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MITRE" WASHlNGTON Of>EHlATIONS

THE OSPG ARMS ROOM

',\ PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

AND THE P R I V AT ESE C TOR

FEBRUARY 1972

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:MTR-6140 W. A. ELIOT .\

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THE DSPGf\ ARMS ROOM

PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM

AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

A Presentation Before the LEAA-Private Security Conference 16-17 December, 1971, Washington, D. C,

W. A. ELIOT

Contract No.: F19628-71-C-0002

Contract Sponsor: Defense Special Projec.ts,..G.r.qup

MTR-6140

Project No.: 832A 'NCJRS

FEBRUARY 1911

This document was prepared for authorized distribution. I t has not been approved for public release.

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MAR301977

THE •

MITRE COR· P O' RAT ". <? N

WASHINGTON OPERA'rIONS

..

MITRE Department

and Project Approval:

ii

ABSTRACT

This paper was presented before the LEAl-\:­Private Security Conference on 17 December 1971, in Washington, D.C. describing the DSPG Arms Room Physical Security Program.

INFORMATION RETRIEVAL INDEX TERMS:

Security Alarm Police Sensor DSPG

Detection Burglar Intrusion Specification LEAA

iii

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4, • L.

TABLE 0:8"' CONTENTS

1\

Pa~ ,}) 1.0 INTRODOCTION 1

2.0 PRESENTATION 2 ;;;::

2.1 l3riefing 4

2.2 Program 4

2.3 Status 9

2.4 Thoughts 21

APPENDIX I 25

APPENDIX II 27

APPENDIX III 31

DISTRIBUTION LIST 33

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

On 9 December 1971 an invitation was extended to the

Defense SQecia1 Projects Group (DSPG) by Mr. Charles M.

Coster, Associate Administrator of the Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration (LEAA), to discuss the DSPG

Arms Room Physical Security Program before a LEAA-Private

Security Conference (see Appendix 1). The author was

requested by LTC Thomas H. Brain of the Physical Security

Branch of DSPG, with the concurrence of Mr. Lawrence L.

Holmes of the MITRE Corporation, to make the presentation

on behalf of DSPG.

The agenda for the meeting (see Appendix 2) covers

the proposed relationship between LEAA and the security

industry, and the plans and recommendations for programs

to improve security practice in the commercial and private

sectors. The DSPG paper was included in the agenda as an

example of the physical security work underway in the

Department of Defense and to provide an opportunity for

the workers in the DSPG program to suggest areas that

appear to need additional R&D by the security industry.

The words are entirely those of the author but they rep­

resent the common concern of all who have been associated

with the DSPG program. The following is the paper pre-

sented before the LEAA-Private Security Conference.

1

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2.0 PRESENTATION

The DSPG Arms Room Physical Securi~y Program and the Private Sector

Description of DSPG

The Defense Special Projects Group is a Joint­

Service agency of the Department of Defense, with re­

sponsibilities for special projects in the development

of intrusion sensorS for the Military. Most of the work

of the agency has been concerned with tactical sensors

for detecting intrusions against field objectives, and

much of it has been done in support of operations in

Southeast Asia. DSPG, as the Group is called, has had

a special funding authority through the Military Depart­

ments to initiate the sensor developments and to produce

the sensors in needed quantities.

Physical Security

In late 1970, with the slow-down of U.S. ac.tivit,y

in Southeast Asia, the special funding authority was

extended into contiguous programs in physical security

covering the development of intrusion detection systems

for fixed installations and arms rooms.

SLIDE 1 - Mission

This is an excerpt of the mission statement~signed

by the Secretary of Defense in December 1970 relating

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to physical security. Two programs resulted, one directed

toward bases and installations invt11ving perimeter sensors

and central readouts, and the other directed toward arms

rooms. The arms room task is now nearing completion and

is the subject of this briefing.

2.1 Briefing

SLIDE 2 - Outline

This outlines the topics to be covered. I will

touch briefly on why it was felt the program was nec1ed

and will describe the program itself. Finally, I will

pass along some thoughts we developed during the program

reg~rding the contributions and responsibilities of the

security industry for better physical security.

2.2 Program

In advance of the mission statement by the Secretary

of Defense, an intensive survey was made by us at DSPG of

Military Commanders and specialists concerned with the

security of arms rooms. The purpose was to determine

what the responsible parties felt were their principal

problems and what they would like to see done about them.

SLIDE 3 - Conclusions

The conclusions were very pronounced and they all

centered on problems with the intrusion detectfon e~uip­

menta Virtually every person contacted, from Pentagon

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official to division security inspector, asked for help

in separating the good equipment from the bad. They all

had tales of purchases that turned out wrong, of equip­

ment that failed to perform to expectations or of operators

who failed even to turn the equipment on, and they all

spoke favorably of the concept of central procurement and

standardization, with all the quality assurance, training

and maintenance support this implies. This is not to say

that the equipment was always bad but obviously somebody

needed help and it wasn't being provided. The purpose of

the DSPG program was to 'Provide the standards needed

to fill this gap.

SLIDE 4 - Program

The initial goal of the program was a set of speci­

fications that would define the minimum'performance

required of the system components. T~~se specifications

would establish the quality assurance standards and inter­

face uniformity needed for procurement to inventory, inde­

pendently of any installation. 'IJhis~;gtandardization is

crucial to the subsequent logistics support plan because

of the impact it has on maintenance and training and the

stockpiling of spares.

The manuals describe the selection and installation ...

of system components to allow the bulk of the work t~ be

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done by the user with minimum reliance on security·

j specialists.

The tests and studies were conducted early in the

program to support the technical provisions of the speci-

fications. The studies evaluated a number of the real-

world factors that seem to influence the effectiveness of

detection systems. They included analyses of apparent

weaknesses of operational systems and studies of intrusion

barrier effectiveness •

2.3 status

Tests SLIDE 5 - Results

An example of results from the intrusion barrier

study conducted with the assistance of the National Bureau

of Standards is this plot of the relative time required to

penetrate walls constructed of common construction

materials. It shows the unsurprising fact that poured-

core cement block walls are mare resistant to penetration

than wooden walls and that reinforced poured concrete

walls are tougher yet. A less expected observation is

that it takes only seconds to smash through many of the

walls with only a sledge hammer and a strong back. For

instance, in a test in the field, it took only 45 seconds

to batter a 12 by 15 inch hole through an 8-inch mortar-

filled concrete block wall with a lO-pound sledge hammer,

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and only 55 seconds for a 5-inch mortar-filled concrete

block wall with }-inch reinforcing rods.

Other tests conducted in Army and Navy engineering

laboratories consisted of evaluations of the sensitivity

~f available detection techniques to intrusion and false

alarm sources. The word techniques is important. Over

120 items of equipment were tested under controlled con­

ditions J not so much to establish that one worked better

than the other but to determine if there was a pattern of

performance that could be associated with a technique.

There was a pattern and the selection of sensors reflects

this.

Specifications SLIDE 6 - System

This is an entirely familiar and conventional system.

It consists of a number of intrusion sensors located at the

arms room and a sensor monitor at the readout site. The

contr~l unit serves as the termination point for all the

sensors and as the secure/access control for the controlled

area. The data transmitter and receiver provide the means

for passing alarm Signals from the arms room to the read-

out site over commercial telephone lines with a high level

~f supervision against line break or tamper.

The alarm unit is an electronic screamer located at

'" the arms room, and used as a backup to the remote monitor.

11

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an alarm by recorded telephone message without the use of

.the remote monitor.

SLIDE 7 - Sensors

The sensors divide into several types. The upper

five are penetration sensors used to detect intrusions'

through the doors and walls of the room. The Balanced

Magnetic Switch detects the opening or removal of doors.

The Passive Ultrasonic Sensor detects the sounds of break-

in at frequencies above normal hearing. The Grid Wire

Sensor detects the actual breakthrough of a fragile sur­

face. The Capacitance Proximity Sensor detects the change

in capacitance of a metal grid covering the inside of a

window or opening when the grill is tOUChed. The Vibration

Sensor detects the vibrations of break-in through metal

shutters and screens.

The Ultrasonic Motion Sensor differs from the others

by senSing the motion of an intruder inside the room after

a penetration is made. The .Magnetic Weapons Sensor is

different in another way in sensing the actual removal of

R weapon from the arms rack.

The two Duress Sensors at the end of the list are

strategically located switches used by the arms room

guards to call for help.

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All of these items are covered by specifications

that leave considerable leeway for design initiative and

no leeway at all for perforlnance and interface.

SLIDE 8 - Specification

Every item is specified separately and all follow

the standard Mil Spec format shown. The specifications

have been completed and will probably be distributed

within the Government before the end of Calendar 1971.

Manuals SLIDE 9 - Manual

The principal manual is an Employment Manual that

aids the nonspecialist user to select the detection

system components appropriate to his own arms room. This

is a new approach to security installation and it is

brought about bJ a recognition of the fact that with over

10,000 arms rooms in the Continental United states, there

is little hope of assembling a large enough army of specia­

lists qualified to give every room indi~idual expert

attention.

The manual describes the threat facing military

arms rooms and describes the general characteristics of

the rooms themselves. The identification of the threat

is important because of the impact it has on the type of

line supervisicn needed. Also, it is important where

'" users might be tempted to apply the system to other than

15

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SPECIFICATIONS I

• DESCRIPTION

• REQUIREMENTS

• PERFORMANCE

• RELlI>,DlI..1TY

• TESTS

... FORM & FUNCTION

• PERFORMANCE

• RELIABILlTY

• ORDER1NG DATA

Slide 8

CONTENTS OF EMPLOYMENT MANUAL

• INTRODUCTlmJ • THREAT • PURPOSE • SCOPE • APPROACH

• ARMS ROOM CHARACTERISTICS • PHYSICAL CHAAACTERISTICS

• VULNERABILITIES

• AVAI lABlE SYSTEM COMPONENTS • SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION

• ADVANTAGES

• DISADVANTAGES

• SPEC IDENTIFICATION

• SYSTEM COST

• COMPONENT SELECTION PROCEDURE • VULNERABILITY SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS

• ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS INSTRUCTIONS

• EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS,

Slide 9

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arms rooms; what works in an arms room may be entirely

inappropriate in a bank.

The manual also describes the system and establishes

a rationale for the selection of components for instal-

lation. This is the crucial part that allows the user to

make a preliminary estimate of requirements. Later manuals

will provide the instructions for installation.

SLIDE 10 - Logistics

The Logistics Support Plan, which is prepared by the

military departments, establishes the responsibilities for

procurement and maintenance following production release.

The draft plan currently in preparation confirms the con-

cept of central procurement to military specifications

and establishes responsibilities for depots and schools.

Follow-On

In summary, the specifications and the Employment

Manual have been completed but not released for use. The

Logistics Support Plan and the Installation Instructions

are in draft and will be completed by the time the system

is in production.

SLIDE 11 - Follow~On

The next step is to procure a limited quantity of ~

items to specification to set the stage for full scale

production in Fiscal Year 1973.

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2.4 Thoughts

Now what has all this accomplished? First., the

Department of Defense now has the necessary criteria to

allow it to test what it buys and ultimately to exercise

firm configuration control. The system format for ev~ry

arms room is identical and the interfaces and equipment

characteristics are uniform regardless of the manufacturer.

This makes maintenance and training programs feasible and

goes a long way to insure that the field is not going to

be populated with systems that don't work.

Second, the stage is set for central procurement of

equipment for all Services. The advantages in cost and

quality control are obvious,

Finally, with the equipment characteristics estab­

lished and with the operational concepts in hand, the

military departments are now in a position to deal with

the system aspects of physical security. ~his refers to

all of the factors that determine whether an arms room

will be successfully protected against attack. Factors

that influence a thief to conclude that a particular arms V

room is vulnerable can be determined. Arms room archi-

tectural standards can be reviewed in terms of the im~act

of construction on intrusion detection, and vice versa. .. ...

Military police practices can be reviewed in terms of the

21

~ I

response interface. In short, the military can rethink

i0s security directives without the burden of dependency

on conflicting practices and cross currents of the alarm

industry.

Now, I'm sure everyone has taken comfort so far in

the fact that the DSPG program has addressed itself only

to military arms rooms. This orientation was very clear

throughout the orogram and in fact, attempts to generalize

the results to other applications were resisted. On the

other hand, it is hard to escape the obvious parallels in

the private sector; intrusions always have the same harmful

effect and arc usually just as destructive; detection

systems look the same and use the same equipment; police

acceptance of alarm equipment is no better in the private

sector than in the military.

This being the case it is reasonable to assume that

obvious improvements in the one area have their parallel in

the other and that things can be done to improve the

quality of physical security practice. I'll name just a

few:

First and foremost, it is mandatory that steps

be taken 30 establish meaningful standards for performance

and quality. There is so much questionable equtpment on

the market and it's sold so aggressively that even the

22

industry sometimes professes dismay. The problem is more

one of quality and application than technology however.

Reliability has to be improved and the design features

that affect the real usefulness of a device as an element

of a protection system have to be emphasized. It has been

our observation that R&D has to be directed not so much

toward new methods of detecting intrusions as toward

methods for not detecting everything else.

Second, and in direct support of this first

point, it is necessary to educate the user to the criteria

that justify the use of intrusion detection equipment.

Does an XYZ device attached to the door of a cleaning

establishment really accomplish an improvement in the

security? At the risk of overlooking much that has been

done, it appears to us that many personnel in the industry

need as much education in this area as do the users. ~

Third, and this is perhaps

of all, the whole question of security

'\ I,

the hardest ta~k if I:

t t · . .Jih pro ec lon ln ~ e I, II

private sector has to be dealt with as a system problem.

It is no longer adequate simply to demonstrate that an

alarm will be tripped when an intruder crosses a thresh­

old. Either the industry :i-s going to determine what ~lse II.'

it takes or the public will establish its own standards . ..

23

. APPENDIX I

UNITED STA'l'ES DEPART1fEm OF JUSTICE

LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION

W.ASHINGTON. D.C. 20530

OFFICI! OF TH1l ADMINISTRATION

Colonel Thomas H. Brain Building 56 U,S. Naval Observatory 34th and Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Brain:

December 9, 1971

On December 16 and 17, 1971, this Agency is convening a conference involving representatives from the private security sector, the alarm industry, and related areas. The purpose of this conference is to discuss the research and development efforts of this Agency in the private security field and to identify the problems which currently exist.

Because of your work in the evaluation of numerous types of alarm systems, I would like to hav~ you make a 30 minute presentation to this conference on December 17, 1971. Your presentation should include a general summary of your work in alarm system evaluation and a forward look to the needs for research and development in this area. The session to which you will make the presentation begins at 9:00 a.m.

If for any reason you cannot make this Mr. Robert R. Donlan of my office.

ifr1' -.­/

;';/-' ," / /~

/t1arence M. Coster

Sincerely,

Associate Administrator

cc: Marshall Esler

presentation, please contact

Law Enforcement Standards Laboratory

Martin Danziger

25

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APPENDIX II

AGENDA

PRIVATE SECURITY CONFERENCE

December 16, 1971

9:00 - 9:30 Opening Comments-Jerris Leonard, Administrator

10:30-11:30

Law Enforcement Assistance Administra~ion

I. Relationship between LEAA and Security Industry

A. Nature of Relationship-·Clarence M. Coster Associate Administrator Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration

1. What should it be to produce the most optimistic results

2. LEAA-Industry Liaison Committees

B. Parallel Effort of LEAA and Security Industry to Control and Prevent Crime

1. The Institute equipment program

Marc A. Nerenstone National Institute of Law Enforcement and

and Criminal Justice

2. Project NI 70-064: Burglary: A Study of Its Character, Correlates, Correctives and Causes

Dr. Harry A. Scarr Human Sciences Research, Inc. McLean, Virginia

3. The LEAA impact plan

Martin B. Danziger Acting Assistant Administrator National Institute of Law

Enforcement & Criminal Justice 11 :30 - 1 :00 LUNCH

27

I

I :00 ~ 3 :00 II. Utilization of Industry Experience in Crime Detection and Prevention

3:00 - 5:00

December 17, 1971

Louis A. Mayo National Institute of Law Enforcement &

Criminal Justice

A. Project NI 70-057: Private and Auxiliary Public Police in th~ United States

B.

Mr. Sorrel Wildhorn Rand Corporation

Home Alarms-How, when, how much?

Louis A. Mayo National Institute of Law Enforcement &

Criminal Justice

Contractual activity of LEAA in security field

Robert R. DOnlan Executive Assistant to the Associate

Admillistra tor Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

I. LEAA procedures

2. Contracts-RFPs-Dissemination of Information

3. Review of Sylvania contract, purpose objective process of award

4. Review of Cedar Rapids grant

5. Jackson, Mississippi contract

9:00 - 10:30 III. Suggested improvements-Clarence M. Coster

1. Minimum training standards for private security forces

2. Coordination between private security forces and governmental units

3. Need for research and development in private security sector­Warner Eliot Department of Defense

Marshall Esler Law Enforcement Standards

Laboratory

28

I '

4. SBA StudY-Chester Smith, Esq, General Counsel Senate Small Business Committee

5. Possible licensing for private security forces and alarm services

10:30-11 :30 IV. Project NI 70-082: Physical Design for the Improvement of Security in Residential Environments

11:30-12:30 V.

..

Professor Oscar Newman Graduate School of Public Administration New York University

General discussion of identified problems and recommendations, summary and close of meeting

29

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APPENDIX III

Private Security Conference December 16 & 17, 1971

LIST OF PERSONS WHO ATTENDED

Jerome Banack Honeywell, Inc.

Roger Battie Burns Electronics Security Services, Inc.

Richard Bugbee American District Telegraph Company

William Byer Alarm Device Manufacturing Company

Jack Caulfield White House

F. S. Chance Brinks, Inc.

Frank Cole W;lls Fargo Alarm Services

. W'$~liam L. Cole . 13rinks, Inc.

Robert Conklin Holmes Electric Protective Company

William Cornforth Systron Donner Corporation

Clarence M. Coster LEAA

James J. Cusack American Courier Service

Martin Danziger LEAA

Garis Distelhorst National Burglar & Fire Alarm Association

Robert R. Donlan LEA A

31

Robert O. Donnelly American District Telegraph Company

Robert Douglas Emhart Corporation

Warner Eliot Department of Defense

Marshall Isler Law Enforcement Standards Lab

A. R. Frye Wackenhut Corporation

Eugene L. Fuss Honeywell, Inc.

Harold Gray Pacific Fire Extinguisher Company

A. 1. Gross ADTCompany

J amecl C. Hensler Wells Fargo Alarm Services

John J. Horan Pinkerton's, Inc.

Jerris Leonard Administrator, LEAA

William Lutz Burns Electronics Security Services, Inc.

Louis Mayo LEAA

Marc A. Nerenstone LEAA

Professor Oscar Newman New York University ..

, I

Gene A. Pack Burns In ternational Security Services, Inc.

Norval Poulson Certified Burglar Alarm Systems, Inc.

Martin H. Reiss· Alarmtronics Engineering, Inc.

Norman Rubin Supreme Burglar Alarm Corporation

Dr. Harry Scarr Human Sciences Research, Inc.

Fritz Schumacher Walter Kidde and Company, Inc.

R. W. Shirley Merchants Police Alarm Corporation

Chester Smith, Esq. Senate Small Business Committee

Wallace Smith Alarm Industry Committee for Combating

Crime

Richard W. Velde LEAA

Ralph Ward Mosler Electronic Systems

George Weinstock Morse Signal Devices, Inc.

Sorrel Wildhorn Rand Corporation

Francis E. Wilkie Biebold, Inc.

John A. Willis Pinkerton's, Inc.

Victor R. Zahn Wells Fargo Signal Systems, Inc.

32

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D-36

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Warner A. Eliot 25

33 il

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