[ORAL ARGUMENT NOT SCHEDULED] No. 17-1179 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT IN RE KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMAD and ALI ABDUL-AZIZ ALI, also known as AMMAR AL BALUCHI, Petitioners On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to Disqualify Judges Burton and Herring from Serving in Petitioner’s Case in the USCMCR MR. MOHAMMAD & MR. ALI’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS RITA J. RADOSTITZ DAVID Z. NEVIN GARY D. SOWARDS DEREK A. POTEET, LtCol, USMC U.S. Department of Defense Military Commissions Defense Organization 1620 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301 [email protected]Tel: (703) 571-0723 [email protected]Tel: (208) 343-1000 [email protected]Tel: (310) 552-5300 [email protected]Tel: (703)696-9247 Counsel for Petitioner Mohammad ALKA PRADHAN JAMES G. CONNELL, III U.S. Department of Defense Military Commissions Defense Organization 1620 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301 [email protected]Tel: (703) 588-0426 [email protected]Tel: (703) 588-0407 Counsel for Petitioner Al Baluchi
Transcript
[ORAL ARGUMENT NOT SCHEDULED]
No. 17-1179
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
IN RE KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMAD and ALI ABDUL-AZIZ ALI, also known as AMMAR AL BALUCHI,
Petitioners
On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition to Disqualify
Judges Burton and Herring from Serving in Petitioner’s Case in the USCMCR
MR. MOHAMMAD & MR. ALI’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF THE
UNITED STATES TO THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS RITA J. RADOSTITZ DAVID Z. NEVIN GARY D. SOWARDS DEREK A. POTEET, LtCol, USMC U.S. Department of Defense Military Commissions Defense Organization 1620 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301 [email protected] Tel: (703) 571-0723 [email protected] Tel: (208) 343-1000 [email protected] Tel: (310) 552-5300 [email protected] Tel: (703)696-9247 Counsel for Petitioner Mohammad
ALKA PRADHAN JAMES G. CONNELL, III U.S. Department of Defense Military Commissions Defense Organization 1620 Defense Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301 [email protected] Tel: (703) 588-0426 [email protected] Tel: (703) 588-0407
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES
1. Parties.
The petitioners in this case are Mr. Khalid Shaikh Mohammad and Mr. Ali
Abdul-Aziz Ali, also known as Ammar al Baluchi. By operation of Circuit Rule
21(b), the respondents are the Hon. Paulette Vance Burton and the Hon. James
Wilson Herring, Jr., who are represented pro forma by counsel for the United
States in the name of the United States.
Before the United States Court of Military Commission Review
(“USCMCR”), the United States was the appellant and Mr. Mohammad and Mr.
Ali were two of the appellees. The other appellees before the USCMCR were Mr.
Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarek bin ‘Attash, Mr. Ramzi bin al Shibh, and Mr.
Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi.
2. Rulings under Review.
Mr. Mohammad and Mr. Ali seek issuance of a writ of mandamus and
prohibition disqualifying Judge Burton and Judge Herring from any participation in
deciding the issue before the Court: whether participation of United States military
officers appointed as judges on the USCMCR violates the statutory prohibition of
holding a civil office, and whether their appointment to the USCMCR while still
ii
serving as members of the military violates the Commander in Chief Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.
The principal ruling under review is at Petition App. pp. A1-A15
(denial of disqualification motion).
3. Related cases.
In re Mohammad, No. 17-1156, 2017 WL 3401335 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2017)
(per curiam). In that per curiam decision, this Court granted Mr. Mohammad’s
petition for a writ of mandamus compelling the recusal of the Judge Scott Silliman,
and vacated the USCMCR’s merits judgment in which Judge Silliman had
participated.
DATED: September 8, 2017
/s/
Rita J. Radostitz Civilian Staff Attorney U.S. Department of Defense Military Commissions Defense Organization U.S.C.A. D.C. Circuit Bar No. 60525 Counsel for Petitioner Mohammad /s/ Alka Pradhan Civilian Staff Attorney U.S. Department of Defense Military Commissions Defense Organization U.S.C.A. D.C. Circuit Bar No. 55913 Counsel for Petitioner Al Baluchi
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES .............. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................... iv
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................... 1
I. A writ of mandamus is an appropriate vehicle to remedy the harm caused by a decision rendered, as here, by judges with a clear conflict of interest in the outcome of the decision .................................................................... 2
II. Judges Burton and Herring are military officers appointed to a civil office, in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) .............................................................. 4
III. Service by a military officer as an appointed judge on the USCMCR violates the Commander-in-Chief clause.. ................................................ 13
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984, 97 Stat 655, § 1002 (1983) ... 12
Regulations & Manuals
Rule for Military Commissions 902 ........................................................................ 4
Other Materials
Acting Secretary of War, 14 U.S. Op. Att’y. Gen. 200 (1873); 1873 U.S. AG LEXIS 48 ........................................................................................................... 7
Army Officer Holding Civil Office, 18 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 11 (1884)...................... 7
Art. of Conf., Art. IX ............................................................................................... 24
Memorandum for the General Counsel, General Services Administration, from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 3 Op. OLC. 148, 150 (1979); 1979 OLC LEXIS 24 ............................................ 6,7
S. Rep. No. 98-174, at 232 (1983) ............................................................................ 9
Off. of Legal Counsel, Applicability of 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) to JAG Officers Assigned to Prosecute Petty Offenses Committed on Military Reservations 16 (May 17, 1983) ...................................................................................................... 7,9
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
USCMCR ............................... United States Court of Military Commission Review
2009 Act .............................................................. Military Commissions Act of 2009
1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mandamus is an appropriate remedy where, as here, the underlying issue is
one on which the lower court judges who have ruled on the issue have a conflict
of interest and therefore should have recused themselves from deciding the claim.
As the Supreme Court has long held, “no man is permitted to try cases where
he has an interest in the outcome.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
Because Judges Burton and Herring have an interest in the outcome of this claim,
they should not be permitted to serve as judges on the panel deciding it.
Petitioners here do not challenge the structure of the USCMCR, but rather
challenge whether 10 U.S.C § 973(b) applies to military officers serving as judges
on the USCMCR who have a vested interest in the outcome of the decision. Thus,
contrary to the Respondant’s argument, the questions here are distinct from those
raised in In re al Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Turning to the merits, the Government conflates the appointment of the
military judges of the USCMCR with their prior assignment as military judges.
Because Lieutenant Colonel Paulette Vance Burton and Colonel James Wilson
Herring Jr. were each appointed to the USCMCR in the spring of 2016 pursuant to
10 U.S.C. § 950f(b)(3), they therefore are no longer serving as assigned military
judges under 10 U.S.C. § 950f(b)(2). Thus, their service is in conflict with the
prohibition of dual office holding proscribed by 10 U.S.C. § 973.
2
ARGUMENT
I. A writ of mandamus is an appropriate vehicle to remedy the harm
caused by a decision rendered, as here, by judges with a clear conflict of interest in the outcome of the decision.
In its Opposition, the Government claims this Court’s opinion in al Nashiri,
holding that mandamus is not an appropriate vehicle for determination of the merits
of the underlying claim, is dispositive. Opp. at 11. However, this Court recently
held that a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for a challenge to a judge
serving on the USCMCR when the judge has a real or potential bias resulting in a
conflict of interest in the matter before them. In re Mohammad, No. 17-1156, 2017
WL 3401335 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2017) (per curiam). Specifically, the Court noted
that:
As to the first, whether Petitioner has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires,” id. at 380, this court has explained that mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for seeking recusal of a judicial officer during the pendency of a case, as “ordinary appellate review” following a final judgment is “insufficient” to cure “the existence of actual or apparent bias”—“[w]ith actual bias . . . because it is too difficult to detect all of the ways that bias can influence a proceeding” and “[w]ith apparent bias” because it “fails to restore public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process,” al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d at 79 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at p.3. Here, a writ of mandamus is the “appropriate vehicle” because ordinary
appellate review following a final judgment would be insufficient to cure the bias
inherent in the judges’ ruling on the legality of their own appointments, and would
3
fail to “restore public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.” al-
Nashiri, 791 F.3d at 79.
Judges Burton and Herring cannot be the judges deciding whether their own
appointments are in compliance with 10 U.S.C. § 973, as doing so shakes “public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. If the public might
reasonably believe that the judges have personal interests in a matter, they should
have recused themselves, and failing that, this Court must hear the case via
mandamus. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860-61
(1988)). As the Supreme Court noted in In re Murchison:
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But, to perform its high function in the best way, ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ Offutt v. United States, 348 U. S. 11, 348 U. S. 14.”
Id. In this case, a reasonable observer would have grounds for questioning the
impartiality of Lieutenant Colonel Burton and Colonel Herring in adjudicating this
motion. First, there are enormous personal financial consequences for each judge
that depend on how the Motion to Disqualify is decided. Further, their decision
implicates whether they are violating DOD policy. See DoD Directive 1344.10 ¶
4.4.2. 1 (“A regular member…may not hold or exercise the functions of civil office
1 Publicly available at http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/134410p.pdf
set out in subparagraph 4.4.1. unless otherwise authorized in paragraph 4.4. or by
law.”). Moreover, the Department of Defense has made clear that an officers’
violation of 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) or its implementing regulations carries criminal
penalties under the U.C.M.J. DoDD 1344.10 para 4.6.4. This case therefore
presents a clear instance in which the judges’ “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), due to their “financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy.” Id. § 455(b)(4).
This general rule is bolstered by the clear and stringent plain language of
Military Commissions Rule 902(b)(5)(B), which specifies that recusal is required
when a military judge knows that he/she has a financial interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. Indeed, the injunction
against financial conflicts of interest, in particular, is so strict that there is no
requirement that the personal interest itself be substantial in any way.
If Petitioners are correct in their interpretation of § 973, Judges Burton and
Herring personally stand to face significant financial, professional, and even
potentially criminal consequences. They have a direct personal stake in the
outcome, thus, Petitioners meet the first prong of this Court’s standard for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus. And, as in In re Mohammad, “the Government
offers no reason, nor can we detect one, why we should withhold issuance of the
writ if Petitioner is otherwise entitled to it.” In re Mohammad, No. 17-1156, 2017
5
WL 3401335, at p.3 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2017) (per curiam).
II. Judges Burton and Herring are military officers, appointed to a civil office in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 973(b). The government offers four arguments why § 973(b)(2) might not disqualify
Judges Burton and Herring from hearing Petitioner’s motion to disqualify in the
USCMCR. It claims that these arguments are “independent,” Opp. 13, but they are
not. Three of them reduce to the single contention that the USCMCR appointments
do not even trigger § 973(b)(2), because (1) military officers are “authorized by
law” to serve as judges on the USCMCR; (2) the position of USCMCR judge is not
a “civil office” under § 973(b); and (3) an appointment by the President, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, is not “require[d]” for a military officer to serve
on the USCMCR. Id. As the petition for writ of mandamus demonstrated, these
arguments are not only unavailing, but also flatly contrary to the government’s
own longstanding interpretations of § 973(b)(2).
1. “Appointment is not required.”
The government maintains that “additional judges” on the USCMCR do not
hold an office “that requires an appointment by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate,” pursuant to § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii), because
§ 950f(b)(2) authorizes the assignment of judges to the USCMCR without
appointment. Opposition at p.15. However, this argument requires this Court to
6
ignore Congress’s plain distinction between assigned military USCMCR judges
under § 950f(b)(2) and “additional” USCMCR judges appointed under
§ 950f(b)(3).
The government incorrectly claims that § 950f(b)(3) does not “require[] an
appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”
(see § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii)). Opp. at 19-20. Even if that were true, then the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution would nonetheless require appointment
by the President and confirmation by the Senate because USCMCR judges are
principal Executive Branch officers, as explained in the Petition at pp. 14-15, 17-
19. Further, the government’s argument ignores the fact that Judges Burton and
Herring were, in fact, nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate
pursuant to § 950f(b)(3). This appointment supercedes any earlier assignment --
otherwise it was meaningless under the Appointments Clause. See also
Memorandum for the General Counsel, General Services Administration, from
John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, 3 Op.
OLC. 148, 150 (1979); 1979 OLC LEXIS 24 (“Where Congress wishes to permit a
military officer to occupy a civilian position on an acting basis without forfeiting
his commission, it has done so explicitly.”) (emphasis added.)
2. “Civil office.”
The starkest example of the government’s abandonment of its longstanding
7
interpretation of § 973 is its novel argument that USCMCR judges do not hold a
“civil office” because the duties of a USCMCR judge are “military in nature” and
USCMCR judges “act pursuant to military, rather than civil, authority.” Opp. at 17.
These assertions are factually incorrect and analytically irrelevant.
The USCMCR is an Article I “court of record.” 10 U.S.C. § 950f(a). In that
regard, it is comparable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF), id. § 941, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims, 38 U.S.C.
§ 7251. The USCMCR’s authority stems from Congress, not the military. See
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 888 (1991) (noting implications of Congress’s
decision to transform an agency into an Article I court).
Futhermore, even if service as a tenured judge on an Article I court of record
were a “traditional military function,” an unbroken line of Department of Justice
opinions have held that an office’s substantive function is irrelevant to whether it is
a “civil office.” Pet. at 15-17, 19-22. As the Office of Legal Counsel explained in
1983, “the applicability of [§ 973(b)(2)] was not to depend on whether the duties of
the civil office were undertaken in obedience to military orders.” Off. of Legal
Counsel, Applicability of 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) to JAG Officers Assigned to
Prosecute Petty Offenses Committed on Military Reservations 16 (May 17, 1983)
[hereinafter “1983 OLC Memo”]);2 see also Memorandum for the General
2 The 1983 OLC Memo is available at https://perma.cc/YLM8-KTR6.
General . . . have ruled that . . . the policy of the statute points to a very broad
interpretation of the term ‘civil officer.’”); Army Officer Holding Civil Office, 18
Op. Att’y Gen. 11, 12 (1884) (“[T]he policy of [§ 973(b)] points to a very liberal
interpretation of the phrase ‘civil office.’”).3 The government cites no authority for
their abandonment of this long held position.
3. “Authorized by Law.”
The government correctly notes that Congress, in § 950f(b)(2), clearly
intended that active-duty military officers would be assigned to the USCMCR. As
Petitioners demonstrated, however, § 950f(b)(2)’s clear statement to this effect
only proves the absence of express Congressional authorization of military officers
being appointed as “additional judges” under § 950f(b)(3). See Weiss v United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 172 (1994) (“This difference negates any permissible
inference that Congress intended that military judges should receive a second
appointment, but in a fit of absentmindedness forgot to say so.”). Tellingly, the
government does not argue that Congress has authorized the appointment of active-
duty military officers to the USCMCR as “additional judges” under § 950f(b)(3).
3 Thus, shortly after § 973(b) was enacted, Attorney General Williams concluded
that it would violate § 973(b) for General Sherman to serve on even a temporary basis as Secretary of War. See Acting Secretary of War, 14 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 200 (1873).
9
Judges Burton and Herring’s appointments to the USCMCR as military officers are
therefore not “otherwise authorized by law.” § 973(b)(2)(A) because there is no
showing of Congress explicitly authorizing military officers to hold this civil
office.
4. 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(5) “Savings Clause.”
In a novel argument not raised in the lower court, the government finally
asserts that “a violation of Section 973(b) [does] not entitle petitioner to relief.”
Opp. at 20. This interpretation is based upon a strained misreading of the text of §
973(b)(5), which provides that “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to
invalidate any action undertaken by an officer in furtherance of assigned official
duties.” The government’s view appears to be that this text thereby immunizes
military officers from any sanction for violating the dual-officeholding ban, and
immunizes from challenge actions taken in violation of the ban.
While now § 973(b) precludes military officers from accepting Presidential
appointments or elective office, the statute historically swept far more broadly,
limiting military officers from performing the duties of thousands of civil offices
within the federal government, and of elective office at the state or federal levels,
regardless of whether they had been formally appointed or elected to those
positions. Indeed, the dual-officeholding ban was designed and intended “to assure
civilian preeminence in government, i.e., to prevent the military establishment
10
from insinuating itself into the civil branch of government and thereby growing
‘paramount’ to it.” Riddle v. Warner, 522 F.2d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 1975); see also
1983 OLC Memo, supra, at 16 (“What was intended was a strict separation of the
military and civilian establishment.”).
Section 973 was amended to loosen those strictures in 1983 after the Office
of Legal Counsel had determined that the assignment of Judge Advocates to serve
as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys ran afoul of § 973. S. Rep. No. 98-174, p. 233
(1983)(Ap. 11). Accordingly, Congress amended Title 10 “to permit the
continuation of this practice of utilizing military attorneys as Special Assistant
United States Attorneys. … This provision does not sanction or endorse any use of
military attorneys beyond that permitted under that interpretation.” Id.(emphasis
added); see also 10 U.S.C. § 806(d)(1) (“A judge advocate who is assigned or
detailed to perform the functions of a civil office in the Government of the United
States under section 973(b)(2)(B) of this title may perform such duties as may be
requested by the agency concerned”) (emphasis added). But importantly, it
continued to “prohibit [active duty] officers from holding any elective office in the
federal government, any federal office requiring appointment by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and any position in the executive schedule.”
Id. (emphasis added).
The government’s reading of § 973(b)(5) would eviscerate Congress’s
11
purpose for the dual office-holding ban in any context, let alone with respect to the
USCMCR.4 Given the profound implications such an interpretation would portend
for civil-military relations in general, it is self-evident that it should be for
Congress to announce, or the Supreme Court to ascertain. See Clinton v.
Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 536 (1999) (emphasizing CAAF’s narrowly
circumscribed role, even within the military justice system).
In any event, “Congress ... does not ... hide elephants in mouseholes.”
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). And the text of
the statute that created § 973(b)(5) proves that Congress did not intend (or effect)
such a sea change in civil-military relations. Taking § 973(b)(5) first, the
government makes much out of that provision’s reference to “any action,” Opp. 21,
27, without addressing the limitation of the qualifier—“in furtherance of assigned
official duties.”
The government agrees that § 973(b)(5) was prompted by a desire to
preclude challenges to criminal convictions obtained by military officers who,
prior to the 1983 amendments to § 973(b), had been assigned to hold a “civil
office” as Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys. See Opp. 21, n5. Thus, Congress’s
4 In its brief in opposition, the government asserts that “[t]he Executive Branch is
bound to comply with Section 973(b), and does so.” Opp. 20. Regardless of how it is enforced (or by whom), the dual-officeholding ban serves no purpose if, as the government claims, there are no consequences for its violation.
12
focus was on immunizing military officers’ actions in the civil office to which they
had (unlawfully, as OLC concluded) been assigned, not on actions taken in their
military capacity subsequent to their appointment of an unauthorized civil office.5
This reading of § 973(b)(5)’s text is confirmed by two additional provisions
of the same statute—neither of which the government acknowledges. First, after
amending § 973(b) in section 1002(a) of the Department of Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Congress separately provided that
Nothing in [§ 973(b)], as in effect before the date of the enactment of this Act, shall be construed . . . to have terminated the military appointment of an officer of an Armed Force by reason of the acceptance of a civil office, or the exercise of its functions, by that officer in furtherance of assigned official duties.
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-94, § 1002(b)(2),
Thus, in the very next subsection of the same statute, Congress used the
same phrase (“in furtherance of assigned official duties”) to unambiguously refer
to actions undertaken by military officers in the civil office to which they were
assigned without authorization. See Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,
286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“[T]here is a natural presumption that identical words
5 Congress’s focus on “assigned” duties also explains why § 973(b)(5) has had
only retroactive effect, since it is no longer a violation of § 973(b)(2) for a servicemember to assume a civil office “in furtherance of assigned official duties.”
13
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”).
Second, the same section of the 1983 Act also separately authorized the
appointment of an active-duty military officer to the Red River Compact
Commission, and specified that acceptance of that appointment “shall not
terminate or otherwise affect such officer’s appointment as a military officer.”
§ 1002(d), 97 Stat. at 656. This proviso would have been wholly unnecessary if
§ 973(b)(5) has the meaning claimed by the government. Instead, it provides
further evidence that § 973(b)(5) has no bearing here. The government’s
unjustified and sweeping construction of this single subsection would have the
effect of nullifying most of the longstanding dual-office prohibition, directly
contrary to the statute’s purpose and its carefully phrased plain language, including
the purpose, context and, most importantly, the carefully phrased plain language of
the 1983 amendment.
III. Service by a military officer as an appointed judge on the USCMCR violates the Commander-in-Chief clause.
In its Opposition, the Government claims this Court’s opinion in al Nashiri,
holding that mandamus is not an appropriate vehicle for determination of the merits
of Petitioner’s Commander in Chief claim is dispositive. Opp. at 22. However, for
all the reasons noted above, a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for a
challenge to a judge serving on the USCMCR when the judge has a real or potential
14
bias resulting in a conflict of interest in the matter before them. As with the violation
of § 973, a finding that their appointment violates the Commander in Chief Clause
creates a conflict of interest that requires Judges Burton and Herring to recuse
themselves from any decision on the merits of this claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons provided above, and those set forth in Petioners Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, this Court should grant the writ of mandamus and prohibition
to disqualify judges serving in violation of 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) and the
Commander-in-Chief clause of the U.S. Constitution and to vacate the ruling
below.
Respectfully submitted, //s// //s// RITA J. RADOSTITZ ALKA PRADHAN DEREK A. POTEET JAMES G. CONNELL, III LtCol, U.S. Marine Corps DAVID Z. NEVIN Counsel for Mr. Al Baluchi GARY D. SOWARDS Counsel for Mr. Mohammad
15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 8, 2017, copies of the foregoing Reply
were served by electronic mail to:
1. The Hon. Paulette V. Burton, LTC, JA, U.S. Army, and The Hon. James W. Herring, Jr., COL, JA, U.S. Army, c/o Mr. Mark Harvey, Clerk, United States Court of Military Commission Review [email protected]
