P(eter) F. Strawson ‘On Referring’

•Let’s talk about real language, not pretend language.

•We must distinguish expressions (words, phrases, sentences), uses of expressions, and utterances of expressions.

•Russell’s theory of descriptions is an attempt to solve a problem that arises only if we neglect to make this distinction.

•More generally: expressions don’t refer to things, and sentences aren’t true or false; only uses of expressions have these properties.

(1) Pierre utters ‘the king of France is wise’ during the reign of Louis XIV. (2) Marie utters ‘the king of France is wise’ during the reign of Louis XIV. (3) Jean utters ‘the king of France is wise’ during the reign of Louis XV. Strawson says: •Pierre, Marie, and Jean produced three different utterances of the same sentence.

•Pierre and Marie made the same use of the sentence (they both said something true), but Jean made a different use of it (he said something false).

•Pierre and Marie made the same use of the description ‘the present king of France’ (they referred to Louis XIV), but Jean made a different use of it (he referred to Louis XV).

Meaning (in at least one important sense) is a function of the sentence or expression; mentioning and referring and truth or falsity, are functions of the use of the sentence or expression. To give the meaning of an expression (in the sense in which I am using the word) is to give general directions for its use to refer to or mention particular objects or persons ; to give the meaning of a sentence is to give general directions for its use in making true or false assertions. (p.327)

Let us call the sentence “The king of France is wise” the sentence S. Then the first argument is as follows:

(1) The phrase, ‘the king of France’, is the subject of the sentence S.

Therefore (2) if S is a significant sentence, S is a sentence about the king of France.

But (3) if there in no sense exists a king of France, the sentence is not about anything, and hence not about the king of France.

Therefore (4) since S is significant, there must in some sense (in some world) exist (or subsist) the king of France.

Let us call the sentence “The king of France is wise” the sentence S. Then the first argument is as follows:

(1) The phrase, ‘the king of France’, is the subject of the sentence S.

Therefore (2) if S is a significant sentence, S is a sentence about the king of France.

But (3) if there in no sense exists a king of France, the sentence is not about anything, and hence not about the king of France.

Therefore (4) since S is significant, there must in some sense (in some world) exist (or subsist) the king of France.

← Russell rejects (1).

Let us call the sentence “The king of France is wise” the sentence S. Then the first argument is as follows:

(1) The phrase, ‘the king of France’, is the subject of the sentence S.

Therefore (2) if S is a significant sentence, S is a sentence about the king of France.

But (3) if there in no sense exists a king of France, the sentence is not about anything, and hence not about the king of France.

Therefore (4) since S is significant, there must in some sense (in some world) exist (or subsist) the king of France.

← Strawson rejects (1).

← Strawson rejects (2).

And the second argument is as follows :

(1) If S is significant, it is either true or false.

(2) S is true if the king of France is wise and false if the king of France is not wise.

(3) But the statement that the king of France is wise and the statement that the king of France is not wise are alike true only if there is (in some sense, in some world) something which is the king of France.

Hence (4) since S is significant,there followsthe same conclusion as before.

And the second argument is as follows :

(1) If S is significant, it is either true or false.

(2) S is true if the king of France is wise and false if the king of France is not wise.

(3) But the statement that the king of France is wise and the statement that the king of France is not wise are alike true only if there is (in some sense, in some world) something which is the king of France.

Hence (4) since S is significant,there followsthe same conclusion as before.

← BR rejects (3).

And the second argument is as follows :

(1) If S is significant, it is either true or false.

(2) S is true if the king of France is wise and false if the king of France is not wise.

(3) But the statement that the king of France is wise and the statement that the king of France is not wise are alike true only if there is (in some sense, in some world) something which is the king of France.

Hence (4) since S is significant,there followsthe same conclusion as before.

← BR rejects (3).

↓ PFS rejects (1).

Assertion vs. Presupposition Strawson thinks that we should distinguish two kinds of things that the meanings of sentences allow us to do with them:

(1) ’The present king of France is wise.’ is used to: (a) presuppose that there is a present king of

France, and (b) assert that he is wise.

In using (1), we can fail in two ways: presuppose falsely and assert falsely. If we make a bad presupposition, we don’t say anything true or false.

(2) ‘It was Fido who ate the Lucky Charms!’ is used to: (a) presuppose that something ate the Lucky Charms (b) assert that Fido did it.

Assertion vs. Presupposition Some other examples:

(3) ‘Fred has stopped clipping his toenails on the subway.’ is used to: (a) presuppose that Fred used to clip his toe nails on the subway (b) assert that Fred doesn’t clip his toe nails on the subway now

“…I am totally unable to see any validity whatever in any of Mr. Strawson’s arguments. Whether this inability is due to senility on my part or to some other cause, I must leave readers to judge.”

Russell, ‘Mr. Strawson on Referring’, p.385