WITTGENSTEIN AND PYRRHONISM: ON THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 1 Plínio Junqueira Smith (Unifesp) Translated by Israel Vilas Bôas “Vision is the essential faculty and, once used, I shall cast it aside” – Clarice Lispector. 1. The systematic comparison between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and scepticism seems only to point out profound differences. It is known that Wittgenstein himself rejected scepticism explicitly during his whole life. As early as the Tagebücher from 14-16 (1.5.15), Wittgenstein formulates an objection, which will reappear in the Tractatus (6:51), according to which sceptical doubt is nonsensical (unsinnig), for it is intended to raise doubts about what cannot be said. And, in the end of his life, he condemns a universal scepticism, since doubt only makes sense if there are previous certainties: “If one tried to doubt everything, one would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty” (UG, 115). In these two objections, Wittgenstein insists in the idea that sceptical doubt is deprived of meaning 2 . The critique of a so-called “private language” could also be seen as a critique of scepticism, for the solipsist 1 This article was written to the colloquium “Scepticism: old and new”, held in Buenos Aires from June 25 th through the 27 th of 1992. Some changes were made after the colloquium. Originally published in Analytica, vol. 1, number 1, Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 1993, p. 153-186. 2 Strawson (1985) and Grayling (1985) drew inspiration from Wittgenstein, in particular from his Über Gewissheit, to reject scepticism.
Transcript
WITTGENSTEIN AND PYRRHONISM: ON THE NATURE OF
PHILOSOPHY1
Plínio Junqueira Smith (Unifesp)Translated by Israel Vilas Bôas
“Vision is the essential faculty and, once used, I shall cast it aside” – Clarice Lispector.
1. The systematic comparison between the philosophy of Wittgenstein and scepticism
seems only to point out profound differences. It is known that Wittgenstein himself rejected
scepticism explicitly during his whole life. As early as the Tagebücher from 14-16 (1.5.15),
Wittgenstein formulates an objection, which will reappear in the Tractatus (6:51), according
to which sceptical doubt is nonsensical (unsinnig), for it is intended to raise doubts about what
cannot be said. And, in the end of his life, he condemns a universal scepticism, since doubt
only makes sense if there are previous certainties: “If one tried to doubt everything, one
would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty”
(UG, 115). In these two objections, Wittgenstein insists in the idea that sceptical doubt is
deprived of meaning2.
The critique of a so-called “private language” could also be seen as a critique of
scepticism, for the solipsist position, which defends a “private language”, would be a
consequence of the sceptical objections to the realist position3. Scepticism would argue
towards showing that we could never know the internal states of other people: for example,
when I perceive something as red, I do not know if another person has the perception of green
or any other colour. Even saying that we believe that the other person perceives the same
colour I do, would be mistaken, because to speak of “belief”, it would be necessary that this
belief could be at least partially proved (or refuted) and that is impossible in the case of other
minds. And, finally, if the meaning of words consists in the reference to personal experiences
and if two people cannot have the same experience, then communicability is lost and I can
never attribute my internal states to other people: the word “pain” can only refer to my pain
1 This article was written to the colloquium “Scepticism: old and new”, held in Buenos Aires from June 25 th
through the 27th of 1992. Some changes were made after the colloquium. Originally published in Analytica, vol. 1, number 1, Rio de Janeiro: UFRJ, 1993, p. 153-186.2 Strawson (1985) and Grayling (1985) drew inspiration from Wittgenstein, in particular from his Über Gewissheit, to reject scepticism.3 Tugendhat (1979, p. 93-94) shows the role played by sceptical arguments in the internal dissolution of realism towards solipsism and, ultimately, in the abandonment of the language of "I". And Hacker (1990, p. 25-26) says that the presuppositions of metaphysical and linguistic theories of philosophers lead ineluctably to solipsism, being scepticism about other minds and about communication two necessary intermediate steps of this process.
and not to someone else’s. Once accepted these sceptical arguments, there would be no other
philosophical option than sustaining solipsism and a theory of private language. Now, if
Wittgenstein shows the absurd of the supposition of a private language (PI, 243-315), he
would equally show the absurd of the sceptical position, since this posture would lead us to
that supposition.
On the other hand, Kripke4 intended to see a new way of scepticism in Wittgenstein's
philosophy, which would bear strong similarity to Humean scepticism: Wittgenstein would
have had formulated a “sceptical doubt” to which he had given a “sceptical solution”, like
Hume did in the sections IV and V of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
Kripke’s interpretation hinges on the theme “rule-following”, of which the question of private
language would just be a particular case. Kripke expresses Wittgenstein’s argument in a
Humean form: from past cases, how can we know in the future that we are really following
the same rule? According to the “sceptical solution”, the correct understanding of a rule
would be shown by a behaviour that would be in accordance with the majority of the
linguistic community. But Baker and Hacker5 persuasively argue that the connection between
the rule and the act in conformity with it is an “internal relation”, that is, to understand a rule
is precisely to know which acts are in accordance with it. The “community view” would be, in
contrast, a way of associating empirically the rule to the acts conform to it and, thus, there
would be here only an “external relation”. It would be incorrect to attribute to Wittgenstein a
scepticism of Humean kind such as Kripke understands it.
Thus, at first sight nothing seems to indicate an approximation between Wittgenstein's
philosophy and scepticism and everything seems to point at the opposite direction.
Wittgenstein's reflexions on the meaning of a sceptical doubt, on the possibility of a private
language, and on what it is to follow a rule would culminate in the rejection of scepticism
rather than in its acceptance. Those who deny any kinship between scepticism and
Wittgenstein seem to be on the right track.
But it is necessary to notice that the scepticism to which Wittgenstein and his
commentators refer is the scepticism in its modern form, inaugurated by Descartes’s first
Meditation. The problematic of doubt and certainty, mainly as it is discussed in On Certainty
clearly has its origins in the Cartesian idea of a methodical, radical and universal doubt, as
well as in Berkeley's intention of denying the existence of the physical world6. No less
4 Kripke (1982), esp. pp. 60-69.5 Baker e Hacker (1984) especially the first essay.6 Kenny (1975) e Bouveresse (1987) recognise that Descartes is Wittgenstein's target, but is does not seem less correct to me that Berkeley is criticised as well.
modern is the question of solipsism, in which sceptical doubts lead us to a subject, the
Cartesian cogito or the Humean bundle of perceptions, which has access only to its own
representations7. Anyhow, it is with reference to modern philosophy that one has been
thinking the question of scepticism in Wittgenstein8.
If one wants to attribute a genuine meaning to this issue of the relationship between
Wittgenstein's philosophy and scepticism, one must introduce two modifications in the way it
is formulated. The first is to set aside the reference to this form of scepticism that is only a
methodological step of Cartesian dogmatism, as well as to the empirical and scientific twist
that Hume gives to it, and turn our attention to ancient Greek sceptics. The second is to set
aside temporarily this discussion by topics, and first tackle Wittgenstein's conception of
philosophy and the more general sense which he attributes to his own thinking. Only thus, one
will be able to discuss the purported scepticism of Wittgenstein with the necessary historical
and conceptual rigour.
My suggestion is that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy has many similarities
with the Pyrrhonian conception9. To support this point, I shall expound briefly some aspects
of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, and then I will compare it with the one that
Sextus presents us. I do not intend to offer a new interpretation of the Wittgensteinian
conception of philosophy, but only to ordain what we already know with a view to a
determined purpose: to show the sceptical style in his conception.
2. Wittgenstein opposes roughly to his own conception of philosophy another one10,
which I will name traditional conception of philosophy. According to the traditional
conception, philosophy should deal with phenomena to see through them (“die Erscheinungen
durchschauen”; PI, 90) or with the things to see through them (“die Sache durchschauen”; PI,
92) reaching, thus, the essence of all things. By “essence of all things”, Wittgenstein refers to
something hidden behind things themselves and that an analysis of these would reveal. The
idea that the essence is hidden (“Das Wesen ist uns verborgen”) is a basic idea that
Wittgenstein attributes to traditional philosophy. Philosophy’s task would be to discover this
hidden essence by means of an analysis of the phenomena or of the things.
7 8 I am aware of the existence of works that compare Wittgenstein and the Greek sceptics, but, amongst the main commentators of Wittgenstein's works, none takes into account the Greek scepticism.9 It is important to highlight that I only refer to the works of Wittgenstein after 1929, in particular to the Philosophical Investigations. Naturally, this suggestion does not apply to the Tractatus.10 Cf., regarding it, Moore (1959, p. 322)
To Wittgenstein, on contrast, philosophy does not deal with phenomena or things, but
with the “possibilities” of phenomena, i.e., with the “kind of statement that we make about
phenomena” (PI, 90). Philosophers take our ordinary claims about phenomena as raw material
of their philosophical reflexions. It is what Saint Augustine would have done when discussing
the nature of time and, hence, his considerations are grammatical: every philosophy is
involved with our way of making statements. As he says farther to his purported interlocutor,
“Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words” (PI, 120). Because traditional
philosophy confounds the semantic domain with the domain of things, it attributes to the latter
that which belongs to the former. “One predicates of the thing what lies in the method of
representing it” (PI, 104). But the correct understanding of language separates rigorously
these two domains and the philosopher will focus only on language. “Philosophical
investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about metaphysics: it obliterates
the distinction between factual and conceptual investigations” (Z, 458). In other words,
traditional philosophy confounds logic and ontology, and Wittgenstein makes sure to separate
them carefully.
Once delimited the field of philosophy (language or discourse, whereas science would
deal with objective investigations), one sees that Wittgenstein opposes to the Erscheinungen
durchschauen another expression, viz., übersichtliche Darstellung (PI, 92). This
übersichtliche Darstellung is a description of the rules of our grammar, which allow us to
acknowledge what we already knew but had difficulty to see. Unlike the traditional
conception, Wittgenstein does not intend to go beyond things or phenomena to apprehend
some hidden essence. The essence, to Wittgenstein, is already visible on broad day light and,
through a sorting of grammatical facts, becomes clear. It is no longer about unveiling the “real
structure of the world”, but only about describing conceptual connexions. The essence, which
was conceived by philosophers as a hidden entity to be unveiled by an analysis, is now
interpreted by Wittgenstein as a mere grammatical rule of our language. If, to the traditional
conception, philosophy formulated ontological-epistemological questions, to Wittgenstein, all
questions are, in the end, semantic.
Wittgenstein characterises the propositions of traditional philosophy as scientific, as if
philosophy were a superscience, for it builds theories, formulates hypotheses, and explains the
world in the same way science does. But, to Wittgenstein, instead of these theories,
hypotheses, and explanations, philosophy should only make descriptions of the workings of
our language (PI, 109). No new thesis is proposed and, if it were the case to propose them,
there would never be a discussion about them, because everybody would agree about them
(PI, 128; BT. p.12). Thus, Wittgenstein does not sustain a philosophical opinion and cannot
even resort to any opinion that is not shared by his purported interlocutor, because, in this
case, they do not share the same language game that it is necessary to describe. “Of all the
topics that we have discussed, I do not have an opinion, and if I had one, I would immediately
disregard it in benefit of this debate for it would not be important to our discussion.”11. To
adopt an opinion is, to Wittgenstein, a way to be partial, as well as to sustain a creed, which is
contrary to philosophy: “Our only task is to be impartial, i.e., all we have to do is to point out
and dissolve the partialities of philosophy; we must not set up new parties – and creeds.” (BT,
p. 14).
Associated with this refusal to formulate philosophical theses or theories, one finds the
idea that, in philosophy, there is no argumentative method in the sense of articulating
premises and conclusions in order to establish the truth of the latter from the evidence of the
former. The argumentation employed by Wittgenstein aims at the dissolution of problems, by
resorting only to linguistic facts recognised by his interlocutor. “In philosophy, one does not
draw conclusions. ‘But it must be like this!’ is not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy
only states what everyone admits” (PI, 599).
It is important to notice that this ordaining is not the result of an empirical science, of
an investigation regarding facts, and that empirical knowledge of grammar is up to the
grammarian. Everything we want to know is already given from the beginning, and it is
enough to recall what we already know about our language. “The problems are solved, not by
giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known” (PI, 109).
One may explain in this way that, after saying that philosophy does not deal with
phenomena and things, Wittgenstein is then able say that philosophy of logic speaks of
propositions and of words in the common meaning of these terms, i.e., “we are talking about
the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal
phantasm” (PI, 108). Not postulating hidden entities as an “essence”, Wittgenstein refers only
to what we refer in our “habitual” life, not only to real language, but also to ordinary objects
(PI, 106).
This positive objective, of description and understanding of what is already before our
eyes but we have difficulties in perceiving, acquires philosophical meaning from a negative
objective. The übersichtliche Darstellung does not have the goal of presenting a new doctrine
of essence of things, according to which the essence would be apparent in grammar and not
11 Quoted by Baker and Hacker (1984), p.8.
hidden behind things, but of eliminating philosophical confusions. The grammatical
consideration “sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away” (PI, 90).
It is in this sense that one must understand the statement, “the work of the philosopher
consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (PI, 127; cf. BT, p.10). This
assemblage of reminders is nothing but the elucidation of the effective use of the words in our
common language. Further, Wittgenstein suggests that organizing our knowledge of the use of
language has a purpose, viz., to avoid theoretical confusions that arise when language spins in
the void, when it no longer works (PI, 132), when it “goes on holiday”. If, on one hand, it is
undeniable that one of Wittgenstein's goals is the description of grammatical rules (“Wir
wollen etwas verstehen, was schon offen vor unsern Augen liegt”; IF, 89), one the other, the
explication of the reason for which he wants to understand something points at a critical
design (“Denn das scheinen wir, in irgendeinem Sinne, nicht zu verstehen”; IF, 89), viz., to
undo the miscomprehension that philosophers have of the logic of ordinary language. “For the
clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the
philosophical problems should completely disappear” (PI, 133). This passage, albeit it
suggests a certain equivalence amongst clarification and elimination of incomprehension, also
points at a certain priority of the disappearance of philosophical problems in face of the task
of describing our grammar12.
Confined to the conceptual questions, philosophical investigations will not obtain a
new and deeper knowledge of things, but will make us recognise that the purported
philosophical knowledge is only a product of an inadequate use of language. It is precisely
because they destroy “houses of cards” that Wittgenstein judges important his considerations
(PI, 118). Shortly afterwards, he admits that “the results of philosophy are the uncovering of
one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got by
running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the
discovery” (PI, 119). In the Big Typescript, Wittgenstein formulates this idea in a more
incisive way: “All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols” (BT, p. 9). The conceptual
description, put in the place of traditional philosophical explanations, “gets its light, that is to
say its purpose, from the philosophical problems” (PI, 109). And Wittgenstein is emphatic
here: philosophical problems must “solved by means of an insight about the workings of our
language, and those workings must be recognised this way: in despite of an urge (entgegen
einem Trieb) to misunderstand them” (PI, 109; highlighted by Wittgenstein), Wittgenstein can 12 Cf. Hacker (1972), pp. 113-116. We disagree, hence, of those who see the therapy as a previous stage to prepare for a positive stage, as if the description of language were the main goal (e.g., Arregui (1984, pp. 161-168)) or even of those who see the process of clarification as an independent goal.
now give us a precise definition of what philosophy is: “Philosophy is a battle against the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (PI, 109)13.
When the nature of philosophy is defined this way, it is natural to characterise it as
therapeutic, as a philosophy whose objective is to heal the philosopher of the malady of which
his understanding is victim. “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of
an illness” (PI, 255). The metaphor of the bumps caused by the dashes of the understanding
against the limits of language (PI, 119) is in consonance with this characterisation: bumps
must be treated. At first, Wittgenstein thought there was only one therapeutic method (M, p.
322), but then he recognised the existence of various ways of conducting this treatment:
“There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different
therapies” (PI, 133)14.
The idea that the method is the essential in philosophy makes it so that the latter turns
into “a matter of skill” (M, p. 322). The idea of a “skill” comes here in opposition to the idea
of “profundity” present in traditional philosophy. The reflexions from this philosophy have a
general meaning, which consists in the discovery of the hidden essence of phenomena or of
things and of the foundation of the sciences (PI, 89). Philosophical profundity can be
characterised as a (supposed) contemplation of the “ideal” that hides itself in reality (PI, 101).
However, it is an illusion, because the profundity is but a grammar Witz, and the whole
question is to know why do we experience the feeling of profundity when we are confronted
with philosophical problems (PI, 111). What characteristics, by its time, does the
Wittgensteinian skill have?
This skill is, as all the others, “very difficult to acquire”. In order to do that, says
Wittgenstein, it is not enough to attend classes, but discussion is indispensable. As the
physician, the philosopher must learn a technique, he must acquire an ability to heal; and, as
the physician must diagnose the true cause, and prescribe the appropriate medicine,
Wittgenstein must investigate which grammar mistake is in the origin of a determined
philosophical illusion, as well as the way to make the philosopher abandon his particular way
of speaking15. In the Big Typescript, Wittgenstein speaks of a capacity to philosophy and,
right after it, tackles the problem of teaching philosophy. Here, “the capacity for philosophy 13 The Big Typescript defined philosophy in the following way: “Philosophising is: rejecting false arguments” (BT, p. 6). Because the descriptions of our language's grammar acquire signification only from philosophical problems, the discussion upon the possible systematicity of this description, independently of the therapeutic finality, appears to us as a discussion outside Wittgenstein's mind (as Backer and Hacker (1980, pp. 290-293) and Strawson (1985, pp. 14-21) do).14 Hacker (1972, pp. 139-144) describes some of these causes of philosophical diseases and, in (1990, pp. 89-92), draws some comparisons with psychoanalytical theory, as the Big typescript (BT, p. 7) had already suggested.
consists in the ability to receive a strong and lasting impression from a grammatical fact” (BT,
p. 15)16. Not only the memories of our uses of the words will not be allowed to leave anything
out, under the charge of there remaining the feeling that something is wrong (M, p. 323), but
also their ordering and reordering will be necessary until we find a determined order that will
allow us to shun away a philosophical illusion (If, 132). On the other hand, the description of
our language is not only made of remembrances, and Wittgenstein allows himself to resort to
apparently absurd possible uses to illuminate certain “regions” of language that, otherwise,
could remain obscure. “Our method is not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but
rather deliberately to invent new ones, some of them because of their absurd appearance”
(BB, p. 28; cf. PI, 122, 130). Wittgenstein demands yet another philosophical ability, viz., to
learn how to express precisely that which the philosopher would like to say. “One of the most
important tasks is to express all false thought processes so true to character that the reader
says, “Yes, that’s exactly the way I meant it”. ... Indeed, we can only prove that someone
made a mistake if he (really) acknowledges this expression as the correct expression of his
feeling” (BB, p.28; cf. IF, 122, 130).
Of what does the philosopher suffer, after all? Of what kind are the philosophical
problems that cause intellectual wounds, and must be dissolved? Philosophical questions have
origin in “a vague mental uneasiness” (M. p. 323, emphasis added). “Philosophical errors or
‘troubles in our thought’ were due false analogies suggested by our actual use of expressions”
(M, p.257, emphasis added; cf. too pp. 318-319 e 323-324). “The problems arising through a
misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth. They are deep
disquietudes (tiefe Beunruhigungen)” (PI, 111; the second highlight is mine). “A simile that
has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this
disquiets us (der beunruhigt uns) (IF, 112; emphasis added; cf. IF, 125; cf. also BT, pp, 6, 9-
11, 14, 19). In the Blue Book, when rejecting the idea that an ideal language should be
produced to improve ordinary language, Wittgenstein attributes a new function to the
construction of ideal languages. “Whenever we make up 'ideal languages' it is not in order to
replace our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone's
mind by thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word” (BB, p. 28;
emphasis added). A little before, Wittgenstein referred to the philosophical question “what
15 One must highlight, however, that the sort of thinking demanded by philosophical activity is "very different from what is required in the sciences" (M. p. 322). We have already observed that philosophy has a very different procedure from science; here, nothing is hidden, no new fact must be discovered and no theory (or hypothesis) is formulated.16 The text presents the following manuscript variation: "A talent for philosophy consists in the receptiveness to receive a strong and lasting impression from a grammatical fact".
is...?” as “an utterance of unclarity, of mental discomfort” (BB, p.26; emphasis added; cf. BB,
p.1 e p.59). This discomfort would be comparable with the mental discomfort children
experience when they ask “why?”.
What causes this disturbance? What philosophical form adopts this mental
discomfort? “A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don’t know my way about' (ich kenne
mich nicht aus)” (PI, 123). This disorientation can only relate to a disorientation in language,
in the grammatical rules (PI, 203), and, as a disease, generates a sensation of malaise. In those
passages of the Blue Book that deal with Saint Augustine's reflexions upon time (BB, p. 26),
Wittgenstein talks about a contradiction amongst different uses of the word “measure”. In the
paragraph 125 of the PI, Wittgenstein talks about a mathematical contradiction that generates
the mental discomfort. It is here, hence, that there is the origin of the philosophical problem
taken in its generality: “The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the
philosophical problem. (PI, 125). How does one interpret this passage?17
The Blue Book gives us the first indications to think the mechanism that leads us from
contradiction to discomfort: the philosopher “sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying
to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results”
(BB, p. 27). The PI describes this mechanism in a different way: “The fundamental fact here
is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules,
things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our
own rules” (PI, 125). Different rules can work well until a new and unusual situation causes
two of them to come into disagreement, producing a contradiction that can generate a
philosophical problem. If we treat mathematically, e.g., a mathematical contradiction, no
philosophical disturbance will arise, for it is up to the mathematician to solve that conflict
manifested by two mathematical rules. But if we attribute a philosophical status to the
mathematical contradiction, then it will be inevitable the rise of a philosophical problem.
Transgressing the conceptual domain, to enter the objective domain, the philosopher will seek
outside the mathematics the solution to an eminently mathematical problem, when he should
only search um a conceptual description the origin of that contradiction. “This entanglement
in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. übersehen)” (PI, 125; cf. PI, 89)18.
17 Fann (1975, pp. 72-73) cites a long passage of Hertz about the contradiction that closely resembles Wittgenstein's texts regarding this theme (Hertz, The principles of Mechanics, New York, Dover Publications, 1956, pp. 7-9).18 This, we see once again that the positive part submits itself to the negative: the description only focalises the contradiction manifested by the rules.
That is why, according to Wittgenstein, of the two ways to cure these disturbances –
either answering the philosophical question or showing that the particular question is not
permitted (M, p. 323) -, only the latter is satisfactory. As long as the philosopher seeks after
epistemological or ontological solutions to semantic problems, his disturbances will not cease
to exist. The Blue Book illustrates this point: “Very often, the way the discussion of such a
puzzle runs is this: First, the question is asked, “What is time?”. This question makes it appear
that what we want is a definition. We mistakenly think that a definition is what will remove
the trouble (as in certain states of indigestion we feel a kind of hunger, which cannot be
removed by eating). The question is then answered by a wrong definition; say, “Time is the
motion of the celestial bodies”. The next step is to see that this definition is unsatisfactory.
But this only means that we do not use the word “time” synonymously with “motion of the
celestial bodies”. However, in saying that the first definition is wrong, we are now tempted to
think that we must replace it by a different one, the correct one” (BB, 27). But there is no
correct definition of time and the solution to the problem must come from somewhere else.
Wittgenstein compares this situation to that one wherein we have a hair on our tongue, but
cannot get hold of it, and cannot get rid of it (BT, p. 6).
In a passage of the PI, Wittgenstein says, “A main cause of philosophical disease – a
one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example” (PI, 593). To
avoid these diseases, hence, it is fit to prescribe a multisided diet; thence the idea of
multiplying the examples of language games, of providing the conditions to the execution of
an analysis that deals with the problem from various angles, without ever intending to a
systematisation (cf. PI, 130-31). The Blue Book did not say something much different (p. 28),
when it recommended counteracting the false analogies with descriptions and inventions of
uses of words, for the false analogies imposed a single meaning to different uses of a
determined word19.
Another one of these methods is substituting a form of expression for other, in order to
make the misunderstanding disappear. This substitution method can be called an “analysis”,
for it often resembles a decomposition (PI, 90). But, in contrast with Tractatus, there is not a
perfect decomposed form of an expression, not is there a complete logical analysis to unveil
the determinate meaning of a proposition of common language (PI, 91). The analysis
Wittgenstein intends to perform now only aims at avoiding misunderstandings and, hence, the
language games he invents to that end must be interpreted only as objects of comparison that
19 Hottois (1976, pp. 141-154) elaborates the idea of an opposition between good and bad images. The “language games” would be good analogies, which would fight the bad analogies that generate philosophical problems.
illuminate our language, and not as revealers of a hidden meaning, but present, in all correctly
constructed propositions (PI, 130). The analytical method acquires, thus, a new meaning in
the later thought of Wittgenstein.
Roughly, one can say that, by pointing to an original contradiction in our rules and to
different uses of words, Wittgenstein intends to dissolve the philosophical problems. Thus, to
perform the linguistic therapy is to make the ways of language known again to philosophers,
to orient them in grammar rules and, by this means, to eliminate the contradictions that
produce their disquietudes. By detecting the origin of the problem and the conflict of rules
upon which the misunderstandings lie, we will quit putting philosophical questions to
ourselves, and, in this sense, we will quit philosophising in the traditional sense.
The disappearance of the disturbance that afflicted the philosopher follows the
abandonment of traditional philosophising. No longer confused or seduced by language, the
philosopher quits running his head up against the limits of language. Wittgenstein expresses
this point in a very famous metaphor, “What is your aim in philosophy? – To shew the fly the
way out of the fly-bottle” (PI, 309). The Notes for Lectures confirm the idea that this
metaphor expresses the disquietude of the philosopher and shows that to leave the fly-bottle is
to reach tranquillity: “The solipsist flutters and flutters in the flyglass, strikes against the
walls, flutters further. How can he be brought to rest (zur Ruhe zu bringen)?” (NL, p. 300)20.
Other passages also refer to tranquillity as the end pursued by philosophy, “The real discovery
is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The one that
gives philosophy peace (zur Ruhe bringt), so that it is no longer tormented by questions which
bring itself in question. – Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series
of examples can be broken off. – Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single
problem” (PI, 133; the first highlight is mine; cf. BT, p. 19). “Disquiet in philosophy (Die
Unruhe in der Philosophie) might be said to arise from looking at philosophy wrongly...
Instead of the turbulent conjectures and explanations (turbulenten Mutmassungen und
Erklärungen), we want to establish the quiet weighing of linguistic facts (ruhige Erwägung
sprachlicher Tatsachen setzen,)” (Z, 447, emphasis added; cf. BT, p. 20)21. It becomes
undeniable therefore that tranquillity is the ultimate goal of the therapy, that it plays a central
role in Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. If we describe language, it is to eliminate the
philosophical illusions and if we eliminate the philosophical illusions, it is to alleviate the
20 Quoted by Tugendhat (1979), p. 92.21 Compare these passages with the manuscript variation of the BT, p. 15, quoted in the footnote 16 above.
mind22 of its discomfort or to remove its disturbance and reach tranquillity. Thus, intellectual
tranquillity is the supreme purpose of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and it is what explains the
objectives subordinate to it that otherwise could seem gratuitous23.
This psychological aspect, so to speak, of therapy has its counterpart in a linguistic
aspect. The first and more evident is that we “bring words back from their metaphysical to
their everyday use” (PI, 116)24. On the other hand, by helping the philosopher to escape this
from the metaphysical use of the terms, “clear up the ground of language on which they (the
houses of cards) stand” (PI, 118). It is effectively about a liberation, for we were imprisoned
in a metaphysical language, which constrains and bothers us. Wittgenstein employs a
metaphor to express the difficulty of making language come back to work normally, “the
choice of our words is so important, because the point is to hit the physiognomy of the matter
exactly; because only the thought that is precisely targeted can lead the right way. The
railway carriage must be placed on the tracks exactly, so that it can keep on rolling as it is
supposed to” (BT, p. 6). This precision consists in the adequate choice of words to express
what the philosopher would like to say, so that he recognises himself in the formulation
proposed by the “therapist”.
Even the mathematician, e.g., is tempted to make (nonmathematical) affirmations
upon the objectivity and the reality of mathematical facts (der mathematischen Tatsachen);
these affirmations do not properly constitute a philosophy, but are rather its raw material, i.e.,
they must be treated by philosophy (PI, 254). When we encounter contradictions, we will seek
to clarify the grammatical rules that give rise to these contradictions so that science can solve
them in its own domain. Scientific investigations will be, thus, free of philosophical
confusions, of distortions that result from a necessarily partial philosophical perspective.
Since philosophy is “before all new discoveries and inventions” (PI, 126; BT, p. 13), one can
sustain that one of its functions is to disentangle sciences from the false problems risen by
22 By employing the word "mind”, we do not attribute any "mentalism" to Wittgenstein's philosophy. The use of this word is authorised by the philosopher himself (e.g., BB, p. 28 and M, p. 323, quoted above). On the other hand, Wittgenstein is not a behaviourist (cf., e.g., Tugendhat (1979, pp. 120ff.) e Hacker (1990, pp. 224-253)).23 Backer e Hacker (1980, “The Nature of Philosophy, p. 259-293) have not mentioned even a single time the tranquillity as the final goal of Wittgensteinian therapy. Arregui (1984, p. 157ff.) says that tranquillity is Wittgenstein's purpose, but does seem to distinguish it from the Übersicht. However, the repeated use of the word “Zweck” (for ex., PI, 109, 127, 132) allows one to talk about clarity as a means to tranquillity. For that reason, we agree with Hottois (1976, p. 164), affirming that the ultimate goal of the übersichthiche Darstellung is to arrive at a state of tranquillity.24 By criticising the idea of a private language, Wittgenstein assumes one must only use words as they are normally used, "If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?)" (PI, 246).
philosophers and, sometimes, by scientists themselves when they step aside from their
scientific work.
The return to the common use of words does not mean a blind adherence to the
conceptions of the common person, nor a prejudice against speculation. Wittgenstein, on one
hand, acknowledges the value of philosophical illusions: they are not mere mistakes, but
answer to basic errors that allow us to reflect upon our language; the importance of
philosophical problems is as great as that of our own language (PI, 111; cf. BT, p.8). And, on
the other hand, he does not aim at rejecting the modifications of our language, but, on the
contrary, conceive it as essentially mutable (albeit its structure changes in an extremely slow
rhythm; cf. IF, 18 and UG, 95-99). To his mind, however, it is not up to the philosopher to
promote the reform and improvement of language: “Such a reform for particular practical
purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in
practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with. The confusions
which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling (leerläuft), not when it is doing
work” (PI, 132). One of the meanings of the famous affirmation that “philosophy leaves
everything as it is” (PI, 124) is precisely that common language must not be altered by
philosophy, but only described when misunderstandings arise.
Giving up the great theoretical and systematic constructions, philosophy will
constitute itself in a practice, i.e., in the activity of reminding or producing possible uses of
words to perform the therapy25. We imagine other language games as object of comparison to
illuminate our language game (PI, 130). If language is like a city (PI, 18), the philosophical
observations that Wittgenstein makes regarding it are like sketches of a landscape (PI, pref.),
accentuating some of its aspects, or walls surrounding its limits, so that philosophers do not
contravene them (BT, p. 16). In the same way medicine is an activity, so is Wittgenstein's
linguistic therapy, “philosophy unravels the knots in our thinking; hence its result must be
simple, but its activity as complicated as the knots it unravels” (BT, p. 14; emphasis added). It
is precisely because philosophy is an activity that Wittgenstein will demand, as we have seen
above, a technical capacity from the philosopher. A method to cure the dogmatists and
metaphysicians of the disease is a way of conducting an investigation, a particular way of
exerting this therapeutic activity.
According to Wittgenstein, of the traces of the traditional way of philosophising, only
a few remain valid (to be of general character, to be fundamental both to ordinary life and to
the sciences, and to be independent of the results of science; cf. M, p. 323) and, in its place, 25 The idea that philosophy is a practice was already present since Tractatus (4.112).
we have only a new discipline that is no more than an heiress of what we call traditional
philosophy (BB, p. 28).
But it is certain that philosophy has no end, since language will continue to suggest
false analogies, and certain people will be propense to be seduced by them26. Thus, new
problems will arise and new philosophical theories will be proposed, making necessary new
therapies. Besides, the dissolution of philosophical problems is always through the
“transversal streets”, never through the “main road” (Z, 447), i.e., the therapy solves particular
problems and repels punctual difficulties, but not a single problem (PI, 133). Thus, therapeutic
philosophy demands an unceasing work: “but in that case we never get to the end of our
work! – Of course not, for it has no end” (Z, 447)27.
3. This conception of philosophy has nothing to do with the so-called Cartesian
scepticism of the first Meditation, which aims at destroying every belief to rebuild sciences
from new and solid foundations, and, at first, neither it resembles Humean scepticism, which
results from an empirical science, whose purpose is to discover the principles of human mind.
In Wittgenstein, a universal doubt is not possible, nor is philosophy an empirical science.
However, the conception of philosophy presented by Sextus Empiricus reveals itself very
close of the Wittgenstein's conception exposed above. A comparison between them presents a
series of affinities, to the point that we can characterise Wittgenstein's conception as a
sceptical conception28.
In the first place, Wittgenstein holds that the task of philosophy is eminently critical
and negative. We have seen that philosophy was defined as a battle against the bewitchment
of our intelligence by means of language, only destroying “houses of cards”, i.e.,
metaphysical thoughts. By refusing to construct arguments to arrive at conclusions, it did not
formulate theses, only combated, with the means of language itself, those theses proposed by
philosophers. This first idea is the one that says philosophy must become a therapy. The
26 Grammatical problems, according to Big Typescript, are profoundly rooted in our own grammar, associating themselves to the most ancient habits of thought. Because we had, and still have, the tendency to think like this is the reason language became as it is, in a manner that the liberation of the seduction of language involves an effort against our instinct, as a natural thought (cf. PI, 109). And that would explain the observation that philosophy, since Plato, does not tire of coming back to the same problems, for the basic structure of language is essentially still the same (BT, pp, 14-16).27 Hottois (1976, p. 165) intends that complete clarity produces a definitive state of serenity. With this, Wittgenstein would reintroduce a theoretical connotation in his philosophy, as well as a utopic ideal. But what seems definitive to us is only the tranquillity regarding a solved particular problem. Other philosophical problems threat the tranquillity that, from this point of view, is momentary.28 I obviously do not intend to deplete this comparison here. Danilo Marcondes (NP) tackle this problem, approximating, to my mind correctly, Wittgenstein and Sextus.
speculations about "the structure of the real" must cede their places to the descriptions of
language, and we acknowledge that, in the origin of philosophical questions, lies a problem to
be solved.
Sextus Empiricus would certainly subscribe to this characterisation of philosophy29. In
contrast to the dogmatists, who formulate a positive thesis about the possibility of knowledge
of the “real”, and to the Academicians, who formulate a negative one, the Pyrrhonian
investigations do not result in any knowledge, whether positive or negative (PH 1.1-3). There
would be, then, according to Sextus Empiricus, three species of philosophy: the dogmatic, the
academic, and the sceptical (PH 1.4), in which the specificity of the latter would consist in its
abstention from the formulation of any philosophical thesis. The sceptic does not hold any
dogma, if by “dogma” we understand, “to assent to some unclear object of investigation in the
sciences; for Pyrrhonists do not assent to anything unclear” (PH 1.13).
If in dogmatic and academic philosophies, arguments sustained theses about the
supposed “real world”; in Pyrrhonism, they assume a very different function. If we understand
"argument" as a discourse that articulates premises and conclusions with the purpose of
establishing theses about reality, then there is no sceptical argument, only dogmatic
arguments that come into conflict with one another, annulling themselves mutually, and
producing suspension of judgement. With respect to argumentation understood in this sense,
what is proper to the Pyrrhonist is not in the formulation of any particular argument, but in the
disposition or organisation of the arguments. The Pyrrhonist ascertains the conflict, the
diaphonía, of opinions and points at the impossibility of finding a criterion that can solve it.
Incapable of pronouncing himself about the existence of the real, due to the equipotence of
the various discourses elaborated by philosophers, the Pyrrhonist is led to suspend judgement.
Dogmatism is seen as a species of disease, which consists in self-love (PH 1.90), in
the conceit and rashness of the philosophers (PH 3.280), and must be cured by Pyrrhonist.
Sextus Empiricus also employs a medical metaphor to explain the way by which the
Pyrrhonist treats the dogmatist’s posture: just as the physician applies stronger medicine to the
most severe diseases, the Pyrrhonist employs stronger or weaker arguments conform to the
intensity of the dogmatist’s disease (PH 3.280). Everything that is constructed of "positive",
for both Wittgenstein and Sextus, assumes philosophical relevance from that destructive
intention. In effect, the Pyrrhonist conceives his arguments as an aperient drug that, by
expelling the contrary argument, is expelled with it (PH 2.188). In the same way, for
29 Except, as we will see ahead, from the idea that the philosophical problems are dissolved. This idea is not in Pyrrhonian thought.
Wittgenstein, the description of language is distinguished from the grammarian’s work
precisely because it serves to eliminate the philosophical confusion. It is noteworthy that the
Tractatus (6.54) employed the same metaphor that Sextus did (M 8.481) to characterise the
philosophical work as a necessary step to be subsequently abandoned: after we use the ladder
to climb the wall, we knock it over.
We have already seen Wittgenstein's particular way of understanding the philosophical
therapy, and it remains to see Sextus’s way of conceiving it. A brief exposition of the
Pyrrhonian therapy already points at other similarities amongst both philosophers. In the
origin of philosophising is a disquietude or disturbance, and therapy must supress this
disquietude, conducing the philosopher to calmness and tranquillity (ataraxía) in relation to
philosophical questions, by means of an opposition of arguments. At first, the Pyrrhonist has
hoped to find, in the possession of truth, the end of his philosophical problems. The
observation of contradictions in things, and the aporia in relation to which alternative he
should accept, had disturbed the Pyrrhonist – before he became a Pyrrhonist. The
investigation of the true and false in things seemed, at first, the solution to his disturbance
and, hence, the Pyrrhonist – before he became a Pyrrhonist – dedicated himself to this
investigation (PH 1.12). But from this investigation has not resulted the possession of truth,
but the suspension of judgment (due to the equipotence of arguments). It occurred then, as if
by chance, that to the suspension of judgment followed the desired tranquillity of the soul
(dianóia) with respect to preventable issues (PH 1.28-29) Based on the repeated experience of
the suspension followed by tranquillity, the Pyrrhonist has gradually abandoned the search for
truth and replacing it with the pursuit of the suspension of judgment. The goal remained the
same, the hope to achieve tranquillity, but the means to achieve it have changed in the course
of his investigations.
With respect to this point, one has observed some similarities between Wittgenstein
and Sextus. Therapy, to both of them, aims at restoring the lost tranquility in front of a
philosophical problem that disturbs us. The cause of this disturbance is identified as being a
contradiction and, of the two possible solutions – either reply to the philosophical question or
abandon it –, only the latter propitiates tranquility, whilst the first only perpetuates the initial
disquietude. It occurs, hence, a shift in the philosophy’s task, since truth ceases to be the
horizon to steer its reflexions. Philosophy becomes a means to achieve, so to speak, a
philosophical tranquility.
In both thoughts, moreover, one tries to curb the partiality of dogmatic philosophy by
calling attention to other aspects involved in the question. Philosophy must be impartial. In
Wittgenstein's case, that is done by counteracting (cf. BB, p. 28) the false analogies with
descriptions and inventions of uses of words or attending to the diverse uses that a word has,
without tying oneself to a single one nor imposing it to all uses of that expression; and, in
Sextus’s case, by opposing negative arguments to positive ones. Pyrrhonism’s most
characteristic feature is the opposition of arguments to arguments in order to produce a state
of mind wherein one does not affirm nor denies any thesis that postulates the reality of things
(PH 1.8). The method seeks after the frontal collision of two opposing tendencies that annul
each other. The characterisation of the dogmatist as a lover of himself (philautós) –, i.e., as he
who prefers his own opinions and elects himself as criterion to solve the conflict of opinions –
corresponds to this denounce of his partiality in the consideration of the arguments and
opinions involved in an issue.
This therapy demands from he who exerts it, whether in Wittgensteinian or Sextian
form, a certain ability or capacity. I have described briefly the technique demanded from one
who intends to dissolve the philosophical problems (to perceive grammatical facts, to know to
ordain linguistic observations, to invent possible uses and to apprehend and express what the
other wants to say). Will there be something in Sextus that corresponds to this ability of the
philosopher? It is the very definition of scepticism and sceptic that gives us the answer. Being
Pyrrhonism defined as a capacity (dúnamis) of opposing arguments and arguments (PH 1.8),
the Pyrrhonist will be precisely the one who participates in this capacity (PH 1.11). Whilst the
philosopher has the capacity of producing arguments and theses with respect to a supposed
real, the sceptic has the ability to organise them with the purpose of annulling them mutually
and reaching the suspension of judgement. The modes of Aenesidemus and Agrippa, e.g., can
be seen as techniques of neutralisation of dogmatism. Besides, Sextus affirms the sceptics are
“men of talent” (PH 1.12) who have been troubled by the contradictions of opinions and who
contrived tranquillity by means of suspension of judgement; it is required, thus, to become a
sceptic, some talent to acquire and exert this technique.
The idea that the sceptic possesses a particular ability is consistent with the idea that
there is no sceptical argument in that sense of argument I defined above, which is to be
conclusive with respect to the reality of things, for the Pyrrhonist does not propose an
argument that convinces the philosopher that he is wrong, but he proposes mainly a technique
to achieve tranquillity, a path by which the philosopher can get rid of the problems that
torment him. To the extent in which the conflict presents opinions and arguments of both
sides and with equal persuasive force, the Pyrrhonist may intend his reflexions to be the most
rational and rigorous result that is within our reach.
In Wittgenstein's conception, philosophy is not a theory or a contemplation of truth,
but a practice, an activity of eliminating confusions and philosophical problems. The same
can be said of Sextus Empiricus: Pyrrhonism also received the name of “zetetic”, from its
activity of investigating and enquiring (apò energeía tês katà tò zetãn kaí sképtesthai) (PH
1.7). Furthermore, the idea that Pyrrhonism is a practice is entailed in the definition of sceptic
as someone who possesses a determined technical capacity.
Not only to Wittgenstein, but also to Sextus, philosophy is nothing but this therapeutic
activity. Albeit both of them recognise a scientific dimension and propose, each in their own
way, a conception of science, the scientific activity is beyond the attributions of the
philosopher qua philosopher. Science deals with phenomena, with facts; philosophy deals
with the discourse about phenomenon, with concepts, and with language. The therapy is done
exclusively in the discursive domain: “The sceptic, being a lover of mankind, wishes to cure
by discourse (iásthai lógoi), according to his capacity (dúnamin), the conceit, and rashness of
the Dogmatists” (PH 3.280, emphasis added). This aspect of Sextian philosophy becomes
clear when one pays attention to the domain of suspension of judgement. This cannot be about
phenomena, for they impose themselves to us, forcing us to an involuntary assent (PH 1.13
and 19); thus, one can only exert it upon the discourse that postulates the reality or unreality
of phenomena. Wittgenstein also affirms to be language the instrument to cure the disease of
the understanding: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language” (PI, 109, emphasis added). The critical project is limited to fight
dogmatism by means of discourse without resorting to science or phenomena.
With respect to this last point, one can make another approximation between
Wittgenstein and Sextus. To Wittgenstein, the logical analysis does not furnish the hidden
meaning of our language, as if the meaning needed to be unburied by an analysis of our
language; ordinary language is perfectly in order, even if there are (or precisely because there
are) indeterminations of meaning. Sextus, by his turn, condemned the philosophers’ attempt at
finding, by means of an "analogy", a deeper grammar that would serve as criterion to
distinguish good from evil Greek (M 1.41ff). To Sextus, the criterion of correct or incorrect
use of words shall not be owed to a special art that discovers a deep meaning of the word, but
only to its real and non-technical use (M.1.152-153 and 176ff). Common use is the criterion
of what belongs and does not belong to the language of a certain community. The meaning of
discourse is in the surface.
Another important idea of Wittgenstein that finds clear resonances in Pyrrhonism is
that we must speak like everybody, i.e., that we must employ words with the meaning they
habitually have. According to Wittgenstein, the philosopher use common expressions to build,
based on them, philosophical propositions (PI, 90), which is condemnable, but it is not
condemnable the use of common propositions in appropriated circumstances. And the use of
ordinary language does not entail the adoption of any philosophical thesis, for it is beneath
any dispute between realists and idealists (cf. BB, p. 48). The Pyrrhonist, by his turn,
acknowledges that he can say, when he is chilled, that he is chilled (PH 1.13). He can say the
phenomenon without being thereby postulating its reality. All sceptical formulae used to
indicate the suspension of judgement (PH 1.187-209) only express the phenomenon or the
personal experience30 of the Pyrrhonian and do not indicate any form of dogmatism. However,
the Pyrrhonist does not accept the discourse that attributes or rejects reality to phenomena,
i.e., that discourse that, differentiating itself from the habitual discourse of men, intends to
establish dogmas about what is real and what is not. Both allow themselves to use the
common discourse without any ontological commitment and reject the philosophical
discourse that intends to establish truths about the real. From this point of view, the similarity
between the two thinkers could not be greater.
It shall not follow from there, to the Pyrrhonist, as to Wittgenstein, that common use is
untouchable. Both conceive meanings as a human convention. Wittgenstein warns, in the Blue
Book, us so that we do “not forget that a word has not got a meaning given to it, as it were, by
a power independent of us... A word has the meaning someone has given to it” (BB, p. 28).
Likewise, Sextus says that language is conventional (M 1.37-38; 142ff). Therefore, nothing
prevents that one gives new meaning to words, or even that one invents new words, and both
conceive an evolution in language and a refinement of our vocabulary. To Wittgenstein, this
reform of language must be done in conformity with practical purposes to avoid
misunderstandings in the practical use of language (PI, 132)31. And Sextus, criticising the
dogmatists about their incapacity to distinguish ambiguities, says the same thing, “for, if an
ambiguity is a word or phrase having two or more meanings, and if words have meaning by
convention, then those ambiguities that are worth resolving – i.e., such as occur in some
practical situation – will be resolved, not by the dogmatist but by the people practised in each
particular art, who themselves have the experience of how they have created the conventional
usage of the terms to denote the things signified” (PH 2.256)32. This passage of Sextus is very
30 31 However, Wittgenstein himself coined expressions of strict philosophical use, such as "rule", "language-game", "form of life" etc.32 Sextus had already said the same thing regarding sophisms: the observation of practical life is capable of solving sophisms, but the philosopher is not (PH 2.254).
significative, since it also attributes to those who deal with empirical and practical questions
the responsibility of avoiding the ambiguities of language that arise from the equivocalness of
words. And even in the common course of life, when it is useful to draw a distinction to avoid
an ambiguity, people do not hesitate in drawing it. “Thus, it is the experience of what is useful
in each particular case that propitiates the distinction of ambiguities” (PH 2.258). On the other
hand, the ambiguities that dogmatists try to solve are not involved in the practical experiences
of life. Of these considerations by Sextus about ambiguity, one can say that the philosopher
tries in vain to solve ambiguities that escape to practical life, whilst common people and
artisans overcome their difficulties from experience. The invention of new terms, to avoid the
ambiguities of the old ones, is due to the necessity of distinguishing in the practical domain
what was not distinguished before, being this um of the modes by which language seems, in
the Pyrrhonist's eyes, to evolve.
Another similarity is that the new task of philosophy is endless. In the case of
Wittgenstein, both the functioning of language and his method of dealing with philosophical
issues led to the conception of an infinite task for philosophy. In the case of Sextus, one also
conceives the idea of a constant rebirth of dogmatism, and, as the investigation about truth has
not reached any definitive result, it remains open the possibility of one discovering the truth.
Thus, each new proposed argument is a threat to the Pyrrhonian position and must be
investigated, whether to re-establish the equipotence of arguments or to recognise that the
"truth" has finally been reached. Either way, both "condemn" themselves, by the own internal
logic of their reflexions, to a permanent critical task.
A basic idea, therefore, animates both Wittgenstein's and Sextus' thought: that life
goes on just fine without the dogmatic philosophy. To Wittgenstein, as we have seen,
common sense is neither realist nor idealist, being beneath these philosophical disputes (BB,
p. 48). Thus, when we employ affirmative proposition current in our common language, we
are not committing ourselves philosophically to any theory, but only living our lives and
using language as a useful tool to them. Dogmatism is like a pair of glasses upon our noses,
and it distorts our view of things; it is so close that it seldom occurs to us to take them off (PI,
103). However, it is only when we remove the dogmatic lenses that we can see things as they
are. Sextus thinks, “it is enough to live by experience and without opinions, in accordance
with the common observations and preconceptions” (PH, 2.246). The propositions in which
the Pyrrhonist employs the verb "to be" do not express the acceptance of a dogma, for the
verb "to be" must be read as indicating what appears to the sceptic, thus the suspension of
judgement is integrally preserved (PH 1.135). By renouncing to philosophise in its traditional
moulds, the Pyrrhonist returns to common sense and live his life as an ordinary man, albeit
without the dogmatic beliefs of the latter. The Pyrrhonist, in effect, does not attack common
life and even speaks on its side, since he refutes those who have risen up against common
judgement (M 8.156-158). To both, we can make affirmations following the common use of
language, adopting the common way of seeing the world, without, however, making of this
conception a philosophical theory. In other words, if, on one hand, there is a continuity
between the dogmatism of both common person and philosopher, on the other hand, Sextus
and Wittgenstein defend common life (or sense) against the philosophical criticisms and
expurgate what they contain of dogmatism.
So many and so important similarities seem to justify the characterization of
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as Pyrrhonian. A negative and therapeutic
philosophy, whose purpose is tranquillity, which demands a determined technical capacity
from he who practises it, which deals only with discourse, rejecting the philosophical and
accepting the common without any ontological commitment, and conceived as an endless
attitude. This more general conception of philosophy is shared by Wittgenstein and the
Pyrrhonists.
4. To the conclusion that the conception of philosophy by Wittgenstein is Pyrrhonian,
however, is possible to oppose some objections. One could say that, if the general conception
does not differentiate one thinker from the other, in its details we find noteworthy differences.
The way by which we achieve tranquillity in each philosophy has little in common,
employing analyses and argumentations of very different nature. If the landscape is the same,
the path shall be different.
Naturally, in a therapy, the diagnosis plays a foundational role, for it is in function of
it that we determine the medicine to be ministered. Sextus identifies in self-love, in rashness
and in conceit the major defects that lead a man who is willing to philosophise to dogmatism.
Here it is the root of all their evils: by not examining an issue from every possible angle, by
not reflecting maturely about every argument involved in a determined problem and by
preferring his personal opinions, without taking in due considerations the ones of others, a
man naturally incurs in an arrogant and precipitated dogmatism. Wittgenstein’s diagnosis is
different: a thinker becomes a dogmatist less for his psychological characteristics than for a
dynamic proper to language. It seduces him and bewitches his understanding; incapable of
resisting this temptation, the philosopher experiments a sensation of deepness and starts to
reflect upon the “structure of the world”, when the cause of his reflexion is actually a
contradiction of the rules of language that moves away the common use of words. Thence the
importance that Wittgenstein attributes to philosophy, for the philosopher is not only "hasty",
but also the one who experiments and denounces basic contradictions of language in his
theories. It is when language goes on holiday that one is tempted to philosophise.
Of these different diagnoses, result different therapies. The Pyrrhonist's activity is to
show to the dogmatist the various opinions sustained with respect to a questions, the equal
force of the arguments employed by different philosophical schools and the impossibility of
discovering a neutral criterion to decide the controversy. The activity of the Wittgensteinian
philosopher will be very different: it is necessary to do, from remembrances of common use
of words, a punctilious description of the workings of our ordinary language, inventing, if
necessary, language games to illuminate our grammar, so that the philosopher can recover
from his illness. The great novelty of Wittgenstein's style of philosophising is tied, thus, to his
particular way of proposing a philosophical therapy.
What is the scope of these objections to the previous suggestion that the conception of
Wittgenstein's philosophy is a Pyrrhonian conception? One could say that the differences,
albeit can serve to deny the character strictly Pyrrhonian of Wittgenstein’s thought, point to
what could be a contribution to the history of scepticism: Wittgenstein would turn much more
acute the conscience that it is in discourse that lies the origin of dogmatism. If this idea was
already present in Sextus, it was not present the idea that it is due to a malfunction of
language (to a contradiction between its rules) that arise the problems posited by
philosophers. The specific analysis of various processes involved in the functioning of our
language and of how words end up losing meaning and “idling” would significantly advance
the comprehension of the illusions that lurk dogmatism.
To the extent that the Pyrrhonist is that who has the ability to oppose argument to
argument in any way at all (PH 1.8) to reach tranquillity of the soul by means of suspension
of judgement, one could think that Wittgenstein offers a new way of reaching tranquillity.
(Let us remember that Wittgenstein admits the possibility of various therapies). In addition to
the modes of Aenesidemus or Agrippa and all the opposition of particular arguments in the
various branches of knowledge, the sceptic would now have at his disposal a new and
powerful mean by which we could learn or acquire that technical ability to become sceptical:
by identifying the false analogies that produce philosophical illusions and describing the good
functioning of language so that he would see that the use proposed by philosophers does not
make sense or, if it does, it is only a new way of speaking that does not have epistemological
or ontological implications, as dogmatism would like it had. To identify false analogies that
are in the foundation of philosophical illusion, to recognise where our grammatical rules enter
in conflict, to apprehend exactly that the philosopher wants to say, to describe correctly a part
of our habitual language, and to invent different language games, but useful to therapeutic
purposes, would be tasks that would demand an refined discernment and that would have an
enormous persuasive efficacy. Wittgenstein would promote, thus, a species of renovation of
the Pyrrhonian tradition, in a very original sense.
Apparently stronger objections, however, could be formulated. The difference of
method between Sextus and Wittgenstein would point to a deeper and more decisive
difference to our question, viz. that the Pyrrhonian sceptic remains stuck in the field of
traditional philosophy, whilst Wittgenstein would have emancipated from it. One would show
that of two ways. On one hand, the sceptic would share a presupposition with philosophers:
“that we possess knowledge of our own subjective experience, that we know with absolute
certainty how things are with us, has been the common ground of agreement between sceptics
and their opponents ever since philosophical debates about the extent and possibility of
human knowledge began”33. The idea that phenomena are not open to investigation, that they
are azétetoi would not result from their inevitable character, as Pyrrhonists claim. To
Wittgenstein, the exclusion of doubt is rooted in grammar and not in the nature of that which
is right; for example, nothing is considered as doubt about our internal states: it is senseless to
say, “I may be in pain or I may not, I am not sure”34. Thus, the sceptic would remain stuck to
the traditional conception of philosophy, for he would attribute the impossibility of doubting
to an intrinsic propriety of phenomenon, when, in fact, the absence of sense of this doubt lies
in our language. On the other hand, the method of Wittgenstein, instead of opposing argument
to argument, assuming a philosophical presupposition, has the goal of identifying this
presupposition and extirpate it: “it seems to have been an almost instinctive maxim of his that
where philosophical debate has polarized between a pair of alternatives that seem exhaustive,
the appropriate method to follow is not just to examine the conflicting arguments on each side
and then opt for the seemingly stronger ones. Rather we should find out what was agreed by
all participants in the centuries-old debate and reject that”35.
The force of this objection lies in the attribution to Pyrrhonists of a common
presupposition with the dogmatists; the opposition of arguments and acceptance of
phenomena would show the presence of the sceptic in the traditional territory of philosophy.
33 Hacker (1990), p. 63.34 Cf. Hacker (1990), pp. 58-5935 Hacker (1990), p. 63.
But it is precisely in this attribution that the objection is wrong, for the sceptical only makes
use of dogmatic arguments to reject them, as an aperient drug that is expelled along with the
substances present in the body, without ever compromising to them (PH 2.188). On the other
hand, the common presupposition that the sceptics would share with dogmatists would be that
we cannot doubt the ideas in our minds or the immediate data of our consciousness. Now, this
formulation is strictly modern and cannot be imputed to Greek Pyrrhonists. However, it is true
that the sceptic does not attribute to grammar the exclusion of doubt about phenomena, but
here we go back to the different already mentioned in the previous objection, and that I do not
hesitate to recognise: the Pyrrhonian and Wittgensteinian way of fighting dogmatism are very
different.
One could insist in the objection and say that, to Wittgenstein, dogmatic theses and
arguments lack meaning, and, hence, a method of opposition of arguments would be equally
meaningless, which would show that the only alternative to whom wishes to do a therapy
would be to reject the implicit presuppositions of the debate. But, on one hand, this method
would not distinguish Wittgenstein from the philosophers who intended to shift the
philosophical scenery (think, for example, of Berkeley and his critique of materialism; of
Kant and his "Copernican Revolution"; or of Bergson and his considerations upon space and
time); and, on the other, Pyrrhonism had also said to be incompatible the dogmatic notions
(cf., for example, PH 3.2-5, to the case of God or PH 3.13, to the concept of "cause"). The
way by which the Pyrrhonist fights dogmatism generally admits of two levels: firstly, one
questions our ability to conceive the dogmatic discourse, conflicting the various definitions of
the investigated terms and, secondly, one opposes different arguments invoked in favour of
the sustained dogmatic positions. Everything happens as if Wittgenstein, considering decisive
the first level – which questions the meaning of philosophical discourse –, ended up
suppressing the second, since, strictly speaking, it lacks sense. That does not prevent the
sceptic to be capable of conceiving, in an ample sense of the term, that which the dogmatist
says (PH 2.1-12). Likewise, Wittgenstein is capable of apprehending what the philosopher
would like to say, but cannot say. Thus, the opposition of arguments makes sense to the exact
extent in which one can conceive, lacto sense, that which the dogmatist says. Only a theory
that postulated what really is the meaning of words could criticise the sceptic this way, but
evidently, as it is known, it is not Wittgenstein's position: the idea that use is meaning does
not constitute a theory of language.
This objection can receive a final form that seems convincing to me, viz. that the
Pyrrhonian way of fighting dogmatism does not go so far as to dissolve the philosophical
question, as Wittgenstein does, and, hence, at least logically, the possibility of discovering the
truth remains open to the Pyrrhonist. Thus, the interminable therapy to which they condemn
has a different meaning, for, whilst one still thinks it is possible, albeit highly improbable, to
reach the truth, the other has his investigation, so to speak, closed to the truth. It is impossible
not to recognise that, in Sextus, there is no mention of a dissolution of philosophical
problems, and that the questioning of the meaning of philosophical discourse always gives
way to the opposition of arguments. It must be recognised that the difference in the manner of
conducting the therapy involves this second difference, that the Wittgensteinian therapy
dissolves philosophical problems, whilst after the Pyrrhonian critical they would remain
significative. If, to modern taste, Wittgenstein is more radical, to Pyrrhonian taste, the
dissolution of the problem and the consideration of the question of truth as over can have the
flavour of a negative dogmatism of academician sort.
Another objection may come precisely from those who, having this Pyrrhonian taste,
believe there is a form of dogmatism of language in Wittgenstein's philosophy. These people
would see a superiority in Pyrrhonism, for the conflict of philosophies, and the polemical
character amongst them, are not a theoretical construction of the Pyrrhonist, but a fact of the
history of philosophy recognised by dogmatists independently from their particular belief.
Wittgenstein, in contrast, would have elaborated a dogmatic conception of nature of
philosophy and philosophical discourse and, based on it, he arrives at a position apparently
similar to that of Pyrrhonists. Thus, there would be a species of unconfessed dogmatism in
this philosophy of language36.
One could retort to this objection in the following way: not only the conflict of
philosophies is a fact of history, but also it is a fact the philosophers often complain about the
imprecision, and about the difficulties that common language presents to metaphysical
speculation. Hence, they elaborate a technical vocabulary, refining common words or
inventing new words one supposes better express the reached truths. Anyway, it is frequent
amongst philosophers the establishment of a linguistic domain whose meaning amply differs
from the meaning that words have in their ordinary use. If (as the Pyrrhonian sceptic) we
place ourselves in the field of the pre-philosophical not knowing with the purpose of
identifying which is the discourse that reflects reality, then we can ask ourselves, from
common language, for the precise meaning of each philosophical discourse. In the very
attempt to clarify the meaning of philosophical discourse, we recognise it does not have any
36 To formulate this objection, I inspired myself on the pages 7-9 of Porchat's article "Scepticism and Argumentation".
meaning. Thus, one could say that Wittgenstein's therapy starts from other fact of history of
philosophy, not constituting itself from a dogmatic conception of the nature of philosophy.
Wittgenstein and Sextus Empiricus, therefore, set forth on from different facts of philosophy,
without postulating an arbitrary beginning, and tread on different paths, albeit parallel, so that
it fits to say that it is about two related conceptions of philosophy.
One could also object that the reach of the differences pointed above is ampler than it
seems at first and that this new therapeutic method proposed by Wittgenstein leads, in contrast
with what is suggested here, to a thought very different from Pyrrhonism when effectively
applied to particular philosophical problems. This is indeed a question that remains open, and
only the study of particular therapies may confirm, or not, Wittgenstein's fidelity to the way
by which he conceived philosophy. But whatever it is the result of such investigation, it shall
not diminish in any way the similarities with respect to the conception of the nature of
philosophy, and that is all I intended to have shown here.
