ConditionalUsePermitsAfter2017WisconsinAct67ByBrianW.Ohm

2017WisconsinAct67addsnewsectionstotheWisconsinStatutesgoverningtheissuanceofconditionalusepermitstothegeneralzoningenablinglawsforcities,villages,towns,andcounties.1Untiltheadditionofthesesections,thegeneralzoningenablingstatutesdidnotincludetheterm“conditionalusepermit”norprovideanyguidancefortheissuanceofconditionalusepermits.Rather,thelawgoverningconditionalusepermitswasbasedoncourtdecisions.Act67RespondstotheWisconsinSupremeCourtDecisioninAllEnergyCorp.v.TrempealeauCountyTheWisconsinSupremeCourt’sMay2017decisioninAllEnergyCorp.v.TrempealeauCounty,2017WI52,providesimportantcontextforunderstandingtheconditionaluserequirementsinsertedinAct67.TheAllEnergycaseinvolvedthedenialofaconditionalusepermitforaproposedfracsandmindinTrempealeauCounty.TheCountyvotedtoadopt37conditionsforthemine,whichAllEnergyagreedtomeet,butthentheCountyvotedtodenytheconditionalusepermitinpartrelyingonpublictestimonyinoppositiontothemine.AdividedWisconsinSupremeCourtupheldtheCounty’sdenialoftheconditionalusepermitacknowledgingthe

1Act67createssection62.23(7)(de)forcities,villages,andtownsexercisingzoningundervillagepowers,section60.61(4e)fortownsexercisingzoningwithoutvillagepowers,andsection59.69(5e)forcounties.

discretionaryauthorityoflocalgovernmentsinreviewingproposedconditionaluses.Act67inpartreflectsthesentimentarticulatedbythedissentintheAllEnergydecisionAccordingtotheDissentinAllEnergy:“WhentheTrempealeauCountyBoardwritesitszoningcode,orconsidersamendments,...isthestageatwhichtheCountyhasthegreatestdiscretionindeterminingwhatmay,andmaynot,beallowedonvarioustractsofproperty.”“Uponaddingaconditionalusetoazoningdistrict,themunicipalityrejects,bythatveryact,theargumentthatthelisteduseisincompatiblewiththedistrict.”“Anapplicationforaconditionalusepermitisnotaninvitationtore-openthatdebate.Apermitapplicationis,instead,anopportunitytodeterminewhetherthespecificinstantiationoftheconditionalusecanbeaccomplishedwithinthestandardsidentifiedbythezoningordinance.”WhilelocalgovernmentsdidnotneedtochangetheirordinancesinresponsetotheAllEnergydecision,Act67shouldpromptlocalgovernmentstoreviewtheirzoningordinances,practices,andprocedurestoensuretheymeetthenewstatutoryrequirements.TheNewStatutoryRequirementsAct67Act67limitslocalgovernmentdiscretionrelatedtotheissuanceofconditionalusepermits.

PerspectivesonPlanning January2018

DepartmentofPlanning&LandscapeArchitectureUniversityofWisconsin-Madison/Extension925BascomMallMadison,Wisconsin53706-1317https://dpla.wisc.edu

Thenewlawaddsthefollowingdefinitionof“conditionaluse”totheStatutes:“’Conditionaluse’meansauseallowedunderaconditionalusepermit,specialexception,orotherzoningpermissionissuedbya[city,village,town,county]butdoesnotincludeavariance.”Act67alsoincludesthefollowingdefinitionof“substantialevidence,”atermusedinseveralplacesintheAct:“’Substantialevidence’meansfactsandinformation,otherthanmerelypersonalpreferencesorspeculation,directlypertainingtotherequirementsandconditionsanapplicantmustmeettoobtainaconditionalusepermitandthatreasonablepersonswouldacceptinsupportofaconclusion.”Thislanguagesoftensthelanguageofearlierversionsofthebillthatstatedsubstantialevidencedidnotinclude“publiccommentthatisbasedsolelyonpersonalopinion,uncorroboratedhearsay,orspeculation.”PubliccommentthatprovidesreasonablefactsandinformationrelatedtotheconditionsofthepermitisacceptedunderAct67asevidence.Act67thenprovidesthat“ifanapplicantforaconditionalusepermitmeetsoragreestomeetalloftherequirementsandconditionsspecifiedinthe[city,village,town,county]ordinanceorimposedbythe[city,village,town,county]zoningboard,the[city,village,town,county]shallgranttheconditionalusepermit.”ThisnewlanguagefollowstheargumentmadebytheplaintiffsandthedissentingopinionintheAllEnergycase.Theuseoftheterm“zoningboard,”however,isatoddswithcurrentWisconsinlawthatallowsthegoverningbody,theplancommission,orthezoningboardofadjustment/appealstograntconditionaluses.This“zoningboard”terminologymayleadtosomeconfusion.Act67alsoprovidesthattheconditionsimposed“mustberelatedtothepurposeoftheordinanceandbebasedonsubstantialevidence”and“mustbereasonableandtotheextentpracticable,measurable”Thisnewstatutorylanguageemphasizestheimportanceofhavingclearpurposestatementsinthezoningordinance.Inaddition,sincelocalcomprehensiveplanscanhelparticulatethepurposeofordinancesthatimplementtheplan,localgovernmentsshouldconsiderincludingarequirementthattheproposedconditionalusefurthersanddoesnotconflictwiththelocalcomprehensiveplan.Act67statesthatpermits“mayincludeconditionssuchasthepermit’sduration,transfer,orrenewal.”Inthepast,sometimestherewasconfusionaboutwhetherlocalgovernmentshadtheauthoritytoplaceatimelimiton

thedurationofaconditionalusepermit.Thisnewstatutorylanguageclarifiesthatlocalgovernmentshavethatauthority.Next,Act67providesthattheapplicantmustpresentsubstantialevidence“thattheapplicationandallrequirementsandconditionsestablishedbythe[city,village,town,county]relatingtotheconditionaluseareorshallbesatisfied.”Thecity,village,townorcounty’s“decisiontoapproveordenythepermitmustbesupportedbysubstantialevidence.”Underthenewlaw,alocalgovernmentmustholdapublichearingonaconditionalusepermitapplication,followingpublicationofaclass2notice.Ifalocalgovernmentdeniesanapplicationforaconditionaluse,theapplicantmayappealthedecisiontocircuitcourt.Theconditionalusepermitcanberevokediftheapplicantdoesnotfollowtheconditionsimposedinthepermit.TheNewRequirementsInANutshell:wTherequirementsandconditionsspecifiedintheordinanceorimposedbythezoningboardmustbereasonable,andtotheextentpracticable,measurable.wAnyconditionimposedmustrelatetothepurposeoftheordinanceandbebasedonsubstantialevidence.wSubstantialevidencemeansfactsandinformation,otherthanmerelypersonalpreferencesorspeculation,directlypertainingtotherequirementsandconditionsanapplicantmustmeettoobtainaconditionalusepermitandthatareasonablepersonwouldacceptinsupportofaconclusion.wIfanapplicantmeets,oragreestomeet,alloftherequirementsandconditionsspecifiedintheordinanceorimposedbythezoningboard,thelocalgovernmentmustgranttheCUP.wTheapplicantmustprovidesubstantialevidencethattheapplicationandallrequirementsandconditionsare,orshallbe,satisfied.wIfanapplicantdoesnotmeetoneormoreoftherequirements(forexampletheapplicationisincomplete)orconditionsspecifiedintheordinanceorimposedbythezoningboard,thelocalgovernmentcandenytheCUP.wAlocalgovernment’sdecisiontoapproveordenyaconditionalusepermitmustbesupportedbysubstantialevidence.

ThenewconditionaluselawappliestoapplicationsforconditionalusepermitsfiledonandafterNovember28,2017.Localgovernmentsshouldreviewtherequirementsoftheirordinancetoconsideraddingtoorrevisingtheconditionslistedintheordinancetoensurethatthelocalgovernmentwillbeabletoreviewspecificdevelopmentproposalsagainstthepurposeoftheordinanceandbeabletosupportconditionsimposedonaspecificapplicationwithsubstantialevidence.Act67maypromptsomelocalgovernmentstoreconsiderwhatmightbelistedasaconditionaluseincertainzoningdistrictsandexplorecreatingnewdistrictsorotherwaystoregulatetheuse.Localgovernmentsmightalsowanttoamulti-stepprocessthatinformsapplicantsoftheconditionsthezoningboardwillimposedpriortotheboard’sdecisionsotheapplicantcanprovethattheycancomplywiththeconditions.vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvFrequentlyAskedQuestionsAboutAct672nDoesAct67LimitLocalDiscretiontoDenyaConditionalUsePermits?Act67attemptstolimitthelevelofdiscretionimpliedintheleadopinionofWisconsinSupremeCourtintheAllEnergycase.ClearlyunderAct67,ifanapplicantagreestomeetalltherequirementsoftheordinanceandalltheconditionsimposed,thelocalgovernmenthasnodiscretiontodenythepermit.However,localgovernmentsstillhavediscretionintermsofwhetherornotsomethingislistedasaconditionaluseinthezoningordinance.Localgovernmentsalsohavediscretionastowhetherornottoimposeacondition(forexampleeverypermitmightnotneedconditionsrelatedtohoursofoperation).Localgovernmentsalsohavetheauthoritytodenyapermitiftheapplicantcannotmeettherequirementsoftheordinanceortheconditionsimposed.ThefactthatAct67talksaboutdenialofapermitandtherightchallengeadenialincourtshowsthelegislaturedidnottakeawayallauthoritytodenyanapplicationforaconditionalusepermit.

2ThankstoBeckyRobertswiththeCenterforLandUseEducationatUW-StevensPointforcompilingthesequestions.

Alocalgovernmentstillhastheabilitytoapproveordenyapermit,andtoattachconditions.AlocalgovernmenteitherapprovesaCUPbecauseitcomplieswiththerequirementsoftheordinanceandtheconditionsimposedortheydenyitbecauseitdoesnotmeettherequirementsoftheordinanceandtheconditionsimposed.Localgovernmentshavemorediscretionwhenrezoningaproperty.Act67maypromptsomelocalgovernmentstolimitwhatisaconditionaluseandrequirearezoningtoadifferentdistrictforcertainuses.nIsalocalgovernmentobligatedtocraftconditionsthatwillhelptheapplicantmeettheordinancerequirements?No,butthelocalgovernmentneedstoarticulatewhytheproposedusedoesnotmeettheordinancerequirementsandallowtheapplicanttosuggestconditionsthataddressthedeficiencies.Forexample,sayanordinancehasgeneralstandardsforCUPSlike"protectpublichealth,safety,andwelfare."Thezoningboardusesthatstandardtosay"weshouldnotallowthisprojectbecauseitwillleadtotrafficcongestionleadingtounsafetrafficconditions."UnderAct67,thelocalgovernmentcan'tdenyitunlesstheybackitupwithsubstantialevidence.Thelocalgovernmentdecidestoconductatrafficstudy.Thetrafficstudyconcludesthatiftrucktraffictothesiteislimitedtocertainhours,therewillbenocongestion.Theapplicantproposesaconditiontolimittrucktrafficbasedonthefindingsofthestudy.Thereneedstobeanopportunityforsomebackandforthbetweentheapplicantandthelocalgovernment--forexample,thelocalgovernmentsayswe'reconcernedaboutwaterquality.Theywillneedtoprovidespecificfactsaboutthewaterqualityimpacts.Theymayusethatinformationtoimposeaspecificconditionthatwilladdressthewaterqualityissueoritmightbethatthelocalgovernmentidentifiesthethreatposedbytheconditionaluseandtheapplicantrespondsbysaying"I'vehiredahydrologist,hereistheirreportaboutthewaterqualityimpacts.Thehydrologistrecommendswedox,y,andztoaddressthoseimpact.Weproposedoingthat".Theapplicantdevelopsthealleviatingconditions.WhatAct67changesisthatinthepastagroupofcitizenswhoareopposedtoaprojectwouldsay"denytheCUPbecauseitwillhavetrafficimpact"andthelocalgovernmentwoulddenytheCUP.Act67changesthat.

Localgovernmentscan'tjustsay,“WehaveastandardinorordinancethataCUPpromotepublichealth,safety,andwelfare.WethinktherearetrafficimpactssowedenytheCUP.”Localgovernmentsneedsubstantialevidencethattherewillbetrafficimpacts.Thatevidencewillprovidethebasisformorespecificconditionsimposedbythelocalgovernmentorsuggestedbytheapplicant.Thereareengineeringsolutionsformanyimpactssoitwillbedifficultfortheretobenoconditionthatcouldbeimposedtomeettheordinancestandards.Itmaybeextremelyexpensivetofollowthecondition--thatmightstoptheproject.Perhapsthehoursofoperationendupbeingsolimitedtheapplicantdropstheproject.Thatmayleadtheapplicanttoarguetheconditionisunreasonable.Resolutionofthatissuewilltakefurtherlitigation.Historically,mostCUPsareapproved.Denialsareverylimited.Act67maymakedenialsharder.nHowcloselydoconditionsimposedbythezoningboardneedtomatchthe“standards”(requirementsandconditions)outlinedinthezoningordinance?Inotherwords,doyouneedtorelyontheordinancepurposeorordinancestandardswhencraftingconditions?Yes,Act67requiresthat“anyconditionimposedmustberelatedtothepurposeoftheordinanceandbebasedonsubstantialevidence.”Manyordinancesincludegeneralstatementslikeprotectpublichealthandsafetyinthepurposestatementoftheordinance,asarequirementoftheordinance,orasastandardforgrantingconditions.Kraemer&SonsInc.v.SaukCnty.Adjust.Bd.,183Wis.2d1,13,515N.W.2d256(1994),providesguidancethatstandardsinordinancescanincludegeneralstandardslikethe"needtoprotectpublichealth,safety,andwelfare"andmorespecificstandardslike"miningoperationsmustnotimpairwaterquality."Act67doesnotprohibittheuseofgeneralstandardssolocalgovernmentsshouldstillincludethem.Theyjustwillneedtoprovidesubstantialevidencetojustifywhytheconditionisnecessarytoprotectpublichealth,safety,andwelfare.nAct67requiresapplicantstodemonstratethatallrequirementsandconditionsare,orshallbe,satisfied.Thisseemslikeitwillbeproblematic.Doyouhaveanytipsthatalocalgovernmentcanusetoavoidsituationswheretheapplicantpromisestomeettherequirements/conditionsandthenneverfollowsthrough?

Alocalgovernmentcouldrevokethepermitortakeotherlegalactioniftherequirementsandconditionsarenotmet.Thebodygrantingaconditionalusepermitretainsjurisdictionoverthepermittoinsurethattheapplicantcomplieswiththeconditionsoverthelifeofthepermitandtheapplicantdoeswhattheysaidtheywoulddo.Justliketheenforcementofanyzoningmatter,thezoningadministratorwillneedtomonitortheactivitytoinsurecompliance.Neighboringpropertyownersalsocanmonitorcomplianceandcanfileacomplaintwiththelocalgovernment--"Thepermitallowstheminetooperatefrom8amto5pmandtheyhavebeenworkinguntil7pmthispastweek."Thelocalgovernmentcouldrevokethepermitfornoncompliance.Theycouldalsoimposeamonetarypenaltyfornotbeingincompliance.Theyshouldchecktheenforcementsectionoftheirzoningordinancetoseewhatitcurrentlyprovides.NowAct67requiresthattheapplicantprovidesubstantialevidencethattheywillcomply.Itisnotclearthatapplicantshavebeenheldtothisstandardbefore.Thismightprovehelpfulwhendealingwith,forexample,"badactors"--"Inthepast,youhadaCUPforasimilaruseandyoudidn'tdox,y,andzasyouweresupposedtodo.Provideuswithsubstantialevidencethatyouwilldothingsdifferently."Itmightbedifficultfortheapplicanttodo.nDoesAct67’sreferencetoonlythe“zoningboard”meanthattheplancommissionand/orgoverningbodycannotgrantconditionalusepermits?UnderpriorWisconsinlaw,itwasinterpretedthattheauthoritytograntconditionalusepermitscouldrestwitheitherthezoningboardofappeals/adjustment,theplancommission,orthegoverningbody.3Itisnotclearwhethertheuseof"zoningboard"wasadraftingerrororintentional.ItmayleadsomepeopletoarguethatasaresultofAct67onlythezoningboardcangrantconditionalusepermitsdespitethelanguageelsewherethatconditionalusepermitscanbedecidedbythezoningboard,theplancommission,orthegoverningbody.(Whenthereisaconflictinthestatutes,themostrecentlyadoptedstatutecontrols.)ThelanguageofAct67mayleadotherstoarguethatAct67onlyappliestoconditionalusepermitsissuedbythezoningboard.TheplaintiffsinAllEnergymadetheargumentthatthecountycommitteedidnothavethe

3SeeWis.Stat.§§59.694(1),60.65(3)and62.23(7)(e)

legalauthoritytomakethedecisionitdidbecausethedecisiontonotallowtheminewasalegislativedecisionthatcouldonlybemadebythecountyboard--thelegislativebody.TheleadopinionintheSupremeCourt'sdecisiondeterminedthattheordinance(thestandardsintheordinance,etc.)properlyauthorizedthecommittee'sactionssoitwasnotanimproperdelegationoflegislativeauthority.SinceAct67islimitedtothezoningboard,itdoesraisetheargumentthatifitisthegoverningbodythatissuestheconditionalusepermit,thegoverningbody,asalegislativebody,hasmorediscretiontoactonconditionalusepermitsbecausetheyarenotboundbytherequirementsofAct67.nCanalocalordinanceprovideforanappealofaconditionalusepermitdecisiontoanotherlocalbody?Anumberoflocalgovernmentsprovideforappealofaplancommissiondecisiononaconditionalusepermittothezoningboardofappealsorthegoverningbody.ItisnotclearfromthewordingofAct67ifitpreemptslocalordinancesfromhavinganintermediatestepofappealtoazoningboardorthegoverningbodybeforethedeniedapplicantcouldappealthedecisiontocircuitcourt.Anordinanceprovidingforanintermediateappealinanordinanceshouldstillbeacceptableunderanargumentthatiftheapplicantsucceedsintheappealitsavesthetimeandexpenseofhavingtobringalawsuitinacourtoflaw.BrianW.Ohm,anattorney,isaprofessorintheUW-MadisonDepartmentofPlanningandLandscapeArchitectureandthestatespecialistinplanninglawforUW-Extension.