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Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley
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Page 1: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

Phishing on Mobile Devices

Adrienne Porter Felt & David WagnerUniversity of California, Berkeley

Page 2: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

,!"#!"$%

Ingredients for phishing

1. Users conditioned to enter passwords

2. A convincing spoof of the user interface

Page 3: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

-!"#!"$% ."#/

1. When are users conditioned to enter their passwords or payment information?

2. Can those scenarios be convincingly spoofed?

Page 4: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

0!.)10 2&3)(

• Sender ⇒ Target

• Direct a!ack: false control transfer

• Man-in-the-middle a!ack: subverted control transfer

Page 5: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

2&'"() -!"#!"$%

• Phones lack trustworthy security indicators

• Interaction between web & mobile apps

• Mobile login screens are simple

Page 6: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

&4. 1--.&1+!

1. Survey how applications condition users

• 50 most popular Android & iOS apps

• 85 popular web sites on Android, iOS

2. Evaluate avenues for spoo!ng

• Direct

• Man-in-the-middle

Page 7: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

+&$0.&( 0.1$#5).#

• Mobile sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Mobile sender ⇒ Web target

• Web sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Web sender ⇒ Web target

Page 8: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6&'"() ⇒ 6&'"()

• Social sharing

• Upgrades via store

• Music purchases

• Game credits (iOS)

Page 9: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6&'"() ⇒ 6&'"()

Target Android iOS

Mobile app 56% 72%

Password-protected

36% 60%

Payment 10% 34%

Page 10: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6 ⇒ 6: 7".)+0 891+/A!ack App Spoof Page Real Page

Page 11: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6 ⇒ 6: 6:;6 191+/

• Scheme squa!ing

• Register for another app’s URI scheme

• Weak: detectable by user, reviewers

• Task interception

• Poll task list, pop up when target opens

• Unnoticeable by users

Page 12: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

+&$0.&( 0.1$#5).#

• Mobile sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Mobile sender ⇒ Web target

• Web sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Web sender ⇒ Web target

Page 13: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6&'"() ⇒ <)'

• Mechanisms

• Links to the browser

• Embedded web content

• Reasons

• Social sharing

• Not much payment

Page 14: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6&'"() ⇒ <)'

Target Android iOS

Web site 30% 18%

Password-protected

3% 4%

Payment 2% -

Browser target

Target Android iOS

Web site 16% 42%

Password-protected

8% 38%

Payment 2% -

Embedded target

Page 15: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6 ⇒ =: 7".)+0 891+/

• Link to web browser

• Send the user to a fake browser

• Open in real browser, hide/fake URL bar

• Embedded content

• Eavesdrop on credentials given to embedded content

Page 16: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6 ⇒ <: 7".)+0 891+/Spoof BrowserReal Browser

Page 17: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

6 ⇒ =: 2"02 891+/

• A"ack: alter target of form on H#P page

• Defense: forms only on H#PS pages

• A"ack: alter links to H#PS pages

Page 18: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

+&$0.&( 0.1$#5).#

• Mobile sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Mobile sender ⇒ Web target

• Web sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Web sender ⇒ Web target

Page 19: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

<)' ⇒ 2&'"()

• Mechanisms

• tel://18005555555

• market://details?id=123

• Reasons

• mailto, Twi"er

• Install the app version

Page 20: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

=)' ⇒ 2&'"()

Target Android iOS

Core mobile application

38% 47%

Password-protected

22% 41%

Payment 6% 25%

Core mobile apps

Target Android iOS

Any mobile application

49% 48%

Password-protected

38% 42%

Payment 6% 25%

Any mobile apps

Page 21: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

< ⇒ 6: 7".)+0 891+/

• Hide the browser chrome and mimic app

• In Android, only detectable if user hits the “Menu” bu"on

• Not possible in iOS unless user has “installed” the page

Page 22: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

< ⇒ 6: 7".)+0 891+/Spoof App (In Browser)Real App

Page 23: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

< ⇒ 6: 6:;6 191+/

• Scheme squa"ing

• Task interception

Page 24: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

+&$0.&( 0.1$#5).#

• Mobile sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Mobile sender ⇒ Web target

• Web sender ⇒ Mobile target

• Web sender ⇒ Web target

Page 25: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

<)' ⇒ =)': 3".)+0

• Spoof or hide the URL bar [Niu et al.]

• Eased how it scrolls

• Reduced URL loading/rendering time

Page 26: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

<)' ⇒ =)': 2"02

• Subvert all H#P pages so that links to H#PS are never trustworthy

• User won’t be warned by the URL bar

Page 27: Phishing on Mobile Devices - ieee-security.org · Phishing on Mobile Devices Adrienne Porter Felt & David Wagner University of California, Berkeley

W2SP 2011 - P!"#!"$% &$ M&'"() D)*"+)#

,.)*)$0"&$

• Permanently application identity indicator

• Embedded web content still a problem

• Trusted password entry mechanism

• Usability?

• Adoption?


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