Pentagon Papers Part v a Vol IB

8/6/2019 Pentagon Papers Part v a Vol IB

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EISENHOHER ADHINISTRATION

SUMMARY

President Eisenhower took office in the context of negotiationsfor.R settlement in Korea and th e portending defeat in France in Indochina . His Administration early faced th e crisis surrounding the GenevaConference of 1954, in which direc t U. S . intervention in Vietnam ,,:as adist inct prospect. Having pressed diplomatically for a constructiveoutcome at Geneva, th e United States threw i ts support behind Ngo DinhDiem and the Government of Vietnam. With U.S. support, that government,despite a series of severe tests, succeeded in consolidating i t se l f andmaking signi:ficant progress . U. S. justification .for i ts policy to\fardVietnam in this period included the following :

a . . The "domino principle" : th e loss of Vietnam, the most vulnerable state of Southeast Asia, would imperil the other nations of theregion, and ultimately lead to a seriously weakened U.S. strategicposition . Vietnam was a key to continued free world access to th ehuman and material resources of Southeast Asia .b . Communist China was pursuing an expansionist foreign policyrelying upon subversive aggression, as well as armaments . China thuscontinued to ref lect th e unchanging Soviet objective of conquest of theworld, and both had manifest designs on Southeast Asia .c . The United States proposed, through i ts aid programs , t o helpthe small and weak nations contiguous with communist powers to maintaintheir freedom and independence les t aggression and expansion be encouraged, and the \"'Orld moved thereby toward a. tbird ,,:orld ,!ar .d. In th e words of PJ.esident Eisenhower, "ive gave militarJ andeconoMic assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. vIe entered into atreaty -- the Southeast Asia Security Treaty - - which plainly warnedthat an armed attack against this area ...,ould endanger our own peace andsafety and that ...re ",-auld act accordingly . "e . U.S. aid for Vietnam -- economic and military -- has madepossible not only i ts survival , but also genuine progress toward astable society , a modern economy, and internal and external security

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JUSTIFICATION OF THE liAR - - RJBLIC STATEl-lENTSEISENHOltlER ADl'{[NISTRl\.TION

CONTENTS

1 . Ei senhower cites the in terrelationship of Southeast Asiannations, their natural r esources and strategic locationsas justifying U. S. concerns (4 August 1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-42 . Joint Franco-American communique citing agreement wherebyU.S . increases i ts aid to France in prosecution of i t s effortsagainst Viet Minh (30 September 1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B- 53 . Eisenhower emphasizes support of French is to avoid the tragedyof U.S. getting involved on large scale in Southeast Asia(10 February 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B- 54. Secretary of State presents a most revealing assessment ofadministration ' s thinking on Indochina and the threat of RedChina . He cites e x p ~ n s i o n of communist domination, th e in creas ed dangers to other nee.rby countries , the loss of foodsupply to Japan and India, the strategic location of Indochina

and the military bases as paramount concerns (29 March 1954 ) . . . . . . B-65. Alfred Sesne Jenkins (Orficer in Charge, Chinese Polit icalAffairs) discusses Chinese Communist regime and i t s relation -ship to Soviet Union (2 April 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B- 96. President states "fe.lling domino" principle loses people and

s t ra tegic resources to communism and threatens Austra l ia incomments on i mportance of Indochina to free world. He respondsto Sen . John Kennedy ' s expressed position on a guarantee ofindependence needed to just i fy U. S. effort (7 April 1954) . . . . . . . . . B- IO7 . Under Secretary Smith indicates vital basic reason for

Indochina ' s importance i s communist expansion, and reiterates"domino" theory and strategic r esources (19 April 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . B- 128 . Secretary of State Dulles r eports on London- Paris conversationson free world interests; advocates collective defense forIndochina as U. S. solution to communist threat (19 April 1954). . . . B- l39 . State Department comments on a speech by Vice President Nixonby r eferring to stated U. S. policy of lI united action"(17 April 195!') . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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10 . Dulles s u m r r ~ r i z e s U. S. position on Indochina in light ofGeneva : comounization of the civi l war; U. S. intervention ;French arcistice; collective security; possibility of U. S.i ntervention (7 May 1954) . " . . . . . . . . . . . . . '" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1511 . Eisenhower assesses progress at th e Geneva Conference ; cites'plans for collective security arrangement in Southeast Asia(5 /lay 1954). .................... . . . . . . . . . . ............ . . . . . . . . . . B-1612 . Eisenhower r eaffirms his "domino" concerns in r esponse topress questioning (12 May 1954) . . . ................. . ............. B-1813 . Secretary of State Dulles analyzes developments to date in

Indochina ; he discusseS the conditions under which U. S. wouldintervene directly (11 June 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1814. Eisenhower states U. S. position on Geneva Accords(2l July 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2015 . Text of th e declaration (21 July 1954) . . . . . . ..................... B-2316 . U. S. -French communique announcing desire to aid directlythe newly independent states of Cambodia, Laos , and Vietnam(29 September 1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-2511 . Eisenhower informs President of Vietnam's Council that aid"rill be conditioned on his government ' s giving the U. S."assurance as to standard of perf'ormance" (23 October 1954) . . . . . . B- 2618 . Eisenhower notes but questions the moderation in Soviet policy;r efers to Diem ' s successes in South Vietnam (21 April 1956) . . . . . . B-2?19 Assistant Secretary of State Robertson r estates Americanpolicy in Vietnam at a time of relative stability (1 June 1956) .20 . Eisenho'.ler emphasizes role of' aid program in achieving Asiangoals ; cites susceptibility underdeveloped nations to

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communist probings (21 May 1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-3 221. Eisenhovier j u s t 1 ~ i e s foreign aid to American people as

necessary fo r U. S. security ; cites i ts "returns" in Vietnam.(211(ay 1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. . . . . . . . . B-3322 . Eisenhmler reports to the nation on th e Rcd Chinese shellingof Quemoy; r elates U. S. security interests to Formosa ; citeslesson of Munich and th e oilite.nt ste.te:lents of Chinese Com-munists as requiring a firm U.S. stand (11 September 1958) . . . . . . . B- 35

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B. Eisenho"Ter Administration

1 . President Eisenhower ' s Remarks at Governors ' Conference, August 4,1953, Public of the Presidents, 1953 , p . 540:* * *

. "I could go on enumerating every kind of problem that comes beforeus daily . Let us take , though , for example , one simple problem in theforeign field . You have seen th e war in Indochina described various l yas an Qutgrolyth of French colonialism and i t s French refusal to t rea tindigenous populations decently . You f ind i t again descr ibed as a "arbetween the communists and th e other elements in southeast Asia . Butyou have a confused idea of where i t is l ocated - - Laos , or Cambodia,or i a ~ , or any of the other countries that are involved . You don ' t}mOl" , real ly, why we are so concerned with the far - off southeast cornerof Asia .

"Why is it? Now, f i r s t of al l , the las t great population remalnlngin Asia that has no t become dominated by the Kremlin, of course , is th esub- continent of India , including the Pakistan government . Here are350 million people s t i l l free . Now le t us assume that we lose Indochina .I f Indochina goes , several things happen right away . The l1alayan peninsula , the las t l i t t le b it of th e end hanging on dOlm there , would bescarcely defensible -- and t in and tungsten that y,:e so greatly value fromthat area would cease cOming . But a l l India vould be outflanked . Burmawou l d certainly , in i t s weakene:d condition, be no defense . NOll , India issurrounded on that side by th e Communist empire . Iran on i t s lef t is ina weakened condition . I believe I read in the paper this morning thatNossadegh s move to\.ard getting rid of his parliament has been supportedand"of course he was in that move supported by the Tudeh , which is theCommunist Party of Iran . All of that \ieakening position around there isvery ominous for th e United States, because finally i f we los t a l l that ,how would th e free world hold the rich empiFe of Indonesia? So you see ,somewhere along the l ine , this must be blocked . I t must be blocked now .That is lThat the French are doing .

"So, when the United States votes $400 million to help that war ,we are not voting for a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapestway that we can to prevent th e occurrence of somethipg that would be ofthe most terrible significance fo r th e United States of America - - oursecurity , our power and abil i ty to get certain things need from theriches of the Indonesian terr i tory , and from southeast Asia . "

* +;. *2 . Joint Franco-Atterican Communique , Addltionai United States Aid forFrance and Indoch in:a. , September 30, 1.953. Department of StateBulletin, Octobe!' 12, 1953. P . 486 :

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"The forces of France end the Associated States in Indochina havefor 8 years been engaged in a bit ter struggle to prevent the engulfmentof Southeast Asia by the forces of international communism . The heroicefforts and sacrifices of these French Union allies in assuring thel iberty of th e neli end independent states of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnamhas earned th e anmarat i on and support of the f ree world . In r ecognitionof the French Union effort the United States Government has in the pastfurnished aid of various kinds t o the Governments of France and theAssociated States to assist in bringing the long struggle to an earlyand victorious conclusion .

"The French Government is firmly resolved to carry out in fu l l i t sdeclaration of July 3, 1953, by which is announced i t s in tention ofperfecting th e independence of the three Associated States in Indochina ,through negotiations with th e Associated States ."Tbe Governments of France and the United States have nO\1 agreedthat, in support of plans of th e French GoverpJnent for the intensifiedprosecution of the war against the Viet Minh , the United States will makeavailable to th e French Government prior to December 31, 1954 additionalfin ancial resources no t to exceed $385 million . This aid is in additionto funds already earmarked by the United States for aid to France andthe Associated States ."The French Government is determined to ma..."!{e every effort to breakup and destroy the regular enemy forces in Indochina. Toward this endthe government intends to carry through, in close cooperation Hith theCambodian , Laot ian, and Vietnamese Governments, the plans for increasingthe Associated States forces while increasing temporarily French forcesto levels considered necessary to assure the success of existing military

plans. The additional United States aid is designed to help make i tpossible to achieve these objectives with maximum speed and effectiveness .liThe increased french effort in Indochina will not enta i l any basicor permanent al teration of the French Government's plens and programsfor i ts NATO forces . n

3. President Eisenhower ' s News Conference Februer 10 1 4 PublicPaper s of the Presidents, 195 , p . 253 :* * *

tlQ. Daniel.Shorr, CBS Radio: t1r . President, should your remarks onIndochina be c o n ~ t r u e d as meaning that you are determined not to becomeinvolved or , perhaps , more deeply involved in th e ..../a r in Indochina , regard-l es s of hm, that war may go ?"THE PRESIDE!rr . "'lell, I 2Il l no t going to try to predict the drif t ofworld events nm" and the course of world events over the next months . Isay that I cannot conceive of a greater tragedy for America than to get

heavily involved n o ~ " in an a l l- out ~ " a r in any of those regions , par t icularlyy.'ith la rge units .B-5


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"So what we are doing is supporting th e Vietnamese and the Frenchin their conduct of that war; because, as \1e see i t , i t is a case ofindependent and free nations operating against th e encroachment ofcommunism . "

4. Address b Secreta Dulles before the Overseas Press Club of Americaat New York Cit on !-1arch 2 1 The Threat of a Red Asia . De art ment of State Bulletin . April 12, 195 ; p . 539 :"This provides a timely occasion for outlining the administration ' sthinking about two related matters -- Indochina and the Chinese Communistregine ."Indochina is important for many reasons . First , and always f i rs t ,

are the hunan values . About 30 million people are seeking for themselvesthe dignity of self- government. Until a few years ago , they formed merelya French dependency. NOi" , their three pol i t ical units -- Viet- Nero, Laos ,and Cambodia - - are exercising a considerable measure of independentpoli t ica l authority ~ f i t h i n the French Union . Each of the three i s not .recognized by the United States and by more than 30 other nations . Theysigned th e Japanese peace treaty with us . Their independence is not yetcomplete. But the French Government las t July declared i ts intention tocomplete that independence, and negotiations to consummate that pledgear e actively under way ."The United States is ",atching this development with close attentionand great sympathy . He do not forget that we were a colony that won i ts

f reedom. We have sponsored in the Fhllippines a conspicuously successfuld e v e l o p ~ e n t of pol i t ical independence . We feel a sense of kinship withthose everyv.'here who yearn for freedom."The Communists are attempting to prevent th e crderly development ofindependence and to confuse the issue before the ".orld . The Communistshave , in these matters , a regular line which Stalin laid down in 1924 ."The schell'.e is to whip up the sp i r i t of nationalism so that i tbecomes violent . That i s done by professional agitators . Then th eviolence is enlarged by Communist military and technical leadership andthe provision of military supplies . In these '1lays , international com munism gets a stranglehold on the people and i t uses that power to' amalgamate ' the peoples into th e Soviet orbit .'" Ana1gamation ' is Lenin 1 s and Stalin ' s word to describe their process ." 'Ama1.gamation I is now being attempted in Indochina under th e ostensibleleadership of Ho Chi Minh . He was indoctrinated in Moscow . He became anassociate of the Russian, Bor-odin, when the la t ter was organizing the ChineseCommunist Party which was to bring China into th e Soviet orbi t . Then Hotransferred his activi t ies to Indochina.

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"12:lose f ight ing under th e banner o f Ho Ch i Minh hsve l a rgelybeen trained and equipped in Communist China . They are supplied withar t i l lery and ammunition through the Soviet- Chinese Communist bloc .Captured materiel shows that much of i t was fabricated by the Skodal-lunition Works in Czechoslovakia and transported across Russia andSiberia and then sent through China into Viet Nam. l-111itary suppliesfor the Communist armies have been pouring into Viet - Nam a t a steadilyincr easing rate .

"Military and technical guidance is supplied by an estimated2, 000 Communist Chinese . 'Ihey function with the forces of Ho Ch i Minhin key positions -- in s taf f sections of the High Command , a t thedivision level, and in specialized units such as signal, engineer ,art i l lery , and transportation ."In the present stage, the Communists in Indochina use nationaJ.

ist ic anti-French slogans to 'Hin local support . But if they achievedmilitary or poli t ica l success, i t is certain that they would subjectthe people to a cruel Communist dictatorship taking i ts orders fromPeiping and Mosco'" The tragedy vTould not stop there . I f the Communist forces lvonuncontested control over Indochina or any substantial part thereof,they would surely resume th e same pattern of aggression against otherfree peoples in the area ." The propagandists of Red China and Russia make i t apparent thatthe purpose is to dominate a l l of Southeast Asia ."Southeast Asia is the so - called ' rice bowl ' which helps to feedthe densely populated region that extends from I ndia to Japan . I t isr ic h in many raw materials , such as t in , o il , rubber, and iron are .I t offers industrial Japan potentially important markets and sources ofr al" materials ." The area has great strategic value . Southeast Asia i s astridethe most direct and best- developed sea and a ir routes between th e Pacificand South Asia . I t has major naval and eir bases . Communist control ofSoutheast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia,and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. Theent i re Western Pacific area, including th e so - called ' offshore is l andchain,' would be strategi cally endangered ."President Eisenho".-er appraised the situation l a s t Wednesday(t.iarch 24) when he said that the area is of ' +,ranscendent importance . '"The United States has shmm in many ways i ts sympathy for the

gaJJ.ant struggle being ,,'aged in Indochina by French forces and those ofth e Associated States . Congress has enabled us to provide material aidt o th e established governments and their peoples . Also , our di plomacyhas sought to deter Communist China from open aggression in that area

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"President Eisenho ....er: in his address of April 16, 1953, explainedthat a Korean armistice would be a fraud i f i t merely released aggressivearmies for attack eIsel/here . I said last SepteI!iber that i f Red Chinasent i t s o ~ n army into Indochina, that would result in grave consequences which might no t be confined to I ndochina .

,rRecent statements have been designed to impress upon potentialaggressors that aggression might lead to action a t places and by meansof free - world choosing, so that aggression would cost more than i tcould gain."The Chinese ConmtU!lists have, in fact , avoided th e direct use oftheir mm Red armies in open aggression against Indochina . They have ,however, largely stepped up their support of the aggression in that area .I ndeed, they promote that aggression by a l l means short of open invasion."Under a l l th e circumstances i t seems desirable to clarify furtherthe United States position.IIUnder the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asiaof the poli t ica l system of Communist Russia and i t s Chinese CommunistaJ.ly, by whatever means, 'muld be a grave threat to th e whole free community . The United States feels tbat that possibility should not bepassively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involveserious risks . But these risks are far less than those that will face usa few years from now i f we dare not be resolute today .liThe free nations want peace . However, peace is no t had merely bywanting i t . Peace has to be worked for and planned for . Sometimes i t

is necessary to take risks to win peace just as i t is necessary in warto take risks to '-fin victory. The chances for peace are' usually betteredby le t t ing a potential aggressor know in advance where his aggressioncould lead him."I hope that these statements which I make here tonight will servethe cause of peace ."Let me noy/ discuss our poli t ical relations with Red China, taking

f i rs t the matter of recognition ."The United States does not recognize th e Chinese Communist regime.Tbat is well known . But the reasons seem not so well known . Some thinkthat there are no reasons and that we are actuated purely by emotion .Your Government believes that i t s position is soberly rational.1tLet me f i rs t recall that diplomatic recognition is a voluntaryact . One c o u n t ~ - has no right to demand ~ e c o g n i t i o n by another .Generally, i t is useful that ' there should be diplomatic intercoursebetween those who exercise de fecto governmental authority, and i t iswell established that recognition does not imply moral approval.

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"President Monroe, in his famous message to Congress, denouncedthe expansionist and despotic system of Czarist Russia and i ts al l ies .But be said that i t \oiould nevertheless be our policy I to consider thegovernment de facto as the legitimate government for us .' That hasindeed been th e general United States policy , and I believe that i t isa sound general policy . However , where i t does no t serve ou r interests,we ar e free to vary f!om i t .

If In relation to Communist China, we are forced to take account ofthe fact that th e Chinese Communist regime has been consistently andviciously hostile to th e United States .IfA typical Chinese Communist pamphlet reads : 'We lfust Hate America,because She is the Chinese People ' s Implacable Enemy . I 'He Hust DespiseAmerica because i t is a Corrupt Imperialist Nation, th e World Center ofReaction and Decadency . ' 'We t-iust I..ook down upon America because She isa Paper Tiger and Entirely Vulnerable to Defeat . '!lBy print, by radio, by drama, by pictures, with a ll the propagandaskills , ~ h i c h connnunism has devised, such themes are propagated by theRed rulers . They vent their hatred by barbarous acts , such as seizuresand imprisonments of Americans ."Those responsible for United States policy must ask and anS\Oler' Hill i t help ou r country i f , by recognition, ""e give increased prestigeand influence to a regime that actively attacks ou r vi ta l interests? 'I can find only th e ans .:e r : 'No. ,I I

* * *5. Address by Alfred Ie Sesne Jenkins, Officer in Charge, ChinesePolit ical Affairs , before the American A c a d e ~ v of Political andSocial Science Philadel hie Pa . Present United States PolicTmlerd China A r i l 2 1 De artment of State BulletinApri l 26 , 195 ,p . 2 :

"I n recent years ,1e have often beard i t said that more heat thanl ight has been cast on th e China question . I am not surprised at th ebeat , nor do I object to i t , provided there is also sufficient l ight .The fate of one- fourth of th e world ' s population is not a matter ",hicb. can be taken l ightly, and th e addition of China ' s vast material andmanpm'ler resources to the Soviet bloc is a matter involving no t only th esecurity interests of the United States but those of th e entire freeworld . I do not'see how one can help feeling strongly about thesematters . We need not apologize that ou r thinking about China is chargedwith feeling. National policies are an expression of national interestsconcerning \olhich there is naturally I:lllch feeling, and ou r policies ar ean expression both of what \Oie are and of what ",e \oj-ant . We are a nationof free peoples . He want to rem3.in free to pursue in peace our propernational destiny, and we want the same freedom and rights for others.

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"We do not believe that the Chinese Cormnunist regime represents thewill of th e people i t controls . First capitalizing on th e natural desireof the Chinese people to enjoy ful l recognition and respect for theirinmortance in the world community) th e regime then proceeded by i tsl ~ a n t o - o n e s i d e policy to betray the powerful Chinese longings ' tostand up straight . I t has folloHed slavishly .he leadership of th eSoviet Union and attempted to emulate it in a l l i t s ways . ' 'lith the aidof thousands of Soviet advisers i t has set about methodically to changeth e entire fabric of traditional Chinese culture, subst i tu t ing com muni sm 's materialistic, atheistic doctrines ,.,.herein the state is thebe-a l l and end-all and the individual i t s pawn .

liThe regilne at f i r s t attracted considerable support, princ ipallythrough i ts sponsorship of a land redistribution program, but is DOW ,after establishment of the prerequisite pOlice - state controls, takingth e land a't!ay from th e O'.mers in the seme collect ivization process whichis familiar in other Communist countr ies and which invariably hasbrought suffering in i t s wake . China ' s much advertised 'New Democracy 'is of course in real i ty 'o ld communism . '

"From i t s inception the regime has proclaimed a ' lean-to-one -side' policy in foreign affairs , and has lef t no doubt about i ts dedication to the proposition of world Communist revolution under the leader ship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . '1hile i ts ' leaning-to one-side ' has no t brought i t to the position of complete 'prostrat ionto -one-side' characterist ic of the Eastern European Soviet satel l i tes ,there is not th e slightest evidence that th is indicates any separatistt endencies . The difference in status of Peiping in i ts relationshipwith Hoscow (a s distinguished from that of the Eastern European sate ll i tes) is rather due chiefly to i ts having come to pO\,ler without benefit ,except in 11anchuria, of Soviet Army occupation; to the prestige of MaoTse-tung, arising from his long history of l eadership of Chinese com-munism and his l i t erary contributions to theoretical communism; toChina ' s assumption of the role of leadership . . . I

* * *6 . President EisenhoHer ' s News Conference . Anril 7 , 1954 , PublicPapers of the Presidents, 1954, p . 382:

* * *" Q. Robert Richards, Copley Press : Mr . President, vlould you mindcommenting on the strategic importance of Indochina to the free v;orld?I think there har been , across the c o u n t ~ , s o ~ e lack of understandingon just what i t means to us ."THE PRESTI>EIrr .general ~ ' h e n you talk You hav.e, of course,about such things . both the specific and the

"First of al l , you have the specific value of a locality in i t sproduction of materials that th e world needs .

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"Then you have th e possibi l ity that many human beings pass undera dictatorship that is inimical to the free world."Finally , you have broader considerations that might follow whatyou ~ o u l d cal l the ' fall ing domino' principle . You have a row ofdominoes set up, you knock over the f i r s t one, and what will happen to

the l as t one is the certainty tha t i t '>"ill go over very quickly . So youcould have a beginnin of a disintegration that would bave the roostprofound influences ."Now , \11thpar t icular areavery important .

and so on .

respect to the f i r s t one } t \ fO of the i terns from th istha t the ,,'orid uses are t in and tungsten . They areThere are others , of course, the rubber plantations

"Then with respect to more people passing under th is domination ,Asia , after a l l , has already los t some 450 million of i ts peoples tothe Communist dictatorship, and we simply can ' t afford greater losses .

"But when we come to the possible sequence of events , the loss ofIndochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula , and Indonesiaf ollowing, nm ... you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply thedisadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sourcesof materials , bu t now you are talking really about millions and millionsand millions of people ."Finally , the geographical position achieved thereby does manythings . I t turns the so - called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa,of the Philippines and to the south'... ard ; i t moves in to threatenAustral ia and Ne,, Zealand .nIt ta.l{es away, in i ts economic aspects , that region that Japan

must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn , will have only one pl acein the world to go -- that is , toward the Communist areas in order tol iv e .

"So, th e possible consequences of the loss are just incalculableto t he free world . "* * *

"Q. Robert G. Spivack, New York Post : Hr . President, do youagree with Senator Kennedy that independence must be guaranteed thepeople of I ndochina in order to just i fy an a ll -out eff ort there?

liTHE PRESIDENT . \{ell , I don ' t knov; , of course , exactly in whatwB:y a Senator "'as talking about this thing .TIl will say th is : f or many years , in taLl{ing to differentcountries, different governments , I have t r ied to insist on thisurincinle : no outside country can come in and be really helpful~ e s s i t is dOing something that the local people went .

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"Now, le t me cal l your attention to th is independence theory .Senator Lodge, on my instructions, stood up in the United Netions andoffered one country independen'ce i f they would just simply pass ar esolution saying they \vanted i t , or at least said , ' I would work fo ri t . ' They didn ' t accept i t . I can't say that the associated stateswant independence in th e sense that the United States is independent .I do not know what they want .

"I do say th is ; th e aspiretions of those peopl e must be met ,otherwise there is in the l ong run no final answer to the problem ."Q. J oseph Dear, Capital Times ; Do you favor bringing thisI ndochina situation before th e United Nations?liTHE PRESIDENT . I really can ' t say . I wOuldn ' t want to commentat to o great a length at this moment , but I do believe th is : th is is

the kind of thing that must not be handled by one.nation trying to actalone ."

7.* * *

Remarks Made by Under Secretary Smith in Answer to QuestionsPrepared for Use on "The American Heekh over the CBS TelevisionNetwork A r i l 11 1 54 on the 1m ortance of Indochina De artmentof State Bulletin , April 19, 195 ,p . 9:IlQ. rlb y is Indochina important to Amer icans?"NR . St-IITH : For one vi ta l basic and two spec i al additionalre asons . I n the f i r s t place, t he vi ta l basic question is : Shall weor can the free world allow i ts position anywhere and par.ticularly inAsia to be eroded piece by piece? Can we allow , dare we permit , expansionof COffimunist Chinese control further into Asia? Propagandists of theSoviet Un i on and of Communist China have made i t clear that their purpose

is to dominate a l l of Southeast Asia . Remember that th is region helpsto feed an tmmense population . I t stretches a l l the way ' from India toJ apan . I t ' s a region that is r ich in raw materials , fu l l of t in , oil ,rubber , iron are ."No .;, from the strategic point of view, i t l ies across the mostdirect se a and air route between the Pacific and South Asia . There aremajor naval e.nd a ir bases located in the area . Communist control ofSoutheast Asia woul.d threaten the Philippines, Australia , and New Zea

land directly , .....ould threaten t-Ialaya ; i t v,ould have a very profoundeffect u p o ~ the economy of other countrips in the area , even as far asJ apen ."Q . The President ) at his ne''''s conference on April 7, describedth e process of C o ~ u n i s t conquest as the ' fall ing domino ' principle . I sthat a good description of th e threat in Southeast Asia?

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"l>IR . SMITH: Yes, i t is . I f Indochina is lost to the Communists,Burma is threatened, Thailand is threatened, the ~ ! a l Peninsula isexposed, Indonesia is subject to the gravest danger, and, in addition tothese countries and their possible loss , there is the possible loss offood source . I have already mentioned the strategic raw mater ials , th ebases in th e area ' and, 'tlhile they are of enormous importance , the mostimportant thing of a ll is the possible loss of millions and millionsof people ''''ho ,'fould disappear behind the Iron Curtain . There are enoughmillions behind the Iron Curtain now . So what ' s at stake in Indochina?I t is th e human freedom of the masses of people for a ll that enormousarea of th e world . "

* * *8 . Statement b Secretar Dulles Made at Au us Geor ia A r i l 19195 , on Conversations in London and Paris Concerning Indochina,

Department of State Bulle tin, May 3, 1954, p . 668:"I have reported to President Eisenho"rer on my recent tr ip toLondon and PariS , where I discussed the position in Indochina ."I fOlmd in both Capitals recognition tha t the armed Communistthreat endangered vi ta l free world interest and made i t appropriate thatthe free nat ions most immediately concerned should explore the possibil i tyof establishing a collective defense . This same recognition had alreadybeen expressed by other nations of the Southeast Asian area ."The Communists in Viet -Nam, spurred on by Red China, have actedon the assumption that a quick, easy victory a t Dien-Bien-Phu would openthe door to a rapid Communist advance to domination of the entire Southeast Asian area . They concluded they were justif ied in r ecklesslysquandering the l ives of their subjects to conquer this strongpoint soas to confront the Geneva Conf'erence with what could be portrayed asboth a military and pol i t ical victory for communism .liThe gall ant defenders of Dien-Bien-Phu have done thei r par t toassure a frustration of th e Communist strategy . They have taken a to l lsuch that , from a military standpoint, the attackers already los t moret han they could wi n . From a pol i t ical standpoint , the defenders ofDie n -Bien-Phu have dramatized the struggle for freedom so that the freeworld sees more clearly than ever before the issues that are at s takeand once again is drawing closer together in unity of purpose ."T he C o m m l m i ~ t rulers 8.le learning again that th e ,,,rill of the freeis not broken by 'riolence or intimi dation .liThe brutal Soviet conquest of Czechoslovakia did not disintegratethe will of th e \ ~ e s t I t led to t he formation of the North Atls.ntic

Treaty alliance ."The violent conquest of the China mainland followed by the Koreanaggression did not paralyze the w}ll of the free nations . I t l ed to a

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series of Pacific mutual security pacts and to the creation under theNorth Atlantic Treaty of a po'.,'erful defensive force - in -being .liThe violent bat t les not-l being waged in Viet -Ne.m an d th e armedaggressions against Laos and Cambodia are not creating ~ ~ y sp i r i t ofdefeatism . On tbe contrary, they are rousing the free nations to measures

",'hieh we hope ""ill be suf f ic ient ly t imely an d vigorous to preserve thesev i t a l areas from Communist domination .. "In t his course l i es the best hope of achieving a t Geneva ther estoration of peace with freedom and justice ."

9* * *

Statement by J mneson Parker, Department Press Officer , Hade toCorres ondents A r i l 17 1954 on U.S . Policy Toward IndochinaDepartment of State Bulletin, April 2 , 195 ,p . 23 :"Certain remarks with regard to United States policy toward Indo china have been attributed to e high Government official Lice PresidentNixo! . The contents of th e speech referred to and questions andanswers "'hich follO'lled were off the record, but a complete report of thespeech has been made available to th e State Department ."The speech enunciated no new United States policy with regard toI ndochina . I t expressed fu l l agreement with and support for the pol icywith respect to Indochina previously enunciated by the President andt he Secretary of State ."That policy ~ v a s authoritatively set forth by the Secretary ofState in his speech of March 29, 1954, in which he said :

'Under the conditions of today , the imposit i on on SoutheastAsia of the polit ical system of Communist Russia and i ts Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means , ,,!ould be a grave threat to the "'holef ree community. The United States feels tbat that possibi l i ty shouldnot be passively accepted but should be met by united action . Thismight involve serious risks . But these risks are far less than thosethat will face us a fe'" years from now i f ',:e dare not be resolute today . I

"In regard to a hypothetical question as to whether United Statesforces should be sent to Indochina in the event of Fpench withdrawal,t he high Government off icial categorically rejected the premise ofpossible French withdrawal . Insofar as the use of United States forcesin I ndochi.l1.a '.-Tas concerned, he was stating a cl1urse of possible actionwhich he was personally prepared to support under a highly unlikelyhypothesis .

tIThe answer to the question correctly emphasized the fe.ct that theinterests of the United States an,d other free nations are vitally

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involved with the in teres ts of France and the Associated s ta te s inres is t ing CO!nmlUlist domination of Indochina . "

10. Address by Secretary Dulles Delivered to the Nation over Radio andTelevision, Ijay 7, 1954, The Issues at Ge ,eva , Department of StateBullet in, 1lay 17, 1954, p . 740 end p . 744 :* * *

"Let me turn nOif to the problem of Southeast Asia . In tha t grea tpeninsula a'ld the islands to the south l ive nearly 200 million peoplein 7 states -- Burma; the three s ta tes of Indochina - - Laos , Cambodia,and Viet -N8I:l; Thailand; Malaya ; and Indonesia . Communist conquest ofth is area would seriously imperil the free world posi t ion in the WesternPacif ic . I t would , among other things, endanger the Phil ippines,Australia, and New Zealand, with al l of which the. United States ha smutual-security t r ea t i es . I t ....ould deprive Japan of iJnportant foreignmarkets und sources of food an d rau materials .

"In Viet-Nam, one of the three Indochinese s ta te s , war has beengoing on since 1946 . When i t began , Indochina Has a French colony ju s tl iberated f r o ~ Japanese occupation . The war s tar ted priJnarily as a warfor independence . Hhat s tar ted as a civ i l ,,,,ar has now been taken overby internat ional communism for i t s own purposes . Ho Chi Minh, theCommunist leader in Viet -Nam , was t rained in t-ioscow and got his f i r s trevolutionary e)C1Jerience in China . "

* * ie"In Indochina, the si tuat ion is far more complex . The presentconditions there do not provide a sui table basis for the United Statest o par t ic ipate ~ i t h i t s armed forces ."The si tuation may perhaps be clar i f ied as a r esu l t of the Geneva.

Conference . The French have stated the i r desire for an armistice onhonorable terms an d under proper safeguards . I f they can conclude asettlement on terms which do not endanger the freedom of the peoples ofViet -Nam, this would be a real contribut ion to the cause of peace inSoutheast Asia . But we would be gravely concerned i f an armistice orcease - f i re were reached at Geneva "'hich would provide a road to a Com munist takeover a'ld further aggression . I f this occurs , or if hos t i l i t i es continue, then the need -,-Till be even more urgent to create theconditions for united action in defense of the area .

" I n making cOlllIllitments '\,lhich might involve the us e o f armed f'orce ,the Congress is a f 'ul l partner . Only the Congress can declare .... ar .President Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized tha t he ~ r o u l d not takemili tary action in Indochina ',.;ithout the support of Congress . Further more , he has made c lear that he would not seek tha t .unless , in hisopinion , there ,,{ould be an adequate col lect ive e f fo r t based on genuinemutuality of purpose in defending vi ta l in teres ts .

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"A great effort is being J:1ade by Cormnunist propaganda to portrayi t as something evi l i f Asia joins with th e nations of the Americas andEurope to get assistance which will help the peoples of Asia to securetheir l iberty . These Communist nations have, in th is connection ,adopted the slogan ' Asia fo r the Asians . '

"The Japanese war lords adopted a similar slogan when they soughtto subject Asia to t h e ~ r despotic rule . The similar theme of ' Europef or the Europeans ..... as adopted by Mr . 1101otov at the Berlin Conferencewhen he proposed that the Europeans should seek security by arrangementswhich would send the Unitett states back home ."Great despotic powers have always known that they could imposetheir will and gain their conquests i f the free nations stand apart andnone helps the other ."I t should be observed that th e Soviet Communist aggression inEurope took place only against countries which had no collective securityarrangements . Since th e organization of the NOrth Atlantic Treaty ,there has been no successful aggression in Europe ,"Of course , i t is of the utmost importance that the United Statesparticipation in creating collective security in Asia should be on abasis '....hich recognizes fully the aspirations and cultures of the Asianpeoples . We have a material and industrial strength which they l ack andwhich is an essential ingredient of security . Also they have culturaland spiritual values of their o ....n which make them ou r equals by everymoral standard ."The United States , as the f i r s t colony of modern history to winindependence fo r i t se l f , inst inctively shares the aspirations fo rl iberty of al l dependent and colonial peopl es . We ..../ant to help , nothinder the spread of l iberty."We do not seek to perpetuate ~ e s t e r n coloniaJ.1sm and we find evenmore intolerable th e new imperialist colonialism of c ~ J m u n i s mIIT hat is the sp i r i t that animates us . I f 'We remain true to t hat

sp i r i t , we can face the future ~ . ; i t h confidence that ".-e shal l be inharmony with t hose moral forces ,!bich ultimately prevail . t

11. President EisenhO\-:er ' s News Conference l-ia 5 1954 PublicPapers of th e Presidents, 195 ,p . 51:* * *

"United States foreign policy has consistently suPP!?rted theprinciples on which .. as fotmded the United Nations . The basic expressionof th is policy ,las the Vendenberg resol1.\tion in 1948 . The United statesbelieves in assuring the peace and integrity of nations through collectiveB-16


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action and, in pursuance of the United Nations principle , has enteredinto regional security a g r e ~ ~ e n t s with other nations . Examples are theInter-American Agreement , th e NATO Agreement , and numerous pacts in thePacific . These arrangements are invariably to assure the peacefulsecurity of the contracting nations and to prevent likelihood of attack ;they ar e no t arrMgements designed primarily f')r waging war .

"The Geneva conference , now 9 da.ys old , has produced no surpri ses .The expressed fears of some have proved unfounded ." I t has not been a ' Five-Po . er ' conference as the Soviet Uniontried to make i t ."I t has not involved establishing express or implied diplomaticrecognition by the United States of th e Chinese Communist aggressors ."The Korean phase of the conference has been organized . Here theCommunists came up with a scheme for Korean unification which was aChinese copy of the Soviet scheme for the unification of Germany . Undertheir proposal no election mea.sures could be taken without Communistconsent, and there could be no impartial supervision of the electionconditions or of the voting ."This scheme was rejected for Germany. Secretary Dulles te l ls methat is equally unacceptable to the Republic of Korea and to theUnited Nations members which took part in the Korean war under theUnited Nations Command now represented at Geneva ."The Indochina phase of the conference is in process of beingorganized and the issues have no t yet been clarified . In this mattera large measure of in i t ia t ive rests viith the governments of France ,Viet -Nam , Laos , and Cambodia, ""hich are the countries most directlyconcerned ."M eanwhile , plans ar e proceeding fo r the realizat ion of' a SoutheastAsia security arrangement . This was publicly suggested by SecretaryDulles in his address of March 29 . Of course , our principal allieswere advised in advance . This proposal of the Secretary of Stat e wasnot a ne .... one ; i t was merely reaffirmation of the principles that haveconsistently guided our post - i..ar foreign policy and a reminder tointerested A s i a ~ friends that the United states was prepared to joinwith others in the application of these principles to tbe threatenedarea. Nost of th e free nations of the area and others directly con

cerned have shmm affinnative interest , and th e conversations areactively proceed Lng ."Obviously , i t ...as ne'Fer expected tbat this collective securityarrangement would spring into existence overnight . There are to o manyimportant problems to be resolved . But there is a general sense ofurgency . The fact that such an organization is in th e process of formation could have en important bearing upon what happens at Geneva duringthe Indochina phase of the conference .

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liThe countries of the area are now thinking in constructiveterms , i.hich include the indispensable concept of collect ive security .Progress in th is matter ha s been considerable , and I am convinced tha tfur ther progress wil l continue to be made . 1I

* * *12. President Eis enhower ' s News Conference Ma 12 154 PublicPapers of the Presidents, 195 ,p . 73 :

* * -II""Q. George Herman, CBS Radio : V President, since we seem to begoing in to the pas t , a fe ...1 \-reeks ago yo u told us of your theory of

dominoes about Indochina , the neck of the bo t t le --liTHE PRESIDEHT . Yes .

'q. Mr . Herman : Since the f a l l of Dien Bien Phu , there has been acertain runount of ta lk of doing without Indochina. Hould you t e l l usyour administration ' s pos i t ion; is it s t i l l indispensable to the defenseof southeast Asia?

liTHE PRESIDEnT . Again I forget ""'he ther i t was before th i s body Italked about the cork an d the bot t le . Well , it i s very important , andt he great idea of se t t ing up an organism is so as to defeat the dominoresul t . Hhen, each standing alone, on e fa l l s , it has the ef fect on thenext , and f ina l ly the whole row i s down . yo u are t rying, through aunifying influence, to build tha t row of dominoes so they can stand thef a l l of one , i f necessary .

IINow , "so far as I am concerned, I don ' t think the free world oughtt o write off Indochina . I think we ought to a l l look a t this thing withsome optimism and some determination . I repeat tha t long faces anddefeatism don ' t win bat t les . "* * *

13 . Address by the Secretary of State, June 11, 1954 , (Excerpt) TheThreat of Direct Chinese Comnunist Intervention in Indochina ,Department of State Bullet in , June 28 , 1954 , p . 971 :"At" the moment, I ndochina is t he area where interne.tional communismnost vigorously seeks expansion under the leadership of Ho Chi l4inh .Last year Pl'esidE':l.t Eisenhov:er , in his great ' Chance for Peace ' addres-i ,said tha t ' aggression i n Korea and Southeast Asia are threats to the

\-Thole free COlr.!!l\l!lity to be met by \l!lited action . ' Bu t the French we r et hen opposed to il'hat they called I internationalizing ' the, .rar . Theypreferred to t r ea t it as a c iv i l war of rebel l ion . HOl-/eyer , on July 3 ,1953 , the French" Government mede a public declaration of independencefor the three Associated States , and in September it adopted the so - calledB-18


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plan , whichThe United contemplated a rapid buildup of national nativeStates then agreed to underwrite the costs of this

"But last winter the fighting ... as intensified and the long strainbegan to t e l l in terms of the attitude of the French people toward awar then in i ts eighth year . Last J.1arch, after the siege of Dien-BienPhu had begun, I rene,Jed President Eisenho,,:er ' s proposal that ...e seekconditions which would permit a united defense for the area . I went toEurope on this mission , and i t seemed that there was agreement on ourproposal . But when we moved to translate that proposal into reali ty,some of the parties held back because they had concluded that any stepsto create a united defense should await the resul ts of the Geneva Conference."Meanwhile , the burdens of a collective defense in Indochina have

mounted . The Communists have practiced dilatory negotiating at Geneva ,while intensifying their fighting in Indochina . Th e French and nationalforces feel th e strain of mounting enemy power on thei r front and ofpoli t ical uncertainty at thei r r ear . I told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last 'I1eek that the situation is grave but by no meanshopeless . The future depends largely on decisions awaited a t Paris,London, and Geneva ."The situation in Indochina is no t that of open military aggressionby th e Chinese Communist regime. Thus, in Indochina, the problem isone of restorin g tranquilli ty in an area where disturbances are fomentedfram Communist China, but where there is no open in vasion by CommunistChina . This task of pacifica.tion, in our opinion, cannot be successful ly

met merely by unilateral armed intervention . Some other conditions needto be established . Throughout these Indochina developments , the UnitedStates has held to a stable and consistent course and has made clear th econdition s which , in i ts opinion , might justify intervention . Theseconditions were and are (1) an invitation from the present lawfulauthorities ; (2 ) clear assurance of complete independence to Laos , Cambodia , and Viet -Nam; (3) evidence of concern by the United Natiorls ;(4) a joining in the collective effort of some of th e other nations ofth e area; and (5) assurance that France will no t i t sel f ...rithdra\1 f r omt he batt le unt i l i t is vron .IIOnly i f these conditions were realized could the President and theCongress be justif ied in asking the American peopl e to make the sacri

f i ces incident to comnitting our Nation , wit h others , to using force t ohelp to restore peace in the area .IIAnother problem night, however, arise . I f the Chinese Communistr egime ,,,ere to show in Indochina or else .. here that i t is determined to

pursue the path of overt military aggression , then the situation ".auldbe different and another i ssue would emerge . That contingency hasalready been referred to publicly by the President and myself . The

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President, in his April 16 , 1953, address, and I myself, in en addressof September 2, 1953, made clear that the United states .,ould take agrave vie'y of any future overt military Chinese Communist aggression inrelation to th e Pacific or Southeast Asia area . Such an aggressionwould threaten i s l a ~ d and peninsular positions which secure th e UnitedStates and i ts aJlies .

"I f such overt military aggression occurred, that would be adeliberate threat to th e United States i t se l f . The United States wouldof course invoke the processes of th e United Nations and consult withi ts all ies . But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for deci sions closely touching our own security and self-defense .

"There are some, particularly abroad, who seem to assume that th eattitude of the United States flm'fs from a desire fo r a general warwith Com."D.unist China. That is clearly false . I f ,",'e had wanted such awar, i t could easily have been based on the presence of Chinese aggressors in Korea . But last July, in spite of difficult ies '.yhich at timesseemed insuperable, lye concluded a Korean 8.l'1ll.istice ''lith COlllI!lunistChina. Hmr could i t be more surely demonstrated that we have both th e'""ill to make peace and the competence to make peace?

"Your Government ,rants peace, and the American people want peace .But should there ever be openly launched an attack that th e Americanpeople uould clearly recognize as a threat to our own security, thenthe right of self-preservation would demand that we -- regardless of anyother c o u n t ~ y -- meet the issue squarely ."I t is the task of statesmanship to seek peace and deter war, ....rhileat th e same time praserving vi ta l national interests. Under presentconditions that dual resul t is not easy to achieve, and i t cannot beachieved at a ll unless your Government is backed by a people who are

....rill ing, i f need be, to sacrifice to preserve their v i a l interests .ItA t the Geneva Conference I said : 'Peace is always easy to achieveby surrender . ' Your Government does not propose to buy peace at thatprice . We do no t believe that the A m e r c a ~ people want peace at thatprice . So long as that is our national '\'rill, and so long as that willbe backed by a capacity for effective action , our Nation c ~ ~ face thefuture with that calm confidence which is the due of those who , in atroubled .:orld , hold fast that which is good . If

14 . President Eisenho.rer ' s News Conference, July 21 , 1954, PublicPapers of t r ~ Presidents, 1954, p . 642 :* * *

rtffieadini / I am glad, of course, that agreement has been reachedat Geneva to stop th e bloodshed in Indochina. The United States has not

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been a bel l igerent in the war in which thousands of brave men, "rhiledefending freedom, heve died during the pest 1 years .

"The primary respon s ib i l i ty for the settlement in Indochina restedwi th those nations \lhich part icipated in the fight ing ."Our role at Geneva has been at a l l t imes to t ry to be helpful

where desired, and to aid France and Cambodia , Laos and Viet -Nan , toobtain a ju s t and honorable settlement which wil l take into account theneeds of the interested people .

"Accordingly, the United States has not i t s e l f been a party to orbound by the decisions taken by the conference, but i t is our hope tha ti t wil l lead to the establishment of peace consistent wi th the r ightsand needs of the countries concerned . The agreement contains featureswhich we do not l ike , but a great de al depends on how t hey work inpract ice .

"The United States i s issuing a t Geneva a statement to the effec tt hat it is not prepared to join in the conference declarat ion but , asl oyal members of the United Nations, we also sa y tha t in compli ancewith the obligations an d principles contained in ar t ic le I I of theUnited Nations Charter , the United Sta tes wil l not use force to disturbt he settlement . We also sa y tha t an y reneual o f Communist aggressionwould be vie'' 'ed by us as a matter of grave concern .

"As evidence of our resolve to ass i s t Cambodia and Laos to play .the i r parts in fu l l independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of free nations, ".e are reques t ing the agreement of the govern=nentsof Cambodia and Laos to our appointment of an ambassador or minister tobe r esident a t the i r respective capitals . We already have a Chief ofJ.1issian a t Saigon , the capi ta l of Viet-Nan , an d this embassy wil l , ofcourse , be maintained .

"The United States is act ively pursuing discussions wit h other f r eenat ions "with a view to the rapid organization of a coll ect i ve defensein southeast Asia in order to prevent fur ther direc t or indirect Com munist aggression in tha t general area . ff ind s readin i /"

* * *" Q. Mrs . May Craig , Maine Papers : J.lr . President , President Rheeof Korea wil l be here soon . Do you regard the par t i t ion of Korea as

permanent, short of war, an d are you including, planning to i nclude ,Kor ea and Free C'1ina in any kind of a southeast As i a pact?"THE PRESIDENT . Well, of course , Korea is not in southeast Asia ."Already we have , you kno"" a t rea ty of mutual defense wi th Korea .I t has been enacted , it has been approved , by the Senate .

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"NO\OT , as I Wlderstand i t , when the Korean war started , the purposethe United Nations was to prevent any advance by ~ o r c e into SouthKorea; they did do that.

"I know of no one that has ever proposed that we go to war to ~ r e e Ndrth Korea .

liAs i t is , i t is 'an u n s a t i s ~ a c t o r y situation , exactly as exists inGe rmany, and now apparently is going to exis t in part of I ndochina ."These are very Wlsatisfactory si tuations and , to my mind , willalways give reason ~ o r aggravating situations that ar e d i ~ ~ i c u l t atbest . But there is no thought on th e part of any us to start anaggressive move ~ o r the freeing of that country ."

* * *"I have never fe l t that , except through these satel l i te excurs ions ,that the COI:ll1lunist "..arld wants any \far at this time ; in other words , Idon ' t believe they ~ o u l d deliberately challenge us , challenge the freeworld , to a war of exhaustion ."So the problem, no rl.atter whether you happen to be ~ i g h t i n g inone of these areas , remains the same . The loss of great areas throughpropaganda and deceit and subversion and coup d ' eta t , and every meansavailable to a secret , well - financed conspiracy , they are a ll there .I personally think that i f there is one good that can come out of th isv,'hole southeast Asian experience , i t is th is : to get the ~ r e e world tolooking ~ a c t s in the face , and to seeing what we must do , what we should

do, what sacrifices we are ready to make, in or der to preserve thee s s e i a l s ou r system ."I think that when the freedom of a man in Viet -Nam or in China

is taken away from him, I think our freedom has lost a l i t t l e . I justdon ' t believe that we can continue to exist in the world, geographicallyisolated as we are , we just don ' t ~ i n d a concerted, positive plan ofkeeping these free nat i ons so t ightly bound together that none of themwill give up; and if they are not ,reakened internally by these othermethods, I just don ' t believe they will give up . I believe can holdthem ."Q . Robert E. Clark, International News Service'; r,ir . President,

along that l ine, a number of Congressmen to day ar e branding the Genevasettlement as appeasement . Do you think there are any elements ofappeasement in the cease- fire agreement ?"THE PRESIDENT . Well, I hesitate, Nr . Clark, to use such ."ords , asI have told you so often . I find that so many v,"ords mean so many differentthings to different people . I would say th is , as I said in my statement :th is agreement , in certain of i t s features , is not satisfactory to us .

I t is not "'hat we ....ould have liked to have had

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"But I don ' t knov, when I em put up against i t at this moment , tofind an alternative, to say "hat "Ie would or could do . Then i f I haveno better plan, I em no t going to cr i t ic ize what they have done ."

15* * *

Final Declaration of Geneva Conference, July 21 , 1954, Ic/43 Rev . 2 ,July 21, 1954, Qpiginal : French:"Final declaration, dated July 21, 1954, of the Geneva Conferenceon the problem of restoring peace in Indo -China, in "'hich tbe repre sentatives of Cambodia , th e Democratic Republic of Viet -Nam, France,Laos, the People ' s Republic of China, the state of Viet -Nam , the Unionof Soviet Social ist Republics, th e United Kingdom, and the Unitedstates of America took part ."1. The Conference ta.ltes note of the agreements ending host i l i t iesin Cambodia, Laos and Viet -Nam and organizing internat ional control andthe supervision of th e execution of the provisions of these agreements ."2 . The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hos

t i l i t i es in Cambodia, Laos and Viet -Na"ll ; the Conference expresses i t sconviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the presentdeclaration and in the agreements on tb e cessation of host i l i t ies willpe-rmit Cambodia; Laos and Viet-Nan henceforth to play their paxt , inf u l l independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations .

"3 . The Conference taltes note of the declarations made by theGovernments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measurespermitting a ll citizens to take thei r place in the national community ,in part icular by participating in the next general elections , "'bich , inconformity with the constitution of each of these countries , shall takeplace in the course of the year 1955 , by secret ballot and in conditionsof respect for fundamental freedoms .

"4 . The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement onthe cessation of hosti l i t ies in Viet -Nam prohibiting th e introductioninto Viet-Nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as ofa l l kinds of arms and munitions . The Conference also takes note of t hedeclarations made by the Governments of Cembodia and Laos of theirre solution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material , inpersonnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effectivedefence of their terri tory and, in the case of Laos , to th e extentde fined by the agreements on the cessation of hosti l i t ies in Laos .

"5 . The Conference te..l(;es note of the clauses in the agreement onthe cessation of hosti l i t ies in Viet-rram to the effect that no militarybase under the control of a foreign State may be established in ther egrouping zones of th e tuo parties, th e lat ter baving the obligationto see that th e zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of

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any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption ofhosti l i t ies or i n the service of an aggressive policy . The Conferencealso t a ~ e s note of th e declarations of the Governments of Cambodia andLaos to the effect that they wil l not join in any agreement with otherStates i f this agreement includes the obligation to participate in amilitary alliance not in conformity "rith the p-inciples of the Charterof the United Nations or, in the ca.se of Leos, ""ith the principles of'the agreement on th e eessation of hosti l i t ies in Laos or, so long astheir security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases onCambodian or Laotian terri tory for the military forces of foreignPowers ."6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of th eagreement relating to Viet -Nam is to sett le military questions with aview to ending hosti l i t ies and that the military demarcation l ine isprovisional and should not in any 'Nay be interpreted as const! uting a

polit ical or te r r i tor ia l boundary . The Conference expresses i t s con viction that th e execution of th e provisions set out in the presentdeclaration and in the agreement on the cessation of host i l i t ies createsth e necessary basis for th e achievement in th e near "fUture of a polit icalsettlement in Viet -Nan ."7 . The Conference declares that , so far as Viet -Nam is concerned,the settlement of pol i t ical problems , effected on the basis of respectfor the principles of independence, unity and t er r i tor ia l integrity , shallpermit the Viet -Namese people to enjoy th e fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free generalelections by secret ballot . In order to ensure tbat sufficient progressin the restoration of peace has been made, and that a l l the necessary

conditions obtain for fre e expression of the national will , generalelections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an inter national commission composed of representatives of the 14er:lber States ofth e International Supervisory COmI!lission , referred to in the agreementon th e cessation of host i l i t ies . Consultations v i l l be held on thissubject between the conpetent representative authorit ies of the t wozones from 20 July 1955 om-Tards . ."8 . The provisions of the agreements on the cessat ion of host i l i t iesintended to ensure th e protection of individuals and of property must bemost s t r ictly applied and must , in particular, allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to l ive .11 9 . The competent represent ative authorities of the Northern and

Southern zones of Viet -Nam-, as well as th e authorities of Laos andCambodia , ~ u s t n)t permit any individual or c ~ l l e c t i v e reprisalsa.gains t persons ~ . . t h o have collaborated in any way ',rith one of th e partiesdwing the ; iar , or against members of such persons ' families ."10 . The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Governmentof the French .Republic to the effect that i t is ready to ...:ithdrb.w i t stroops f r om the terri tory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet -Nam . at the request

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of th e governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixedby agreement between th e parties except in the cases where , by agree ment between the t\\o parties, a certain number of French troops shallremain at specified points and for a specified time .

"11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the FrenchGovernment to the effect that for the settlement of a l l the problemsconnected with th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, th e French Government "\lill proceed from theprinciple of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity andterr i toria l integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.

"12 . In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet -Nam, eachmember of th e Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty ,the independence, the unity and the terr i tor ial integrity of the abovementioned states , and to refrain from any interference in their internalaffairs .

"13 . The members of the Conference agree to consult one another onany question which may be referred to them by the Internat ional Supervis ory Commission in order to study such measures as may prove necessaryto ensure that th e agreements on the cessation of host i l i t ies in Cam-bodia , Laos and Viet -Nero are respected . "16 . Direct Aid to the Associated states : C o m m R ~ i q u e Regarding FrancoAmerican Conversations, September 29, 1954, Department of StateBulletin, October 11 , 1954, p . 534 :

"Representatives of the two Governments have had very frank anduseful taLlts ""hich have shown the community of thei r vie,!,s , and arein f u l l agreement on th e objectives to be attained ."The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treatyin Manila on September 8, 1954 , has provided a firmer basis th8n hereto fore to assist th e free nations of Asia in developing and maintainingt heir independence and security . The representatives of France and theUnited states wish to reaffirm the support of their Governments fo r theprinciples of sel f -government , independence) justice and l iberty pro claimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on September 8, 1954 .liThe representatives of France and the United states reaffirm theintent ion of their governments to support the complete independence

of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet -Nam . Both France and the United Stateswill continue to assist Cambodia, Laos , and Vjet -Nam in their effortsto safeguard their freedom and independence and to advance the welfareof tbeir peoples . In this sp i r i t France and the United States areassisting" the Government of Viet -Nero in the r esett lecent of the Viet namese who have of tbeir own free ..,-'ill moved to free Viet -Nam and 1


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"In order to contribute to the security of the area pending thefurther development of national forces for th is purpose, th e representa t ives of France indicated that France is prepared to retain forces ofi ts Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with the government c o n c e r n ~ d , within th e limits permitted under the Gen eva agreements and to an extentto be determined . The United States will consider the question offinancial assistance for the Expeditionary Corps in these circumstancesin addition to support fo r the forces of each of the three AssociatedStates . These questions vitally affect each of the three Associatedstates and ar e being fully discussed wi th them.

"The channel fo r French and United States economic aid , budgetarysupport, and other assistance to each of the Associated States will bedirect to that state . The United States representatives will begindiscussions soon with the respective governments of the AssociatedStates r egarding direct aid . The methods for efficient coordinationof lTench and United States aid programs to each of the three AssociatedStates are under consideration and will be developed in discussions witheach of these states .

"After th e bila tera l taL';,;.s, the chiefs of diplomatic missions inWashington of Cambodia, Laos and Viet Nam were invited to a finalmeeting to have an exchange of views and information on these matters .The representatives of a l l five countries are in complete agreement onthe objectives of peace and freedom to be achieved in Indochina . "

17 . Aid to th e State of Viet -Ne.m.: t-lessage from the President of theUnited States to the President of th e Council of Ministers ofViet-Nam, October 23, 1954 , Department of State Bulletin,November 15, 1954, pp . 735 -736:"Dear loU- . President : I have been follmdng with great interestth e course of developments in Viet -Nam , particularly since the conclusion of th e conference at Geneva . The implications of th e agreementconcerning Viet-Nero have caused grave concern regarding the future of acountry temporarily divided by an ar t i f ic ia l military grouping , weakenedby a long and exhausting 'liar and faced with enemies without and by their

subversive collaborators within ."Your recent requests for aid to assist in the fonnidable projectof th e movement of several hundred thousand loyal Vietnamese cit izensaway from. areas ""hieh are passing under a de facto rule and pol i t ical

ideology which they abhor , are being fulfi l led . I am glad that theUnited states is able to assist in this ~ u r n a n i ~ a r i a n effort ."\fe have been exploring ways ao.d means to permit ou r aid to Viet Nan to be more effective and to make a greater contribution to th ewelfare and s tab i l i ty of the Governmen t of Viet -Nam . I am , accordingly,instructing the American Ambassador to Viet-N2lll to examine with you inyour ca?8.city as Chief of G o v e r ~ ~ e n t how an intelligent program of

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American aid given directly to your Government can serve to assistViet -Nero in i ts present hour of t r i a l , provided that your Governmentis prepared to give assurances as to the standards of perfonmance i twould be able to meintain in th e event such aid were supplied .

liThe purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet -Neroin developing and maintaining a strong, viable state , capable of resist-ing attempted subversion or aggression thrqugh military means. 11* * *

18 . Address by President EisenhovTer before th e American Societ ofNe\fS aner Editors Anril 21 1 Public Fe ers of the Presidents195 ,p . 17 and p . 23 :* * *

"The ideas of freedom are at work , even where they are Officiallyrejected . As we know , Lenin and his successors, true to Communistdoctrine, based t he Soyiet State on the denial of these ideas . Yet thenew Soviet rulers who took over three years ago have had to reckon withthe force of these ideas, both at home and abroad .liThe situation th e new regime inherited from the dead Stal inapparently caused i t to reappraise many of his mistakes ."Having lived under his one-man rule, they have espoused the con cept of ' collective ' dictatorship . But dictatorship i t s t i l l remains .They have denounced Stalin fo r some of the more flagrant excesses ofhi s brutal rule. But the individual citizen s t i l l lacks the mostelementary safeguards of a free society . The desire for a better l i feis s t i l l being sacrificed to the insatiable demands of the state ."In foreign affairs , the new regime has seemingly moderated thepolicy of violence and hosti l i ty which has caused the ~ r e e nations toband together to d e ~ e n d their independence and l iber t ies . For thepresent, at least , i t re l ies more on pol i t ical and economic means tospread i ts influence abroad . I n the las t year , i t has embarked upon acampaign of lending and trade agreements directed especially t o ~ a r d the netdy-developing cotultries."It is s t i l l to o early to assess in any final way yfhether th eSoviet r egime wishes to provide a real basis for stable and enduring

re lations . ..* * *

"For example, why was there such a sudden change in th e Sovietpolicy? Their basic aim is to conquer the world , through' world revolution i f possible , but in any '.jay. Anyone that has read any of theirbooks knows that their doctrine is l ies, deceit , subversion, war i fnecessary, but in any Hay : c o n q u ~ r the world . And that has no t changed .

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"But they changed their policies ver"J markedly . They were depending on force and the threat of force only. And suddenly they have goneinto an entirely different atti tude . They are going into the economicend poli t ica l ' f ie lds a.'1d ar e really wearing smiles around the ... or;tdinstead of some of the bit ter faces to which we have become accustomed ."Now any time a policy is winning end th e people are conpletelysatisfied with i t , you don ' t change . You change policies that markedly ,you destroy old idols as they have been busy dOing, only ,,,hen you thinka great c h a ~ g e is necessary . So I think we can take some comfort ; atleast we can give careful consideration to th e very fact they had tochange their policies ."And I think the whole free world is trying to tes t and determinethe sincerity of that plan, in order that the free nations themselves ,i n pursuing their own policies, will make certain that they ar e not

surprised in eny place ."We look at some of' the advances we think they have made, but le tus remember : they did not conquer Korea, which they announced they weregoing to do . They were stopped finally in the northern part of Vietnam ;and Diem, the le ader of the Southern Vietnamese , is dOing splendidlyand a much better figure in that field than anyone even dared to hope ."The I ranian situation which only a few short years ago lookedso desperate that each morning we thought we would wake up and read inou r newspapers that l!ossadegh had le t them under th e Iron Curtain, hasnot become satisfactory 1 but that crisis has passed and i t is muchbetter."

* * *19 . United states Polic with Res ect to Viet-Nam : Address b theAssistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Aff'airs th is addressby Assi stant Secretary of State Robertson restated Acerican policyand was delivered at a time of relative stabi l i ty in South Vie t -Nam) ,Weshin on June 1 1956 Department of State Bulletin, June 11195 , pp . 972 -97 :

"This past March, I had the pleasure of accompanying t he Secretaryof State on his visi t to Saigon ' ....here we conversed with President Diemon th e present and .future problems of Viet -Nam . I ",jas struck, as so manyother recent observers have been , at the progress Free Viet -Nam has madein a fe''/' short months to\.lard stabi l i ty, security, and strength . PresidentDiem seeoed to r rflec t th is progress in ~ i s o w ~ person . On the occasionof' our earlier visi t some 15 oonths ago , he seemed tense and gravely con ce rned about the problems facing Viet -Nam . This time he was reposed,poised, and appeared confident of the .future of his country .

"Among the factors that explain the remarkable .r ise of Free VietNem from th e shambles created by 8 years of murderous civi l and inter national war , the division of the country at Geneva and th e continuing

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menace of predatory communism, there is in the f i rs t place the dedicat i on, courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself . I n him ,his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotionto his country ' s welfare have become generally recognized aDong hispeople . Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure , andt he entire free ,,;orld has become the richer fo r his example of determinat ion and moral fortitude . There is no more dramatic exacple of thisfortitude tban P r e s i d ~ n t Diem ' s decisions during the tense and vi ta l daysof the battle against th e parasit ic poli t ico - religious sects in th e c ityof Saigon in the spring of 1955 . These decisions were to resist tb emultiple pressures to compromise that were building up around him, andto struggle to th e victorious end fo r the sake of a j ust cause . Thefree world o"/es him a debt of gra.titude fo r his determined stand at thatfat eful hour .

trConsider Vie t -Nero at three stages in i ts r ecent history :"Firs t , in mid-1954, par t i t i oned by f ia t of th e great powers againstth e will of the Vietnamese people , devoid of governmental machinery ormilitary strength , drifting without leadership end without hope in thebackwash of the defeat administered by th e combined "eight of Commun i s t impressed i nfantry al1.d of Chinese and Russian arms ."Secondly, in early 1955, faced with the military and subversivethreat of the Communists north of the 17th paral le l , confronted wi thi nternal st r i f e , i ts government challenged by the armed , sel f - seekingpoli tico - re l igious sects , i ts anmy barely reformed and of uncertainl oyalty, assailed from within by the most diff icul t problems , includingthat of having to absorb the sudden influx of three - quarters of a million refugees who would rather leave their ancestral lands and homest han suffer l ife under Communist tyranny :"And finally Vie t -Nam today , in mid-1956, progressing rapidly tot he establishment of democratic institutions by elective processes , i t speople resuming peaceful pursuits , i ts army growing in effectiveness ,sense of mis s io n , and morale , the puppet Vietnamese pol i t icians dis cr edited , th e refugees we l l on the vlay to permanent resettlement , thecountryside generally orderly and calm , the predatory sects eliminatedand their venal leaders exiled or destroyed .t1Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to the new st ate of af f airs inViet -Nam could be cited than the voi ce of the peopl e t hemselves asexpressed in their free election of las t t-farch . At that time th e las t

possible q u e s t i o ~ as to t he fee l in g of th e people was erased by an overwhelming m a j o r i for President Diem ' s leadership . The fact that th eViet Minh , ..as uneble to carry out i ts open t hreats to sabotage t hes eelections is impressive evidence of the s tabi l i ty and prestige of t hegovernment ."The Un i ted States is proud to be on the side of the effort of th eVietnamese people under President Diem to establ ish f r eedom, peace , and

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the good l ife . The United States wishes to continue to assist and tobe a loyal and trusted friend of Viet-Nero."Our policies in Viet-r;am may be simply stated as follows :"To support a friendly Don-Com.unist government in Viet-Nam and tohelp i t diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion andinfluence.liTo help the Government of Vie t -Ne.m establish th e forces neces sary for internal security ."To encourage support fo r Free Viet -Nam by the non-Communist world .liTo aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country andpeople ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civi l and internat ional "'lar .IIOur efforts are directed f i r s t of aJ.l toward helping to sustainthe internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about150,000 men, a mobile civi l guard of some 45,000, and local defenseunits which are being formed to give protection against subversion onthe vil lage level . We are providing budgetary support and equipment forthese forces and have a mission assistin g the training of th e army . Weare also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese policeforce . The refugees ...rho have fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the VietMinh are being resett led on productive lands with the assistance of fundsmade available by our aid program. In various ways ou r aid program alsoprovides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthenthe economy and provide a better future for th e comnon people of tne

country . The Vietnamese are increasingly giving attention to the basicdevelopment of the Vietnamese economy and to projects that may contribute directly to that goal . We give our aid and counsel to this programonly as freely invited .III do not wish to minimize the magnitude of th e task that s t i l lremains and of the problems that s t i l l confront this s t a 1 L ~ c h and valiantmember of the free world fighting for i ts independence on the thresholdof th e Communist heartland of Asia ."The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet -Nam .With monstrous effrontery , th e Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuseFree Viet-Nem and i ts friends of violating the armistice provisions ",.hlchthe Vietnamese ~ ~ d their friends, including ourselves , have scrupulouslyrespected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselvessigned the Genev. Accords while they, t h ~ Comnl'mists who have solemnlyundertaken to be bound by these provisions , have violated them in themost blatant fashion .liThe facts are that while on the one hand the nil i tary potentie.lof Free Viet -Nem has been drastically reduced by the '....tthdra..ra l ofnearly 200,000 members of th e French E A ~ e d i t i o n a r y Corps and by thereduction of th e Vietnamese Army by more than 50 ,000 from the time ofthe armistice to the uresent as ..;el l as by the outshipment from Viet -Nam. -

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since the cessetion of host i l i t ies of over $200 million worth of warequipment, we have on the other hand reports of steady constant growthof tbe wanmaking potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel

. "Our reports reveal that in complete disregard of i ts obligations,the Viet J>1inb have imported voluminous quantities of arms across theSino- Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of ChineseCommunist ~ i l i t a r y personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads , toestablish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to thegrowth of the military potential of th e zone under Communist occupation ."As so eloquently stated by tbe British Government in a diplomaticnote released to the press end sent to f40scow in April of th is year ,and I quote :

'The Viet Minh army bas been so greatly strengthened by th ee m b o d i u ~ n t and re - equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7Viet Minh divisions in existence in Ju ly 1954 there ere no ... no less than20 . This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the '-North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in tbe Southspeaks for i tself . I

"By l ies , propaganda, force, and deceit, th e Communists in Hanoi\{ould undermine Free Viet-rTam, whose fa l l they have been unable to secureby their maneuverings on the diplomatic front . These people, whose crimesagainst suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lt .Dooley wbo addressed you th is morning, have sold their country to Feiping .They have sbamelessly f

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