Returning to Argentina after 17 years of exile, Juan Per6n spoke from a window of his new palatial suburban Buenos Aires residence to ,.he crowd of 100,000 gathered below and said, "'I want you to stay calm and be prudent."

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PERONISTAS WITHOUT PERON Peter Ranis

Juan Per6n finally returned to Argentina last November to a people that rarely let him out of their minds in the years since his ouster as president in 1955. The spectacle was memorable. Per6n, with a small entourage of friends, politicians, professionals, artists, celebrities and hangers-on, landed some 20 miles south of Buenos Aires at Ezeiza International Airport. His arrival--widely billed as a "mission of pacification" and "voyage of peace"- -was met by 35,000 soldiers in full battle gear while 15,000 federal and municipal police guarded the masses turned away several miles from the airport. The army was occupying its own country as the airport, all radio and television stations, police station houses, rail- way terminals, bus depots, telephone installations and post offices bristled with modern, mechanized military units and weapons brought from as far away as 600 miles.

Per6n's return had to be a disappointment. It could

not have been otherwise. If he had inspired a mass revo- lution or arrived with a packaged plan for Argentina's political stalemate and economic woes, it would have been superhuman and unbelievable--an unlikely repeat performance. The Per6n regime had made its historical entrance almost 30 years ago and left a national impact that is still fresh and relevant. Its significance in con- temporary Argentine politics far outweighs the com- parable influence of Nazism and Fascism in West Germany and Italy.

A debate over the merits and liabilities of the Per6n regime has raged since his ouster. The Per6n period is recalled with equal rancor and nostalgia: neither the last indictment nor the last eulogy has been heard on the role of the Per6n era in Argentine politics. Memories of a decade of paternal, autocratic government are hard to erase: its dazzling image is even more difficult to ex- tirpate.

March/April 1973 53

is there continuity between the policies of the Per6n government in power and the positions espoused by Per6n's followers out of power'? Since 1955 the Peronista movement has changed along with its exiled leader. Yet a large reservoir of earlier political habits, styles and atti- tudes persists among Peronista leadership, union mem- bers and the mass popular following.

In the years immediately preceding the Peronista era of 1943-1955, socioeconomic conditions in Argentina changed noticeably with the upsurge of migration to the industrial belt surrounding Buenos Aires. Unskilled workers with no union tradition were drawn to the cities to take jobs in the booming World War 11 economy. Service personnel and white-collar employees in com- merce, industry, and municipal and federal government increased rapidly.

Per6n, as Minister of War and Secretary of Labor and later as vice-president under the military junta that took power in 1943, could exploit the new urban classes from his unique military-industrial vantage point while maintaining his foothold in the bureaucracy. Searching for popular support to maintain and sustain his regime, Per6n seized upon the inexperienced and unpoliticized migrants as his political base. He exalted the new urban proletariat, though he wanted it led by the military and propertied classes, in order to water down the "poison" of potential class revolution, he improved the status of unionized blue-collar workers and redistributed the na- tional income in their favor, all the while abstaining from any attempt to change the traditional social structure, modify the profit system or reshape national economic priorities. As one journalist saw it, Per6n believed that he could invert the classic imperial formula of "'subjugate with humiliation" with "humiliate without subjugation." Per6n largely succeeded in this venture. A leader of one socialist party wing recalls:

Peronismo was a horizontal movement...in its popu- lar base and in its hopeful expressions it tended toward the left. As for its vertical aspect, in its tendencies and actions, it served to maintain the middle class and aug- ment its privileges. Its base was "'left" and its regime "right." Per6n liked to allude to the government's mediating

role, helping neither the worker against capitalism nor the monopolies against the working class. After his elec- tion as president, he was quoted by Jos6 Grunfeld (a socialist labor leader) as saying to a group of indus- trialists:

Don't be afraid of my syndicalism. Capitalists have never been so secure as now. l am also one with my ranch and ranchhands. What 1 want is to organize the workers under the auspices of the state so that they may be guided and their paths marked out. in this way one neutralizes their ideological-revolutionary tendencies which could jeopardize our capitalist so-

ciety. To the workers one must give certain improve- ments and they will be a force easily manipulated. So while the straighd'orward economic gains of labor

under Per6n were indisputable, the achievemcnts of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) did not come as the direct result of the efforts of the workers and their representatives or through the bargaining of political parties. They came through the good graces and personal will of a single clique led by Per6n. Answering the charge of having been appendages of an authoritarian Per6n regime, the unions have asserted that what benefits they received under Per6n were just and that these policies should not stop under succeeding regimes.

Socially Acceptable

I-hroughout Per6n's two terms as president, his gov- ernment sought to be muhi-class in its orientation-- avoiding the overturning of class privilege despite the political profits gained from occasional demogoguery aimed at recalcitrant employers. The Peronista move- ment since Per6n continues to receive its heaviest support from labor, but it is by no means dependent only upon the working-class vote. Despite the preponderance of labor in Per6n's governing coalition, he had been able to lay a firm basis for multi-class support. The pattern for this motley social support had its origins in Per6n's very first election triumph in 1946 when he defeated Jos6 Tamborini for the presidency. Per6n scored heavily in the big cities (55 percent) but did well in townships under 50,000 (50 percent) and in the countryside in towns of under 2,000 inhabitants (46 percent).

The varied composition of Peronista support continues to be predominantly but not exclusively working class. Jeane Kirkpatrick conducted a national survey in 1965 which reemphasized this historical phenomenon--mid- dle-class respondents comprised approximately one-third of those who supported Per6n for president and a larger proportion of those who expressed sympathy for the Peronista movement.

In the most recent Argentine election of 1965, the Peronistas (as the Uni6n Popular) received 30 percent of the vote and took 36 of the 99 contested seats in the Chamber of Deputies--a cross-sectional popularity comparable in scope and dispersion to Per6n's initial victory 20 years earlier against a single opponent (the Union Democr~.tica). Geographically (eastern and central provinces) and demographically (cities, suburbs and towns) the Peronista movement achieved impressive totals in both urban industrialized and rural agricultural provinces. People with elementary education were more likely to support Per6n, as well as those living in the in- terior provinces, those coming from communities of less than 50,000 and extraordinary numbers in the industrial suburbs of Buenos Aires. C6rdoba and Rosario.

54 Society

The results of the Kirkpatrick national survey of the general public revealed few significant differences be- tween Per6n's followers ~and other Argentine political groups in terms of attitudes toward foreign policy, po- litical participation, the army and the Church's role in politics. It was also found that landowners and Commu- nists were the most unpopular social groups among all Argentines including Peronistas. It was they and not the Peronistas that tended to be politically isolated.

My poll of Argentine legislators in the same year sub- stantiated the findings of the Kirkpatrick survey. It did not appear that the Peronista legislators were socially ostracized by their colleagues in the Chamber of Depu- ties. On the other hand, three out of four legislators felt that the Communists would represent a distinct threat to Argentina's national sovereignty. Should the Commu- nists gain power, they were expected by many lawmakers to be ruthless and inhumane.

When legislators were asked which party was furthest from their own, almost two-thirds singled out two parties, the Communists and to a lesser extent the con- servative Federation of Center Parties (FNPC), as most divergent from their own and representing extreme ideological positions. It is clear that despite the political weakness of the Communist Party and its affiliates in Argentina, it is still the most distrusted and feared of all major political movements.

Survival of the Movement

Beyond the multi-class support and acceptability of Peronismo within leadership and mask ranks, we must search again for supplementary clues for the survival of the movement. It is important to focus as well on Peron- ista doctrine and ideology, the role of its political ve- hicles, its leadership basis and its approach to the attain- ment and maintenance of power.

There is considerable disagreement about whether Per6n was simply a personalist demagogue, a fascist, a revolutionary or simply a military dictator with wide- scale labor support. However, there is agreement upon the facts from which the frustratingly difficult assess- ment of Per6n has been based: that he was a military man first and foremost; that he was not a liberal politi- cian nor a Marxist; that he reorganized the country's labor force; that he redistributed the national income; that he had corporativist leanings; that he deeply af- fected Argentina's social and political life; and that he inspired great fervor, both pro and con.

During his one-month stay Per6n displayed his pro- pensities to handle societal problems from the highest levels, carefully avoiding mass rallies and extended pressing of the flesh with his "shirtless ones." He bar- gained, nevertheless, with patience and resilience for a man of 77, in small restaurant gatherings, carefully or-

chestrated news conferences and select private meetings with pivotal political party and interest-group leaders. He made one tour of a villa miseria invited by a leading Third World priest. But it is reported that when a live microphone was handed to him, he pushed it away for fear of bringing down a mob scene upon himself. Ap- parently his basic distrust and insecurity with the work- ers and the poor who adore him remains a permanent feature of his personality.

The Per6n government represented the emergence of the Argentine working populace into the national politi- cal arena, competing there with the upper and middle classes and their political representa!ives. Seen in an his- torica I light, Juan Per6n's emergence as a leader was a response to the needs and aspirations of a previously un- represented social sector. Per6n appeared as the first na- tional leader with sufficient power to integrate and up- grade the role of the majority of Argentines. Popular political participation was severely limited before his period as dictator immensely altered the country's politi- cal scope. His leadership widened political involvement astoundingly and irrevocably initiated Argent!na into the era of mass politics.

No interim government has been able to win over the mass of society as Per6n did for a decade. Successive governments have been unable to relieve the dual pres- sures built up by lack of capitalization and poor income distribution. Per6n's party has maintained its legitimacy as the mass party par excellenc~. Distinct from the Nazi and Fascist regimes, Peronism was not effectively im- perialist, nor defeated in foreign encounter, nor more than nonchalantly militarist in character (though Per6n was a colonel). Argentina was never violently racist and bigoted in character, though discrimination has been clocumented, nor were massive persecutions the rule. These differences, combined with the positive socio- economic impact of Peronismo on the working classes and the upheaval of Per6n's regime by an unpopular military, have resulted in the continued legitimacy and influence of the party today.

On the other hand, few fundamental areas of the civic culture remained untouched by Per6n's rule. Repressive legislation was not uncommon. Electoral manipulations and restrictions supplied an easy answer to organized op- position. Governmental intervention played havoc with the federal structure, intimidated competitive free trade unionism and generally drew sharp political lines--pos- sibly over-politicizing Argentine society in the demagogic sense. And there seems little doubt, even before the Mar- tin Bormann revelations, that Per6n had earned a good deal of Nazi blood money, absconded with a very large fortune and depended on financial dealings and eco- nomic policies that were not in the best interest of wise capital accumulation. (Rumor has it that Per6n is worth over $200 million and that in exile he was one of the six

March/April 1973 55

leading private New York Stock Exchange investors along with Aristotle Onassis, Stavros Niarchos, the British Royal Family, the Rothschilds and the Sheik of Kuwait.)

At present both the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and the Peronista movement remain indebted to Per6n and largely loyal to his leadership, and support his return to Argentina for the presidential campaign that will culminate in the election of March I 1, 1973.

In October 1971, the Peronista movement reorganized itself for the upcoming campaign and again elected Per6n supreme head of the movement on June 25, 1972-- a rare feat of longevity,. Free to run for executive offices for the first time in 20 years, the movement chose Per6n as its presidential candidate on December 15, 1972. The nomination was in defiance of a government ruling that no one could be a candidate for the presidency who had not established residence in Argentina six months prior to the elections or by August 25, 1972. Under this gov- ernment decree, twice sustained by Argentine superior and appeals courts as non-discriminatory since it applied to all candidates, Pcr6n was obviously prohibited from accepting the nomination which he subsequently did not. He deferred to his Iongtime subordinate, Hector C~m- pora. C~mpora was president of the Chamber of De'pu- ties under Per6n between 1948-1953. After six years in exile he re-emerged in the Peronista organization and was named Per6n's national delegate and personal repre- sentative in Argentina in November 1971. With Per6n al- ready out of the country, the nomination of C~impora on December 16, 1972 was a foregone conclusion. The mili- tary had stood firm and Per6n had reaffirmed his control of the movement.

The continuing mass acceptance of Per6n combined with the viability of his national organization has been an astounding and inveterate feature of Argentine politics for a generation. Under ex-President Roberto Lev- ingston, ousted by Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Alejandro Lanusse in March 1971, the Pcronistas were instrumental in pushing the military government toward some type of political-electoral solution by form- ing with several competitive parties a common front know as La Hora del Pueblo. The willingness of the Peoples Radicals, archenemies of the Peronistas, to join with them in the cause of returning the country to civilian party government may have convinced the Lanussc gov- ernment that such a consensus did in fact exist.

The Peronista quid pro quo for cooperating with the military authorities was certainly not revolutionary in its scope. They requested that the remains of Eva Per6n be buried at the headquarters of the CGT, that Per6n's Argentine passport be returned, that he receive his pen- sion as ex-president and that his b~.st be placed alongsid e other ex-presidents in the sai6n Blanco of the Casa Rosada.

After engineering the coup, Lanusse moved toward reconciliation with the civilian political sectors by con- voking a series of discussions with party leaders. He labelled the goal of this continuing dialogue "the great national accord" of Peronistas, Radicals and others by accepting the legitimacy of future elections without re- strictions. "'No Argentine who really desires to con- tribute positively to the solutions of the great national problems will be restricted," Lanusse assured them.

it appeared (partly because of the conciliatory tone of Argentine leadership and Per6n himself) that the Lanusse regime would be the first government in 18 years to recognize explicitly the leadership of the ex-dictator if not his personal candidacy. Per6n's political coattails were still very much in evidence when shortly before his departure from Argentina in December he was able to take a leading role in the formation of the Justicialist Liberation Front made up of the Peronistas and other smaller parties including the MID (Movement of Inte- gration and Development) of former President Arturo Frondizi and the PCP (Popular Conservatives). Several other political coalitions have also nominated presiden- tial candidates--the centrist Peoples' Radicals, the Re- publican Federal Alliance, the Popular Federal Alliance and the rightist New Force.

Revolutionary Peronista Youth

The considerable violence in Argentina since the kid- napping and slaying of ex-President Pedro Aramburu on May 31, 1970 has apparently been condemned by Per6n and the Peronista political and labor following. The as- sassination of Aramburu was followed by the killing of Jos6 Alonso, ex-Secretary General of the CGT, on August 27, 1970 and of Commander of the Second Army General Juan Carlos S~inchez on April 10, 1972, as well as the kidnapping and killing of Oberdan Sallustro, a Fiat auto executive, on the same date. There is apparent public and private agreement that the Montoneros, the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Revolution- ary Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL) have been re- sponsible for these acts, as well as for assaults on com- mercial and municipal establishments and various armed robberies. These groups of youthful student revolutionaries, both male and female, considered Catholic nationalists by many, see the return to elections as a mere fraudulent palliative to the resolution of Argen- tina's basic problems.

Though the Peronista youth groups suspended violence during Per6n's sojourn in Argentina, it appears that they will increasingly find themselves at odds with Per6n despite their support of the Peronista electoral slate. Should the elections of March 1973 spell defeat or be fraudulent or compromised in any way they will com- pletely disavow the Peronista-CGT q[ganization. The

56 Society

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tic)n~, ~c)uld .,.'i~e added impetus to the ~,o-callcd nco- Pcroni~,ta~, c)r thor< v, ho ha,,e ira tile pa~t r, ub~,cribcd to "'PcronJ.'->n)o .,,Jl] })crt)/ i. '" Thc:,,e : ] lnorphous .,_'rour).s h;l~,e their leaderqaip and ~,upportcrs principall,, drav, n Ironl tile middle classes in tile interior provinces, tJndcr the mii i tar) governmcnls o l l . c v i ngs ton and l.anusse these neo-Peronista~, provided six prc)~incial governors, several national ministers, univcrsitv rectors and other high appointees at the federal level.

tlm~cver, the vast bulk o1" Peronista Io~er-middle- class and blue-collar ~orkcrs ~ill continuc to l'ollo~ him for lack of art',one else on the horizon. The) recall that bread-and-butter gains can be made through capitalist bargains struck at the highest levels bctv,een manage- ment and a populist military government. If H6ctor Campora should win the March election, both the labor and the political wings of the Peronista movement stand to gain political jobs as senators, deputies, state legis- lators and the thousands of executive appointments throughout a federal system.

Per6n has made a rather courageous attempt to in- volve himself directly in Argentina's destiny when many thought (possibly including I_anusse) that he had no

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libcr<tl ;tnd t~oLir,.z'eoi~, de.-,pitc hi', rh,_'toric: hc cho~,e .'gpain ror hi,, e,,ilc <Ind in~c,,zcd hea~il~ ira I .n i lcd ,gtaCe~, c:H~itali~,m in tile interim...\~, . f thb, ~r i t ing h,: has visit- ed Rome, .-\suncion and l. ima, on his roundtr ip from Madr id (not. for e,;~lmple. Santiago. Havana and Al- giers), t te ha~, never in~ested hi:> movement ~ i th indige- nora,, d \namic ~,ocial le~ldcr,,hil->, preferring aging, s,,co- phantic ~,tand-im,.

Fina ih . it is crucial to deal ~ i th Per6n'~ lasting im- pact on the ~ork ing class, the organized labor movement and tile ramification,', of a proletar iat indebted to a pcr- sonalist regime. PerGn used his office as Secretar', of Labor not only to proliferate union membership but to organize the nlembcrs into single industr~,-v.ide collcc- tivc bargaining units: then Per6n's good oftqces arbi- trated negotiating dcadlocks and strikes. From this posi- tion of po~er with a military junta to support him, be- tv, een 1944 and the elections of 1946, Per6n increased salaries and pension funds, instituted paid vacations, froze rents and land prices and intervened continually on the side of the laborers in attaining better collective contracts.

The issues in the presidential campaign of 1945-1946 were taken in large part from the platform of the Uni6n Sindical Argentina (Argentine Syndicalist Union) and

March/April 1973 57

later incorporated into the Labor Party program es- poused by its candidate Per6n. Not three months after his election in 1946 he undermined the Labor Party and recombined his supporters into an aggregation called the Partido Unico de la Revoluci6n Nacional, which shortly thereafter became simply the Peronista Party.

By his dominance as Secretary of Labor under the military junta government and later as president, Per6n substantively strengthened the power of the working class vis-&-vis other economic sectors. However, their increased strength was at the cost of subjecting them- selves to the paternal authority of the Peronista govern- ment. Opposition labor leaders were ousted and harass- ed and unfriendly unions replaced by Peronista-support- ing unions: Individual torture and persecution were not unknown. Per6n's technique and impact on the workers are worth detailing as Peter Smith describes:

Lab0r-management relations took a decisive turn for the worse in early 1945, when the packinghouses sus- pended thousands of workers, partly for "'disciplinary reasons" and partly because of a reduction in the vol- ume of trade. On March 31 a general strike was called in all packing plants. A deadlock ensued, with both sides determined not to back down. On April 24 it happened again: the government intervened and order- ed the management to take workers back. If it proved impossible for the packers to absorb them all for eco- nomic reasons, the state would pay the salaries of up to 12,600 workers for as long as three months as a mat- ter of social justice. And pay it did: in the end this pro- gram cost the Argentine government nearly ten million pesos. Few measures ever captured the Peronista con- cern for, tile packinghouse laborers quite so neatly.

The packingho0s~ workers repayed Per6n handsomely six months later on October 17, 1945 when 100,000 of them and Other laborers demonstrated massively in front of the Casa Rosada in Plaza del Mayo until they won the release of Per6n from military custody. Shortly there- after he becamg the Labor Party's candidate for the presidency andi,~eronismo was launched. As president- elect, Per6n reciprocated:

Late in 1945 packinghouse managers refused to co- operate with a newly created labor-relations board that was supposed to establish minimum wages .... Cipriano Reyes (head of meatpackers union) re- sponded by calling a ,~eneral strike. A frequently violent stalemate ensued ~'or three months, and then

'1 the climax I~egan. The government declared the strike to be legitimate, decreed that working hours should be reduced in freezing rooms, and publicly condemned the management's intransigence. In March 1946- significantly enough in (outgoing) President Farrell's office--the packing companies surrendered. They promised ltei comply with a minimum wage decree. They pledged their cooperation with the labor corn-

mission. They said they would reincorporate all the workers suspended since the beginning of 1945.

Thus labor enjoyed these differential advantages, espe- cially in the seven years of feast (1944-1951). Real wages surpassed output per worker for the entire Per6n period. Though productivity lagged, these considerations did not deter Per6n's distributive policies.

Reformist Policies and Union Labor

Loyalty to Per6n for these social policies remains an important factor in the contemporary trade union move- ment. The CGT remains Peronista controlled. Among the rank and file of all organized workers, 40 percent still remain loyal to the Peronista movement. While the balance cannot be categorized as Peronista supporters, they may support him on one or another issue. Peron- istas more than other segments of society believe in a constructive labor role in society. They are also more adamant in their belief that since Per6n, labor has been treated unfairly. Peronistas have a more benign per- ception of labor unions than have other Argentines or, for that matter, lower-class people or laborers in gen- eral. They appear as the most self-conscious proletariat vanguard of lower-class workers.

But it is not a proletariat of the style envisioned by Marx and Lenin. It is not revolutionary or international. Its major interest is in income redistribution and politi- cal participation rather than sociological restratification and economic restructuring. A quick look at the Peron- ista-dominated CGT's 1970 program is instructive. Eco- nomically they call for an increased minimum wage, small enterprise credits, elimination of payroll income tax, increase of luxury taxes, ban on luxury imports, na- tionalization of banks, insurance, foreign trade, profit and management sharing in industry, augmentation of pension plans and agrarian reform. Politically they speak of a return to constitutional elections, university reform, and an investigation of what constitutes conspir- atorial crimes under "state of siege" circumstances. These demands are certainly within the framework of non-conspiratorial reformist politics, given a progressive government-military, Peronista, or otherwise.

The CGT's sociopolitical position seems to be consist- ent with the main criteria of a politically-oriented labor movement. Direct mass action--a demonstration, a strike, or sometimes a staged riot--is frequently support- ed, along with a propensity for tailoring the performance of economic functions to serve political ends. Ideological conformity in leadership is sought, although limited dis- sent is tolerated. Trade unionism alone is considered an inadequate instrument with which to attain the political, economic and social reform sought by the union leaders.

Under the Aramburu military government (1955- 1958) the labor movement received its worst setbacks.

58 Society

There were ~requent interventions into the unions, and labor leaders were jailed on conspiratorial charges. Col- lective bargaining agreements were rescinded. The Min- istry of Labor was taken over by managerial personnel. Under the subsequent civilian Frondizi {1958-1962)and lllifi (1963-1966) administrations, labor again assumed a dominant role. Without doubt, the CGT's most import- ant organizational successes came with Frondizi's ad- ministration. Under his sponsorship military inter- vention in the trade unions was lifted and the Law of Professional Association (one union representing each industry) reinstated as under Per6n. However, the Aramburu years seemed to have placed the CGT "in op- position," a position from which it has not emerged. Many parties have competed in the past for labor's sup- port but only the Peronistas successfully received the majority of the CGT's backing.

The CGT has not pretended to represent an apolitical point of view. It has provided not only individual candi- dates for high political office, but it is a large pressure group before which no issue is too far-reaching, no inter- est too minute. But the Confederation is not a mono- lithic superstructure. In the last 18 years internal splits have divided the confederation into rival Peronista fac- tions, "independent" trade unions and Communist- affiliated unions

A Permanent Peronista Fixture?

Per6n's followers remain not too different from other Argentines. They are anti-landowners, anti-Communist, anti-American, anti-Cuban, anti-Soviet, and generally anti-foreign. They are pro-Catholic. They seek more po/Jtical representation and better distribution of eco- nomic goods and services. They are not alienated from Argentine political culture and tend, on the whole, to be more civically and politically inclined tha;n average. They are not socially ostracized. I f they ever were a subculture, they have been assimilated since Per6n first identified their needs.

It is conceivable that a coalition much like the one Per6n created in the past could again emerge before or after the March 1973 presidential elections. Peronismo has once before perceived itself a proletarian-based spearhead against Communist subversion and an ag- gregation of the national interests (of the Third World variety) against imperialist penetration by the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus far, Peronistas have played by the rules written by the military in the hopes of mounting such a multi-partisan effort again. They re- main essential components of the Argentine political cul- ture. They maintain an important stake in its bourgeois system of values. The Peronistas return again and again to the electoral solution. They are tireless negotiators with all sorts of governments, while the CGT laborers wait to be wooed and protected once again. []

Thus though the CGT has had an automatic political weight advantage over the majority of political parties combined, it is by no means a necessarily permanent Peronista fixture. Rather it has continued to support Per6n and post-Per6n Peronismo and will continue to do so, until the realization of those social conditions which would make such a commitment gratuitous.

As even Per6n's worst detractors admit, since 1945 the working class in Argentina has been thoroughly integrated into mass society. They are no longer political neophytes and they deal on equal terms with the middle and upper classes. No government, movement or party can long survive while ignoring this proletariat con- glomeration. Per6n was the first leader to join his efforts to the needs of this working mass while he sought to maintain the support of sectors of the nationalist in- dustrial class, the Church and, of course, the military. No government since Per6n has been able to put these pieces together again.

Labor provided Per6n his legitimizing electoral sup- port, the industrialists his financial buttress, and the army and bureaucracy his political power. Meanwhile he alienated groups without significant economic and po- litical resources: students, professionals, intellectuals, artists, teachers, and the Communist, socialist and small liberal parties and their many splinter groups.

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March/April 1973 59