PESC-Wallace, Pollack, Young

8/13/2019 PESC-Wallace, Pollack, Young

1/13


2/13

43 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace

IntroductionStatcs have forcign o l i c i e s ~ international organizations coordinate national positions.National defence. and the 11lobilization of national resources for defencc, require cen-tralized conlmand and control' concepts of national securitv and national interestA jjustify strong st ate authority. Hardly surprisinglYl t h e r e f o r e ~ even the most [ederalist .proponents of European integration have found foreign and security policy peculiarly difficult. Cooperation in this policy field has evolved gradually, often spurredby externa} events which exposed inadequacies. The structures and underlyingassumptions of PolicY-lnaking in this field today are lllarked by past struggles overthe balan ce bet\veen na tional sovereignty and effective capabilities. National politicalcultures differ significantly in aS5ulllptions abouL appropriate roles in internationalpolitics) about the projection of power beyond national boundaries, and about theuse of force. Such poli tical cuI tures change slovvly. VI/hile a Brussels-based set of institutiOllS and procedures has emerged, intergovernlnentalism remains the nonn in thesense that the predonlinant actors are the member govemnlents . Thi5 in pan explainswhy performante in (Ominon foreign and se curity poliey falls 50 far short of aspiratio11s. None the less the increasing intensity of policy developlnen tin this field and itsincreased importance in the treaties suggest elements of the policy mode of 'intensivetransgovernmentalisll1' (see Chapter 4).

\iVest European integration began under US sponsorship, vlith the European Economic ComlTIunity EEC), as it vvas then, 'nested' \ vithin the broader franlevv'ork ofthe North Atlantic Treaty. Consultations on foreign and security policy thereforetook place vvithin Nato, \vhich provided the integrated structure for thc defence of\vestern Europe against the Soviet-led VlarsJ\v Pact. The Treaty of ROl1le gave theEEC llnited cOlnpetences for external trade relations (see Chapter 16) and assisting development in fonner colonial territories. French Gaullisrs insisted an a cleardistinction bet veen high and '10,, politics: the EEC \vas to be confined ta the lo\vpolitics of comlnercial diplomacy, Ieaving the high politics of foreign palicy anddefence to sovereign states.Issues of national security and foreign policy \vere 1 of c o u r s e ~ fundan1ental to thedevelopnlent of \vest European integration. The French governn1ent had launchedthe SChU111an Plan for a European Coal and Steel Comn1unity (ECSC) in 1950 inresponse ta ntense US pressurc, to contain the reconstruction of \tVest Gernlanindustry \ vithin a supranation al franlcwork. The outhre ak of the Korean \/\/ar thcn led\tVashington to press for \ ~ c s t Gernlan rearn1an1ent; the Plevcn Plan for a EuropeanDefence C0l11111unity EDC), iuto vibich GClman units 111ight be integrated, \vas thereluctant French response. The European Defence Ireaty, signecl in Paris in i v1ay1952, C0111luiuecl its signatories to design the 'poHtlcal supcrstnlcture needed to givethe EDC direction and legitilnacy. Thc resuhing draft treaty for a European Politica]C0111111unilY \vould havc transfonned the six founding nlcrnocr statcs into a [ornl offederation, with a European executjve accountable to a dircctly decred European

-- .: : 'Foreign and Security Polcy 4

Parliament (EP). The Korcan armisticc and the death of Stalin in 1953, hn'v',rever, madeso direct an attac1z on tbe core of national sovereignty less cOInpelling; thc FrenchNational AssembJy rejected t he treaty. An intergove rnlnental compro111ise, prorno tedby the British, brought V /est Cennany and ItaIy, with France and the Benelux (Belgiuln,The Netherlands, and Luxenlbourg) states 1nto the\i\lestenl European Union WEU),a bociv \vhich at first serveci luainlv to 1110nitor German rearmaluent.Fjve years Iater, Preside nt de Gaulle chose foreign-poli cy cooperation as the groundon vvhich ta make his double challenge to US hegelnony and to the supranationalanlbitions of the infant EEC. A 'conference of heads of state and governlnent andforeign n l i n i s t e r s ~ of the Six Inet, al French invitatioll, in Paris in February 1961 'todiscover suitable means of organizing closer political cooperation as a basis for 'aprogressively developing union (European Parliamenl 1964). This Fouchet Plan'(nalned after the French diplonlat Christian Fouchet) was vigorously opposed bythe u t c h ~ and found little support even v ithin the German government. With Britain applying to join the EEC, and the Kennedy administra tion calling for a new'Atlantic partnership') this vvas an evident challenge to US leadership and to Natoas such. De Gaulle's 1963 veto an British accession negotiations sank the initia

t i v e ~ and the French later Ieft Nato's integrated structures (Cleveland 1966; Grosser1980). This chapter captures the gradual developulent of foreign and security policycooperation anl ong lllen1ber states by analysing the hesitant moves from Europeanpolitical cooperation (EPC) to a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), andthe emergence of European security and defence policy (ESDP) as a part of CFSP.

e c o n d ~ the underlying thenle of national sovereignty combined with EU-levelcapadty is explored through a range of examples.

roITI European political cooperationto common foreign policyForeign-policy consultations among EU members separately frOUl those withinNato v/ere agree d as a concession to the French in 1969 1 after de Gaulle's departure.


3/13

Bastian Giegerich andWilliamWallaceRelations witb the US have bec.n the 1110S1. ilnportant factor in these cyeles, the

Mic1dle East the 11105t frequent and diffieuh [oens [01 transatlantic dispute. TheFrench government, the n10st strategic actor in prollloting a 1110rc CllltOI1CnnousEuropean foreign polle)', frequently canle up against Anlcrican opposition. Divergent reactions ta the Arab-lsraeli War of ()ct.ober 1973, for exanlple, cscalated intoa bitter Franco-US confrontation, with other west European governments caughtin between. European dis111ay at the dlift ofUS policy in 1979-81, over the coup inPoland and over the revolution in lra11, as well as at their o\vn failure ta concert theirresponse ta the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led to rene\ved efforts ta promote

c o o p e r a t i o n ~ this time led by the British.Vvestern Europe)s self-image as a civilian power) in the 19705 and 19805 partIy

reflected the exclusion of security and defence issues, reinforced by the unresolvedGaullist challenge to US security leadership. The concept a150 inlplied a clailn to normative authority, portraying \vestern Europe as a nlode1 of peaceful dip10macy operating through economic instruments a self-image \\rith a particular appeal v/ithinGermany, \vhose recent history had led ta a rejection of 'pov'ler politics in its don1estic culture (Bull 1982; Sjursen 2007). It a1so appealed ta the Comn1ission1 \vhichhad international capacities in the civilian dimensions of trade and developmenLbut was exeluded froln the harder instruments of foreign policy. Foreign ll1inistriesdeveloped extensive n e t \ ~ l o r k s for consultation an such harder issues through E P C ~but with little policy output and almost no national ar European accountability.

The revolutions in central and eastern Europe in the course of 1989, and the rapidlnoves towards Gennan unification \vhich followed in 1990, nevertheless forcedforeign and security policy up the EU's agenda. Ihe cnd of the cold \var broughtGermany back ta the centre of a potentially reunited continent, and reopcned underlying questions about the delicate balance between France and Gennany and aboutAmerican security leadership through Nato. \l\lest European governlnents adjustedslowly and hesitantly ta this radical transforu1ation of their strategic environlnent.

nd of the cold war and launch of FSPThe Freneh and German governments jointly proposed, in April 1990, that theplanned intergovernmental conference (lGC) should formulate a C01111110n foreignand security poliey (CFSP) as a cen traI feature of the EU alongside econon1icand nl0netary union (EMlJ; see Chapter 7). The t \\'o governlnents, hovvever, hadvvidely different concepts of CFSP, vvith the French govcrnnlent [ocuscd on capabilities and thc Gernlan on institution-builcling. Lengthy negotiatiollS f0110WTcl,\vith several dividing lines: bctween defenders of AUlerican leadcrship throughNato (thc British) the Dutch anel Portllguese, and to sonlC exre.nt the Gcn11ans)and supporters of grcater European autonolny ( B c l g i u J n ~ France, and l t l y ~ andto S0111e extent Spain); between defcnde.rs of national sovereignty (Britain, Denlllark, anel France) and proponents of transfer of forcign polie) into the C 1l1111U-

, .

Foreign and Security Policy 4 5

thc capacity and d0111CStic support for active foreign and defence policies abovealI Britain and France and those 1ike Germany for \vhich international strategy,above a ll1ilitary deploynlcnt beyoncl national borders, \vas surrounc\ccl by political inhibi tions (Cncsotto 1990).,

The US \vas an active player throughout thi5 lG C, detern1ined ta 1naintaill theprimacy of Nato (and thU5 of US leadership) in post-cold-war Europe. Successfulagreement an the conclusions of the post-cold-war Alliance Strategic Review,launched in April 1990, \vas a precondition for successful agreel11ent an10ng thethen tvvelve n1cmber states (i'vlenon et al. 1992). External developments distractedthe negotiators horn their institutional designs. New regin1es to the EU's east werepressing for the pro111ise of n1embership (see Chapter 17). Iraq invaded Kuwait inAugust 1990; Britain and France contributed significant ground forces to the USled coalitio l1: \\'ith son1e dozen ar other European countries in supporting roles.Ihe break-up of Yugoslavia begaD- in the summer of 1991, and the Luxelnbourgpresident of the Council unwisely declared as civilian ElJ monitors were deployedin Bosnia that ~ t h i s is the hour of Europe Nevv Yorh Tinles 29 June 1991).There vvas also an attenlpted putsch in M o s c o in August 1990. The subsequentdisintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen separate states accon1panied the finalstages of the lGC.

The confident opening statelnent of Artiele J of the Maastricht Ireaty on European Union (TEU) A e0111ffiOn foreign and security policy is hereby established therefore papered over unresolved differenees. CFSP and justice and home affairsUHA.; see Chapter 19) \vere to remain as the second and third pillars of the EU outside the integrated, C0111111issioll-led first piUar. Policy initiative, representation, andilnplelTIentation \vere explicitly reserved ta the Couneil r e s i d e n c ) ~ assisted if needbe by the pre'vious and next ll1ember states to hald the Presidency in \vhat becan1eknov/TI as the troika. The COlun1ission was ta be 'fuUy a ~ s o e i a t e d with discussionsin this intergovernll1ental pillar, and the vie\\TS of the European Parlia1uent dulytaken into consideration . Ambiguous language allowed for Joint action5 in pursuitof agreed C0I111IlOn ail115 , and referred to the eventual frm.ning of a COlTIlnOn defence

p o l i c ) ~ \vhich might in tin1e lead to a common defence.i\1uch of the CFSP negotiation during the IGC leading to the IEU amounted to

shaclo \\'-boxing behind the security cover which the US provided, while monetaryunion and social poliey preoccupied heads of governulent. There 'Nas little discussion of the strategic in1plications of the transformation of European order, or of thebalance benvecl1 civilian and 1nilitary instrunlcnlS required for an effcctive COD1D1onpolicy in this l1e\\r context (Nihlett and vVallace 2001). t \vas only aher thc IGC\vas concluded that the \ ~ / E U secretariat, aher negotiations \Vth Nato, persuadcdEuropean govenl1nents ta agrc.c, in the :PeteTsberg Deelaration (Box 18.1), 10 dehnea rangc of sharcd tas zs in pcacekeeping and peaceJnaking operations. Most unrcsolvecl issues, such as the exlent of qua1ified lnajority voting in CFSP ar hO'w todetinc rhe overall institutionallinkbet\veen thc \ .1 EU and thc EU, however, werc put


4/13

4 6 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace

, . he etersberg tasksPetersberg Declaration, June 1992, Section II, On Strengthening WELJ s perationalRo/e, para 4:'Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance \'vith Article 5 of the \j\I'ash-ington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, miiitary uni:s ofWEU member states, aeting under the authority of WEU, coulo be employed for:

humanitaflan and reseue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forees in crisls management, including peacemakirg:

(Western European Unon Council of Min isters, Bon: . 19 June 1992, available 2t:http://www.weu.int .The Treaty of Amsterdam's substantial revisions of the Treaty on European Union's provisions n Ttle V (TEU) on CFSP incorporated this list, as Article ~ i 7 ( 2 : 1 (eTEU:I. Tne European Securty Strategy (ESS) expanded this task spectrum and the TI eaty of Lisbo1 (TcLLwhich entered into force in Oecember 2009 following ratification bV 'aii member s:ates,offered a further revised defintion of what the ESDP \A/as to cover. The ToL stipulatesthat the EU should use both civilian and mlitary means ta conduet humanitar:an, rescue,and dsarmament operations, provide military advice and assistanee to t h i ~ d eountries,and undertake conflict prevention and peacekeeping. tt furthe: specifies that the Un:onshould be able to apply combat forces ta crisis-management tasks inc uding peacemak-

, ing and post-conflict stabilization. The Treaty observes tha: ali these tasks could also oe,appled to the fight against terrorism, and that the EU could use ESDP m i s s ~ o n s to support hird countries combating terrorist activity in their territories. VVhether ar no C the ToLentersinto foree, it is likely that this expanded definition of tne task specuum \Nili guide

ESOPin the future."

External events nevertheless drove European governn1ents to cooperate moreclosely during the course of the 1990s. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force(Unprofor), the initial peacekeeping force in Bosnia: \vas under French commancl.The French and the British provided the largest numbers on the g r o u n d ~ the Spani5h and Dutch also contributed substantial contingents. Other European COUlltries with troops in Bosnia or Croatia in early 1995 ineluded e l g i u m ~ the CzechRepuhlic, P oland, Slovakia, and Ukrainc, as \vcl1 as thc Danes, f'inns, and S\vedcswith Nonvegians in a joint Nordic battalion. French attitudcs botb to Nata andto Britain shifted further under thc experiencc of cooperation \\711.11 British forcesin thc field, ancl closeT appreciation of the ulility of Nato D1ilitary asscts. Anothel'field of closer cooperatiol1 arosc fronl pressure exerted by thc EU's sourhcrn n1enlhers [ar Mecliterrancan progran1n1es, orientecl particularIy to\varels the Maghre.lj,to parallel thc eastern-oriented Pharc progranl111e Pologrle, Nongrie: assistance a larestructuraiiml des t:cononlies and Tec:hnical Assistance to the COl1llnc)1nvealth of

,'

" .. ~ . . . . .. : -

Foreign and Security Policy 4 7budget. The Spanish presidency convened a Euro-Ivlediterranean Conferencc inBarcelona in Noven1ber 1995, \vhich con1n1itted Lhe EU in principlc to a generouslong-term progran1n1e (Sarbe 1998). -

Nevertheless, the US continued to dominate Nato and overshad()\ved SOlne ofthe cffcets of European governn1ents \-vorking closer together. For e x a l n p ] e ~ theCS) \vhich had insisted in 1991 that Yugoslavia was no v a European responsibiliry,nevertheless intervened to supply and to train Croatian forces, and dominated thenegotiations \-vhich led to the Dayton Agreen1ent in December 1995 (Neville-Jones1997). Silnilarly the l 5 through Nato continued to define East-'0/est political strategy, although \vest European governments collectively and individually provided byfar the largest proportion of economic asslstance to the former socialist states includ-1ing Russia. An1erican officials promoted a parallel Nato dialogue \vith the Maghrebistates. At the Nato summit in Brussels in january 1994 the Clinton adnlinistrationproposed to enlarge the alliance to Poland , H u n g a r y ~ and the C z ~ c h Republic, aheadof their projected accession to the ElL The accession to the EU in 1995 of three morenon-aligned states (Austria, Finland) and Sweden), to join neutral lreland, furthercOlnplicated the relationship between the EU and Nato.Britain) France, and Gennany were the key players in moves towards a more effective CFSP. Painful reasseSS111ent of post-cold-war Germ an responsiblities was leading to a gradual 'normalization) of German foreign and defence policy. Nevertheless,continuing suppon for the principle of a conscript 'citizen army' and deep cuts indefence spending Ieft its anned forces poorly structured and ill-equipped. Attitudesin the British ancl French governments \vere) ho\vever, converging. The French governnlent had explicitly lnodelled its post-Gulf-War defence review on the Britishanned forces, ending conscription to focus an a s111aller, better-equipped, and moredeployable military force. Cooperation on the ground in Bosnia built n1utual respectbetvveen the French and British military. At the poliLicallevel the British and Frenchshared similar frustrations over the reassertion of US leadership in the Balkans andthe ilnposition of the Dayton Agreen1ent. AlI this eontributed to a convergence ofattitudes bet\veen London and Paris, though the strength of Euroscepticisln withinthe British Conservative part)' and within the British press meant that its iUlplications clid not becolne evident until well after the election of a Labour governmentin M.av 1997.

\\7ith ratification of the T L ~ conlpleted only in 1993, there was little enthusiaSlTIfor the (nlajor reviev/ of CFSP in the JGC which \vas convenecl in 1996 and stretchedthrough lLali:J.l1, Irish, and Duteh Counci1 presidencies ovcr eighteen 1110nths. Proposals [reHn 111elnber goven1l11cnts for thi5 IGC rcvivecl the debate frorn five yearsearlier. As in 1990-1, intra-European negotiations on security policy and c1efencen10ved in parallel \vith developnlents \vithin Nato.

1hc concept of a European security and defence identity (ESD [ J agreed at the J3russcls Nato SU111111it in ]anuary 1994, signalled lIS wilhngness to accolIllllodate Frenchsensitivities, as \ve11 as US insjstence that the European allies should play a larger


5/13

4 8 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace

govcrnlnent announced a formal return to some parts of the Nata structure, althoughPresident Chirac Inac1e c1ear that France expected a genuinc E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n ~ of thealliance in returil. His public den1and that a french ofGcer should take over Nato'ssouthern cOlnlnand and Washington's prcdictable refusaL h o \ v e v e r ~ dashcd hopes thatFrench re-entry intoNato's integratcd lnilitary structure wcould pern1it the en1ergenceof a stronger European piUar wit.hin the alliance, c10sely integrateel \vith thc EU.

From CFSP to ESDP Britain and France as leadersGiven the reluctance of most meluber governments to clarify the strategic objectivesthat CFSP should serve, innovations in this field have carne 1110fe from responsesto externa1 erises than from IGCs. The crisis in Kosovo, a Serbian province \vith anAlbanian luajority, in 1998 sent another surge of refugees through neighbouringcountries into EU member states. The US administration led a bombing ealnpaignagainst Serbian targets; the British and French were willing in addition to deplo)'substantial ground forces. Tony Blair, the neV\7 British prime 11linister, \vas shockedto discover how feV\ troops other European governments eoulci depIo)' beyond theirborders. Over 1;000 German troops were nevertheless posted to the neighbouringformer Yugoslav Republie of Macedonia (FYROM), and German troops. participatedin the later peacekeeping force in Kosovo, after]oschka Fischer, the Green Pan)' Foreign Minister, had passionate1y argued the case for a change in Germany's attitude tohumanitarian crises beyond its borders.

Partly in response to Kosovo and partly to demonstrate the ne v governlnent'sCOilllnitn1ent ta closer European cooperatioll, the British no\v 1110ved fron1 Iaggardto Ieader in prolnoting European defence integration. In the defence realIn Britainand :=;rance stand apart horn the other EU mel11ber states. By 2008, bet\veen thelD,they accounted for 45 per cent of defence expenditure in the EU, and 60 per centof spending an defence equipment; Gern1any and ltaly accounted for a further 15per cent and 13 per cent of defence spending respectively though their equiplnentbudgets are luuch s111aller. At a bilateral Franco-British sUlnmit in Deceu1ber 1998,Blair and Chirac issued the St Malo Declaration, robustly stating that 'thc unionlnust have the capacity for autonomous aetion, backed up by crediblc militar)'forccs', with 111Clnber governnlcn ts operating 'Vv'ithin rhe insti tu tional frarnc\vod,of thc European Unjon', inc1uding 'Ineetings of defencc luinislcrs'. Intensive Franco-British consultations bctween political directors anei senior clcfencc officialscxpanded bilaterally to olher kcy EU governillents, and 1.hen to thc- US; t11e NorvVfgians; and the Turks (as Nato menlbers). \Vithin the EU the Gern1ans and Dutchwere 1110st close1y d r a \ ~ n in. Thc Social Dell1ocrat-Green c03111.10n govern111ent inBerlin i'ound it hard t.o fornlulatc a cohcrcnt responsc: the concept of Europe as apower for peacc, renouncing lnilitary anlbitions, rctaincd strong suppon anlongthe Gerlllan Ieft.

. 0-

-

-

Foreign and ecurity Policy 4 9

Tnitial rcactions in Vv'ashington vcre 111ixed. The North Atlantic Counei vvhich111el in \iVashington in April 1999 ta celebrate the fiftieth anniversarv o[ the Atlantic-Alliance and ta \\iT1conle three ne v rnc.lnbers the Czech Republic, I--Iungary,and Po1and declarcd in its careful1y balanced cOffilDuniquc thal \ve reaffirm ourCOlnnlitIDcnt to preserve the transatlantic link', but a1so 'welcolTle the new inlpetusgiven to the strengthening of a C01TIlTIOn European policy in security and defence'(Nato 1999).

The Franco-British partnership, with the support of the German Council presidency in the first six months of 1999, pushed through some significant innovations. The strategy vas to focus on EU n1ilitary eapabilities n10re than institutionalchange. They challenged their European partners ta reshape their armed forees, inorder to enable European states to manage peacekeeping operations outside theirregion \vithout depending an the US for crucial equipment and reinforcement.Their intention, ou tlined in the 1999 Cologne c O l n m u n i q u e ~ was to gain strongerc01111nitn1ents from their partners ta build dep10yable European forces, and thento 111erge \\7EU into the EU in the further IGC planned in 2000 They achievedthe first of these aims at the December 1999 European Council , which adoptedthe 'Helsinki headline goa1s', pledging EU governments collectively ta constitute aEuropean Rapid Reaction Force of up ta fifteen brigades (60,000 troops), 'militarilyself-sustaining \vith the necessary command, control and intelligenee capabilities,logistics: other c0111bat support services and a d d i t i o n a l l ~ as appropriate, air andnaval eleluents on operations beyond their b o r d e r s ~ and ta achieve this aim 'by2003) (Council of the European Union 1999c).

A follo\v-up Capabilities Comn1itment Conference, in Noven1ber 2000, identifiedthe lnajor shortcomings in \veapons and transport systems, and dre'w up a list ofpledges and priorities. The \vorking nlethod was similar ta that af the Lisbon econ0111ic-refornl process: intended to spread 'best practice' from the most advanced tathe laggards; and to shame the most deficient govemn1ents into improving their performances. Nineteen \vorlzing groups vere set up to consider each target and shortfallin 1110re detail. As sa often before, the US was sponsoring a parallei process through1\0.1.0, the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Neither process, however, made muchimpact 011 lnost governlnents. Meetings of EU defence lninisters received ahnost noattention in parlialnents ar press. Competing pressures an national budgets blockedany reversal in the recluction of defence spending. The Gennan government, after theeffon required ta persuacle the Bundestag to depIoy troops to o s o v o ~ diseouragedcliscussion of \vhcther the Rapid Reactiol1 Forcc l11ight be sent beyond Europe toAfrica ar the Middlc East. In south-eastern Europe, ho\vever1 the succession of criseshad IeEt behincl a rTIuch higher 1evel of European political and 11lilitary engagc.n1ent.i\S the Pentagon \vithcJIT\V l.J5 troops frOTII deployrnents in Bosnia and Kosovo, thenUDlber of contributing European countries rase.

Only the British and Frcnch governnlents vvere yet prepared ta project lnilitaryforces beyond Europe for luore than lJN peacekecping operations. A slnall Britishforcc re-estabhshed order in Sierra Leonc in 2001, after a UN force of over 17,000


6/13


had [ailed to contain civil conflict. French forces intervened in Cote d'lvoire in 2002.In a gesture o[ shared COlll111itnlent to the stability of a continent \vhere. FrancoBri tish rivah-y haei persisted into the 1990s, the British and French foreign 1ninisterstravelled round Africa together the same yeaL Nordic governments, the Irish andAustrians had long contributed a UN peacckeeping operations in Africa and the1viiddle East. While EU 111en1ber states have for decades contributed to U-N peacekeeping missions) the number of troops deployed rose significantly in the context ofthe Balkan crises. Ioday, EU member-state governments sustain bet\veen 60,000 and70\000 troops an international crisis-management operations. \Vhile deploYlnentsare conducted through many frameworks, including the UN and since 2003 the EU s

E S ~ Nato remains dominant.

CFSP in the context of eastern enlargementThe implications of the EU s forthcoming eastern enlargement for the Europeanregion preoccupied European governments much more directly. lf enlargement isseen as a part of the EU s foreign policy (see Chapter 17), the ext,ension of security,prosperity, and democracy within a strong international frame\vork across easternEurope must be counted as a lnajor achievement. The Helsinki European Councilof December 1999 a150 sa\v reluctant heads of state and governlnent accept Iurkey as a forn1al candidate, under intense US pressure based on Iurke;/s strategicimportance to western interests across the Middle East. Negotiations \vith Russia,with which the EU now shared a common bordel' jointly lnanaged in un\vieldyfashion by representatives of the COll11nission, the High R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ~ and therotating Council Presidency ranged from relations \vith Belarus to energy security (see Chapter 15) to the future of Kaliningrad (the Russian region surroundedbv EU lnen1ber states), ta cross-border crilninal netvlarks. Nato enlargementwhich passed another milestone \vith the Prague SUlnnlit of 2 0 0 2 ~ \vas relativelystraightforward in institutional tenns. ElT enlargement necessitatecl delicateadjustlnents of COlnmon policies, financial flo\vs, institutional e p r e s e n t a t i o n ~ andvoting weights.

Postponelnent of decision on these issues in the Ireat)' of An1sterdan1 (IoA) requireda further IGC, ending \virh President Chirac)s mislnanaged late-night c0111promisesat Nice in Decen1ber 2000. This failure, in turn, sparkecl the propo5al for a broaderConvention on the Future of Europe, \vhich n1et fron1 lnid-2002 to Jul-y 2003, \vithrepresentativesofthirteen candidate states i n c i u d i n g B L l l g a r i a ~ ROlnania, and Turkey)as participating observcrs. Meanwhile the European C0I111nission v/as atternptlng tofocus the attcntion of 111elllber governments on the ilnplications of enJargClncnt forthe wider European periphery, east and south. 1n carIy 200.3 it floated proposals fora broader European neighbourhood policy (ENP), ain1cd al providing a franlf\Vorkfor economic cooperation and political consultation for the states araund thc EU seastern and southern borders: con1n1on foreign policy in effecL) but cleGned andmanaged through civilian instrUi11ents (sec Chapter 17).

.. :,..... ,. .yr .- : : . .

Foreign and Securty Policy 44

Coordination in Brussels but decisions-in national capitalsThe CFSP pillarren1ains largely in the hands of the member governments, althoughit i5 110\V supplemented by a cluster of Brussels-based institutions. Intensive

. transgovernn1entalism thus has becolne the dOlllinantpolicy mode (see Chapter 4),and its character is changing) in particularas a result of the structures created n thev.rake of the decision to launch ESDP Heads of state and governlnent remain ultimatelyresponsible for CFSP and its overall direction through the European Council. TheGeneral Affairs and External Relatons Council (GAERC, up to 2002 called theGeneral-Affairs Council), \vhich brings together melnber states' foreign lninisters inmonthly 111eetings, is the main decision-making body in practice. To manage betterthe ever-gro\ving agenda j GAERC is divided into two sessions. The first, prepared bythe COlnlnittee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), deals with internal palieycoordination alnong governlnents and the second, prepared by the Political andSecuritv COlnn1ittee P S C ~ also knovvnafteritsFrenchacronym COPS) in coordination\vith Coreper, addre5ses the external din1ension. \A/hile there i5 stiU no formalCouncil of Defence Ministers, they have met in informal sessions under G.l.L\.ERC1.0 discuss military-capability questions since 2002. Furthermore) EU melnber-statedefence lninisters serve as the steering board of the European Defence Agency CEDA),\vhich \vas created in 2004. The European Council and the GAERC are supported bythe Council Secretariat: which has acquired a substantial nUlnber of foreign affairsofficials as ve11 as a militarv staff.

1The Conncil S forn1ally empo vered to appoint special repre5entatives'forparticularpolicy issues generalizing the experiment adopted (vvith Lord Carrington, DavidOVlen, and CarI Bildt) [ar the Yugoslav wars. In autumn 2009, the EU had elevenspecial representativcs (ElTSRs) in different regions of the world which pron10te EUpolicies and seek to contribute ta their overa11 coherence and effectiveness by actingas the :face of the Union: Afghanistan and Pakistan, the African Great Lakes Region,the African U n i o n ~ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia and Georgia, Kosovo, theformeI Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)1 the Middle East, Moldova, the .South Caucasus, and Sudan.

The PSC. created 011 an interim basis in 2000, was formalized in 2001 and is the:,uccessor to the Political Con1111itteeofEPe. Unlikc its p r e d e c e s s o r ~ its D1cmbers arealI based in B r u s s e l s ~ pennanent national representatives with ambassadorial rank\


7/13


The creation of the PSC in iLS current fann elearly refJccts reeognition on the panof Inember-state governments that coordination al. the centre had ta be strengthencd.However, thc PSC is a1so a good example of the efforts governn1cnts undcrtake toillaintaintight control of the Brussels-based institutions that thcy created in thc fidel offoreign and security policy. Governlnents had rather diverging vie.v Ts an ho\v seniortheir representatives in the PSC should be, with son1e reasoning that more junior an1-bassadors would be easier to control from capitals. Ivlore subsrantively, the divergentviews relating to the 2003 invasion of lraq illustrate that national governments \vill notbe shy ta put the brakes an if the stakes are perceived to be high. Several PSC alubassadors were issued rigid and unequivocal instructions from their respective ll1inistries offoreign affairs to resist discussion in the EU on the issue of lraq (Hoviorth 2007).

An important institutional innovation under the IoA \vas the ereation of the postofHigh Representative for CFSP\vhichwas merged with the post ofSecretaY)T General ofthe Council (HRlSG). lts holder is part of the troika consisting since the ToA alsoof the Council presidency and the COlumissioner for external relations, and is assistedbya small Policy Unit to develop poliey and assess relevant events. The job descriptionfor the High Representative was imprecise, beyond 4assisting: the Council. Ho\vever,the first High Representative, former Nato Seeretary General: ]avier Solana, has lnadehimself the external face of CFSp, tirelessly travelling, in and ou of Belgrade, Mosco\v,W a s h i n g t o n ~ and across the Middle East, while carefully avoiding too open a challengeto luember-stateautholity.As in the debate about the seniority of PSC representatives)luember governments clicl not see eye ta eye when discussing the desirability ofhavinga political and diplon1atic heavyweight like Salana in the HR/SG position. The UK inparticular favoured a more junior appointment whereas more integrationist-mindedgovernn1ents aud the Comn1ission had argued that the post should be located insidethe COlTIIUission rather than the Council.

The limited roles played by the European C o m m i s i o n ~ the Ep and the EuropeanCourt ofjustice (EC]) further underline the dominance of the 111ember governmentsthrough intergoven1mental structures. The Commission has only a non-exclusiveright of initiative for CFSP and despite involvement through the COllUl1issioner forexternal relations in the reforn1cd troiha it is in a difficult position to exert influence.However, given the multi-faceted nature of mast foreign- and security-policy issues,the Cammission, in its rale of running external economic relations 1 is sOluetin1esable to exploit crass-pillar linkages to make its voice heard. In response ta the creation of CFSP and ESDP it has furthe.r adapted its structures, for example throughthe crcation of a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management UniL (CPCMU) anc1 afurther increase of the nUlnber of units ~ T i t h i n directorates-general responsible. foraspects of extenlal relations. The EP retnains linlitecl to provic1ing running C0111-1l1cntary ou CFSP The treaty rules stipulate that the parhanlent.'s vie\vs on al] CFSPlnatters have ta he taken into account, but in practice 111uch depends on the Councilproviding a steady f L O ~ T of infonnation and an M.EPs, especial 1y in relevant spccialized comluittees, developing the necessary expertisc to strengthcn the Parhame.nt'svaice. The Ee] rC1TIains exc1uded from the CFSP pillar.

. . .. , ..

Foreign and Security Policy 44

Political resistancc to the encroachnlent of the COD1Illission and the EP into thcsecond pillar has lcssened throughsuccessive IGCs. Duplication ofIunctions betweenthe Con1mission and the noVv substantial externa1 DG E of the Council Secretariat\vas contained by easy personaj relatioI1s between So1ana and Chrislophcr Patten,thc then COTI11Uissioncr for External Relations. Burcaucratic rivalrv is nevcrthelessa constant problen1, in particular horn those within the Comn1ission who vicw theexpansion of the Couneil Secretariat as a threat to its powers and privileges. There\\Tre turf battles: too, over funding CFSP activities: the Commission and the EP\\Tere seeking to use the 1 per cent of external aetion expenditure 60 million)alloeated to the CFSP ta introduce Community procedures and oversight, whilegovernments \vere torn bet\:veen seeking additional COlnUl0n funding and defendingthe intergovernn1ental approach. Adlninistrative expenditure for the second pillarand non-lnilitary operational expenditure can now be charged ta the EU budget,leaving operations having military or defence implications; ta be funded by thosestates \vhich have not exereised their right of constructive abstentiol1 in each case.

ESDP triggered a further raft of institutional engineering in Brussels. The EU Military Comlnittee (EUTvIe): the Union s highest military body, was created in 2001ad in[eriln from 2000 and brings together member states ehiefs of defence

(CHODs). The Ellj\1C usually meets in the form of the CHODs military representatives, \vho are often double-hatted with their nation s representatives at Nato. TheEUi\1C provides unanimous advice and recommendations an military nlatters ofESDP ta the Council, channelled through the PSC. For example, it evaluates different options for ESDP missions, oversees the development of an operations plan, andmonitors the conduct of ESDP operations.

The Ee N1ilitary Stafe no\v l1lore than 200 strong, \\Tas set up at the salne tinle.It ,vork5 under the political direction of the European Council through the PSC

, ,ancl under the militarv direction of the EUMC. It eonstitutes the pernlanentJ

Brussels-based luilitary expertise that the EU can draw on for early warningpurposes, situation asseSSlnent (and intelligence cooperation), and strategicplanning tasks. It i5 organized like a directorate-general within the Counci1Secretariat. It houses a civil-tnilitary planning ceU and, since January 2007,the nucleus of an operations centre vvhich can, if reinforced through national

s e c o n d n 1 e n t s ~ run autonomous ESDP ll1isslons of up to about 2,000 personnel. '1Ylirroring these lnilitary bodies on the civilian side are: the Committee for Civilian

Aspects of Crisis l'vlanageluent (CIVCOM) and the Civilia11 Planning and ConductCapability (CPCC ). CIVCOlvl adviscs and drafts recommendations for the PSC oncivihan aspects of cri5is Inanagclnent. The cpec has a luanclate to plan and concluctcivilian ESDP opcrations ancl in general assist thc Council with regarcl to civilian1111ss10ns. Thc ercc Director serves as EU Civilian Operations COffiTnandcr.F i n a l l ~ severa1 agencies play ilnportant enabling rales. The l:DA is warking ande[ence capabilitics clevclopll1ent, armaments cooperatiop., the European defencctechnological and industrial base and defencc equipn1cnt lllarket, and research andtcchnolog)'. Thc \vork of theFDA docs not seek 1.0 replace national defencc-planning


8/13

Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace

or eapabilities-developn1ent proccsses with a European-level equivalent but ratheroperates as a facilita tor and ta some degree coordinator of such processes. The EDAsuffers from divergent British and French viey\ls of itspril11ary objective: v/hethcr1.0 foeus an raising the effectiveness of national forces and their equiplnenL orto prolllote defence procurelnent frorn European manufacturers. The agency hasatten1pted to co11ect comprehensive data on defence l)rO a ralun1es undenvav ando jdefence-spending trends across member states, although some governments haveresisted publication of their data (Witney 2008). Its steering board consists ofnational defence ministers, chaired by the HRJSG: it thus remains firmly in the handsof the member governments. Furthern10re, the EU incorporated the \\7ElTs Institute for Security Studies in 2001 and the satellite centre in Iorrejon, S p a i n ~ \vhichproduces and analyses space-based imagery in support of CFSP To provide trainingin the field of ESDP, the Council set up the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in July 2005. The ESDC is a virtual institution organized as a net\vorkbetween national i n s t i t u t e s ~ colleges, and academies.

The institutional set-up clearly sho\vs a grovving trend tovvards more coordinationat the EU level in CFSP and ESDP and thus represents a marginal shift frolll the original and whol1y intergovemmental 1110del of EPe toward5 closer association v.ith theestablished Brussels institutions and thus ith intensive transgovernn1enta lism (seeChapter 4). The resuIt is a ren1arkably complex machinery \\lhich is intended ta makethe EU a more effective actor in the seculit:y realm through coordinatiol1 of nationalpolices. However, it is clear that govemments are careful not to relinquish control.

From Iraq to the European Security StrategyThe policies pursued by President George l Bush provided an external shock tothe EU's 1005e1y coordinated structures for foreign polie) . President Bushs flrstvisit to Europe, for an Ell-US sunlnlit in Gothenburg inJune 2001, \vas a disaster)when fifteen heads of governnlent repeated criticisn1S of US policy on climate

c h n g e ~ having failed ta agree what messages to convey ta their most importantexternal partner.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 follo\ved three lTIonths later. European governments expressed their solidarity vvith the US by invoking for the first tinlf everNato)s collective defence clause, Article 5. In gathering support for its plannedintervention jn Afghanistan the US ncvertheless ignored both Nato and thc Ee asconsllltative fOrU111S, \vorking bilat.erally 'w1th the lnajor European states. UnderlJS cOlnmand, French German, and Spanish ships patrolled the Indian C)ccan jBritish air 1.an kers refucllcd US planes , aud special. [orces fr 1TI several Europeancountries, includ ing Dennl(uk an d GermanYl operated inside Afghanis tanlnarking a furthcr point of transition in thc gradual adjusnnent of European governn1ents to globa1 CO111 n l n H ~ n t s

ln moving rapidly on honl Afghanistan to Iraq, US policy-makers luade evenless efron to carry thcir European allies \vith thC111. The flilnSy st.ructures of CFSP

, 0.. I , ~ . o o.

Foreign and Security Policy 5

vveakened furthcr bv the Jeterioration in Dcrsonal relations between British ancl,French lcaders ancl by the domestic poHtics of a Genllan election campaign, buckledunder the. strain. Thc British offered full public suppare in the hopc of influencing thedirection of 1]5 policy, anel Britisb troops entered ]raq with the US. Thc Frenchrefused 5Upport for an invasion \vithout lJS conce5sions , and resisted thc British-USeffarts to gain authorization [rolu the UN Securitv Council for militarv action. The. jFranco-Gennan clain1 Lo represent 'European) opposition to the invasion provokedcompeting statenlents by other groups of governn1ents. In April 2003 the Belgiangovernment vvorsened divisions by eonvening a sU111mit ta discuss an independentEuropean defenee headquarters. \vhich only the French, German, and Luxembourgheads of government attended. Washington policy-nlakers eelebrated the division bet\veen 'old Europe) and ~ n e r Europe), as Donald RUlnsfeld, US Secretary ofDefence) dubbed it 1 playing on transatlantic loyalties of the ten east European countries about to join the EU. Disintegration of a COlnnlon European foreign policyover the invasion of Iraq) in the winter of 2002-3, revealed the wide gap between a'colnnlon1 policy, created out of political negotiations among heads of governmentand foreign ministries, and a 'single) policy built 011 integrated institu tions and expenditure and an a Europe-\vide public debate.

The intervention in Iraq constituted the sharpest crisis in transatlantic relations since 1973-4. The underlying issue for CFSP remained how far Europeangovernments should converge to\vards an autonon10US international role l asopposed to one roated \vithin the Atlantic frame\vork and under US leadership.Bitter \vords among Europe's political leaders, and across the Atlantic, did not,ho\vever1 prevent a rapid return to cooperation among EU governments. Here,as after previous crises 1 the European response ta failure \vas to re-establish collaboration\ on a firn1er base vI/here possible, following the path set by establishedins titu ion5.

In]une 2003 o l a n a ~ s Secretariat produceda draft European Security Strategy (ESS),Secure Europe in a Better \:V orld, partly as a response to the Bush adlninistration's 2002

National Security Strategy, but also as a ll1eans of stimulating an EU-wide debate. Arevised version \vas adopted by heads of government at the Decelnber 2003 EuropeanCouncil (Couneil of the European Union 2003b . Te llingly) the 2003 ESS receivedscarcelyanymentioninnationalmedia,andlittleornoattentioninnationalparliaments.National governments, in spite of approving the dOCU111ent 1 had not \vanted toencourage an open debatc. lts prol11inent place in the Brusscls-bascc1 cliscours e onsecuri ty affairs thus sCr v'ed to \vidcn the gap between Brussel s anel national capitals)\vhcre prior assuI11ptions and connnitnlents continued to drive defence polie)'. TheBritish and French governn1enls were pushing the ESDP agenda fOT \\Tard togetheronly 1110nths aher thc invasion of Iraq (Menon 2004). Frustrated at the [ailure ofother governn1cnts in 1.he 111u1tilateral capabilities-pledging process to achieve theHelsinki goals, thcy declared in February 2004 that they vvould advance in defcnccthrough 'cnhanced coopcration'; they announced that they would provide 'battlegroups' in rcsponse to international crises, and invited thosc othcr lnelubers (or


9/13

44. 6 Bastian Giegerich andWilliamWallace

-

groLlps of lllcmbers) which could delllonstratc a c0111parable capability to join thenl,The Gennan governlnent announced its COlll111itlnent tojoin thenl the follo\ving, L_- day (Ins1.1 tutc- for Security Studies 2004) _The battlegroups concept \vas adoptecl at

l ~ U I e v e l in J\1ay 2004 within the f r a n H ~ w o r k of the 111iliw.ry J-Iead1ine Goal 2010 secBox 18_2)_

Under the pressures of US demands for burden-sharing inhibitions overlong-range military deployment were giving way. Every EU member government (except those of Cyprus and Malta) has contributed troops ta Afghanistansincc the enel of 2001. Recognizing their shared interest in a stable ou tcarnein lraq, despite the divisions caused by the 2003 invasion: no fe\ver than fifteen governments fro111 the post-2004 EU25 contribu ted troops to post-conflict

,reconstructlon.

. , .. -B ()X'1:8 -'2 ,.-. ;' ... ::.. .. . : . . . . . . . : .. .:;.: : ' ........ .. . ... . . ' ... .

The Couneil of Minister s declared in May 2004 that the 'abilityfor the EU to deploy force'I packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or aspart of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases, is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal_ These mininlu m force packages must be military effeetive, credible and coherent and should be broad\y based an the battlegroups concept' (piess reiease, 2,582ndCouneil Mee1ing, General Affairs and External Relations r 17 ~ v i a y 2004). Batt egroupscan be provided by individual member states or as a rnultinational force package. Highreadiness is rotated an six monthly schedules. Since the EU aims ta have the capability to conduct two rapid response operations at onC8, four siots neeo te be filied eachyeaL An EU battlegroup, a particular military rapid reaction element has the follovvingcharacte ristics:

its generic composit on is capable of stand-alone operations across ali crisis management tasks included in ESDP's remit; it is based on a combined-arms battalion-sized foree reinforced v'I'ith comba: sup

port and combat service support units leading ta a gelleric s ~ l e n g t h of about 1,500troops;

it can be initially sustained in theatre for 30 days, a period that can be ex:ellded ta120 it the battlegroup is resupplied appropriately; and

it is deployable vvithin 5 10 days of a decision to launch an operation.At a Military Commitments Conference in November 2004 EU member states agl-eedta set up the first thirteen battlegroups, with initial operationai capability hom January2005 and full operational capability from January 2007. Since 2007 the EU has hcd aminimunl of two battlegroups on standby caii at ali times, Although the target strength o'fa battlegroup is set at 1,500 troops, the tata involved can exceed 3,000 vI/hen aii supportand enabling capabilities are taken into account.

- - - - - - - - - , , - - - - - - - - - - - - --_ __._--------,,-,,------ --______

.. : . . .. - .. .


10/13


ESDP enters the real worldESDP becan1e operational in 2003, when the formally toah. over COlnmand of thelTIodest civil and 111ilitary operations in FYROM. It took over n1ilitary responsibilityErom Nato for the much larger mission in Bosnia in December 2004. By the end of2008 no fe\ver than t\venty-three missions) ahnost all small and most of thenl civilian in nature) had been launched (Table 18.1). The overall deploYlnent of Europeantroops an operations outside the boundaries of the EU and Nato rose froIn 40-50.000in the late 1990s ta over 70,000 from 2003 an thU5 surpassing the target of theHeadline Goals even as they missed their formal deadline. The pereentage of theseactually deployed through the EU nevertheless remained l o v l ~ nlost vv ere cOlnmittedto Nato operations\ ar were part of UN peacekeeping missions (Giegerich and \Vallace 2004; IISS 2008). EU oJ2erations were limited to the lower end of the spectrumof military tasks; even then, they relied on Nato assets (and of en on Ukrainian airtransport) for logistical support, and were deficient in command-and-control andoperational-planning capabilities, as \vell as in tactical airlift.

The EU's decisions to deploy a military mission to the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC) in 2003 and 2006 under the ESDP heading and the failure ta do so atthe end of 2008 serve as good illustrations that the EU is in some cases able to deliversubstantially, in particular if there is strong leadership from a major playeL \vhiledifferences among capitals continue to throw up obstacles. On 11 May 2003, Franceindicated that it was willing to deploy a force to Bunia in the DRC follovving a requestfrom the UN Secretary-General for a stopgap measure to reinforce the UN missionalready in country in the face of a deteriorating securit)' situatioll. Having securedassurances for a UN Chapter VII mandate, with agreenlent [roln the relevant regionalplayers including on the lin1ited nature of the operation in tenns of time and scope,the French governn1ent officially announced ils readiness to conduct the operation.French planning for what \vas then dubbed Operation 1vlamba' \vas already \\.'ellUnder\\1ay v/hen then President Chirac re.cognized this as an opportunity to sho\vcase ESDP on operations . It was onl1' then that Operation Arten1is: the ESDP lnis

s i o n ~ vas born in essence a Europe.anized French operation built on the Frenchdesire ta demonstrate that ESDP could ODerate autonomouslv in Africa \vhich ena-/bled the Council's decision of 12]une 2003 to launch the operation.

When in 2006 the El] \vas again asked to reinforee temporarily the lJN:s presence in the DRC to help ensure security around the presiclcntial elections schcduledfor 30 July, the absence of such detennined leadership provecl problell1atic. Francelnadc clear that it v\louJd not lead again and was looking to Gernlany to fin this Tolc.Pressure on Gennany rase further after the UK indicate.d it \vould not partjcipare inany significant way owing to overstretch in its anned forces, then heavily engaged inAfghanistan and lraq. Gcrmany, howevcr) found it difficuh to fon11 a coherentp o s i t i o n ~ with the Minister of Defence sencling confusing signals regarding \vhetherGennany was \villing to lead. A lacl


11/13


12/13

452 Bastian Giegerich and Wil l iam Wallace

defection [ron1 the princip1e of solidarity (Box] 8.3). 1 i5 hard ta disagrce \vith thebitter conclusion of the first head of the EDA, that (nlen1ber states anei Brusselsinstitutions have ignored the need [or cohere11t strategies, i111prcrvised inlportantoperations, and taken refuge in process as an easier option than delivering real\vor1e changel (Wi ney 2008: 8).

From 1969 ol1\\lards, Ffench governments have driven CFSP forvvard. Their Belgian, e r n l a n ~ and Italian counterpart5 have supported institution-building) thoughpreferring a lnore supranational framework. They have not, ho\vever, shared Frenchstrategic objectives, or France s willingness to invest in military instruments to fulfi1thClll. In ternlS of defence 1 Britain and France constitute the dominant p1ayers;agreement bet\veen them launched ESDP. The cooling of the British Labour goven1-TIlent tovvards the project} and the major conlmitments of British forces to lraq andAfghanistan, have contributed to the 510\\1 pace of progress in the ten years sinceSt MaIa. The grea test obstacle has, h o w e v e r ~ been the reluctance of other govern-11lents ta invest in the equipment needed, or ta reshape their anned forces to be ableto operate effectiveIy outside the EU ta the shared frustration of the British andFrench governnlents. ESDP has created the as-yet unfulfilled promise of comprehensive (civil and milital) ) crisis 11lanagelnent, which adds a crucial building blockto CFSP While ESDP operations so far have been nl0derately successfu1 \vithinthe limitations defined by their parall1eters an the ground) they in the end are yetanother reminder of the difficulties EU menlber governnlents face as they try ta aligntheir cOlllmonly agreed aspirations \vith actual policy outpUL

\Vest European integration was built an a revulsion against lvlachtpoIitik Extension of the EU across southern, central, and eastern Europe has created \vhat thehead of Solana s CFSP Secretariat called a postmodern) state systenl, fron1 \vhichforce has been excluded and across which human rights and civil liberties areenforced (Cooper 2003). lv1any intellectuals and politicians \vithin European COUlltries \\lould 1ike to extend this civilizing process to the rest of the \vorld, throughcivilian instrlunents and moral example thus justifying the lO\\T level of lnilitaryspending by lnany vvest European governments (Linklater 2005; 1\1anners 2008).The EU is nO\\1 a civilian pO\\Ter in a lin1ited nUlnber of f i e l d s ~ \vhich is lllakingsome progress to\vards shared civi]-1l1ilitary capabilities. A rising proportion (no\vapproaching 10 per cent) of its COffilllon budget is spent an externa1 relations,including nation-building in south-east Europe; further development of neighbourhaod Dolicv would increase this further.

Thc El] punches belo\.v its \veight in international diplornacy including in theinternational institutions through \vhich civihan po\ver 11light best be cxcrcised.Dependencean the US for hard security and for leadership in 111anaging extra-Europeansecurity threats betrays idealist daillls to clistinctively civilian po"\vcr. Thc absencc ofa European public space of a shared public debate, cOlllnlunicating through sharecl

. nlcdia, think tanks, poliricat p a r t i e s ~ responding to and critlcizing 3uthoritativepolicy-nlakers lcaves issues of global strategy ancl externa} threats ta Sl11a11 groupsof professianals. A transnationa1 expert C01l1111unity has gradl1ally developed across

". ' - - 0_. ;,. -

Foreign and Securi ty Policy 45: .. .. llDX.18.3. Treaty ofLisbonprovisions forCFSP

IiIIjIII;,,,

IIi,,

~ \ J e w for-eign policy irstitutional arrangements in the Treaty of Lisbon: Tile ne\'v EU High Representative (EUHR), taking over the functions of Presidency,

High Representative, and Commissioner for External Relatons and apPonted by theEuropean Couneii and Parliament for up to two five-year terms, will be responsible tothe Couneil Tor the ieadershio, management. and implementation of the EU's foreignand seeurity policy. -he EU H R wi l at the same time be Vice President of the Commsson, responsiblefor aii of the Commissi01'S activities in the external relatons field, either directly, orin a eoordinating role where other Commssoners have the lead (e.g. enlargemen(development, trade, energy, climate change).

The EU H R will be assisted for the purpose of externa representation by an ExternaAction Service (EAS), dravl/ing together officials from the Couneil Secretariat andCommission engaged in external affairs and diplomats seconded from the diplomatic services 07 the member states.

ihe EU will have a solidarity clause (Art. 222) and a mutual assistance clause (Art. 42.7).The assistance clause ealls on EU member states ta aid each other n case of armedaggressior on a rf1,ember's territory and to do sa with 'aii means in their power . Thesolidarity clause eommits EU member states to support each other in the event oflerrorist attaeks or natural and man-made disasters. While the clause refers ta militarv assets, it \ y' I be left ta member states to decide what kind of assistance theywould provide,

"The Pe"Lersberg Tasks arc be redefined. Lsbon lists these as joint disarmamentoperations, numar:itarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks,conflict prevention arid peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, inciuding peace-making and post-conflict stabilization ... aII these tasksmay contribute to tlle flght against terrorism, includ ng by supporting third cauntriesin combating terrorism in their territories'. A start up fund is envisaged through which member states could agree to fundsome activitles outside the EU budget.

. Further innovations are the provisions regarding permanent structured cooperation. (Art. 42.6 and Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation) which allo\;vs thosemember states whose military capabi ities fulfi higher criteria and whieh have mademore binding commitments ta ane another in this area with a view ta the mostdemanding operations to set up a leadership group seeking closer cooperation butwithin the overail rramewol-k of the EU.

Afull-time president of t ile European Counci , with a twa-Elnd-a-half year mandate,renewable onee, is at that level ta 'ensure the external representation of the unionon ssues concern-Ing its cornmon foreign and security policy'.

_ _ -----_ . _._- . - -._--------------

thc EL, COlll111unicating tlltough specialist journals and think tanks 1 such as the EUInstitute for Security Studies\ but it has developcd only \\7cak links \\7ith nationa]political debates.


13/13

5 Bastian Giegerich and Williarn WallaceEuropean coopcration in foreign policy has gOlle bcyond thc [r,llllev\/ork r sov

creign state cliplo111acy, bUl stiU rcrnains far short of an iIltegratecl singlc pobe)', \vithin1.cgratcd clip]onlatic, flnancial, ancl u1ilitary in5lTU111cnts. Thc dCH111nant lnodc of po1-iCY-lllaking sec Chaptcr 4) i5 predolllinantly intensivc traDsgovernnlen tahsnl dlllongforeign lninistrics \vithin the EU ancl an10ng cJnbassics in third countrles. \t\Tithin itsresu-ieted fields of CODTpetcnce for external rclations thc European COlllnlission pur-sucs the COlTIlnunity 111Cthod 1 v ith national rcpresentatives IDoniloring its anlbitiollSto extend its authority. Variable geometry i5 a frequent characteristic, both in closeTcooperarion bet\v een Britain and France, of en also vvith Gennany in an in forn1alleadership group of states with active international interests, and also across the EU s external boundaries, \vith Turkey Norw-ay, and even Switzcrland contributing to externalactions. ToL proposals for enhanced cooperation might rcinforcc thi5 tfend,

There relnain evident tensions between national autonolny and con1111on polie)';and (particularly for the smaller meluber states) bet\veen national passivity anc1 theacceptance of the 'global responsibilitiesl which the European Security Strategyspelled out. Acceptance of shared responsibilities and institutions since 1970 hadbeen driven as much by a succession of external de111ands and crises, hOTIl acrossthe Atlantic and froln the USSR (later Russia) and the :\1iddle East, as by competing Gaullist and federalist grand designs. It seelned likely that further deve1oplllent would sin1ilarly be driven by external pressures, but \vith the significant pathdependence of established structures and procedures through \vhich to respond.

FURTHER RE DINGThere is a substantial and growing literature an the various aspects of European foreigr:and defence policy as well as on the broader field of EU externalmlations. a -::holougnintmduction to the field see Hill and Smith (2005). K. E. Smith (2003) and rvi. E. Smith(2004) examine the gradual development of foreign poiicy cooperation. HO\tvorth (2007)and Jones (2007) trace the developnlent of ESDP. Ca:isnaes et al. 2004:, oner a moretheoretical approach. The series of Chaillot Papers from the EU Institute fOi Securit\, Stud-ies provide case studies of CFSP and ESDp, as well as compilations of primarv sourcematerial, fllost recently Gliere (2008). Journals such as Surviva/and the Eurooean Fore.rgnAffairs Review are Llseful on recent developn1811ts.Carlsnaes, W., Sjursen, H., and White, B. (2004) eds.), Conternporary European F oreign

Policv(London: Sage).Gliere, C. (2008), EU Security and Oefence: Core Oocurnerns 2007 VoI. VI/I, Olaillot Paper

No. 112 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies).Hill, c. and Snlith, M (2005) (eds.), International He/ations and the European Union (Oxford:

Oxford University Press).

. .,.-.i .;1 .i .>f .I ..

.

,,,,,;r .l;., .,, .}i

,

Foreign anei Security Policy 55Ho\."'/orth, J. (2007), Securit} anei Oefenco PolicV In tlie European Union (B8sinqstoke:

j-Jalgrave Vi2cmiilem).Jones, S. G. (2007), n Je Rise of Europeaft ecurity Cooperation (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversit'y' Press).Srnith, K. E. (2003), European Union F oreign PolicV in a Changing lIVorld (Canlbridge: Po ilyl.SITlith, rv1. E (2004), Curope's Foreign and Secu rity Policy:The Institutionalization of Coopera-

tion ,CslTbridge: Cambridge University Press).

-

Date post:	04-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	camelia-prica
View:	228 times
Download:	0 times

PESC-Wallace, Pollack, Young

Documents