Perikles a rational politician · 2014-04-30 · involved in the analysis of the ancient society.1...

2014-04-30 Lyttkens and Gerding

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Perikles – a rational politician

CH Lyttkens*, H Gerding**

4th draft, May 2014

*Department of Economics, Lund University, Sweden

**Classical Archaeology and Ancient history, Lund University, Sweden

Work in progress – please do not quote without permission


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1. Introduction

Perikles is usually presented as a great statesman and an astute politician, for many years the

undisputed leader of the Athenians, and the initiator of the great building projects on the

acropolis that we still admire today. We suggest that he probably was even more astute than

modern scholarship traditionally gives him credit for. This exploration concomitantly

demonstrates the potential usefulness of an economic approach to the ancient material.

To begin with the methodological aspect, economists have in recent years increasingly been

involved in the analysis of the ancient society.1 This has brought rational-actor models to the

forefront of the scientific debate regarding the nature of the economy in the ancient world. For a

long while, the position of Finley (1999 [1973]) dominated the scene, namely that economic

theory was of no use for the study of the ancient world. Finley’s argumentation have however

increasingly been questioned2 and several scholars from the humanities now argue for the

potential usefulness of an economic approach.3

Possibly the most important characteristic of an economic approach is the focus on individual

incentives. If an economist sees a change in behaviour, she immediately asks herself how and if

incentives have changed at the individual level. Conversely, if the economist sees incentives

changing, she is on the lookout for reactions from individual decision makers. The following

discussion demonstrates two concrete ways in which an economic rational actor perspective can

add to our understanding of antiquity. So while this paper ostensibly is focussed on improving

our understanding of the activities of Perikles around 450 BCE, the methodological

considerations represent a separate (and possibly more important) contribution.

1 Amemiya (2007), Bitros and Karayiannis (2008), Fleck and Hanssen (2006), Halkos and Kyriazis (2010), Kaiser (2007), Kyriazis and Metaxas (2010), Kyriazis and Metaxas (2013), Kyriazsis and Economou (2013), Lyttkens (2006), Lyttkens (2010), Lyttkens (2013), Pitsoulis (2011), Tridimas (2011), to name a few dealing with ancient Greece. 2 Burke, Davies, Loomis etc. The central argument of Finley was that economic relationships were embedded in social ones and therefore played no separate role. This seems to both underestimate the presence of market relationships in antiquity and to overestimate the rationality of the modern world. Cf., e.g. Lyttkens (2013), pp xx. 3 The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World (Scheidel, Morris, and Saller, 2007) and L’économie de la Grèce

des cités by Alain Bresson (2007, Ch. 1). Morris and Manning (2005).


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According to Aristotle (The Athenian Constitution, 27.2), Perikles introduced public pay for jurors in

order to be able to compete with his main rival Kimon in popularity.4 This is the only major

decision by Perikles that (almost) invariably is seen as a stratagem in the internal competition for

power. However, we believe at least two additional policy measures associated with Perikles

should be seen in the light of the intra-Athenian competition for power: the law on citizenship

and the great building projects on the Acropolis.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: first we provide the historical background that

leads up to the days of Perikles, followed be a more detailed presentation of the segment of

Athenian history that we are particularly interested in. These are the years that witnessed Perikles

appear on the political scene and become the leader of the Athenians. We will subsequently

discuss his actions in the crucial years around 450 BCE.

2. Background: The emergence of democratic institutions in Athens

In 510 BE, the rule of the Peisistratid family ended in Athens with the expulsion of Hippias,

Peisistratos surviving son (his brother had been assassinated a few years previously). In the

aristocratic struggle that followed, Kleisthenes of the Alcmaionid family was victorious, but only

after having turned to the common people for support. Kleisthenes reformed the constitution

and many argue that these reforms represented the birth of Athenian democracy.5 However, it is

difficult to see anything necessarily democratic in these reforms.6

Whatever significance one attributes to Kleisthenes’ reforms as such, they had at least two

important effects, the reorganization of Attica into demes most probably weakened the position

of the traditional aristocratic families by reducing the influence of old cultic centres.7 Secondly,

the actions of Kleisthenes established a new way for the traditional elite to beat their rivals –

appeals to the common people. This set off a process where aristocratic leaders proposed

democratising reforms (to gain popular support) and thereby ironically over time reduced the

number of institutions that the aristocracy could control directly (Ober, 1989; Lyttkens 2013).

4 ”Pericles first made service in the jury-courts a paid office, as a popular counter-measure against Cimon’s wealth […] Cimon had an estate large enough for a tyrant […] supplied maintenance to a number of the members of his deme […] as Pericles’ mean were insufficient for this lavishness, he […] instituted payment for the jury-courts” (Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 27.2-4). 5 Ref xx 6 Kleisthenes did not, for example, reduce the power of the council of the Areopagos, the most important institution of aristocratic power, nor did he open up offices to the poor. 7 Whether Kleisthenes intentionally manipulated the deme-organisation to further the interest of his family (the Alkmaionids) is disputed, and it will remain so as it seems impossible to determine which of the irregularities in the system actually go back to Kleisthenes’ time (refxx).


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The democratization process was probably significantly strengthened by the increasing military

importance of the common people. The well-to-do farmers had been important since the

development of hoplite warfare in the 7th century, and they had saved the Athenians at Marathon

in 490. The landless thetes (the lowest of four property classes) were increasingly becoming

politically important with the growing importance of the Athenian fleet, demonstrated at Salamis

in 480 BCE and repeatedly thereafter.8

By the end of the fifth century, Athens was a direct (male) democracy. All major decisions were

taken in the Assembly where all citizens could attend, vote and speak. Issues for the assembly

were prepared by the council, where members were appointed by lot. Other magistrates were also

chosen by lot, as were the jurors in the poplar courts. Magistrates and jurors were paid so that

also the poor could serve. The top magistracies were theoretically closed to the lowest property

class, but that rule probably ceased to function already in the fifth century. An exception to the

general rule of appointing officials by lot was the generals (strategoi) who were elected. According

to Plutarch (xx), for example, Perikles was elected general each year for more than 10 years as we

approach the Peloponnesian war, which provided him with a political platform.

We will now take a closer look at some of the democratising measures and the context of the

decision making process.

3. Athenian politics 465-4459

In the mid-460s we find in Athens two major factions – one associated with Kimon, son of

Miltiades, the organiser of the Athenian victory at Marathon, and the other associated with

Ephialtes and his younger colleague Perikles. Of these, Ephialtes and Perikles are usually seen as

the ones mostly basing their support on the common people. That political competition had been

fierce for some time is amply illustrated by the fate of some Athenian leaders in the preceding

decades. Miltiades – the hero of Marathon – was fined 50 talents in a political trial, while Perikles

father Xanthippos was ostracized in 484, and so was the famous Themistocles (the hero of

Salamis) in the end of the 470s. Ostracism entailed a ten-year exile, but without loss of property.

8 This shift in military power is often seen as crucial for the development of democracy Kallet (2000), Osborne (Kyriadzis, Raflaaubxx). Kallet (2000) argues that a general principle in ancient Greece was that those who contributed militarily to the polis should have political rights. 9 This is an attempt to give a conventional account that ignores many details and corresponding controversies.


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Around 465, Kimon was on top of things. Not only had he led the Athenian forces to several

important victories, the most important being the battle at the river Eurymedon against the

Persians, he was also able to persuade the Athenians to send help to Sparta in 462 when they

faced a revolt by the helots at mount Ithome, despite the fact that the Spartans had recently tried

to help Thasos against Athens. Kimon was also able to fight off a charge of bribery brought by

Perikles at this time. The Spartans however declined the help of the Athenians and Kimon

returned to Athens.

During Kimon’s absence, Ephialtes managed to deprive the aristocratic council of the Areopagos

of most of its powers. This council (the Areopagos for short) was traditionally a very strong force

in Athens, but not much is known in detail about its functions. Previously the Areopagos

probably and among other things had carried out the scrutiny of magistrates before they took

office and later the auditing of their time in office (Hansen, 1999). These tasks were transferred

to the council, the assembly and the courts, the latter being composed of more ordinary citizens.

The anti-Spartan faction had gained the upper hand, and when Kimon returned and tried to

reverse the policy, he was ostracized in 461. In 457, the archonship was opened to the third

property class (the zeugithai). About this time (early 450s) Ephialtes is murdered and Perikles

takes over as leader of this political faction.

The 450s saw Athens at war with Sparta and Corinth, and engaged in a conflict in Egypt. Not a

great success as things turned out. The expedition to Egypt cost the Athenians 250 ships. In the

late 450s, the Athenians began establishing cleruchies in defeated poleis), which naturally caused

some resentment.10 At this time, Kimon was back on the scene, either because his 10-year exile

had expired or because he was recalled early. Kimon was given command of an expedition to

Cyprus, as it seems very soon after his return. Under his command the Athenians were

victorious. Kimon however died in (perhaps) 450. The same year there is a truce with Sparta and

shortly thereafter, there is peace with the Persians (the so called peace of Kallias).11

In 451/0, Perikles suggests and carries a new law on citizenship, which restricts citizenship to

those who had both a father and a mother who were themselves citizens. This is one of the

relatively few happenings for which we have a specific date because Thukydides gives the name

of the eponymous archon.12 Perikles also introduced public pay for jurors. In 449, finally, Perikles

10 Hornblower p. 44 11 Though typically we do not know if it was a formal truce or just an informal end of hostilities Rhodes (2007), p. 27. The Athenians of the fourth century thought there was a truce, but we lack contemporary evidence, Kallet (2000), p. 180. 12 Thus we do not know for certain, for example, when Kimon died, when he was ostracised, when he returned to Athens, when Perikles introduced pay for jurors, etc.


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suggests in the Assembly that the temples on acropolis should be rebuilt, and so in 448 the

Athenians start building the Parthenon on the Acropolis. This means that they broke the oath

that they had sworn in 479 never to rebuild the temples destroyed by the Persians.13

4. A bleak future for Perikles around 450 BCE?

Being Perikles cannot have been easy in 451-450 BCE. If you are used to a rational actor

perspective as an analytical tool, there is one conclusion that strikes you in the development

described above. That is that Perikles seems to have been in serious trouble around 451/0. It is

important not to be misled by the very strong position of Perikles in the late 43014 and assume

that such was always the case. In the late 450s, the situation was arguably decidedly different.

Even after Kimon’s death, Perikles in all probability had to contend with powerful political

adversaries. As late as 443 BCE, the leader of the aristocratic faction (Kimon’s successor)

Thukydides son of Melesias (not the historian) was ostracised.15

What were Perikles problems in 451/0? Firstly, at this time, Kimon is back in town after his long

exile, having been recalled prematurely or simply because his 10-year exile had expired

(Hornblower, xx, p. 44). Secondly, the Athenian wars had not been going well lately: “About 454

the Egyptian campaign ended in disaster,”16 and ”this undertaking of the Hellenes came to

naught after a war of six years ; and but few out of many […] escaped with their lives.”17 Perikles

– as the leading politician – would probably have been held responsible for these bad outcomes

of Athenian policy.

Already these two aspects of the situation in Athens suggest that Perikles’ political position may

have been threatened by the political opposition. Thirdly, and to add insult to injury, not only was

Kimon back but he seems to have been popular, as he more or less immediately was given an

important military command on his return. Fourthly, Kimon was having great success with his

campaigns.

Modern writers dealing with these years in Athenian history obviously note that Kimon was back.

However, we have yet to find someone who notes the significant difference this would have

13 Thukydides xx 14 According to Plutarch, Perikles was elected general each of the last 15 years leading up to the Peloponnesian War. 15 This event probably marks the beginning of the period which saw Perikles without serious contenders for power in Athens. 16 Rhodes (2007), p. 26 17 Thukydides 1.110.1.


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made to Perikles’ decision environment, compared to the mid 450s. In other words, modern

accounts implicitly suggest that the return of Kimon was no big deal.

In contrast, we see an important qualitative change in Perikles’ position. He may very well have

faced a significant risk of losing his power over the Athenians to Kimon. Indeed it may have

seemed to him that it would soon be his turn to be ostracised. Consequently, if we assume that

Perikles wished to remain in power (to further his own interest or for some other reason), we

should expect that Perikles in this situation would everywhere to find ways to counter Kimon’s

influence. Any measure that strengthened Perikles’ position vis-à-vis Kimon would have received

serious attention. It is in this perspective – Perikles needing ways to beat Kimon – that we should

arguably see Perikles’ actions around 451/0.

This disparaging view of Perikles’ situation in 451 is conspicuously lacking in historical accounts.

The reason why it is a natural starting point for an economists is the focus on (changes in)

individual incentives which is an integral part of the economic approach to social changes.

Before we turn to Perikles’ actions we should consider also the implications of the peace of

Kallias. The end of hostilities with Persia and (the peace) would mean that a number of

Athenians (probably thousands) no longer received regular pay for military service. Both hoplites

and rowers in the fleet were paid one drachma per day when on campaign (Loomis (1998).

Following Ober (xx) and Scheidel (xx) this was 2.6 more than subsistence pay. While this must

have been welcome for the hoplites, it was not necessary for their survival, as the hoplites

typically were recruited among the relatively well-off farmers.

The rowers in the fleet were a different lot, largely made of the landless thetes, who had to rely

on temporary employment and similar measures for their survival. The fleet would have provided

a substantial part of the Athenian population with a significant income. A fleet of 60 ships would

for example need 10200 rowers, and if it stayed out 5 months each rower had earned enough to

feed his family for a whole year. Obviously the Athenian fleet wold not has been completely

scrapped during the peaceful period, but a major reduction in activity is practically certain. Van

Wees (2000) argues that foreigners and slaves constituted the majority of the rowers, but given

the size of the Athenian naval undertaking, several thousands of citizens would also have been

engaged (the common people were mockingly called “the yo-heave-ho” by Aristophanes, after

the rhythm of rowing). This meant that many citizens would have had to look elsewhere for

means to support themselves and their families. Anyone who could deliver a solution to this

problem would likely have a large group of voters on his side.


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5. The rational and rationality in Perikles activities 451-448 BCE

Traditional accounts of Perikles’ actions around 450 invariably ignores the fact that his incentives

changed dramatically at that time. The historical accounts often go into considerable detail (as is

common in the historical paradigm) regarding the actual events but fail to make the connection

with the change in incentives (E.g. Rhodes 1992, 1993, xx; Hornblower xx; Osborne xx;

Patterson.)

A rational actor perspective suggests that we should see every decision by Perikles at this point in

time in a common framework. In an historical accounts, on the other hand, each decision by

Perikles is typically discussed in isolation rather than seeing them as a unified rational policy in

the face of fierce political competition. The rational-actor perspective provides two benefits as

suggested in the introduction. It focuses our attention on how incentives had changed for

Perikles compared to the mid-450s and it provides a common framework for simultaneously

discussing the different measures undertaken by Perikles at this particular point in time.

Consequently the rational-actor perspective suggests that we should look carefully for new

measures directed against Kimon, and any measure that we find should be met with a strong

suspicion that it was fundamentally motivated by its anti-Kimon properties.

It is relatively easy to identify several Periklean policy measures that seem to fit the bill of being

motivated by a need to beat Kimon. In fact, for each of the major decision taken by Perikles

during the crucial years around 450, a substantive case can be made for it being intended as a

means to keep the power and prevent the Ionian faction from getting the upper hand in Athens.

5.1 Pay for jurors

The introduction of juror pay is presented by Aristotle “as a popular counter-measure to Kimon’s

wealth” (The Athenian Constitution 27.2). Perikles, according to Aristotle, could not – as Kimon

could – rely on great personal wealth to become popular. Kimon had resources “large enough for

a tyrant” and could allow anyone from his deme to come to his house and be fed Perikles lacked

private means for such lavishness (The Athenian Constitution 27.3-4). Juror pay is often accepted by


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modern authorities as a measure designed to favour Perikles against Kimon.18 That it is an anti-

Kimon measure is of course entirely consistent with the rational-actor perspective employed

here, and with the view that measures designed to please the common people were used as

instruments in the elite competition for power after Kleisthenes’ demonstration of how effective

this could be (cf. section 1).19

Some commentators prefer to place the introduction of juror pay before Kimon’s ostracism

(Rhodes 1992; Hornblower xx; Hansen 1999 p. xx), however without providing any compelling

argument as to why this timing should be preferred. The main idea behind these suggestions

seem to be that we hear most about the conflict between Pericles and Kimon in connection with

the stripping of the powers of the Areopagos in 462 and the decade before 451/450. If juror pay

was a part of that conflict, then we should place juror pay at the same time.

On the other hand, it is at least equally possible that Perikles needed this weapon against Kimon

after his return to Athens in 451, as we argued above. Furthermore, the most straightforward

reading of The Athenian Constitution places juror pay after the law on citizenship in 451/50. That

we hear relatively little of the conflict Athens-Sparta after the return of Kimon is arguably the

results of Kimon’s death and Perikles’ deft manoeuvring cf. below. Our interpretation of Perikles’

situation in 451 moreover provides a reason for the exact timing of this event, .i.e., shortly after

Kimon’s return to Athens.

2. The law on citizenship

We now turn to the other great initiative taken by Perikles: the law on citizenship. This was

presented by Perikles in 451/0, according to the account in the Aristotelian (The Athenian

Constitution 26.4). The only explanation given in our ancient sources for this law is that it was

“because of the number if the citizens” (ibid.), which, as often noted in the literature, is not very

helpful because it is difficult to see the logic in this suggestion. Unfortunately, we do not know

how the law was implemented and have to rely on assumptions about what seems reasonable.

Any explanation of the law needs to considerer the fact that it is unlikely that it was retrospective.

If it had been retrospective, the result would have been a purge of the role of citizens, and this

18 Rhodes (1992) prefers dating it to shortly after Ephialtes’ reforms, but he notes that accepting Aristotle’s view that it was a political manoeuvre against Kimon means that it must have occurred when Kimon was in Athens. 19 Towards the end of the Peloponnesian war, we find councillors being paid as well as various magistrates. It is usually presumed that these payments were introduced in connection with the introduction of public pay to jurors, but we have no firm evidence on the exact timing of these reforms and so we will not discuss them here.


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would have caused an uproar that would still have been heard today.20 Since it is unlikely that the

law was made retrospective, the effect of the law would only come at the point where new

(young) Athenians were accepted (or not) as citizens. Hansen (1999) argues that the process of

being accepted as a citizen began when the prospective citizen was entered into his father’s

phratry at the age of 3-4 years. However the crucial moment came when the young Athenian was

admitted to his father’s deme at the age of 18 or 20.21 The Law would have limited the number of

citizens, but only with a fraction of those who each year were accepted in their demes as being

citizens.

The possibility that it was an anti-Kimon measure is generally discounted on the grounds that it

could not have applied to him personally, it would not have changed his status as a citizen. For

instance, Rhodes (1992, xx) suggests that since the law was not retrospective, and since Kimon

almost certainly held his last command after the introduction of the law, it could not have been a

measure against him.

The law is most commonly seen as a measure that should be seen together with the introduction

of juror pay, as a reflection of a “jealous desire to ensure that the increasingly valuable privileges

of Athenian citizenship […] were not shared too widely” (Rhodes 1993, p. 333). Similarly,

Hornblower (xx) suggests that it was perhaps occasioned by a desire to restrict the set of

beneficiaries of the new policy of sending out cleruchs (from the mid 450). Taking a broad view

of the matter, Osborne (2010) notes that “the suggestion that the law was deliberately designed to

limit future access to the material and other advantages of being an Athenian citizen is not

without attractions”.22

As mentioned above, a straightforward reading of The Athenian constitution suggests that jury pay

was introduced after the citizenship law. This obviously would make it relatively difficult to see

the law on citizenship as motivated by desire to limit the group of people who could be paid as

jurors.23 The law would of course have limited the pool of potential cleruchs.

20 The prospect of revision of the list of citizens had caused great convulsions in Athenian society on two occasion in the 6th century. The issue of citizenship had helped bring the tyrant Peisistratos to power and this issue probably was instrumental in helping Kleisthenes to power after the fall of the tyranny (Aristotle xx; Manville, xx; Lyttkens, 2013). 21 Hansen (1999, p. 96). See also Rhodes Greek city states p. 110. 22 Osborne sees the main function of the law as a symbolic statement of the exclusiveness of being an Athenian and therefore having special rights as against everybody else, such as the members of the Delian league. 23 Hypothetically, one can always construct other and more complex scenarios. For instance, perhaps it was known that juror pay was in the offing, and the law on citizenship facilitated the introduction of this kind of pay. Note that the expenditure associated with political pay would have been independent of the number of people who could qualify for such pay since the number of positions was fixed.


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With this kind of explanation, the connection between juror pay and the law on citizenship has a

somewhat ad hoc character. This is because the only reason for seeing (in this historical tradition)

a connection between them and their almost simultaneous occurrence is the need to find an

explanation for the citizenship law. The historical approach here suffers from the lack of a

common framework, such as the rational actor paradigm, which can explain both events and the

connection between them and thus provides an organic connection between the two measures.

It seems to us that the possibility that the law on citizenship was an anti-Kimon measure has

been abandoned rather too quickly.24 The argument that Kimon was unaffected by the law since

it did not apply retrospectively (and hence would not touch to him personally) probably

underestimates the potential impact of such a law on Athenian politics. It seems to us that the

law may well have affected Kimon’s position in Athens. Perikles had an Athenian father and

mother. Kimon did not.25 Perikles was married to an Athenian woman, Kimon was perhaps not.

It would arguably have been to Kimon’s distinct disadvantage politically that an existing new law

implied that he only marginally escaped being disqualified from the Athenian citizenry. It would

probably have changed the Athenians’ view of Kimon and his family. Furthermore, we should

not underestimate the psychological effect for him personally – suddenly implicitly defined as a

non-Athenian (even if the law gave dispensation for a transitional period).

Family relations were important in Athenian politics, long after a property qualification replaced

noble birth as eligibility criterion for offices in Athens in 594 BCE. Family ties were still very

important in the first half of the fifth century. Remember, both Perikles’ and Kimon’s fathers had

been conspicuous enough to have suffered substantially in political trials in the Athenian courts

(Xanthippos was ostracized and Miltiades was fined heavily – 50 talents). Kimon, as mentioned

above, was the son of Miltiades, and Kimon married into the (previously) powerful Alcmaionid

family. Hornblower (1979, p. 28) sees “almost professional political families” (around 20 of

them) dominating the political arena. To strike against an opponent or against his family was in a

sense equivalent.

Additionally, intermarriages across city-states were primarily an upper-class phenomenon, and the

citizenship law has been seen as an anti-elite measure.26 By this time Perikles and his following

24 We note with interest that this kind of explanation has been labelled “eccentric” (Rhodes (1993 [1981])). 25 Kimon was the son of the Athenian Miltiades and Hegesipyle, daughter of the Thracian king Olorus. He was probably borne around 510, cf. Davies (1971), p. 302. He married the Alkmaionid Isodice and perhaps also an Arkadian woman (i.e., non-Athenian). Perikles was borne c. 495. His faher was Xanthippus and his mother the Alkmaoinid Agariste 26 Rhodes (xx) notes this, but he does not make any explicit connection between this fact and the law on citizenship.


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would have been relatively firmly established as champions of the poor majority (stripping the

Areopagos of power etc.).27 So the law on citizenship meant that, in the long run, elite families in

Athens would have fewer connections with the elite in other poleis. The law thereby reduced the

likelihood that a take-over occurred with foreign help. We note that as late as 443, the leader of

the oligarchic faction (Thukydides son of Melisa’s) was ostracized. Thereafter the oligarchs went

underground (but did not disappear).28

Osborne suggests that the marriages across the polies were already becoming much less frequent

as such connections were increasingly view with suspicion. Hence the citizen ship law in his view

was not necessarily a dramatic change but could rather be seen as a symbolic measure.

It also seems highly significant that it is citizenship that becomes an issue when the political

struggle was fierce. Attempts to purge the roll of citizens of those who should not belong there

was a well-known stratagem in Athenian politics. The reaction to such a policy is reported to

have helped Peisistratos assume power in Athens. Additionally, a similar purge of the citizen role

was probably instrumental in bringing Kleisthenes to power in 508/7.29 This is important because

it would a priori be much more likely that Perikles came up with a policy that had been tried

before. In general, how we define our self-interest depends on our belief systems, and decision

costs would be much lower if there were previous examples that a politician could draw upon.

So far we have discussed Kimon himself. What about his children? Citizenship was determined

when a person turned 18 or 20 (Hansen, 1999, 89-90, xx). Perikles’ law on citizenship would

presumably have excluded from politics any sons of Kimon who had a non-Athenian mother and

who had not yet reached the age of 18/20 in 451/50. Davies (1971, p.305) in his comprehensive

study of “Athenian Propertied Families” argues that Kimon well have had 6 children.30 (Already

his oldest son “Lakedaimonios” was seen according to Davies born no later than 470, which -

means that already the oldest son could have been a marginal case w r t being accepted as a

citizen. We know however that: Lakedaimonios served as hipparch not later than 446 and as

general at Kerkyra in 433/2. These assignments suggest that he was a citizen. We know almost

27 In 462 the Areopagos would still arguably have been dominated by the elite, even though archons were appointed by lot from 487. 28 29 Cf. Lyttkens (2013) on Peisistratos and Lyttkens and Manville on Kleisthenes. 30 Davies 1971), pp. Xx.


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nothing about son number two (Oulios) but son number 3 – Thettalos – indicted Alkibiades in

415 and so presumably was also a citizen.31

Kimon however seem to have had three more sons (for 6 in total). Davies suggests that we have

no reason to doubt their existence, though we lack information about their lives. There is also

talk of a second and non-Athenian wife (Arcadian). This means that it is not inconceivable that

the three later sons could have been in the line of fire for the new law. The fact that we no

absolutely nothing about them is precisely what we would expect if they were born so late that

they had not yet been accepted in their deme when the law on citizenship was established.

Similarly, the fact that, as Davies (1971, 308) puts it, “the family descended into comparative

obscurity” after 430 agrees very well with viewing the Law as a (successful) Periklean measure

aimed to strike at his political opponents.

It is worth pointing out that the law on citizenship seems to have entailed an irreversible process.

If a father in one generation married a non-Athenian woman, and the offspring in the family thus

was excluded, there was no way back into citizenship for the family! This long-run consequence

has not been emphasized in the literature.

5.3 Rebuilding the Acropolis

Finally we come to the building activities on the Acropolis and other public building projects in

Athens. Perikles was greatly engaged in the building program in Athens in the 440s and 430s. It

begins with the construction of the Parthenon. The plans and suggestions were presented in 449

and work began in 448 (Hurwit, 2004). With this the Athenians broke the oath they had sworn

before the battle of Plataia not to rebuild the temples that the Persians had destroyed, but Hurwit

suggests that perhaps they felt that the peace of Kallias justified this action.

Gerding (xx) has suggested that building activities in the Roman republic may have been a way to

foster client-relationships, since building activities would give employment to the urban poor, and

selection of workers could have been geared to the clients of the builder. Something similar may

well have taken place in Athens.

31 Perhaps we should note that the Athenians did not hesitate to use naturalized foreeigners as generals; hence it is perhaps conceivable that the sons of such a prominent figure as Kimon could have been selected for such duty even if they did not fulfill all the criteria for bgna citizen.


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Even if Kimon was dead by the time Perikles proposed the building program (which is not

certain), his faction presumably did not vanish with his death. For example, as mentioned above,

the oligarchic element tried to take over in 443.

Plutarch suggests that one of Perikles major objectives was to put the idle masse sto work.

Hurwit dismisses this as a fabrication on Plutarch's part; he argues that this is an anachronism

since unemployment was a big problem in Plutarch’s time but not in Perikles’ Athens. However,

Plutarch may have had a good point, either because he knew what he was talking about or

because he was just plain lucky. As described above, precisely just before Pericles took the

discussion on whether to rebuild the Acropolis to the assembly, there would have been a

considerable number of Athenian thetes that were ’between jobs’. They had earned a substantial

income from acting as rowers in the Athenian fleet, but with peace with both Sparta and Persia,

this source of income was reduced and looked uncertain to say the least.

The peace with Sparta and Persia from 450 and onwards (or a few years later) created a new

situation in Athens. Some of the money that had been used to deal with the threat fro Perisa

could now be allocated to other uses. The building project on the acropolis was not peanuts.

Salmon (2001) has estimated that during the 25 year period 450-425, the stonework involved in

these enterprises engaged on average 1000 persons per year, day in and day out. This represents a

substantial amount of employment and would have made a number of citizens very grateful to

the proposer (Perikles). Of course some of the work will have been carried out by foreign

specialists and some by slaves. Nevertheless, what remained would suffice to make a

considerable impact on Athenian politics. In addition to Athenians actually engaged in the stone

work, these enterprises will have called for other kinds of work which again may have fallen on

the local population. Furthermore, the presence of foreign craftsmen will have generated demand

for food, lodging, and other goods and services (prostitutes?). In other words, the economic

impact would have been considerably greater than the number of Athenian stone masons in itself

suggests.

Secondly, assembly meetings in Athens were not huge gatherings. A group of, for instance, 500

voters could be very important. We do not know by how great a margin Perikles used to win the

votes in the Assembly. Hansen (1999) suggests the attendance was probably around 5-6000

citizens (xx; Hansen, 1999, pp.130ff) and there was a physical limit because the capacity of the

area where the Assembly met was probably circa 6,000. If the relative strength of the two parties

in the population was around 55-45, this translated into a need for those about to lose the


15

struggle of 500-700 votes to carry the day.32 Consequently, it wouldn’t be surprising if Perikles

saw as an important benefit of the building program that a number of potential voters in the

assembly would owe their income to his proposal for rebuilding the acropolis (not necessarily the

only benefit). In addition, to the extent that a significant part of the citizen body could no longer –

it seemed – look at serving as rowers as a likely source of income, the political benefit would have

been even larger. Additionally, those who worked on the Acropolis were stationed in Athens, and

hence belonged to those who were relatively more likely than others to attend the Assembly (the

Assembly met around 40 times per year, and most of the time for only half a day).

6. The importance of being rational

The rational actor perspective helps us understand Athenian politics in the fifth century BCE. It

dos so on the one hand by focusing our attention on the way individual incentives change over

time. It helps us identify the kind of evidence we ought to be looking for, and sometimes suggest

other explanation than the purely historical account.

Already a brief look at the historical accounts suggests that the incentives for Perikles to look for

new weapons to use against his political opponent Kimon increased greatly with Kimon’s return

just before 450. As it turns out, all three sets of actions by Perikles at this time could easily have

been motivated by the need to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Kimon: the pay to jurors, the law

of citizenship, and the large building projects.

A rational-actor perspective thus provides a diachronic analytical benefit by focusing on the way

incentives change over time, and it provides a synchronic benefit by dealing with various

decisions taken at a specific point in time in a common formwork. It can handle several

seemingly divergent developments simultaneously and our belief in the results is strengthened

when we handle several factors within a common framework.

32 According to Aristotle the Athenians had to use coercion to get sufficient members to attend the Assembly in the years after the Peloponnesian War (cf. Hansen (1999, pp.130-132).


16

References (to be amended and completed)

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entrepreneurship in ancient Athens." Journal of Institutional Economics 4:205-230. Bresson, Alain. 2007. L'économie de la Grèce des cités. I. Les structures et la production. Paris:

Armand Collin. Davies, J. K. 1971. Athenian propertied families 60-300 B.C. Salem: The Ayer Company. Fleck, K. R. and F. A. Hanssen. 2006. "The origins of democracy: a model with application to ancient

Greece." Journal of Law and Economics 49:115-145. Halkos, George E. and Nickolas C. Kyriazis. 2010. "The Athenian economy in the age of Demosthenes:

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of Michigan Press. Lyttkens, Carl Hampus. 2006. "Reflections on the Origins of the Polis." Pp. 31-48, vol. 17. —. 2010. "Institutions, taxation, and market relationships in ancient Athens." Journal of Institutional

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models, edited by J. G. Manning and I. Morris. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Pitsoulis, Athanassios. 2011. "The egalitarian battlefield: reflections on the origin of majority rule in

archaic Greece." European Journal of Political Economy 27:87-103. Rhodes, P. J. 1993 [1981]. A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia. Oxford: Clarendon

Paperback. —. 2007. "Democracy and empire." in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Pericles edited by L. J.

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Constitutional Political Economy 22:58-82.

Andrewes, "The Opposition to Pericles", Journal of Hellenic Studies 98 (1978)

Humphreys 1974 (Cynthia n.24)

Ancient passages cited

To be completed

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