Peter Singer 2

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Utilitarianism and VegetarianismAuthor(s): Peter SingerSource: Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 325-337Published by: Wiley

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PETERSINGER Utilitarianismand Vegetarianism

The bettersort here pretendto the utmostcompassion for animals of everykind: tohear themspeak, a strangerwouldbe apt toimagine they could hardly hurt the gnatthat stungthem. They seem so tender, nd

so full ofpity, hatone would takethemforthe harmless friendsof the whole creation,the protectors f the meanest insect or rep-tile thatwas privilegedwithexistence.Andyet (would youbelieve it?) I have seen theverymen who have thus boasted of theirtenderness,at the same time devour thefleshof six differentnimals tossed up in africassee. Strange contrariety f conduct!they pityand theyeat the objects of theircompassion!

Oliver Goldsmith,

CitizenoftheWorld

I am a utilitarian. am also a vegetarian. am a vegetarian ecauseI am a utilitarian. believethatapplying heprinciple futilityoourpresent ituation-especiallyhemethodsnow usedto rear animalsforfood and thevariety f foodavailable to us-leads to the conclusionthatweought obe vegetarian.

WiththisTomRegandisagrees.'Utilitarianismoesnot,he claims,

provide dequategrounds or heobligation obe a vegetarian. his isthenegativeside of his essay, and it is a pointwith which severalother ritics fAnimalLiberation gree.2Thepositive ide ofRegan's

i. "Utilitarianism,Vegetarianismand Animal Rights,"above, pp. 305-324.

2. See Michael Martin,"A Moral Critiqueof Vegetarianism,"Reason Papers,no. 3 (Fall 1976): 13-43; Philip Devine, "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism,Philosophy53, no. 206 (October 1978): 481-505; Leslie PickeringFrancis andRichardNorman,"Some Animals AreMore Equal Than Others,"Philosophy53,no. 206 (October 1978): 507-527; AubreyTownsend, "Radical Vegetarians,"AustralasianJournalof Philosophy57, no. i (March 1979): 85-93; PeterWenz,

"Act-Utilitarianismnd Animal Liberation,"The Personalist 6o, no. 4 (October

? ig80 byPrincetonUniversity ressPhilosophy& Public Affairs , no. 40048-3915/80/040325-13$oo.65/ I







326 Philosophy PublicAffairs

argument,withwhichmostof thesecriticswould not agree, s thatanethical theory ased on rights oes provide dequate groundsfor theobligation obe a vegetarian. shall defendmyself gainstthe chargethatutilitarianismoes not support egetarianism,ut shallnot con-sider the alternativergumentnvolving ights.Regan admitsthathe

has presented nly sketch f an argumentwhichhe hopesto be ableto developmore fully n anotheroccasion.To criticizehis argumentwould therefore e premature. shall, however,begin witha wordaboutmethodologyn ethicswhichmay sufficeo explain myattitudeto Regan's suggestion hattodefendvegetarianism shoulddrop utili-tarianism nd take up a rights-basedheory.

I

Somephilosophershink hat he aim ofmoraltheorys to systematizeour common moralintuitions.As scientific heoriesmust match theobserved ata, they ay,so mustethicaltheoriesmatchthe data of oursettledmoralconvictions. have elsewhere rgued againstthe nbuiltconservatism f thisapproachto ethics, n approach which s liableto takerelics of our culturalhistory s the touchstone f morality.3These arguments eed not be rehearsedhere,forRegan does not de-fendthe viewthat sound ethicaltheorymust matchour moral ntui-tions.Whatdoesseemtobe implicitnRegan'sarticle, owever,s the

viewthat soundmoraltheorymust ead to thebeliefthat t is wrongtokill and eat animals.Certainly e recommends bandoningutilitar-ianism n favor f a rights-basedheorywithout avingmade a singlepoint againstutilitarianism,xceptforhis argument hatutilitarian-ism does not support vegetarianism.Unless the animal liberationmovement as mademuch fasterprogress han dare tohope,this sa curious nversion f the strategy f testing thical theoriesby thedegree owhichtheymatchour commonmoral convictions.Nor s the

1979): 423-428; and R. G. Frey in a forthcoming ook, The Ethics of EatingMeat.

3. "Sidgwick and ReflectiveEquilibrium,"The Monist 58, no. 3 (July 1974),

especiallypp. 515-517.







327 Utilitarianismand Vegetarianism

invertedtrategynysounder method ftesting thicaltheories hantheoriginal.

Perhapsthis s unfairtoRegan. Perhaps his suggestion hatutili-tarianism houldbe abandonedbecause itdoesnot ead tovegetarian-ism is not directed to utilitarians t large, but to me personally.Perhapshe thinks hat n mycase, at least,

thecommitment ovege-tarianisms so strong hat willbe prepared o abandon anyethicaltheorywhich s unabletoproduce he udgment hat t s wrong oeatanimals. fso, this s a misjudgment hich omes, wouldguess,fromneglecting he mportance fcorrectmethodologyn ethics. t wouldbe just as wrongforme torejectutilitarianismecause I cannotde-duce vegetarianismromtas itwas forWhewelltorejectutilitarian-ismbecause itmightmake t ourduty osacrifice hehappinessofmenin order o increase thepleasure ofpigs or geese.4Ourmoralconvic-

tions re notreliabledata for esting thicaltheories.We shouldworkfrom oundtheories opractical udgments,notfromour judgmentstoour theories.

Regan's accountofmy publishedviews on the basis ofmyvegetar-ianism s accurate.Myvery paring alkof"rights"n Animal Libera-tionoccursmostlyn thecontext fad hominem rguments. lsewherewhen talk ofrights, do it,as I have said,as a concessiontopopularrhetoric. Animal Liberationwas not written rimarily orphiloso-phers. Vegetarianisms,forme,a meanstoan end rather han an end

in itself.Whetherwe ought obe vegetarians ependson a lot offactsabout the situationn whichwe find urselves.Some writers ind hisstrange.Theythink fvegetarians s moral

absolutists,who will stickto theirbelief n the immoralityf eatingmeat no matter what. Thus Cora Diamond writes: ". . . one curiousfeature of the Peter Singer sort of argument . . . is that your PeterSingervegetarian houldbe perfectly appyto eat the unfortunatelamb thathas just been hitbya car."5Why s thiscurious? t is only

4. See the quotation from Whewell's Lectures in John Stuart Mill's essay"Whewell on Moral Philosophy."The relevantsectionis reprintedn Tom Reganand PeterSinger, eds.,AnimalRightsand Human Obligations (Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice-Hall, 976), pp. I3I-I32.

5. "Eating Meat and Eating People," Philosophy,53, no. 206 (October i_78):

47I-472.








curious nthe assumption hatvegetariansmustthinktalways wrongtoeat meat.No doubtsomevegetarians re moralabsolutists, ust asthere are absolute pacifists, bsolute antiabortionistsnd absolutisttruth-tellersho wouldnever ella lie. I reject ll theseforms fmoralabsolutism.

Regan suggeststhat by basing the case forvegetarianism n ani-mals' rights "could dispense with theneed to investigate ystemati-cally the probable consequences of changingour eatinghabits" (p.3I8). This suggestion trikesme as quite wrong-headed, ather iketellingthe President hat bybasing his case on the moralprinciplethat t is always egitimate o resist ggression, e can dispensewiththe need toinvestigateystematicallyheprobableconsequencesof anuclear responseto Sovietmilitarynitiatives. n contrast oRegan, Ithinkwe shouldalways try ofindout as much as possibleabout the

probableconsequencesof our actions. Without his nformation,urdecisions about what we oughtto do shouldbe subjectto revision nthe ightofmorecomplete nformation.

II

To turnfrommethodologyo thesubstantivessue: whatare the m-plications futilitarianismorour treatment fanimals?

Whenwe applyutilitarianismo theissue ofhow we shouldtreat

animals,one vitalpoint tands outimmediately. tilitarianism,n itsclassical form, ims at minimizingpain and maximizingpleasure.Manynonhuman nimalscan experience ain andpleasure. Perhapssomesimpler orms fanimal ifecannot,but shall leave thisqualifi-cation aside.) Therefore heyare morally significantntities.Theyhave moral standing. n thisrespect hey re likehumansand unlikerocks.

This s a simplepoint, o obvious hatwemay forgetts mportance.Regan's difficultyn interpreting y "principle fequality"may stem

fromhis underestimatef the mportance fthispoint, nd his con-sequentvain searchforsomeadditionalutilitarian rinciple fequal-itywhich mighthold. The onlyprinciple f equality hold is theprinciple hat the nterests feverybeingaffected y an action are to








be taken nto ccountandgiven he ameweight s the ike nterestsfanyother eing-whatRegancalls the"equality f nterests" rinciple.As Regan grants, tilitarianismresupposes hisprinciple.The prin-ciple ofequality f nterestsmerelymakes texplicit hat,because theprinciple futilitys thesole basis ofmorality, o otherprinciplewilllimitthe applicationof theprincipleof

utility, r affect heway inwhich t operates. do notholdany"equality ftreatment"rinciple,except nsofar s givingweight o the nterests f a beingis a formof"treatment."s I said inAnimalLiberation: Thebasic principle fequality oesnotrequire qual or dentical reatment;trequires qualconsideration.6

The importance fthefactthat heprinciple futility ives nimalsmoral standing, nd givestheir nterests qual weightwith the likeinterests fhumans, ies in theconsequencesofdenying nimalsthis

equal moralstanding-andhistorically, ostmoralphilosophers aveeitherdeniedanimals moral standing ltogether,r discounted heirinterests ecause they re nothuman.Thus Aristotlehought hat allanimals exist forthe sake of man. Aquinas tookoverthis attitude,addingthatwe do notevenowecharity oanimals.Kantsaid thatwehave no directduties to animals.Whewell, s we have seen,thoughtit so obviousthat animals do notcountequallythat he regarded hecontrarymplication s a damningobjectionto utilitarianism.Morerecently ohnRawlshas denied nimalsa place in histheoryf ustice,

arguingthatwe owe justice onlyto thosewho have the conceptofjustice except thatwe oweit to nfanthumans).7So utilitarians an do much to revisemoraltheoryn favorof ani-

mals, merelyby defending he claim thatno being shouldhave itsinterests isregarded r discountedmerelybecause it is nothuman.Moreovert needs tobe emphasizedthatthisreally s theutilitarianposition, or there s a widespreadmisconception hatutilitarianismvalues everythingy ts utility orhumanbeings.Thus opponents fwhaling riticize he"utilitarian"ttitudes fwhalers,whosee whales

6. Animal Liberation (New York: A New YorkReview Book, I975), p. 2, theitalics in original.Furtherpage references n the text are to thisedition.

7. For references ee Animal Liberation, chap. 5. Rawls' discussion is in Sec-tion77 of A TheoryofJustice Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity ress, 97I) ).








as so muchoil,meat,and ambergris. his mayseemno morethanapopular,non-philosophical se of the term "utilitarian"; ut as dis-tinguished philosopher s StuartHampshirehas similarlymischar-acterizedutilitarianisms a theorywhich "places men at the verycenter f the universe,withtheir tatesof feeling s thesourceof all

value in the world."8So utilitarianism,orrectlynderstood,tands n sharpcontrast o

otherwidelyheldethicaltheoriesn respect f thestanding tgivestoanimals. We must now ask if this differenceetweenutilitarianismand other ethical theories eads to an equally sharpcontrast n thepracticeswhichcan be justified n thesetheories.

III

Itwouldbe a remarkable oincidencef our current ractices,manyofwhichare based on givingittle rno considerationo the nterests fnonhumans, houldhappento maximizepleasureand minimize ain,even when the pleasuresand pains of animals are fullytakenintoaccount.9Nor is this whatRegan or myothercriticsclaim. Almostunanimously, hey cknowledge hat controls ver the use of animalsin experimentshouldbe tightened,nd that ntensive armingmeth-ods inflict nnecessarydistresson chickens,pigs, and veal calves.Thus thedisagreement etweenus is not over whether urrent rac-

tices are, judged by utilitarian tandards, deal. We are agreedthatthey renot. The question s whether heutilitarianondemnation f

8. "Morality nd Pessimism"in S. Hampshire,ed., Public and PrivateMorality(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, I978), p. 2. Hampshire's persistencein thismischaracterizations odd, for n an exchange of letterspublishedin TheNew York Review of Books, 20 September 973, he appeared to concede thatutilitarianismtakes all sentientbeings into account and hence cannot be de-scribedas anthropocentric.

9. In Animal LiberationI give several examples of the attitudesto animalsimplicit-and oftenexplicit-in factory arming;here is anotherexample fromarecent New South Wales Department of Agriculturebrochureon the housingof pigs: "A piggerymust be imagined as being similar to a factorywith rawgoods (breedingstockand feed) going n one end and thefinished rticle (porkand bacon) comingout theother."








these practicescarrieswith t the implication hat we shouldswitchto a vegetarian iet.

There are threeways in whicha utilitarian ondemnation f thetreatment ffarm nimals might all short f entailing hatwe shouldswitch oa vegetarian iet. Firstly,f the objection s not to all raising

and killing f animals forfood,but onlyto particularmethods frais-ing and killing hem, t wouldseem thatwe can avoid the necessity fvegetarianismy restricting,urdietto the flesh f animals not rearedor killed bymethods nvolving uffering. econdly, ne might rguethat,bad as factory armings, theconsequencesof abolishing t arenotclearly etter han theconsequencesof continuingt. And thirdly,those whoadmitthat twouldbe betterffactory armingwereabol-ished may denythat there s any utilitarian onnection etweenthisconclusion nd the obligation o avoid consuming he products ffac-

tory arms.The first f thesethreeattempts o denythe moral necessityfor

vegetarianism-thergument hat t is notwrong o eat animals thathave had a pleasant life and then been killedhumanely-raisespro-foundquestions boutthevalue of ifeand the egitimacy fregardinga new generationfhappy nimalsas replacements or hose hatwereeaten. haverecently iscussedthese ssues in otherplaces,so I shallonlytouchupon themnow.While I acceptthat n particular ircum-stancestheremaybe no direct tilitarian bjection o the use ofsome

kindsofanimalsforfood, heseare not the circumstances f thoseofus whomustrely n theusual commercial ourcesofmeat.'0Moreover,evenin theabsence of directutilitarian bjectionsto eatinganimalswhohave livedhappily nd diedpainlessly, here s an indirect bjec-tion. n AnimalLiberationp. I72) I put t thisway:

Ifwe are prepared o takethe ifeof another eing merelyn orderto satisfy ur tastefor a particular ype ffood,then thatbeing sno morethana means to ourend.

io. See "Killing Humans and Killing Animals," Inquiry, vol. 22 (Summer1979): 145-I56; "Animals and the Value ofLife,"in Tom Regan, ed., MattersofLife and Death (New York: RandomHouse, I980): 2I8-259; and PracticalEthics(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity ress, I979), chap. 5.








This sentence ed Leslie PickeringFrancis and Richard Norman toclaim thatwhen thegoinggetsrough fall back on a Kantian kindofobjection othe use ofanimals as means.11Had theyquotedthenexttwosentences s well,theymighthave seen thatmy point s stillutili-tarian,though t takes a longerperspective:

In timewe will come toregardpigs,cattle, nd chickens s thingsforus to use, no matterhow strong ur compassionmaybe; andwhen we findthatto continueto obtainsuppliesof thebodies oftheseanimals at a pricewe are able topay tis necessary ochangetheir ivingconditions little,we will be unlikely o regardthesechanges too critically. he factory arm s nothingmore than theapplication ftechnologyothe dea thatanimalsaremeans toourends.

This is a "slippery lope" argument:no matterhow humane ouroriginal ntentions,s long as we continueto eat animals there s adangerof ourslidingback intothemethods ftreatingnimals n usetoday. confess hat n other ontexts-the ebateovereuthanasia,forinstance-Ihavebeencritical fslipperylopearguments.t is a matterof udgmentn each case whether heriskof sliding s real or imagi-nary. mayhavebeen nsufficientlyritical fmyownuse oftheargu-ment, ut have notbecome a Kantian.

IV

The secondwayof arguing hatutilitarianismoes notlead tovege-tarianism s the one pressedbyRegan. It is, he says,an enormouslycomplicated uestionwhether heundoubted ufferingaused animalsbythepresent ystems enoughtooutweigh oththepleasurespeoplegetfromeating animals and the disruption hat abolishingfactoryfarmingwouldcause tothe ivesofthosedependent nraising nimalsforfood.Perhaps tis,Regan says,but havenotevenbeguntoshow

this.It is true thatthequestion s complicated nd I have notdone all

thecalculations nvolved.But havebegun.The firsttepwas toshow

iI. "Some AnimalsAreMore Equal Than Others,"p. 5I7.








how muchsuffering odern armingmethods nflict n animals. Thiswas theobject ofthe ongthird hapterofAnimalLiberation,my ac-count ofwhatRegan calls-and agreesreallyare-the "gruesomede-tails"offactoryarming.

The second stepwas toshow thata vegetarian ietdoes not nvolvegreat acrifices, ot n ourhealth,nor n ourcapacity o feedthe grow-ing worldpopulation, or n thepleasures ofthepalate. This was theobject of thefourth hapter, nd oftheappendix on cooking.On thematter f thepleasuresoftaste,Regantakesme totask fordescribingthesepleasures as "trivial." stillthink hatthepleasures of taste-which re not the same as thepleasuresofeating-arerelatively rivialby comparisonwith the nterests f,say, a pigin being able tomovefreely,minglewith otheranimals, and generally void theboredomand confinementffactory arm ife. Butwhat shouldemphasize s

not theunimportancef thepleasuresoftaste, o muchas the unim-portance f thedifferencenpleasurebetween ating nimalflesh ndeating vegetarian ood. f animal fleshwereuniformlyeliciousandvegetarianfood uniformlywful,the case forvegetarianismwouldadmittedlye weaker.PhilipDevinewas right o guessthat"'perhapstherecipes nd so on whichSinger ppendsto hisbookarenotmerelyhelps to virtuous nd happy living,but essentialparts of his argu-ment."-2

The third tep n the calculationswouldbe to consider he loss of

utility opeopleinvolved n raisinganimals likely oresultfromourall becomingvegetarians.This I have notdone,largelybecause I as-sumedthat nysuch oss ofutility ould n the ongrunbe outweighedbythe benefits o bothanimals and humans. I say "animalsand hu-mans" because whileRegan is right o saythatanyutilitarianhouldincludethis oss ofutilityn thecalculations, fwe are to look at thequestionobjectively e should nclude ncidentalgainsas wellas inci-dental losses. In Animal Liberation made the point-whichmanyotherswithno specialconcernforanimalshave also made-thata re-

ductionn the amountofanimalflesh onsumedbyWesternerswouldrelease enormous mountsof grain, oybeansand otherhigh-qualityplantfoods,nowbeingfedto animals,forhungry nd malnourished

I2. "The Moral Basis ofVegetarianism,"p. 49I.








humans who cannot afford o pay thepricespaid forthesecropsbyfactory armers. he gain nutilityrom his lone could faroutweighthe osses toanimalproducers.Nextwe add in thepossiblereductiona vegetarian iet wouldbring n human sufferingromheart diseaseand cancer of the stomach nd colon.Finally, herewouldbe environ-mentalbenefits rom ndingfactory arming,which s energy nten-

siveand leads toproblems n disposing fthe huge quantities f ani-malwasteswhich tconcentrates n one site.13

Supposewe leave thesebenefitsside,and focusonlyon thebenefitsto animals and losses to animal producers. t stillseems that f thechoice s betweenperpetuatingrabolishing actoryarming,heprin-ciple ofutilityellsus to abolishfactory arming.While thiswill cer-tainly avecostsformanypeople, hecostswilloccuronceonly.Thereis no reasontobelievethatworking n a factory arm s a particularlyenjoyablewayofmakinga living;visiting ne stronglyuggeststhe

reverse. t is thedisruptionfa settledifeand occupation hatcausesthe oss ofutility.Now eitherfactory armingwill eventually ease-in whichcase the costs of the transition re merelypostponed-oranimalswill go on sufferingn factory armsforever.Comparetheindefiniterolongation fanimalsuffering ith heonce-only ostsofa transition,nd I think hat s longas wegivethe nterestsfanimalsequal considerationwith imilarhuman nterests,heanswer s clear.

Itmight e said thatthe best solutionwould be neither heperpetu-ationoffactory arming or ts suddenabolition, uta gradualphas-ingoutwhichwould allowthe ndustryobewounddown n an orderlyfashion.But this s likely o happenin any case. I have no illusionsaboutseeingvegetarianismweepAmerica vernight.fthevegetarianmovement ucceedsat all,itwillsucceedgradually noughforfactoryfarmingo be phasedoutovermanyyears.Onutilitarian rounds,hisis what we want.

V

The utilitarian egetarians on strong roundn arguing hatfactoryfarming nd the other cruelties nvolved n large-scalecommercial

13. For furtherdetails on these issues, see James Mason and Peter Singer,Animal Factories (New York: Crown, I980).








animal production hould end. The finalproblem s to establish thelinkbetweenthisgoal and the obligation o becomea vegetarian. nAnimalLiberation tried wodifferent aysofforginghis ink. Onewas alongthe ines ofGeorgeBernardShaw's remark hat he will befollowed ohis graveby a herdof animals ofassorted pecies, ll grate-fulforhaving been sparedfrom laughter yhis vegetariandiet. n

defenseof the serious dea behindthis ight-heartedmage, assertedthat because becominga vegetarianreduces the overall demand foranimalflesh, n individualcould assume that t loweredtheprofita-bility fthe animal ndustry,nd thusreducedthe number fanimalsfactory armerswould breed. Trenchant criticism f this claim byMichaelMartin,PhilipDevine,R. G. Freyand PeterWenz,has con-vincedme that misstated hisargument. he loss of one consumerfrom hemillionswho buyanimal fleshmakes so small a differencethat t s impossible osaythat taffects henumber fanimalsreared

and killed.As Wenz puts t: "There are thresholds eneathwhich analterationn demand has absolutely o effect n price,profitnd pro-duction."

Fairenough;butthis till mplies hat largenumber fconsumersrejectinganimal fleshmust make a difference. erhaps for everyI0,000 vegetarians here s one fewer 0,000 birdchickenunitthantherewould otherwise e. Perhapsnot: this s merely n exampleandI have no idea whatthe truefigurewouldbe; buttheremustbe somepointat whichthe numberofvegetariansmakes a difference o the

sizeofthepoultryndustry. heremustbe a seriesofthresholds, id-denbythemarket ystem fdistribution,hichdetermine owmanyfactoryarmswillbe inexistence. n this ase onemorepersonbecom-inga vegetarianwill make no differencet all,unlessthat ndividual,added to the otherswho are alreadyvegetarians, educesdemandbe-lowthethresholdevel atwhich newfactory armwouldhave startedup (or an existing ne would have remained n production,f the n-dustrys declining).

Looking t one's own decisionto be a vegetarian,tmayseemfrus-tratinghatone cannotbe surethat ne has savedevena single nimalfroma miserable ife on a factory arm;but from a utilitarian er-spective treallymakesno difference hether ach vegetarians per-sonallyresponsible orsavingten chickensa yearfrom hisfate,or








one vegetariann io,ooo makesthedifferencehat will save IOO,OOObirds.Utilitarianismudges actionsby their ikely onsequences,andso itranks thecertainty f saving tenchickensequallywith the i inio,ooo chance of saving ioo,ooo. As long as I have no idea whetheror notmy own decisionto govegetarian s the decisionthat takesthe

demand forchickensbelow thethreshold,he strengthf thisreasonforbeinga vegetarians unaffected.'1The second way tried o inkvegetarianismnd thegoal ofending

theexploitation f animals was bydescribing ecoming vegetarianas "the mostpracticaland effectivetep"we can take towardendingtheexploitation f animals (Animal Liberation, . I73). This claimtoo, may have been incautiouslyworded. (Had I been writingpri-marily orphilosophers, wouldhave been morecareful.) Some peo-ple, skilled t publicity nd lobbying,may do more to end the exploi-

tation of animals by politicalcampaigning than by ceasing to eatanimal flesh.Merelybecoming vegetarian,without oinganythingelse to change our treatmentf animals,mayhave no effect t all.But I donot advocatethis passiveform fvegetarianism.

I advocate vegetarianism s somethingwhich"underpins,makesconsistent, nd givesmeaningto all ourother ctivities n behalfofanimals" (Animal Liberation,p. I71). I remain convinced that forthose concernedto change the situationof animals in our society,vegetarianisms of realpracticalmportance.tprovides n irrefutable

answer otheoft-repeatedlaimthatweneedfactoryarms ofeedourgrowing opulation.t allows theanimal welfare ampaigner o defeatad hominem ttacks, or nstance: Howcan you objecttokilling ealswhenyoueat pigs and calves?' Byeliminatingne's personal nvolve-ment ntheproductionfanimalsforfood, tmakes teasiertotakeadetachedviewof theanimalindustry,nd toavoidcompromisingheinterests f the animals withone's own interest s a consumer ofanimals.Callingon thepublicnot tobuytheproduceoffactory armscan be an important artof a campaign against factory arming.t

I4. Bart Gruzalskicomes to a similar conclusionthoughbya slightly ifferentroute in his unpublishedpaper, "The Case AgainstRaising and KillingAnimalsforFood." I am gratefulto Gruzalskiforhaving givenme a copy of this paperand forhaving discussed the issue with me.







337 Utilitarianism

and Vegetarianism

holdsout a threatening rospect o farmers-onewhich s beginningtobe noticed n farmingmagazines-and itenablesthosewhosupportthe campaignagainstfactoryarmingo make a personal ommitmentwhichgoes beyond igning etitionsnd writingetters o their lectedrepresentatives.ne cannotconvincinglysk others o do this f one

does notdo it oneself. Unless one eats animalflesh n secret-whichhardly eemsworth hehypocrisynd riskof discoverynvolved.)

Finally, ecoming vegetarians a wayofattestingo thedepth ndsincerityf one's belief n thewrongness f whatwe are doingto ani-mals. Perhaps n a society f sophisticated hilosophers herewouldbeno needtoattest oone'ssincerityn thisway,because sophisticatedphilosopherswouldunderstand hat one can sincerely pposethe ex-ploitation f animals n factory armswhilecontinuingo buyand en-joythe product f thesevery arms.But to mostofthe members f our

society hiswouldmean, as it seemedtoOliverGoldsmith's ictitiousChinesetraveler, "strange ontrarietyf conduct."

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