has

acknowledged that the attacks were effective in

taking out targets accurately and causing mini-

mum casualties among non-combatants This

claim is disputed by some observers and of course

excludes the families hosting the targeted militant

leaders Pakistan seems to have finally started col-

laborating with US forces in these attacks which

recently resulted in the killing of key guerrilla

leader Baitullah Mehsud and his close associates

The slain militant had access to sizeable resources

2 ldquoUS drones prowl over Waziristan Pakistan concernedrdquo The Daily Times 25 June 2009 httpwwwdailytimescompkdefaultasppage=20090625story_25-6-2009_pg1_5 accessed 17 Sep-tember 2009 David Ignatius ldquoA Quiet Deal With Pakistanrdquo The Washington Post November 4 2008 httpwwwwashingtonpostcomwp-dyncontentarticle20081103AR2008110302638html accessed 17 September 2009


- 4 -- 4 -

within the tribal area and outside and reports indi-

cate a succession war has erupted within the TTP

that has claimed the lives of a number of important

Taliban commanders Whether or not this group

survives the internal conflict remains to be seen

Anti-American sentiment is very strong among

the Pakistani public3 and consequently there is

an undercurrent of approval for Taliban resist-

ance to American forces in Afghanistan Pakista-

nis also strongly disapprove of the drone attacks

by American forces from across the border into

Pakistani tribal territory However in the face of

increasing suicide bombings by militants all over

the country the destruction of hundreds of girlsrsquo

schools in FATA and adjoining areas increased

killings of political opponents and beheadings

and other gruesome murders support for the mili-

tants has waned In fact as shown by a recent sur-

vey4 a vast majority of Pakistanis have started

to see the Taliban and al-Qaeda as a threat to the

country They have begun supporting military ac-

tion against them and would like the Afghan Tali-

ban to stop using Pakistani territory for attacks

against Nato and Afghan forces Nevertheless

3 ldquoPakistani Public Opinion Growing Concerns about Extremism Continuing Discontent with USrdquo Pew Research Center Wash-ington DC 13 August 2009 httppewglobalorgreportsdisplayphpReportID=265 accessed 17 September 2009 4 ldquoPakistani Public Turns Against Taliban But Still Negative on USrdquo World Public OpinionOrg httpwwwworldpublicopinionorgpipaarticlesbrasiapacificra619php accessed 17 September 2009

the survey also shows that the public continues

to resent the US forces and their drone attacks

Dimensions of the Conflict

The conflict theatre has five principal actors

1 Islamic militants who fall into four broad

categories

bull Highly-motivated and resource rich inter-

national terrorist groups like Al Qaeda

bull Afghan Taliban who conquered and ruled Af-

ghanistan between 1997 and 2001 They took

refuge in Pakistan mainly in the tribal area

after being thrown out by the US-led interna-

tional forces in 2001 They have since been

waging a war of resistance against the Afghan

and international forces across the border

bull Al Qaeda- and Taliban-inspired tribal war-

lords in Pakistan who have cropped up wher-

ever local traditional power structures have

ceded to their militant tactics such as killing

local power holders They have enforced their

own version of Islamic law in their domains

bull A number of Islamist militant organiza-

tions spread throughout the state with the

objective of establishing an Islamic emir-

ate in Pakistan liberating Kashmir and sup-

porting international jihad against occu-

pational forces (the US India and Israel)

2 Nato and the US-led International Security Assist-

ance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) together with the

forces at the command of the Afghan government


- 5 -

3 The Afghan government which is still battling with

Taliban influence in rural areas and which is de-

pendent upon the support of ISAF in its efforts

4 The government of Pakistan which had for

its own security reasons lent its full support to the

Taliban in taking over Afghanistan between 1994

and 2001 continues to regard the Taliban as an

asset in ensuring a friendly Afghanistan when the

international forces leave The government is now

facing the consequences of the Islamic militancy

it nurtured over decades to serve its geo-strategic

interests in the region especially against India

5 India has suffered at the hands of the Pakistan-

supported militancy and is now trying to recover

the foothold it had enjoyed in pre-Taliban Af-

ghanistan From there it can destabilize Pakistan by

assisting rebellions in the border regions India

is currently lending assistance to the order of

US$30 to $40 million a year to the Afghan gov-

ernment in development projects including road

reconstruction food and transport About 4000

Indian workers including 500 highly-trained

security personnel are currently employed in

various Indian projects in Afghanistan5 To

5 Jayshree Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations Council for Foreign Relations 22 July 2009 httpwwwcfrorgpublica-tion17474indiaafghanistan_relationshtml accessed 17 September 2009

Pakistanrsquos discomfort India has also established

consulates in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar

as well as other ldquocentresrdquo along the border

which Pakistan claims are being used by

Indian intelligence the Research and Analysis

Wing (RAW) to wage covert activities against it6

Cutting the Umbilical Cord

The Pakistani armyrsquos relation with militant Is-

lamic organisations is a significant factor Pa-

kistan had its first taste of aiding and using such

groups during the Afghan jihad against the So-

viet Union It housed militants from all over the

Islamic world in collaboration with the US Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistanrsquos

intelligence agency the Inter-Services Intelligence

(ISI) had complete control over the channelling

of money and arms to the mujahedin Islamabad

therefore had no qualms about using veterans of

the Afghan jihad in the Indian section of Kash-

mir facilitating the infiltration of militants in

order to wage a war of liberation from within India

and colouring the uprising against Indian occupa-

tion so that it was seen as a holy war A number

of jihadi groups specific to Kashmir such as

Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT the Righteous Force)

6 Bajoria India-Afghanistan Relations 22 July 2009


- 6 -- 6 -

Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM the Army of Moham-

mad) and Harkat-ul-Mujahdeen (HuM) emerged

and became powerful due to Pakistanrsquos patronage

Simultaneously a number of deadly sectar-

ian groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) Sipah-e-Mohammd

Lashkar-e-Abbas and others also emerged

in the late 1980s and became the source of

increasing sectarian and religious violence in

the country Later any distinction between the

jihadi groups LeT JeM and HuM and sectarian

groups such as SSP and LeJ became academic

The activities of several of these groups have been

a source of increasing tension between India and

Pakistan The December 2001 attack on the Indian

Parliament brought about a face-to-face confronta-

tion between the armies of the two countries for

several months The November 2008 attack on

Mumbai by LeT has again shown that the peace

process between the two countries is hostage to these

groups who seem to have outgrown their handlers

The umbilical relationship between these groups

and the Pakistani army has proved very diffi-

cult to sever It appears that the army needed

a lot of external and internal persuasion to

agree to turn against the groups Wheth-

er or not all military personnel agree is

still questionable Many may still regard militants

as essential in forcing India into negotiating the

Kashmir dispute The Indian army believes that

even in these difficult times of combating militants

in Swat and FATA Pakistani security agencies

are infiltrating jihadis into Indian-held Kashmir7

The Regional Dimension

India is certainly a factor in Pakistan-Afghanistan

relations In pre-Taliban times Afghanistan and

India had collaborated with each other in sup-

porting movements in Pakistan for either great-

er autonomy or outright secession The Taliban

period was the only time when Pakistan consid-

ered its western border safe Thus for Pakistani

strategists the ideal outcome of the present Af-

ghan crisis would be a safe western border which

to them is more easily guaranteed by a return of

the Taliban in Kabul Pakistani participation in

the US-led war on terror was therefore at best

ambivalent in relation to the Taliban until the Pa-

kistani variety of the Taliban started to play havoc

within the country with the help of foreign fight-

ers Even now it is not certain that the armyrsquos

attitudes have changed in this regard In fact there

appears not to be any real strategic shift to confront

7 ldquoPak army support in infiltration canrsquot be ruled out Army Chiefrdquo The Indian Express httpwwwindianexpresscomnewsPak-ar-my-support-in-infiltration-can--t-be-ruled-out-Army-Chief500245 accessed 17 September 2009


- 7 -

the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and their al-Qae-

da allies in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan

India and Pakistan are likely to continue to engage

in a fierce struggle over establishing influence in

the new Afghanistan The present Kabul govern-

ment is not friendly to Pakistan and is openly

allowing India to regain a foothold in Afghani-

stan8 Pakistan has accused India of fomenting

trouble in the Pakistani-Afghan border region and

in the southern province of Baluchistan through

the extensive network of consulates along the bor-

der that India has established and through Bal-

uch leaders who have exiled themselves in Ka-

bul India has accused Pakistan of being directly

involved in a bomb attack on the Indian embassy

in Kabul The Karzai government for its part

accuses Islamabad of abetting Taliban attacks on

Afghan soil It is thus hardly surprising that the

Taliban are seen in Pakistan as geo-political assets

Pakistan is therefore keen on supporting any

move that distinguishes between good and bad

Taliban and engages the former in negotiations

on the future of Afghanistan The good Taliban

are the ones who would be friendly to Pakistan

8 ldquoIndia Befriends Afghanistan Irking Pakistanrdquo Wall Street Jour-nal httponlinewsjcomarticleSB125061548456340511html accessed 17 September 2009

and willing to negotiate a partnership in the Kabul

government The bad Taliban are the ones who are

deeply influenced by al-Qaeda and lend full mili-

tary and political support to jihadi groups aiming

to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan Pakistan

a modern state with nuclear weapons is fearful

of being taken over by such militant ideologies

Those who have worked in Afghanistan for dec-

ades generally advocate negotiating with the Tali-

ban9 Both the US and British governments seem

inclinedmdashto varying degreesmdash to identify those

Taliban with whom they could negotiate10 The

9 Fotini Christia and Micheal Semple ldquoFlipping the Talibanrdquo Foreign Affairs July 2009 httpwww foreignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-christia-and-michael-sem-pleflipping-the-taliban accessed 17 September 2009

10 ldquoUS talking peace with Taliban Al-Qaeda associatesrdquo Dawn httpwwwdawncomwpswcmconnectdawn-content-librarydawnnewsworld11-us-talking-peace-with-taliban--al-qaeda-associates--il--10 accessed 17 September 2009


- 8 -- 8 -

Afghan government is still reluctant to talk serious-

ly with insurgents11 but the situation could change

after the August 2009 elections Given this possibil-

ity Pakistan would naturally keep its old relations

with the Taliban open Inclusion of the Taliban in a

future Afghan government could again relieve Pa-

kistan of a hostile government on its western border

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in

1989 Pakistan found another useful role for the mil-

itants it had used in Afghanistanmdashemploying them

against the Indian forces in Kashmir The objective

was to bring the worldrsquos attention back to the Kash-

mir issue which had been relegated to such a low

level that even the United Nations had taken it off its

active agenda To Pakistani strategists the actions

of jihadi groups achieved this purpose Since 1989

India and Pakistan have negotiated the dispute sev-

eral times often coming very close to devising a

solution to this complex issue Pakistanis fear that

as things cool down India will again refuse to dis-

cuss it For this reason they wish to keep the flame

of insurgency burning in Indian-held Kashmir To

achieve this the army and the ISI need to rely on

11 Steve Herman ldquoAfghan Government Denies Talking with Tali-banrdquo Voice of America 7 October 2008 httpwwwvoanewscomenglisharchive2008-102008-10-07-voa38cfmCFID=270394600ampCFTOKEN=82267331ampjsessionid=0030826c308f8116c20e2b242c2b656d4df4 accessed 17 September 2009

militant groups such as LeT JeM and HuM which

they facilitate through providing arms and training

Nevertheless while under state patronage over the

years groups like LeT and JeM became relatively

autonomous in their decision-making and sources

of support often to the embarrassment of the gov-

ernment and even the army Attacks on the Indian

Parliament in 2001 and then the November 2008

attack on Mumbai are cases in point All of these

groups are officially banned in Pakistan yet they

exist and work openly often under changed names

They are known to have connections with al-Qae-

da and the Taliban12 and JeM at least is known

to have carried out several terrorist attacks and

12 US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism Ch 6 April 30 2008 httpwwwstategovsctrlscrt2007103714htm accessed 17 September 2009 See also Imtiaz Gul The Al Qaeda Connection The Taliban and Terror in Pakistanrsquos Tribal Areas PenguinViking New Delhi 2009 as narrated in ldquoThe Al Qaedaisation of FATArdquo Nirupama Subramanian The Hindu August 20 2009 httpwwwhinducom20090820sto-ries2009082056820900htm accessed 17 September 2009


- 9 -- 9 -

assassination attempts in Pakistan Pakistan has

now openly admitted the role of LeT in the Mumbai

attack and has arrested a few LeT leaders yet it has

not taken any convincing steps to disarm or elimi-

nate them The head of the organisation was initial-

ly only placed under house arrest and is now free

under court orders The reluctance to clamp down

on these groups comes from ambivalence about

their role in Pakistanrsquos foreign policy objectives

The lack of response by the state against these

groups even when they transgress the limits of the

law has allowed them to expand their influence in

society A presence of Islamist vigilante groups

patterned after those active in Swat and elsewhere

can be seen in other areas of Pakistan too Most

noticeable among them are the north-eastern dis-

tricts of the Frontier province southern and cen-

tral districts of Punjab some parts of Karachi and

a few districts of Baluchistan In most places

Islamic militants have been organising themselves

through madrassas and mosques A shocking

example of this was the near-insurgency waged

by the mullahs of the Red Mosque in the heart of

Pakistanrsquos capital city of Islamabad Their chal-

lenge to the state ended in a bloody armed clash

which claimed nearly 200 lives The mullahsrsquo suc-

cess in amassing so many weapons and housing so

many trained fighters on the premises of a mosque

in the middle of Islamabad testifies to their grow-

ing boldness as well as alarming negligence on

the part of the security institutions of the state

Similar militant cells seem to exist in other parts of

Pakistan Vigilante groups were reported threaten-

ing video and barber shops in Bhakkar in western

Punjab and Dera Ismail Khan in south NWFP A

huge explosion that killed 14 people in the central

Punjab town of Mian Channun revealed that the

militants of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had amassed a

large cache of arms and ammunition in the house of

a local mullah Security agencies have concluded

that Taliban fleeing US missile attacks have been

taking refuge in Karachi and could become active

on orders from their high command13 Local politi-

cal groups have claimed that the Taliban rule some

13 ldquoTaliban could activate in Karachi on Baitullah ordersrdquo The Nation August 6 2008 httpwwwnationcompkpakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-onlinePolitics06-Aug-2008Taliban-could-activate-in-Karachi-on-Baitullah-orders accessed 17 September 2009


- 10 -- 10 -

who executed the attack on Mumbai in November

2008 and against the leaders that masterminded it

Pakistan needs a push from within the coun-

try as well as pressure from outside to help

it make the transition Its campaign against

the Islamic militancy must proceed unabated

Pakistan also needs a paradigm shift on the na-

tional question and on centre-province relations

within the country where the economic exploi-

tation of weaker provinces must come to an end

The Baluchistan insurgency is an indigenous prob-

lem and requires political compromises for an

effective response Pakistan can-

not hope to win a war against Is-

lamic militancy and terrorism if it

also has to fight wars of secession

In putting its house in order Pa-

kistan needs to avoid the pitfall of

showing a lack of coherence and

consistency in policies Vowing to fight militancy

on the one hand and releasing those who took up

arms against the state and aided militancy within the

country and outside (like mullah Abdul Aziz of the

Red Mosque and the head of LeT Hafiz Saeed) on

the other shows continued ambivalence and sends

the wrong signals to both the public and militant

districts in Karachi after dark and collect taxes from

residents and they have called for government ac-

tion to protect citizens In the most recent incident

of an armed attack on a Christian neighbourhood

in Gojra in central Punjab the armed perpetrators

who burnt seven members of a family including

women and children belonged to Sipah-e-Sa-

haba Pakistan a sectarian terrorist organisation

Conclusions and Recommendations

Pakistan is severely embattled Its plans to destabi-

lise other governments through religious militancy

are now being questioned after its own security was

imperilled at the hands of the same

militancy Islamabad needs a para-

digm shift in its national security

thinking and it has been slow to do

that It has mounted a serious cam-

paign in the tribal region in which

hundreds of militants have been

killed and it is struggling to guard itself against ter-

rorist attacks on its cities It has arrested a number

of militants who were part of the Taliban network

On the other hand the Pakistani authorities are still

reluctant to take firm action against the militants

Pakistan also needs a

paradigm shift on the

national question and on

centre-province relations

within the country


- 11 -

groups The state must be especially vigilant in en-

suring that violators of the law of the land do not go

unpunished mdash be they wealthy industrialists feudal

lords powerful civil servants or Islamic vigilantes

The promise by Indian Prime Minister Dr Man-

mohan Singh to resume stalled negotiations with

Pakistan without conditioning them on reining in

the militants is a positive gesture Pakistan may

be ready to break the umbilical cord with militant

groups once it is assured not only of its eastern bor-

der but also on Indian advances in Afghanistan

The August 20 Afghan elections appear to have

returned Hamid Karzai to power albeit under

unsettled circumstances Karzai has minced no

words in the past in expressing his hostility to-

wards Pakistan and friendliness towards India

This will likely slow Pakistanrsquos break with the

Taliban The spectre of a hostile Afghanistan abet-

ting secessionist political elements in Pakistan

would continue to push Pakistan into the arms of

the Taliban as a counterweight to a hostile Kabul

The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)

PO Box 2947 Toslashyen N-0608 Oslo Norway

Website wwwpeacebuildingno E-mail infopeacebuildingno

Author Abdul Hameed NayyarAfghanistan-Pakistan Series Coordinator Robert Matthews Editor Fionnuala Niacute EacuteigeartaighDesign Ivar Windheim and pikeluseneno

Copyright The Norwegian Peacebuilding CentreNorsk ressurssenter for fredsbygging (Noref)

1 Barnett R Rubin and Abubakar Siddiqu Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stale-mate United States Institute for Peace Spe-cial Report 2006

2 Barnett R Rubin and Ahmed Rashid ldquoFrom Great Game to Grand Bargain Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistanrdquo Foreign Affairs November-December 2008 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles64604barnett-r-rubin-and-ahmed-rashidfrom-great-game-to-grand-bargain

3 Ahmed Rashid Descent into Chaos The United States and the Failure of Nation Build-ing in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia Viking New York 2008

4 Michael Semple Reconciliation in Afghani-stan United States Institute for Peace September 2009

5 Fotini Christia and Michael Semple ldquoFlipping the Taliban How to Win in Afghanistanrdquo For-eign Affairs July-August 2009 httpwwwforeignaffairscomarticles65151fotini-chris-tia-and-michael-sempleflipping-the-taliban

Further reading

- 12 -


Pakistan and Afghanistan are at a critical juncture in

their history Islamic militancy has made rapid

advances in these countries and if unchecked

will gain control of them This would signifi-

cantly boost the strength of international Islamist

movements and pose a threat to much of the world

The genie of Islamic militancy let out of the bottle

in the war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s

is proving difficult to push back in Its rapid ad-

vancement has been fuelled as much by state weak-

nesses in the two countries as by the seemingly

open-ended American presence generally seen in

the region as imperial expansionism An equally

important factor is festering regional disputes

Pakistan has entered a defining phase in this

respect The authority of the state has been

directly challenged by Islamic militancy in the

Frontier Region1 as well as elsewhere in the coun-

try Civil and military leadership are finally con-

fronting this challenge Is this a passing episode in

the statersquos love-hate relationship with the militants

1 The semi-autonomous tribal lands consist of seven parts called ldquoagenciesrdquo Bajaur Mohmand Khyber Orakzai Kurram and North and South Waziristan There are also six smaller zones known as frontier regions in the transitional area between the tribal lands and the North-West Frontier Province to the east See Jayshree Bajori ldquoPakistanrsquos Tribal Areasrdquo Council on Foreign Relations httpwwwcfrorgpublication11973p2 accessed 17 September 2009

or has a paradigm shift finally occurred Can

Islamic militancy be defeated and defeated for

good What are the roles of the governments

of Pakistan Afghanistan and India In what

manner can the international forces assist the

regional governments so as to clear a path toward

exiting Afghanistan How important is it to address

the question of festering disputes in the region

Regional stability depends on two important

conditions external forces must vacate the

region as soon as possible yet at the same time

they must not leave a power vacuum in Af-

ghanistan and Pakistan as this would clear the

way for the organised forces of Islamism These

two conditions make the task very difficult

Pakistan finally acts

It seems that the Taliban advance has finally been

halted by the Pakistani army Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan (TTP) had spilled over from the Feder-

ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into the

settled areas of Swat Dir and Malakand rout-

ing out local governments The TTP defeated the

police and paramilitary forces that came to help

those administrations then enforced sharia laws

on citizens at gunpoint and extended the ad-

vance further into other districts coming to


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