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Physician Agency

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Physician Agency. Thomas McGuire. Questions . Do physicians maximize profit ? Are physicians constrained by market demand? Do physicians even set price and quantity? In what way do physician motives and power matter if insurance plans set price and quantity ? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Physician Agency Thomas McGuire
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Page 1: Physician Agency

Physician Agency

Thomas McGuire

Page 2: Physician Agency

Questions Do physicians maximize profit? Are physicians constrained by market demand? Do physicians even set price and quantity? In what way do physician motives and power

matter if insurance plans set price and quantity?

This chapter will address motivation, market power, and price and quantity setting, referred to here collectively as the issue of “physician agency.”

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Physician incomes are very high, among the highest for any occupational group. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, physician earnings grew relative to college graduates and lawyers (Gaynor, 1994). In 1994, average physician net income, according to the AMA, was $182,400.

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Physicians average about 55 hours of work per week. Figuring 48 weeks per year, the average physician net wage was $65 per hour in 1994. Net is about half of gross. The average price charged by physicians in 1994 could be figured at approximately $130 for each hour of their time.

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醫生薪資 (1999)

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醫生薪資 (2011)

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Average range of salaries for physicians 2010.Specialty Median salary (USD) Anesthesiology 331,000 to $423,507 Dermatology 313,100 to $480,088 Emergency medicine 239,000 to $316,296

Cardiac Surgery 218,684 to $500,000 Family practice 175,000 to $220,196 Internal medicine 184,200 to $231,691 Neurology 213,000 to $301,327 Obstetrics and Gynecology 251,500 to $326,924

Ophthalmology 150,000 to $351,000 Orthopedic surgery 397,879 to $600,000

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Average range of salaries for physicians 2010. Specialty Median salary (USD) Otolaryngology 191,000 to $393,000 Pathology 239,000 to $331,842 Pediatrics 160,111 to $228,750 Psychiatry 173,800 to $248,198 Radiology (diagnostic) 377,300 to $478,000 Surgery (general) 284,642 to $383,333 Urology 331,192 to $443,518 Neurological surgery 350,000 to $705,000

Plastic surgery 265,000 to $500,000 Gastroenterology 251,026 to $396,450 Pulmonology 165,000 to $365,875

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The number of physicians supplying health care is governed by licensing laws, including provisions for students trained outside the U.S., and the capacity of the 126 U.S. medical schools.

About 16,000 students graduate from U.S. medical schools each year, and these are joined by 5,000 immigrant physicians. The accumulation of these flows has built the current stock of 550,000 physicians in active practice, a stock that is growing at about 1.5% per year.

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The AMA, from its founding in 1847, advocated uniform national licensure. Between 1880 and 1890, every state licensed medicine. With the reorganization and growth of the AMA

between 1900 and 1910, and a rise in membership from 8,000 to 70,000 (Starr 1982, pp. 110, 112), membership began to be associated with hospital privileges and control of expert witnesses in malpractice cases.

In his 1910 report, Medical Education in the U.S. and Canada, Flexner recommended an increase in the quality of medical education, uniform training (based on the Johns Hopkins model), and a decrease in the number of schools and students per school.

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本土醫師養成 就讀醫學院醫學系 台灣醫學生需七年醫學教育

大二到大四修習基礎課程 大五、大六則是見習兩年 大七進入實習的階段

畢業國考才取得醫師執照,可獨立開業 住院醫師

住院醫師因不同的專科而有不同的年限 住院醫師訓練後經一年總住院醫師可考取專科醫師

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98 學年度大學考試分發 ( 醫學系 ) 大學校名 學系名稱 科數 最低分數 原始分數 國立臺灣大學 醫學系 6 523.16 523.16

國立陽明大學 醫學系 6 515.32 515.32

國立成功大學 醫學系 6 510.71 510.71

長庚大學 醫學系 6 568.71505.52

臺北醫學大學 醫學系 6 493.32 493.32

馬偕醫學院 醫學系 6 488.83488.83

高雄醫學大學 醫學系 6 486.67 486.67

中國醫藥大學 醫學系 6 481.67 481.67

輔仁大學 醫學系 6 479.79479.79

慈濟大學 醫學系 6 474.73474.73

中山醫學大學 醫學系 6 510.35 471.09

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醫學教育的成本很高,每年限制一千三百名醫學生的名額可以確保投注的醫學教育成本能得到相當的回饋,進而導致國考並不是要淘汰不適合的醫學生,而只是確保一個醫學生有成為醫師應具備的基本能力。

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國外修習 國外修習醫學課程的學生,根據醫師第四條之一的規定,「以外國學歷參加考試者,其為美國、日本、歐洲、加拿大、南非、澳洲、紐西蘭、新加坡及香港等地區或國家以外之外國學歷,應先經教育部學歷甄試通過,始得參加考試。」 除了九大區域外,到其他國家修習醫學課程都需通過學歷甄試,才能再參加國家考試以取得醫師執照。 避免波波事件

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成本標準化 - 各類人員年平均薪資(2003)

統計值主治醫師每年平

均薪資住院醫師每年平

均薪資護理人員每年平

均薪資醫事人員每年平

均薪資行政人員每年平

均薪資

平均值 3, 715, 887 1, 504, 124 705, 655 758, 390 593, 375中位數 3, 600, 000 1, 440, 000 762, 627 816, 229 540, 000最小值 2, 250, 000 1, 161, 396 360, 000 384, 000 312, 000最大值 7, 069, 731 2, 700, 000 1, 008, 012 961, 344 994, 179標準差 1379386. 38 469741. 31 205051. 02 179041. 09 227925. 37

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99 年─受僱員工人數、平均每人月薪資—按職類別分職 類 別 受 僱 員 工

人 數 總 薪 資 經 常 性 薪 資 非 經 常 性 薪 資

總計 6,676,119

41,571 36,207 5,364

專業人員 630,464

56,348 48,784 7,564

地質工程師 54

78,742 78,438 304

精算師 77

150,724 146,497 4,227

系統分析師 32,284

60,168 51,830 8,338

程式設計師 39,164

52,677 47,536 5,141

電腦維護工程師 33,691

42,219 39,388 2,831

航空機械工程師 643

59,249 57,447 1,802

冶金、採礦、鑽探工程 310

205,378 65,017 140,361

生物科學工程師 2,397

41,329 38,465 2,864

醫師 44,260

119,298

104,598

14,700

藥劑師 22,706

44,859 41,926 2,933

護理人員 144,869

40,060 37,656 2,404

會計師 2,848

62,644 52,394 10,250

律師 648

112,047 81,566 30,481

財金及經濟分析研究 4,266

80,957 66,050 14,907

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行政院勞工委員會「職類別薪資調查報告」顯示, 99 年7 月各行業不含自行開業之「受僱醫師」平均薪資約119,298 元

薪資水準最高 10% 的醫師,僅每月平均經常性薪資已達175,600 元之譜,再加計績效獎金、年終獎金及其他津貼,每月薪資數十萬元不足為奇。

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全民健保開辦之後,醫院及診所的經營費用大多來自健保給付或醫療保險給付,醫師與牙醫師的薪資很大一部分是看服務的病人數,這部分會影響到紅利、點數、業績等,而點值也跟專業科別有關,例如外科點值較高、復健科比較低,因此薪資水準的差異很大,通常風險較高、自費項目多的科別,或是技術性高、專業性強的醫師薪資會較高。

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急診醫生荒 喊 40萬月薪找不到人? 台灣的醫師荒日益嚴重,不僅內外婦兒「四大皆空」,近來急診科醫師也人力告急。由於急診醫師發生醫療糾紛風險高,部分區域醫院、地區醫院越來越不容易招募到急診主治醫師,不少醫院紛紛開出近 40萬元的月薪招人。和不必值班的新進醫師月薪約 10萬元相比,條件實在優渥,各醫院都希望以高薪待遇爭取年輕新血。 壢新醫院 : 「具急診專科醫師證書 39萬元起、亦歡迎內外兒科,薪資面議」 台大醫院新竹分院 : 月薪 35萬元 童綜合醫院 : 院內較資淺的急診醫師月薪約 38萬元

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醫療糾紛判賠 3 千萬 曾收治“人球案”邱小妹童綜合醫院神經外科醫師李明鐘,因車禍病患醫療糾紛,日前被台中高分院宣判,醫院與李明鐘等三名醫師,要連帶賠償 3000多萬元(新台幣,下同)。此判決引發神經外科醫學會高度反彈,今將召開記者會聲援李明鐘。 台中市民陳仁傑七年前發生車禍頭部受重創,經醫師手術後全身癱瘓、雙眼全盲,家屬請求損害賠償,一審判決童綜合醫院及三名醫師賠償 2800余萬,兩造不服均提起上訴,二審查出醫師未在手術後放置腦壓監測器,致陳全身癱瘓,判決醫院及三名醫師賠償 3200多萬元。

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醫療糾紛判賠 3 千萬 2005 年九月間,陳仁傑車禍送童綜合醫院,經電腦斷層檢查,發現顱內出血,由主治醫師李明鐘做硬腦膜外血腫清除術後,再由醫師呂志明、李傳輝照顧,三天內,昏迷指數從恢復八分,又下降至五分,家屬見狀轉院,昏迷指數降至三分。 陳仁傑家人不滿童綜合醫院、李明鐘等三名醫師疏失,致陳腦部右側出血量,擠壓至左側,腦部持續累積血塊,造成二度腦創傷,致其腦部細胞壞死而左側癱瘓,雙目失明。 經陳父陳福德提起損害賠償,一審法官認為,醫師未積極追蹤腦壓變化,直到他陷入昏迷還有血塊未清,導致陳成為植物人,認定醫院及醫師有過失,判賠兩千八百餘萬元。

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醫療糾紛判賠 3 千萬 台灣神經外科醫學會表示,置放顱內壓監測器,有相當高風險,可能造成感染、出血、堵塞,甚至傷害腦組織,所以進行置放手術前,需慎重其事,醫師應對患者及家屬詳細解說,才能做最適當處置。

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內外婦兒,四大皆空 監察委員黃煌雄於日前( 4/14)在第三波全民健康保險改革研討會前會中,發表半年來走訪醫院、醫師訪談結果,發現健保醫療資源錯置,未來應積極檢討健保支出及資源分配問題,也應重振內外婦兒 4 大科,並呼籲改革健保支出。黃委員的發言,再度點出內外婦兒四科「四大皆空」的陳年老問題。為此,立委涂醒哲於今日( 4/22)召開「內外婦兒,四大皆空,醫療生態危機」公聽會,邀請官方代表、中華民國醫師公會全國聯合會、台灣醫學會、內外婦兒四科醫學會代表,並探討內外婦兒等科,為何人力不足?醫療糾紛及給付制度產生哪些問題?醫療生態的破壞對民眾健康的衝擊,及改善之道為何?

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內科 台灣醫學會及內科醫學會楊培銘秘書長則表示,內科人力不足的問題,相較其他三科來說是較小的,但是人力不足的問題仍會影響醫療品質及醫病關係,這部分仍值得政府加以注意。內科目前存在的主要問題在於,因為給付制度的不同而影響到醫師走向,使得內科內的不同科間也常在作變換。

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外科 台灣外科醫學會第一副秘書長林家瑋則認為,如何讓次專科醫師的人數作合理分佈,是健保局的職責,而給付制度需作修正及將資源作重分配;至於是否開放部分負擔,讓病人願意補差價,這是值得思考的課題。對於醫療糾紛問題,林則認為不應任由病人提出刑事告訴,否則易破壞醫病關係及打擊醫師士氣。

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婦產科 台灣婦產科醫學會黃閔照秘書長則語重心長的表示,婦產科人力只占全國各科醫師人力 6.8% ,人力真的很吃緊,婦產科醫師老化的問題也嚴重,需思考人力上的重新配置;此外,婦產科也常被稱為「作愈多賠愈多的科」,若加上開刀及醫療糾紛成本,則現行的給付制度對婦產科相當不公平,久而久之也消磨掉婦產科醫師的熱情。黃閔照接著說,在現行健保制度下,醫師常被稱為「廉價勞工」,醫師無尊嚴,外界更常把醫師塑造成是愛錢的,這樣其實是傷害醫病關係。

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兒科 四大科最後發言的台灣兒科醫學會李秉穎秘書長表示,兒科常被視為是「賠錢科」,也是醫院愈不想投資的科。少子化不是問題,問題出在健保給付不公,政府常常只考量到量,卻不考慮質的問題,而兒科在治療過程中,常常需要用到許多設備,這部分卻得不到評鑑,最終影響到給付。李秘書長並認為,預防醫學作的若愈成功,科別就會愈萎縮,而這不應是國家未來的發展方向。對於醫療糾紛的問題,李認為醫療院所應先過濾投訴信件,才能糾正不當的醫療生態。最後,李建議醫師若不能入勞基法,至少也應針對醫師制訂特別法,以保障醫師的權益。

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「歷年專科醫師核證人數」 年度 內科 外科 婦科 兒科 89 239 169 62 149 90 293 131 62 184 91 328 157 50 209 92 351 186 67 209 93 320 178 54 144 94 310 171 55 132 95 273 158 39 117 96 262 159 42 117 97 277 149 36 123 98 320 126 29 96 99 315 138 33 94

資料來源:行政院衛生署統計室

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Do physicians maximize profit? Are physicians constrained by market demand? Do physicians even set price and quantity? In what way do physician motives and power

matter if insurance plans set price and quantity?

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市場均衡

X 數量

P 價格

E

A A’

B’B

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市場均衡供給曲線(生產者) 需求曲線(消費者) 均衡數量 均衡價格

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生產者和消費者 生產者

醫院 醫師 護理人員

消費者 病患

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均衡數量和價格 均衡數量

就診次數(門診) 就診次數(住院) 就診天數(住院)

均衡價格 單次費用(門診) 每天費用(住診)

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市場均衡假設許多生產者許多消費者 市場資訊會流通消費者相互比價 生產者相互比價買賣品質有保障→彼此在品質和價格上相互競爭

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醫療市場特性市場資訊不流通消費者不比價 生產者不比價買賣品質沒保障

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醫療保險市場資訊不流通消費者不比價 生產者不比價買賣品質沒保障

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Setting 1: both q and p are controls

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The quantity x is optimal since b(x)=c

The physician sets the price to extract the CS up to NB0

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Setting 2: with insurance, q as the control

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The quantity x is more than the optimal since θp > b(x) (as long as p > c)

The physician chooses x to extract the CS up to NB0

If p goes down, x would go up (dx/dp<0)

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Setting 3: with insurance, q and e as controls

Payment scheme: R+Psx (R>0, c>Ps>0)

NB = B(x, e)-Pd x

Bx>0 Bxx<0, Be>0 Bee<0

C(e)>0 ce>0 cee>0

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Setting 3: with insurance, q and e as controls

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R=0, Bx - Pd <0

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Setting 4: physician induced demand PID exists when the physician influences a

patient’s demand to care against the physician interpretation of the best interest of the patient (Fuchs, 1978)

Influence v.s. Inducement Undue influence

Utilization v.s. Demand Changing utilization may not change demand There are other ways to change demands (ration,

efforts, etc)

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Physicians can alter the patient’s preferences

It has many direct policy implications Training fewer surgeons will reduce the

unnecessary surgery To make physician fee policy within a budget

constraint, it must be anticipated that fee reduction induces quantity increases

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Setting 4: physician induced demand

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Theory of Demand Inducement

N↓ → income effect →Uy/ Ui ↓ → i1 , i2 ↑

m1 ↓ → income +substitution → i1 ?

m1 ↓ → income → i2 ↑


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