Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the Com m ittee for Cultural Relations and Foreign Contacts, Tirana, for originally making possible the project of writing this book.

The Fakulteti Shkencave Politike-Juridike of Tirana Uni­versity helped me to correct many errors w ithout being in any way responsible for remaining imperfections.

And very sincere thanks to the people of Albania, of all ages and positions, who in answering my questions in such a frank and comradely spirit, supplied me with the inform ation which has contributed to whatever understanding I have of socialism in practice.

William Ash

Albania’s difference with the Soviet Union over the issue of the true nature of socialism, coupled with its fraternal alliance with People’s China, has been at the very core of the split in the world comm unist movement.

Yet, until William Ash wrote this book, no adequate history of Albania has been published in the West.

PICKAXE AND RIFLE is more than an historical account of this interesting but little known country: it is a political and sociological study of the only socialist state in Europe.

Having liberated themselves from fascist occupation, how did the Albanian people free themselves also from the whole system of exploitation and defend their new socialist state from the hostile countries all around them?

What new social institutions and governmental organisation reflect the transfer of state power into the hands of the working people?

What are the characteristics of real socialist society as developed by the Albanians, and how have they guaranteed it .gainst the distortions and deform ations which have over­taken the o ther East European peoples’ democracies?

And as a result, what is the quality of life in Albania today?

William Ash, author of MARXISM AND MORAL CONCEPTS, was invited to Albania in 1969 to tou r the to iin try extensively and to collect material for this book. A),.mi, in 1971, the author had an opportunity of visiting Alli.mia at the time of the Sixth Congress of the Party of I ilium of Albania, and of checking the draft typescript of III* work with historians, with State and Party leaders and, 111 • * 'I t im portant of all, with the people in the factories and on tin i *illi i live farms.

I In ii suit is a m ost compelling account of real socialism in

O ther books by William Ash

FictionTHE LOTUS IN THE SKY CHOICE O F ARMS THE LO N G EST WAY ROUND RID E A PA PER T IG E R TA K E-O FF

N on-fic tion :MARXISM A ND M O RAL CONCEPTS

PICKAXE AND RIFLE

W illiam Ash

H O W A R D B A K E R L O N D O N

William Ash PICKAXE AND R IFL E

First pub lished by H ow ard Baker Press L td ., 1974

A H OW ARD BAK ER BOOK

© C o p y rig h t: William Ash, 1974

A ll rights reserved. No part o f this book may be reproduced in any fo rm or by any means w ithou t the prior w ritten permission o f the Publisher, excepting quotes used in conncection with reviews written specifically fo r inclusion in a magazine or newspaper.

IS UN 0 7080 0039 X

I mI.Ii.Ih il 11 l lnw i ir i l l lnkci I'lriw Ltd., 1 it V t i iIn il \ II mill, Win11ilriIon, I .oiuliin, S.W.20

I . | i « «• lit u lij 'i|i. i I ,i 11»i il I Him I Si i vli i •, I III-. Liverpool, in.I |-i in|• il In I ii i ill III lliiln liy I id , M iirlyi Mim il l iiillillm (I, Sin try.

CONTENTS

WHO ARE THE ALBANIANS?Chapter

1. From Illyria to the Turkish Conquest2. Scanderbeg and the Growth of National Conscious­

ness.

THE GREAT LIBERATION WAR3. From the Turkish Conquest through the National

Movement to the Italian Invasion.4. Beginnings of Albanian National Resistance.5. The Development of People’s War6. Relations of the Liberation Leadership with other

National Groups and with the Allies7. The Liberation War against the Nazis and Final

Victory

ALBANIA AND THE POST-WAR WORLD8. Results of the War in Albania: Relations with

Britain and other Countries; the Struggle against Yugoslavia

ALBANIA’S SOCIALIST SOCIETY !). The State

10. The Party I I . The Mass Organisations

THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY OF ALBANIA I C r e a t i n g the Socialist Economic Base I '■ 1 >i‘veIopmcnt of AgricultureI I Development of Industry and the Relation

between Economic Base and Social Superstructure

THE SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT15. Albania’s Relations with the Soviet Union and the

People’s Republic of China

THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE NEW ALBANIA16. Socialist Man at Leisure17. Y outh and Education18. Women and the Socialist Family19. Health20. Arts and Culture21. A Genuinely Free Society

PICKAXE AND RIFLE

(The revolutionary slogan of the Party of Labour of Albania: ‘To build socialism hold­ing a pickaxe in one hand and a rifle in the o ther.’)

WHO ARE THE ALBANIANS

Chapter One:

From Illyria to the Turkish Conquest

It has been said of the Albanians that they have ‘hacked their way through history, sword in hand’. This little country, somewhat larger than Wales, has been the scene of fierce wars of resistance from the very beginning of European history. These people, numbering till recently fewer than two million, have an unm atched record of struggle down the centuries to achieve their national integrity, to win and hold for them ­selves the right to develop their own resources, their own skills and talents w ithout any interference from outside their own borders. The Albanians, descendants of the ancient Illyrians, are the oldest inhabitants of the Balkans going right back to the early Bronze Age; but it was only half way through the Tw entieth Century that Enver Hoxha, who had led them in the liberation war against fascism, could at last say: ‘The Albanian people will never again allow themselves to be tram pled on as in the b itter past. They have their rights, dignity and honour; they have the right to live, to take their own decisions on any m atter, ju st as any other people.’

The Albanians take their name from an old Illyrian tribe, the Albanoi, who inhabited the region from Durrës on the Adriatic coast to m ountainous Dibra — the central portion of the present State of Albania. The Illyrians were an Indo- I uropean people who in the great migrations from north to Moutli Europe in the second millenium B .C . settled in the western Balkans. They had their own Illyrian language from which, though influenced by the speech of various invaders, modern Albanian is directly derived. Shkodra in northern Alban ia was the ancient capital of the Illyrian kingdom which vv.in incorporated in the Rom an Empire in 1 6 8 B .C . and Mipplied five Illyrians, including Diocletian, to rule as Rom an • nmiTors.

I lie culture o f the Albanians has enriched itself from many

11

sources, Thracian, Greek, Roman, Slav, Byzantine and Islamic, w ithout ever losing its identity. Their history is the account of their fight for survival. The development of their national character is intim ately bound up with their rugged, scenically spectacular homeland which lay like a stumbling block across the old imperial routes of trade and conquest.

This abrupt dramatic land of lofty peaks dropping sheer into the sea, of deep valleys and bottom less lakes was in the path of the northw ard sweep of Greek colonisers; it lay across the main road, the Via Egnatia, which connected Rome with its eastern empire; it was overrun by Visigoths, Huns and slavs in their drive to the south; it blocked the invasion of western Europe by the Turks.

The resistance of the Illyrians to the Roman Empire contributed, together with the revolts of slaves and colonists and the invasion of barbarian tribes, to its final overthrow. The Illyrian uprising of the first few years of the Christian era, in which women fought side by side with their menfolk, was the most terrible, except for that against Carthage, of all the wars Rome waged abroad.

In mediaeval times there were successive revolts of the Arberesh, the Albanians, against Byzantine bondage. And in 1185 the Albanian feudal chiefs threw off the yoke of Byzantium and formed their first state, the principality of Arberia with Kruja as its capital. But none of the feudal dynasties, constantly warring with each other, was strong enough to unify the country; and the intervention of such mercantile states as Venice, eager to control the Albanian coast, was a further hindrance to centralisation.

During this time Albania did, however, achieve consider­able economic progress. Arable land was extended and the (liltivalion of cereals, olive groves, vineyards and silk all Ili>iii mhed; (here were big herds of sheep and cattle; and the Im M i n i >1 ,i)*i it ullural and dairy products made it possible to i'0 |nH l 1 1 1 1 1 nl i ,n li annual yield. In the revival of the cities of rtMlltlllil V, i I In' v I'l'i •»llie centres of artisan production #II|mVHIM 1 I'*1' mM1«III .ifcs prosperity, Dyrrachion thrived riti mi m h u m Vulmi i, Vlm.t, Skodra as Shkodra and old A u | «in i i it* I In 111 iv11 liii"i\ n I hen and m >w as Herat.

I l«l m Wi l t i In M l m u I in ill it ........ w In n i In ( >111 mi . in lurks in

I ' i t

the middle of the Fourteenth Century bypassed Constant­inople and spread over the Balkan peninsula. In the year 1389 a coalition of feudal rulers, Albanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian, met the Turks in a bloody encounter on the plain of Kossovo and were completely crushed.

For some while a struggle over the succession of the Turkish throne held up all plans of conquest; but by 1421, under Sultan Murad II, the Janissaries and Spahis were on the march again, advancing on Hungary with the intention of battering their way into central Europe, and o f reducing Albania to an obedient base for their attack on the rich Italian states.

The Albanian people led by their national hero George Kastrioti, known as Scandcrbeg, repelled the Turkish forces for twenty-five years in a series of remarkable victories. At a time when the Ottomans were considered invincible, the Albanians successfully resisted more than twenty-two fierce campaigns to eliminate this stubborn salient. Sultan Murad II, who had never been defeated in th irty years of fighting, was routed before the walls of Kruja and his son M ehmet II, called Fatih, the Conqueror, because of his conquest of Constantinople, was also defeated utterly and repulsed.

The battles fought by the Albanian people under Scanderbeg’s leadership echoed far beyond the coun try ’s frontiers and assumed international importance because in I lieir courageous and skilful war to defend themselves they defended the whole of Europe for a quarter of a century, blunting and turning the edge of the massive invasion of the Turkish hordes. The Albanian resistance must therefore be recognised as one of the historical factors contributing to the independent development of European mercantilism which was a condition of the subsequent bourgeois revolution.

Scanderbeg was a great leader. He succeeded in breaking down feudal separatism and in the heat of battle fusing disparate social elements into a central government. He had iIk unique quality for his time of understanding how to rally about him the Albanian masses and of thus being able to give I lie war against the Turkish invaders the popular character of i people’s liberation struggle. It is this which explains the

13

legendary epic enacted in the m ountains, valleys, plains and castles of Albania by an em battled people when the rest of Europe was terror-stricken and prostrate before the Turkish advance.

In the military field he proved himself a great captain, a m aster of exploiting to the full the geographical peculiarities of Albania. He was also a shrewd diplom at who strengthened the position of Albania on the world scene by sagacious negotiation with a dozen different courts.

It is symbolic of the role the war against the Turks under Scanderbeg’s leadership played in the development of the Albanian nation tha t the standard of the Kastrioti, a two-headed eagle on a red background, which Scanderbeg raised over the citadel of Kruja at the beginning of the struggle on November 28th, 1443, should be the national flag of Albania today. In order to understand the more recent history of Albania it is necessary to know something of the desperate resistance of the Albanian people, few in num ber, ill armed and w ithout allies, against the vastly superior Turkish foe. Though the Turks finally conquered Albania — or w hat was left of it after a quarter of a century of being ceaselessly fought over, they never entirely subjugated the people who survived. The sense of a national identity grew so strong through the years of stubborn fighting that it endured through five hundred years of Turkish oppression, and the b itter struggle to preserve the Albanian language and customs and to prevent denationalisation never ceased.

It was of this fiercely independent tem per o f the Albanians, expressing itself in feudal forms of behaviour, that Byron wrote in the Second Canto (Stanza LXV) of Childe Harold's Pilgrimage:

‘Fierce are Albania’s children, yet they lack Not virtues, were those virtues m ore mature.Wlicr i- is the foe that ever saw their back?Wlio i . 111 so well the toil of war endure?I In ii • i.1 1 ivi- fastnesses not more secure I hiiit I hi \ in doubtful time of troublous need:I In ii v\mill Imw deadly! but 1 heir friendship sure,Wit i ii • <i aiiiiiiIi h i Valour bids them bleed,1111 h 11 •! t* I ii i nulling mi whcirVi their chief may lead.’

Chapter Two

Scanderbeg and the Growth of National Consciousness

George Kastrioti, born about the year 1405, was the youngest son of a nobleman from the north-eastern part of Albania whose family had managed to extend their holdings during the early years of the Turkish invasion. Whenever the Turkish grip weakened, the Kastrioti, like other feudal houses, sought to strengthen their position, often by contracting alliances with Venice or other principalities across the Adriatic. But when the Turkish rulers were able to re-impose their authority , these noblemen were forced back into vassalage. ,

It was as a vassal of Sultan Murad II that George’s father, John , sent him to the Sultan’s court at Adrianople as a youthful hostage. The Turkish chronicles describe the young man as ‘sturdy, dexterous, comely and intelligent.’ The son of a vassal ruler, he was trained at the military school near the palace; and on being converted to Mohammedanism he was given the name Skender. He was obliged to take part in the expeditions of the Turks in which he so distinguished himself as a soldier that he won the title of ‘bey’, thus coming to be called Scanderbeg.

Having won the confidence of the Sultan, he was appointed governor of the im portant district of Kruja including the fortified castle which was one of the m ost impregnable in Albania. Built high up on the rocky slopes of Mount Kruja the fortifications grow out of a huge mass of rock detached from the rest of the m ountain rearing up behind. The unassailable front of this vast structure of thick walls and hidden passage ways, crowned with a citadel which -.I ill stands, points ou t over the northern coastal plain like .the I now of a huge stone warship, commanding the coun try ’s most im portant port, Durrës, ju st visible in the distance

15

against the blue Adriatic and, indeed, the whole sweep of coastline right up to Albania’s northern boundary, Kruja was the most strategically im portant of all the fortresses in central Albania, Petrela, Rodoni and others, whose signal fires at night could be seen from Kruja’s high ramparts.

During Scanderbeg’s many years at the Sultan’s court and in the Turkish army he had never ceased to think of himself as Albanian nor lost his patriotic feeling for his homeland. Aspirations for the liberation of his country guided his thoughts and actions from the m om ent he took up his post in Kruja as subash. But in order to avoid, by long and careful preparation, the failure of past revolts, he kept his planning secret. He w ent quietly among the people to find out how ready the masses were to rise. He sought through his fa ther’s connections to discover what support there might be from abroad. When he was later transferred to the office of the governor of Dibra, some fifty miles to the east of Kruja on what is now the frontier with Yugoslavia, he was able to continue his preparations, assuring himself of popular support in this region, too.

For three years after being sent to Albania by the Sultan he worked in this underground way to make sure that when the revolt came it would break out with the m ost shattering force. Toward the end of 1443 he decided that conditions within the country were favourable for a massive uprising and at that time he was presented with the best possible external circumstances for launching a nation-wide insurrection.

Under the leadership of Janosh Hunyadi the Hungarians had been able to pass from defensive war against the Turks to offensive operations. In November 1443 the Hungarian army crossed the Danube and began an advance which threw the Turkish forces opposing them into panic. Scanderbeg was ordered by the Sultan to take his place in the army of the Dibra region and march to throw back the Hungarians. He gave every appearance of obeying this command; but during tin ( on fusion of the first encounter he suddenly pulled threeI.....died Albanian horsemen out of the battle to the dismay■ ■I (In I inUisli forces. At the head of this m ounted troop, Wlllt lili n< I'lirvv, Hamza, riding beside him, Scanderbeg M*iIIii|imI li.nk In Dibra where the whole population of the

I (i

town turned out to receive him with acclaim.His first task was to clear the land of all occupying

garrisons and in the whole system of fortifications enabling the Turks to m aintain their grip on Albania the Castle of Kruja was the m ost formidable. Scanderbeg hurried there from Dibra and gained control of town and castle by the ruse of a forged paper announcing that the Sultan had re­appointed him to the governorship. During the night he opened the castle to his own soldiers who had hidden in a forest on the mountainside and they rushed through the fortress annihilating the Turkish garrison.

The capture of Kruja was the signal for a general revolt of the Albanians. Scanderbeg visited o ther regions spreading the flames of rebellion and returned to Kruja on November ‘28, 1443, when he hoisted the double-headed eagle banner over the battlem ents and proclaimed the re-establishment of the free Albanian principality.

Throughout the rest of that year Scanderbeg’s force of Albanian volunteers occupied all the o ther citadels and strong-points in central Albania. But he realised that all the steps taken so far to secure the country would prove inadequate once the Turks had ended the threat of the Hungarian advance and could mass their forces for the reduction of Albanian resistance.

What was needed was an Albanian army under a unified command with the financial means of maintaining it. In the early part of the following year preparations were made for a convention of all the Albanian nobles who had shown any disposition to resist the Turks. This convention began its work on March 2, 1444, at Lezha, a town on the northern coastal plain which belonged to Venice and thus enabled the various feudal nobles to assemble there w ithout misgivings about their own status. The free Albanian mountaineers were also represented at the meeting. Both Venice and Ragusa were invited to send delegations and since an anti-Turkish coalition in Albania was so much in their interests it was hoped that they would offer aid. But Ragusa failed to respond at all and Venice sent only an observer.

The convention confirmed an alliance known as the Albanian League with Scanderbeg as president. An Albanian

17

army made up of contingents recruited by each member of the League was established under the command of Scanderbeg who had promised the greatest num ber of troops. Each member also pledged a sum of money which became part of the common fund for arming and supporting a force of about 8,000 soldiers which with peasant volunteers mobilised in emergencies could be expanded to an army of 18,000.

The Albanian League was brought in to being solely by the Turkish threat and the nobles who joined it kept their own domains, merely recognising Scanderbeg as first among equal feudal lords. But in spite of these lim itations, the political and military alliance form ed at Lezha represented a stage in the development of an Albanian national consciousness which was to have an im portance extending far beyond the immediate needs of defence against the impending invasion. Moreover the League was not simply an agreement among nobles for holding on to their own possessions; it was an organisation in which the people themselves participated, no t simply as dependents of this or that noble, bu t in their own right. The victories to be won and the advance in national awareness to be consolidated were achieved by the Albanian people under the political and m ilitary genius of Scanderbeg.

No army of mercenaries nor peasants forced to fight against their will could have proved a match for the Turkish Janissaries and Spahis. Scanderbeg spent the spring of 1444 personally going from village to village explaining the significance of the military mobilisation and recruiting the best men for the army. He inspected fortresses and strong- points, studying the ways by which they could be attacked, and he set up inform ation posts among the people to warn of the approach of the Turkish vanguard on any part of the frontier.

There was not long to wait. In June 1444 an O ttom an .iiiny of 25,000 men under the command of Ali Pasha t invit'd (hi Albanian frontier at Dibra. Scanderbeg ■•I'j'iiii nils nit',.if',rd the invading army with his entire force tiliil Witt lliimvn I nick; bill this was merely a manoeuvre toIim. il...............it.in I...... . deeper into the country. Theyjtlll «mi! lltt .......... . A11 >.i 1 1 1 .11 is into the narrow valley of

IN

Tervioli surrounded by thick forests and steep m ountains and here, within the natural confines at the end of the valley, the Albanians turned on the Turks and annihilated the whole force.

Two other expeditions were sent by the Sultan against the Albanians, in 1445 and 1446, and bo th of them were crushed by the Albanian army.

But by then the Republic of Venice, alarmed at the growing strength and independence of the Albanian nobles under Scanderbeg’s leadership, began to fear the loss of the cities on the Albanian coast to which it laid claim. When the lord of Dania died w ithout heirs, the city should have passed under the au thority of the Albanian League. A Venetian force occupied Dania and also took possession of the neighbouring coastal castles. Scanderbeg attacked at once, but w ithout artillery it was difficult to dislodge the de­fenders. However, the Venetians failed to split the League which was their main object, and their offer of a princely reward to anyone who would kill Scanderbeg m et with no success either.

The fighting against the Venetian occupation forces continued into the following year and was still pinning down a num ber of Albanians when, from the east, a huge Turkish army under the personal command of Sultan Murad II invaded the country in June 1448 and m arched toward Kruja.

Scanderbeg was thus caught between two hostile forces. He undertook a series of lightning actions against the Venetians in the region of Shkodra and, with the aid of peasants in the area whom he roused to revolt, forced the Venetians into an open battle on the River Drin which resulted in a decisive victory for the Albanians.

Meanwhile the Turkish advance had been halted by the slubborn resistance of the Castle of Sfetigrad whose cour­t e o u s garrison held out against massive assaults with siege engines right through the summer. By this time the I Inngarians had launched anew campaign and the Sultan was forced to withdraw to Edrene in order to prepare for this ,it lack. The tw o forces clashed in October and the Hungarians under Hunyadi were badly beaten; bu t the Albanians were

given additional time to consolidate their own defences.Two years later the Sultan had amassed another force of

more than 100,000 men for the final reduction of Albanian resistance. Word o f this m ighty army began to reach Scanderbeg as it approached the frontier. He called for a general mobilisation and within a few days expanded the army to some 18,000. He placed 1,500 men in the castle at Kruja against which the Sultan was advancing. He took personal command of 8,000 soldiers whom he held in the Gumenishti Mountains above Kruja. The rest of his forces he split up into small highly mobile bands.

From the moment the Turkish armies entered Albania, all along the valley of the Shkumbini River, they were harassed by these roving bands. Ambushes were set and sprung continuously; small detachments of the Turkish forces were separated and cut down; food trains were attacked and destroyed — classic guerrilla tactics in classic guerrilla country. By the time the Turks reached Kruja and deployed under the steep slope and solid battlem ents, they had already suffered heavy losses.

The Sultan ordered the bom bardm ent of the citadel with artillery capable of hurling four hundred pound shells into the fortress. A fter this bom bardm ent there was a general assault. While the Turkish forces were engaged with the castle garrison, Scanderbeg swept down from the heights with his best troops, striking first one flank of the Turks and then the other. The besieging army was thrown into a complete panic and the attack broke up in a disorderly rout.

During the summer two more major attacks against Kruja were launched and failed as miserably as the first. Nor had the guerrilla bands ceased their hit and run operations. The caravans that kept the Turkish invasion army supplied with provisions from Macedonia and Venice were repeatedly attacked. More and more peasants were recruited into theseI >.• i ii I . which not only cut off the Turks from necessary m|>|ili< .. Imi kept nibbling away at their main forces. After

I• 'Mi mil ,i lull months of military disasters Sultan Murad II Min 11 • • I 111 I d in n ' leaving more than 20,000 dead under the H'itlU 'il I-■ 1 1 1 1 i mil in llir valleys and forests through which I I I * 'II lll\ I'llMI il

’,MI

This great victory not only strengthened Scanderbeg’s position inside Albania. It resounded throughout Europe. Congratulations on his brilliant achievement were received from m any European courts.

And Scanderbeg needed allies. There had been great military successes, bu t six years of war had ruined the country. The Turks, cheated of their expected victory, burned entire villages, drove peasants from the fields and destroyed crops. In the w inter of 1450-51 there was a serious threat of famine. Scanderbeg approached those states with the m ost immediate interest in defeating the Turkish design of conquering Europe, bu t only the Kingdom of Naples responded at all and they offered very little actual help.

Inside Albania, too, there were those who were having second thoughts about the hard-won achievements on the field of battle. With the intensification of the war Scanderbeg had been forced to constrain the individualistic actions of the nobles who had bound themselves in the Albanian League. Willing enough to join in the m utual defence of their particular feudal interests they could not subscribe with any enthusiasm to a long uneven war in the interest of the whole country. Their selfish conduct made the mobilisation of resources in m anpower and materials increasingly difficult. Their vacillation at critical moments was an ever-present danger behind Scanderbeg’s back. The Turks and Venetians were quick to take advantage of this situation by trying to bribe or corrupt the nobles into betraying Scanderbeg and the defence of Albania.

He was thus left to depend as little as possible on the nobles and to rely more and more on the Albanian masses. The army, in so far as it was attached politically to him, who had no other concern but the country’s freedom, began to have the characteristics of a national force.

When the interests of the war demanded, he ignored the status of nobles as autonom ous rulers, violated the bound­aries of local lords and made use as the need arose of their own castles for quartering troops. He even took coercive action against unreliable nobles and dismissed from office inefficient members of the aristocracy. The worst offenders against the com m on cause he deprived of lands which he gave

21

to peasants who had distinguished themselves in the fighting.This growth in Scanderbeg’s authority and the further

erosion of feudal boundaries and privileges m eant that Albania, at a very early period for such a development, was being fused by the flames of war into a single and united state.

And this in turn provoked even greater discontent among the nobles. Some, like the Arianits and Dukagjins, left the League altogether and began plotting with the Sultan against Scanderbeg. The treachery of Moisi Golemi, comm ander of the Albanian frontier forces, led to a defeat at the hands of the Turks near Berat. This reverse was remedied when a large force of Turkish cavalry with Moisi Golemi as their guide was surprised in the Dibra district and u tterly annihilated. But the worst blow to Scanderbeg was the defection of his own nephew and earliest confederate, Hamza Kastrioti, with whom he had made the historic ride back into Albania as a declaration of war.

In the spring of 1457 the Sultan was sufficiently en­couraged by the divisions in the ranks of the Albanian feudal chiefs to send an army 80,000 strong under the experienced general Isak bey Evrenos, against the Albanian people. As before, Scanderbeg succeeded in avoiding battle throughout the summer, harrying and retreating, feinting and w ith ­drawing. Then in Septem ber, when the Turkish comm ander had become certain that these tactics indicated weakness in the enemy and the promise of an easy victory, his forces were caught off guard in the plain of Albulene, not far from Kruja, and thoroughly defeated. Among the thousands of prisoners taken was Hamza Kastrioti.

This trem endous victory again brought Scanderbeg con­gratulations from all over Europe. With the death of the Hungarian patriot, Janosh Hunyadi, Scanderbeg had become the m ost popular hero in the West and Europe’s hope against llu Turkish hordes. Pope Pius II sought to make Scanderbeg iIh pivolal ligufe in a crusade to be recruited from all ( Ininli iiilniii; IiiiI as on previous occasions, professions of mijijiMii wen mil bac ked by substantial help.

Hi umli iln n ile ied into a three years’ truce with the lu il ., <1 1 1 1 1<I\ iu I'.mi lime lor preparing to renew the

liberation war. But the armistice was actually broken by Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror. He sent three expeditions against the Albanians in 1462 and sall three were met, defeated and routed by Scanderbeg.

The Sultan then proposed not simply a truce bu t a ten years’ treaty of peace which Scanderbeg signed. However, when it looked as though the long-discussed European crusade against the Turks was at last about to be launched, the truce agreement was broken. And then, once again, internal conflicts among the crusaders brought the venture to an end.

That left the Albanians under Scanderbeg, after twenty years o f war which had destroyed the coun try ’s economy and largely depopulated it, facing on their own an enraged Sultan. An expedition commanded by Ballaban Pasha was immedi­ately m ounted and hurled against Albania. It was crushed — as were four successive expeditions. But when the Turks had been thrown back for the fifth time, the Albanians found themselves at the beginning of w inter with no supplies of food.

Somehow famine was staved off; but then in the spring of 1466, before the grain stores could be filled, Sultan Fatih took command himself of an imperial army of 150,000. With Ballaban Pasha as his deputy-com m ander he set off at the head of this mighty force for a final showdown with this stubborn people who had for so long thw arted Turkish schemes of world conquest.

Ju s t as fifteen years before, when another huge Turkish army under a Sultan’s personal direction had invaded the country, the Albanians resorted to guerrilla tactics to weaken and delay the enemy. Ju s t as fifteen years before, Kruja, besieged by the Sultan’s forces and assailed by his engines, stood firm. During this period of stalemate Scanderbeg made a hasty visit to Rome where he appealed to the Consistory for help. In the streets he was hailed by the crowds as a great hero but he had to return to Albania w ithout any promise of assistance. Collecting a force of battle-hardened veterans he m ounted an attack on the army before Kruja and, just as fifteen years before, the Albanians won a brilliant victory, ballaban Pasha was killed and the Sultan had to retreat with

23

the broken rem nants of his once formidable army, still harassed by guerrilla bands.

Yet in Ju ly of 1467 Sultan Mehmet had once more amassed an army which he led in another assault on Albania. After a bloody battle near Elbasan the Sultan was convinced that Albanian resistance had been finally broken and m arched on Kruja. But the garrison of the castle proved as indomitable as ever and the Sultan had to retreat.

The following year the Turks changed their tactics and invaded from the north instead of taking their usual route from Dibra along the Shkumbini valley. Scanderbeg at the head of the Albanian army moved north to m eet them, but, falling ill, he was left at Lezha. The forces he had trained so well scored a splendid victory over the Turks near Shkodra. As so often in the past the Albanians had shattered the army sent against them ; but at Lezha, on January 17th, 1468, their great leader Scanderbeg had died.

After his death the Albanian resistance continued for some years, indeed it never altogether ceased throughout the whole period of Turkish dom ination. Kruja did not surrender till 1478, ten years after Scanderbeg’s death, and remains to this day a shrine of Albanian national straggle with the names of its heroic defenders like Count Urani, Tanush Thopia and so many others inscribed in the epic history of Albania’s long fight for freedom. Above the tow n of Kruja, which was destroyed by the fascist invaders during the Second World War and has now been carefully restored, part of it just as it was in the past, there is a huge equestrian statue of Scanderbeg looking out to the sea over the plain below the fortress where so many of his battles against the Turks were fought and won.

W ithout Scanderbeg’s inspiration and genius, which for twenty-five years had brought victory and international fame to the Albanian people, the struggle against the invading lim es Inst its drive. N ot till the anti-fascist war of liberation u ,r. I In same indomitable unity of the people under the Ii .nli i’.ltip nl ,i national hero to be achieved again, and this IImii> llit im m lry ’s freedom, Scanderbeg’s compelling vision, H i" I " I i i I iii,ills M i m e d .

THE GREAT LIBERATION WAR

Chapter Three From the Turkish Conquest through the National Movement to the Italian Invasion

Resistance to the Turkish occupation and control of Albania never ceased and in certain parts of the country the military authority never succeeded in establishing more than a merely formal administrative system. The highlanders of the m ount­ainous regions of Himara, Dukagjin and Dibra could not be subjected to the colonial feudalism imposed on the rest of the country and remained peasant free holders, governing themselves by their own traditional canons and acknow­ledging Turkish overlordship only by the paym ent of an annual tribute. Whenever the O ttom an empire was weakened by internal dissension or wars w ith European states, the highlanders were quick to take up arms in their unending struggle to free themselves from alien rule.

In the 17th Century the Turks undertook a forceful campaign of converting the Albanians to Islam hoping thereby to break their will to resist. Severe religious discrimination was practised and the fines and penalties for those who remained Christians became unbearable. But the conversion of the major part of the Albanians to Moham­medanism did no t decrease the num ber nor the fierceness of the uprisings against the Turkish power.

During the 18th and 19th Centuries two great Albanian feudal chiefdoms achieved semi-autonomous rule — the aristocratic family of the Bushatlies in the north and Ali Pasha Tepelena in the south. A plaque on the remains of the great palace at Tepelena commemorates the visit of Lord Hyron to the court of Ali Pasha which could be said to represent a renewal of western European interest in the romantic land of Scanderbeg. These feudal lords were unablelo make common cause and unite the country for a national .iruggle, bu t they continued to exert pressure on the Turks

25

and at times succeeded in establishing themselves as indepen­dent rulers. In the large region of Janina Ali Pasha’s great feudal estates were held at the expense of the m ilitary feudal government of Istambul and he depended for support on the Albanian population, bo th the ruling class and the armed forces of his domain being constituted entirely of Albanians.

When about 1830 the Turks began to replace the feudal military government with a more m odern state administra­tion, there were a series of armed revolts of peasants led by local chieftains. Further attem pts to centralise power in Albania by the reforms of Tanzim at.had the support of those landlords whose position would be strengthened as the old military feudal order was abolished. But the highland chieftains in particular and the peasants generally were bitterly opposed to these new forms of subjugation and rebellions broke out all over the country culminating in the great insurrection of 1847.

At the same time as the uprising against the Tanzimat, various personalities were emerging in Albania who felt that the country could not be saved by re-establishing a backward, feudal even though independent Albania and that the only hope lay along the road of the advanced European states. This national movement found its voice at the Conference of Prizren in 1878 which was called to meet the threat of A lbania’s dismemberment by the European powers at the Congress of Berlin. O ut of the Conference grew the organ­isation of the League of Prizren which was split between those who wanted to make it a predom inantly Muslim body still depending on Turkey to defend Albania’s integrity from other imperialist powers, and those patriots led by Abdul Frasheri who demanded that the League should assume a purely Albanian character, irrespective of religion, and fight no t only to save Albania from partition but to secure its complete autonom y as well.

11 was the latter line of national resurgence which grew in■ in in.lh leading to the revolts of 1910 and 1911 and then to• In i t in I.il uprising of 1912 when Albania gained its iutlt ....... .in i .J in nearly half a millennium of oppressive• m1 1-1«11 mi l Uni in Ilu: gen era l d iv i s ion o f t h e spo i l s a t t h e

Hiil "I l lu I ii l VVnilil War , Br i t a in , F r a n c e a n d t h e U n i t e d

States, who had acquired a self-assumed right to interfere in Albania’s affairs by the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors held in London in 1913, agreed to pay off their jun ior partners in the conflict against the Central Powers by carving up Albania and handing out the pieces.

In their M emorandum of December 9, 1919, Italy was allowed to annex outright the district of Vlora and the island of Sazan and was given a m andate over the rest of the country. The old city of Gjirokastra in the south was ceded to Greece and Korça, the major city in the southeast, was to remain in political limbo till its future could be decided. The northern boundary was left intact; bu t the newly-created Yugoslavia was granted the right to construct a railway across Albania to the Adriatic.

By this M emorandum of the Great Powers Albania would have escaped the clutches of Turkey only to become the prey of the Western imperialist countries. A t a Congress sum­moned by Albanian patriots on January 21, 1920, these decisions were firmly rejected and the government which had been prepared to accept the proposed partition and occupa­tion of the country was dismissed.

A popular uprising against the Italian forces in the Vlora district was so successful that Rome had to agree to withdraw its troops by Septem ber of that year. With the failure to impose against the will of the Albanian people the main provision o f the Great Power M emorandum the other recom mendations were also abandoned. A sovereign Albania, with its frontiers as established in 1913, applied for member­ship of the League of Nations and was accepted by a resolution o f the General Assembly in December, 1920.

But this by no means ended either the internal dissensions w ithin this m ost economically backward of European countries, nor the external designs against its sovereignty by its imm ediate neighbours. A progressive government under the patrio t, Fan Noli, came to power with popular support in June, 1924; b u t in spite of various liberal measures enacted it failed to consolidate its position with the masses or to make adequate m ilitary preparations against reactionary forces which had the backing of foreign powers bent on inter­vention.

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At the end of the year Ahmed Zog, who had taken refuge in Yugoslavia when the anti-feudal, reform government assumed office, crossed the frontier into Albania with a force of mercenaries including troops from General Wrangel’s White Russian Army then quartered in Yugoslavia. The backing of foreign firms, like the British Anglo-Persian Oil Company, supplied funds in exchange for the promise of oil concessions. Zog also raised a mercenary force in Greece which invaded Albania simultaneously from the south. With the support of the big feudal landlords inside the country, Zog was able to overthrow the government and establish his reactionary regime throughout the country.

His rule depended on the suppression, often by assassina­tion, of patriots and the opening of the country to exploitation by foreign companies, mainly Italian. By 1928, the year in which he had himself proclaimed King of Albania, a quarter of the country was let out in concessions to Italian, British and American corporations which discovered and developed for their own profit the oil and mineral wealth of Albania.

A loan of 70 million gold francs was raised from the Italian Company for the Economic Development of Albania on the security of the revenues from customs duties and the Albanian state monopolies. This loan was subsequently converted by Mussolini into a debt to the fascist imperial state; and the failure to pay the instalments was used by Mussolini io exact further concessions, such as customs agreements between the two countries, opening Albania even wider to the penetration of Italian goods and eliminating Albanian producers.

So desperate was the economic plight of Albania by 1936 that Zog had to sign a new economic agreement with Rome in exchange for credits. A secret proviso of this agreement placed the Albanian army under control of the Italian government and required Albania to construct under Italian direction strategic roads leading to the Yugoslav border.

Thus at the time of the reconquest of the Rhineland by Nazi Germany and Franco’s fascist insurrection in Spain, when Mussolini’s government had launched an unprovoked war of aggression against Ethiopia, the way was also prepared

for the fascist occupation of Albania. Indeed Count Ciano, Ita ly ’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on his return from a visit to Tirana at the time of King Zog’s marriage in 1938, set out a concrete plan for the conquest of Albania which involved excluding Albania from the League of Nations, destroying the Albanian arm y’s capacity for resistance through the Italian officers serving in it, developing by means of subsidies a fifth column and spreading throughout Albania fascist and pro-fascist institutions of a social and cultural nature.

By March 1939 world conditions seemed favourable for Mussolini’s invasion of Albania. Czechoslovakia had been occupied by Nazi Germany w ithout any resistance from the Western Powers. Fascist forces supported by Germany and Italy were on the verge of victory in Spain. In Yugoslavia the government which had opposed Ita ly ’s conquest of Albania suddenly resigned.

On March 25th, having massed invasion forces in the southern Italian ports opposite Albania, Mussolini delivered a projected treaty to Zog’s government in the form of an ultimatum. By the terms of this treaty Italian troops should be perm itted to land in Albania’s principal ports and take control of roads, aerodromes and strategic points along the frontier; Italian farmers should be settled on Albanian land and enjoy full rights of citizenship; Italian citizens residing in Albania should be entitled to hold the m ost im portant official posts and the general secretaries of the government ministries should all be Italian citizens. An answer to these non-negotiable proposals was demanded before midnight of April 6th. Counter proposals from Tirana were simply ignored.

Zog, whose policies of internal repression and external capitulation had brought about Albania’s disastrous situation, quickly collected whatever he could lay his hands on and abandoned the country.

Albania had barely begun to emerge from its backward feudal state as a former Turkish colony when the whole weight of Italian and then German fascism threatened to crush the life out of it. Over four-fifths of the population were illiterate; one out of every two babies died in the first year. Apart from the extraction of raw materials by foreign

29

firms there was no industry, only handicrafts; and the entire labour force totalled fewer than 15,000 workers. Of the foreign-trained graduates there were perhaps eighty engineers, economists and agricultural specialists in the whole country. Such was Albania on the eve of five years of enemy occupation which in terms of arm ed might and savage barbarity were unequalled by anything even the Albanians had ever experienced before.

* * *

The Italian Invasion At dawn on Good Friday, April 7, 1939, an Italian invasion force of 40,000, aboard a fleet of troop transports escorted by hundreds of fighter planes, was approaching the four principal ports of Albania — Shengjin, Durrës, Vlora and Saranda.

The supreme commander of this aggressive operation, General Guzzoni, could have expected little active resistance from the Albanians. Their army had long been virtually under Italian control; fascist agents had been free to carry out acts of sabotage and disruption; collaborators within Zog’s government had done their best to demoralise the people and destroy any will to fight back. As the troop ships drew near, it was discovered that the few artillery pieces had been rendered ineffective, am m unition for rifles and machine guns had suddenly disappeared and the army was throw n into a state of complete confusion by conflicting orders.

Even so, a num ber of individual volunteers and regular soldiers managed somehow to acquire arms and offer resistance. In Durrës the Italian troops who had landed were so hotly engaged they were forced to board their transports again. Warships directed a heavy bom bardm ent against the town and another landing was attem pted. Three times troops tried to seize Durrës by assault and three times they were driven back to their ships. An Albanian sailor, Mujo IJlqinaku, who fell at a street intersection while heroically holding off an attacking column became the symbol for this '.pont.incous and unorganised resistance.

liul (.he enemies of Albanian independence w ithin and

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w ithout had prepared the way too well for individual acts of heroism to stem the Italian advance. Tirana was taken on April 8th, Shkodra and Gjirokastra on April 9 th ; and by April 10th almost the entire country had been conquered by the fascist forces.

This act of aggression evoked no protest to speak of on the part of the Western powers nor of Albania’s Balkan neigh­bours. In the House of Commons on April 13, the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, presented Italian and Albanian versions of the invasion and stated that the Italian governm ent’s action had ‘cast a shadow over the genuineness of their intentions to carry out their undertakings’ no t to alter the status quo in the Mediterranean. But unless Greece or Rumania should be involved, it was felt that there were insufficient grounds for ending the Anglo-Italian Agreement signed a year before.

Mussolini did not, of course, adm it that m ilitary occup­ation of Albania am ounted to forceful annexation of the country: he described it as insuring the ‘independence’ of Albania, threatened by other powers, through the ‘personal union’ of the Kingdom of Albania and the Kingdom of Italy under the crown of the King-Emperor Victor Emmanuel III. To try to maintain this political fiction a ‘constituent assembly’ of those who had been in touch with the Italian legation in Tirana before the occupation and representatives of landlords, chieftains and business men sym pathetic to fascism was hastily called to proclaim the act of union. An ‘Albanian Governm ent’ under the presidency of one of the biggest landlords, Shefqet bey Verlaci, was established by the invaders; and prom pted by the King-Emperor’s special lieu­tenant, Francesco Jacom oni, this puppet government promulgated a whole series of political and economic conventions.

By these conventions Albania and Italy were to be one single land subject to all the tariff and customs regulations of Italy, with the Albanian franc tied to the Italian lira. Italian citizens in Albania were to enjoy all the civil and political rights of Albanians. Albania was to have no parliament, the legislative as well as the executive power being reserved to the King of Italy and Albania and Emperor of Ethiopia in the person of his

31

lieutenant. The international relations of Italy an,d Albania were to be united and concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome. And the Albanian army was to be suppressed as an independent force and become part of the Italian army.

Close on the heels of the military occupiers came special agents from Rome to set up an Albanian Fascist Party with all its subsidiary organisations for youth, for children, for women and for workers. There was no popular response to this move; bu t employees were coerced into enrolling themselves and their families in the respective fascist organ­isations and had to submit to the attem pt at indoctrinating them with fascist ideology.

These steps having been taken for the complete colon­isation of Albania, tens of thousands of Italians poured into the country — workers, farmers, teachers, technicians, m er­chants, industrialists and, of course, state officials. In agriculture Mussolini’s ‘reform s’ for Albania included draining the lands near the coast and settling thousands of Italian farmers there while the Albanian peasants were driven from these areas up into the stony highlands. By 1940 there were more Italian workers in the country than Albanian. In schools and in the adm inistration the Italian language was imposed and the whole culture of the country was subjected to the process of complete Italianisation.

Swarms of Italian monopolists moved into Albania to exploit the coun try ’s natural resources and profit from cheap labour. Within the first year there were nearly 140 Italian capitalist enterprises developing mineral wealth to feed the war economy of fascist Italy and constructing military bases and strategic roads connecting the coast with the border regions to further Ita ly ’s aggressive intentions in the Balkans. Two powerful banks, the Banco di Napoli and the Banco del Lavoro, together with the Italian capitalised National Bank of Albania, covered the country with a financial network controlling all economic life.

The National Bank of Albania, which had followed a severe policy of deflation up to the Italian invasion, switched1 1 1 ,i policy of ruinous inflation and in two years the amount ill 11 .mi s in circulation rose from some 10 million to over I III million.

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Albania was thus quickly turned into a source of raw materials for Italy and a safe m arket for Italian goods — the classic condition of any colony. The few native industries were forced out of business and craftsmen were reduced to absolute want. The working conditions o f Albanian labourers, enjoying none o f the advantages of Italian immigrant workers, were deplorable. The fascist policy of ruthlessly exploiting the countryside to secure foodstuffs for Italian cities and the expanding army of occupation brought the Albanian peasantry to a miserable state. Only the upper ranks of the Albanian m erchant class which entered into jo in t speculation with Italian capitalists benefited from the complete absorption of Albania into Italy’s fascist economy.

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Chapter Four

Beginnings of Albanian National Resistance

Throughout this period of Italian conquest and the attem pt to consolidate fascist rule in Albania, there was resistance by the people, at first o f a spontaneous and sporadic nature. Even before the actual invasion a communist-led anti-fascist dem onstration in Tirana on April 3, 1939, sparked off protest dem onstrations all over the country.

In June, two m onths after the invasion, the workers of the Vlora dockyards went on strike against the oppressive conditions imposed on them and held up the unloading of arms and supplies for the occupying troops. Carabinieri had to be used to break up the workers’ resistance. In the Italian enterprises particularly strikes and acts of sabotage by Albanian workers were common.

The obligatory enrolm ent o f Albanians in the various fascist organisations was defied from the start. Workers and employees refused to accept membership, tore down the fascist party posters, chalked up their own liberation slogans everywhere. Even children took part in the wave of popular resentm ent, like the students of the lycëe in Shkodra who clashed with the local militia in the course o f an anti-fascist rally, or those of the Korça lycëe who m arched out of school in a body rather than give the fascist salute. Peasants too were involved in this general if, as yet, unorganised resistance and in the Muzeqe district acted together to prevent the m easurem ent of their fields for the purpose of i<- allocation.

I lie nation-wide dem onstrations on Flag Day, November ’H. I'l l!), brought tens of thousands of Albanians out into

1111 111 re l ■. ol the principal cities, marching under the national llir. 'iln.iilih}', anti lascist slogans and skirmishing with the

34

police and carabinieri. So powerful had the mass movement of strikes and political dem onstrations grown by April, 1940, just one year after the Italian landing, that the fascist authorities banned all forms of rallies, processions and meetings, and imposed the death penalty on anyone defying the ban.

Quite apart from the Italian forces introduced into Albania for launching further acts of aggression in the Balkans, more and more troops were required simply to suppress continued Albanian resistance. In addition to the IX th Army Corps, special detachm ents of the airforce and navy, fascist militia, carabinieri and border guards were landed, making up an occupation force of more than 100,000.

To the thousand Albanians of known patriotic sentiments who were rounded up immediately after the invasion and sent to Italian gaols and concentration camps, more were added every m onth as arrests were made by the netw ork of police spies and collaborators covering the country. The possession of fire-arms, a strong tradition among the self- reliant Albanians, especially in the m ountainous regions, was ilso subject to sentence of death. Moving about at night, I is I cning to foreign broadcasts, showing contem pt for fascist ollicials — all became matters of severe punishm ent including summary execution.

Most of the dem onstrations, protest movements and v.irious forms of political and industrial resistance were led 11\' the communists. The comm unist movement had grown throughout the ‘thirties in spite of Zog’s repressive measures■ Hid il was the only political organisation in the country wliii h was untainted by any form of collaboration. However, I In communists a t this time did not represent a united political force capable o f leading a national liberation iiiMu ment in a protracted struggle against fascism. There VVi i i , .ipurt from individuals sym pathetic to comm unist ideas, t in i . main groups, two of them based in Korça and Shkodra ulilt h Were in conflict with each other on questions of both |inli< \ and organisation and a third, the ‘y o u th ’ group tl I mini y influenced by Trotskyite and anarchist views.

Ihii hi spite of these weaknesses, the communist-led ruaUhlllie (h iring the first half of 1940 took m ore active

35

forms, passing over to concertcd sabotage of Italian military installations. With Italy’s entry into the Second World War on the side of Nazi Germany in June, 1940, the Albanian resistance became part of the world anti-fascist struggle.

In October the Italian fascists, using conquered Albania as a base, invaded Greece. Included with this aggressive force were two battalions of Albanians who had been impressed into the Italian army. Ju s t as so many years before the Albanian troop of horse sent by the Turkish Sultan against the Hungarians had been pulled out of the battle by Scanderbeg, so these Albanians, forced to jo in the Italian expedition against the Greeks, refused to fire on Greek soldiers and deserted from the ranks. Avoiding capture they made their way back to Albania and took to the mountains, joining the armed bands of the liberation movement. With other Albanian patriots they supported the Greek people by attacking the Italian lines of comm unication and disrupting the rear of the invasion army.

The Italian fascists and their collaborators tried to present the aggressive war in the Balkans as an opportunity for Albania to recover the territories lost to Yugoslavia and Greece. Zog’s representative in the United States, Faik Konitza, said in a statem ent to the American press: ‘Italy is prepared to intervene in order to rectify the injustices that have been inflicted on the Albanian nation and to re-establish the natural and historical boundaries of Albania’. This propaganda failed to make any impression at all on the Albanian people who could scarcely be deceived into regarding their fascist oppressors as liberators of their country. They increased their efforts to turn Albania into a very insecure base for the Italian conquest of neighbouring states.

Mussolini suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Greeks and in a letter to Hitler in November, 1940, he a ttributed the failure of his invasion to insufficient military preparation and to the ‘unforeseen treason of the Albanians who had turned their guns against the Italians’.

In pursuit of the retreating Italians, Greek troops entered \lli.mi.i, capturing Korça in November, 1940, and Gjirokastra

h i I >(■( ember. Albanian patriots, led by the Korça communist

36

group, immediately requested permission to join the Greek forces under their own national flag forming a common anti-fascist front. The Greek comm ander rejected this p ro­posal and set about establishing Greek civil adm inistration in the ‘liberated’ portions of Albania, arresting those Albanians who protested against this attem pted annexation. The heroic defeat of the Italians was marred by this opportunistic exercise of Greek chauvinism and the possibility of uniting against the com m on enemy was throw n away.

In the spring of 1941 the military situation in the Balkans was abruptly transform ed by German surprise attacks against Yugoslavia and Greece. The Nazi aggression begun on April 6, 1941, quickly shattered open resistance in both countries and within two weeks the Yugoslav and Greek armies had capitulated, thus enabling the Italians to expel the Greek forces still in Albania and regain their grip on the whole country.

That summer, on Ju n e 22, 1941, the Nazis launched their attack on the Soviet Union. In spite of early German successes, this had the effect of enormously broadening the anti-fascist war front and creating the prospect of the eventual defeat of the Axis Powers. It raised the Albanians’ hope of liberating their own country and offered the possibility of a friendly alliance with the Soviet Union as a i heck to the ambitions against Albanian sovereignty of the Yugoslav and Greek exile governments in London.

The fierce resistance of the Soviet people to Nazi aggression and the beginnings of the massive effort to shatter ,iih1 hurl back the German invaders gave anew impulse to the Albanian communists. During the summer and autum n of I 'll I they were more active than ever in spreading armed niluggle to various parts of the country. The Korça com- M1 1 1 1 1 1*• I group in particular issued a series of appeals for a war nl liberation and in the m ountainous regions began to oqi.mise and arm fugitive patriots like those led by Myslim l'i / ,i Along with the form ation of guerrilla bands went the i ll" il lo eliminate the differences among the various com- HIIIIiInI groups and unite them into a single revolutionary Mm Hin I ,i ninist party capable of leading the national "liiinnlr.

37

In this effort to establish an Albanian Communist Party, a tall, handsome, young man, only 31 at the time, bu t already politically m atured by revolutionary experiences, soon dem onstrated by his correct assessment o f the situation and his courage in acting on it, the qualities which were to make him the great popular leader o f the coun try ’s grim struggle to free itself and then to consolidate that freedom after the war.

Enver Hoxha was born in southern Albania, on October16, 1908, in Gjirokastra, a rom antic old city on the lower slopes of the Mali i Gjërë, which clusters about a majestic fortress looking ou t over the valley of the Vjosa. It was also the birthplace of the brothers, Bajo and Çerçiz Topulli, who played a heroic part in defeating the O ttom an troops and liberating Albania from Turkish rule. A fter finishing second­ary school in Korça and coming into contact with the communists there, Enver Hoxha spent six years studying and working in France and Belgium. He contributed articles denouncing Zog’s regime in Albania to the French Com­m unist press and, subsequently, Zog’s agents abroad got him dismissed from a post in the Albanian Consulate in Brussels. He returned home in 1936, a convinced communist, and pledged at the grave of Bajo Topulli th a t he and all young Albanians would fight for a free and unified country. He taught for a time at the state lycëe in Tirana and then at the lycëe in Korça where he played an active part in the comm unist group. Sacked in 1939 by the collaborationist adm inistration, he w ent to Tirana where he was charged with the responsibility of organising the anti-fascist movem ent in the capital and surrounding districts.

His position as organiser of the Tirana branch of the Korça group was useful in bringing about the unity of the com m unist movement which was the only force potentially qualified to lead the liberation struggle. He made contact with two young activists of the Shkodra group, Qemal Stafa and Vasil Shanto, who shared his views and were prepared to work with him in the task o f pulling the movem ent together. This was very necessary because Trotskyists and anarchists were characteristically spreading such absurd ideas among the youth as the impossibility of forming a comm unist party at■ ill sincc there was no working class to speak of and the

38

peasants were hopelessly reactionary, or the possibility of merging with fascist organisations in order to fight the enemy from within by conspiratorial means.

Even the leaders of the communist factions were incapable of seeing the mistake of calling for unity on the basis of a federation of existing groups. What Enver Hoxha correctly demanded was their complete fusion into one party with the u tter elimination of any special features which had once distinguished them. He realised that this fusion of Albanian communists into a single revolutionary party could not be achieved simply by the groups agreeing to shed their distorted views, nor even by the general acceptance in the abstract of a M arxist-Leninist programme, bu t principally by common revolutionary action against the fascist enemy which would do m ore than any am ount of theoretical discussion to weld all professing communists in to a unified, fraternal force.

In applying this understanding Enver Hoxha personally led a great patriotic dem onstration at Tirana in front of the office of the quisling prime minister on October 28, 1941.I lie communists were involved in fiercely-contested street bailies with the Italian police and the need to fight and ill lend each other w ithout regard to who belonged to what Hi Klip was the best possible preparation for the convention of• i nnmunists called for the first week in November. As a result "I die dem onstration a sentence of death was passed on I mm i lloxha ‘in absentia’ by the fascist authorities. A bigialls in Korça on November 8, the opening day of the h u t ling o f comm unist groups, also led to a bloody encounter willi police and carabinieri in which Koçi Bako, a veteran m m iiiIm'i o f the Korça group, was killed and many of the ili MMMislialors were seriously wounded.

I In meeting held in Tirana under the closest security iHi,iii}m mcnls from the 8th to the 14th was attended by 15• iimmunislN including Enver Hoxha, Qemal Stafa, Vasil....... . line I I’ilo Feristeri. Right at the start the decision wasMlo n In disl land the three groups and form the Albanian I Himiiiiiii'.! Party on the basis o f Marxism-Leninism. To help HIM)*' mu I ha II lie old groupings did n o t survive it was agreed llnil ....... ill I lie former factional leaders would have a place

39

on the Provisional Central Com m ittee, which was elected with Enver Hoxha at its head. A new programme in the form of a resolution was approved.

This resolution set forth the political tasks of the Albanian Communist Party as the mobilisation of the popular masses of Albania in the armed struggle against the fascist invaders and their collaborators for the national independence o f the country, in co-operation with all nationalist, patriotic forces, in m ilitant friendship with the people of the Balkans, particularly with the peoples of Yugoslavia and Greece, and in alliance w ith the anti-fascist coalition, mainly the Soviet Union. It was explained that the mobilisation of the masses, the workers and peasants, had the aim not only of liberating Albania, bu t after independence was won of ending the rule of business men and landlords and establishing popular democratic rule.

A m anifesto issued for secret distribution by the Provisional Central Com m ittee called on the masses to begin the general war of liberation. The people should not pay taxes, deliver corn nor give so much as a glass of watei to the enemy occupiers. They should join, arms in hand, the ranks of the freedom fighters. This same manifesto addressing itself to communists urged them to display revolutionary zeal in all circumstances — a spirit of self-sacrifice, initiative and organ­isational ability. They m ust stand always in the forefront of struggle, occupy always the advanced posts in the fighting, be always where the danger was greatest and give w ithout hesitation even their lives for the coun try ’s liberation.

The leading role of the Communist Party in the national struggle was founded entirely on the examples of courageous devotion o f individual communists. Communists were the main target of the savage repression of the Italian fascists. The collaborationist government under Shefqet Verlaci and, when the situation demanded even more brutal measures, under Mustafa Kruja, also directed the full force o f its military, police and propaganda machine against the communists — trying to split the resistance front by detaching non-com m unist elements from Party leadership in order to isolate the main enemy of the Italian occupation. But the people soon realised that the communists never

40

called for military initiative and personal risks which they were not already taking themselves in the fullest measure.

On November 23, a few weeks after the form ation of the Party, the underground organisation of Albanian Communist Y outh was created in Tirana with Qemal Stafa as its political secretary. In that same m onth a guerrilla unit carrying out an assault on a fascist command post in Tirana was involved in a running gun battle with the collaborationist police and killed the chief of that reactionary force.

The passing over from spontaneous resistance to an organised liberation war, which after years of hardship and sacrifice was to free Albania from the armed might of both I tidy and Germany w ithout the help of any other power, m ust be dated from the foundation o f the Albanian Communist Party which was to provide the leadership for every stage of the struggle.

Chapter Five

The Development of People’s War

Throughout 1942 the Albanian Communist Party continued to mobilise the people for what had become a full-scale anti-fascist wrar. By the middle of the year partisan units covered almost the whole country, carrying out frequent attacks against Italian transport columns and co-ordinating their actions with guerrilla operations inside the cities. During the single night of Ju ly 24th, guerrilla units from one end of Albania to the other knocked down telephone posts, cut wires and cables and blacked out the entire com m unication system, throwing the Italians in to a state of panic.

In Tirana, guerrilla units burned down the telephone office, seized the archives of the ministry of the interior, including the dossiers kept there of all those suspected of working with the resistance, blew up the warehouses of the military engineering departm ent and destroyed military installations on the airfield. In Korça the headquarters of the fascist party was set on fire. In Shkodra the political prison was storm ed and those detained were freed to join the partisans.

Individual communists, who in fulfilling their party tasks preferred to die than to fall into the hands of the fascist police or the militia of M ustafa Kruja, won the admiration of the whole country.

Qemal Stafa, secretary of the recently-formed Albanian Communist Y outh Movement and himself only 22, became involved on his own in a running fight with a whole company of militia. He was hunted from one section of Tirana to another till at last, besieged in a house which was completely surrounded, he charged out with only a pistol and was finally brought down.

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The head of the Tirana guerrilla units, Vojo Kushi, with two comrades was cut off by 500 carabinieri and police in a small house in the Kodra Kuqe quarter. The battle went on for six hours and then tanks were brought up to dislodge the young men. Vojo Kushi storm ed out breaking through the lirst and second rings of besiegers and killing a num ber of fascists. He climbed up on one of the tanks and had pried open the cover to take it over when he died under a fussillade of bullets.

In Shkodra three students, Perlat Rexhepi, Branko Kadia and Jordan Misja were also surrounded by a large force of fascist troops and police. They fought off attacks for many hours and then, when their am m unition was almost ex­hausted, rushed out of the house firing as they went and killed many of the enemy before they themselves died lighting.

Midhi Kostani and Kiço Greço were capturcd and sub- jet ted to the m ost brutal tortures to make them reveal information about the guerrillas. Both of them died in agony without telling the enemy anything.

Such acts of courage could not but arouse enthusiasm .inlong the people who learned of such things from secret li.it Is and bulletins which circulated everywhere. The first mimeographed issue of the paper of the Albanian Communist I’.ii I y, Xeri i Popullit (People’s Voice), came out in August, I'l 12, and became the main source of inform ation about thei mu se of the war and the theory and practice of people’s nI niggle. The leading article o f the first num ber called for the• iit1 1y ol all Albanians. ‘All honest, anti-fascist people,ii r ii<Hess of their religious beliefs or political opinions, m ust iimlr around this organ for an independent, free and ill in- •< i .11ie Albania.’

I In ( n ation of a broad liberation front depended on the Ii-*i|Hiiise of the peasants. They hated the Italians and their• iill.ilmi,ilots and they were prepared to fight. Particularly IIihm in the m ountainous regions had a strong tradition of Hlim il ilelence o f their own households. But at first they did IIMl wiuli |o join actual guerrilla formations nor accept the It nil i ‘111 1 1 > ol the Communist Party. Party recruiting agents U Ii- i nine lo lli e villages to try to win peasants over to a

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more active and organised role in the struggle were likely to be mocked and accused of being tyros in the art of war.

However, the peasants soon became convinced that the Party-led National Liberation Front was not only capable of taking on the enemy, but of bringing about the social emancipation of the country as well. They were a ttracted by the prospect of lands being turned over to them at the conclusion of a war which was to change social conditions in Albania as well as free it from external enemies. Once they began to co-operate more closely with the fighting units the quality of leadership removed their suspicions of the Party.

And ju st as peasants were taking arms and joining the partisan bands, so workers, artisans, students and employees were fleeing from the cities and enlisting in the resistance struggle. I t was in the partisan bands, in the heat of battle, that the alliance of the working class and the peasantry was forged.

On Septem ber 16, 1942, a National Liberation Conference was convened at Peza which had been liberated by the partisans even though it was only fourteen miles from Tirana. Those attending included n o t only communists but well- known personalities who had come close to the Party in the course of being engaged in the anti-fascist struggle on their own; patriots like Myslim Peza, a kind of Albanian Robin Hood who for ten years had been an outlaw under the Zogist regime. It also included those who were outspokenly anti­comm unist and had no t so far been engaged in the fighting, as long as they declared themselves in sympathy with the national struggle. Such was Abaz Kupi, a supporter of the former King Zog, whom the British had smuggled back into Albania the year before. There were even those like Midhat Frashëri who had not yet com m itted themselves to the national cause at all.

I t was impossible for even those elements m ost hostile to the Communist Party to deny the guiding role the Party had already played or to oppose openly the proposals Enver Hoxha advanced on behalf of the Party for the continued prosecution o f the war. Objections centred around such trivial questions as calling the fighting units ‘partisan units’ or having red stars as insignia. But these differences were

disposed of and the Conference, which was not a meeting of various political parties bu t of the whole spectrum of nationalist elements under the leadership of the Communist Party alone, was able to get on with its task of creating a comm on National Liberation Front.

The Front included all the patriotic forces in the country organised under a General National Liberation Council. It was com m itted to an intensification of the war in all sectors with no compromise. Throughout the country local and regional National Liberation Councils were to be elected by I he people, functioning legally in liberated zones and underground in districts still occupied by the enemy. These Councils had the double task o f acting as mobilisation centres lor the armed revolution and as organs of local authority which would replace fascist rule as it was overthrown. In this way the re-establishment of a bourgeois-landlord regime, following on the collapse of fascist power, would be prevented, and the National Liberation Councils would remain the basic organs of the new democratic authority till such time as a constituent assembly could be convoked after the liberation of the whole country.

The Conference of Peza thus merged two historic processes in a common revolutionary struggle: the national liberation w.n for independence and the popular revolution for establishing true democracy in Albania.

Ala rmed at this developm ent the Italian fascist authorities immediately sent a punitive expedition under Francesco| ..... moni to attack Peza and other centres of partisanin livily. In the cities a campaign of unrestrained terror was Ilium lied against communists and those suspected of support­ing I hem. Unable to crush the partisan units, the fascists hi r, .ii icd peasants, burned whole villages and arrested and iin iinril people indiscriminately.

Mill the partisan bands continued to grow in num ber and » 1 1 1 iii'lli and more and more liberated zones were created

in IV/.i, Skrapar, Kurvelesh, Çermenika, Martanesh, Opar, Miilliik.rili,i. The authority of the National Liberation ( (lUlli lls operated freely over wider and wider stretches of • In i m i i i itry.

I»\ ll.e end ..I 1942 there were more than 10,000 fighters

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in the resistance army organised in partisan units. Each unit, usually of 50 or 60 men, had a com m ander who need not be a Communist Party member and a political adviser appointed by the regional com m ittee of the Party. The adviser was responsible for the carrying ou t of a correct political line, both in the unit itself and in the area in which it operated. Com m ander and adviser took jo in t decisions on the general character of the un it’s objectives and on m atters of principle; bu t the comm ander had priority on all m ilitary questions as long as his orders were not at variance with the political line of the Party nor the agreed strategy o f the war.

There was a cell of Party members in each partisan unit, m eeting regularly to discuss m ilitary operations and the provision of supplies, the well-being of the partisans and the admission or expulsion of members. Study sessions were held on Marxist-Leninist theory, the international comm unist and workers movement and the history of Albania.

These Party cells, working under the guidance of the commissar or political adviser, were responsible for the morale of the units, for maintaining a martial spirit, imparting love for the people and loyalty to the country, encouraging an international outlook, strengthening the close links of partisan comradeship and eliminating illiteracy among the fighting people.

Military discipline hardly existed in the units from a formal point o f view, but the rules of m ilitary conduct which the partisans imposed on themselves were very strict. Orders of the commander and the political adviser were carried out zealously even when obedience involved the probability of dying in action. Of particular im portance was the absolute integrity of partisans in all their dealings with the people and their property — ‘not taking so much as a piece of thread for which they did not pay .’

The units, their own morale and political understanding raised by the Communist Party, disseminated in turn among the masses of the people a warlike spirit and a grasp of the polil it ill aspects of the liberation struggle. As soon as a region was cleared of carabinieri and militia, the partisan units di.solved the local government and replaced it with a lieely circled National Liberation Council. They assumed the

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task of protecting the people of the liberated zones not only from enemy counter-attacks, bu t from robbers and spies and all those who would take advantage of the confused situation to defraud the people in any way. They began courses to combat illiteracy, they staged theatrical performances which by dramatising the national movement and caricaturing the enemy bo th entertained the people and raised their en­thusiasm for liberating themselves. The partisan bands thus dem onstrated their character as an armed force of the people with a political role.

And the people for their part soon came to regard the partisan units as their own army. They supported the units whole-heartedly, supplying inform ation about the enemy, capturing spies and detaining suspected persons moving about in the liberated areas. Their houses were always open to the partisans and they shared with them what food there was. In the cities cash, clothes and medicine were supplied freely. Women made uniforms for the liberation fighters and the funds of the liberation war were generously increased by the people’s gifts.

When the units were not engaged in military operations nor in carrying ou t their political tasks in the National Liberation Councils, they studied the tactics of partisan warfare and practised to make themselves expert with various weapons. Each partisan was required to master no t only the weapons he himself carried but all other weapons used by1 11. 1 1 particular unit; and there were few who did not become ill idly sharpshooters.

The units were equipped with conventional rifles, sub- mu I tine guns, pistols, hand grenades, light machine guns and, Inii i on, heavy machine guns, m ortars and 45 mm howitzers. Mi ml of the arms were of Italian make captured in military ii|iehilions against the enemy on the principle: ‘You must Iirht in order to take from the enemy what you need to fight 111111 I here were also older weapons from the time of the I in f, i.li occupation and the First World War, which people IitiiI kepi concealed throughout the period of Zogist rule.| |i ........... nnam ent captured from the enemy was usually||i «| 11 i\Til since it would be useless to highly mobile units.

I \ 1 1 ii .iI of this period of struggle was the liberation of

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Corovoda, near Berat, in Septem ber 1942. By a series of hit and run attacks the enemy forces in the area were so weakened that it became possible to m ount an assault liberating the village and surrounding countryside. This was followed by brutal reprisals; bu t these savage counter­liberation actions, far from intim idating people, inspired them with a greater hatred for the invaders of their country and a stronger com m itm ent to the national independence forces. *

The way in which the people rallied to the side of the partisans was shown in the battle of Gjormi, southeast of VIora, where 300 volunteers joined the guerrilla force under the leadership of Mehmet Shehu and Hysni Kapo, making possible a shattering victory over 2000 heavily armed Italian troops who were completely routed on January 2, 1943, leaving the fascist commander among the hundreds of dead on the field.

A few weeks later partisan units of the Korça district besieged and destroyed the whole fascist m ilitary garrison of Voskopoja. All along the Kukës-Puka highway, victories were scored against the Italians. In three m onths at the beginning of 1943 the liberated area almost doubled. So disastrous for the Italians were these operations that the Viceroy Jacom oni was replaced by General Pariani, in February, with orders to intensify violence against the whole population.

During that year the partisan units, which had up till then operated against the enemy in isolated groups, began to combine for attacks on a larger scale. Territorial units were set up in the bigger villages which could be quickly assembled to go in to battle with the perm anent partisan formations.

By March, 1943, at the first national Communist Party conference held at Labinot, near Elbasan, Enver H oxha’s report on behalf of the Central Committee could record 16 months of victories. The mastering of Marxist-Leninist11 .ii hings by Party members was stressed and the idea that ‘in Iime of war there was no need for books’ was strongly iiiliiiscd . The conference elected Enver Hoxha Secretary< .i in i.il ol the Party’s political bureau and those elected to ihi (li nlial Com m ittee included Nako Spiru, Hysni Kapo,• <"i"’ Nushi, Mchinet Shehu and Vasil Shanto.

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Right through spring and early summer attacks were m ounted against the enemy of ever-increasing force. Severe defeats were imposed on Italian troops near the Selenica mine in the Vlora district, at Leskovik on the Struga-Dibra highway, at the Kiçok Pass and at Permet. In the Permet battle alone over 500 Italians were wiped out in the five days fighting to liberate the city. Partisan detachm ents from the Korça, Gjirokastra and Berat districts combined forces in this action in which tens of m ilitary vehicles were destroyed and a vast am ount o f arms and am m unition captured. On July 6th Albanian partisans carried out their first attack on German troops at Barmash on the Korça-Janina highway.

In the nation-wide wave of enthusiasm following on these m ilitary successes the Communist Party proposed that the National Liberation General Council should m eet, mainly for the purpose of transforming the partisan units into a people’s liberation army. At Labinot, where the first Party conference had taken place, the meeting was convened on Ju ly 4th, 1943. The Albanian National Liberation Army, at that time numbering 10,000 fighters, was to be organised by a unanimously-appointed General S taff with Enver Hoxha as chief political adviser. This General S taff assumed the strategic and operational conduct of the armed struggle and was assisted in centralising the war effort by the establish­ment of district staffs to co-ordinate regional initiative with the over-all battle plan. The General S taff announced on July Kith: ‘So long as one single armed fascist remains in our

i ountry our war must continue m ost ferociously’.The development of people’s war made possible the great

\ ii lories of the Albanian National Liberation Army in the Mimmcr and autum n of 1943. Nearly 1000 Italian troops weie killed in the battles fought by partisans and people dmmp, July at Mallakastra and Tepelena where several enemy illvittioiis had been massed in an attem pt to crush resistance. I In lascists suffered further losses at the battle of Pojska on

I lu1 IhkI iway between Thana and Pogradeç. In the passes of NliMittii and Buall where 3000 local inhabitants fought illimiIilii to shoulder with the partisans, in the Dibra,< • 1 1> 1 1 K .i.11 .i, Korça and Shkodra districts bloody actions took I'l i t ' ilmiug the m onth of August in which the Italians lost

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more than 1500 killed. In Septem ber attacks were launched on German troops in Konispol and on a German convoy along the Elbasan-Tirana highway.

Staggered by these military disasters the Italian com­mander-in-chief reported to Rome that ‘the m ajority of the Albanian people, w ithout class distinction, have risen up against Italy and against the stationing of our troops in Albania.’ He urged headquarters to increase immediately the num ber of occupation forces to enable him to cope with the situation.

* * *

The Albanian people in their war of resistance were learning the same lessons and developing the same m ethods of fighting as other people whose countries have been invaded by powerful, heavily-armed imperialist armies — the people of China in their struggle against the Japanese or the people of Vietnam against the United States. The principles of people’s war, waged by ordinary people against aggressive professional forces equipped with all the m artial resources o f highly industrialised nations, have been developed into a political and m ilitary science, a science enabling, in the words of Mao Tsetung, ‘the people of a small country to defeat aggression by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, dare to take up arms and grasp in their own hands the destiny of their coun try ’.

That people’s war is indeed a science is dem onstrated by the fact tha t all who have perfected this kind of warfare in victorious practice have independently arrived at the same conclusions about its successful prosecution. This science has been further attested and inventively elaborated by the experience of the Albanian people in their resistance struggle against fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. A summary of these experiences was compiled by Mehmet Shehu just after the w.n , in 1947, as a guide to the correct development of a1 1 .1 1 ional army.

Mehmel Shehu had fought as a volunteer during the civil " ii in Spain where Italian and German support brought 'M im s lo (he fascists. From the very beginning he was ill llvels involved in his own country ’s liberation struggle

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against those same two powers. In August, 1943, he helped to organise and took command of the First Shock Brigade, a m ilitary form ation marking the advance from small guerrilla units to higher forms of warfare.

One of the main features of people’s war is the recognition of the im portance of morale, the advantage enjoyed by those who are conscious of fighting a just war as opposed to those fighting an unjust one. This advantage, form ulated in the principle ‘men are more im portant than weapons’, always lies w'ith those waging people’s war which cannot, by its very nature, ever be an aggressive war waged in someone else’s country.

M ehmet Shehu makes this point in his summing up of the experience of the national liberation war. ‘In fighting on the plains as well as in the mountains man is the decisive factor that determines the fate of the war regardless of any development or armaments. A small army can defeat a bigger one, superior in numbers and means, if it wages a just war and if it is made up of m en who are politically enlightened on the ju st nature of the war they are waging, united in their determ ination to overcome the enemy, resolved to the end to shed their last drop of blood to achieve victory and well trained to face adversities in battle. On the field of battle man can replace the weapon, bu t weapons can never diminish I he role of men. W ithout men a weapon is nothing but a dead piece of iron, lifeless and powerless’.

In people’s war the relation between armed fighters and the masses of the people is crucial. Success depends on the partisan being able to live among and move among the people 'like a fish in w ater’. The people are the intelligence and the• ommissariat of the fighting troops, and victory in a liberation 'ilniggle is ultim ately determined by the people’s willingness lo share all the hazards of war with their men in the field.

I his relationship is maintained on the one hand by the dm iplincd conduct of the armed forces. As a people’s army, I'unging from the people, fighting with and for the people,

dicy must treat all as equals and brothers. They m ust have die Nlrictcst regard for the property as well as for the persons ill lIn men and wom en with whom they come in contact,• h 11 »iii>• ihcm through the hardships of a protracted war and,

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in the liberated areas, setting up schools, providing medical care, improving village amenities, as a promise of the better life to be won with the victorious conclusion of the resistance struggle.

On the other hand the relationship is m aintained as the workers and peasants do realise that they have a stake in the war which goes beyond simply eliminating a dangerous and brutal invading force. They m ust be sustained by their understanding that the war is revolutionary as well as liberative, no t being fought to restore previous forms of local exploitation and oppression bu t to establish socialism, or at least to create the conditions of a genuine people’s democ­racy in which socialism can be developed as a successive stage.

This political aspect of people’s war was expressed by the Albanian Communist Party in its declaration on the object­ives of the war: to free the country from foreign invaders, to do away with local reaction, to set up a People’s Democratic Republic, to confiscate the large estates of the feudal chiefs and the accumulated wealth of m erchant speculators and to enact land reform laws, to inaugurate a good life for the people in a free and truly democratic Albania.

Because this political perspective m ust guide military operations, a strong political leadership is essential for the successful waging of people’s war. As Mehmct Shehu pointed out: ‘Form er wars of our people have not been successful because the people lacked a capable political party to lead them in their just struggles. Only such a party can mobilise, train and lead the people in armed struggle, enabling them to defeat a bigger enemy. Our people could cope with the hardships of an unequal war because the organiser and director o f the liberation movement, the Albanian Com­munis) Party, through its correct political line of action, led ihem from victory to victory. W ithout political commissars ind political organs in the army it would not have been I• • iviiblc to train our fighting troops politically and morally iiuiI \vr would not have had an army willing at all times to lay down 11 ki i very lives for the people. The members of the I'm I y w n i . 11 way s the first to attack and the last to retrea t.’

I him llit Alli.mian national war o f liberation can be seen as

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successfully exemplifying the political characteristics of people’s war generally — the response to the aggressive acts of capitalist states of the masses, organised under working class leadership com m itted to ending all forms of exploitation and guided by a communist party capable of appraising local conditions in the light of universal revolutionary experience. The form ulation applies, o f course, not only to resistance to the Axis powers but to liberation movements since the War in many colonial and semi-colonial countries.

M ehmet Shehu has shown how a partisan army differs from a regular army in the way it is recruited, the role it is required to play and, m ost im portant, the political back­ground out of which it emerges. The partisan army is made up entirely of volunteers who jo in the ranks of their own free will. There are no age nor sex restrictions and partisan formations include men advanced in years, young women and boy and girl pioneers as well as men of m ilitary age.

Partisans are, for the m ost part, an infantry equipped with light weapons. Emerging from circumstances of a people occupied by foreign aggressors or oppressed by internal reaction, they have to begin fighting with whatever they can get hold of since arms and the factories to produce them are in the hands of the invaders or the regime in power. Progressively they arm themselves with weapons snatched from the enemy.

While a regular army seeks to clear its opponents from the area in which it operates, the partisan army is interwoven through and within the enem y’s field of operations, providing opportunities for sabotage, cutting lines of communication, attacking isolated concentrations and spreading terror and t on fusion through the ranks of the enemy. Terrorising the ru n n y as a step toward the development of full scale liberation w.1 1 1'arc must not be confused with isolated terrorist acts which irpresent a distrust of the revolutionary movement.

The tactics of a regular army are based mainly on numbers, both of men and means. Partisan tactics are based on quality• •I lighters — their initiative, devotion and combative spirit. A u vular army relies on the combined fire power of all its units, while the partisan army depends on the excellence of liliti Ksmanship, the positioning of men to make the best use

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of cover and, always, the element of surprise.Being inferior to the enemy in numbers necessitates the

partisan principle of the ‘main blow ’, using m obility and knowledge of the terrain to concentrate forces secretly and quickly at the right time and place to achieve relative superiority over the enemy for a knock-out blow. The morale and physical fitness of the partisans, the configuration and topographical features of the ground, time and weather conditions, possibilities of reinforcem ent from other form­ations and, above all, the political situation in the area where the fighting is taking place, are all elements in these tactics. Mobility, of course, is essential in attacking the enemy where he is weakest — on the flanks or, be tter still, in the rear.

Although the overall nature of people’s war is defensive in the sense that external aggressors have brought the war to the people by invading their country, it is of the greatest im portance that the people’s army should be imbued with the spirit o f attack, acquired by assailing the enemy wherever he may be and as often as the occasion arises. To make use of one of their main weapons, surprise, the partisans m ust never lose the initiative and m ust never find themselves fighting a defensive war of merely trying to hold ground. ‘To allow the initiative to slip from your hands,’ Mehmet Shehu warned, ‘to hang back and fail to pursue the enemy, to fail to go for him and perm it him to go for you, to pursue you, means defeat pure and simple . . . continuity of operations is a t the root of all o ther principles guiding partisan warfare. Only through repeated attacks can be m aintained the moral superiority over the enemy essential for success.’

For this reason military operations were co-ordinated through general directives, warlike slogans and orders from above in the m ost elastic terms allowing local commanders the maximum scope for initiative and never providing any excuse for partisans to lose their martial impetus waiting for further instructions.

This point was made by Enver Hoxha in his criticism of a p.ulisan battalion which was caught off guard in September l!M'l. ‘Partisans should never be on the defensive. Standing -ii youi own ground might well bring our army face to face uilli i major enemy force which could exterm inate it. You

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m ust by all means take the offensive so that by speedy manoeuvring and frequent attacks we may confuse and cause the enemy losses, by blowing up bridges and hitting convoys incessantly we may disrupt the enem y’s plans, by raiding depots we may make free with the material to equip new arrivals in the ranks of the partisans . . . We are here in our own land. We are better acquainted with our mountains and m ountain passes. The people are on our side in m ost regions and therefore it cannot be tolerated that the enemy should ever take us by surprise.’

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Chapter Six

Relations o f the Liberation Leadership with other National Groups and with the Allies

The reverses suffered by the Italian forces of occupation in Albania contributed to the overthrow of Mussolini on July 27, 1943; bu t there was no slackening of the national liberation war which the General Staff ordered to be continued with even greater intensity until Italy and Germany too surrendered unconditionally.

When Italy did finally capitulate on Septem ber 8, the Central Com m ittee of the Albanian Communist Party and the General S taff instructed the partisans to break off the armed conflict and propose to the Italian troops that hostilities between them should end and that they should join together against the com m on enemy o f Albania and Italy — Nazi Germany. At that time Hitler’s armies were pouring into Albania from Macedonia and Greece. The Italian comm ander who had replaced Jacom oni, General Renzo Dalmazzo, rejected this proposal and ordered the Italian soldiers to surrender to the Germans as most of them did.

Many thousands, however, deserted and sought refuge among the Albanian people. Some 1500 Italian soldiers volunteered to enlist in the ranks of the partisans, forming a company of fighters called the Antonio Gramsci battalion, after the Marxist intellectual and leader of the Italian Communist Party, himself of Albanian descent, who had died in one of Mussolini’s prisons.

The partisans had clashed for the first time with German troops after defeating the Italian garrison at Permet. The Germans were pushing through Albania from Korça toward the Greek city of Jan ina when the partisans attacked them and inflicted serious losses. The Nazi troops took revenge by setting fire to the nearby village of Borova and murdering

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every m an, w om an and child who had n o t been able to escape. O ne hun d red and seven people w ere m assacred by the G erm ans in this b ru ta l reprisal.

This was to be the p a tte rn o f the war against th e G erm an Nazis w ho w ere m uch m ore ru thless and determ ined than the Italians. As Enver H oxha w ro te to the F irst S hock Brigade in N ovem ber, 1943: ‘G erm an bands o f 50 to 60 soldiers led, to be sure, by traito rs, com e and burn up villages and a ttack our own bands w here they least expect them . Y ou should p o in t o u t to all our com rades th a t o u r ba tta lions in general seem to be u n d er the im pression th a t they still have to do w ith M ussolini’s troops w ho lacked the spirit o f co m b a t.’ A nd the libera tion forces quickly rallied to deal w ith this m ore dangerous and m ore vicious foe.

A v io len t en co u n te r to o k place near V lora in the course o f w hich the partisans freed 7000 Italian soldiers and officers held as prisoners o f w ar and forced the G erm ans to re trea t afte r sustaining heavy losses.

B ut m ore and m ore G erm an troops ro lled in to A lbania from d iffe ren t parts o f the Balkans and soon w ith an arm y force o f m ore th an 70,000 m en, they greatly ou tn u m b ered the partisans. A fter hard fighting the Nazi troops occupied all the m ajor cities and key com m unication po in ts; b u t the liberation forces in fierce com bats prevented them from deploying over the w hole coun try and m ost regions and a num ber o f tow ns rem ained free for the con tinued operation o f the partisan forces. W herever the G erm ans were, they im posed a curfew and proclaim ed th a t from 20 to 30 Albanians w ould be sho t o r hanged for every G erm an soldier killed, fo r every act of sabotage, for concealing w eapons or I'ood and this th rea t was ru th lessly carried ou t. The b itte res t p .ii I o f the libera tion struggle had ju s t begun.

Along w ith operations in the field against the partisan unils, the Nazis also pu rsued a policy o f enrolling the forces ol inlcrnal reaction for use against the libera tion m ovem ent. N.il only feudal chiefs and w ealthy m erchants collaborated willi (he G erm ans, b u t also m any of those w ho belonged to liniirgeois-led nationalist groups like Balli K om bëtar (N.ilional F ron t) and Legaliteti (Legality). T hey covered their In n.iyal w ith the absurd argum ent th a t the G erm an invaders

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were p repared to recognise A lban ia’s ‘independence’ against Greek or Yugoslav claims at the very tim e w hen the Nazis were savagely try ing to tu rn the w hole co u n try in to a base from w hich to operate against allied landings in sou thern E urope o r against the popu lar, anti-fascist forces in the rest o f the Balkans.

With th e in ten tio n o f setting up a quisling governm ent the Germ ans called a ‘co n stitu en t assem bly’ in T irana on O ctober18, 1943. The recen tly form ed partisan Third Brigade was close enough to th e capital to score a d irect h it w ith a cap tu red field gun on the palace w here the m eeting was being held. T he co llaborators fled in panic to ho ld their assem bly in a less conspicuous building. Early in N ovem ber a p u p p e t governm ent was form ed from those w ho had w orked w ith the Italians, the Zogists and m em bers o f the an ti-com m unist ‘resistance’ organisations. T he N ational L ibera tion General Council w arned people all over A lbania n o t to be deceived by these sordid political m anoeuvres.

Bourgeois nationalist organisations like Balli K om bëtar, founded ostensibly fo r the purpose o f resisting the fascist invaders u n d er a non-com m unist leadership, had first com e in to being a t the end o f the previous year, 1942. A t th a t tim e the resistance struggle in A lbania had already reached a level w hich led the Allied G overnm ents to recognise the role o f the A lbanians in the w ar against the Axis Powers. A sta tem en t read in th e H ouse o f C om m ons by B rita in ’s Foreign Secretary , A n th o n y Eden, acknow ledged the freedom and independence o f A lbania and le ft it to the A lbanian people to decide at the end o f the w ar w hat regim e and form o f governm ent they w ould have. A lban ia’s borders w ould be discussed a t the post-w ar peace conference. T he n ex t day the Soviet M inister o f Foreign A ffairs, V. M olotov, expressed sym pathy w ith th e A lbanian liberation m ovem ent and praised th e heroism o f the partisans. T he Soviet G overnm ent recognised the A lbanian p a trio tic forces as allies in the anti-fascist coalition and affirm ed the right o f the A lbanian people to choose the form o f governm ent they w anted. The U nited S ta tes Secretary o f S ta te , C ordell Hull, also praised I lie A lbanian resistance and declared A lban ia’s righ t to be a lice and independen t state.

This in terna tional recognition o f the successes achieved by the N ational L ibera tion F ro n t led by th e A lbanian Com ­m unist Party sounded a n o te o f alarm for those elem ents in the co u n try w ho did n o t wish to see their privileged position in the old A lbania w iped o u t in a new socialist A lbania after th e war. The N ational L iberation F ro n t drew its streng th from th e overw helm ing m ajority o f the A lbanian people — the w orking class, the p o o r and m iddle peasantry , the p e tty bourgeoisie and m ost o f the m edium bourgeoisie in the cities, p a trio tic in tellectuals and even certain individuals from the u pper s tra ta . It w elcom ed in to its ranks all w ho were genuinely prepared to fight against the fascist enem y. T he form er explo iting classes,the landlords, feudal chieftains, reactionary bourgeoisie, the m ajority o f rich peasants and those in tellectuals and clergy w ho served their in terests, had openly collaborated w ith th e Italian occupiers. B ut w ith even the possib ility o f an A llied v ictory it becam e necessary to th ink o f establishing a claim to partic ipa te in the post-w ar ‘free choice o f governm ent’ prom ised to the A lbanian people.

T he m ost im p o rtan t o f the ‘n a tio n a lis t’ groupings b rough t in to being for this purpose was Balli K om bëtar w ith M idhat Frashëri, w ho was anti-Zogist, anti-fascist and an ti­communist., as its figurehead. W ith him , how ever, w ere well know n collaborators like Ali K elcyra and am bitious landlords like N uredin bey V lora. In fact, as was subsequently discovered, the Italians them selves p ro m p ted the fo rm ation ol Balli K om bëtar as a coun ter to the groupings of genuine I i.i I riots w hich came in to being at the Peza Conference. A pio-Zogist ‘n a tio n a l’ organisation, Legaliteti, was set up by Aba/. Kupi, afte r he had b roken w ith the N ational L iberation< ii neral Council to w hich he had been ap p o in ted at the Peza C onference. A cting u nder the instructions o f the B ritish w ho w in ted to in fluence A lbania a fte r th e w ar th rough a resto ration o f th e m onarchy , Abaz K upi m ain tained th a t only Zog’s regime was ‘legal’ and he dem anded th a t the N.ilional L ibera tion F ro n t m ust rally u n d er the banner o fl • l alitcti. R eac tionary C atholics in th e n o rth grouped llirni.Nolves u nder the leadership o f a big landow ner, J o h n M uk.igjon, w ho had every in te rest in keeping n o rth ern Mli,in i;i feudal.

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A t first these ‘n a tio n alis t’ organisations did a ttra c t som e people in to their ranks w ho tho u g h t they were seriously in ten d ed to resist foreign occupation , and the N ational L iberation F ro n t m ade every effo rt to w ork w ith them and draw them in to the anti-fascist war. A t the L abinot C on­ference o f the L iberation F ro n t the C om m unist Party invited Balli K om bëtar to agree to proposals for co-operating against the invaders and their A lbanian collaborators. This approach was re jected on the grounds th a t the tim e was n o t right for an open uprising and it w ould be b e tte r to w ait for the prom ised ‘second fro n t’ w hich m ight even be opened up in A lbania itself. This policy o f w aiting, o f w ishing to conserve its forces fo r fighting the com m unists a fte r the w ar, n o t the fascists during it, gained Balli K om bëtar its descrip tion by the peasant p a trio ts as ‘the big grey ass w hich w aited and w aited and never cropped grass’.

The C om m unist P arty , in line w ith its policy of building the w idest possible national fro n t against the enem y, con­tinued its effo rts to win over the Balli K om bëtar for jo in t ac tion ; b u t a t the same tim e it was necessary to expose the plots o f the leaders o f this organisation to betray the liberation m ovem ent to the fascists. Secret docum ents came in to the possession o f the Party revealing th a t tw o leading m em bers o f the Balli K om bëtar, Ali K elcyra and N uredin V lora, had signed an agreem ent in M arch 1943, w ith the Italian com m ander in chief, R enzo D alm azzo, know n as the D alm azzo-K elcyra P ro toco l, according to w hich the Balli K om betar p rom ised n o t to s ta rt any arm ed revolt in sou thern A lbania if the Italians prom ised n o t to a ttack those arm ed bands respecting the agreem ent. This le ft the Balli K om bëtar free to organise th e ir operations n o t against the foreign occupying forces b u t against the partisans.

As these ‘n a tio n a lis t’ groupings began to believe th a t landings in A lbania by British and Am erican forces were possible, th ey came o u t in b la tan t opposition to the partisans. A t K olonja, w ith the support o f the Italians, the Balli K om betar launched a surprise assault on a partisan form ation . Again, at M allakastra, while partisan battalions were engaged in a fierce b a ttle w ith a larger Ita lian force in fro n t o f them , the Balli K om betar suddenly assailed them

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from the rear. By this tim e leaders like M idhat F rashëri had becom e so fanatic in th e ir h a tred o f com m unism th a t they endorsed these treacherous attacks. T he open m ilitary col­labo ra tion w ith the enem y o f these organisations representing the reactionary and explo iting classes o f Zogist times had the effec t o f m erging the w ar fo r the libera tion o f the coun try w ith a civil w ar to determ ine the social and political character o f a libera ted A lbania.

A last e ffo rt to avert a fratricidal war was m ade by the G eneral Council o f th e L iberation F ro n t at the C om m unist P a rty ’s suggestion in A ugust, 1943, w hen a m eeting was arranged at M ukje, near K ruja, betw een Balli K om betar chiefs and a delegation from the L iberation Council. But the delegates from the C ouncil, Y m er D ishnica, a m em ber o f the P a rty ’s Political B ureau, and M ustafa G jinishi, instead o f defending the line o f the N ational F ro n t under C om m unist Party leadership w hich had been established at the Peza C onference and w hich had proved so successful in the liberation war, gave way under pressure and agreed to an independen t existence for the Balli K om betar on an equal foo ting w ith the N ational L iberation F ron t. This w ould have resulted n o t only in sp litting the liberation forces b u t also in paving the w ay fo r a re s to ra tio n after th e w ar o f reactionary elem ents w ho had n o t fired a shot in the c o u n try ’s defence.

O n the initiative o f Enver H oxha the C entral C om m ittee of the C om m unist Party condem ned the failure o f Ymer D ishnica and M ustafa Gjinishi to dem and th a t the Balli K om betar jo in in the w ar against the fascist invaders and rejected th e M ukje agreem ent ou t o f hand. A t the Second N ational L iberation C onference at L abinot in Septem ber,1943, the m ain issue was the question o f the p eo p le ’s dem ocratic pow er and the N ational L iberation Councils were recognised as the sole representatives of th a t pow er. Regula­tions for the N ational L iberation Councils were form ulated and executive organs for b o th the G eneral Council and the d istric t councils were set up. The M ukje agreem ent was publicly condem ned as being inim ical to the p rosecu tion of the w ar and the u n ity o f the A lbanian people. But even then, while exposing the co llaboration o f the Balli K om betar w ith the enem y, in structions w ere issued to m ake use o f any

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chance for w orking w ith elem ents o f the Balli K om bëtar and o th er political groups outside the libera tion m ovem ent if they ever did decide to p artic ipa te in the w ar and if they agreed to recognise the N ational L iberation Councils as the only expression o f popular pow er.

Early in 1943 a British m ilitary m ission was sen t to A lbania by the Inter-A llied M editerranean C om m and to w ork w ith the N ational L iberation forces. Soon a fte r its arrival the m ission established secret co n tac t w ith the leaders o f Balli K om bëtar and w ith A baz K upi o f Legaliteti. Even though it was obvious by this tim e th a t these tw o organisations were n o t only refusing to engage the fascists, b u t o ften actively assisting them , they con tinued to receive the greater p art of the aid from B ritain and th e U nited S tates in arms, am m unition , clo th ing and gold. T he Inter-A llied M editer­ranean C om m and b rough t pressure to bear on the G eneral S ta ff to o rder partisans n o t to fire on the anarchic bands of these reactionary groupings even w hen u nder a ttack from them and, fu rth er, insisted th a t British officers should be recognised as a rb itra to rs in the relations betw een Balli K om bëtar o r Legaliteti and the N ational L iberation Council.

M eanwhile the British m ission tried to persuade Abaz Kupi in particu lar to m ake som e show o f fighting the G erm an troops, the Italians by this tim e having capitu lated . But Abaz K upi becam e less and less w illing to com m it his forces in any ac tion at all, arguing th a t the defeat o f the Germ ans could be le ft to the great pow ers: his task was to save his strength for the defeat o f Albanians w ho opposed Z og’s re tu rn and the resto ra tion o f the old reactionary regime. The British had no b e tte r luck w ith a group o f w hat w ould now be called ‘revisionists’ u n d er M ustafa Gjinishi and Y m er D ishnica who had broken w ith the C om m unist Party a fte r being criticised for the surrender over the M ukje agreem ent. T hey even p lo tted w ith such no to rious reactionaries as the feudal chieftain J o h n M arkagjon who had m ade no p re tence o f opposing the G erm ans.

W hat the British m ission was looking for was an an ti­com m unist force prepared to wage all-out w ar against the Nazis and, a t the conclusion o f hostilities, to restore a governm ent in A lbania favourable to B ritish in terests in the

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M editerranean. No such force existed in A lbania. The liberation m ovem ent was too un ited u n d er the leadership o f the C om m unist Party and the forces of reaction to o openly involved w ith the enem y and too lacking in popu lar support to provide the British any o p p o rtu n ity for intervening in A lbania’s civil war as th ey were to do so disruptively in Greece.

T he A lbanian libera tion struggle was sim ply a specific instance o f the dilem m a confron ting th e governm ents of B ritain and the U nited S tates in m any parts o f the w orld once the assaults of the Axis Powers had been checked and thoughts tu rn ed to questions o f post-w ar settlem ents. The th rea t o f fascist conquest had b rough t to g e th er in a defensive alliance governm ents and peoples w ith very d iffe ren t long­term aims. In m any countries overrun by the Italians, the G erm ans or the Japanese th e resistance forces w hich gathered to expel th e invaders w ere e ither com m unist-led or sym ­pathe tic to com m unism . The anti-fascist w ar thus becam e also, in countries like A lbania, a revolu tionary war to prevent the previous exploiters from regaining pow er — exploiters who m ay have represen ted or been su p p o rted by the older im perialist countries like B ritain or France.

T he com m unist-led partisans o f A lbania certain ly had no in ten tion o f ridding them selves of fascist aggressors in order to le t B ritain , the U nited S tates or any o th er im perialist power back in to exp lo it them either d irectly or indirectly. Wlicn Prime M inister W inston Churchill, speaking on behalf of British capitalism , s ta ted th a t he had n o t assum ed th a t ill lice ‘to preside over the liqu ida tion o f the British em pire’, lie was, in effect, briefing tbe British mission in A lbania to work fo r a post-w ar se ttlem en t consonan t w ith the in terests "I British im perialism in the M editerranean. The C entral C om m ittee o f the A lbanian C om m unist Party accordingly lU '.nucted its local organs th a t allied m issions ‘should n o t Inli rfcre in our in ternal affairs and should in no way be M*K,uded as arbiters betw een us and reactionary organisations.II our war against the com m on enem y is agreeable to them , km much the be tte r. O therw ise the d o o r is wide open for llu'in lo leave’.

I lie British m ilitary m ission tried to convince the A lbanian

L iberation A rm y G eneral S ta ff th a t its forces should n o t be m oved in to n o rth ern A lbania because they regarded th a t as A baz K u p i’s zone o f action — even if he was n o t, in fact, acting. M eanwhile in L ondon the British G overnm ent a ttem p ted to set up an A lbanian governm ent in exile under the discredited ex-King Zog. But British prestige suffered a severe blow w hen Brigadier Davies in com m and o f the m ission and tw o o f his staff, all unfam iliar w ith guerrilla w arfare, were cap tu red by co llaborators and handed over to the Germ ans.

By Septem ber, 1944, the leaders o f the N ational L iber­ation Council felt th a t they had to lera ted long enough the clum sy efforts o f the British m ission to find ‘friend ly ’ agents w hich only resu lted in establishing co n tac t w ith the enemies o f the partisans w ho were bearing the whole b ru n t of the war. Enver H oxha dem anded the w ithdraw al o f the mission w hich he no longer hesita ted to describe as ‘agents o f foreign reac tio n ’.

T he im portance of the episode for the A lbanians was th a t it em phasised the necessity o f self-reliance and of no t depending on outside assistance if th ey w ere to preserve their independence a fte r the war. Subsequent dem ands o f the A nglo-Am erican M editerranean C om m and to send paratroops and special arm y units to A lbania to jo in the final stages of the fight against th e G erm ans were firm ly rejected. The A lbanian N ational L iberation A rm y insisted th a t it was capable o f freeing the en tire co u n try on its ow n. When British com m andos landed in Saranda a fte r L iberation brigades had w iped o u t the G erm an garrison there , the G eneral S taff com pelled the British to remove th e ir forces w ith o u t delay. T he message sen t to a British warship lying o ff D urrës was an inv ita tion to d inner for all the officers and m en w ho cared to land unarm ed b u t a recep tion o f bullets if they came ashore equ ipped to ou tstay th a t lim ited welcome.

The same princip le governed relations w ith the U nited S tates. T he A lbanians recognised the Am ericans as allies bu t resisted any suggestion o f sending U nited States forces into A lbania. In 1945 w hen President T rum an proposed to send tw o destroyers to Durrës to p ick up various A m ericans who found them selves in A lbania, he was to ld th a t w ould n o t be

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necessary since these people w ould be m arched across the fron tier in to G reece and could be picked up there.

As for the various pseudo-nationalist groupings like Balli K om betar and Legaliteti, in D ecem ber, 1943, the General C ouncil finally abandoned tiny hope o f getting them to jo in in the fighting and denounced them all as treacherous co llaboration ists. Abaz Kupi was expelled from the N ational L iberation Council in w hich his place had been reserved long afte r his h a tred o f com m unism had carried him in to the enem y camp.

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Chapter Seven

T he L iberation War against the Nazis and Final V ictory

In N ovem ber, 1943, the G erm ans decided to launch a massive offensive operation to crush resistance in A lbania once and for all. The w in ter cam piagn, com m anded by the Nazi general Fehn, involved the troops o f four divisions, som e 45 ,000 m en, equipped w ith the m ost m odern w eapons and heavily su p p o rted by arm oured cars, tanks and aircraft. In addition , the p u p p e t governm ent and those so-called ‘n a tio n a lis t’ organisations w hich had by this tim e gone over com pletely to the enem y, supplied a force o f 10,000 m ercenaries w ho were particu larly useful to the Nazis for espionage and for acting as guides in the w ilder regions. Against this trem endous force the N ational L ibera tion A rm y had 20 ,000 m en organised in four brigades arm ed w ith rifles, au tom atic rifles, light and heavy m achine guns, light and heavy m ortars and a few field pieces which they had cap tu red and m an-handled up in to the m ountains.

The cam paign began w ith a series o f lightning prelim inary blows delivered by the G erm an arm y against the Peza zone, near T irana, w here the T h ird Brigade had to fight fiercely to b reak o u t tow ard Ç erm enika, against the partisans in the D ibra zone and against B erat w hich had been libera ted bu t was soon reoccupied by the Germ ans w ith the m ost b ru ta l consequences for the civilian population .

A few days la te r while the partisans were still adjusting their positions to cope w ith the first assault a strong G erm an force a ttack ed the liberated zone o f M allakastra, defended by the F irst Shock Brigade. T he Brigade was very nearly cu t o ff and had to m anoeuvre quickly in to a position from w hich it was possible to slice th rough the en em y ’s lines. B ut to carry o u t this m ovem ent it was necessary first to cross the river V josa and this was m anaged by m ounting a diversionary

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a ttack from behind Sym iza Hill w hich gave the bulk o f the partisan forces ju s t tim e to get th e ir equ ipm en t across the stream on the one uncap tu red barge. A fte r a short b loody en co u n te r in w hich the G erm an troops w ere p u t tem porarily to flight, the rest o f the Brigade fo rded the river and the w hole force th en m oved in to the M esapliku d istrict. Here the F irst Brigade regrouped and struck back, alternating its co u n te r attacks w ith those being launched by partisans in the V lora d istrict. Heavy losses were in flic ted on the G erm ans at Vajza and along the B olena-V ranishta line. The F irst Brigade th en swung over tow ard Zagoria w hile partisans from V lora m oved in to the M esapliku area to m op up Balli K om betar elem ents w ho had been operating w ith the enemy.

In D ecem ber a crack G ennan division trained in m ountain w arfare, w ith 1,500 ‘n a tio n alis t’ m ercenaries to act as guides and inform ers, struck at the rough upland regions o f cen tral A lbania above T irana w here the G eneral S taff o f the L iberation A rm y had its headquarters and w here the Second and Third Partisan Brigades were concen tra ted . These new ly-form ed brigades m ade up o f elem ents from d iffe ren t regions and n o t y e t consolidated in to fighting units capable of operating independen tly , were th row n in to confusion fo r a time and suffered heavy losses. T hey could n o t halt the< icrm an offensive, b u t by courageous fighting when alm ost cornered, by increasingly skilful m anoeuvring and feinting die partisan forces did succeed in evading the traps laid for ill cm and slipping aw ay to o th er districts w here they were able to re-form .

The G erm an plan for the w in ter cam paign o f 1943-44 was i'i co-ordinate their prelim inary attacks in such a way as to ill ivc the bulk o f the partisan force in to the south and then , i u lling o ff their re trea t, to su rround and annihilate them in I lie Vlora, B erat, K orça triangle. On Jan u a ry 7, three G erm an divisions, w ith th e ir usual com plem ent o f co llaborators, <hIv.UI ced from th ree d iffe ren t poin ts to carry o u t the second, bum and-destroy, p a r t o f the plan in the sou th ern region. In.......... . icration the in te rio r districts were ravaged, the villages•tinI towns on which the partisans depended were cap­lin* 'I and p u t to flames and hundreds o f peasants were In ill illy m urdered in typ ical Nazi fashion.

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A num ber o t fierce running engagem ents were fought betw een G erm an troops and the L iberation forces o f the F irst and F o u rth Brigades. The partisans kep t falling back to avoid a decisive ac tion on the en em y ’s term s and by breaking through the advancing lines and th en attack ing from the rear succeeded in keeping the G erm an offensive o ff balance. On Jan u a ry 21 the b loodiest b a ttle o f this stage o f the w ar was fo u g h t at Tenda-e-Q ypit, the T en t o f Ja rs , near Perm et. Two batta lions o f the F irst Brigade and the Skrapari guerrilla detachm ent rushed dow n from opposite directions on Nazi troops try ing to close th e ring and p u t them to flight.

A n o th er G erm an division was b rough t up from G reece to com plete the encirclem ent. T hrough heavy snow, across swollen rivers, always a ttack ing in spite o f privations and shortage o f am m unition , the First and F ourth Brigades, supported by o th e r partisan elem ents and by local groups o f arm ed peasants, consisten tly ou t-m anoeuvred and out-fought th e num erically superior and b e tte r equipped forces o f the W ehrm acht. Each tim e the G erm ans though t th ey had finished o ff a com pany o f partisans and began moving away to ano th er sector, those ‘finished o ff’ partisans w ould rise up to a ttack their flanks and rear. A dvancing tow ard V lora w here resistance was tho u g h t to be w eaker, the G erm ans u nexpected ly en co u n te red a new brigade, the S ixth , one o f th ree new fighting units form ed in th e very h ea t o f battle .

In the second h a lf o f F ebruary , 1944, the brigades and territo ria l ba tta lions had so successfully w arded o ff the various prongs o f the G erm an offensive th a t they w ere in a position to coun ter-a ttack . T hree battalions o f the First Brigade led by M ehrnet Shehu struck back n o rth in to central A lbania and suddenly appeared in the ne ighbourhood of T irana, creating a serious diversion behind the enem y lines. It becam e increasingly d ifficu lt fo r the Germ ans to m aintain th e ir offensive in the face o f partisan form ations w hich kept springing in to ac tion w here they w ere n o t supposed to be; and th ree m onths afte r it began the furious onslaught o f the G erm an w in ter cam paign was over.

This cam paign had tho rough ly tested the people of A lbania and their L iberation A rm y, finding them at the end m ore un ited and m ore determ ined th an ever to fight on till

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final v ictory. Close links betw een C om m unist Party , L iber­a tion A rm y and the people from w hom they had sprung and for w hom th ey fough t ensured the con tinued grow th o f the resistance m ovem ent in spite o f the enorm ous odds against w hich they struggled. The people show ed them selves u n ­wavering in th e ir devotion to the cause o f national indepen­dence, providing the partisan detachm ents w ith food and c lo th ing in a tim e o f terrib le scarcity and o ften , w ith whatever w eapons th ey could find, taking an active part in the fighting by harassing the G erm an convoys.

In the cities, to o , people show ed the same steadfast spirit under the m ost b ru ta l acts o f repression by H itle r’s arm y of to rtu rers and killers. Thousands o f patrio ts , b o th com m unist and non-com m unist, partisans w ho had com e in to the tow ns for medical trea tm en t and ord inary citizens w ho had dared to express their sym pathy for the libera tion struggle w ere rounded up and sen t o ff to the ex term ination cam ps at Prishtina, Belgrade or B uchenw ald itself. The Balli K om betar traitors were particu larly useful to the Germ ans in poin ting ou t patrio ts. O n the night o f February 4 alone the quisling police, on the au th o rity o f the co llaboration ist M inister o f I lie In terior X hafer Deva and acting under the d irection o f the Nazi captain , Langer, dragged 84 citizens o f T irana o u t of their beds and bu tchered them in fron t o f their hom es. Two young w om en, Bule Naipi and Persephone K okedhim a captured and questioned by the gestapo in G jirokastra , underw ent days and days o f to rtu re w ith o u t revealing a single ih'in o f in fo rm ation useful to the Germ ans. A t last th ey were tluggcd o u t, already m ore dead th an alive, and hanged in the Mjiiarc bearing the nam e o f Cerçiz Topulli the hero o f an i iii lier liberation struggle.

The w in ter cam paign had d em onstra ted the basic correct-III '.:. o f the s tru c tu re o f the L iberation A rm y and the......... Iness o f its tactics. Having w ith sto o d the assault theyVVi nl over to the offensive th ro u g h o u t the sou thern half of Albania, Farly in M arch forces o f the F irst Brigade and the Mi'uhil Collak B attalion nam ed fo r one o f A lbania’s heroes, t in iii led a large num ber o f irregular enem y form ations near Imh I,,i and forced them to surrender. A few weeks la te r tw o bullulions o f the F o u rth Brigade sm ashed a strong G erm an

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force in the Devolli region. The F ifth and S ixth Brigades, having elim inated Balli K om bëtar concen trations along the V lora-Sevaster highw ay, suddenly launched sw ift attacks in the vicin ity o f V lora and inside the city itself taking the G erm ans com pletely by surprise.

In A pril the G eneral S ta ff o f the L iberation A rm y issued an o rder co-ordinating these actions in a general spring cam paign. ‘A ttack everyw here the barbarous Germ ans. Make sh o rt w ork o f traitors. H it the vital centres of the enemy. Dem olish depots and barracks; blow up bridges and destroy roads; a ttack and liberate the coun tryside and cities o f our beloved A lbania. T he destiny o f the F atherland is in y o u r hands. The fate o f ou r people is b o u n d up w ith y o u r w eapons! ’

Follow ing on th is order elem ents o f the F irst and F o u rth Brigade libera ted Pogradeç after a tw en ty -fou r hour b a ttle in w hich the Germ ans suffered heavy losses. The Seventh Brigade forced the enem y troops in the neighbourhood o f B erat to shu t them selves inside the city and w hen they were o rdered o u t to try to recap tu re lost ground the partisans engaged them in a seven day b a ttle ending in a serious G erm an defeat. A reserve force of Germ ans was surprised on the banks o f the Osumi River and le ft beh ind m any dead and considerable quan tities o f arms and am m unition .

Engagem ents w ere also fough t in central A lbania at Peza and K ruja and even in the n o rth ern highlands w here it was th en possible fo r the partisans to ex ten d their operations. A new brigade, the E ighth, was form ed in the course of these nation-w ide attacks w hich liberated vast areas from enem y co n tro l. O n M ay 9 the F ifth Brigade am bushed a large G erm an convoy com ing from G reece and heading fo r Perm et, in flicting heavy casualties and cap turing m uch m aterial.

O n May 24, 1944, the A nti-fascist N ational L iberation Congress m et in th e libera ted c ity o f Perm et. T he 200 delegates representing the w hole p o p u la tio n supporting the libera tion w ar w ere draw n from the ranks of revolu tionary com m unists and sincere nationalists, w orkers, peasants and in tellectuals, m en and w om en, partisan fighters and political agitators operating b eh in d the enem y lines in the first genuinely dem ocratic elec tion ever held in A lbania. The

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C om m ittee chosen by the A nti-fascist Council elec ted by the Congress was recognised as the provisional governm ental executive. T he Secretary General o f the Central C om m ittee o f the C om m unist Party of A lbania, Enver H oxha, was elected C hairm an o f this C om m ittee.

T he Congress decided to set up divisions and arm y corps in th e N ational L ibera tion A rm y and the fo rm ation o f the F irst S to rm Division was announced. Enver H oxha was appo in ted C om m ander-in-Chief o f the A rm y. N o t only was i t unan i­m ously agreed th a t the libera tion w ar against the foreign aggressor m ust be in tensified till the last fascist soldier had been expelled b u t also th a t hostilities should n o t cease before the com plete d estru c tio n o f all co llaboration ist organisations like Balli K om bëtar and Legaliteti.

All the political and econom ic agreem ents w hich the Zog governm ent had en tered in to w ith foreign states were annulled as being against th e in terests o f the A lbanian people and it was fu rth e r decided to bar the re tu rn o f A hm ed Zog who had always p lo tted w ith ex ternal pow ers to secure his position in A lbania. No o th er ‘governm ent’ form ed either w ithin or outside the coun try was to be recognised as long as the A nti-fascist N ational L iberation Council, popularly elected by all the forces partic ipa ting in the liberation struggle, rem ained in existence.

The N ational L ibera tion Council thus becam e the Provisional D em ocratic G overnm ent o f the A lbanian state, liorn o f the revo lu tionary libera tion w ar under the leadership oI the C om m unist Party . It was dem ocratic in re la tion to the popular forces in struggle w hich had b rough t it in to being ■ iml d ictato rial in re la tion to all the enemies o f libera tion within and w ith o u t — a dem ocratic d ictato rsh ip o f the people, holding w ith in itself in em bryo the d ictatorsh ip of the w orking class w hich w ould begin to establish a socialist Nociety w hen A lbania was freed.

The Peza C onference had laid the foundations o f the new nl.it e power. The L ab ino t C onference centralised this state pow er and proclaim ed it uniquely au thoritative. T he Perm et Congress, having ro o ted political pow er in the revolu tionary I" ople, founded the A lbanian P eop le’s D em ocratic S ta te . Its ili i iNions were the basis o f the state constitu tion .

Before ad jou rnm en t the Congress re-affirm ed its allegiance to the Soviet-Anglo-A m erican alliance and sent greetings to th e heads of th ree great pow ers — S talin, C hurchill and Roosevelt. B ut it also publicly denounced the a ttem p ts o f the U nited S tates and British allies to in terfere in the in ternal affairs o f A lbania. ‘The tim e w hen A lbania can be used as a m edium o f exchange in in tern a tio n al bargaining is gone for ever’.

W hile the Congress o f Perm et was still in session the G erm ans, ju s t th ree m onths a fte r the collapse o f their w in ter cam paign, began th e ir last great offensive to crush resistance in A lbania. This final e ffo rt was d ic ta ted partly by the m ilitary necessity o f suppressing the arm ed struggle to ensure th e free m ovem ent o f G erm an troops betw een G reece and Yugoslavia on the eve o f their re trea t from the Balkans and p artly by sheer vindictiveness against a people w ho had frus­tra ted their m ilitary plans and hum iliated them on the field o f battle . During th e last tw o weeks in May a force o f som e 35 ,000 m en was assem bled, m ade up o f the divisions which had taken part in the w in ter offensive streng thened by the F irst Division o f m o u n ta in troops b rough t up from Greece. The quisling governm ent supplied 15,000 desperate p u p p e t troops w hose fa te was now com pletely linked w ith the suc­cess or failure o f the invaders. On May 28, the final day of the Perm et Congress, th e massive a ttack against the libera ted zones o f the sou th was launched.

Though the G erm an force was larger and supported by heavier arm our and m ore aircraft th an in the w in ter o ffen ­sive, the N ational L iberation A rm y had increased its ow n num bers and fighting spirit to a relatively greater degree. T here were then 36 ,000 partisans m ost o f w hom had becom e seasoned guerrilla fighters experienced in b o th the defensive and offensive operations o f p eo p le ’s war.

In the first tw o weeks o f the J u n e offensive the partisans suffered 500 casualties and m ore th an 1,000 peasant m en, w om en and children were m urdered. B ut over 3 ,000 G erm an and co llaboration ist officers and m en were killed in the same period . A nd there were thousands o f volunteers to replace the partisans w ho fell in battle .

N ow here did the fascist forces succeed in carrying o u t the

plan o f elim inating the liberation units. A G erm an colum n com ing from G reece by w ay o f B ilisht did succeed in over­running the libera ted zone o f Devolli. But an o th er colum n advancing from Elbasan to jo in the G erm an forces around K orça was b ro u g h t to a shattered h a lt in a surprise a ttack by the F irst Brigade at the M oglica Bridge. A G erm an colum n in ten d ed to a ttack the F irst Brigade from the rear never m ade co n tac t a t all and a fo u rth colum n setting o u t from Berat was so badly m auled by the Seventh and T w elfth Brigades th a t it had to w ithdraw to Berat again.

T he second phase o f the offensive s tarted on Ju n e 5 w ith th ree G erm an colum ns m arching o u t from Korça. But p a rti­sans o f the F irst Division were lying in w ait all along the line o f m arch. F rom Dushari M ountain across the Serpent Pass to Shem berdhej the partisan forces fought a fierce running battle killing 1 50 G erm ans for the loss o f only 22 partisans. The Seventh and T w elfth Brigades drove back G erm an forces advancing tow ard th e T en t o f Jars w ith a b ay o n e t charge.

All operations in the K orça, B erat, Elbasan thea tre having failed, the G erm an divisions tu rn ed tow ard Saranda, V lora and G jirokastra in the sou th , throw ing m ore th an 20,000 troops in to this th ru st. The S ixth Brigade a ttack ed Germ an lorces on fou r successive days along th e V lora-Saranda road, com pletely disrupting their advance. T he m ain w eight o f the offensive was th row n in to the V lora-G jirokastra zone on Ju n e I ; bu t the N ational L iberation A rm y had an tic ipated ju s t such an assault and supported by volunteers from the local population b lu n ted and tu rn ed back every p rong of the< icrm an attack .

The L iberation A rm y com m and did n o t rem ain on the defensive during this early sum m er campaign. In response to I lie call fo r in tensified w ar from the Congress o f P erm et it li.nl been planned th a t the F irst Storm Division w ould strike iiMiihward beyond the Shkum bini River tow ard the end o f 11iti<*( and the decision to proceed w ith this op era tio n even While ihe G erm an offensive in the sou th was a t its height (noved to be a brillian t stroke.

A n the F irst Division drove n o rth th rough central A lbania ( I I I v were greeted enthusiastically by the people and soon H»*W groups o f fighting m en jo ined in the advance. When the

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G erm ans heard o f this force, th ey th o u g h t at first th a t it was m ade up o f fleeing rem nants o f the L iberation A rm y th a t was supposed to have been shattered in the south . B ut as one enem y strongho ld after an o th er fell to the partisans and w hole areas were libera ted , the G erm ans had quickly to abandon their abortive cam paign in the sou th and pull their forces back to try to cou n ter the th rea t o f the F irst Division which was jo in ed in th e libera tion o f the central and n o rth ern district by th e new ly-form ed Second S torm Division. While th e region a round D ibra was being cleared o f the last o f the Balli K om betar elem ents, this second Division suddenly appeared in the suburbs o f the capital c ity itself, d isrupting com m unications betw een T irana and the rest o f the coun try .

These tw o divisions were th en in co rp o ra ted in to a yet g reater m ilitary un it, the F irst A rm y Corps, and m arched triu m p h an tly in to the last bastion o f in ternal reaction , the feudal regions o f n o rth ern A lbania. T he people o f the inac­cessible m ountainous d istric t a round M irdita had been left fo r centuries in ignorance and isolation , having resisted T urkish occupation at the cost o f being cu t o ff in their rug­ged fastnesses from any co n tac t w ith the ou tside w orld. They were hopefu lly regarded by the co llaborators as likely to resist the partisans w ith the same stubbornness. Instead these p ro u d b u t backw ard m ountaineers w ere soon w on over by the courage and patrio tism o f the libera tion fighters. The n o rth was freed and only the palace o f the u ltra-reactionary ch ieftain , Jo h n M arkagjon, was destroyed as an ind ication th a t patriarchal, feudal rule was ended and M irdita, like o th er rem o te parts o f the co u n try , was to partic ipa te fully in the new independen t A lbania.

W ith the G erm an forces divided and d istracted b y this cam paign o f the F irst A rm y Corps, the T w elfth and F o u r­teen th Brigades libera ted Saranda and cleared the w hole coastal region in the south. In S ep tem ber B erat and Gjiro- kastra w ere libera ted . The F o u rteen th and N ineteen th Brigades drove the G erm ans o u t o f V lora w hile the Second and N in th Brigades drove tow ard K orça w hich was liberated on O ctober 24. O nly Elbasan, D urrës, T irana and S hkodra still rem ained in enem y hands.

The N ational L ibera tion A rm y, now num bering 70,000

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fighters, o f w hom nearly 6 ,000 w ere w om en, was p a rt o f the great in terna tional anti-fascist force w hich was rolling back the Nazis on every fron t. The A lbanian com m and had no in ten tio n o f w aiting fo r the G erm ans, defeated elsewhere, sim ply to be w ithdraw n from the country . The T w enty-first and T w enty-second Corps o f the W ehrm acht still had to be brought from G reece across A lbania and o u t by way o f Yugoslavia to take part in the defence o f G erm any itself. The N ational L iberation A rm y was determ ined to follow up the v ictorious campaigns which had already liberated th ree fourths o f the coun try by striking heavy blows at the G erm an troops moving n o rth and at those still holding o u t in a few cities and strong points to try to secure them a safe passage through the country . By con tinu ing to fight w ith the same ferocity which had broken the G erm an grip on A lbania the partisans were discharging their in terna tional obligations to o th er people engaged with the same enem y.

It was in these circum stances o f having nearly concluded trium phantly the w ar o f liberation th a t the second m eeting of the N ational Council was held in libera ted B erat on O ctober 20. T he assem bly was faced n o t only w ith the task of finally com pleting the v ictorious struggle b u t also w ith all I lie political, econom ic and social problem s o f a free b u t war-ravaged state .

The Council to o k the formal decision of transfo rm ing the Anti-fascist N ational C om m ittee in to the D em ocratic G overn­m ent of A lbania w ith Enver I lo x h a as Prime M inister and Minister o f N ational Defence. Eleven governm ent departm ents were set up , th e m ost im p o rtan t being those concerned w ith tin restoration o f the econom ic and cultural life o f the lo im try . T he G overnm ent assum ed the responsib ility o f mi c,uiising, as soon as conditions perm itted , dem ocratic •'It i lions for a co n stitu en t assem bly w hich w ould d ra ft a i mi in I i t h tion for the new A lbanian state. But w ith o u t waiting fill such an assem bly the C onference approved unanim ously tin D eclaration on the Rights o f Citizens w hich guaran teed Piiiiiilily before the law, freedom o f speech, of. press, of |(ll|',iMii and conscience, equal rights fo r m en and w om en in l*i1111 econom ic life and social activities, the right of secret Htlil d irect voting and the righ t to elect and be elected fo r all

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persons over 18 years o f age, the right o f petitio n in g all governm ent bodies, the right o f appeal and so fo rth . All fascist and pro-fascist organisations were p roh ib ited . The local N ational L iberation Councils w hich had been organs o f b o th the governm ent and the N ational L iberation F ron t, were th en ce fo rth to func tion solely as governm ental organs o f the p eo p le ’s dem ocratic pow er and the N ational L iber­a tion F ro n t w ould create its ow n separate m ass organ­isations — of w orkers, o f w om en, o f you th .

A few days a fte r the Berat C onference, on O ctober 25,1944, the N ational L iberation A rm y began its last great b a ttle in the anti-fascist w ar — the libera tion o f the capital c ity o f T irana. This was the cu lm ination o f p eo p le’s w ar, the p o in t a t w hich from isolated attacks by guerrilla bands progressing to a conflic t o f rapid m ovem ent in order to engage w ith o u t crippling losses an enem y superior in num bers and equ ipm en t it was finally possible to m eet the foe in full scale fron ta l war. It was fitting th a t this set piece o f T iran a ’s libera tion should be undertaken by the F irst S torm Division com m anded by M ajor G eneral M ehm et Shehu.

T he G erm ans had begun moving n o rth to S hkodra b u t th ey had left a full division to hold T irana till the last o f their forces had been w ithdraw n from Greece. During the first n igh t o f the a ttack ab o u t half o f the city fell in to the hands o f the partisan ba tta lions and the w hole p opu la tion o f T irana rose to help in th e heroic struggle against tanks, arm oured cars and enem y-held bunkers. They kep t the partisan forces inform ed o f enem y m ovem ents and supplied them w ith food and drink th ro u g h o u t the fierce battle . O n the nex t day the fighting reached the centre o f tow n and the s ta ff o f the First Division m oved its headquarters inside the city.

F rom th a t stage the libera tion proceeded desperately from stree t to stree t, from barricade to barricade and o ften from house to house. V ery heavy fighting raged around the M osque o f Sulejm an Bargjini, w here a m o num en t m arks to d ay one o f the b loodiest encounters o f the w hole struggle. F o r the n ex t 12 days the b a ttle w en t on incessantly with fierce a ttacks and coun ter-attacks, every b lock b itterly con tested .

A t the height o f the fighting the position o f the partisans

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in the city was th rea ten ed by a Nazi division advancing on T irana from Elbasan. O ther brigades detailed to operate in the vicinity o f the capital were hastily assem bled and th row n against the G erm an relief colum n o f m ore th an 3 ,000 men. A t M ushqetas on N ovem ber 13 and 14 this Germ an division was sm ashed and rou ted .

T hen , on the m orning of N ovem ber 17, T irana was com pletely libera ted a fte r 19 days o f the hardest fighting of the war. M ore than 2,000 G erm an officers and m en were killed and the rest w ere taken prisoner; 25 cannon and 1,000 heavy m achine guns were cap tu red ; over 200 tanks and arm oured cars were destroyed or taken . The partisans suffered only 417 casualties in killed and w ounded; b u t hundreds o f civilians were lined up against walls and shot as the G erm ans re trea ted from one p art o f the city to another.

T he u tte r defeat o f the G erm an forces in T irana p u t an end to the H itler te rro r and practically ended the war. W hat was left o f the Nazi armies fled n o rth to S hkodra w here the partisans prepared to a ttack them . However, the Germ ans had lost all taste fo r fighting th e A lbanians. T hey blew up the larger bridges and pulled o u t o f tow n during th e night, (Tossing the fro n tie r in to Yugoslavia w ith hordes of co llabor­ators trailing along w ith them. A t daw n on N ovem ber 29 the partisan brigades en tered Shkodra w ith o u t firing a shot and .ill A lbania had been cleared o f the last o f the fascist invaders.

ALBANIA AND THE POST-WAR WORLD

Chapter Eight

Results o f the War in A lbania;R elations w ith Britain and o th e r countries;

The Struggle against Yugoslavia

A lbania m ade a considerable co n trib u tio n to the A llied victory over the fascist pow ers — in p ro p o rtio n to its size, a trem endous con tribu tion . D uring the p a trio tic w ar A lbania k ep t p inned dow n 100,000 Italian and 70,000 G erm an soldiers. T he N ational L iberation A rm y inflicted on these tw o invading forces casualties o f 26 ,594 killed, 21 ,245 w ounded and som e 20 ,000 cap tu red — thus elim inating from the w ar m ore than 68 ,600 officers and m en. Over 2 ,000 tanks and arm oured cars were cap tu red or destroyed ; m ore than 4 ,000 cannon, m ortars and m achine guns w ere w rested from the enem y for the use o f partisans and upwards o f 200 arms depo ts were b low n up.

These serious blows against the enem y were no t in flicted w ith o u t great losses to the A lbanian people. C ounting only those w hose deaths were directly due to enem y action there were 28 ,000 killed or over 214% o f the popu la tion . In p ro p o rtio n to its size A lbania lost in the w ar th ree tim es as m any people as B ritain and 17 times as m any as the U nited S tates. In m ilitary losses 11,000 partisans were killed in ac tion o r 1% o f the popu lation . O nly the Soviet U nion had a higher percentage o f people w ounded, and 44 ,500 A lbanians were im prisoned o r deported .

M aterial damage was also staggering. M ore than a th ird of all hab ita tions and, indeed, o f all buildings o f any kind, were to ta lly destroyed . M ore than a th ird o f the livestock was bu tch ered o r stolen and the same p ro p o rtio n o f fru it trees and vineyards had been ruined. N early all the m ines, ports, roads and especially bridges were w recked, and n o t a single industrial p lan t was in w orking order.

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B ut in spite o f these losses A lbania cam e ou t o f the w ar w ith certain very great advantages for facing the problem s ahead. For the first tim e in h isto ry the A lbanian people en joyed an independence w hich could n o t be tak en from them because th ey h ad w on it them selves w ith o u t any outside help. A nd as a people they w ere u n ited as never before and w ould be able to bring to the form idable tasks o f restoring and developing their co u n try the same u n ity w hich had enabled them to defeat vastly superio r enemies. T he p eo p le ’s w ar w hich had freed them from external aggression had also lifted from th e ir backs the in terna l oppression o f reactionary forces w hich could have m ade their v ic to ry hollow. A lbania had m ore than its share o f heroes and m artyrs in the anti-fascist w ar b u t unlike so m any o th e r countries th ey d id n o t die in vain.

Travelling ab o u t the cou n try to d ay one finds everyw here records o f the epic struggle o f the A lbanian people. Each tow n has its m onum ents to local heroes and heroines and its revolu tionary m useum to keep fresh the m em ory o f the sacrifice o f a w hole generation to secure A lbania’s national independence and socialist fu ture . T hey do n o t in tend to forget th e cost o f freedom and every achievem ent in creating a prosperous and ju s t society is a trib u te to those w ho fought to set A lbania on its p resen t course.

The d e term in a tio n to defend their hard-w on freedom and I lie social u n ity forged in the h ea t o f struggle were to be challenged, b o th by A lbania’s tw o nearest neighbours and by Britain and the U nited S tates, even before the last sho t in the liberation w ar was fired. To appreciate the foundations o f I his u n ity and how it was fostered in the early days o f the IVople’s R epublic th u s provides a key to the understanding of A lbania’s im m ediate post-w ar h isto ry . ^

m As has be e n s t^ w m th e C om m unist Party H rm nnstri^frl iis i .n iarilv rTTTr^TTërshjpo f th e l ib e r a ^ io n r r ^.jll Ihc nat.riot.ic and an d -fa sc is t^ T o ^ e so f the coun try i n ~ ■.mi'lc N ational L iberation F m n t. This F ron t included the working class, poo r and m iddle peasants, the small city bourgeoisie, p a trio tic in tellectuals and even som e national bourgeoisie w ho had already before the w ar been th rea tened with annihilation by foreign capital. T he peasantry , as by far

^ t h e largest section o f the popu la tion in a co u n try w here 87% of the people w ere engaged in agriculture, was the largest social grouping in the L iberation F ro n t and the principal source o f recru itm en t fo r th e L ibera tion A rm y. The pnlitir^ l b a s ^ o f d i e ^ J F r o n t w a s ^ h c ^ ^ ^w o rking class, w ith the w o r k in ^ T I ^ s ^ ^ jE SMStL3l£££tiri.iJ f5 rc ? ^ r^ tfu r jv v I!ioIe*'*co'alition o f classes m obilised in th e resistance.

ih e^ w o rk in g class at the beginning o f the w ar was very small, to talling only ab o u t 15,000 o r 13% o f the popu lation . It was also inexperienced since there had no t been enough developm ent o f industry for an industrialised p ro le ta ria t, tem pered in class struggle w ith em ployers, to have com e in to being. However, from 1941 w orkers had their ow n M arxist- Leninist p a rty — the A lbanian C om m unist Party , sub­sequently nam ed th e Party o f L abour o L Albania^. A Nlarxlst-Leninist. nartv represents the distilled experience o f

f i w orkers generally in the revolu tionary struggle to em ancipate • * them selves and in doing so to end all_(onns_of ex p lo ita tio n,

ih e A lbanian w orking class m atu red and grew in size under the leadership o f a M arxist-Leninist p arty and was thus equipped alm ost from its beginnings w ith a co rrec t p ro ­letarian ideology. T he in terests o f any exploiting class are necessarily exclusive while the in terests of the w orking class, including in th e A lbanian situation , n o t only national independence b u t also the elim ination o f exp lo ita tion in a genuine popu lar dem ocracy, could em brace the real interests o f peasants, p e tty bourgeoisie and intellectuals. .* To w in these o th er sec tions and classes for an alliance w ith the w orking class t h e / f n p stage o f the A lbanian revolution was lim ited to ju s t thos^goals w hich all p atrio tic forces could su p p o rt — the d efea t o f the invaders and the vesting o f state pow er in the people am ong w hom the w ork ing class p layed a leading b u t n o t contro lling role. T he fecoirtl stage, d istinct b u t n o t separate from the first, w ould b eg ln w h en these goals had been achieved and w ould carry the revolu tion on to the building o f socialism under the d ictato rsh ip o f the w orking class w hich alone can bar any re tu rn o f capitalist exp lo it­a tion . B ut by this stage the w orking class w ould n o t only be m uch m ore experienced b u t also w ould have increased its

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num bers by all the peasants and o th er sections o f the popu lation w ho had becom e pro letarian ised through their service as partisans under th e leadership o f a w orkers’ party . A w orking class under the d irec t guidance o f its own M arxist-Leninist p a r ty ceases to be sim ply a class-m-itself and acquires the political consciousness w hich m akes it a cla.ss- E l I tsel£_with_its ow n ideology — the ideology o f socialism as opposed to the ideology o f capitalism . Peasants, intellectuals and o th e rs w no, m rougn sucn experience as a libera tion war under M arx istrlxn in isticaclersh ip ! ad o p t the ideoio£m_aLll3e

The C om m unist Party rallied around it all w ho were prepared to resist and since the L iberation War le ft no corner o f A lbania u n touched , how ever rem ote , all sections of society w ere forced sooner or la te r to declare themselves. T here was no m iddle ground betw een p a trio tic forces and out-and-out co llaborators, and m ost o f the la tte r who had n o t been dealt w ith by partisans in the course o f the w ar fled w ith the re treating fascist troops. Religious leaders o f the three faiths in A lbania, p redom inan tly M uslim b u t w ith some Rom an C atholicism in the n o rth and G reek O rth o d o x y in the south , had also, for the m ost p a rt, co llaborated w ith either the Italian or G erm an invaders, and they , too , left the coun try , or, if they rem ained, w ere largely d iscredited in the eyes o f th e ir erstw hile flocks. —_

A distinction w ithin A lbanian society which w estern com m entators em phasise, betw een the ‘G hegs’ o f the feudal north and the ‘T osks’ o f the sou th w here bourgeois influence Irom Italy and o th e r parts o f E urope had been stronger, was w eakened during th e struggle in w hich n o rth and sou th were united. As the p eo p le’s dem ocracy afte r the w ar began •■weeping aw ay the rem nants of b o th feudal and bourgeois, Noeial custom s and habits, this difference, w hich no longer llud a class basis anyw ay, ten d ed to disappear altogether. Thel Albanian people came o u t o f the w ar w ith a u n ity fewl ii.itions can have enjoyed. T hey were going to need it.

British im perialism ’s in terest in A lbania dates back to 1924 when Zog’s invasion o f A lbania had the backing o f certain Hi 1 1ish firms hop ing to exp lo it the c o u n try ’s m ineral wealth. During the w ar m em bers o f the British m ilitary m ission to

A lbania had to be expelled fo r p lo tting w ith collaborators; b u t the British G overnm ent u n d er th e prem iership of Churchill o r A ttlee , did n o t give up the idea o f controlling this strategically im p o rtan t corner o f the M editerranean area by having Zog re insta ted as King. When post-w ar elections were being held th ro u g h o u t A lbania on D ecem ber 2, 1945, th e British G overnm ent proposed to p u t observers in the co u n try to oversee th e voting. The A lbanians assured the British th a t they also knew how to count.

In th a t same year the British navy, w ith o u t any consul­ta tio n , began clearing m ines from A lbanian w aters, ignoring the p ro test o f the A lbanian G overnm ent. No A lbanian representative was allow ed on the M editerranean Zone Mine Clearance B oard and the British even called in G reek m ine-clearing vessels to operate in A lbania’s territo ria l w aters in spite o f the strained relations betw een G reece and A lbania. W hen the A lbanian G overnm ent ob jected , Ernest Bevin, B rita in ’s foreign secretary , used w hat he called the unco­operative a ttitu d e o f the A lbanians as an excuse for declaring in April, 1946, ‘th a t His M ajesty’s G overnm ent have decided th a t no useful purpose can be served by opening d iplom atic relations w ith th em ’.

O n May 15 the British cruisers O rion and Superb steam ed through the C orfu channel, com ing w ithin hailing distance of the A lbanian shore and appearing to head right in to the h arb o u r o f Saranda. W arning shots were fired from the coastal batteries. T he British G overnm ent dem anded an apology and an assurance th a t those responsible had been severely punished. T he reply from the A lbanian G overnm ent was n o t an apology bu t an explanation . G reek ships on several occasions had a ttacked the A lbanian coast and foreign warships could n o t be p erm itted w ith in A lbania’s th ree mile lim it w ith o u t p rio r in fo rm ation of such an in ten tion . While it was tru e th a t th e C orfu channel was an in ternational w aterw ay, this had been established w hen A lbania was unable to assert its legitim ate rights. B ritain re to r te d thal A lbania w ould no t be inform ed w hen ships of the Britisli navy chose to use the channel, how ever close this m ight bring them to the A lbanian shore, and if they were fired up o n they w ould fire back.

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On O ctober 22 British warships left C orfu for Argostoli and , under orders to be ready to open up if fired upon, w ent o u t o f their w ay to test A lbanian reactions. Two of/- the ships, the Saum arez and the Volage, h it m ines involving the loss of bo th ships and the lives of 40 seamen.

Enver H oxha com plained to the Secretary General of the U nited N ations ab o u t British ships en tering A lbania’s te rri­torial w aters and British aircraft flying over A lbanian soil. ‘T hree tim es the B ritish G overnm ent has callously violated our sovereignty. We have done everything in our pow er to bring ab o u t cordial relations w ith the U nited S tates and B ritain. . . . All we get for our pains is an u tte r disregard of our rights and an unending stream o f d ip lom atic n o te s .’

M eanwhile the British navy set ab o u t trying to collect p ro o f th a t A lbania was responsible for the m ining o f the tw o ships. T he m ines in the channel tu rn ed o u t to be G erm an. The one coun try in the whole M editerranean area possessing ne ith er m ines, m ine-layers nor personnel trained in handling m ines was A lbania. Nevertheless Britain accused A lbania of full responsibility and dem anded reparations equal to the value o f the tw o ships and com pensation for the dependants o f the killed and in jured sailors. O therw ise the m atte r w ould be raised in the Security Council.

When B ritain did raise the m atter, the only evidence for the charge was th e ir co n ten tio n th a t the mines looked too fresh to have been in the w ater m ore than six m onths. B ut in the developing Cold War situation the W estern Powers decided th a t the British case was proved and the Soviet U nion had to veto the granting o f the reparations Britain dem anded.

The case was then referred to the In ternational C ourt at the Hague, Hysni K apo, the great partisan leader and by tha t time a p rom inen t m em ber of the A lbanian Party and G overnm ent, opposed the charges, arguing th a t on such meagre evidence A lbania had no case to answer. Eventually , in April, 1949, the C ourt prom ulgated its decision. Britain had n o t violated in terna tional law in respect to territo rial waters on the date the ships were m ined, bu t it had violated in ternational law in the course o f trying to collect evidence in ihe same w aters afterw ards! T he British claim for damages

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was gran ted and A lbania was o rdered to pay <£843,947. A lbania, o f course, ignored the dem and.

Indeed it becam e a popu lar jo k e in E strada perform ances, a kind o f A lbanian m usic hall, th a t a coun try w ith no navy, w hich had n o t stirred beyond its ow n fron tiers, had m anaged to inflict a million pounds w orth o f damage on the great British fleet!

A lbania did no t pay the aw ard, b u t ne ither has it ever received back one ounce o f the gold bullion stored by the A lbanian N ational Bank in trans-A tlan tic vaults a t the o u t­break o f the war.

The U nited S tates and B ritish G overnm ents were unable to reconcile them selves to A lbania’s slipping away from the ‘free w orld ’ — th a t is, the w orld free for the operations of A nglo-Am erican m onopoly capitalism . The m ost serious a ttem p t to subvert the popu lar G overnm ent in A lbania and restore a reactionary regime sym pathetic to Anglo-Am erican in terests was a cloak-and-dagger operation in itia ted in 1946 by the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6. The scheme was to recruit a force o f agents from the co llaborators and tra ito rs who had escaped from the co u n try w ith the Germ ans at the end o f the w ar and parachu te them in to an area of cen tral A lbania, the M ati, w here there were supposed to be elem ents still loyal to Zog. These elem ents were to be organised in to counter-revolu tionary groups w hich the British w ould supply by air-drops. If full-scale civil d isturbance could be provoked, then an invasion force w ould be landed at various poin ts on the coast.

The first batch o f agents was raised from displaced person cam ps in Greece and Italy and from the ranks o f those who had accom panied Zog in to exile before the war began, their one qualification being the virulence o f their an ti­com m unism . T hey were taken to M alta for training and, th ro u g h o u t 1947, d ropped am ong the m ountains o f the Mati. It was like dropping pebbles in a bo ttom less well as far as the SIS was concerned. The operation con tinued in ;i sporadic m anner until 1949 w ith n o results apart from several easily-frustrated sabotage a ttem p ts on the oil fields of K uçova and the copper m ines o f R ubik.

A t th a t po in t the A m ericans becam e in terested in the

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pro ject which was then cefo rth placed under the jo in t control o f the Secret Intelligence Service and the C entral Intelligence Agency. E rnest Bevin was a t first re luc tan t to agree to the massive stepping up o f a schem e w hich had thus far proved so abortive; b u t A m erican pressure soon persuaded him to au thorise an o th e r operation on a m uch larger scale. This time Zog was asked to recom m end personally the right men to serve as leaders and he p u t his entire royal guard at the disposal of the SIS and the CIA. C om m ittees o f ‘Free A lbania’ were set up in Ita ly , E gypt and Greece as recruiting centres and gradually a small arm y of fanatic an ti­com m unists, professional adventurers and crim inals was scraped together and sent for train ing to C yprus, M alta or West G erm any. For the n ex t tw o years groups o f agents were dropped by parachu te , landed by subm arine or filtered across the A lbanian frontier.

The w hole operation was a series o f disasters for the British and Am ericans. In Jan u a ry , 1952, in one b a ttle w ith agents d ropped in the n o rth , A lbanian security forces killed 29 and cap tu red the rest w ho were sent to T irana for trial. A rm ed peasants and m ountaineers were on the look o u t for these enem ies o f the national freedom so hard ly won and they were quickly rounded up and handed over to the state authorities for trial and pun ishm ent. In an a ttem p t to find o u t w hy things were going so badly the leader o f the Albanian m ercenaries was d ropped in to the coun try w ith a radio operato r, to be fo llow ed by a m ajor drop of agents when he signalled the all-clear. He was cap tu red by the Albanian m ilitia and forced to transm it a message tha t the way was clear for the rest to be dropped. U nits o f the A lbanian arm y w aited in a large circle and the British planes Hew over and unloaded scores o f their agents in the m iddle o f die ring. T he leaders were sen tenced to be shot and the others were im prisoned. So ended th a t particu lar p lo t of British and A m erican Intelligence.

The head o f th e British side o f the A lbanian operation and, indeed, their ch ief liaison officer w ith the C entral Intelligence Agency was Kim Philby. It m ay be th a t, as o ften as possible, lie was getting w ord to the A lbanians by w ay o f the Soviet I Inion w hen they could expect their n ex t consignm ent of

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secret agents from the SIS and CIA. W estern com m entato rs like to p re ten d th a t the whole fiasco was the w ork o f this Soviet spy. The reason w hy the scheme never had the slightest chance o f succeeding was th a t the A lbanian people were m uch too closely un ited behind the leadership w hich had brough t them victoriously through the war and m uch too vigilant in the defence o f their freedom for a bunch o f h ired saboteurs and gangsters to be able to cause m uch trouble. These are the obvious facts ab o u t a coun try w hich the intelligence services o f Britain and A m erica w ith all their m en in tile field equ ipped w ith all the latest paraphernalia never seem to be able to find out.

The official a ttitu d e o f Britain and (he U nited S tates to A lbania was as unfriendly as their secret operations. In spite o f w ar tim e undertakings to accept w hatever governm ent the people of A lbania them selves should choose, Britain and the U nited S tates bo th refused to recognise the governm ent of the P eople’s R epublic o f A lbania and ne ither coun try has thus far established relations o f any kind w ith it. They excluded A lbania from the San Francisco C onference tha t founded the U nited N ations and from the L ondon and Paris Conferences on war reparations from Italy and G erm any. N or was A lbania invited to take part in discussions on drafting a peace trea ty w ith Ita ly . T hey tried to bar A lbania a ltogether from the Peace C onference w hich began in Ju ly 1946. Only through the insistence o f the Soviet U nion was the A lbanian delegation, headed by Enver H oxha, finally ad m itted as representing an allied coun try . During the C onference the A lbanians had to rep ly frequen tly to attacks on their coun try w hich the G reek governm ent, backed by the U nited S tates and B ritain , in tended to fu rther its claim to large areas of A lbanian te rrito ry . Before leaving for hom e Enver H oxha solem nly w arned the m eeting tha t ‘ne ith er the Paris C onfer­ence, n o r th e F our Pow er C onference, nor any o th er conference w hatsoever, can take up for discussion the boundaries o f m y co u n try , w ith in w hich n o t even an inch of foreign land is included. O ur boundaries are ind isputab le and n o b o d y will dare violate them . . . . L et the w hole w orld know th a t the A lbanian people have n o t sent their delegation to Paris to render accoun t, b u t to dem and th a t an account

should be rendered to them by those w ho have caused them so m uch damage and against w hom the A lbanian people have fough t so fiercely to the en d ’.

A t abou t this tim e the U nited S tates Senate passed unanim ously the Pepper R esolu tion w hich favoured G reece’s claim to the whole of sou thern Albania. Some tim e later, in 1949, G reek arm ed forces, su p p o rted by artillery and aircraft, suddenly invaded A lbania to try to establish by force the claim to K orça and G jirokastra. T hey had advanced less than a mile w hen th ey were th row n back by the A lbanian arm y.

The hostility o f A lbania’s neighbour to the south was to be expected since a right wing governm ent had been im posed on the G reek people, w ith the help o f Britain and the U nited S tates, for the express purpose o f opposing com m unism . R elations w ith Yugoslavia m ight have been supposed to develop in a m uch m ore cordial way. C ertainly A lbania did everything possible to foster the friendliest relationship w ith this coun try w hich had shared a com m on experience in the anti-fascist war. A nd yet the gravest th rea t o f all to A lbanian independence in the im m ediate post-w ar period came precisely from Yugoslavia.

When the last G erm an troops were driven from A lbania in N ovem ber, 1944, the N ational L iberation A rm y did n o t consider th a t the war was over sim ply because their ow n land was liberated from the enem y. O n the orders o f the Com m ander-in-Chief, Enver H oxba, and at the request o f the Yugoslav arm y com m and, the T h ird and F iftb A lbanian Brigades crossed in to Yugoslavia and engaged the Nazi troops around Kosova w hich th ey liberated . T hey were th en jo ined by the T w enty-fifth Brigade and all th ree were inco rpo rated in the F ifth Division w hich inflicted heavy casualties on the (icrm an troops in the Sandjak region and advanced as far north as Priepolje w hich they also liberated.

Elem ents o f the S ixth Division also crossed the fro n tie r ind pursued the enem y tow ard Podgorica, liberating Tuzi in a M oody battle on D ecem ber 2. R ight through severe w inter i onditions for w hich their ow n cam paign o f the previous winter had hardened them , the A lbanian partisans fought on Yugoslav soil, driving the Germ ans o u t o f M ontenegro and

freeing m any villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the city o f Vishegrad in w hose liberation they jo in ed w ith Yugoslav partisans.

In spite of the rigours of w in ter in a foreign land the A lbanians w ent short o f fo o d them selves ra th e r than allow the Yugoslav peasants to go hungry in expressing their friendship and adm iration for their sou thern neighbours who had come up to take p art in their struggle. As a Yugoslav m o th er in Senica said o f th e A lbanians killed in freeing ano th er land: ‘Tell the m others, wives and sisters of those w ho laid dow n their lives for the libera tion o f the Sandjak, th a t the sun o f our m ountains will warm the place where their loved ones fell, ju s t as the sun o f their m ountains. T hat the spo t w here they lie will be revered by us w ith the same feelings as th ey w ould have’.

N or did A lbania’s assistance stop w ith this partic ipa tion in the final phase o f Yugoslavia’s liberation. There are a m illion A lbanians living w ith in the frontiers o f Yugoslavia in the Kosova d istric t and they expected th a t new boundaries of A lbania w ould be draw n in such a way as to include them once m ore in their native land. The A lbanian G overnm ent urged them to rem ain as they w ere, continu ing to be good citizens o f Yugoslavia, since this problem like any others could surely be solved by tw o countries in b o th o f w hich the people had taken power.

But the chauvinism renounced by A lbania was to charac­terise all tne actions o f the T ito regime tow ard its sou thern neighbour, and it soon becam e apparent th a t the Yugoslav G overnm ent had no o th er plans for its relations w ith A lbania than to incorporate it as a seventh province in the Y ugo­slavian federation . These plans could n o t be carried o u t if the tw o peoples were linked in friendship based on com m on experiences in the anti-fascist war and com m on aspirations for the fu tu re . Yugoslav party and state officials began to m inim ise the co n trib u tio n o f the A lbanians to the victory over the com m dn enem y and any reference to their partic i­pa tion finally d ropped o u t o f Yugoslav accounts o f the period altogether.

In terference o f the Com m unist Party o f Yugoslavia in the in ternal affairs o f the C om m unist Party o f A lbania began as

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early as the Sccond Plenary session o f the Albjmian Partx_at Berat in Novemb<j^_19441 j o n t he eve o t A lbania’s liberation. T he session was in ten d ed tcT ta k e up theTas^s""which woulcl co n fro n t a liberated A lbania; b u t Enver H oxha suddenly found him self having to defend the line o f the Party and, indeed , the w hole conduc t o f the w ar against charges levelled by the Yugoslav delegation under the leadership o f V elim ir S to in ich w ho was acting on the d irect in structions o f T ito . The A lbanian Party was accused o f having ‘vacillated betw een sectarianism and o p p o rtu n ism ’ and Enver H oxha was criticised as the source o f these errors. T he libera tion m ovem ent in A lbania was said to owe its success alm ost en tire ly to aid and advice from the C om m unist Party of Yugoslavia and the leadership o f the w hole Balkan struggle by T ito . T»

Such an a ttack w ould have been rid icu led if the way for it had n o t been carefully prepared. C ertain im p o rtan t m em bers o f th e A lbanian Party like Koçi X oxe, o f the Political Bureau, who w ith Enver H oxha had been a m em ber o f the K orça group even before the founda tion o f the P arty , and Sejfulla Malëshova, a candidate m em ber o f the C entral C om m ittee, had already been w on over to the line o f the Yugoslav Party on A lban ia’s fu ture . This line as advanced by S toinich and strongly supported by som e m em bers high in the counsels o f the A lbanian Party itself, was based on the co n ten tio n th a t A lbania was too small and to o weak to stand on its own after die war. It could only be a ‘tem pting m orsel’ for the imperialist powers. T herefore it was necessary, in ternally , for I lie A lbanian G overnm ent to b roaden itself by including influential representatives o f the reactionary bourgeoisie and even im p o rtan t m em bers o f the clergy, w hatever role they bad played during the war, and postpone indefin itely any idea o f carrying o u t the socialist revolu tion . A nd, externally , Albania m ust agree to jo in the Yugoslav federa tion as a step toward the com plete fusion o f the tw o countries, the sym bol ill such union being T ito ‘the great libera to r o f the Balkans >ni(l of E u ro p e’.

In add ition to those m em bers o f the A lbanian Party who worked actively on behalf o f the Yugoslav p lo t against the Interests o f A lbania, like Koçi X oxe and Sejfulla M alëshova,

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the la tte r even proposing w ith him self in m ind the need for a Party Chairm an over Enver H o x h a’s head, there were m any w ho were sim ply confused ab o u t the issues. T hey were d o u b tfu l ab o u t th e possibility o f a coun try the size o f A lbania being able to m aintain its ow n independence and build socialism relying on its ow n efforts. T hey could not believe th a t the leadership o f the Yugoslav Party , calling itself M arxist-Leninist, could be m otiva ted by the sort o f chauvin­ism characteristic o f im perialist pow ers or could, indeed, actually en ter in to arrangem ents w ith the im perialist powers as the price o f econom ic aid. Such were N ako Spiru and o th er m em bers o f the C entral C om m ittee w ho agreed th a t sectarianism was the principal danger in the Party and decided to enlarge the C entral C om m ittee by adding new m em bers sym pathetic to the line o f class co llaboration and closer association w ith Yugoslavia.

The m eeting at Berat dealt a serious blow to the u n ity o f the C om m unist Party o f A lbania and in troduced the th rea t of a re trea t from socialist principles and collusion w ith capitalist countries, increasingly the policy o f the Yugoslav Party and leadership. B ut the p lo t failed in one o f its main aims w hich was to depose Enver H oxha as Secretary G eneral, and this was to prove fatal to any u ltim ate chance o f success. Many m em bers o f the C entral C om m ittee m ight be confused about the problem s o f A lbania’s fu tu re course, b u t they had no doubts ab o u t the correct leadership o f Enver H oxha in founding tne A lbanian C om m unist Party and guiding the liberation struggle to v ictory. T hey could n o t be sh ifted from their support by the a ttack o f the Yugoslav delegation and the T ito ites in the C entral C om m ittee. Enver H oxha rem ained in a position to go o n defending resolutely a M arxist-Leninist line for the Party and a socialist pa th fo r the coun try .

D urin^J]i£_fle^J_J^Q_^£a£SJ-1945 to 1947, T ito co n tin ued to use pressure from w ithin and w ith o u t to reduce A lbania to the status o t dependency on ce ig raae u n ae r cover "7)1' ‘s treng then ing • in this lie was aDie inexplo it the position w ith in the A lbanian Party o f Koçi Xoxe w ho had becom e d ep u ty prem ier and secretary o f the Central C om m ittee. Econom ic and political conventions concluded

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betw een the tw o countries ostensibly for their m utual benefit were n o t very d iffe ren t from the com m ercial agreem ents Ita ly had im posed on A lbania before the war. Revaluing the A lbanian lek in term s of the Yugoslav dinar, establishing a custom s un ion and subord inating A lban ia’s econom ic plan to Yugoslavia’s, were all used by the Yugoslav leadership to tigh ten their grip on A lbania and prepare the way fo r its to ta l incorporation .

The good relations A lbania en joyed w ith the Soviet Union during tbls p e rio d were of greai neip to l.nvei H oxha amTTill w ho were determ ined t o m ain tain t he c ()un ti^S ijn d e2 £ l1id- c ijf f from Belgrade, ^ i l i n was well a w a re o fT i to ’s in ten tio n s and advised th e A lbanians accordingly . Why was Yugoslavia so 'k een on form ing jo in t industrial com panies m A lbania^he asked po in ted ly , w hen they refused to form them w ith the Soviet U nion in their ow n co un try? Why were th ey sending instructo rs to the A lbanian arm y w hen they still needed Soviet instructo rs in their own? H ow could Yugoslavia provide experts fo r the developm ent o f A lban ia’s econom y w hen th ey were them selves seeking such experts from abroad? How was it th a t Yugoslavia, itself poor and undeveloped, suddenly in tended to assume the developm ent of A lbania?

In Ju n e 1946 Enver H oxha subm itted to the Political Bureau a special rep o rt on th e need to re-exam ine the proceedings o f the Second Plenum o f the C entral C om m ittee at Berat in 1944. He p o in ted o u t th a t the conclusions reached th en were erroneous and seriously encroached on the independence o f the A lbanian Party. This rep o rt was opposed in the Political B ureau by Koçi X oxe and Pandi K risto who m anaged to get it rejected.

Bv 1947. under the guise o f a trea ty o f m utual assistance, Yugoslav p lans were w ell advanced for a m ilitary coup to

Central C om m ittee o f the Yugoslav P arty m ade a vicious ittack on Enver H oxha accusing him o f pursuing an individualistic, anti-M arxist line hostile to Yugoslavia and against the in terests o f A lbania itself. In Ju ly an A lbanian delegation headed by Enver H oxha concluded an agreem ent in Moscow for the supply o f agricultural m achinery. The

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Yugoslav leadership sta ted th a t A lbania could en ter in to no relations w ith o th e r countries w ith o u t Y ugoslavia’s approval and dem anded to see copies o f the agreem ent. Later th a t year Koçi Xoxe tried to prevent Enver H oxa from signing a trea ty o f friendship w ith Bulgaria. A lbania m ust be kep t isolated to facilitate its absorp tion in to Yugoslavia.

In N ovem ber N ako Spiru w ho had recognised his m istakes at Berat and had com e around to firm support o f Enver H oxha was charged by the X oxe clique w ith having co llabor­a ted w ith the enem y during the war. The false charge together w ith the realisation o f the harm he had done previously to Party un ity was too m uch for Nako Spiru and he com m itted suicidc. M chm et Shehu, w ho had never wavered in his co rrec t stand w ith Enver H oxha, was prevented from a ttend ing the Party m eeting convened in F ebruary , 1948, and also excluded from the C entral C om ­m ittee by Koçi X oxe w ho was using his position as organising secretary to isolate F,nver H oxha.

This F ebruary m eeting was the cu lm ination o f the Yugoslav p lo t. Enver H oxha was accused o f leading a faction w hich was responsible for all the m istakes the C om m unist Party had allegedly m ade. T ito ’s accusations o f the previous year were form ally adop ted and all the econom ic and political ties w ith Yugoslavia for the colonisation o f A lbania were agreed.

A fter this m eeting Koçi X oxe’s group pressed on as rapidly as possible w ith p u ttin g the Yugoslav scheme in to effect. T hey used their position to place the state security organs above the Party and began elim inating those m em bers who opposed the schem e. A special con tro l com m ission arrived from Belgrade to in tegrate the A lbanian econom y w ith th a t o f Yugoslavia. As the final step in im plem enting A lbania’s o u trigh t annexation , Koçi Xoxe p u t forw ard T ito ’s dem and th a t the Soviet m ilitary m ission be expelled and th a t several divisions of the Yugoslav arm y should be brough t in to A lbania to w ard o ff the danger o f a G reek attack .

Enver H oxha reso lu te ly o p p osed these dem ands in the C entral C om m ittee and got thiëm"*7e |r r te d . rirrisiTinsaved A lbania lrom once m ore having to take up arms against an occupying arm y and was the beginning of the exposure

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and defea.t_of the Yugoslav agents w ith in the coun try w ho had p lo tted against A lbanian independence. There could no U3imël""be tne slightest cTouSFafioiuY uiJO slav in ten tions and Fmver__Hi2xlia!s_Jnsistcnc£.-Qn_the_..need...for A lbanian self- reliance if the co u n try was to develap_in a socialist way had

people behind him Enver H oxha w ent over to the attack . On T ito ’s b irth d ay in M ay, 1948, there were no greetings from Albania. Three weeks later Yugoslavia was ordered to close its in fo rm ation centre in T irana and the circulation of the Yugoslav Party paper, Borba, w hich had waged a continuous cam paign against Enver H oxha’s correct line, was banned in A lbania.

S ta l in was kep t in form ed of Yugoslavia’s moves against A lbania — particu larly the proposal to send troops in to the coun try . The C entral C om m ittee o t the C om m unist Party o f the Soviet Union p rom ptly sen t a le tte r to the „Çeritial (JomrnTt'tee o f the C om m unist P arty o f _Yugoslavia con­dem ning its o p p o rtu n is t hne w hich w as leadmg_to__Uje re s to ra tion o t capi talism , its violation of socialist n o rms in tire Inner lile ot the Party and the arrogance and conceit_of the leadership, ih e Albanian Party w hlcn had rallied behind E tfV W Tloxhas leadership against Yugoslav in terven tion , was soon to have its princip led stand against a revisionist conspiracy endorsed by the w orld com m unist m ovem ent.

When Koçi X oxe realised th a t the p lo t against A lbanian s o v e re ig n t^ T a d fa ile d L J ie j^ ^o u t him self w ith an a ttack on T ito . But this sudden_akflllt tu rn fooled no o n e. He w as expelled from th e Party, arrested and b rought to trial.ç m T T ë o g ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T x e ç ^ £ ^ I l i e p u b i i c e x p o s m ^ r o f this T ito ist agent had the effect o f alerting o th er East E uropean countries to the same danger since A lbania, though the m ost directly th rea tened , was n o t the only socialist coun try in whose in ternal affairs T ito had in terfered .

The a ttem p t by the Yugoslav leadership under T ito to take over A lbania illustra ted the d istinction Lenin always made betw een the n ationalism o f an oppressor n a tio n and tjTe nationalism o f an o p p ressed nation . T he nationalism which Iiad inspired the people o f Yugoslavia to" TTgTTt ~the Germ an

occupation forces and becom e p art o f the in te rn a tio n a l revolutionary m ovem ent was transfo rm ed by T ito , n o t w ith o u t resistance fyom wit.bjn1 tç> çh^uvinisn^ ifiQUldbe directed against a sm aller nation in order to m ake it a ‘ evenih k ep u u n c m a u re a ie r Y ugoslavia. ‘l 'h is could no t have happened iI* T ito had com m itted Yugoslavia to the task o f building socialism because no socialist co u n try w hich elim inates exp lo ita tio n w ith in its ow n borders can absorb an o th er co u n try fo r the purpose o f exploiting it w ith o u t denying its ow n nature .

In fact, -E i I.-.H 1 h <■ d istinction (> 1‘com m unist’ leader enjoying s ta lep o v ^M x > betray socialism by taking a revisionist line. Revisionism as a d isto rtion o f M arxisnTtatal to revolu tionary advance had long existed_asjm erroneous trend in variouj5_com rnunistp in ij£a. Lenin had waged a b itte r controversy against this line as exem plified by B ernstein, who was influenced by the social dem ocratic ideas o f the British Fabians, and K autsky , who had degenerated from a M arxist theore tic ian in to a hostile critic o f the O ctober R evolution. Revisionism can be described as th e betrayal o f class struggle. Beginning w ith the assum ption o f the possibility o f peaceful transition to socialism hv narTia- m entary m eans, ‘socialism w ith o u t tears’, and o f peaceful roëxisTcncë wTtK im perialist countries, even on the p art of

very countries they exp lo it, revisionism ends in accepting c*'apTfaEm.--Lntermilly and'"submiffm” Xo j n n ^ e r i^ s i ^ j ,xt(-|-pi- ally. Revisionism had lip ^~r 1' ltiMrl i r '7preventing certain com m unist parties from -itt j ism or from leading anti-im perialist struggles in colonial countries. T ito ’s revisionism was coun ter-revo lu tionary , re s to r­in g UUlCfltSHI Will'I Hie' OourgeoT^TeT'a^E£IlLicaJ*Hr()wn and m aking Yugoslavia an agent o f im perialist in terests in E a s tern Europe when it had once b e l o n g e d to the socialis t bloc.

From 1944 till 1948 the A lbanian Party and people, increasingly un ited under Enver H o x h a’s leadership, were in the fron t line o f the struggle against T ito ’s betrayal of socialism. They had friendly advice and assistance from Stalin and the Soviet P arty ; b u t it was their coun try w hich was u nder direct a ttack and in fighting to preserve their own independence and the right to develop their own socialist

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society they w ere defending, alm ost alone in this instance, the cause o f socialism generally. Indeed, the last tense m eeting betw een Stalin and th e Yugoslav representatives before the expulsion o f Yugoslavia from the socialist camp was largely concerned w ith T ito ’s actions against A lbania.

In the sum m er o f 1948 representatives o f the w orld com m unist an d w orkers’ parties partic ipa ting ' l n ’the In I o rm - ation B ureau o f C om m unist Parties m ade an analysis IjHTTe "errors and deviations oi‘ the~"Vugoslav leaders anri nnhlished their findings in R esolu tion agreed by theB u reau w as circu lated ‘to im prove the ideological, theoretical and political w ork in the parties, to safe-guard socialist achievem ents in countries w here the w orking class had established its ru le , to p ro tec t the socialist cam p and consolidate revolu tionary forces th ro u g h o u t the w orld and to in tensify the struggle against im perialism and prevent im perialist agents from penetra ting any fu rth e r in to the p eo p le’s dem ocracies’. The leaders o f the Yugoslav Com ­m unist Party were charged w ith having abandoned in te r­nationalism and ad o p ted a course o f narrow national self- in terest. ‘T hey apparen tly do n o t u n d erstan d ,’ the R esolution p o in ted o u t, ‘or p re ten d they do n o t understand , th a t such a nationalist o rien ta tio n m ay only lead to the degeneration of Yugoslavia in to an ord inary bourgeois republic, to the loss o f its independence, to the tran sfo rm atio n o f Yugoslavia in to a colony o f the im perialist co u n tries.’ _

The Yugoslav leadership rejected the R esolu tion and T ito m oved fu rth e r away from M arxism and closer to open co llaboration w ith the U nited S tates. This betrayal for dollars o f the in terests o f the w orkers and peasants was n o t carried through w ith o u t resistance; and thousands o f m em bers were expelled from the Yugoslav C om m unist Party. N early all those in certain provincial governm ents like M ontenegro were jailed and a large p ro p o rtio n o f com m anders and com m issars o f the old partisan brigades were im prisoned or discharged lrom the arm y. The A lbanians living w ithin Yugoslavia’s borders at K osovo, in M ontenegro and on the Dukagjin Plateau were subjected to special acts o f repression. A ttem p ts to m aintain th e ir A lbanian language and cu ltu re were I rustra ted and under the oppressive acts o f the governm ent

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they becam e a source o f cheap, m enial labour and, in some cases, of agents w ho could be sent back in to A lbania for subversive purposes. The trea ty signed by Yugoslavia under U nited S tates instigation in 1953 w ith Greece and T urkey linked in a hostile ring the past and present enem ies o f A lbanian independence.

T he A lbanian C om m unist Party , o f course, warm ly approved the R esolu tion o f the In fo rm ation B ureau which was a ju stifica tio n o f their ow n stand and o f Enver H o x h a’s leadership. A t a P arty m eeting in S eptem ber, 1948, all the agreem ents w ith Yugoslavia were abrogated and the task o f purging the rem nants o f T ito ist influence from their ow n ranks were carried out. M ehm et Shehu and o th er m em bers unjustly excluded from the previous session were welcom ed back and various violations o f socialist legality by the Xoxe group were repud ia ted . N ako S p iru ’s nam e was cleared o f the charges tha t had been m ade against him. Party organisations were charged w ith the responsibility o f m aking clear to the people the na tu re o f the Yugoslav p lo t and the weaknesses in the A lbanian Party w hich had allow ed it to go so far. Publication o f the Party paper, Zeri i Popullit, w hich had lapsed during the height of Yugoslav influence, was to be recom m enced and was to include, for the first tim e, all the decisions taken during this E leventh Party Plenum . A nd, finally, p reparations were m ade for the first full Party Congress in N ovem ber w hich, having m ade a thorough investigation o f the m istakes w hich had enabled their ranks to be p en e tra ted and having heard the self-criticisms o f those w ho had failed in vigilance, w ould be able to go on to a consideration o f the vital tasks o f constructing the socialist base o f society. It was agreed th a t at this Congress the name o f the Party w ould be changed to the A lbanian Party of L abour while the M arxist-Leninist line o f the Party w ould be confirm ed and strengthened .

While this first severe crisis o f the new state o f Albania m ay have delayed som ew hat the co u n try ’s em barking on a correc t socialist course and even allow ed errors to develop during the period o f Yugoslav influence —- like the P a rty ’s rem aining a sem i-secret organisation w hen it had becom e .1

Party in pow er o r like th e concessions m ade to rich peasants

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which im peded the fo rm ation o f agricultural co-operatives, there were im p o rtan t gains too . P arty and people could go forw ard in the confidence o f enjoying a leadership w hich had proved itself u n d er the m ost testing circum stances. A nd had it n o t been for the b itte r experience o f revisionist betrayal which could tu rn a war-time ally in to a counter-revolu tionary agent o f the im perialist countries, the A lbanian people could n o t have recognised so quickly a far m ore dangerous and pow erful revisionist th rea t w hich was to develop a fte r S ta lin ’s death.

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A LBA N IA ’S SOCIALIST SOCIETY

C hapter Nine

The State

\ The real question o f politics is w ho rules w hom , who enjoys 1 state pow er and how is th a t pow er m aintained. J h e essential

p olitical problem o f a socialist society is th a t o f vesting real state pow er in the hands o f the masses o t people in tow n and countryside, headed bv the w orking class, and keeping it there__£s. socialist society is n o t sim ply crea ted , tor the w orking masses; It m ust be created and preserved by the w orking masses. It this does n o t con tinue to be the case, state and society will soon degenerate from socialism in to some form o f capitalism w ith a consequent resto ration o f exp lo it­ative relations o f p roduc tion . —

The C o n stitu tion o f the P eople’s R epublic o f A lbania, ad o p ted on M arch 14, 1946, by the C onstituen t Assem bly b rough t in to being by the first dem ocratic election ever held, is short, s traightforw ard and dem ocratic in the fullest sense. The whole docum ent o f fewer th an a h u ndred articles takes up only 40 pages o f a very small book. This conciseness and sim plicity stem from the fact th a t, unlike m ost constitu tions, there are no ruling class in terests to be concealed in elaborate verbiage, no com plicated divisions of pow er to check the s ta te ’s in terference in business and finance, no pseudo- dem ocratic form ulations designed to give people the illusion o f governing them selves. I t is w orthw hile setting o u t the basic s tructu re o f A lbanian governm ental in stitu tio n s; bu t the test w hich has to be applied in judging their e fficacy is w hethej the people, the w orking masses, really are in co n tro l o f their own social destiny. T his can only be d em onstra ted concretely by exam ples draw n from every aspect of th e life o f the people and from the very quality of th a t lite in the broadest sense.

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T he very first p roc lam ation o f the A lbanian P arty of Labour, issued in 1941, set before the com m unist m em ber­ship and the people o f A lbania the task no t on ly o f liberating the coun try b u t o f investing political pow er in the working masses. This double task was re flected in the tw ofold r e ^ o n s ib j l i t ^ i ^ o f ^ th e ^ J i^ y J ^ ^ j^ e i^ J M ^Councils as h o .th m obilising centres o f the arm ed struggle and p opu lar organisations o f th e new revolu tionary governing pow er established on the rum s o t the occupational regime of the invaders and the pre-war regime o f the old exploiting

People’s pow er as em bodied in the A lbanian C onstitu tion was n o t, therefo re , g rafted on to the in stitu tions o f pre-war society nor even developed as a radical m odification o f them . It was established afte r a clean sweep in w hich the whole governm ental apparatus o f the old ruling class had been brushed aside. This was the lesson M arx had draw n from tht^ experience o f the Paris C om m u n i^ ^ -th a i-il. was no t enough for the w orking class to lay hold o f the state m achine o f the bourgeoisie: they m ust smash it and create their ow n organs m p ro le ta n a r^ a o w e n

All the m ajor dem ocratic organisations w hich enable the Albanian w orking masses to exercise sta te pow er originated and developed in the heat o f national struggle. As they came into being in answer to the national need th ey were tested in the fires o f the liberation w ar involving the w hole people. O ut o f the N ational L ibera tion G eneral Council grew the People’s A ssem bly; and the N ational L iberation C om m ittee appoin ted by the Council becam e the G overnm ent, Prime Minister and C abinet, elected by the Assembly. The N ational Liberation Councils at village, d istric t and city levels developed in to the People’s Councils which are the local organs o f state pow er.

The N ational L ibera tion F ro n t, set up at Peza in 1942, as a mass organisation including all those, regardless o f ideo­logical, regional or religious differences, who were prepared to join in the anti-fascist w ar u nder the leadership o f the General Council, diversified in to various mass organisations such as the D em ocratic F ro n t, the Trade U nions, the L abour Y outh U nion, the A lbanian W om en’s U nion and o ther

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volun tary groupings. The en tire legislative ac tion o f the governm ent is carried on w ith the active partic ipa tion of these mass organisations in one or m ore o f w hich all workers find a place. Indeed the fundam ental law o f the A lbanian S ta te C o nstitu tion was only approved a fte r the m ost m eticulous exam ination by w orkers organised in these mass fronts.

T he general fram ew ork of governm ent is dem ocratically based on the mass organisations, b u t w hat anim ates the entire s truc tu re , gives life to all these in stitu tions o f popu lar rule and provides a d irection for A lbanian society as a w hole is the Party . It is the responsibility o f the A lbanian Party of L abour to keep sociahst.malitkis. the^MLtjcs_ojL_m2Lkiii£ class leadership in com m and o f all aspects o f developm ent, flow ever d em o cratic the C o n stitu tion as fo rm ulated , the only guarantee against the grow th _ o t_ _ b u reaucracy and the form ation o l a new class o f exijjoilgrs_is the Party. The Party is the social conscience o f the workintLxlass.

The A lbanian sta te is the governm ental expression o f w orking class ru le — the d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t, w hich sim ply m eans com plete dem ocracy for the w orking masses and violent opposition to their enemies. N o o th er form of state can build socialism and prevent the resto ration of capitalism . The d ictatorsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t is essential for expropriating the possessions o f the explo iters and liqu ida t­ing private p ro p e rty w hich is the source o f exp lo ita tion . It is also essential fo r p ro tec ting the victories of the socialist revolu tion from enemies inside and outside the coun try ,

z '" The G overnm ent w hich came in to being a fte r the first real dem ocratic elections on D ecem ber 2. 1945. enacted a series o f m easures ol a socialist, tha t is to say, anti-capitalist and anti-feudalist character. All the unequal agreem ents con- trac ted w ith o th er countries by form er regimes were abrogated. The p ro p erty of foreign capitalists and war crim inals was confiscated. The agrarian reform laws based on the principle o f ‘land to the tille r’ red istribu ted the holdings o f big landlords. All industrial p lants and m ines were nationalised w ith o u t com pensation creating a new socialist sec to r in the econom y. Foreign trade and the p rod u c tio n and d istribu tion o f the industrial o u tp u t were b rough t under state

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con tro l. Legislation was passed on conditions o f work, length of the w orking day and paid holidays w hich am oun ted to a charter o f em ancipation fo r the w orking masses.

A t the same tim e the w orking class under Party leadership and the b road masses o f th e people were m obilised to defend the socialist s ta te from th rea ten ed invasion by its im m ediate neighbours and from th e aggressive in ten tions o f the im perialist pow ers, taking the form e ither o f d irect arm ed in terven tion or o f subversion through reactionary elem ents inside the co u n try . *

Class struggle does n o t cease even after the liqu ida tion -o f th e ex p loiting classes. It sim ply takes d ifferen t forms as the battle betw een the ideas, custom s and h a b k s of Lhe old ex p lo ita tive society and the ideals and as^iialioiIg^LLh^JllIivsocjahsTnianjs ju EOIuOSSEr TIIEmjj ijililjilOEtjTI -As long as there exist any groups inside the country in terested in the resto ration o f capitalism , as long as there exist im perialist countries anxious to overthrow the socialist order by open o r h idden aggression, as long as there exists the T rojan H orse o f revisionism , the state o f the pro letarian d ictatorsh ip rem ains a necessity if a coun try like A lbania is to remain socialist.

Class struggle transcends sta te boundaries and appears on the in tern a tio n al, scene as the struggle betw een capitalist ancf socialist countries and betw een im perialist and colonial o r neo-colonial countries. A lbania plays its part in this gigantic (o n llic t, n o t only detending its own liberty bu t actively partic ipating in the progress o f hum an society generally. The socialist sta te has the func tion o f strengthening ties of fraternal friendship w ith countries based on the same socialist principles and o f supporting everywhere the revolutionary national libera tion m ovem ents against im perialist oppression.

For A lbania to rem ain socialist, defend itself ;>nr\ plav a m instructive role in in terna tional affairs the state requires the direct p artic ipa tion o f the people — the w orking class, the in o p e ra tiv e peasantry and the popular intelligentsia m n - sliliiling very__neaily the w hole o f society. N o t only do the Working people own the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , they m ust in lively d irect econom ic, cultural and political developm ent.I In socialist s ta te canno t even be conceived apart from this

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direct p artic ipa tion o f the masses and the C o n stitu tion is designed to insure th a t such partic ipa tion occurs at every level and in every dep artm en t o f ^overnm rnt. i l has already led to the discovery of ta len ted organisers am ong the w orkers and peasants w hose abilities have streng thened the state apparatus in the service o f the people.

S ’ T he nroixss by w hich t he p.e_QE>le_ have the fullest o p p o r-\ t l in i t v o f pvprpccina w ill f j y p lv nn p yp fy

developm ent and this expression is then co-ordinated by the poyenim ent in decisions w hich are fed back to the p eople for im ja le m e n ta tio rw sc a lle d ^ D em ocraticcen tra lism is n o t on ly the organisational principle o f the s ta te apparatus ot the FëOplt1' ! K ttpuPiic o l A lbania, it is also the organisational princip e o f e v e r y re m " e s e n t^ ated w ith the state apparatus and the Albanian P a r t v o f L abour itself. T he cen tralisation o f the socialist state is n o t a con cen tra tio n o f s ta te functions in an in te rdependen t b u reau ­cratic com plex, n o r is its link w ith dem ocratic practice lim ited to a periodic electoral m andate from the people. I t is - a co n tin u o us process o f th e dem ocratisa tion o f every legislative and executive act ol governm ent according to tne fundam ental socialist rule o f the mass line — from the m asses, to the masses. D em ocratic centralism is the organisational form o f this fundam ental mass line which Mao Tsetung has described as tjie socialist necessity to ‘go to the masses and learn from th em , synthesise th e ir ex p e rien ce_ Jn to _ b&Lier artic u lated_E im £ipies and " m e thods, then do__nropapanda am ong the m asses, and call upon them to _ p u tth e se p r inciples

p r o h le m s an d

help ...them achieve libera tion and happiness’. It is to encour­age this social process w hich is repeated over and over again w ith respect to all the specific econom ic and political responsibilities o f the socialist s ta te th a t dem ocratic cen tra l­ism has been established as the operational basis of govern-

I m ent.O ne check on undem ocratic procedures is the o b ligation o l

the state tn observe socialist legality as set o u t in the C o n stitu tio n — rigorously and uncond itionally . T he C on­s titu tio n fixes the com petence o f th e various state organs ana insures the suprem acy o f the popu larly elected P eople’s

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Assem bly w hich is the source o f all ju ridical n orm s regulating the m ost im p o rtan t relations o f social life.

Every citizen having com pleted eighteen years o f age, regardless o t sex, econom ic s ta tus, social position , religious belief or anv o th e r consideration, enjoys the right to elect and be elected to any elective body in the s ta te . E lectors vote directly to r their representatives w hether as m em bers of a village council, as p eop le’s judges or as deputies o f the People’s Assem bly itself. Polling is done secretly by sealed ballo t in special boo ths and is u nder the supervision o f electoral com m ittees appo in ted by the mass organisations o f the D em ocratic F r o n t— trade unions, y o u th and w om en’s associations and the w orking collectives o f industrial en te r­prises, agricultural co-operatives, governm ent m inistries, arm y units and so on. These same mass organisations o f w orkers have the right to present any o f their m em bers as candidates. No taxes, guarantees or deposits are dem anded o f candidates n o r o f the organisations nom inating them . A t ore-electoral m eetings, characterised by a spirit o f criticism and self- criticism , the past activities o f all the candidates for a particu lar post a re thoroughly discussed angTin^'v o’ETuTcd to give a. full accoun t of their w ork. The w inner of I hr election is the candidate receiving one m ore vote than half the num ber o f electors registered in th a t particu lar con­stituency and partic ipa tion in the voting is nearly ] 00%.

The nom ination o f Enver H oxha as a candidate for deputy to the P eople’s Assem bly by T irana constituency num ber 219 in Ju ly , 1970, to o k the same form as any o th er nom inations in th a t or any o th er elections in A lbania since the war. His proposer p o in ted o u t th e significance o f Enver H o x h a’s nom ination from the very d istric t in w hich he had founded I lie A lbanian P arty 29 years before.

In his election speech the follow ing Septem ber, Enver Hoxha p o in ted o u t th a t this was the seventh tim e the people had elected dem ocratically th e ir representatives to the IVople’s A ssem bly, casting their votes for the candidates of the D em ocratic F ro n t ‘know ing th a t these are am ong their best sons and daughters and th a t, by voting fo r them , they h.ivc voted for the building o f socialism, for the freedom and Independence o f the H om eland, for its p rosperity , for the

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M arxist-Leninist line o f our Party . . . . On S ep tem ber 20 all the people o f socialist A lbania w ith o u t excep tion will go to the polls and vote d irectly for the persons they wish to send to the People’s Councils, to the People’s C ourts of Ju stice and to the P eople’s A ssem bly, thus ratify ing the state pow er w hich was born to them from the barrel of the rifle in the course o f th e ir national struggle. . . . D uring the election cam paign the w orking people draw up a balance sheet of their creative w ork , po in ting o u t the good and negative aspects o f the w ork and those who have perfo rm ed it, criticising weaknesses and shortcom ings, adop ting and upholding progress m ade and p rom oting to governm ent posts those devoted to ceasclcss revolu tionary advance. T he people do this in open , public and free m eetings w ith o u t the least obstacle and w ith o u t any tim id ity . T hey have w on the political right and achieved the m atu rity to hold to account all w ho err, to pass judgem en t on all culprits, to praise and encourage those w ho w ork well. T hey are fully conscious of the real force o f o u r p ro letarian dem ocracy ’.

The e lectoral cam paign is an im p o rtan t part o f the revolu tionary political activ ity o f the A lbanian people; but the relations betw een the people and their representatives do n o t end w hen the voting is over and the elected deputies receive their m andate . The deputies have to m aintain con tinuous co n tac t w ith those w ho have elected them and rep o rt to them in detail at the end o f every session. E lectors have the right to dismiss a representative and elect som eone else. This initiative can be taken e ither by the electors o f the constituency or by the mass organisation o f w orkers w hich originally p resented the represen ta tive’s candidature.

The People’s A nr pan stalc now er. is e lected every fou r years o n t h e basis o f one r e p r e s e n t a t iv e fo r every 8000 inhabitan ts. I t is an executive bo d y as well as legislative, supervising the application o f the laws it enac ts. Its acts are n o t subject to consideration , am endm ent nor altera tion by any o th er body. I t elects the Praesidium o f the A ssem bly, the G overnm ent, the High C ourt o f the R epublic, the A tto rn ey G eneral and his deputies. I t also appoints com m ittees to deal w ith such specific m atte rs as the budget, various social questions or foreign affairs. T here are norm ally

tw o sessions a year b u t ex traord inary sessions m ay be c a l l e d ^ on the initiative o f the Praesidium or at the request of one th ird o f the deputies.

The Praesidium , as the perm anen t organ o f the A ssem bly, exercises the lunctions o f a collective state leadership, calling tKT sessions o f the A ssem bly, lixing election dates, deciding on the com patib ility ot laws w ith the C onstitu tion , aw arding decorations, appoin ting envoys, choosing. _the.. suprem e com m and o f the arm ed forces and declaring a s ta te o f w a rm case o f aggression against A lbania. In all these tasks it is directly responsible to the P eop le’s Assem bly w hich elects it an d can dismiss it at any tim e.

The G overnm ent o f the P eople’s R epublic is also ap p o in ted and dismissed b v j.h e P eop le’s Assembly! J i . does no t co n stitu te a separate and independent au th o rity bu t m ust render an accoun t to the popu lar forum o f all its activities.A t the first session o f eacb new ly-elected Assem bly the existing prim e m inister tenders the resignation o f his cab inet; and if accepted , the A ssem bly chooses one o f its m em bers as prim e m inister and charges him w ith the du ty of form ing a new cabinet w hich has to be approved by the Assembly. The G overnm ent draws up th e general econom ic plan and presents the budget, directs the m onetary system , defends die co n stitu tio n a l o rder and the rights o f citizens and conducts relations w ith foreign pow ers. _

The popu lar character o f the G overnm ent finds expression in its program m e w hich in respect to b o th in ternal and external policy reflects and safeguards the in terests of the people, o f the w orking masses. The m ain task o f the program m e in ternally is to develop fu rth e r the productiveloices by increasing industrial and agricultural o u tp u t, to develop socialist relations o f p ro d u c tio n , deepen the socialist involution in the id ro lo d ra l and c u ltu r a l spheres ami< onsolidate peo p le’s pow er and the m oral and political un ity ol l he people around th e h a rty and G overnm ent. T he foreign policy o f the program m e aims at guaranteeing national independence and sovereignty against any danger from abroad, strengthening th e friendship, co llaboration and m utual aid w ith th e peoples of o th er socialist countries, Mipporting the revolu tionary national liberation struggles of

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rthe oppressed peoples, extending relations w ith countries o f d ifferen t social system s based on the principles o f equality , non-in terven tion in each o th e r’s in terna l affairs, m utual respect and p ro fit and safeguarding real peace.

T he local organs o f state pow er are the P eople’s Councils which together w ith the People’s Assem bly constitu te tfre po litica l basis o f ^A lban ia- These Councils for villages, districts, tow ns and city quarters are elected for three yeays by th e same voting procedure as t he Assem bly. Each Council calls periodic mëëTings to rep o rt on its activities to the e lecto rate and renders an account to the nex t Council above it in geographical im portance. All m em bers are subject to dismissal by the electors and the w hole Council can be dissolved if the people feel it has n o t deserved their confidence. The duties o f th e C ouncils are to direct the econom ic an d cu ltural activity w ith in their jurisd iction,

fa|kcgu a r a n ty DUBTr~ol'dl'l and thu fright* oihgww and Uresponsibility for, realising the econom ic nla and ■administer-ing the local budget. The executive com m ittee o f the Councilis chosen a i i h o five ■Lmeetimr a irer e lec tio n .

— Ju stice in A lbania is adm inistered by the High C ourt and by D istrict C ourts. T he High C ourt is appo in ted by the People’s Assem bly for four year periods and the D istrict C ourts are elected by the People’s Councils for a term o f th ree years. These courts p ro tec t from violation the socialist system and socialist p ro p e rty , the political social and econom ic rights o f th e people and the personal and p roperty rights to w hich they are en titled , m e courts m ust, on the o n e~ hand, Tigh t against tne in ternal enem ies of socialism .id th revolu tionary violence and, on the o th er, educate thew orking masses in the spirit o f d isc ip lin e -socialist legality and socialist e thics.

C andidates to becom e peop le’s judges and d epu ty judges are proposed by the various mass organisations and associ­ations o f w orkers like any o th e r candidates and are subject to dismissal on the same term s as o th e r representatives w ho fail to retain the confidence o f the people. The whole legal system is supervised and adm inistered by the A tto rn e y ’s O ffice w hich is an organ o f the People’s Assem bly responsible fo r the ju s t and uniform application o f the laws. District

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A ttorneys arc appo in ted by this Office to carry o u t the same function locally. „

The dem ocratic character o f the judicial system is secured by the fact th a t judges and depu ty judges are elected and can be dismissed bv the popular assemblies, that they are electe^l from am ong th e w ork ing masses and th a t they are helped in their tasks bv a ^ s ta n t^ ju d g e s w h o are ordinary citizens serving 15 days a year in..a...judicial capacity w ith the same rights and responsibilities and having the same w eight of judgem ent as the elecl£tLiuilges.

' This em ploym ent o f assistant judges assures the partic i­pation o f the b road masses in the adm inistration of justice bo th to enable them to becom e fam iliar w ith the judicial process and to enable the verdicts of the courts to benefit from the conscience o f the w orking class. W hat is thus achieved is n o t justice on behalf o f the people by those who conceal their ow n class in terests under a show o f legal professionalism , b u t justice by the people them selves — the in stitu tionalisa tion o f those popular courts in violently revolutionary situations w hen people who have been tram pled on fo r centuries take justice in to their own hands and deal sum m arily w ith class oppressors w hose crimes only J they can judge.

In so far as the courts o f justice in villages and tow ns deal w ith non-antagonistic con trad ic tions am ong the people,, jEsTt is. conflicts w hich do n o t have their origin in irreconcilable ( lass d ifferences, th r vrry p r o c e s s o f debating these issues in aT* dem ocratic w ay_and_nassing iudg e m e n l j r u v h i d i ^ ^ are involved plavs an educative role in enabling the masses increasingly to resolve such con trad ictions am ong th emselves. More and m ore cases o t this kind are handled by people m llieir own collectives at places o f w ork or residence — ju s t as die shrinking nu m b er o f p e tty crim es against personal or socialist p ro p erty are dealt w ith collectively on the basis of criticism and self-criticism w ith o u t recourse to the police.

The dem ocratisation , w hich is to say the revolu tion ising. 'iljJicu^M aZ X aiZl^TTm g sim ple civilian conflicts in creating die conditions for the masses to exercise their leading and supervisory rolp w ith respect to the judicial system , is also a• Li:i> in the fight against bureaucracy. In recen t years a broad

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public discussion has taken placc to sim plify the laws, m ake them m ore understandab le and divest them o f a purely official character.

A jh a n ia n law asserts the leadership of the Party over the courts o f justice and subjects them to the criticism and supervision o f th e w orking masses. The principle o f the absolute independence o f the courts o f justice, w hich is sim ply a co n stitu tio n a l device to r concealing their real c l ^ s ch aracter, is rep laced by th e frank recognition o f the jud icial s ^ s te m a s a n m s t iU iU o n j j£ t l^n o T ^ re ten H Tng to stand a b o v e c lassesL above society, b u t openly serving the in terests o f the w orking class.* T E T "various organs of the A lbanian sta te and th e C on­s titu tio n itself do n o t im pose a dem ocratic character on the co u n try ; th ey reflect and m ake explicit the dem ocracy inheren t in the d ictatorsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t established by the w orking masses u nder the leadership o f the A lbanian P arty o f L abour in the revolu tionary w ar w hich n o t only [expelled ex ternal invaders b u t also destroyed the in ternal [basis o f exploiting classes. The governm ent of A lbania (expresses the political pow er o f th e b road w orking masses land has no o th er in terests th an those o f the w orking masses [on w hose su p p o rt and p artic ipa tion it absolutely relies.

The d ictatorsh ip o f th e p ro le ta ria t can n o t be strengthened and the all rounrLdevclo pm en t o f socialist dem ocracy canno t be realised w ith o u t a determ ined struggle against hnrean- c r a ç ^ xoots o f th e regressive and counter-revolu tionary process w hich has taken nlare in certain erstw hile socialist countries like the Soviet U nion and_the_J^ast. E uropean T eo p le ’s R epub lics n ^ g j^ b c sought in the gradual hnreau- cra tisa tion o f the socialist s ta te apparatus, in its e s tran g em en t from the broad masses and in the c rc a tio n .o f-a privileged class o f burcau£ ia ls. ‘B ureaucracy’, as Enver H oxha explained in his rep o rt to the F ifth Congress o f the Party in 1966, ‘is a consequence o f alien influences in h erited from the o ld feudal and bourgeois s ta te m achinery , from th e detaching o f some cadres and organs from the masses, from th e blind applica tion o f foreign experience w ith o u t taking in to con­sideration the concrete conditions o f our coun try , from the cu ltural backw ardness inherited from the past, from the

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pressure o f bourgeois and revisionist ideology, from the lack o f looking a t problem s from a political angle.’

Enver H oxha in tha t sam e very im p o rtan t speech a t the F ifth Congress w en t on to say: ‘F undam entally our Party line on state building and on the general o rien ta tio n o f p eo p le’s pow er has been correct. B ut in our practical activity there have occurred m any bureaucratic d isto rtions and sh o rt­com ings, such as subord ination of elected to executive organs, exaggerated form alism in the operation of elected organs, excessive concen tra tion o f com petence in a few hands, relying for everything on the adm in istration , lim it­ation o f the active p artic ipa tion o f the masses in the solution of state and social problem s and in the con tro l o f state organs, bureaucratic d isto rtions in socialist legislation. . . . T herefore th e m easures ad o p ted by the Party for the eradication o f red tape m ust n o t be seen as measures of a simple organisational and technical character for the elimi­n ation o f certain shortcom ings and gaps in the w ork o f sta te organs b u t as m easures having a deep political character, because the struggle against red tape is one o f the m ost im p o rtan t aspects o f the class struggle in our co u n try at the p resent tim e .’

The figh t against bureaucracy has to go deep because its roots are deep. ‘This concep t of th in k in g ,’ Enver H oxha explained in a la ter speech on the revolutionising o f Party and G overnm ent, ‘the idealistic ideology o f bureaucratism , is . . . the ideology o f m inority class rule over the m ajority — an ideology w hich the m in o rity inculcates in to the m inds and conscience o f the m ajority through cu lture , education, politics and m orals in order to m ake it their second na tu re , a m anner o f life, th ough t and ac tio n .’ This is ih r m s n n w h y ' f is necessary, as m ust be considered in m ore detail, to exjgm i

l l

]

l [it d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t intojhe_jd£i2lagi£aLj£a]Ia ' 'I education , etlucs and the arts generally .w here bourgeois u.iys of th ink ing h a v e J i ie i j^ j^ U e s L i^ revolu­tion w hich com plem ents the revolu tion ising o f the econgjjnc hiisc o t society

Some o f the measures taken under the leadership o f th eAlbanian Party o f L abour in the fight against bureaucracy ' y t e •in-: curtailing higher salaries to establish a m ore lust ra tio o f

incom es, partic ipa tion of cadres, adm inistrative personnel, in tellectuals and studen ts directly in m anual labour side by side w ith w orkers and farm ers, system atic circu lation of cadres from the centre to the grass roo ts and back again, placing cadres, Party m em bers and all sta te em ployees under the rigorous supervision o f the w orking masses, application of th e .principle o f democratic centralism against anv sym ptom s o £ bureaucratic centralism and im provem ent of the m e th o d an d style o f w ork by treating all sta te and econom ic problem s not t'rom the stan d p o in t ol' ‘tech n o c racy ’ and‘ economist]_________ _________ ' _____an d ideology, always keeping p ro le ta rian politics in th e forefront.

T he fight a gainst bureaucracy and the m easures fn r im proving the style o f w ork o f the w hole state annaratns axe n o t a teTnnnrarv-.campaign. T hey are an essential part o f the continuing struggle to preserve state p ow er in the hands_af the w o r k i n g m a s s p s and to p revent the degeneration o f th e state in to the d ictato rsh ip o f a new privileged class.

lh is struggle was raised to a higher level follow ing the F ifth Congress o f the Party in 1966. T he process of the revolutionising o f the w hole life o f the co u n try on the principle o f the greatest possible mass involvem ent has n o t only streng thened the econom ic base o f society b u t has led to p ro fo u n d developm ents o f a social, political and ideo­logical na tu re as well. The A lbanian people have acquired new experience concerning how to bar the way to revisionism and the resto ra tio n o f capitalism and how to ensure the con tinued m arch o f the revolu tion to its final v ictory in full com m unism .

I t is as a resu lt o f these developm ents in the fu rther revolutionising o f the life of the cou n try th a t in the R eport on the A ctivity o f the C entral C om m ittee su b m itted by Enver H oxha to the S ixth Congress of the Party o f L abour of A lbania held in T irana a t the beginning o f Novem ber, 1971, the proposal was m ade fo r the d rafting o f a new constitu tion . The R eport w hich the Congress unanim ously ad o p ted says:

‘V iew ed th rough the prism o f these deep revolutionarychanges, th e C o n stitu tion in force, in spite o f later

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am endm ents and additions, has becom e o u td a ted in m any fundam ental aspects and no longer reflects the socialist reality in A lbania today . T herefo re , the C entral C om m ittee o f the P arty proposes the drafting o f a new con stitu tio n appropria te to the p resen t stage o f the co u n try ’s develop­m ent, to the new reality , so th a t, as a com ponen t p art o f the politica l superstructu re , it m ay serve the econom ic base and the w hole socialist developm ent o f society better.

‘T he refram ing o f the C o n stitu tio n will be a step of great theo re tica l and practical im portance fo r the s treng th ­ening and fu rth e r im provem ent of the state of the d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t in our coun try . The new C o n stitu tio n will serve as a ju rid ical basis fo r the state organisation and legislation required by the presen t stage o f our socialist construc tion . I t m ust be a jurid ical, political and ideological do cu m en t w hich com pletely reflects th e line o f the Party em bodied in our revolu­tio n ary practice and inspires the w orking people in the struggle fo r the com plete construc tion of a socialist so c ie ty .’

r ’here was no th ing w rong w ith the existing co nstitu tion during the period in w hich it has reflected the consolidation o f national independence a fte r the War and the first stages of building socialism . In term s o f politica l m atu rity the A lbanian people have sim ply outgrow n it. rJ h e _ ^ ] i^ £ >i>ofii<i£ 0 £ulM dem ocracy has been succeeded_by_the p h ase o f full socialism w ith the w orking class playing the leading role .rmt-Qnly m jliticallv and econom ically h u L cn lturallv as well. The im plications o f these p ro fo u n d social developm ents require expression in a new docum en t w hich will be a m ilepost in the advance o f the A lbanian people along the road to com m unism .

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C hapter Ten

The Party

Any place one goes in A lbania, tow n or coun tryside , coastal plain or m ountains, one sees, pa in ted on facto ry walls, inscribed on co lourfu l banners strung across streets, picked o u t in flowers o f d iffe ren t hues in garden cities like V lora or depicted in w hite-w ashed rocks high up on a hillside, the slogan, ‘Long Live the A lbanian Party o f L ab o u r!’ This is the natu ral expression o f a p eop le’s pride and confidence in an organisation w ith o u t w hich the victorious liberation war, the successes o f the drive tow ard socialism and, indeed, the w hole prosperous, co-operative fabric o f life in A lbania today w ould be inconceivable. The period since the founding o f the P arty o f L abour in 1941 is the m ost brillian t in the long story o f the A lbanian people, realising M arx’s observation th a t socialism is the beginning o f h isto ry , true h isto ry m ade by m en consciously pursuing their aims in co-operation ; and everything before, the w hole dark period o f class-divided societies based on ex p lo ita tio n , is prehistoric.

In the co n stitu tio n o f the P eople’s R epublic o f A lbania there is only one reference to the Party , in A rticle 21 which guarantees to citizens the right to jo in social organisations. These include the D em ocratic F ro n t, the trade unions, the co-operatives, organisations o f y o u th and o f w om en, organis­ations for sport and defence, or cu ltural, scientific and technical societies. Finally ‘the m ore active and conscientious citizens o f the w orking class and o f the w orking masses jo in the ranks o f the A lbanian P arty o f L abour, the vanguard organisation o f the w orking class and o f all the working masses in their endeavours to bu ild the bases o f socialism and the leading nucleus o f all the organisations of the w orking masses, social as well as the s ta te .’ B ut this b rief m ention

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describes im plicitly the Party o f L ab o u r’s vital role as the sole directing and leading force in the socialist system of p ro le ta rian d ictatorship .

T h is f o r c e r e sts on t h e P arty ’s close and perm anent tie,s w ith the w orking m asses. In the daily revolu tionary experi- ence o f the masses, by their su pport and opinions, the Party tests the justice and validity o f its decisions, enriches its own experience and gets the necessary insp iration to continue its advance. In com pliance w ith the aspirations o f the masses the Party issues directives and instructions on im p o rtan t political, econom ic, social, cu ltural and organisational questions. Thus its influence in terpenetra tes and flows through all the s ta te organs, m aking itself felt as a co n stan t pressure guiding the whole society along the road to socialism.

N ot p art o f the state organs defined in the C o n s titu tio n /) the Party was the in itia ting force in elaborating the C o n -/ s titu tio n and presenting it to the C o n stitu en t Assembly. The in 11| in irr ivf th>< Party nn the activities m(' the State is exerted prim arily through th e Party i r r m h r n m-..y h P tr>com m anding posts in the state_a2 £aratus and are to be found at R H alt levels in the governm ental and legal structu re , bringing to wRatever**poslUoh LllCV UWUflV H'ie'a'Tded jgai Ulltl llKidersfnp which their fa r ty m em bership enables them .to exert th jis breath ing in to the whole state edifice the directive insp iration o f :h e raiTy.

" Ill UT tfë r to im plem ent this puidin^ role the P irty crejpfs WP branches in all the e lec ted organs o f th e p eop le’s dem ocratic Kovernment and m all th e industrial, co-operative and socialorganisatTonsTTt is the d u ty _ o fjiie se i ranches_to_strengthen lhe P arty s in iluence and to ui)hold_its__poIicy anuinjLJliiise who are n o t f a r ty m em bers, tc^strengthertsocialist discipline intl to prc^ecuie the w ar against bureaucracy, to supervise ilie execution ot Party directives. The leading role o t the Party over the peopie s dem ocratic state does n o t m ean at all that Party organs are substitu ted fo r the corresponding I'.overnment organs. The P a rty ’s acts are n o t juridical and are “ iilv nhlicratcry fo r thncp citizens who are m em bers.

i“ the state organs since th ey determ ine the g£n£iaLLin£_aad I lie essential co n ten t o f all the actTTorm ulated and execu ted

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bv th e state. T hey create the very p o l i t i c a l rlim ate-in which the st.at.el function^. A nd in certain cases, w ith regard to questions vital to the developm ent o f the social order, the Party issues directives jo in tly w ith the state organs, thus converting them in to jurid ical acts w hich are binding on all citizens. The m ost im p o rtan t directives are those issued by the highest forum o f the Party o f L abour — its Congress. These directives provide the basis for the measures adop ted b v the state organs for the developm ent o f the co u n try ’ssocial a n 4 iPQlitv(^LrTrrp*"* ......................... ""'***

•> T he Party o f L abour also plays a leadership role in respect to the activities o f all the mass organisations in the D em ocratic F ron t. T hey are the P a rty ’s m ost im p o rtan t links w ith the people and th rough them the vital two-way process o f learning from the people in o rder to teach and guide them is conducted ._Just as during the war, in the early days o f the Party , the source o f its an th n ritv wag thp quality r»l' {{<; m em bers, com m unists always being the first to undertake the m ost dangerous m issions and to m ain tain m orale in the face o f th e gravest hardships, so ^ jp , the periy^ of snci^Ji^t

E co n struc tion the willingness o f com m unists to accent cheer­fully tl-|p m ost a rd u o u s tasks, go w herever they are needed m ost and exem plify the socialist_ jnorality_of p u ttin g the rn llertivp in terest hefn re self-interest is the basis o f the P a rty ’s influence am ong the masses*

T he correctness o f this close relationship betw een Party and mass organisations is illustra ted by the fact th a t in those countries w hich have abandoned socialism and are in the process o f restoring capitalism one o f the steps taken was tc> p roclaim the independence o f mass organisations from th e com m unist p arty , w hich in fact m eant independence from a pro letarian political line. D escribed as ‘freeing’ these organis- ations from politics it really involved cu tting them o ff from pro leta rian influence to allow them to fall under bourgeois influence. As Ram iz Alia, a p rom inen t m em ber o f the Albanian Party o f L abour who has p layed a leading p art in mass organisations has explained: ‘The hegem ony o f the p ro le ta ria t is necessarily linked w ith the existence o f the revolu tionary p a rty o f the w orking class. W ithout the leading role o f the p arty the hegem ony and the historic mission ol

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the w orking class are em pty phrases. The efforts o f m odern revision ists to prove th a t the h istoric mission o f the working class and the_leadiniJ role of th (^_ co m m u w s^)arty are_two d ifferen t things, th a t th anks only to the td a c e i to c c u p iej in the system o f social p ro d u c tio n the w orking class can plav itsleadership role, even w ith o u t a M arxist-Leninlst p a r ty .orthrough o th er so-called “ w orkers’ p arties” Mike the R ritkh I Labour T arty ) wRich are in the service o f the bourgeoisie^ h ave no th ing in com m on witfr

There are h istorical and po litical reasons why there have been no o th e r parties in A lbania from the tim e o f the founding o f the C om m unist Party , the A lbanian Party of Labour. D uring the period o f the liberation war, w hen the w idest possible alliance was sought against the fascist armies o f occupation , it w ould have been consonan t w ith a correct M arxist-Leninist line for o th e r political parties to have been included in th e N ational L ibera tion F ro n t if they supported the national resistance m ovem ent led by the C om m unist Party on behalf o f the w orking masses. In fact A lbania is a rare exam ple o f a coun try in w hich, prior to the creation of the C om m unist Party , there ex isted neither social dem ocratic nor any o th er bourgeois parties. In the course o f the war various political groupings w hich m ight have constitu ted parties discredited them selves by collaboration w ith the enem y and thus elim inated themselves from the anti-fascist coalition.

A fter libera tion , the rem nants o f the old exploiting classes with the su p p o rt o f U nited S tates and British agents tried to establish a political p a rty w ith the aim o f underm ining the People’s D em ocratic G overnm ent. But this a ttem p t at creat­ing political su pport for the tiny m inority o f landow ners and capitalists was in such obvious and direct conflic t w ith the ml crests o f the overw helm ing masses o f w orkers and peasants that it s tood no chance w hatever o f succeeding.

It is n o t surprising th a t those w ho backed the form ation o f l he kind o f political parties w hich could d isrup t and reverse the revolu tionary course o f the cou n try should describe the absence o f o th e r parties as ‘un dem ocratic’. T he dem ocratic i haracter o f a state is n o t dem onstra ted by the num ber o f its_^ in )li~lical n am es, nor by th e variety, o t cunn ingly-devised

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program m es offered to the public, nor by noisy electoral c a m p a ig n s anH H p m a o n g i r a l j T r n r n k p ^ ^ ^ tom ake anv real difference h o w ever the jaeople vote. It is determ ined hv w h e t h e r the class in pow er is th a t o f workers

jfv or explo iters, w hether state activ ity serves the in terests o f a privileged m i n o r i t y r»wnino a H is n r o n o r t in n a tr am ount o f t | ] e sources o f w e alth o r ra-.icc,-c prrvti.r-pt hat w ealth . A lbanian experience has proved th a t a M arxist- L eninist p arty o f the w orking class whose in terests are no d ifferen t from those o f peasants and progressive intellectuals is n o t only perfec tly capable o f representing and safeguarding the real in terests o f the people b u t, in the absence o f o ther parties w hich w ould necessarily be bourgeois, discharges even be tte r its m ission o f liberating the nation and proceeding with the socialist revolution.

In any case once the w orking class has assum ed s ta te I power, as—occurred in A lbania w ltb th e final d e f e a t of

t f j ex ternal and in ternal enem ies, th e£ x isU m c< ^ snvp' ^ th a t of the \^ rk e r§ _ w o u ld be political nonsense. As Enver

H oxha says on this p o in t: ‘Since the w aT^Fclasses continues during the period o f building a socialist society, during the transition to com m unism , and since political parties express the in terests o f particu lar classes, the presence o f o ther, non-M arxist-Leninist parties w ould be absurd . . . especially afte r the construc tion o f the econom ic base o f socialism. This does n o t at all jeopard ise dem ocracy b u t, on the con trary , strengthens real p ro le ta rian dem ocracy .’

lu s t ..as m em bers o f the Party , sharing the same com m it­m en t to seeing th a t the ideology o f socialism perm eates every aspect o f w ork and life, bv belonging bo th to the organs o f the state and the mass organisations help to un ite governm ent and people, so th ey have a sim ilar role to nlav in resolving o ther d istinctions in A lbanian society . T he fu rth e r develop- m en t o f socialism dem ands th a t certain social con trad ictions inherited from the past be narrow ed and eventually elim i­nated — such as those betw een w orking class and peasantry , betw een tow n and coun try , betw een industry and agri­cu ltu re , betw een m ental and m anual labour. If these co n tra­dictions are n o t dealt w ith, they can grow to the p o in t where they divide society and even generate new class differences.

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B ut m em bers o f the Party , operating on b o th sides o f each o f these con trad ictions, im bued w ith the com m on aim of progressively reducing them , m ake a m ajor co n trib u tio n tow ard creating the m ore equ itab le and m ore closely united^ society in w hich socialism can flourish.

In his 1966 report to the F ifth Congress, Enver H oxha criticised the Party fo r n o t m aking the fullest use of the d istribu tion of m em bers in order to break dow n these con trad ictions. While approving th e general trend o f recru it­ing the m ajority o f m em bers from produc tion centres, from the ranks o f the w orking class and the labouring peasantry , he p o in ted o u t anom alies like the overw eighting o f city m em bership w hich w orked against the principle of un ifi­cation . Sim ilarly w ith differences like those betw een y o u th and age o r betw een m en and w om en, he po in ted o u t the need to fight conservative a ttitu d es w hich had led to the under-represen tation o f w om en and young people. ‘The adm ission o f w om en to th e Party is still unsatisfactory and does n o t correspond to the vivid, active and revolutionary co n tribu tion they arc m aking in all fields o f the co u n try ’s socialist co n s tru c tio n ’. A nd also ‘the y o u th organisation m ust be regarded as the inexhaustib le revolu tionary reserve for the grow th o f the Party ranks’.

Since the Party plays such a crucial role in m aintain ing the thrust o f fu rth e r socialist developm ent, in assuring correct relations betw een leadership and people, in resolving social con trad ictions and strengthening the d ic ta to rsh ip o f the p ro letariat, it is plain th a t the health o f the Party through continuously pum ping in fresh b lood to revivify all the Party’s organs is a m atte r o f the gravest concern for the whole co u n try . ^

While the P arty needs new b lood this b lood m ust be clean. Careful a tten tio n is paid to such qualities in the candidate m em ber as character, m orals, self-sacrificing sp irit, political m aturity , revolu tionary elan and links w ith the masses. The lerm o f cand ida tu re is n o t m erely form al b u t a tw o to th ree year period o f testing the cand ida te’s co n d u c t on the w ork I ron t o f socialist co n stru c tio n , his discipline, resourcefulness and ab ility to defend the P arty line, his relationships w ith lellow w orkers and the w orking masses generally, the respect

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and love he enjoys from com rades and his harshness to his own errors and shortcom ings. I t is also a period o f intensive ideological and political education.

W hat is requ ired o f the m em bers o f the A lbanian Party o f ! Labour once they have been accepted as full partic ipan ts in

Party w ork? Enver H oxha set o u t these requirem ents in considerable detail in his 1966 report.

— ‘T he m em bers o f our revo lu tionary Party should be loval t o the teachings o f M arxism -Leninism , to our Party and to the people, ready for every s a c r if ic e th a t m ay be re flu jred jn the in terests o f the revolution and sorialisnp.

‘C om m unists m ust have the discinlined d e t e r m in a t i o n in im plem ent the P arty line and th e s ta te laws w ith o u t allowing the application o f Hirertives to hprnmi- tnerhan iral. They m ust be creative, understand ing the political essence o f Party decisions and governm ental acts in order to apply them to concrete s ituations in such a way as to insure their effectiveness.

mmmm ‘They m ust be rigorously conscien tious in seeing ihai th j i r Party m em bership does n o t b r in g a n d will never bring them even the sligh te s t personal privilege b u t only confers on them the m ost d ifficu lt and responsible tasljg. Those w ho th ink d ifferen tly and use their Party cards to ob ta in for themselves o r for those personally associated w ith them any m aterial or m oral advantages do n o t deserve, n o t even for a m om en t, the h o n o u r o f being Party m em bers.

‘C om m unists should he closely linked w ith the m asses, atten tively ™<\ p n e c t f u l lv listen to w hat they have to sav. live and w ork w ith them , sense their feelings and know th e ir needs, p u t them selves at the head of the masses and lead them. They m ust regard as inim ical every characteristic , self-conceitedness, arrogance or com m andism , w hich leads to negligence or under-estim ation o f the masses and their work.

‘Valuable m em bers o f our P arty are those w ho always tak e in to account and fearlessly wage class struggle, outside and w ith in the ranks of the Party , reiving for this co n tin u o us struggle on the fundam ental p rincip les o f M arxism -Leninism .

i *" ‘They m ust know how to distinguish, follow ing a correct dialectical analysis, betw een w hat is good and w hat is fyad. what is dangerous and w hat is bold and creative. T hey must

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be able to use m ethods of education and persuasion, always leaving coercion to the last. G ood revo lu tionary Party m em bers are those w ho by their w ork and behaviour win the confidence and affection o f th e people, w ho educate and save those w ho m ake m istakes, w ho a ttack m ercilessly w ith the greatest hatred the incorrigible and socially dangerous enemies o f o u r people and our Party.

——^‘C om m unists m ust be endow ed w ith revolu tionary vigil­ance* in defending th e Party line and the p u rity o t its ideals. T hey m ust never hide their shortcom ings and errors, critic­ising their ow n failures w ith o u t w aiting for o thers to do it for them . O nly thus will they be in a position to criticise the shortcom ings o f their com rades and co rrec t o thers by the exam ple o f th e ir own principled conduct,

r——1 R evolutionary m em bers m ust w ork conscien tiously a t w hatever pi ace the Party has assigned them , always pu tting above e v e r y t h i n g t h e general in te re st. T hey should never connive at any unhealthy situation created by incorrect conclusions and decisions taken by any Party or s ta te organ, ne ither should they com ply w ith w rong o r arb itrary instruc­tions by any functionary . S ound centralisation in the Party organisation m ust be dialectically linked w ith the decen­tralised responsibility o f every Party m em ber, collective responsibility rightly com bined w ith the individual respon­sibility o f each com m unist.’

W hat Enver H oxha has described at som e length as the requirem ents o t JParty m em bers is sim ply Marx ist m orality — a m orality , in L en in ’s w ords, ‘en tirely subord inated to _ th e interests o f the class struggle o f the p ro le taria t. . . . For up (M arxists ) there is no such thing as m orality apart from hum an so c ie ty ’ A nd ending exp lo ita tion in hum an society can only be achieved by uniting the vast m ajority who are explo ited , the w orkers, against the class o f exploiters and oppressors in a p ro trac ted struggle to abolish classes altogether. Class struggle contains by im plication the whole of M arxist m orality . In the social reality o f the ‘class’ such feelings as so lidarity , fra te rn ity and the love o f o n e ’s fellow man, w hich canno t excep t as m ere abstract hum anism stre tch across th e gulf betw een oppressors and oppressed, find their true expression am ong those sharing the b u rden o f oppres­

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sion in all its form s and capable by their com radeship and u n ity o f em ancipating them selves and society. In the activity o f ‘struggle’ is realised M arx’s in junction th a t the p o in t is no t sim ply to understand th e w orld b u t to change it - to the sort o f place w here those fellow feelings need no lonyer he lim ited

exploite^L.aiiiljeiyilaiJ^s.It m ight be w ondered if a sufficient num ber o f people

could be found in A lbania, or in any coun try for th a t m atter, w ho by being prepared to com m it them selves to so strenuous an eth ic could keep the C om m unist Party up to streng th and able to perform its tasks o f leadership. B ut it m ust be rem em bered th a t w ith the revolutionary overthrow o f the exploiting class and the assum ption o f state pow er by the w orking class, as occurred in A lbania along w ith the successful conclusion o f the liberation war, the w hole m oral clim ate o f a cou n try begins to change; and for the individual­istic, com petitive, self-seeking co n d u c t encouraged by capital­ism is progressively su b stitu ted the fight against self-interest and the co-operative realisation of the collective good dem anded by socialism. The tes t o f w hether such peop le exist in A lbania and can be recru ited in adequate num bers t o m an the defences ap n n st a resto ration o f capitalism and to co n stru c t a new society from w hich exp lo ita tion in any form h as been e lim inated is precisely the e x t e n t tn w h ir h so c ia l i s tr e Ia l io n s ( ) f i product__at^he^econom ic_base__andiii_so£iaJjst m orality in tne cultural sji2 en>trucjjjre_haye_bee^ and are being lu r th e r developed.

T h e P artyoT T ^abour o f A lbania, Enver H oxha goes on to say in his rep o rt, m ust cherish those m em bers who have w orked long and devotedly in the Party ranks and have acquired great experience in struggle — n o t by p e ttin g them , b u t by safeguarding them and continu ing to provide them w ith revolu tionary tasks com m ensurate w ith their ability . The com m ittees anrl Party organisations generally m ust pay their m ain a tten tio n n o t to figures of p roduc tion increases b u t to the education o f com m unists and the w orking people? It i<: penpl£_jfrfho c re a te m a te r ia lw e a lth aridjTero^cally^ajTply the Party line, and it is people also w ho degenerate , steal or d am agc jioc jahsji)roperty and violate state laws.

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T he principle o f dem ocratic centralism , the subord ination o f the m in o rity to the m ajo rity and the low er organs to th e higher, is n o t sim ply an organisational_j3u e s tio ^ the fundam ental torm s ot education and political dcvelyp- m en t w ith in the Party. D em ocratic centralism com bines iron-likc discipline w ith full d e m o c r a c y , ensuring th e im p lem en ta tion o f d e c i s io n s arrived a |^ a f tp r ^ j jT P ^ v iH p s t discussion and testing these decisions by social practice. In the verification o t decisions in term s ol m en 1 UUtlltll Ton- sequences com m unists them selves, the m ajority on a p arti­cular issue as well as the m inority , are rem oulded and tem pered. If the correctness o f the decision is confirm ed by reality this serves to educate the m inority voting against that decision’s adop tion . If p ractice proves the con tra ry , th en the m ajority voting for the decision m ust m ake self-criticism and consider w hy th ey arrived at a w rong conclusion. *

Above all, the seriousness o f a revolu tionary p arty l i e s jn its a ttitudg—to its ow n errors and shortcom ings. In his repo rt to the S econd Congress o f the P arty in 1952 Enver H oxha took the whole Party severely to task in order to im prove m ethods o f leadership. ‘We call m eeting a fte r m eeting which go on fo r hours and days on end b u t very little com es o u t o f them . Decisions are taken , m any decisions at th a t, b u t n o t all o f them are applied. T hen nearly as m any decisions are taken again to carry o u t the previous decisions. N ew decisions are adop ted also on m atters already decided upon , b u t forgotten . This is trifling w ith the w ork , p re tending you are w orking and deciding issues w hen in reality you are obstructing the w ork ’.

R eturn ing to the them e o f Party shortcom ings in the 1966 report Enver H oxha urged: ‘N o t a single Party organisation, cadre o r com m unist should be afraid o f criticism and self-criticism. I t is a great error to take a bureaucratic or liberal a ttitu d e tow ards errors, no m atte r by w hom com ­m itted . C riticism and self-criticism should n o t only be conducted beh ind closed doors, w ith in the P arty organis­ations, b u t on occasions it m ust be carried o u t in the presence o f the w orking masses. The P arty and its m em bers do n o t w ork and fight separated from the masses so their errors and shortcom ings have consequences fo r the w orking

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masses and are n o t unknow n to them . T he activ ity o f the' Party and its m em bers m ust be under the co n tro l o f the masses. I t is a m istake to th in k th a t Party problem s should be tackled only by com m unists o r th a t elections to Party posts should be held secretly w ith o u t being know n to n o n ­m em bers as if the P arty w ere an illegal organisation, or as if the w orking people were ind ifferen t to the problem s discussed by com m unists, the tasks they assign them selves and the leaders th ey have e lec ted ’.

Speaking on the fu rth e r revolu tion isation o f the P arty and the G overnm ent in 1968, Enver H oxha defined the class na tu re o f the A lbanian Party o f Labour. ‘We know th a t our P arty o f L abour is, like all genuine M arxist-Leninist parties, an organised d etachm en t o f the w orking class. This implies th a t those in the P arty are the best, m ost revolu tionary and m ost reso lu te vanguard o f th a t class. Such people do n o t fall as m anna from heaven. They em erge from the ranks o f the masses and distinguish them selves at w ork and in b a ttle by their virtues and conduct. Those adm itted to the P arty com e from various classes in our society , from the w orking class, from agricultural co-operatives, from em ployees, from in te l­lectuals and people o f o th er walks o f life. N evertheless our Party is n o t an arena o f classes in w hich each class has its p rop o rtio n a l num ber o f representatives defending the indivi­dual in terests o f each class. N o, the hegem ony in our P arty is possessed by the w orking class w ith its own ideology, M arxism -Leninism ’.

By the tim e o f the S ixth P arty Congress in N ovem ber, 1971, o u t o f a Party m em bership o f 86 ,000 , w orkers m ade up 56% o f the m em bers and co-operative peasants 29%. D uring this Congress the C ontro l and A ud it Com m ission rep o rted th a t from 1967 to 1970 1,323 m em bers and 434 candidate m em bers had been expelled from the P arty and 1,400 full m em bers had been reduced to candidate m em bers. T here were 1,320 appeals against expulsion hand led by the Com m ission and in 75% o f these cases the decision o f the local Party com m ittees to expel was upheld. The m ajority were exnelled for shortcom ings resulting from insufficient education in M arxism -Leninism , to r violations of1 socialist norm s and for dissolute behaviour.

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The im portance o f these figures, covering the period following on tlnver noXflii s can io r greater e tto rts fey com m unists to take the lead in ideological struggle, is the p ro o f they provide th a t belonging to the Party o t L abour o't AJbania does n o t give one special privileges n o r p u t one b ey o n d criticism . To the con trary m em bership represents greater obligations to serve the people. The Party can only p lay its leadership role if it purges itself o f those unw orth y of thg~ nam e o t com m unists as well as co n tin uously revivitvlng itself w ith fresh blood. Over 20 ,000 new m em bers were taken in to the P arty bClWUtlll Lilt! F lfltTand S ixth Congresses. <—

Enver H o x h a’s continuing concern fo r the rec titu d e o f the A lbanian P arty o f L abour w hich he founded, is only one aspect o f the co rrec t leadership he has given to the A lbanian people ever since he to o k the initiative in organising their resistance to the fascist occupation o f the coun try . As C om m ander-in-Chief o f the L iberation A rm y, as acknow ­ledged head o f th e Party and S ta te he has always been in the fo re fro n t o f the struggle fo r national independence and socialist developm ent. The appreciation o f the people for his guidance and for his sharing w ith them every hardship along the d ifficu lt w ay they have travelled to A lban ia’s present position as E u ro p e’s only socialist co u n try takes m any forms. A long w ith slogans wishing a long life to the Party w hich are to be seen everyw here, appear as frequen tly the letters ENVER as a popu lar trib u te to their com rade and leader. Every appearance o f Enver H oxha on the streets o f the capital or in w hatever o th er to w n or d istric t he visits — and m any are the occasions form al and inform al on w hich he moves freely am ong the people — becom es a spontaneous trium phal procession. T he house w here he was born in G jirokastra has becom e one o f the m useum s o f the A lbanian revolution.

There is no th ing slavish or ‘mass organised’ ab o u t these dem onstrations o f affec tion and respect. T h at w ould be entirely _alien to the tough independen t character of the Albania^ Thpy | pVe the m an as a staunch com rade mstruggle: b u t he_also em bodies_^or them t h e j x >litical and philosophical line which has en ah ler l them to achieve so m uch bv their ow n correc tly -o rien ta ted efforts. T heir deep

regard for Enver H oxha, as for the Party o f L abour of A lbania, is u ltim ately a regard for the principles o f scientific socialism w hich, applied to th e specific cond itions of A lbania, have freed them from ex ternal in terference and laid the foundations o f their socialist society.

Marxism__by_no m eans rejects the concept of leadership.

respect to the w orking class as a w hole. Sim ilarly, in the ranks o f revolutionaries there are leaders w ho are particu larly well equipped to apply the principles o f scientific socialism, M arxism -Leninism , to the concrete conditions o f their ow n sphere o f engagem ent. M arxism ’s unique co n trib u tio n is_tod e f i n e t h e d i ; i l e r ) i r : i l r r h i l m n h r 1w < > f m . _ b - : i r l < - r c h i p a n r l p e o p l r

peo£ le_and jth£ jD eo]i}leiiiif r o m b e in g d e p r iw contro j.

In the great social transfo rm ations o f recent h isto ry the w orking masses in revolt against oppressive conditions have had the leadership o f a com m unist p arty and, also, o f a revolu tionary genius w ho com bined to a rem arkable degree the grasp o f scientific theo ry and the p ro fo u n d understand ing o f the social forces in his ow n co u n try enabling him to apply th a t theo ry concretely w ith ou tstand ing success, thus con­tribu ting creatively to the deepening and broadening o f the theo ry itself. Such was Lenin w ho led the w orkers, peasants and soldiers o f Russia in the first conquest o f s ta te pow er and firm establishm ent o f a d ictato rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t. Mao T setung led the Chinese people in their own revolutionary struggle and d em onstra ted by his leadership o f the p ro ­letarian cu ltural revolu tion th a t the w orking masses, having won sta te pow er and established a d ic ta to rsh ip of the p ro le taria t, could ho ld on to it by roo ting o u t the rem nants o f bourgeois ideology and sm ashing any a ttem p t to restore capitalism . Ho Chi Minh led the V ietnam ese in proving th a t a relatively small co u n try organised in p eop le’s war, under the guidance o f a com m unist party , could take on and defeat the

n

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m ost pow erfu l im perialist aggressor o f our tim es. What Enver H o x h a’s leadership o f the A lbanian people has shown is_thaj no co u n try is to o small, no people too tew to defend _their national sovereignty against a_ujiole_aiTay_of_hostilc powers and set ab o u t the task^In so doing Enver H oxha, the leaders and people o f A lbania have enriched the revolu tionary experience and theoretical understand ing o f the w orld p ro le ta ria t. T hat is the test of great M arxist-Leninist leadership.

O f course these great leaders have always w orked in the closest association w ith o thers o f com parable grasp and understanding , and on the recru itm en t to the leadership of younger m en w ith the same qualities depends the continued advance o f socialist co nstruc tion and socialist m orality . Such in A lbania are m en like M ehm et Shehu, Hysni Kapo, Gogo Nushi w ho recen tly died, Myslim Peza, A bdyl Kellezi, Haxhi Lleshi, Shefquet Peci, Beqir Balluku, Ram iz Alia, Manush M yftiu , Spiro K oleka, R ita M arko, Haki Toska, Adil Çarçani— to m ention only a few o f those distinguished by their

service to the people w ho them selves include in their ranks innum erable heroes and heroines o f A lbania’s struggles in w ar and peace.

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C hapter Eleven

The Mass Organisations

R evolution and socialism are the achievem ent o f the masses

revolu tionary practice o t tne masses are the inexhaustib le source t r o m w h i c h t ^

ins^ iradon^jU jjL iiidM jJJiS fi-JiiJia lU iiijL j^^learning from the masses in o rder to j3ejih le_ toJ1eacl2_^h^j^

th is n u E s s ^ m e J ^ T o ^ jn T ^ ’xpressed in thc^organisational principle o f dem ocratic centralism ; it is ro o ted in the very theory o f know ledge o f Marxism. AllJknowled^e^orujm

tion o f the objective ex ternal w orld through m an ’s

know ledge is only com plete when this rational know ledge has been tested in social p ractice, w hen the abstract ideas o f physical and social laws have been d irected to the practice o f changing b o th the objective and subjective w orld by their applica tion to p ro d u c tio n , to scientific experim ent, to revolu tionary class struggle. *

T ru th as the p ro d u c t o f social p ractice is n o t to be found

vivid creativeness o f th e m a s s e s ^ v h ic n ^ e n in describes as ‘the fundam ental factor o f the new social life ’.

The process o f the m ass line as set fo rth by M ao Tsetung

( e,‘T ake the ideas o f the masses (scatte red and unsystem atic ideas) and concen tra te them (through s tudy tu rn them in to co n cen tra ted and system atic ideas) th en go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas un til the masses em brace them as th e ir ow n, ho ld fast to them and translate them in to action , and test the correctness o f these ideas in such ac tio n ’. Once the ideas draw n from the experience o f the masses are tak en back to the masses as an elaborated theo ry of revo lu tionary change and are grasped by the masses they becom e ‘a m aterial force w hich changes society and changes the w o rld ’. As Enver H oxha expresses it: ‘M arxism -Leninism is n o t a privilege and m onopoly o f certain “ able-m inded” people w ho can understand it. It is the scientific ideology of the w orking class and the w orking masses and only w hen its ideas are m astered by the w orking masses does it cease to be som eth ing abstract and becom e a great m aterial force fo r the revolu tionary transfo rm ation o f the w o rld ’.

He stigmatises those w ho neglect e ither aspect o f this tw o-w ay dialectic betw een masses and leadership. ‘Those who underestim ate and despise the experience of the w orking masses, w ho try to com m and o thers on the basis of their au th o rity , in reality have nothing to teach the masses. They are em pty-headed cha tte rboxes whose only ‘cap ita l’ is their conceitedness and arrogance. On the o th er hand there are som e com m unists w ho vulgarise the links w ith the masses and the idea o f listening to their opinions. T hey passively listen to w hat d ifferen t w orking people say. T hey approve everything that is said and do n o t take a stand on principle, do no t try to analyse the ideas expressed by the w orking people in order to distinguish w hat is correct from w hat is wrong, the im portan t from the trivial and to sum up the mass experi ence

To deepen the mass line the P arty has to devote special ■itten tjo jL lo -th e 1WIH5S c o n s o l id a tu ^ T K ^ m E ra T T h e J 'a ^so th a t the w orking people, rem oulded in ^ ç o m m u n ia ljf la y,

on tlca lr

f

ilJJ J J j i ^ g m ^ n ^ ^ o u t i c a l ^ T o n s a o u s j m ^ t e r ^ f ^ h e ^ o u n t ^ .

had m ain tained the closest ties w ith the A lbanian people

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fd u n n g _ th e anti-fascist struggle becam e, afte r the successful

war. diesuch m as^o^am saT ions as trade u n io n s^^ i^u m o n T o T T o iU h au<T‘TH"*"women, the union o f v m te r s and v aru m ^ -o ltie r c u U u £ 2 n T ^ ^ Q r = ^ These D em ocratic F ro n t o rçam saT Io n ^ riav ^T o iS in u eaT o play an im p o rtan t p art in transm itting the Party line to th e people, in educating them in political u n ity around the Party and the socialist state and also in providing organised a ttendance to w hat the masses in the countryside and cities have to say so th a t th ey can partic ipate actively in solving social and state problem s and in struggling against regressive habits and tendencies inim ical to the building o f socialism.

* T ra d e ^ in io n s ^ ^ n fa n is e ^ n o ^ o n ^ h ^ b a s i^ c i^ r^ ^ s k i l ls n o r k in d s o f w o r l^ ^ lo n e ^ b u t r e p r e s e n t in g a n id i^ w o r k e i^ i i^ a parti c u T a n a c to r y o r m ^ u s U ia ^ e n f e i^ n s e ^ ^ ^ ^ Z E Q Q T ^ o fc o m m u m s m lO T d e v e lo g ^ i^ j^ j^ j^ g n s d o u s n e g ^ a ^ B i^ i ts o f p ro d u c tio n and fo r draw ing w orkers in to a le a d e rs h im o le n o tja n J h M r^ ^ s p e c tto th ^ m jd u c d v ^ a ro c e s y ts e lf jJ n i^ ^ ^ J ^ e

worldn^jTierël**flIë^navë"!T ië^^sponsiI)ITT^^of encouraging socialist em ulation as the m ain m otivation for b e tte r and m ore creative m ethods of w ork and they are the principal channel for th e tw o-way flow o f concrete proposals and counter-proposals betw een th e econom ic organs o f the state and the w orking people in the com pilation o f the five-year plans.

f A ny A lbanian factory is a m odel_of_dem ocratic organis.- a tio n ^ T h e w orkers, trade un ion secretaries and Party cadres are willing to talk freely abou t their own or anyone else’s conditions o f w ork or rates o f pay , including managers, specialists or section leaders, because noth ing is h idden from general know ledge. In a p rom inen t place a bu lletin board will contain notices o f individual workers or collectives who have done ou tstandingly good w ork or, perhaps, developed some productive innovation in m achines or their use. T here will also be references to those w ho have done slipshod work. The ‘fletë rru fe ’, or public no tice board for criticism and self-criticism, is the m ost characteristic and universal social phenom enon in A lbania and the rules governing its use are

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stric tly adhered to . In a facto ry , for exam ple, no charge o f ^ incom petence against any individual o r collective can go unansw ered. No counter-charge against the original critic or critics constitu tes an acceptable response. T im e lim its are set for the person or collective criticised to explain why the thing was done and, if w rong, to m ake self-criticism. An unsatisfactory response or self-criticism considered to be insincere have resulted in facto ry m anagers’ being replaced.

W hat o ften strikes a v isitor as strange are the flower gardens and trees around facto ry buildings. B ut o f course they belong to the w orking people; th ey are the places w here they spend a good part o f their tim e; there is no reason why they should n o t be m ade as p leasant as possible.

Party m em bers in the trade unions, who- in this as in all

have tlx: responsibility ot nrevcmtiivj narrow ness ot ou tlooka<n d ^ ^ te n ^ y i£ ^ ^ ^ ie a lp r im a r i l^ w iU ie c o n o m i£ ij£ |j12k]i£ffl£.U nchecked this tendency can result in a failure to wage class strutnrle amMoTaf^'PBTTlT^TnfiTarv^TasE^rTHffSroTuTTo'n-ia r ^ ^ ç n j j jg j^ j^ ^ ^ w o ^ c i^ ^ a re Ie s s h ^ a ç ç e ^ jj^ > -jis jT iem beo ,wi

The future of s o c ia b s m T e p e n d s o n educating th e n c w generation in a class revolu tionary spirit and this responsi­bility is undertaken by the U nion o f L abour Y outh o f A lbania. I t is to its y oung people th a t a co u n try m ust look for passing on and fu rth e r developing socialist achievem ents and, u ltim ate ly , fo r accom plishing the transition from socialist to com m unist society. T he p a trio tic and revolu tion­ary y o u th o f A lbania, ideologically hea lthy and m orally sound, prepared for hard w ork in the construc tion of socialism and self-sacrifice in the defence of the coun try , shows th a t the U nion o f Y outh is function ing correctly in close association w ith the Party.

The com m unist education o f A lbanian y o u th is taking place in the m idst o f class struggle a t hom e and abroad and in I he co n tex t o f b itte r and com plicated ideological differences betw een revisionist and socialist countries. F urtherm ore young people do n o t know from personal experience the savage class oppression o f the past and the sacrifices required

US

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to end it. I r ^ t l ^ r e la t iv e h ^ e a c e h d c o n d i t io n ^ ^ b a n i a ^ r g g ^ ^ a r e r ^ ^ n ^ ^ ^ ^ ë n l ^ J h a t ^ ^ t h e ^ a ^ ^ n o t in fluenced j as has been th e_ çase^ in the E a s tE u ro p e a n p e o p i c ^ i c m o c -r .ic ie s , b v In 'Ui <-< >is ide as w ln c n , U ir o u m iH i f

f o r ill j canta^eT rianT suE nT anT m sT diour^rm s...

S tuden ts p a r tic u I^ jT ^ n a ^ ^ D e tra y such bourgeois ten d ­encies as idleness and intellectualism , detachm en t from the masses and unconcern w ith the problem s and worries of the people, exaggerated dem ands and pretensions, conceitedness and disregard for the revolutionary experience o f o lder people.

C iU ^ ic i^a tio n h ^ jh ^sicaH v o i^^

| s<choolim>biis t em ^ e||2 jS^^E^^E^^S2 3 ^£iiiim c ^ a fe jo t^ m c H ^ e r ta i i^ im o u iU o fT o m ? o r trT i!^ M b a n m a ir n e w '^ ra n 'w a y ^ o n sT T u c U o n 'T s^ a m e d ^ u rrT ^ y o u n g people w orking in their holidays or during periods taken o ff from form al education . A visit to one of their w ork cam ps along the line, o r to som e bare hillside w here they are engaged in terracing and p lan ting trees, confirm s the salu tary effect o f such organised physical labour in encouraging a sense o f com radeship am ong them selves and the ideal o f being of service to the people.

On the o th e r hand , there are m isunderstandings in the rest o f society ab o u t the needs and dem ands o f y o u th , unjust com plaints ab o u t their behaviour and expressions o f m istrust in their ab ility and willingness to learn. The U nion o f L abour Y ou th , co-operating w ith the Party com m ittees, can com bat such prejudices, win respect for their energy and zeal and open up opportun ities fo r them to play a full and responsible part in socialist construc tion .

coilQjX^._lQ-Igudal and_bi2IiI££Qi§-Societies m ost w om en suffgrth e -d

• This was particu larly tru e o f pre-war A lbania w here m anyw om en still w ent veiled and in the feudal n o rth the Lek D ukagjini, a canon o f m orals covering such custom s as the blood feud and defining the position o f w om en as th a t o f ch a tte l, still governed social relations. One q u o ta tio n from

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this canon gives som e ind ication o f the life w om en led. ‘A wom an m ust w ork harder than a donkey for the la tte r feeds on grass, w hich costs no th ing , while a w om an lives on b read ’.

During the liberation w ar w om en fought side by side w ith m en and 6 ,000 o f the 70,000 partisan fighters were w om en and girls. A t the F irst Congress o f A nti-fascist W omen, Enver H oxha said ‘A lbanian w om en w on their rights w ith b lood and these rights are guaranteed by the G overnm ent o f the People w hich they , along w ith their b ro thers, founded at the cost o f great sacrifices’.

The U nion o f the W omen o f A lbania has m ade a valuable co n trib u tio n to the radical change in the position o f w om en, placing before them the perspective o f throw ing o ff the yoke im posed by the o u tlo o k and habits o f the old regressive fam ily, doing away w ith their cu ltural backw ardness and partic ipa ting in productive labour to win econom ic and social em ancipation and equality w ith m en in all fields.

W om en have responded to this challenge and now m ake up som e 42% o f the w ork force, engaged in all professions and branches o f industry excep t th e hardest and m ost dangerous jobs. But a struggle still has to be waged against the old enslaving concepts. Xll£I£—is_a_£ontiadiction in the a ttitu d e ev e n ^o ^ n g jy ^ o m rn u n is tsw h cH ri^ v o ri^ y T j^ o c ju ^ ^ eT es^ e j^ .

Q nT!ie7jraa^sum pTion1 r T t ^ ^ e f l S 3 n ^ ^ r ‘womeT ^ V n iIe inthe fj^IcT^T"TjroaucUon there l s a n e m u i i i E I ^ I m S S a r S f labour betw een m en an d w o m e n , w hen it com cs_loJim iS£-

labour is as w idesp reaT a irT tsfiouIcnSerM uch has been d o ne to create‘ ettt? 'TaciT7B ? ? T S i ^ i?^cH T m plB s1im eryo!T!ouse-

towns .uid_im_(jT^H^in7^ lin m ^ n rM n u d im u rc needs to be <lone_to_jm (* narlionate 5jn_absoh^.gTy con^lterms in every__£I2ll£re of productive and social life.

The W om en’s U nion in p a iT n ë^ fn p T IT ^ im ^ P arty still has the considerable responsibility o f educating w om en to play the fullest p a rt in socialist construc tion claim ing on their behalf all the assistance th ey need to do so and o f educating men to get rid o f the last vestiges o f m ale chauvinism in o rder to play their fu llest p a rt in the socialist fam ily.

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O th er mass organisations m ust be considered under appropriate headings. A necessary cond ition for these mass organisations to carry o u t the arduous dem ocratic tasks assigned to them is the continu ing sup p o rt and assistance of the A lbanian Party o f Labour. Since it is the d u ty o f every com m unist to be w ith the w orking masses, to w ork am ong them and to provide them w ith correct political leadership, no mass organisation is w ith o u t its com plem ent o f active Party cadres to help them realise th e ir im p o rtan t func tion o f m ediating creatively betw een Party and people.

C hapter Twelve

C reating the Socialist E conom ic Base

A t the end o f the anti-fascist war the m ost pressing problem facing the A lbanian people was the reconstruction o f the c o u n try ’s shattered econom y. To the P arty o f L ab o u r’s call fo r vo lun tary w ork to repair damage and get the wheels tu rning again there was a willing response, and soon workers and peasants organised in squads, battalions and brigades, ju s t as in the recently-concluded war, were engaged in this new battle fo r A lbania’s econom ic recovery.

Bridges and highways w ere rebu ilt and lines o f com m uni­cation were quickly re-eslablishcd. During 1945 workers got som e of th e factories, pow er stations and m ines back in to operation . Peasants were m obilised to sow the p loughed land and m ake a s ta rt on rebuilding the b u rned -ou t villages. A wave o f enthusiasm for w ork sw ept the co u n try and young people in their thousands from tow n and co u n try jo ined the voluntary lab o u r brigades and w orked tirelessly at the tasks o f reconstruction .

In Jan u a ry 1945 the law on ex traord inary taxation o f war profits was passed so th a t a p art o f the w ealth accum ulated hy p rofiteers could be used to m eet the im m ediate needs of the people and help pay fo r reconstruction . T he law fu rther provided th a t the p ro p e rty o f those w ho refused to pay these l.ixes was to be confiscated w ith o u t com pensation. During that year revenue from the tax on w ar p ro fits accounted for m ore th an h a lf o f the sta te budget and w ith the goods acquired by th e state from confiscating the p ro p e rty o f defaulters the first state-ow ned shops w ere opened in itiating a socialist sec to r in trading.

A nother law was passed requisitioning food stuffs and o ther m aterials in great need and steps w ere tak en to stam p

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o u t hoard ing and speculation; a system o f fixed prices was enforced and private accum ulation and selling o f grain was p ro h ib ited ; old bank-notes were overprin ted in order to begin checking the inflation w hich had so drastically devalued the war tim e currency.

T h ese _ te m p o ra ry solutions o f the co u n t ry^s_financial proK TonT^talrfatea^T?Taf!yT15^es*^rreconsTTuctjoiT . and_at tTTe^sam^tnneTurfTTerweaEen&3Tn<^Hm om i^positoQ^Q!jlh£ b o u rg e o is ie ^ n n l^ ^ T tro n g m tu sT o rT T F T o m g n n n a n c ^ m in B ritain ‘oT T ffi^ 'T Jnited S tates could have p u t A lbanian capitalists on their feet again and the Party o f L abour had categorically rejected all offers from these tw o countries, know ing only too well from w ar-tim e experience the con­ditions w hich w ould be a ttach ed to such ‘a id ’. A part from fraternal assistance, on a m utually independen t basis, from the Soviet U nion and the P eople’s D em ocracies, A lbania by the very na tu re o f th e p eo p le ’s political pow er established by the revolu tionary w ar, was firm ly com m itted to developing the econom y in the in terests o f the w orking masses by relying on their efforts and its ow n resources. Qs£,2i£]&£fjiiiip e^fot^jw as-iA e i<iw h o l^ h e a r t e d ^ |SgonseBo f t h ^ p e ^ l e t ^ ^ h c Party 's c.ill In iliro w ^ ian sH T T sT T ^ ^ IIIZ lE lIS Iu l iJ jZ IS ^ ^ oT,r^constm cH orr"T fie^T ffT e^ id ew a jith e en ac |[p fn i hy ihp

founda tion o l a socialist e c o n o m yIn D ecem ber 1944 the m ines and the p ro p e rty o f refugees

w ho had fled the co u n try for political reasons were n a tio n ­alised, and a m on th later a law transferred to the A lbanian sta te , w ithou t com pensation , as the com m on p ro p e rty of the people, the banks and share-holder com panies ow ned by foreign capitalists. I ^ A p r iM ^ 9 4 ^ a l lp n v a te lv o w n e d n ie ^ is o j j ^ y j g j j o r t a t i o n v v e r e t a k e n o v e r ^ T h ç ^ n icasu iii^__ ii£ ix_T ncU U xT l)\^^ i^7T nnM rriU cin eils '»1 1.1m jTeoplc; b n j^ h c ir j io c ia la n d e c o n o i™ . transfeijjngo w n e r s h ip o f f h e r n e a n ^ T T ' j p w T n ^ n ^ t n t h e p r o n l r a n d

j^ u U in ^ ^ ie r n ^ c o m g k te l^ ^ tU i^ p e o p le ^ g g j^ j^ j j j a a ta l i ly

sTatc and .u ^ j J ^ ^ n K ^ a s i^ ^ r T s oH ^H isi^tale^IuiX -lL liialismiT T h e i d e o l o g v o f n i ^ ^ o r ^ m ^ ^ T a s ^ a n d ^ c a n _o nly bem ain tained and d ev e lo p e c^ /fien the w orking c la^ sen jo y s

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stale pow er, what this change really am ounted to in political terms w as_the transtorm ation o f the peo p le ’s democratic <3 ic t a t o r s h it ^ ! v I n crR jj|!j^ jm ffP rr^ A s s {Til/ ' m ' ATrHrm^ff p r c e s ^ n ^ E ^ a n t i - f a s c i s ^ w a r i n t ^ ^ a d ic ta to rship o f the

) le ta n ^ ^p ro le ta rn ^^ T n U ah jT ^I r ^ ^ o l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ g n g u m e r ^ ^ ^ a g e r a d v e ^ v e r e s e t u ^ j n j t h ^

w p rk in g class.. In the countryside agrarian m easures were enacted to solve the con trad ic tion betw een the labouring peasan try and the big landow ners on the basis o f the war-tim e alliance betw een peasants and w orkers. In A ugust1945 the agrarian reform law was p rom ulgated by w hich existing state-ow ned land, the estates o f religious institu tions and all privately-ow ned land exceeding certain defined lim its was exp ropria ted and assigned fo r red istribu tion free o f charge am ong relatively landless peasants on the principle th a t ‘land belongs to the tille r’. T he p e rm itted holdings were 100 acres fo r owner-m anagers w ho had dem onstra ted their ab ility to farm their land efficiently , 50 acres for those w ho w orked their land them selves and 17 acres fo r those w ho did n o t till the ir ow n land b u t were requ ired to do so w ith in tw o years.

In a co u n try like A lbania w here arable land was so lim ited in ex ten t the holdings le ft to private p rop rie to rs were too large and p erm itted landlords and rich peasants to re ta in too m uch econom ic pow er. These shortcom ings in agrarian reform resulted from the influence the C om m unist Party o f Yugoslavia exerted at th a t tim e through certain m em bers o f I lie A lbanian P arty o f L abour, and once th a t alien influence had been rem oved these m istakes had to be rectified.

Up to 12 acres o f land were a llo tted to the head o f each lam ily and the buying, selling and leasing o f land was prohib ited .• n j K ^ j j g J j ^ ^ i ^ n b i U i o n o f l a n d a n ^ ^ ^ ^ a n i s ^ ^ s i s t a n g f

d * r le v e l n f n o b t j r n l c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e a i i d

I i > o j i _ l l l £ - _ l e a d i n t h e m o v e m e r ^ T T ^ f o r m a g r i c u l t u r a l —c o -

I’art o f the exp rop ria ted land was n o t d istribu ted b u t

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tu rned in to state farms w hich established a socialist sector in agriculture. Forests, springs, w a te r supplies and all subsoil riches were proclaim ed the com m on p ro p e rty o f the people while m ost o f the land cultivated by agricultural workers, their im plem ents and farm animals w ere the p ro p e rty o f co-operatives.

f AS-iL-££sult o f these m easures all the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n

agncu ltu ral c o ^ p ë n ^ v ë s r^ a fc T p ro p ë r^ T 't^ e T n 'g f ie ^ fo 'm ^ f s o c ia l l s t rx Ia t io n s o T ^ ^ r o d u c t io n , was d om inan t in the industrial sec to r in w hich co-operatives o f h an d icraft w orkers were m arginal; b u t the agricultural sector was predom inan tly co-operative w ith sta te farm s m aking up a small b u t in fluen tial p ro p o rtio n of the w hole. This reflected the basically small scale na tu re o f agriculture and the large scale na tu re o f industrial p roduc tion . B oth form s o f ow nership had a socialist character in th a t ex p lo ita tion was elim inated and d istribu tion was based on the am oun t o f w ork done.

By th e end o f 1946 87% of industrial o u tp u t wasco n tr ilj7 rT e c r^ ^ T C ^ s to t^ e c ^ r^ n T T B ^ T C u n 3 a E o ^ S a ^ ^ £ £ nlaid fo r th e ^nBaTnarT T c o n o m y ^ ^ T e v ^ o ^ m nnljerm ptëdb/ a c c o r a in ^ j^ j^ a n r T a m m e r e T ^ u T n ^ ^ l^ r ^ ^ T ^ in ^ p e o ^ e j i

unem ploym ent and \v ith_ jj^JjJj_ j_ajj^naj_ jis^^ labour. T ro ?u cH o r^ ~ o u ld be geared to u ie n e e d s o f society regardless o f p ro fitab ility excep t in the w idest sense of w hat benefited the w hole com m unity . But A lbania was econom i­cally a very poor co u n try and w ould rem ain so till small scale p roduc tion and prim itive farm ing were transform ed by increased industrialisa tion and fu rth e r collectivisation. Only in this w ay could the con trad ic tion betw een the advanced political pow er and the backw ard econom y, the new socialist relations o f p ro d u c tio n and the low level o f the forces of p ro d u c tio n be resolved — a con trad ic tion w hich was precisely the opposite o f th a t in the older industrialised countries w here highly developed forces o f p ro d u c tio n w ere in conflict with backw ard relations o f p ro d u c tio n represen ted by reac­tionary state pow er.

F rom a prim itive agrarian co u n try , p robab ly the m ost

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kaçkv^rd_Jn_Jiuroge1_^Mbania was to be turned in to an agricuIturabindustrM country w itntneem pnasTs increasingly on the^gvelo^m enTl"lo r inaustry"TiTT7Tventually, 71 would

In 1938 the rn a jo n ^ ^ rT Iie w o r^ n i '^ p e o p le w e 're e n ^ I 'g e d r in agriculture and only 15,000 w orkers or 13% o f the w ork force w ere engaged in industry w hich accoun ted for only W o o f the national incom e. Such had been the dam age and dislocation o f the w ar th a t it to o k a little over a year, till the end o f 1946, ju s t to get industrial and agricultural p roduc tion back up to 1938 levels.

But fu rth e r m easures were being taken to assure a rapid all round advance as th e skill and energy o f the working masses were concen tra ted on ending A lbania’s backw ardness. In May1946 the agrarian reform law was m odified to reduce the holdings of those w ho cultivated the land them selves to 12 acres and to expropriate altogether those w ho did not. In this way som e 430,000 acres o f land, 4 7 4 ,0 0 0 olive trees and6 ,000 draught animals becam e available fo r red istribu tion to land-poor peasant families. In Ju ly along w ith the nationalis­ation o f the banks, new ban k notes w ith five tim es the value o f the old were in tro d u ced and no fam ily was allow ed to exchange m ore old m oney th an the equivalent o f 100 units o f the new currency. In A ugust the law on the general econom ic sta te plan was adop ted . The Planning Com m ission, which had been set up the year before, was reorganised and work was begun on d rafting the econom ic p lan for 1947. *

f A s ^ a re s u l to f th e s o c ia h s a t io r^ jo f j^ h ^ jn n c iM H r ie a n g ^ I p r o d u c ^ o n a n T ^ ^ n ^ l l ^ ^ ^ r ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ e c o ^ ^ ^ ^ T tllie time"‘o ^ ^ T e n rs ^ w Q ^ e a r 'T > Ia r rT o ^ ld r^ ')u nc^?clvance' i»i )^d^Hl"T3l l K r T ^ m 7 r " MT n rrjis^ s in aT ^ n iT ^ r^ m m M n T r

The socialist form included industry , m ining, pow e si at ions, tran sp o rt and com m unications, th e financial system foreign trade, in ternal w holesale trade , s ta te retail trading enterprises, sta te farm s, state m achine and trac to r stations which enabled the co-operatives to begin the m echanisation ill agricultural p ro d u c tio n , forests, w aters and subsoil re sources. This form dom inated the econom y and accountec lor 95% o f all industrial p roduction .

137

r aaaditY_Droduction included the em ploym en t o f poor and m iddle peasants in agriculture and artisans________ago__________________inK ancIicn^jarodujyj^^j^^^J],^^

This form represen ted ab o u t 80% o f the to ta l volum e o f p roduction .

T h e capitalist form included rich peasants in the cour ^ y -side

: capita m ercna

h ec o u i^ ™ -

e j g o l o ^ i i j ^ J j j j ^ l J i ^ j j ^ J h e y were prim arily concerned w ith the d is trib u tio n o f goods and though th ey accoun ted for only 5% o f the volum e o f p ro d u c tio n , they hand led 80% o f t h ç ^ retail trade.

^ T ^ i e s e t h r e ^ o r m s o ^ c o n o r n y c o ^ s ^ o n d e d h ^ d i e t h r ^ social classes - ine working class. Uic working peasantry .ami th e b o u i^ e o i s i e ^ A lr e a d ^ th f ^ jD ^ ^

other w a ^ ^ n "w n T c li^ !e v l voult^tru 'ggI^ '7 o l‘m am tair^laeirm i l l i o n c

th ey had certain initial advantages and.alwaj/S|J ia v e iid i^ ^ a c k i r u ^ ^ f <w o d ^ c ^ ^ ta l i s i r ^ ^ l lufiJl ^fliljLd

f ‘T a te rT ’T T T a n u a ^ T ^ W T w I ie n '^ n e w T y s te m ot procure- | m en t and supply was in troduced by the C entral C om m ittee to strengthen and im prove the econom ic relations betw een to w n and coun tryside, the th ree kinds o f m arkets established reflec ted these th ree econom ic form s. The state-guaranteed m arke t supplied goods a t fixed prices to w orking people on the basis o f ra tion cards; the barte r m arket supplied peasants w ith industrial com m odities in exchange for their agricultural surpluses; and the free m arke t served those in to w n and co u n try w hose needs were n o t m et by the o th e r tw o m arkets because they were n o t supplied w ith ra tio n cards o r were no t engaged in co-operative agricultural p roduction . Prices in the free m arke t were m uch higher th an in o thers and in this way m oney accum ulated by rich peasants and capitalist elem ents w ould be gradually m opped up. *

D uring 1947 sta te industrial enterprises were p u t on a self-supporting basis and were requ ired to cover all the expenses o f p ro d u c tio n to g eth er w ith a surplus for accum u­lation o u t o f their revenues. The m ain form o f budget incom e was derived from tax a tio n on the tu rn over o f econom ic

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enterprises. The artisan co-operatives were required to lay aside p art o f their p ro fits fo r expansion and the rem uneration o f m em bers was p u t on a socialist basis. The buying and selling co-operatives were charged n o t only w ith supplying the countryside w ith industrial goods b u t also w ith accum u­lating agricultural p roducts for the regular supply o f cities.

These m easures did n o t solve all the problem s o f socialist g row th by any m eans and, particu larly , on questions like the p rocu rem en t o f food grain m uch m ore experience w ould be requ ired in o rder to avoid the developm ent of new co n trad ic ­tions betw een tow n and coun tryside; b u t the basis had none the less been laid for a rem arkably rap id advance o u t o f A lbania’s old econom ic backw ardness.

Where before th e w ar the m ajo rity o f w orkshops em ployed fewer than 25 w orkers, by 1965 less th an 1% o f A lbanian w orkers w ere em ployed in such small concerns; from 454% of the to ta l incom e th en represen ted by industry the percentage had grown to over 55%; and this g row th ra te was assured by a steady increase in m eans of p ro d u c tio n at a rate of som e 65-70% as against a 30-35% rise in consum er goods — w hich is the form socialist accum ulation takes.

The econom ic base was able to sustain increasingly large units o f p ro d u c tio n like the big oil refineries, m echanised copper, chrom e and iron-nickel m ines, the great S talin and Mao Tsetung tex tile mills, the H am m er and Sickle kn itting mills, huge cem ent factories and chem ical w orks fo r the |>roduction o f fertilisers, the trac to r spare parts facto ry at T irana and gigantic hydro-pow er stations like the Karl M arx ,md Friedrich Engels p lan ts in the n o rth , and Jo sep h S talin in I lie south and the new Vau i Dejes (Deja Ford) s tation on the l)rin River w hich produces over one billion Kw/H.

The rate o f annual increase o f industrial p roduc tion has been over 15%, reaching in 1967 a level 44 times th a t of 19.38, and in under 25 years the national incom e has grow n l<> m ore th an five tim es its original size.

A lbania, the m ost backw ard co u n try in E urope, has left m ost E uropean countries far beh ind in its rate o f develop­m ent.

From a co u n try _w hiçhjiad t o im p o rt all sorts o f industrial K< >' xls A lbania now _exports n in F T n n e jr tj^ a m o u M

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Average G eneral D evelopm ent R ate o f Industry (1951-1966)A lbania 15.0Yugoslavia 9.9G reece 8.3Italy 8.2Bulgaria 13.6R um ania 13.2Britain 3.1Soviet U nion 10.6France 5.6U nited S tates 4.7

Increase in Industrial P roduction (1938 = 100%)1950 1960

A lbania 435 2621Yugoslavia 170 444Greece 107 242Italy 126 295Bulgaria 312 1236R um ania 147 500Britain 133 181Soviet U nion 222 677France 120 214U nited States 232 337

as befor£ _ lh £ _ ^ a i—and—half o f those exports are in d u strial prornicts. Planning is dom j^aw a^T vT H rT C ^TIspm poffionate cfevelopm eir^aF d iffe ren t regions. H undreds o f new industrial w orkshops, factories, pow er stations and m ines have been established in econom ically backw ard areas and new tow ns have sprung up like S talin , Bulqiza, Patos, M em aliaz, Cerrik, Maliq and Laç. The need for technicians and specialists has been m et by creating the institu tions to train them and in 1967 a lone m ore than 1400 graduated from advanced technological centres — fou r times the num ber sent abroad for train ing in the w hole 15 year period o f Zogist rule.

H ow has it been possible for such a tiny co u n try , encircled by enem ies, to resist all the pressures b rought to bear by im perialist countries, the betrayals o f revisionist countries and to achieve such a record o f social and industrial progress?

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The answer is the sam e as to the question o f how it was possible to defeat a vastly superior invasion force — by m obilising the courage, energy and skills o f the people w ho by relying on their ow n efforts w ere able, in the one case, to free their coun try , in the o th er, to develop and industrialise it.

'H i e j m j a g ^ y j y ^ ^ ^ i e l f ^ d i a n ç e i s b a s e d o n t h ^ f i y } ^ -m en taM M a rx is ^ j j r in c ip l^ T lK a c l ia n g e ^ ^ r^ E ro u g T ita b o u t

i S e m a T 7 ^ ^ |^ ^ iC o n to d ic to r in e ss |H<w ith in > i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ j l T e

an S n n 7 e^ £ aS o n sT v T n ^ y n ?e !^n n g < ran ^ eco n c Ia?^ au ses /~ 77Tsetting up a w holly independen t econom y w ith all branches o f m achine-m aking and heavy industry developed to the p o in t w here every possible need could be m et. But self- reliance does n o t m ean self-sufficiency. By relying on th e ir

r j jJ g U o n s h i^ jD ^ jm tU ja lsm i^ D o r^ ^ ^so c ia lisr* co u n T n ës^T?ëyic f o n o t" n ë g ie c t th e n U c m a n a c to r buTTIie'TTnmvTTa't w hat th ey p roduce at hom e is o f decisive im portance while w hat th ey im p o rt is secondary.

As M ehm et Shehu explains it: ‘A biding by the princip le o f self-reliance does n o t m ean th a t we should lock ourselves inside o u r national hull and ignore advanced foreign experi­ence, n o r should we ignore the in terna tional aid o f friendly countries. On the con tra ry , we should m ake a correct appraisal of and grasp the positive experience o f o thers and p ro fit froml he in terna tional aid of our real friends for building socialism in our own coun try . . . . ’

J J i i^ y g ^ ^ ^ i iU lf i i^ ^ U ^ jj j^ b il is a y o n o f th ^ e n m j^ jJ ^ I j jf l^

s H ^ J ^ T ^ ^ to f f T l^ ^ ^ b jm a k e ^ i tp o s s ib l^ J lo i^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n e ^ U ) c on tribu te the b e s F T T e T i a ^ ^ ^ n e r ^ o t n ^ g e n e r a ^ o o d o f

)im iiu ^ so c ic ^ T l'? S T ^ f f i^ T M rs F ^ !o n g re s ^ c > r tn ^ ra ^ ^ o f I T iioouTl,im B ? 5 7 ^ ''n v e r H oxha said: ‘T he A lbanian people who have heroically fought for the libera tion o f their coun try iind for th e ir dem ocratic p eo p le’s pow er have th o u g h t it best

th a t they should base their aspirations for m arching forw ard, first and fo rem ost, on their own inexhaustib le forces. They are conscious th a t, how ever great their sacrifices m ay be, th ey are w orking fo r them selves and n o t for o thers. T hey are w orking fo r their P arty and p eo p le ’s pow er w hich will surely lead them on the road to well-being and socialism. ’

Socialist econom ic_planning takes the sam e form ofdcm io cra tk ^ jen tra lism j^ f^T ejT T ^o i/O T jam an life . It is based on th em a^um m n p a ^ c ip a H o n o f tnë mas’sësT T T O P T ^ F B iey ^ Iaces o f w ork, in_cit^ fluart£ rs

d ra ^ a i^ c U v e s_ jia iL llia k £ _ th e ir rem arks_m d—silggsslionj.—o ^ e r ^ ^ ^ r ^ e f f e c t th a t th e ta n ^ e t s a r e n o t high enough and m o ^ ^ c o u l d D e a c c o m p l i s n e a n r a p a r t i c u l a r se c to r_ g fagrTcuTtuHI M ncfustryHT'airTiaH5eerH?anëcrT'orrHnsrtwQ_mayprocess TT?nve£n‘,TlSfl?"'pTa5iTTmgcomm]ttee and w orking people continues till the w hole plan in all its details is finally agreed. T he m eetings o f w orking collectives on the fou rth Five Y ear plan, w hich ended in 1970 w ith greater increases th an those p roposed in every branch o f the econom y, involved 174 ,000 discussions in w hich 141,000 proposals were p u t forw ard. T he fact th a t s ta te plans fo r econom ic and cultural developm ent ‘bear the m arks of the p eo p le ’ guaran­tees their being successfully p u t in to effect.

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C hapter T h irteen

D evelopm ent o f Agriculture

Before the w ar the backw ardness o f A lbania was now here m ore apparen t th an in the agricultural system , still based on feudal o r sem i-feudal relations o f p ro d u c tio n w ith the addition of som e exp lo ita tio n o f the peasan try by city capitalists. Landlords and w ealthy p rop rie to rs to o k half o f the p roduce in high rents and the rest was subject to the further depredation o f having to be exchanged at unfavour­able prices fixed by the m erchants. T he labouring peasantry was heavily in debt to usurers charging fan tastically high in terest rates. T he land was tilled w ith prim itive im plem ents by ineffic ien t m ethods and agricultural p ro d u c tio n was abysm ally low.

During the w ar the su p p o rt o f the p o o r peasants for the liberation struggle was w on by the prom ise o f land reform as part o f the revolu tionary transfo rm ation o f the country . In every liberated area the grain depots o f the land owners were confiscated and ren t and debts were cancelled. In the first days o f independence the state collected grain to prevent speculation; the tith e system was abolished; all debts were officially annulled and w hat rents rem ained were fixed a t a low lim it.

The agrarian refo rm , carried ou t in only 14 m onths during 1945 and 1946, was th e first revolu tion in A lban ia’s i ountryside. A ny rem aining feudal relations were abolished, l.md was d istribu ted free o f charge to the peasants who tilled11 and the land lord class was liquidated. T he liqu ida tion o f a• lass does n o t m ean, o f course, the annih ilation o f the individuals m aking it up — any m ore th an the liqu ida tion o f iIn ( lass of reckless drivers by disqualification w ould m ean

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anyth ing b u t p u ttin g an end to th a t form o f anti-social behaviour.

t hn was a necessary condition for thesocialist tran sfo rm atio n o f the coun tryside_hu t was nol_in

^ T e ^ e T T T n ^ T io im ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S m o U e ^ je a s a n ^ c o n o m ^ ^ eT ia te n a lT ^ T ic ^ a s e d a n H ^ q in n y im p o ^ n t^ n T T 'c o I le ç t iy ^ -atiQ]i_£i _______ _ _ ^ _ ___________

the tim e being was held at bay by legal restric tions o n jJ je 1!STsTeFo!T T a n c L ^

nSoJT^PfWTKTTion o f agriculture provided the reso lu tion of the con trad ic tion betw een socialist industry , based on social ow nership o f the m eans o f p roduction , and a small-scale peasant econom y based on private ow nership o f the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n . As long as this con trad ic tion rem ained, the tw o realms o f p ro d u c tio n , industrial and agricultural, w ere b ound to develop n o t only at d ifferen t rates b u t even in d ifferen t political directions. Socialist industry was being supplied w ith advanced technical equ ipm en t while small-scale peasant agriculture used the m ost prim itive techniques; industry was centralised and b rough t under a s tate plan for co-ordinated developm ent while the peasant econom y could only develop spontaneously ; and on th e political side the liqu ida tion o f the bourgeoisie in th e cities was linked to the creation o f a socialist base for industry w hile in the coun tryside private ow nership on how ever restric ted a scale could only go on generating capitalism day by day. I f w hat am oun ted to tw o d iffe ren t econom ies were allowed to exist side by side, there cou ld be no general socialist advance for the w hole coun try , no ‘w alking on tw o legs’ as the co-ordinated progress o f industry and agriculture has been called, and inevitably there w ould be a d rift back to capitalism w hich w ould gradually erode th e socialist sector.

'^ l iS jU ill to d ic tio n J a e ^ v e e n to w T ^ m d c o u n ^ y s id e ^ g o in g

q ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 3 E ^ S S l^ ^ Y ^ o T T e c 5 v is a t!o n T T ^ g n c u Iu ire —A lb am ^_ seço n x lj^ o lu tio n i^ 0 T ë^m ra 'H ireas‘T !o llecH ^sation was brought a b o u tb y l ’nJnsRn!nTTu>™THepnvatc property of small producers into socialist property through the voluntary

(lo p ) Families celebrating International W orkers’ Day in Tirana.

(bo ttom ) The Albanian fo o tb a ll team, tile 'Partisans', scores a goal against a Swedish team in a match in the Q em al S tafa Stadium.

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Reunion o f comrades a t the house in Tirana where the Party o f Labour o f Albania was founded on November 8th 1941. A ll p layed active parts in the war o f liberation and are now leading members o f the S ta te and Party. Enver Hoxha (second from right) is flan ked on his left by M ehm et Shelni

and on his right by Hysni Kapo.

Students on the steps o f Tirana University. Before the war over 80% o f the people of Albania were illiterate and it was the only country in Eu

u n i v e r s i t y .

/ liver Hoxha and Vasil Shunto during Albania's war o f resistance. Vasil Slianto was k illed in action in 1944.

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£nv<?/- Hoxha with M aria Biha, whose father. P arly Secretary for M irdita District, was killed in 1949 by a hand o f traitors in the p a r o f A lbania’s imperialist enemies. M aria is now vice-Director o f the m iddle school which

bears her fa th er’s name. Bardhok Biba.

M ao Tsetung and Enver Hoxha. The comradeship o f two peoples is in llie warm personal greetings o f these two socialist leaders.

co-operation o f peasant owners. T hey un ited their land, shared tools and farm anim als, and d istribu ted the p roduce according to the w ork days each had p u t in , thus securing the advantages of larger-scale p ro d u c tio n w ith o u t re-in troducing exp lo ita tion in any form . W ith the creation o f collective p ro p e rty th e co-ord ination o f individual in terests w ith collective in terests and o f collective in terests w ith the in terests o f society as a w hole becam e possible.

The P arty o f Labour did n o t leave the fo rm ation o f co-operatives to spon taneous developm ent b u t carried o u t a cam paign o f political education am ong the peasants encouraging them to com bine their individual holdings in to socialist units. A t the sam e tim e collectivisation o f agriculture was n o t b rough t ab o u t by adm inistrative fiats b u t by the free choice o f the w orking peasantry once they had becom e convinced o f the superio rity o f the collective over individual plo ts. O ptional partic ipa tion in co-operatives has always been one o f the basic principles o f their organisation.

Having provided political su p p o rt for the collectivisation m ovem ent the socialist state offered practical econom ic assistance as well. M achine and trac to r stations were estab­lished fo r the use o f the bigger collectives; agrarian credits were granted on favourable term s and selected seeds, chem ical fertilisers, im proved stock and insecticides were provided.

W ith the success o f the first collectives voluntarily set up in 1946, co-operatives soon spread all over the coun try . B ut just as th e first agrarian revo lu tion o f land reform had involved class struggle against landlords, so the second agrarian revolu tion o f collectivisation involved class struggle against form er rich peasants or kulaks who had hoped to acquire for them selves m uch o f the red istribu ted land as the system o f tiny private holdings proved uneconom ic. In the course o f this struggle against the kulaks, the poor and m iddle peasants changed their own class character from th a t o f individual peasants to th a t o f a co-operative peasantry . T he socialist state helped the co-operative peasantry in their class conflic t by isolating the kulaks politically and taxing them econom ically ; b u t the state could only intervene usefully to the ex ten t th a t the w orking masses them selves

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I

were prepared to struggle.T here were set-backs when the kulaks, no longer a strong

enough force to oppose th e agrarian m easures o f the p eo p le ’s s tate openly , exp lo ited ideological weaknesses am ong the peasants and tried to incite them to resist p rocu rem en t policies w ith w hich they them selves com plied. They gave currency to the idea th a t the new socialist system m ight be good fo r city w orkers and em ployees b u t had little to o ffer the w orking peasants w ho were expected to assume an unequal burden in the general transfo rm ation o f society as a whole. Since the revolu tion in the coun tryside had n o t y e t resu lted in obvious m aterial advantages and since the local P arty organisations did n o t always successfully co u n te r these attacks, som e peasants, even som e secretaries o f the nascent co-operatives, fell in to the trap set for them by the kulaks and re trea ted in an o p p o rtu n is tic w ay from the applica tion o f p ro cu rem en t ordinances.

In_an_open_letter^‘On Som e Problem s in the C o un tryside’ p u b l i s h e d in Z e n W ^ P o ^ ^ex jjla in ed ^ Jh ^ ^ a^ as il^Q L JL hc new agraria n s y s tëm and the p e rs j^ e c tiv e s iW jjD c n c d ^ j^ fo i^ a i^ ru IU ^ a r^ ^ ^ o ^ m e T ^ ^ T n reIanoiT T o " 7 n r '^ T o T ? , o a a n n e c o m T m v ^ f " 7 n P a m a ! ^ lep o in ted o u t th aT T JT e^n am ^ro in ën ^ v asrio ^m e p rocu rem en t ordinances them selves, b u t the failure o f Party organisations in the countryside to establish the so rt o f links w ith the masses w hich w ould have p revented their being misled.

Follow ing this criticism the Party com m ittees shook o ff their defeatist a ttitu d e , purged them selves o f any idea th a t the answ er to the co u n try ’s econom ic d ifficulties lay in obtain ing foreign aid and supported the effo rts a t the centre to bu ild up larger reserves o f industrial goods to be exchanged for agricultural p roducts. The Council o f M inisters for its part allocated special credits for the au tum n sowing o f 1949 and reduced p rocu rem en t quo tas th rough a reclassifica­tion of land.

In the im proved political clim ate the co-operative m ove­m en t forged ahead. By 1950 there w ere 90 co-operatives, by 1955 there were 318 and by 1960 there were 1,482. A t the end o f 1967, follow ing on the in co rpora tion o f sm aller units in to larger and m ore econom ic aggregates, th ere were 1,208

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co-operatives covering 99% of the land surface and including 98% o f all peasant families.

Initially co-operatives were form ed around each separate village and averaged from 250 to 500 acres in ex ten t; b u t the

u s e o M ^ ic H > ^ t^ t io n s jg ^ ^ r e d - the_enlargem ent_of_co^o£er-

co-operatives averaged 1250 acres, those in hillier regions 750

2500 a c r e s ^ ffn ? T o T u n S ry m ien rin ^ o f sm aller co-operatives n a ^ m a u ë ^ o ss ib le a b e tte r u tilisation o f the capital provided by th e state and a b e tte r d istribu tion o f available m an pow er and m echanical im plem ents. These larger co-operatives were also able to carry ou t m ore extensive projects of land im provem ent and reclam ation. D uring th e th ird five-year plan (1961-1965) m ore th an 140 reservoirs were bu ilt by co-oper­atives. In the D ibra d istric t alone irrigation was ex tended to an additional 7500 acres and vast previously uncultivable tracts w ere p lan ted w ith fru it trees.

evidence fo r th e success of the way in which ( (> o p e ra tiv es_ w e^ |^TaBn?TTCTrg *prapgggtTTl!g^itTeMwiwp ^ ^ 4 T ^ 4^)enonty__of_^oÇ ^^^se5^^g^cultu re and w a iH n ^ f o ^ t f ie peasants them selves t c^ c o m l3T n ^ lfTf?'nll‘Tiolcfm g?"l<?cFoper- . l^ v e I^ ^ jT j |E r^ ^ e r^ T T a v e ,^ ec rw io "T v ^n n m w aI^ T m n rtT ie | <xdl££lili£S-tll£ peasants u e e ly e n te re d in to and rem ained tree lo leave if th ey wIsW rTTTTW eTormation o i a <?:o-&peranvë alll.mcl ii {WffCTPancHnr'TaWPFpTOpfcrty is handed over to the C om m ittee o f E stim ation , appo in ted by the General M eeting which is the co-operative’s dem ocratic assembly. The m em ber whose p ro p e rty is being assessed takes p art in the deliber­ations o f the C om m ittee and the agreed to ta l value o f the p roperty — farm im plem ents, d ra ft animals, wagons, seeds — is repaid in yearly installm ents.

From the collective land each fam ily is given a p lo t to< ulIivate in add ition to the ground im m ediately surrounding l heir dwelling place. The size o f the p lo t, w hich varies w ith (hr size o f th e fam ily and w ith the difference in fe rtility In tween low land and m ountainous regions, is fixed by the< ieneral M eeting — as are the num bers o f cattle , sheep, goats mid pigs w hich can be k ep t privately. Houses and their

•MKUU

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furnishings, sheds and tools requ ired fo r w orking the private p lo ts do n o t becom e collective p ro p e rty , though it has been custom ary for m em bers o f the co-operative, using co llec t­ively-owned im plem ents, to help each o th er on their personal holdings thus ex tending the co-operative princip le even to these privately-ow ned allo tm ents.

All m em bers en joy th e fullest dem ocratic rights as belong­ing to the G eneral M eeting w hich elects the executive com m ittee and its chairm an w ho are responsible fo r d irec tion and guidance in the co-operative’s day to day conduc t o f its affairs. The G eneral M eeting dem ands and receives regular accounts from its agents on the executive com m ittee and can dismiss before the exp iry o f his term o f office any person w ho has lost th e confidence o f the m em bers o f the co-operative.

E^gaflfl£_is_paid according to the am oun t o f w ork done,bu-£r£C £nth^> ^ ^ r T a ^ X e e ^ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ / m g T m 3 e n ^ ^ T?"assess w o ^ ^ Q o n ^ o n m ^ T a s i^ * o ^ c o n e ç tw ? " ^ T?ë^!ian^nnivTcfual

a T y s^ n T o ^ e m m ie T a tio n T e U e ^ e rv e ^ ^ ie ^ p i ri t o t team w ork and is m ore consisten t w ith a socialist a ttitu d e tow ard labour. When co-operatives have been com bined in to larger units, differences in the fe rtility o f the various sections m ay have been reflected in differences in paym ents; b u t these

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distinctions have been abolished by the volun tary ac tion of the co-operative peasants now p art o f the same enlarged econom ic com m unity . ^

The larger th e co-operative th e m ore econom ic the u tilisation o f m achines and trac to rs. In 1938 there were only 30 trac to rs in the w hole coun try . T oday , w ith m ore than 1 0 ,000 trac to rs available for use in 30 m achine and trac to r s tations, there is one trac to r fo r every 125 acres of tilled land. These sta tions provide the m echanical equ ipm en t for carrying o u t 95% o f the ploughing, 80% o f the sowing, 55% o f the reaping and 85% of the threshing. From being able to perform only a lim ited num ber o f operations, m ainly in connection w ith ploughing, the m achine and trac to r stations now carry o u t a w ide variety o f functions ranging from deep ploughing to m echanised shearing. The co-operatives pay the stations fo r their w ork e ither in farm produce o r m oney.

The workers in the machine and tractor stations^w hose conditions of sociafisecTTabour are com paraljT^^j those of ra c to ry w o i^ccn ^ r^ l^ ^T ^ ^ io n ^ ^ 'w T tT ^ ^ ^ jD eraU v ^ h in T y ^ rs develop TE j^ ^o aQ m ic^^ ^ T w g ey S E ^ w o m n S iaS iL am L ltlP

TnTT^tationw H ran^idem o g ic '^( ountrysTcTëTgTvm c l i r e c n o n T ^ ig n o n T u re T ^ ^ esT.il <■• M\\m 7 s T u ^ ^ r * T T i^ T n n a r T ^ m ^ f7 i^ ^ T ^ i m X T ^ r m a ' n i l

iin ll)« u (s a n T * T n u s tr i i ru rT u c MeM ^Ipm ^T i^uur^ !ir!m ^T n^ ".■•nMal '1xvë^o^^T o< )pe^T ve* j2m daatja a r3 i^ £ S In I^ a £ Z l^ l1 1 in ilio ii^ u u ^ T J M S U in c e lo those tha t are econom icallydamci. ....... ...

WP’certain o f the larger com bined co-operatives the state invests m oney and the re tu rn on these investm ents is allowed lo rem ain in the co-operative to stim ulate fu rth e r develop­m ent. N ot only is this a step in the transition from i o operative p ro p e rty relations to th e higher socialist stage of Nl.ite p ro p e rty relations b u t also those who adm inister the l liiuls in the in te re st o f b o th state and co-operative are state em ployees, like teachers, docto rs and nurses, and thus m< rcase the num bers w ith in the co-operatives whose con- (In ions o f service are the same as w orkers in the towns.

Willi the increase o f p ro d u c tio n there has been a consider­

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able im provem ent in the w elfare and richness o f life o f co-operative m em bers. In place o f the old soo ty cottages new dwellings have sprung up everyw here and now m ore th an half o f the peasant families live in houses construc ted since collectivisation. A lbania is one o f the few countries in the w orld w here there is no dwelling, how ever rem ote , w ith o u t elec tricity , the rural elec trification scheme having been com pleted m ore th an a year ahead o f schedule. ‘The light o f socialism shines all over the republic — in every one o f A lbania’s 2 ,550 villages.’ The credits advanced to the co-operatives for the electrification o f the coun tryside, som e 130 m illion leks, have been converted in to free grants and recently a full s ta te pension schem e has been ex tended to all agricultural co-operatives. Co-operative centres have assum ed the character o f new , well-planned small tow ns, each w ith its infirm aries, m atern ity hom es, eight-grade schools, gym nasia, theatres, cu ltural centres and artisan shops. Few er and few er am enities to be found in the larger cities are absent from these hubs o f rural life.

O u t o f land confiscated from foreign com panies or reclaim ed by draining swamps have been created state farms w hich, like the trac to r stations, are based on state-ow ned ra th e r th an co-operative-ow ned p ro p erty . A gricultural w orkers on the sta te farms receive a regular cash wage like bench hands. These farm s have m ore specialised functions like cultivating new varieties o f cereals, m eeting the needs o f large cities and industrial centres fo r vegetables and fru its o r developing new strains o f live stock. T here are at p resent 32 o f these socially-advanced state farms w hich have becom e agricultural schools for experim enting w ith the la test tech ­niques, train ing m em bers o f the co-operatives in new and im proved m ethods o f farm ing and breeding and acting as a vanguard in the drive for rural developm ent.

Yields on the sta te farm s are phenom enally high, 22 tim es m ore cereals and fou r tim es as m uch m ilk being p roduced over a 15-year period and co tto n and sugar beet production being increased by som e 70%. Fig and citrus trees have been p lan ted over wide areas o f form erly uncultivable land and extensive olive groves cover the hills above Elbasan, V lora and B erat. Large herds o f selected breeds o f ca ttle like Jersey

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and O sterlitz and great flocks o f im proved breeds o f sheep have been carefully built up.

N ot only is A lbania very m oun tainous, only 40% of the land surface being norm ally considered as cultivable a t all, bu t m uch o f the m ore fertile low lands were sw am py and undra ined a t the tim e of libera tion and the coastal plain generally was subject to flood and drought. Large drainage and irrigation projects were an urgent necessity fo r increasing agricultural p roduction . T he Maliqi and T erbufi lagoons were drained and huge irrigation schemes were carried o u t a round Korça, Fier, Lezha and o th er tow ns on the plains. M ore than500.000 acres o f new land have been reclaim ed and m ore than 600 ,000 acres p u t under irrigation, giving A lbania one of the highest p roportions of irrigated land in Europe. F u rth er schem es include the drainage o f the K akariqi swamp in the n o rth and the D ropulli plain in the sou th while irrigation canals m any miles long flowing at heights above6.000 feet are being construc ted in the m ountainous regions.

In socialist countries there is no such thing as ‘un eco n ­om ic’ land in the sense th a t a capitalist farm er could n o t m ake an im m ediate p ro fit by w orking it. P ro fitab ility is judged by w hat is beneficial in the long run to society as a whole. In 1966 the Party advanced the slogan ‘Let us take to the hills and m ountains and m ake them as beau tifu l and fertile as the p lains’. As one travels in the sum m er along roads cu tting th rough the rugged uplands one sees people, m ainly young people, w orking high up on the steep slopes, terracing the ground for p lanting orchards and vineyards. A nd in the w inter the peasants o f th e highlands w ork to snatch additional stretches of fertile land from the rock-strew n folds and degraded forests.

The uneven p a tte rn o f capitalist developm ent, constan tly i (-producing b o th inside and outside national boundaries the basic im balance o f over-concentrated m etropo lis and deprived environs, is precisely the opposite o f the socialist I>.iItem o f evening o u t differences and resolving co n tra ­dictions betw een tow n and coun try , betw een m ore and less favoured regions. Speaking on the occasion o f the 25 th iiimiversary o f libera tion , Enver H oxha m ade ju s t this po in t. 'While fighting for high yields in the low land areas, we do n o t

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neglect the struggle for the rap id developm ent o f agriculture in the hilly and m ountainous areas — ju s t as, attach ing great im portance to industrialisa tion , we by no m eans underrate the needs o f the countryside. We do n o t advance by the depopulation o f villages b u t by their g row th as the centres o f a flourishing agriculture. Preserving the right p roportions is essential to the cause o f socialist construc tion . A llowing discrepancies to develop is fraught w ith grave econom ic, political and ideological consequences.’

In p art the elim ination o f discrepancies is achieved by state su p p o rt in the way o f special drainage and irrigation funds which were increased by six times in the fou rth five-year plan ending in 1970. W ork is proceeding on 230 reservoirs, m ainly in th e poo re r regions. But the people them selves also co n trib u te to the social process o f m aking up for natural deficiencies. N ot only have experienced farm w orkers gone up in to the hills to share their expertise , b u t also the o lder co-operatives in the plains have m ade vo luntary gifts o f 5 ,250 ca ttle , 36 ,700 sheep and 8 ,800 goats to the new er co-oper­atives form ed in d ifficu lt circum stances.

The problem o f m ain tain ing a co rrec t re lationship betw een agricultural and industrial advance as part o f the p lanned elim ination o f differences betw een tow n and co u n try has been a stu b b o rn one requiring co n stan t a tten tio n . During the first five-year plan (1951-1955) it becam e obvious th a t the backw ardness o f A lban ia’s agricu lture had been u n d er­estim ated and the proposed increases in p ro d u c tio n w ere n o t being realised. In 1953 the C entral C om m ittee to o k special steps to deal w ith the situation . Som e of the investm ent allocated to the industrial sector was sw itched to agriculture, arrears in the quotas o f food grains and livestock p roducts fixed fo r the previous fo u r years w ere w ritten o ff and unpaid taxes ow ed by co-operative m em bers were cancelled. The discrepancy betw een the com paratively low prices o f agri­cu ltu ra l p roducts and th e high prices o f industrial goods was ad justed and the m ovem ent was begun o f shifting p lants and w orkshops, particu larly those engaged in processing farm p roducts or m aking farm tools, in to the countryside. The buying and selling co-operatives established accum ulating po in ts as near as possible to the centres o f agricultural

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p ro d u c tio n and assum ed responsib ility fo r the tran sp o rta tio n o f p roduce to the tow ns.

In subsequent five-year plans the need to check the d isp roportionate rate o f increase in industry and agriculture has been taken in to accoun t by fixing a h igher ra te of developm ent fo r the agricultural sector. For exam ple in the fo u rth five-year plan (1966-1970) the following differentials were proposed and achieved in narrow ing dow n the d istinc­tions betw een urban and rural conditions:

Percentage increase In d u stry A griculture

(city) (village)Over-all p roduc tion 50-54 71-76Average annual ra te

o f increase 8.7 11.5S ta te investm ent 40 68Real incom e per capita 9-11 20-25New dwelling houses 5 11

As a result o f intensive effo rts to im prove and develop the rural econom y, agricultural p ro d u c tio n has increased by four limes the pre-w ar level. Up to 1938 the m ain agricultural revenues came from live stock , ab o u t 51% o f the to ta l income com pared w ith 43% from farm ing, while fru it growing and forestry to g eth er only accoun ted for 6%. Now 61% of the rural incom e is provided by farm crops and the percentages of fruit-grow ing and fo restry have increased. Before the w ar the only industrial crops w ere tobacco and co tto n . The production o f these crops has been enorm ously increased, tobacco by nine tim es as m uch as in 1938, by obtain ing higher yields ra th e r than by an ex tension o f acreage. To them have been added sugar beets, sunflow ers, sage, vallonia and m any o th er crops having industrial or m edicinal uses. The n itrate p lan t a t Fier and the superphosphate p lan t a t Laç have m ade A lbania one o f the m ost advanced countries in I .m ope in the use o f chem ical fertilisers.

The state accum ulation agencies are able to handle for the internal m arke t or fo r ex p o rt the greatest increases o f various i lops produced by the co-operatives, even w hen an u nexpec­

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ted ly large harvest is gathered as w ith the 1967 super­abundance o f olives. G rapes to o , the p ro d u c tio n o f w hich has greatly increased every year, are en tirely absorbed by d istribu tion th ro u g h o u t the co u n try or conversion in to wine. Huge refrigeration plants have been construc ted in all the m ajor cities for the preservation o f perishables like m eat, fru its and vegetables. In one year, from 1955 to 1957, agricultural p ro d u c tio n rose by 15% and in O ctober, 1957, the ra tion ing system was abolished altogether and there was a general low ering o f prices.

B ut the prob lem o f differences betw een tow n and co u n try is n o t only econom ic. I t is ideological as well. The struggle to elim inate this co n trad ic tio n , therefo re , takes the form of educating the peasan try in new socialist a ttitu d es tow ard private and collective in terests, tow ard the re lationship o f the individual to the sta te and society as a w hole — attitudes w hich are d irectly connected w ith the increase in p rod u c tio n m ade possible by these very socialist relations. Special effo rts have been m ade to eradicate the regressive custom s and trad itions, the religious prejudices and superstitions to w hich people in the coun tryside w ere the particu lar heirs. A long w ith scientific m ethods o f w orking th e land has been tau g h t a scientific perspective generally and w ith recognition o f the practical necessity o f th e w orker-peasant alliance has been tau g h t the w orld o u tlo o k o f the p ro le taria t.

Ideological a ttack is specially d irected against custom s, prejudices and superstitions tha t harm the p eo p le’s health and their econom y, th a t keep alive the old patriarchal relations o f inequality in the fam ily, th a t abuse the rights of w om en, low ering their dignity and obstructing th e ir active p artic ipa tion in the econom ic, political and social life o f the countryside. To help in this struggle o f ideas and a ttitu d es young people and w orkers go voluntarily in to the co u n try to live and w ork side by side w ith the peasants for considerable periods. T here are exchanges o f groups o f people betw een upland and low land regions, betw een districts o f the n o rth and the sou th — so th a t by the sharing o f experiences and the spreading o f new ideas the ideological education o f the peasan try can be advanced and th ey will becom e progres­sively proletarianised. In the cities courses have been started

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for train ing w om en from th e co-operatives m various skills and professions, equipping them to go back and play their p a rt in raising the econom ic and cu ltural level o f life in the rural com m unities.

U ltim ately th e decisive fac to r in the great transfo rm ation o f agriculture is m an — the new m an o f a socialist conscience and revo lu tionary spirit. ‘I t is m an ,’ Enver H oxha to ld the F ifth Congress o f the Party in 1966, ‘who m akes a place thrive and our m ountains will be transform ed by the hands and the creative m inds o f our p eo p le .’

I t is in freeing m an to play this creative p roductive role th a t the P arty and people have achieved such results and Enver H oxha could say in all tru th at the tim e of the celebrations o f the T w en ty fifth A nniversary o f liberation: ‘All o f us have still fresh in o u r m inds the thatch -roo fed huts and the oppressed peasants o f M yzeqe, the hungry highlands o f Puka and D ukagjin, the w hole o f our suffering and toiling peasantry . We rem em ber the swam ps and m arshes w hich flooded som e o f our best lands from Buna to the V urgu of Delvina. B ut all th a t belongs to h isto ry , to the past. T oday all the new co-operative coun tryside is shining in the light o f socialism. . . . T he successes and victories achieved are closely connected w ith the Party line fo r the co rrec t so lu tion o f the peasant prob lem w hich is am ong the m ost im p o rtan t and the m ost com plicated problem s for every coun try em barking on the road o f socialist co n s tru c tio n .’

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C hapter F ourteen

Development o f Industry and the Relation between Economic Base and Social Superstructure

The com m itm ent o f the A lbanian people, once they had liberated them selves, to the task of transform ing their coun try d irectly from an econom ically backw ard sem i-feudal sta te in to a socialist sta te , w ith o u t passing th rough the phase o f advanced capitalist industrialisation, posed as the m ost im m ediate and urgent post-w ar problem the rapid develop­m en t o f a socialist industry .

B ut industrialisa tion is through and through a class issue and the decision to raise the w hole industrial s tru c tu re on a socialist foun d a tio n from w hich exp lo ita tio n o f one class by ano th er has been absolutely excluded involves a num ber of social corollaries ab o u t the ways in w hich capital is accum ulated , the kinds Of incentive o ffered to w orkers and even the in terna tional co n tex t in w hich industrialisation takes place. F irst and forem ost o f course, is involved the political question o f how it can be assured th a t the beneficiaries o f industrialisa tion are and will rem ain the great mass o f the w orking people w ho by their creative skill and labour m ake industrial developm ent possible. It can only be assured if s tate pow er is firm ly in the hands o f the w orking people. Betw een societies based on exp lo ita tion , like feudal­ism or capitalism , and fully com m unist society in w hich there are no classes a t all there is a period o f revolu tionary transfo rm ation o f the form er in to the la tte r. M arx in the C ritique o f the G o th a Program m e had laid dow n the necessary political character o f the transito ry period of socialism. ‘The state o f this period cannot be o th er than the revolutionary d ictato rsh ip of the p ro le ta ria t’; and this was the n a tu re o f the A lbanian sta te created by the P arty and people on w inning independence.

T he prim itive accum ulation w hich enabled countries like

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Britain to em bark on the cap ita list m ode o f p ro d u c tio n took the form partly o f saving by the early en trepreneurs to invest in the expansion o f m anufactu ring b u t, m uch m ore, of ex tracting lo o t from the colonies w hich flow ed back to the m o th er co u n try to be tu rn ed in to capital. In so far as th rift and self-denial en tered in to the amassing o f capital they were re flected in the ideology o f puritan ism ; bu t this curta ilm ent o f p resent pleasures for fu tu re satisfactions at com pound in terest was ro o ted in a purely individualistic e th ic o f getting ahead and securing the personal pow er m oney in a capitalist society gives. In so far as the gross exp lo ita tion o f colonial peoples provided the capital for industrialisation it was reflected in an ideology o f national and racial chauvinism.

In a socialist coun try like A lbania the accum ulation for investm ent in industrialisation came partly from the expro­priation o f the bourgeoisie, landlords and foreign capitalists b u t, m uch m ore, and on a continuing basis, from the savings of the w orking people by way o f the creation o f surpluses in industrial and co-operative en terprises a large p ro p o rtio n of which was devoted to investm ent in industrial expansion ra ther th an to sim ply increasing the p ro d u c tio n o f con­sum ers’ goods. In the last five year period, for exam ple, 28.2% of the national incom e was set aside for investm ent, prim arily in m eans of p ro d u c tio n , and 71.8% was used for social and personal consum ption . B ut this saving was collec­tive, corresponding to the socialist m orality of p u ttin g the interests of society as a w hole and even of generations yet to com e above im m ediate individual interests.

Even m ore im p o rtan t in the developm ent of capitalism than prim itive accum ulation is the creation o f an exploitable labour force — workers w ho, in M arx’s w ords, are free to sell I heir labour pow er and have been ‘freed ’ o f anyth ing else to dispose of. People in Britain, for exam ple, were driven o ff the land by Enclosure A cts, artisans were deprived of the tools of I heir trade and an industrial arm y of ‘h ands’ was form ed which had no alternative to their recru itm en t in to factories and mills on term s fixed by the owners, p roducing goods which, above th e value necessary to sustain themselves and reproduce a new generation o f w orkers, belonged en tirely to the ow ner. T he only incentive for w orking rem ained the

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m aterial one o f w ork or starve and the cash nexus becam e the dom inant form o f hum an relationships generally—reflected in the social p h enom enon o f alienation o r com m odity fetishism .

Socialist A lbania was faced w ith th e same prob lem o f finding w orkers to m an th e new industrial enterprises required fo r econom ic grow th — and in a co u n try w here the bulk o f the labour force had been em ployed in agriculture and where there were no trained technicians n o r specialists to speak of. N ot only was force or pressure ruled o u t by the very n a tu re o f the p eo p le’s po litical pow er so firm ly established, b u t even dependence on m aterial incentives cou ld only resu lt in grosser inequality th an was com patib le w ith socialist relations o f p roduc tion , leading eventually to the fo rm ation o f a new privileged class and the creation o f a social clim ate o f com petitive individualism favourable to the resto ration o f capitalism . People could only be draw n to the great tasks o f socialist industrialisa tion by their conviction th a t its benefits w ould accrue to them and their children as collective owners o f the m eans of p ro d u c tio n and n o t find their w ay, as p rofits , in to the pockets o f individuals. The m ain incentive fo r the exertion o f th e ir energy and the application o f their skills was socialist em ulation . T he state for its p art legislated fo r the well-being o f w orkers and tapped a relatively new source o f creative labour by establishing the necessary conditions for w om en to play an equal p a rt w ith m en in the w ork o f factories and mills. The educational in stitu tio n s required fo r train ing specialists in various branches o f industry were set up so th a t A lbania w ould n o t be d ep en d en t on foreign experts.

The determ ination to defend and develop socialism n o t only m ean t th a t no assistance could be expected from capita list countries b u t even th a t A lban ia’s econom y w ould have to be expanded and streng thened under the conditions o f a virtual b lockade w ith im m ediate neighbours like Yugo­slavia and G reece, b o th now p art o f the capitalist w orld, helping to tigh ten th e ring. O nly from o th er socialist countries, m ainly, in the early stages o f industria lisa tion , the Soviet U nion, and, afterw ards, the P eop le’s R epublic of China, could A lbania hope to receive or risk accepting credits and technical assistance.

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The stages o f the developm ent of industry in Albania began with the two year plan (1949-1950) which laid the foundation for the rapid econom ic advance realised in successive five year planning periods, the fourth of these having been com pleted in 1970 with planned increases in all sectors either fulfilled or overfulfilled.

During the tw o year plan large projects were begun like the Lenin Hydro-power plant to m eet the industrial and domestic needs of the Tirana district, the Stalin Textile Mills and the Maliq Sugar Refinery. Of the to ta l investm ent in this period 47% was devoted to the developm ent of industry with 20% going to the im provem ent and expansion of mining A lbania’s rich sub-soil resources. By 1950 general industrial o u tpu t had been raised to over four times the o u tpu t in 1938.

With the first five year plan (1952-1955) the development of industry gathered such m om entum that by the end of the period Albania had been transform ed from a backward agricultural into an agrarian industrial country. The Lenin power plant and Stalin textile mills were com pleted on schedule and many new industrial projects were realised —I he wood working mills at Elbasan, the cement factory at Vlora, co tton gins at Fier and Rogozhina, the Shkodra lobacco ferm entation plant and woollen textile and furniture factories in Tirana. A bout 150 new state enterprises in all were commissioned and com pleted and the mining and petroleum industries were further developed. Overall indus- Ilial ou tpu t rose to over 11 times that o f 1938 and w hat it11.id taken Albania an entire year to produce before the war w.is turned ou t in 35 days in 1955.

During the second five year plan (1956-1960) the average .mimal rate o f increase of industrial production rose to the phenomenally high figure of 20%. The Karl Marx hydro­electric plant was constructed on the Mati River, an oil i cliiicry was built at Cerrik, canneries at Vlora, Elbasan, K(»i <. a and Shkodra, glass and velvet factories, a porcelainI • 11 111 and a food processing combine at Tirana, brick liii lories at many places, a copper enrichm ent plant at Kni bnesh and a whole netw ork of high tension power lines Were all com pleted. Industrial production as a whole was 25 limes that o f 1938 and it took only 15 days in 1960 to equal

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the total production of 1938. Socialist relations of produc­tion were so firmly established tha t 99% of industrial ou tput, 100% of wholesale trade and 90% of retail trade, were all in the socialist sector o f the economy.

In the third five year plan (1961-1965) the greater emphasis on creating means of production was reflected in a num ber of m ajor projects like the construction of the Engels and Stalin hydro-electric plants, the Elbasan iron smelting plant and the copper smelting plant at Gjegjan, the copper wire factory at Shkodra, the Tirana trac to r spare parts factory, three paper mills, new mines and the first large chemical plants for producing fertilisers — in all 430 new works instead of the 400 planned for. In spite of the fact tha t it was during this period that Khrushchev no t only broke off unilaterally all economic agreements between the Soviet Union and Albania, bu t also, in effect, jo ined the imperialist countries in their economic blockade, industrial production rose to 35 times th a t of 1938 w ith 11 days sufficing to turn ou t the goods which had then required a whole year to produce. Industry represented 57% of to tal o u tp u t as opposed to 8% in 1938. National income as a whole was 536% as com pared with 1938 and per capita income 300%.

The fourth five year plan (1966-1970) took its character from Enver H oxha’s political report to the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labour on November 1, 1966, in which he outlined the main tasks of the plan, spoke of the need for improving the work of the Party, strengthening its ties with the masses and rooting out bureaucratic methods and urged the deepening of the ideological and cultural revolution so tha t the social superstructure would conform to and defend the socialist economic base — particularly guard­ing against tha t ‘o ff shoot and ally of bourgeois ideology — revisionism’. Among the industrial enterprises set up in this period were sheet metal plants, nitrate and phosphate fertiliser plants, cem ent factories, a new caustic soda plant, a glass factory at Kavaja, a plastics plant at Durrës and tin huge, fully-autom ated Mao Tsetung textile mills near Berat. The great hydro-electric plant at Vau i Dejes was opened ahead of schedule at the tim e of the Sixth Congress in November, 1971, and work has already begun on an eve i

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larger plant higher up the Drin river. There was a great upsurge in housing construction on the basis o f voluntary contributions of labour by the people and the supply of materials by the state, over 20,000 new houses ou t of the73,000 com pleted within the five years being built in this way. Even before the end of the period, in 1968, industrial ou tput was already 52 times tha t of 1938 and by 1970 a single week’s o u tp u t was equal to 1938’s total production. The national incom e as a whole and per capita had risen to 806% and 392% respectively com pared with pre-war and were 55% and 17% higher than 1965.

Albania is fortunate in its mineral wealth — petroleum , gas, chrome, iron, nickel, copper, coal, bauxite and bitum en to mention only the most im portant. I t was this th a t first attracted the interest of foreign countries and geological surveys of a superficial nature were carried ou t by their experts to discover how accessible was this subsoil wealth for exploitation. During the pre-war period m onopoly-capitalists look advantage of the ‘open d o o r’ policy of the Zogist regime to exploit these riches; bu t since the extraction industries set up were for no o ther purpose than to make profits for foreign investors they did nothing to create a base for heavy industry in Albania itself.

All these enterprises were nationalised by the people’s government in 1944 and work was gradually begun on a I lioroughgoing survey of mineral reserves, establishing the presence o f oil in lime beds and bringing in seven new fields in addition to those already operating near Patos and Stalin (lily, discovering big deposits of iron ore containing nickel in llii' Pogradeç-Elbasan zone, vast reserves of coal in central All >ania, copper in the north and developing Bulqiza into one "I I lie richest sources of chrome in the world. Over a million .ind a quarter tons of crude oil have been extracted by drilling equipm ent made in Albania and there are five times •is many mines as before the war.

Along with this exploration of new sources of mineral wi al til has gone the developm ent of processing operations nr.idc the country. There are refineries for producing petrol, licii/inc, kerosene and coke at Cerrik and Stalin City, and "i Iicis have recently been constructed. The bulk of mined

161

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copper is processed in Albania, providing copper wire and various by-products for export. The erection of a metal rolling plant at Elbasan, num erous smelting plants, a foundry for ferrochrom e and a steel producing capacity of a million tons a year are all steps tow ard self-reliance in turning the coun try ’s great mineral resources into finished products. The production of fuel is ample to m eet all the needs of a rapidly expanding industry.

By 1968 the supply of electric power was already 80 times that available in 1938 — thus well on the way to realising Lenin’s slogan that socialism is people’s power plus electrifi­cation. To the hydro-electric power plants near Tirana and on the Mati River and the therm o-pow er stations a t Stalin City, Vlora, Cerrik and Maliq have now been added the huge Fier therm o-power station with a 100,000 kw capacity as well as the great Mao Tsetung hydro-electric power plant on the Drin River w ith an annual o u tp u t o f one billion kwh. In 1967 the decision was taken to com plete the electrification of all the rural areas by 1971, a project requiring 5,000 miles of cables, 1,600 transform er stations and 160 sub-stations. This exten­sion of electric power to 1,800 villages in every part of the country however rem ote, was an advance of 14 years on the original plan o f completing rural electrification by 1985 and, in fact, was com pleted in O ctober, 1970, a year ahead of the date fixed by the final plan.

Before the war there were only a few primitive repair shops for m otor cars. Now there are over 200 machine shops supplying 70% of the coun try ’s needs for spare parts. This branch of industry, 95 times larger than in 1938, is capable of servicing and repairing all types of machines in use. Special attention is given to the production of agricultural m achinery — centrifugal pum ps, sprinkling equipm ent, grain threshers, corn shellers, ploughs, harrows, sorting, binding and sowing machines. Also supplied in adequate quantities are conveyors, band saws and circular saws, diesel m otors, electric m otors, transform ers, metal cutting machines and consum ers’ goods like kitchen utensils. During the fourth five year plan the coun try ’s machine-making capacity was doubled.

Chemical production, which did no t exist before the war

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at all, is the youngest branch of Albanian industry. New enterprises have been started producing pharm aceutical goods, plastic articles and cosmetics; and the developm ent of o ther industries like glass, textile and oil has depended on the creation of a heavy chemical industry. Three great chemical works, the n itrate fertiliser plant at Fier, the superphosphate plant at Laç and the caustic soda plant at Vlora, are all in full production and by-products like nitric acid, sulphuric acid and oxygen have made Albania self-sufficient in a whole range of industrial chemicals which form erly had to be im ported. In one year, 1968, the ou tpu t of the chemical industry increased by 50 times.

Food processing has developed trem endously from the few olive oil presses, flour mills and cigarette factories existing before the war. The total o u tp u t of food processing plants in 1938 is achieved in nine days now — an increase of 37 times as much as then. Sugar mills, fruit, vegetable, m eat and fish canneries, wine and soft drink distilleries and processing plants for children’s food are to be found in every district. The Ali Kemendi combine in Tirana has gained an in ter­national reputation for the quality of its exports of tinned and preserved foods and cigarettes are exported from the factories at G jirokastra, Shkodra, Elbasan and Durrës.

Textiles in the last 30 years have increased by 65 times per capita even though the population has doubled in that period, and from having to im port textiles Albania now exports them to a num ber of European countries.

A fter the war there was an enorm ous building programme to restore houses, bridges, roads, ports and mines which had been damaged or destroyed and to construct new factories, cultural centres and public buildings. At the rate of construc­tion in 1938 it would have taken over five centuries to equal the buildings com pleted in the first two decades of socialist construction. Guided by the slogan ‘build faster, cheaper and b e tte r’ construction workers, during the first five years after the war, rebuilt some 62,000 demolished houses and com­pleted 1,100 new apartm ent blocks. More than 75,000 new houses were built in rural areas from 1951 to 1965. The state provides long term credits at no interest to enable workers to build their own houses and 30,000 new dwellings have been

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com pleted on this basis. In Tirana alone, mass voluntary work on housing is responsible for the building of 800 apartm ents a year over and above normal planned construc­tion. The population of Albania is growing so rapidly that housing remains a problem b u t at present rates of construc­tion the problem will no longer exist in another three or four years. Dwellings which are state p roperty ren t at about 3% of the average income and are allocated by the popularly-elected People’s Councils according to the num ber of persons in a family. Those who own their own homes can lease them as long as the rent does n o t exceed the state norm. A fter the earthquake in 1967 which caused considerable damage in the eastern part o f the country, 6,048 houses and buildings were rebuilt or repaired in 29 days.

Unlike th e , d u c ticm iiSj>ells<ij^u in ^^o rj> m allii ^A lb a n ia ^ jv h j l j^ j^ a d m ^ iu r e in d u s ta a i^ n te ^ n ^ ^ ^ h ^ ^ ls ^<nicouragec^^yj^>1 j]D ]3 o S ^ f^ ^ n d ic ra i^ c ^ H } £ n it^ ^ ™ th u gl^ re s e i^ in g ^ K ^ ^ e v e lo p m ^ ^ ^ U ^ ^ ^ ^ H T ^ ^ ^ ^ e c h n iq u e s . New workshops have beenTuI^^m cTequipm enTTupjnieaU ) raise 15 fold the 1938 m anufacture of such articles as glass ware, wickerwork, carpets, em broidery, jewelry, po ttery , hriar pipes, fu r garments, copper ware and silver filigree work. Examples of the fine workmanship which goes into these goods could be seen at the Olympia Handicrafts Fair inI .ondon in 1970 where for the first time Albania exhibited its characteristic arts and crafts in Britain. The handicraft i cooperatives also operate repair services in both tow n and country so th a t workers and their families can keep their possessions in working order and get full value from their purchases. This repair service now makes up 40% of the work ol these co-operatives. -

Industrial enterprises in Albania are the property of the pe ople and are run by the class enjoying state power, the Workers themselves who, indeed, through their represent­atives in the Governm ent manage the co u n try ’s entire economy. But is this merely an ideal or do the workers in lually exercise control in the places where they are employed?

The managers of enterprises are appointed by the appro-

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priatc m inistry and arc responsible lo il for the organisation ~q! p roduction. In this task they arr assistprl hv thp Pa7t^ branch, the trade union and the various workers’ collectivesi n u T a t p a r t i c u I a T T o r "r u n m e enterprise in c u rre n t ' "plan o n ' Jhc.billing centralised leadership with the maximum creative

I^ esem an ag ers are the sons and daughters of workers and peasants, m any of whom fought in the anti-fascist war. A num ber of workers who have distinguished themselves on the production line have been prom oted to managerial posts. Others, also the sons and daughters of workers and peasants, have been trained in higher institutes of technology where political education in the revolutionary line o f the Party has played an im portant part in fitting them for the respon­sibilities o f management. Managers are not the owners o f factories, pyr <jlo they have g|to j^ n y jju rn ^ la ss^ m c ^ h e ir in te rmo l sociaTTs7T^nTdiu7TonTT7Tie‘l ' c n c r j H I u I u ^ ^ S IILjji«ii<i«.

T E H | ^ t ^ ^ | ^ ^ ^ ^ 2 ^ ^ e | j c j o s e s t ^ o ^ p e r a t i o n o fw o rk e rs anti n u in a ^ e rs ^ jig H ^ ^ n ~ j^ jp e r^ ë n s c 7! s s i o r r T i r ^ i e

t^ ^ ^ ^ h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a re r^ u u ]e T p ro (7 u c b o n !* Ti7Tr^e"collectives ^ n a iim in iL -a ild _ ^ a m ic a r personneri 'io^etiieil'l''Mffl“*W(\lll 'prs c o m b in ^ s c ie n r e ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ ^ ^ i^ ^ l l e ^ e ^ ^ ^ j^ ^ J L L jM M n dco ]ita l^ r^ ion_^o i_so lv ingpro^uct[on"^rob lem s, developingne^^n v O T ^^T aM ^^S n S R T ft^^o f^T n T IT ^ ire rT IT reey earsof the fcn irriT p lan^v erT T O T ^^^^tT onalisa tion proposals were made o f which m ore than 170,000 were approved and adopted.

All thn tp in r r^ n rn is ib le nnsts Ho no less th a n a m o n t^ ’cIjr^ filtta^ v o rk Jr^ iro d u c tio n ^ v en ^ j^ ea^ tliu ^ n a^ w v in g ^ th edistinction between m e n ta l a n d m a n n a l la h r .n r an rt f-nahUfirrjead ing cadres to be fully acquainted w ith the practical problems'"BT'Y'TfidiWPlc'm, to m aintain the closësTcOTSjjJç^JIyi

u m im y g n r T O T B ffiça^ ^ n Y jn an ifest^ io rio rT n reaucratisma n d t e c t m o c r ^ i s m " " * T h e ^ ^ s ^ ^ ^ o n t n i u m i '^ ^ n x i r i a t i o n ^ ) f p e rso n n e l^ fn R m g those doing office work to production

nK R D ililtW tU U -K ni

cem ^ M ^ ia ^ e r^ P ^ ^ ^ ^ id M tra d ^ u n ig ji

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work and prom oting those on the factory floor to positions of leadership..A fter Enver H oxha’s 1966 R eportxm the in t ilsome 15,000 cadres were released from state and PadA m iliu w o ^ T o | ^ ™ """n ^ ^ v v o rk e rs7 colIecTives control the activity of the

managers through regular meetings of a supervisory nature. Those in managerial posts can be called to account for shortcomings or mistakes and, if they persist in them and lail to show signs of im provem ent, they are dismissed.criticism _and self-criticism bulletin boards displayed n r ^ m inently i n _ £ ^ £ ^ j i ^ w o ^ e ^ ] _ i m i i ^ i dually or .collectively, are free to criticise each o ther or question oTTnanaKcrs loc leaiadequately with charges against them may and lias resulted in loss o f post. When the adm inistrator of the Eushnja industrial complex tried to side step an accounting demanded by the workers, the m atter was referred to the I’arty and immediate action was taken. The manager in charge o f planning at the Elbasan Forestry Establishment replied to criticisms by forest workers in the Biza division by threatening to close down the division altogether and this conduct was dealt w ith summarily. Num erous examples could be given of such working class control; but because differences between m anagem ent and workers do not involve antagonistic class contradictions, they can usually be resolved in collective discussion. ,

C o ^ c ^ ^ g l io n ^ e tw e e n w o A e rs o n th e fa c to r^ f lo o i^ m ^ liJnJ^^m J^adci^^^rigosinons^ i^T nam tem ecH j^^^ iyste ii^o f |uymcrU^invv4nd7dTc7e™ Tr^TT',pronourTcccrTfjspanty^TTH- i.iIn» l)ei'TvWTrTOTr7^r9CW5FWTrr7TT^TiT?a^isamongmcTf)wesI11 not the lowest in the world, brought about by consistently leiwering the salaries of all high ranking officials including •el.ite and Party leaders while improving the rates of pay of lliosc in the medium or lower brackets. Since 1966 whenI.nvcr H oxha at the Fifth Party Congress called for special i llorls in im plem enting socialist principles, higher salaries leave1 been cut twice and there has been a steady rise in lower itilcs o f pay and pensions. Workers themselves have

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responded to the urgency o f replacing m onetary with socialist incentives by giving up of their own free will many supplem entary paym ents above their standard income.

This playing down of material incentives has narrowed the gap between cadres and the working masses, “ctngHtenTTfe tendency ..toarai^LaiLGcialcloirrancHrcomemnt roTTTrocljLu:!ionc o m ^ ^ ^ l o ^ w h i c h i n j ' g J ^ ^ J ^ J j f l M g f i f l i g < ^ ^ n e r S ^ ^ o ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ A ^ U T ^ a m ^ i m e the role o f nwraTTncenUvesT^F^ocIalisFemulation, has assumed growing im portance as the m ajor m otivation in the working masses’ conscious m obilisation for the advancement o f production.

In doing away w ith anomalies in pay and reducing differentials there has been no in tention of imposing a flat mechanical equalisation, ignoring the relation betw een simple jobs and those involving managerial responsibility, between unqualified and qualified work or betw een onerous and lighter tasks. Jjifi^m t^jflj^ o r j^ o c ia lis t rem uneration is ‘from each according in his ability a n r l tn f>arh n rrr .rr lin jrJ^ tk p woriç-J ^ -^ o e s \_ N o t till the p e n o T ^ ^ r a n s i t io n i^compTetethe__QJ3 Ji£i]2 l£_becoine ‘fro m each according to his ability and to each according to his nëëcfsTBut in the transitional perioddivisions^viidiiniit h ^ ^ n ^ ~ o F ^ ^ w ^ ^ i ^ ^ T ^ T ^ ^ r j r s ^ y J ( dd l m m H n ^ j n o ^

Because the system of paym ent is a ju st reflection of socialist principles, workers, specialists and managers all know each o th er’s rates o f pay and talk quite freely about them to anyone interested in how the system works. Some comparative figures in leks per m onth, the standard unit of Albanian currency, will show the measure of present differen­tials. At the current rate o f exchange a pound sterling is w orth about 12 leks; but while the following figures are useful for comparing rates o f pay in Albania, they provide no basis for com paring the standard of living of workers in Albania and Britain. This is because all essentials like food, housing and clothes are so very much cheaper in Albania while certain luxury goods tend to be m uch higher if, indeed, they are available at all.

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In the huge Mao Tsetung textile com bine at Berat the manager receives 1100 leks a m onth and the lowest paid workers start at 550. Skilled technicians receive about 750. At the caustic soda factory in V lora the chief engineer gets 900 leks, the director 1000, those doing light work from 500 to 550 and average workers between 700 and 750. The manager of the copper wire factory in Shkodra gets only 880 leks per m onth because it is fully-autom ated and compara- lively easy to run, while the workers, 60% of whom are women and young girls, make about 600 leks. All women, who have been drawn into industry in ever increasing numbers, have always received equal pay for equal work. AtI lie tractor spare parts factory in Tirana workers get on the uverage 600 leks a m onth, the chief engineer 900 and model workers may make as m uch as 1000. Workers, invariably men, engaged in particularly hard or hazardous work like mining, heavy loading and unloading, dyeing where lead11.lints are used, diving or glass smelting, receive more pay, often exceeding the salaries of directors; bu t there is a rontinuous m ovem ent by the use of new techniques and equipm ent tow ard eliminating the heavier and more li.i/.ardous jobs.

To com pare these paym ents in industry with those to wiiters and intellectuals: teachers, depending on qualifi- i .ilions, start at about 550 leks per m onth, rising at the end nl l ive years to 700 and after 20 years to 750. They receive ,n i additional 20 leks per m onth if they take posts in rural iii e,is. Full time writers in the Writers Union are paid about HIK) leks.

Thus the whole range of paym ents throughout industry mid, indeed, in all other sectors of the econom y, fall roughly wilhin limits o f from 500 to 1100 leks a m onth , or a m.isiinum differentiation of about two to one. As well as by |i>i\ increases, mainly for the lower and m iddle ranks of W i n k e r s , the standard of living of workers generally is also Improved by price reductions, particularly of necessities, and li\ l.u'ger allocations of funds for free social services like k i n d e r g a r t e n s , creches, schools and public health. There have Im en 12 major reductions in prices over the whole range of HOixU, quite apart from random decreases in prices of specific

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commodities, and the reduction announced for the year 1969 alone resulted in a profit to the people of 170 million leks. In the ten year period from 1950 to 1960 expenditure on health and sanitation increased five fold.

The righ t to w ork is the m ost impo rtan t social and econonnc£reroggj|j ^ ^ o ^ e v e ^ / ^ b a n ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B ^ ^ ^ ^ t l T le war^TverTwith a labour fo re e n o T a ^ e r ’ffianTlT^Tium'Eier by which the present labour force increases every tw o years, unem ploym ent was sometimes as high as 50%. j^ jt^ w ijiju labour power no longer a com m odity t o be hired and fired so le ly j[n _ u ie jn te res t^ j^p ro tits l oriir^m pToym j^Tass')"'w Ifli

according_to_BlaQ^_lQ££PUlated in the interests o f the working m g sce s t h r m ^ W t h e r e r a n h e n o u n e m p l o y m e n t . I n r l ^ d there is a continuing labour shortage and those released from a particular branch of industry by rising productivity or the adoption of m odern techniques are quickly absorbed by new projects. ‘Hushed up agrarian unem ploym ent’ has dis­appeared with the collectivisation of agriculture, and the forced m igration of farmers and workers to o ther countries in search of jobs is a b itte r m em ory of the past. The complete em ancipation of women is part of the abolition of unem ploy­m ent and they now make up 42% of the labour force.

Ju s t as every citizen is entitled to be elected to any post in the state so also every citizen has the right to take a job in any enterprise. A t the same time the adm inistrators of enterprises, in consultation with the w orkers’ collectives, can transfer workers from one job to another as the needs of production demand. Ultimately the question of assigning to Qr_djsinisgiaiLllQgt a job is left to the wor^er^tTTemselveran^1 w ithout the c o n s e n ^ ? ^ ie ir7 o ITeniverm^Tiagem ent can take jl» ■■ Ui-ai_^HTt^Tin';T7rH jT^Tierine<^^s t ra t io n can r&c o m ^ n d ^ i s m i s s a j a r i d j ^ s m t ^ lelob fo r th e w o rk or r[| i j £ n K ~ f o u m ^ ^ s e v ^

No one under th e a g t^ J ^ ^ T T a n ^ n t^ jo b and those under 18 are forbidden to engage in the more arduous kinds of work. Heavier work is also forbidden to wom en if it could be injurious to their health. The working day is fixed at eight hours, bu t those on night w ork do only seven hours with no

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drop in pay, and for those engaged in particularly heavy work the hours may be further reduced while they are still paid the same as for a full eight hour day. Similarly teenagers, mothers in the early stages of pregnancy or for a period after returning to w ork following on child b irth and workers pursuing courses of training all work up to two hours a day less at the full rate. Extra work may be done in times of emergency or to m eet special production needs, bu t entirely at the discrimination of workers and excluding those who might harm themselves by their zeal.

Workers are entitled to no t less than 36 hours off each week, usually including Sundays, and there are a num ber of .nmual holidays like Independence Day, Republic Day, May Day and Liberation Day. The yearly vacation is 12 full working days bu t 24 days for those in their teens, and supplementary leave of from 6 to 36 days is granted to those performing heavier tasks. From 10 to 30 days are granted to workers taking night or correspondence courses to prepare lor their exam inations and wom en workers have 15 weeks off over the period of child birth. Rest homes at the best resorts on I he coast or in the m ountains are run by the trade unions lot workers and their families at only 22% of the cost of iii.iintenance. —

The medical service, including sanatoria, health resorts and i < i upcration centres, is entirely free. Pensions begin at 50 forI hose in heavy w ork, at 55 for those in less onerous jobs andI I (iO for those doing lighter tasks, women in each category |rtiling five years earlier. The size of pensions is based on m inority and special or m eritorious service bu t averages 70%I I I I lie final year’s pay. Incapacitated workers receive from 7fl% to 95% of their last m o n th ’s salary. Family pensions i nvn rases where the wage-eamer dies and are based on the in i lls of the family deprived of support. All these social• liners are m et ou t o f funds contributed by industrial• ii11 1 1 >rises and drawn from the state budget. Workers and employees pay nothing at all. Indeed, from 1970, they have I n i i i relieved of paying any taxes whatsoever.

hillI'tv at work is governed by the Labour Ci>dg-_andilt i~'iinis .iiid regula j^o n ^^g re e H o y ^ tJT ^^o r lç e rT o ile c ljv e s

/mil ^ t,irrT T gau!rrlaH o^M nspcH onfl7sl am tary"anc^ecurity

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ço m jjiisg ia a ^ jf l^ j^ g jJy n g ^ la ss^ ç o n tro ltea n ^th e standards of health and hygiene.

f “" ^ n i^ to r ^ T ^ C ^ l ie s ^ n e a s u r e ^ T o r the well-being of the working class is the revolutionary im petus of socialist construction. By 1968 the industrial targets set for 1970 had already been reached and this, in the main, has been the story of each o f the successive five year plans.

In these achievements on Albania’s industrial front, as in the developmenf"or^grTruTTTTre7TTT?T[eosivie"roT?TTa? been p l a y e d b y s o c i ^ S T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T c r ^ m i m e ^ t n a t ^ ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ siHerafionsTTTave consistently been given priority .over cçqjj- < ^m c^p!s^!'sT ?rT T i^!ben^on^va]^tw asdem c> nstra ted that m en are m ore im portant than weapons, so in the struggle for socialist construction m en are m ore im portan t than machines. Technique, no m atter how advanced, remains a dead le tte r w ithout the working masses, im bued w ith a high political sense of duty, to set technique in m otion toward social goals collectively fixed. It has been the task of the Albanian Party of Labour to raise the political consciousness of the working class and support its leadership in the social and econom ic life of the country , exposing reactionary theories which make a fetish of technocracy and exalt experts regardless of their political attitudes. This task finds expression in the Party slogan: ‘Man is the m ost precious capitaL__Çonçeni for man m ust be më""TETlfT ^ " 7 y W n '

Socialism is the creation of the labouring masses. Awaken­ing their revolutionary vigour, not in tem porary outbursts but in a sustained forw ard m ovem ent, has been the key to A lbania’s industrial progress. The incentives of their creative ac tiv jt^ -m illg -Jiam the n a tu re o l their socIaTancl ë^onomTcan entirehui£W vista for initiative and endeavour. In socialist ^ o c k W ^ j j j iu ^ ^ ta ^ d in ^ ^ e ^ M s ^ in m h ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t ic i^ a t io jT

w c lL L io im -^ ^^ -m d in tn^ fl in rT ^5m T e^?!7flT rT !onaT !smMalLilSfilLiS-Ëfliailcip ated^m cnaëcom e^ ^ n a u ë r T o n io n o u i ancHmygg.

In every factory and industrial enterprise on the same

bulletin board which serves for the posting of criticisms and self-criticisms there is a space reserved for commending those workers who have made special contributions to raising production or proved themselves m ost helpful to others on the production line. There are heroes and heroines of socialist work, outstanding examples of placing general above personal interest — as there were heroes and heroines during the anti-fascist war.

Adem Reka had been a partisan and after the war he worked so well in the docks at Durrës that he was made a section leader. He was off duty when the tem pest of November, 1966, hit the seaport; but hearing that a huge floating crane was in danger o f going adrift he rushed to the dockside and was helping to secure the moorings when a ■•napped cable killed him.

Hysni Hajasllari a master oil driller who has faced danger so often that it is second nature to him, has on several occasions risked his life to seal off wells ou t o f control.

Nuredin H oxha a chemical w orker in Elbasan lost both legs in an accident; b u t once he was able to walk on the artificial Ilfs provided him, he handed over his pension card and irjoined his fellow-workers at the plant where he has devised ,i number of useful innovations in m ethods of work.

Myzejen Golloberda works in the cloth fabricating depart­ment o f the Hammer and Sickle knit-wear works in Korça.I b i qualities o f leadership have helped her section surpass the I>1 iimed o u tp u t for 1970.

Alll lough they have only recently started working at the Mm Tsetung textile mills, two girls, Naxije Kaldani and Esma Vodira, have already distinguished themselves as conscien- I In us workers.

I n Kerkaj is a tu rner in the Enver mechanical plant who «1 it I led work there when the plant opened and has grown up W i l l i i l , making many proposals for innovations and rational- UillloilB.

I wo women tractor drivers at the Korça tractor station, fiilbiiidha Cuka and Liliana Kola, are tireless workers and llim | * u . 11 > I e friends.

\inong those singled o u t for com m endation at the P arty ’s Ht • lit Congress in November, 1971, were Dila Cuni, a

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co-operative brigade leader in Lezha district who helped bring in a record maize harvest, the tractor driver, Shyqyri Kanapari, who with the same tractor has ploughed more than70,000 acres, a leading wom an worker in the Korça knit- goods com bine, Arterie Shahinllari, and the drivers Nikoll Cuni and M ehmet Delvina.

Albanian youth are following the same traditions of devoted service in the cause of industrial development. Shkurte Pal Vata, a young girl from the northern highlands, was killed while working on the Rogozhima-Fier railway, built entirely, like all the railways in Albania, by young people. N ot only has she becom e an inspiration to her own generation, bu t her father, when he heard of her death, took his daughter’s place at the construction site so that ‘the front of socuilist construction would no t be broken for a m om ent.’

r There is nu_siilislitute for d i r e c t j 'n a ^ insocialist construction. Ju s t as revolution cannot IjeexpoTted, TmtK>scQl^nTHfl3ov(MTor‘camccH)u'H)IHjeKaITCnTf^vorTung

people^ Every form of knowing w hat is best for the people and acting w ithout their full participation will always turn out to be a means of exploiting them and of reintroducing class divisions. Socialism is, quite simply, about people and their collective well-being — people irrespective of race, national boundaries or cultural background, people organised co-operatively and armed with the political consciousness to prevent any insidious restoration of capitalism. Only the working masses have the collective understanding to know what is ultim ately best for them. Only the working masses have the collective experience to exploit nature in a way that enriches their own lives and the lives o f those to come. Only the working masses have the collective m orality to build a new society from which all forms of oppression, discrimi­nation, individually selfish or narrowly class-interested actions have been eliminated.

That is no t to question the need for leadership. Socialism ^ £ £ ^ J l i i t -£^8jv |^^£ |o r^ an eo u sl^ ^ B irtsu ch ii<le a d e ^ h i^ jn i^ J to * jd w a y s_ l)e _ s \^ e c r_ to ^ t^ e ^ src T T !T ie ^ e rn id en tif ie s itselI çom EletëI^vvim th^tU eresrorn7?rnasses^3rocëë5ir?g*aIw ays

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on the hjisis o f the mass lin£i_lk^i]iijig_£rom the masses in order to he a b l^ T ^ ^ a c h —th o n -i Leaders cut on^^onTTfi^ people are like, in Stalin’s phrase, ‘Antaeus lifted away from the earth .’ <

There is a need for specialists, for in tellectuals, emerging Irom _the_ranks of the working classTTuTTToijëly btfTTTWTB I hem in socialist sp in t^R 'inniSr'A lurr'^Com m ittee, reporting to the Sixth Plenary Session of the I’arty on ‘deepening socialist revolution through developing llie class struggle and carrying ou t the mass line’ pu t the problem in these words: th,-ir f_Pdivorce m en te l^ i^ m jn an u a l labour, because of their position ,uid the role they play in’TeacTmg'^nT^rgamsmg'worF'anT^fU ^ a lie n ^ b o u rg e o i^ a n jI jy ^ i j i j j f l i^ l^ tU u S ^ ^ i^ jd e o jb j jy . They are^nrTm ea to detach th emselves from the m asses^to ovc^^Te"TTieir^C T ity"^nT T inën ts7*T cr^Iip"T nF o"pos^^r|^rI[oU snr*anrTëTF<Q nc£5!ll^^consiH ër"Tnar^rëv alone are■ ,i liable T)T^c[irecting and le^ding1_Jt_js_Jiere__tha^_a_^j;y 111 iport anT T irena^rtm rH asrjU m gah^c^^E lE ^nL O M jL P ^It y■ M ganisaTTonTT!TouTTT^^nsn!y u ie T ^ v o rk w m iin T e IIe c tu a ls ■njil stuclenis.'"IJnjMilj4 iLJJUlli fium ...Hit |jliu,h l in -wkich. ^i2ijjjJiaJ^_iiiid_lXXiaiifflisIs^^^T^acc(n7i??riTffeTTeciuals, wemust see that our intellectua lliT T ç ^ ^ E ^ ^ fl^ ^ ^ ^ P a r ty and of Comrade Enver Hoxhajso lli,11 I hey max^e_tempe^c^rrevoTuTTonafT?yTffTTos^?2Sla£l willi w o ^ e ^ a n ^ je a s a n tT a n cnnia^n^rfS ffio t^^ ^ o o k s they»!TouTTt!nc^m iH io!cHTf 1pTcEa£^ffTCWfig^*M^ " ‘ M ^TIT >ania has taken great strides along the road of socialist

i obstruction, b u t no one there claims tha t all social questions llnvc been finally and irreversibly decided in favour of * 0 1 i.ilism. Personal interest had taken deep root in the iicople’s consciousness during the centuries-old existence o! |iiivate property and

_,misl lhe__alien_ influence of_bourgeois^ individualism, a"m i ib<-^iWK)t^ppeaIing*T ^ T ? T u m a nTty7)r^TO5u?^T5u^ ~TTI7T7™scTnoW^T™nnTr5!^r" T T ë c fin j^ iT o m p ë tin v eE3inr3 ssESZ2 2 !2 2Z ^i v,.n v fo m w )^TH ?lTi7cnr!TTua!s^stmggfrforsurvival/ [f — — --------- ------- ___

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economic Dase,"ffië?7^ o o n e ^ T T ate rT h a^ E )as^ LtscBrwI!rT3ethe ideological superstructure is no t also socialised, it will corrupt the leadership, deflect the Party from its vanguard role and so weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat that state pow er can be wrested from the working masses.

Revisionism is the cancerous growth within Marxism of bourgeois__j£nçlendes;__U£__gs£ençe ll> J UUlL.lV lllUWlamcjJ

Jgo-ducjij,

Speaking at a meeting in April, 1970, to com m em orate the centenary of Lenin’s birth, Ramiz Alia dealt with this very problem. ‘O f decisive im portance to the victory of socialism over capitalism is the establishm ent of a correct relationship between objective and subjective factors, betw een basis and superstructure, between econom y and politics, between the material conditions of life and the consciousness of man, between proletarian dictatorship and proletarian democracy, between centralism and initiative from below, between the working masses and Party leadership, between national and international interests. In_£QIBBiete_opposition to t he th eoriesa n d p r a ^ i c e j ^ th ^ ^ v jg i f l j y ^ ^ w h a ^ b ^ ^ ^ i^ T ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i^

176

e d u c a t i o n a n d t e m g e n n ^ j j ^ j y i g j j g j ^ j n a ^ ^ r ^ o ^ y y j j j çim portance.^ n ^ n ^ T S u c a t io n , as Ramiz Alia had pointed out on a

previous occasion, it m ust be shown tha t ‘to give priority to personal interests means to give priority to the individual not to the collective, to partial no t to basic interests, to the interests o f the m om ent no t to those of the future, to material no t to moral stimuli, to national egotism not to proletarian internationalism . . . Self interests are objective interests, entirely legitim ate and rational. Society is not something abstract b u t composed of people (with all their individual needs), just as general interest is no t something abstract b u t is made up o f all the vital interests of workers. I'lierefore our fight is n o t against the very existence of self-interest but against placing it above general interest. We ire for combining and harmonising them by subjecting personal interests to the interests o f the working class, o f the people, o f revolution and socialism.’ *

' M a m _ M arxists-who were perfectly aware of all that was involved in the developmen^_of_soçi^ist_man_jn__terms_of

.1 i A

.iirKjisnr^TndeTe^Hna^ ^ T tlT e 'm m n J tT e s^ ^ ^ n m in a h n ^ o ld wTiVk U1 UWUuIll ibid action to bring about a - m 5 a l i n v n e r a d o n a n c ^ w e r ^ a b o i ^ ^ h e ^ U m e t h e I i* jnsm or^^*^i'^^a^ s T e s ^ o o c ^ ^ o ^ ^ m rn uiusm^voTn^*t^e.l""n ' l,flTTH^EPHPH3Tn^TI!^^?outTrT!£agu^r^n5!??J^I?oupitili.il young people of 15 w ould live to see com m unist society, which m eant tha t he envisaged a transition of some 40 or 50 yr.ns. The revolutionary experience of the Chinese and Alban ian people in building socialism has taught them to ilimk in terms of a m uch longer period — perhaps 10 |m in rations. And meanwhile the betrayal o f the working class in die Soviet Union and the Eastern European people’s ili itineracies and the restoration of capitalism in thosei • Min|rics have dem onstrated tha t the vigilance of Party and Wm lung people m ust n o t slacken at any time during theii in itional period.

In I.nver H oxha’s R eport to th e F i f t j i_ j |a ^ ^I’lTX. U^irTnrTar^frea3yT eerT T e!eiT ea7o*^T ^ontica[event

177

of makjx-imp ut.tattcc-.lii?- 'Ilf <llp ni',''~^il v'o f^ h ^ d e o lo g iç g ijS iiJ ^ ii io n j^ Q i^ h ir^ e r j^ v o lu tio n is i j jg j

;life in our countiX-£aDIIot_bc_understood w ithout further rS o fu ^ o n ^ sin F ^ ^ o c ic ty is c a r r ie d o u t o t ^ T i^S'asT ^^^e the c o n s c ie n c e o f a l^ v o d d n ^ g e g j i l^ ^ r o l^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p t

< ^u u a iu ^m ^ ^^ T m iu n an ^ [m £ £ n u ^ T F n T rT r\rT ?K u 7 * M |TR-d e c is iv ^ ^ c to M n ^ o lv in g th ^ c o m g le x ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ jn |T u 2 5 i^ ^

# # ' • ' Op Othe former exploiting class elements in our own society and against the imperialists and revisionists beyond our bound­aries, remains an imperative task of our Party, our state and our working people. But^we^^should consider class strugglejn ^ b ro a d e r a s |) e ç ^ —

u lwI c a » a i n s t the misuse parasitic and speculaliyg_j££Liim£i£S_tXL-Siiatch more fromS O C I C L V and c o n i r i h l l t r lr-ss :lu ; i i n s t n u l l i n g .in r - n c y 1 ifV- r.

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ d ii u 3 j j^ j ] ^ ^ ^ o l le c d v e iijn te rests iBj igairm iiburegy-jarejudices^jjj^jjijyserstitio^^la^T u o ir"T m d ^^bo u n ieo i^* w av ot lire ii'cnerallv. auainstr^U^ , ayaiij$tdecadent b o u rg eo i^an a^ëv !sT o m sr* a i^^n d _ çu ltu re^^a^§ ) m etaphysic^ancP?3eaR snr^nragam s^^repo]iS£aL i]l£Iu£n£t

w o rk in jjj2 £ g ]J |j^ |yj2 j]j£ j||ijy|v ^ i l i e n a t ^ N oone should consider h im se^ im m u n ^T ro n ^v ilten d en c ies and think he has nothing to fight against in his own person. A sharp struggle takes place in the conscience of every man between socialist ideology and bourgeois ideology.’

This report o f Enver H oxha’s parallelled both in timing and in ten t the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. But the similarity of the revolutionary movements in the two countries resulted from the fact that both , as socialist countries developing on M arxist-Leninist principles, had

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encountered the same problem s and set about solving llinn by applying the same mass line.f Indeed while the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in Cliin.i and the further revolutionising of life in Albania have been identical in ideological content, there have been differences in the way they were carried ou t stemming from differences in the specific historical conditions in the two countries. The line of Mao Tsetung ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China has been consistently that of developing the ideological revolution as com plem entary to the revol ution in the economic base of society and even in his early writings this social strategy had already been worked out. But

l,iu Shao Chi and the revisionists who collected around him had constantly advocated an opposition line, being careful not to challenge too openly the popularity and authority of China’s great leader. By taking advantage of any tem porary set-backs to China’s socialist construction from natural disasters or the beginnings of the split in the world ( om m unist m ovem ent they were able to usurp some share in ■•late power, being particularly active in cultural and propa­ganda organisations where their bourgeois qualifications secured them a foothold. Mao Tsetung was perfectly aware of what they were doing and at any time could simply have exposed them and invoked his trem endous prestige to have them removed. But he did no t wish to deal with the threat I hey represented on the basis of an inner political bureau or i veil an inner party struggle. He preferred to wait till the political consciousness of workers, young people and the army w .is such that they could be mobilised to repudiate the ‘top pi (iple in authority taking the capitalist road ,’ thus revolutiou- 1 11m; themselves in the process. This application of the mass line resulted in a sharp revolutionary struggle by the working iii.i .ses to recapture tha t portion of state power which the M nsionists had assumed.

In Albania the problem of a counter-revolutionary it v i .i<>11 ist plot w ithin the Party and state originated muc h!• M i l l e r , even before the anti-fascist war had been successfully nun huled. Koçi Xoxe and other revisionists, with the m i p p u i t of the Yugoslav Party under T ito, made their bid in lIk i .u ly days of the Albanian People’s Republic to divert the

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country from a socialist course and make it a part of Yugoslavia. Enver Hoxha had no alternative to exerting his leadership at a time chosen by the revisionists because they considered the people too politically im m ature to understand the issues and support him. They created a very dangerous situation, bu t Enver H oxha exposed the nature of their

[conspiracy and rallied the forces to deprive them of their I positions. This experience of revisionist betrayal at the very

beginning of their socialist h istory armed the Albanian people against allowing revisionists to creep into im portan t posts. That is n o t to say that there have been no distortions of socialist legality, no incorrect m ethods of work, no bureau­cratic tendencies in Albania to be countered and pu t right — only th a t these errors were n o t represented in an organised form within the Party and state requiring a mass upheaval on the scale of C hina’s cultural revolution.

Ju s t as the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China was the specific form at a particular period in socialist develop­ment of a continuing process of rooting out the old selfish, individualistic ideas and habits of bourgeois society, so the further revolutionising of life in Albania goes on continu­ously and Enver H oxha’s 1966 R eport to the Fifth Party Congress was simply a very cogent expression o f the need for perpetual ideological struggle and an urgent call for even more dedicated leadership by communists in creating and fostering the new socialist man. W ithout the conscious developm ent o f socialist m orality by the working masses they will no t only be unable to achieve such dram atic successes in production b u t they will no t even be able to hold on to the state pow er which is their guarantee during the transition to communism against the restoration of an exploitative system. *

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THE SPLIT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENTChapter Fifteen

Albania’s Relations w ith the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China

During the early period of socialist construction Albania enjoyed the closest fraternal relations w ith the Soviet Union. Stalin had prevented the U nited States and Britain from excluding Albania from the peace negotiations and the Soviet leadership had supported Albanian resistance to T ito ’s attem pts to take over the country, expelling Yugoslavia from I lie com ity of socialist countries in 1948 as a client state of I lie U nited States.

In spite of the desperate need of the Soviet Union to repair its own colossal war damage and rebuild its industrial strength to meet the challenge o f the capitalist world headed by a nuclear-armed United States, long term credits were advanced10 Albania and specialists helped to set up industrial projects■ md train Albanians to run them. Factories like the huge Slalin textile plant on the outskirts o f Tirana were built with Soviet assistance and Soviet technical aid enabled the Albanians to develop their own mineral resources — like the011 industry which developed around Stalin City, nam ed after the great friend o f the Albanian people. Today in most Albanian towns, along w ith statues of Marx and Lenin, will lie seen those of Stalin as well. _

Albania was in no sense a ‘satellite’ of the Soviet Union, j Hie relations between the two states were based on a |miInership betw een countries sharing the same socialist MN|»i rations and determ ined to defend socialism against i n* roachments by the capitalist powers. The Albanians were dedicated to developing their country in a spirit of self- li li.nice and any help received was for the purpose of making 1111 111 more no t less economically independent. They, played

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their full part in the defence of the socialist camp in to which one serious inroad had already been made by the defection of Yugoslavia in exchange for the very different kind of ‘aid’ supplied by the U nited States. Albania was the bastion of socialism in the M editerranean area, preventing the imperial­ists from further outflanking the socialist countries in southern Europe and providing the Soviet Union with a base which could be used, w ith the full concurrence of the Albanian people, in protecting the people’s democracies and the Soviet Union itself.

O f Stalin the Albanians say: ‘He always m aintained a m ost fraternal attitude tow ard our country, always dealing with our Party on the basis of parity and m utual respect, never intervening in its internal affairs nor trying to impose his own ideas. When our Party solicited his counsel on this m atter or that, he insisted tha t his words were by no means binding, that they should be considered w ith a critical eye in the light o f our conditions and that our Party should decide itself according to its own experience and judgem ent.’

A fter S talin’s death in March. 1953. a train of events began

in the Soviet Union which was to shatter the un ity of the

com m unist world, alter profoundly the relations among major world powers and cast Albania once more in the roTe

of a small embattled country standing up against a vastly slipenor to rce in a struggle for its very existence.

I One of the first indications that an entirely different line was being adopted by the Soviet leadership came in May, 1955, when Khrushchev unilaterally rejected the decisions of the Inform ation Bureau and other com m unist and w orkers’

parties in respect to T ito ’s betrayal of socialism and headed a delegation to Belgrade for the purpose of rehabilitating, w ithout consultation, the Yugoslav leader. Two days before the delegation left Moscow the Albanian Party of Labour was inform ed of the visit and asked to approve a statem ent which Khrushchev had drawn up in the name of the Inform ation Bureau w ithout bothering to convene it. This the Albanian Party refused to do on the grounds that there had been no change in the line of the Yugoslav leadership since it had been condem ned by the 1948 resolution of com m unist and w orkers’ parties represented on the Bureau, to*

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As a consequence of Khrushchev’s support for the Yugoslav line, in Hungary and other people’s democracies concessions were made to capitalist elements inside~~the' country_ and bourgeois ideology and__culture were giyen_frge ja la ^ I n the People’s^ ^ u B T ic o T Albania n o t only were class enemies granted no concessions but the fight againt bourgeois and revisionist tendencies was intensified. The Central Com ­m ittee had no hesitation in exposing the revisionist activities of Tuk Jakova and Bedri Spahiu in June , 1955, relieving the former of his post on the Central Com m ittee and expelling the la tte r from the Party altogether.

The conference of the four great powers, the Soviet Union, the U nited States, Britain and France, at Geneva in Ju ly , 1955, was acclaimed by Khrushchev as ‘a new stage in the relations between states’ and he described the leaders o f the imperialist powers as ‘reasonable people who were trying to ensure peace’ — this on the eve of the Anglo-French-lsraeli a ttack on Suez! It was in pursuance of such collaboration with imperialism tha t Khrushchev praised the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and argued that it was no different from the foreign policy of the socialist countries. It was no t a line of argument tha t could impress the Albanian people with their direct experience of the role the Yugoslav leadership had played as the price for dollar aid. —

' At the 20th Congress of the Com m unist Party of the Soviet Union in February, 1956, after three years of preparation, Khrushchev presented in the report o f the Central Com m ittee a num ber of ‘new ’ theses described as ‘a creative developm ent o f M arxist-Leninist theo ry ’ which were i n fact a complete departure from Marxism-Leninism. .Col­laboration with im perialism which he labelled ‘peacefulio existence' was exalted as tliepolicy of all socia3ist states in opposition to Lenin’s principle jli.it the foreign policy of a socialist country could only be fused on proletarian internationalism — ‘an_alliançe_witlLthe jevohitionarieso lM lT e^idvan ced ^ ther. j i|n e s s r d n e o p l e s against, i m p e r i a l i s t s . ' K o r t h e s a k e of pe,ireful co-existence at all costs Khrushchev made it clear lli.it he was prepared to give up international class struggle, lenouncing on behalf o f the colonial peoples any .right to

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liberate themselves from oppression and reassuring capitalist governments by emphasising ‘peaceful transition to socialism’ or the Parlimentary road as the only correct line for com m unist parties everywhere. If only the U nited States imperialists were given to understand that their economic and m ilitary positions all over the world were n o t to be challenged then they w ould give up their aggressive designs against the socialist block.

What this really am ounted to was an a ttem pt to freeze theinequalities, for the sake of a ‘peace’ which the two maip'rl wx>ridj30wersiiiith £ U n ite d J ita le !^guarantee with their n i'<~lf>ar The ‘creative developm ent of Marxism-Leninism’ which Khrushchev was advancing was simply the division of the world into Soviet and American spheres of influence in which each was to enjoy unquestioned supremacy — a Tw entieth Century version of the Pope’s dem arcation line sharing out the new world between Spain and Portugal. ‘T hen’, Khrushchev was to say, ‘if any mad m an w anted war, we, the two strongest countries in the world, would have bu t to shake our fingers to warn him o ff’ — and included among the ‘mad m en’, of course were any popular leaders wishing to take their countries oul o f imperialist bondage. Instead of challenging the policy of nuclear blackmail which the U nited States government had used ever since the war to keep the world safe for the operations o f m onopoly capitalism, Khrushchev was going to use the Soviet U nion’s nuclear capacity to get in on the act. That this was the case was dem onstrated later on when A lbania’s opposition to the Khrushchev line prom pted the threat from Kozlov, a m em ber of the Central Com m ittee of the Soviet Party, that ‘either the Albanians will accept peaceful co-existence or an atom bom b from the imperialists will tu rn Albania into a heap of ashes and leave no Albanian alive’.

I t was at this Congress that Khrushchev made his notorious secret report ‘On the cult of the individual and its con­sequences’ which was an all-out attack on Stalin launched, as was Khrushchev’s habit, w ithout any prior warning to fraternal parties. Indeed m any com m unist parties only came

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to know o f the contents o f the report through the Western press to which it was leaked.

The attack, a fabrication of distorted docum ents and all the slanders o f Stalin ever propagated by the enemies of socialism, charged him with being an ‘ignorant despot’ guilty of the greatest ‘arbitrary cruelty’. ^t_j>ei2e£LJiUi«jluijlil£ purpose of-__consnlida.tinpf Khrushchev’s own position by destroying the personal reputation of his illustxiouj (lecessor and, mure Im portant. ‘TinHermined the theory and practice o f Marxism-Leninism bv viewing the whole_penod_of socialist construction in the ISoy|ej_ Um on~ umfcr Sruilin*s l e a d e r s l i ^ ^ o ^ r a T ^ t ^ ^ ^ T o u r g e o i ^ g o ^ l l ^ ^ i e w d e d ^ J out in odds ancT ends 'o t M arxist-Leninist. languaggi_JThe trem endous achievements o i tJie workers and peasants of the Soviet Union under the guidance of the Com m unist Party which had transform ed a backward, repressive country in to a ^reat socialist industrialised state capable of taking on and defeating the armed might of Nazi Germany was described in the report as a ‘dark, anti-dem ocratic period of violations of socialist legality, of terror and m urders, o f prisons and concentration camps’. Stalin’s victories against capitalism were presented as ‘crim es’ against socialism; and the enemies of socialism, witting or unw itting agents of imperialism, whom Stalin had at various times unmasked, like Trotsky, llukharin, Zinoviev or, after the war, T ito, were described as martyrs and heroes, victims of Stalin’s tyranny. In this attack Khrushchev could be sure of the support of all who hated Stalin as a powerful exponent o f socialist ideas and a staunch defender o f socialism. *"E JJ'he basic political question on which Khrushchev’s it tem pt to reverse the whole line of the Soviet C om m unist Kirty depended was whether or not class connicHTad"ceasetr to exist in the Soviet Union. Lenin always took an absolutely unequivocal stand on this issue, holding th a t during the entire historical period separating capitalism from the classless society• ■I communism, tha t is the period designated as socialism, i l.iss conflict did continue and therefore the dictatorship of the proletariat remained a political necessity for the develop­ment of a socialist society. Indeed, after the assum ption of nl.ile power by the working class, bourgeois elements w ould

185

struggle even harder to re-establish themselves, not disdaining to call on outside help from the capitalist world for this purpose. This was the position usually defended by Stalin. Mao Tsetung and Enver Hoxha, drawing on the experience of the Chinese and Albanian peoples in making and consolidat­ing a proletarian revolution, have never wavered from this M arxist-Leninist line. But if Khrushchev could convince others, and those with revisionist tendencies were susceptible to such conviction, ‘HiaT*"al sunn- time earlier man Party dongress class conflict had ended in the Soviet Union, then the dictatorship of the proletariat would from that period have become unnecessary and S talin’s actions in defence of the dictatorship of the proletariat could be described as arbitrary — an attem pt to bolster up a merely personal dictatorship requiring a cult of the individual to delude the masses into acquiescence.

C pnrlherm ore, if class conflict had ceased to exist, the Party and state instead of being the political and governmental expressions ol' the d ictatorship , of the proletariat could be

designated bv Khrushchev as the Party and State of thfL ‘whole people’. Bu t in this form ulation he departed al- together from anything rem otely resembling Marxism. The Marxist view developed by Lenin in such works as ‘State and R evolution’ and strictly adhered to by all except those deviationists who forfeited any right to call themselves Marxists, was that the state always represented the interests of a particular class in a society in which there was stilT d^ conflict. Neither the state nor the com m unist party was above class struggle and they would cease to exist whep c la sse sceased to ex is t^ JjiiJ jtJ ij^^which Marx had only predicated of the classless society of

full communism. Therefore_a party or a state ot the jw hole

people1 was nonsense from a Marxist point ot y 'pw: fl^d Stalin, in his last theoretical work. ‘Ernnomir Prnhlpmc of

Socialism in the USSR^_^Jii£]3 _a£tacked revisionist ideaS-ia precisely the same terms the Chinese and Albanians were inprecisely th e same t erms the Chinese and Albanians wejjy jo use in th e 'polemics following t ic 20tK 'Congress.jipecificall\criticised the ‘state oI_jJi£_wholg__ people ’ concept as ,1^1

anti-Marxist a ttem pt to undermine the dictatorship of I Inproletariat"

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In fact, the denial o f any further need for the leadership ol the w orking class in a situation where other classes silU existed merely prepared the wav for those anti-worTTmTII.iss elem ents to recaptu re political power and begin diveytiiiL’ tin■ Soviet" Union from a socialist course. T hat this was the in ten tion of Khrushchev and the revisionist clique around him became apparent in the econom ic changes which accom panied these political manoeuvres. The decentralisation of the econom y was no t a loosening of control from the---- — IW Illllll ... .... ■Illllfa— I— IM'H'I WWIIlim — W— W> ... j- If- ^ III ...................MM— M lcentre b u t a change from control by organs responsible to Ll\y working people like t n _ e j j l a l £ _ a n d - f a g t . y to control b y e x p e r t s , m an ag ersjiiK lJau reau cn its^ ^m otivation from the socialist incentives ox putting collectivc above personal interests to m aterial incentives no different trom^ t.nose characteristic o t capitalist socieT ^Z IE tiflissIE * econom ic liberalisation was simply a move from socialism to slate capitalism and, as such, was naturally hailed as ahreak-through by bourgeois economists everywhere. In due course, along with these political and economic changes w ent a restoration of bourgeois ideology generally — the ‘thaw ’ welcomed so effusively by bourgeois ideologues in capitalist countries. But it was never intended tha t such a restoration would threaten the position of the revisionist party hacks and state officials who had brought it about — hence the con­tinuing conflict between bourgeois writers and artists in the Soviet Union demanding the freedom of expression they might have expected in a bourgeois dem ocratic society and the Soviet state apparatus with the same bourgeois values who were prepared to welcome works attacking Stalin and the dictatorship of the proletariat b u t were no t prepared to i oiintenance those criticising themselves and the bureaucratic I dictatorship they had imposed.

Neither the Albanian nor the Chinese party was pre­wired to accept the line Khrushchev elaborated at the 20th I'n l y Congress, although they tried to m aintain correct icl.it ions w ith the Soviet Union knowing th a t Khrushchev did n o t speak for the Soviet people. It was no t tha t they thought Ni.ilin, for all his great services to the world proletarian movement, was above criticism. No com m unist leader is ever rtliovc criticism and every com m unist leadership has made

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mistakes. Learning from mistakes has been a m ajor feature of the social practice through which the theory of scientific socialism has been creatively developed. But they rejected criticisms made from the point of view of socialism’s enemies and realised tha t Khrushchev’s lies and slanders, gaining some credence from the fact tha t he had played a prom inent part in the events he maliciously distorted, was an attem pt to bury for all tim e no t only Stalin bu t Marxism itself.

This rejection by no means implied that Mao Tsetung or Enver H oxha had any sym pathy whatsoever w ith a ‘cult of the individual’ which is entirely alien to the spirit of Marxism. Marx himself, when he and Engels had enrolled in a secret com m unist society, said explictly: ‘Both of us d on’t give even a brass farthing for our popu larisa tion . . . We participated right from the beginning on the proviso that everything th a t helped m ystic subjugation to authority should be wiped ou t o f the constitu tion .’ Lenin always fought any m anifestation o f such a cult as diametrically opposed to the mass line — ‘only those are true bolsheviki leaders who n o t only teach the workers and peasants bu t also are taught by them .’ And in a letter to Shatunovsky Stalin w rote: ‘You speak of your*loyalty to“ me . . . I woufd advise you to do awav w ith the nrindn le o f_ jo ^ alt:Y t< w g !l!l separate individuals. This is no t bolsheviki-like. Be loyal to the w orking class, _to its party , to its state, This is a

^ ^ a ^ in d iv id u a l s ^ jv h ic h j s J I ^ ^ ^ m g t^ ^ n d ^ u n n e c e s s a r yIt m ust have seemed odd to those familiar w ith develop­

ments in the Soviet Union that Khrushchev, who circulated the secret report ‘On the cult o f the individual and its consequences’, at the period when this cult was supposed to have flourished had out-done everyone in adulation of Stalin. He described Stalin as ‘the father, the wise teacher, in whose work M arxist-Leninist philosophy has reached its acme . . . the Coryphaeus of science and the genius of m ankind’ and so

on. In deed Enver Hoxha in speaking on this question in his report to the Albanian Party 's Fifth Congress said"thal ''STTiTm might be criticised, no t because ne developed and practis^TI his own cult, bu t only because he did no t take^ propri

188

measures to restrain this unnecessary propaganda, especially taking in to consideration tha t the grgat reputation which he Jy^J^j^jy^Jj^j^i^uJgleandcleedsjs™and love which the Party and people had__for_him, were sufficient to deal a telling blow to the bureaucratic elements who were jeopardising the d ic tatorship <>t the pro lc taria j/M l

is obvious that those who attacked Stalin m iy&b lo r having established a personality cult were the very people who had tried to build it up around him, partly in an attem pt to separate him from the masses and partly to lay the grounds for subsequent condem nation. —

Following the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev began to bring pressure to bear on the Albanian Party of Labour to re-examine its line in the spirit of the conclusions he had prom ulgated in Moscow. Michael Suslov, one of the Soviet Party’s th eo re ticians who had throw n in his lot with the rrvicionict group around Khrushchev, demanded through Lm Rplishnva o f the Albanian Central Com m ittee that the4]l £yd£-lJ ta ^ 2 j^ iT i to _ a n d th e s e n te n c e £ v v h ic h h a d >jD£eirpronounced against Koçi Xoxe. Tuk Takova and othçr anti-ParlAL_£lements on the grounds_JliaLJilfiSfi^£££_£nors. Q)mmiilgd__!under the influence of S talin’s cult o f the ‘Df]jY^nal’ Thig dpTnanrt wag rcppatert in the m ost arrogam way by the Soviet delegation to the Third Congress of the Albanian Party which m et in Tirana on May 25, 1956.

This Congress, representing the 41,372 members and 7,272 randidate members o f the Albanian Party, endorsed the political line of the report delivered by Enver Hoxha,( (msidered it ‘a m istake to think that class struggle is dying

away anrl that _the o v c r th ro w n jija s ^

Hi niggle of their own free w ilT^nd_^^£dk£^-Si-£2££££L^^ measures taken bv the Party against ‘revisionist. T ro tskvite. iMM>ortujiis^elem entg '. A lthough the*Central Com m ittee had m.ide known to the Soviet leadership its opposition to the mli-Marxist theses of the 20th Party Congress, the Third Albanian Party Congress did no t condem n the Khrushchev line openly, wishing to avoid if possible any further damagelo the unity o f the international com m unist movement. The 1%. sisl-Leninist line which the Party of Labour of Albania

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had pursued since its form ation was unanim ously confirmed and, unlike a num ber of o ther particsV no concessions torevisionism__were made""Tmcf^T..the pre'ssurë WnffTT"TTTg*Khrushchev group Increasmglyj^xerted. A t the same time tTie XTCanTan press p u B IT sn e T a iu im b e r^ r,,Trticles for popular consideration whose political im port was directly opposed to the whole tenor o f the 20th Congress formulations.

K hrushchev’s rehabilitation of those who had been con­dem ned previously for revisionist activities enabled anti- Marxists to emerge in the people’s democracies and even to resume leadership in several o f them with Soviet support. This was particularly the case in Poland and Hungary where the dictatorship of the proletariat was seriously weakened and the ideology and culture of the western bourgeoisie were allowed to spread w ithout check. Disguised as ‘cultural circles’ counter-revolutionary groups were established in many cities. This situation was, o f course, exploited by the capitalist countries which recognised the opportun ity for eliminating socialism in m uch of Eastern Europe.

The Albanian Party was aware of w hat was happening because a plot involving certain members o f the Party, backed by T ito and intended to stage a counter-revolution in Albania to coincide with a similar a ttem pt in Hungary, was discovered on the eve o f the Third Party Congress. Two of the conspirators, Dali N dreu and Liri Gega, were warned by T ito to flee to Yugoslavia where an ‘Albanian Resistance G roup’ was being formed with a radio station a t its disposal for hostile broadcasts to Albania; but they were both apprehended at the frontier and brought to trial. To the am azem ent of the Albanians, who were still taking in the full implications of the revisionist usurpation of state power in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev spoke out in defence of these traitors and condem ned the Albanian authorities for arresting and punishing them.

N ot long afterwards Enver Hoxha, while passing through Moscow, held a conversation with Suslov in which he reported w hat he had seen in Budapest. He told Suslov that Imre Nagy, one of the rehabilitated revisionist leaders closely associated w ith Tito, was deserting and was organising .1

counter-revolution at the ‘Petofi C lub’. Suslov denied cate^;

190

orically that Nagy could be contem plating any such act of betrayal and took from a drawer Nagy’s latest ‘self-criticism’ to show w hat a good chap he was! And Khrushchev continued to press for the acceptance of T ito as a socialist leader, when even the Western newspapers were describing Yugoslavia as a ‘transmission belt for conveying economic ideas of the west to the east.’

In O ctober, 1956, the counter-revolutionary uprising in Hungary duly occurred and when the Soviet leadership was finally forced to take action to suppress a revolt for which their own revisionist policies were largely responsible, T ito ’s com plicity became obvious. All the flags in Yugoslavia were flown at half-mast when the insurrection was put down and the intervention of the Soviet Army to prevent Hungary from passing over to the imperialist powers altogether was des­cribed as ‘savage and impermissible’. The Soviet leadership disposed of Imre Nagy whom they had themselves placed at the head of the Hungarian state; and yet in looking for those to blame for the tragic events in Hungary, they lashed out not at revisionists but at ‘dogm atists’ and renewed their attack on the Marxist-Leninists in Albania and China.

‘But why did these things happen after the 20th Congress?’ I ,nver H oxha demanded. ‘Did they really happen because the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania is sectarian or dogmatic or pessimistic? The tragedy of the Hungarian people will certainly be a great lesson to all honest people in I he world. It will be a lesson to all those who, listening to the imperialists and the forces of reaction with demagogical •.Ingans, slacken their vigilance and replace it with oppor- imiisin. The Party and people of Albania have never fallen .ind never will fall in to this trap. They will no t be misled by .logans of ‘people’s socialism’ and catchwords about some unit o f ‘dem ocracy’ tha t smell o f everything except true p i oletarian dem ocracy.’

In April, 1957, a delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania, headed by Enver H oxha and M ehmet Shehu, went In Moscow at the invitation of the Central Com m ittee of the Nnvict Party to hold conversations about the differences Whirh had been developing between them since the 20th I',uly Congress. At one point when Enver Hoxha was

191

explaining the stand of the Albanian Party, Khrushchev suddenly in terrupted him: ‘You Albanians are trying to take us back to the road of Stalin! ’ He dem anded th a t they change their a ttitude tow ard the Yugoslav revisionists and rehabili­tate those form er members of the Albanian Party who had opposed its M arxist-Leninist leadership. This Enver Hoxha and the o ther delegates refused to do, w hereupon Khrushchev shouted: ‘You Albanians are h o t tempered. It is impossible to come to terms with you. The discussion is closed.’

C This incident was the first open clash betw een the position\ m aintained by the Party of Labour of A lbania and the course

taken by the Khrushchev revisionists; b u t even then_thg_talks were n o t finally suspended and, instead_of_dem ands and threats, Khrushchev tried to use economic pressure on th e delegation. Believing Albania to be absolutely dependent on Soviet credits he announced the cancellation of the debt Albania had incurred up to 1955, some 450 million old roubles. The delegation, however, did no t regard this as charity for which they could be expected to modify their stand but as proletarian internationalism between fraternal peoples for which they expressed their thanks and departed w ithout altering in the slightest their revolutionary line.

This same line was advanced as tenaciously by the Albanian delegation to tne meeting 0 1 com m unist and w orkers’ parties held in Moscow in November ot that year. Khrushchev used the opportunity to present as out-dated the Marxist-Leninist teachings on imperialist wars, armed uprisings and socialist revolution, on the leading role of the party of the working class in revolution and socialist construction and on the continuing necessity of the d ictator­ship of the proletariat to prevent a restoration of capitalism. In drafting the docum ents of the meeting the revisionists under Khrushchev’s influence wanted_to_.Jeax£__QllL^um reference to imperialism at all — particularly any description T>1 In ite d Mates imperialism as the ençjim j^I. peace; anil n course they were" vehement, in their objections to a dçc l.u ation that^ as the events of thc-Dasl-lwp years had so cleaiT shown, revisionism w as.the_main danger in tbe_jntern£tk>n com m unist movement.

The Albanian delegation, led by Enver Hoxha, played an active part in exposing these anti-Marxist lorm ulationsT

diis cri^ 1,^1 % ,,th ^ d e le ^ a tlo n of tliip Comr|i\ipi^t Party of China, headed on this occasion by Mao T s e tu j^ j ju j i js ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ s l^ ^ ^ ^ ^ n n m ^ o f^ ^ ^ n n c i^ le ^ a l l ia n c e which was to. grow ever stronger. Such was their deter­m ination to defend a correct revolutionary line that they gained the support of o ther delegations and the Khrushchev faction was forced to retreat from positions taken up at the start o f the conference. Revisionism was described in the final statem ent as the ‘principal clanger in thë cMWrflDjM^ln te m ^ j^ g d ^ a j^ u tu la t io ^ T ^ lm ^ ^ ^ ^ p ressu reex ^m all^ . ’

But as a concession to preserve the unity ot the movement the Albanian unci, (jlnnese dcjc^^P»ns uni agree to le a \r imclum'jed an h iiunciT "T c-^riij ii< >n ol^TTie^?TE3T^PartAl (^2 lg it£ S S _ as^^v m ^^o p en e^^^e^^ teg ^^^h e~ m tem atio n a i

oflihç, | | The 1957Moscow Declaration on the whole represented a victory for the M arxist-Leninist forces bu t it did no t long restrain the revisionists.

Khrushchev certainly did no t allow himself and those ;iround him in the Soviet leadership to be bound by the socialist principles set forth in the Moscow Declaration. He sowed confusion generally by issuing quite contradictory statements on all the problems which had been collectively discussed and resolved at the Moscow meeting. The United States was praised as a great country prepared to collaborate with the Soviet Union and also described as an aggressive ‘world gendarm e’. At one time he would call the U.S. president a ‘reasonable, peace-loving friend’ and at another a ‘hangman’ who ‘could no t even run a kindergarten’. He would laud Tito and the Yugoslav experience to the skies and ilicii call Tito an arrogant person ‘who is ou t of step with the rest of the p la toon’. Such eclecticism is characteristic__of iliose who are m otivated by an unprincipled opportunism ; pul the rea^^*nH ^r*K hn Isncnev’s policies, behind all the vribal twists and extem pore o_utbursts, was shown m ‘such in )M'liations as the 1951* Camp David talks with l^resuTent

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popular (Icmocracy. lVve have said it nfofc ihanTmce thaTtlTe m ost com plicated international issues can only be settled by the heads of governments vested with the com petent au tho rity ’.

A t Camp David the whole pattern of the new Moscow linetions

and unjust wars. 'A rt' atohlk' dWii' h o t distinguishDetween imperialists and working people and millions of workers would be killed for every m onopolist destroyed’. The oppressed peoples and nations m ust abandon any idea of

even a

____________ _______ "the- gl°be’.The m ost im portant factor for the liberation of colonial peoples, he argued, was disarm am ent; and if they would contain themselves patiently till the imperialist powers voluntarily surrendered their arms, they could then revolt peacefully!

^■turally these ideas, representing a com plete capitulation to United States nuclear blackmail, were very acceptable toKi.«erihnwpr -ig tlw>' 1 • for the Soviet U nion’s [)artncrship_hcjng_qai(1

the two maior nuclear"powers. Indeed. Khrushchev (11 777>[ blame the danger of a world war on those who used the threat o f nuclear weapons to maintain their economic empire, but on ‘people who pose as Marxist-Leninists, who are dogmatic, who do no t believe in the possibility of achieving socialism and communism under conditions ol peaceful co-existence with capitalism ’. ^ L ji lf i^ a t ta d ^ o iiStalinism was tthe coyer.£ar_att;acking socialism and restyjim 1capitalism inside the USSR, terror of a nuclear holocaust w.r. the cover lo r coming to terms with United States imperialism in dividing the world into respective spheres of influence.

In May, 1959, Khrushchev paid a visit to Tirana personally

194

In discuss differences with the Albanian leadership. The trip was no t a success. The Albanians yielded neither to blandish­ments nor threats. During his brief stay Khrushchev was ( nntem ptuous of Albanian efforts to improve and diversify .i",i iculture and to develop its own industry. ‘Turn your little* n u n try into a flourishing garden,’ he suggested. It would make a nice holiday spot for Soviet tourists. ‘Specialise in "lowing oranges’ and give up producing your own grain. ‘The Soviet Union has such an abundance of grain that the mice ' ill more than you can produce here.’ The Albanians with their experience of the necessity of self-sufficiency ini v.entials when under attack were no t likely to heed such iidvice — fortunately for them in the light of events the following year after the Bucharest meeting.

Khrushchev left Tirana in a tem per and hinted to Sophocles Venizelos who visited Moscow soon after that the Soviet Union would not be at all averse to territorial and pi'lilicid concessions to Greece on the part of the Albanians.-

In spile of all this the ideological differences between the n 11 > .1111,111 Party of Labour and the Soviet leadership were not

U public up till the middle of 1960 and they were not : .■ 1 ■.

' mini i ies^The same situation obtained m Cmna where also llit i e was increasing concern by the M arxist-Leninist leader­ship headed by Mao Tsetung at the line being taken by the him isluhev revisionists. ^lh;inia and China

^ B cu H ^u ^e iM n _ jlev ch j^ im ^ io cia |js£ s(^^■liiiil,niirni.il print:i|>lo_lin d _ jji^ a in t .m i 2ll^_jj^L^iIIIl£-l^iIlI-

policies in their relations with the world at large, theyiqjui.lnsioii.s aliaui.,the solit in the socialist camp introduced Li a \ i.'iionism.

t in:, awareness was certainly heightened at the Congress of i! ■ l<"iim;mian W orker’s Party held in Bucharest in June, lUlilJ. I lie Communist Party of the Soviet Union took

hiinl.i^e of the occasion to summon a meeting of the It in il delegates of the various com m unist parties attending

t1 Congress, -aQrnp■ n£__the Mart;je^ were informed of what the meeting was to he about, the F a r tT o l

..... of Albania, the Com m unist Party of China, thy

195

W orkers’ Party of Vietnam and the Party of Labour of Korea IJ Pfl - th a t llwinfonna^i j jJ ly ji j^ iB2fiiogin|io n s a n d fo r J f e Moscow conference of li^ com m unist parties to b e h eld later th a ty e a r . I 'o their surprise '3iëH!?ovieFT[ëTëgation suddenly launched an all-out attack on the Com m unist Party of China supported by ‘inform ative’ material released only a short time before the meeting was convened. They accused the Chinese Party of being ‘dogmatic, sectarian, in favour of war and opposed to peaceful co-existence’ and dem anded that their general condem nation of the Chinese leadership should be endorsed immediately by all the parties represented.totally disauproved of this conduct of the Soviet delegation which \inlaU-d 11 if |>iincjjiles of relations between IroKnTaT partiesT"TTysniK apc> expressing theT initecl stand of the Albanians refused categorically to pass judgem ent on the alleged mistakes of the Communist Party of China w ithout taking full account o f the Chinese Party ’s own views on problems which had been presented in such a hasty, distorted and anti-Marxist way. ffierp the.se questions of the condem- lia tio i^o ^S ta lii^ th e^ fu n ^arian co u ^ b y w h ic h ^ w o rk e rs v ^should not be discussed prim erl^ in a meeting organised for the purpose with time for the various parties to consider_their positions r

Infuriated by the Albanian opposition to a quick decision against China which the Soviet delegation had tried to obtain, Antropov said bluntly to Hysni Kapo: ‘Albania m ust decide w hether to go with the 200 millions (the Soviet Union) or with the 650 millions (People’s China)’ — meaning that it was too small and exposed to stand on its own. But the Albanian delegation refused to budge from their position and, in fact the meeting ended w ithout the Soviet delegation’s achieving

» its purpose.J^aaibiaai.dtti-Abii^UJaaEj^n^deljegatio^

after the m eeting were worked on b ^ m e Khrushchev groupii~| -in e n o r t to " 1 Lil'll the" leadership .. t )T fluAlbanian Party who werecTIargecTvrith ‘betraying Albanian Soviet friendsh itr^" * " " " ^ " " ^ ^ " " " " " " " " ^ " " " ^ " " " ^ * ^ ^

✓ 196

I R p l^ [ |A ' ,o | a m f m h r r n f t h e P o l i t i c a l B u r e a u , o n h e rvv iy hack rihMiLYiiLlitjIlMillVYi W[I. 11) o ro ach an dM.irxist-Leninisl line of the Party. She was joined in her I. Il l io n a l a r t i v j fjflft ^ T C s i d e r U o f t h c ^ J U ^ j j ^C o m m i s s iq p j H e J | f ld h ç e n r ^ j u i A ^ - L M - l i i e _ S o y iy | E n i j h j ^ v jn j j^ a n ^ w h id T ^ ^ ^ c o in p lc tc J iu ^ ig jj^ o ^ c tio n ir^ ^ jg n ig di)d used it to make contact with officers in J h IViH_\_j_jn^?TuunrrT^^TTrTT^T^rjj^oT j^K 2 n wen expelled liom the Party aj^"TfT"T?tEL£^-attempt^ J^ r^ n ?"^ o v i!cTu lieii J ja c ^ ë y ^ y ^ e ^ ^ ^ ^ > f la r iy e bribes^'I'hey were no more •auccssful with Albanians who had studied in the Soviet Union and were therefore thought to be more susceptible to inii uption. ‘Our cadres,’ Enver Hoxha said of these efforts, ' liaiiiiiaAjj_iii_lhe natioinTTTTcTTTTnnu .11 anil liTSii^Er^SrTiR: and death 3 | r u £ jE |le w i th t^ fCiY's on 5iWi ^deijdedim:ir lieroic P a rtv jn a M a rx is t ^

As well as these attem pts to underm ine the Albanian position from w ithin, there were open attacks from Moscow liol stopping short of scarcely veiled m ilitary threats. Ju s t i In lore the Moscow conference Marshal Malinovsky launched it vicious diatribe against the Albanian people and leaders; itml Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-chief of the Warsaw In .ily forces, told the Albanian m ilitary delegation that■ oiilraets for military equipm ent already signed would no t be IIM I, adding ‘You are only in the Warsaw Pact for the time III Inn anyway.’ Then in O ctober when a serious earthquake Mini floods following one of the worst droughts in Albanian ■lllnry so depleted the grain reserves that the people were liii i d with an acute bread shortage, the Soviet Union refused In nell All Kinia grain — even though they were exporting large | ■Unlitilies at that time to o ther countries. The mice in Russia M. lnh I eat but the Albanians could starve as far as the Soviet

VUioni sis were concerned. China was able to divert supplies I p.i .1111 to Albania which carried them through the bad H in d .

Us I Ins lime it was obvious w hat persistence in defending ill M an Leninism against the Khrushchev revisionists m ight

I < (lice more Albania found itself confronting a mighty

197

economic and military power whose present leadership was determ ined to p u t an end to Albanian resistance in any way possible. And once more the Albanian people showed themselves united and prepared to endure whatever sacrifices were required rather than yield to economic or military pressure by abandoning the correct line of the Party of Labour. It was with the confidence of a unite d c o u n try behind him that Enver Hoxha led the Alfojjflian delegation totire Moscow Conference ^ f j8J. com m unist..and w prkcrs’parties convened in November, I960. To the assembled delegates of the world com m unist movem ent he made one of the m ost courageous speeches of all time, at last exposing the whole anti-Marxist course of Khrushchev and the other revisionists who had usurped state power in the Soviet Union and detailing every move against the principled stand of the Albanian Party and p gople. Mehmet Shehu has iustlv described this great speech as ‘an everlasting m onum ent in the history of the international com m unist movem ent, an exceptional contribution of our Party and Comrade Enver Hoxha . . . to the defence of the purity o f Marxism-Leninism on a world scale.’

‘Y ou ,’ Enver Hoxha addressed Khrushchev directly, ‘raised your hand against a small country and its Party; bu t we are convinced that the Soviet people who shed their blood in defence of our people and that the great Party of Lenin arc no t in agreement with these actions of yours.’ He denied the charge of ingratitude to the people of the Soviet Union who were as much the victims of revisionism as those outside their country whom Khrushchev had tried to bully and intimidate.

He called on all those present to ‘confront imperialism with the colossal econom ic, military, moral, political and ideological strength of the socialist camp, as well as with the com bined strength of the peoples throughout the w orld.’ ll< assured them that the Albanian people ‘who detest war arc fully aware of the warlike moves of the imperialist powers; b u t they have no t become pessimistic nor have they been m arking time as far as socialist construction is concerned. They have a clear vision of their future and have set to work with full confidence, being always on guard, keeping ill pickaxe in one hand and the rifle in the other. We hold lli

m■

198

view that United States-led imperialism should be mercilessly exposed, politically and ideologically . . . No concessions of principle should be made to imperialism.’

irushchev’s false ideas about a change in the character ofKJirimperialism were firmly repudiated. ‘Imperialism, particularly United States Im perialism , "has changed neither its skin nor its nature. It is aggressive, it will be aggressive while even a single tooth remains in its m outh . . . Therefore we continue to insist tha t it must be made clear to the peoples that there can be no absolute guarantee that there will be no world war until socialism has trium phed over the greater part of the world.’

11' the spread of socialism was the real road to world peace,

J

11)(~n ‘peaceful co-existence does n o t imply, as the revisionistsclaim, *5iat_w e should give up dass_ £ tru i^Imiher prom ote class struggle in capitalist countries, as well

lie national liberation m ovem ent of the peoples of" l" i i ia l and dependent countries. The labouring masses of I lie world, led by the working class and guided by the communist party , should make life impossible for imperial- is m , crush its fighting and economic potentia l and proceed to the destruction of the old pow er and the establishment of the new power o f the people.

‘Will t h e y do..-this by violence or by the peacefulimi Iiamentary road?’ J n y e r Hoxha posed a question aroundw JTii Ii the revisionists had raised considerable confusion. ‘Sol‘.i he nointed out, ‘no people, no proletariat, no com ­munist or w orkers’ party has ever assumed power w ithoutlil.....Ished, w ithout violence . . . Our Party thinks that on this

! ■ Mon we should be prepare a to tollow both roads^ but i tyn-< ially that of seizing pow er by violence, because il we are

i II prepared for that, the peaceful road has a be tter chanceIII also raised the question of Khrushchev’s bargain with

I'iUmhower at the Camp David talks to deprive China of lim n bombs. ‘Why should not China have the atom bomb?

111 i 11 k China..and then we shall seelier ihe U.S. imnerialists will darc to brandish their

H.... . as they do at present . . . We (Marxist-Leninists) willi i attack first with the bom b; we are opposed to war; we

199

a n ^ j ^ a d v t o ^ d e s t r o ^ d l s u ç h h ^meanwhile for defensive purposeT.’

‘The imperialists and their agents accuse China and Albania of being warlike and opposed to peaceful co-existence. Why? Because we do not open our borders for them to come on to our land and graze freely. The time has gone forever when the territory of Albania could be treated as a medium of exchange between the great powers. We are opposed to a co-existence with Yugoslavia which means tha t we should give up our ideological and political struggle with the agents of international imperialism. We are opposed to co-existence with the British or U.S. imperialists for the sake of which we would be expected to recognise the old political, diplomatic and trading concessions King Zog’s regime granted them.

‘On the o ther hand the Party of Labour of Albania wouldacce£t_sta te ..' r e Tes's'‘“wi tTV"YTTg()-slavia provided the principles"or"TiK?aceCTbctw ccu_states with dlHerent social .systems are observed

—as- far as ^ d ic l* :i m _ o t J _ y ^ i ^ isconcerned1 T ito ’s .Yugoslavia has no t been, is not and never ^ULkfe-.-iL-g^cialist coun try so long as it !s headed by a ur o u p o J j r n e £ a d e s >riu u r j j f l £ £ lL ^ n e v e r a g r e e tocarving up Albania to satisfy Greek chauvinists and we condem n Khrushchev for arousing Venizelos’ hopes of territorial aggrandisement.’

Taking up the p lo t against the Communist Party of China at the Bucharest meeting, Enver H oxha criticised the Soviet leadership in forthright terms. ‘The Party of Labour of Albania is unanimously of the opinion tha t the Soviet comrades made a grave blunder in unjustly attacking the Com m unist Party o f C h in a . . . The Bucharest meeting should, under no circumstances, be forgotten but must be severely condem ned as a stain on the international com­m unist m ovem ent.’ He w ent on to characterise the three years since the Moscow Conference as a period fully verifying that ‘the revisionists are nothing bu t splitters of the com­m unist m ovem ent and the socialist camp, avowed enemies ol socialism and the working class.’

Enver H oxha realised that: ‘There may be people who wil no t be pleased with w hat our small Party is saying. Our sm;il

200

I'iirty may be isolated. Our country may be subjected to economic pressure to try to prove to our people that their leadership is no good. Our Party may be and is being .il Kicked. Suslov equates the Party of Labour of Albania with bourgeois parties and likens its leaders to Kerensky. But this dues not intim idate us . . . Marxism-Leninism has given us th eii hi lo have our say and no one can take it away from us,

i 11 iei- throupi'" 'ppTTucal..nor econom ic p ressu re ,, n~!tK?ri)noni;h epithets nor t h r e ^ . ’

lie ended his great speech with an expression of the Party "I Labour’s determ ination to do everything possible to .iiciiglhen the unity of the com m unist and w orkers’ move- iiii lit. For nearly ten years the speech rem ained unpublished mid unknown outside the circle of fraternal parties at the l'l(il) Conference — unlike Khrushchev’s ‘secret’ report to the 'llili Party Congress which was carefully leaked to the

i nciiiics of socialism. N ot till the end of 1969, long after any Ii* 11 h of maintaining the unity of the movem ent had been (haltered by the Soviet revisionists, was Enver H oxha’s »|n rcli made public.

In I Ii c discussions which took place during the course of llir ( Conference, Khrushchev rem arked tha t he ‘could reach a In Hi i understanding with Harold Macmillan than with the Mlii,ni.ii is.’ To which the Albanians re torted : ‘That you can 1 1 miii lo terms with Macmillan, Eisenhower, Kennedy and iln n slooge, T ito , by making all sorts o f compromises and I mu rssions is a personal talent of yours which no one....... 1 •Inver H oxha was to describe ‘the chatterbox

• Ii it 1 1 .i I .in, N. Khrushchev, as the greatest counter­revolutionary tha t history has ever know n.’ And M ehmet Mill 1111 lo Khrushchev’s question as to w hether they had any Mlli'i'.ms at all to make of Stalin announced: ‘Yes, Not Hi lling lid of you!’ -

I In1 Albanian delegation, as at the earlier Moscow Confer-ii three years before, played a leading part with the tin ’■< delegation in improving the draft declaration and

!• until cning its M arxist-Leninist content. There were still iimr. flaws like the wrong evaluation of the 20th Party "M* rv.; but on the whole the Declaration eventually signed tin H I parties was a repudiation of revisionist theses. The

201

epoch in w hich we live, for example, was no t characterised as one of peaceful co-existcnce and economic com petition, but as tne epocti of the ‘transition Trom capitalism to socialism . . . o f the struggle betw een the tw osociaT 'system s, the

epoch of socialist revolutions and of national liberation revolutions, the epoch o f the collapse of imperialism and the liquidation of the colonial system . . . ’ The Declaration also condem ned the Yugoslav form of ‘international opportunism which is a concentrated expression of the theories of m odern revisionism. ’

The_.Moscow Conference of 1960 was almost an exact repetition of the 1957 Conference. In both cases Khrushchev and the revisionist Soviet delegation prepared for the meeting by distributing material containing unsubstantiated attacks on the Albanian and Chinese parties; in both cases the revisionists were unable to defend their capitulationist line in open debate; in both cases declarations were drafted and signed which com m itted all the parties present to the general line of Marxism-Leninism and in both cases the Soviet

I revisionists and the revisionists in other countries and parties 5dem onstrated their opportunistic character by completely [disregarding the principles set forth in a docum ent they had pound it expedient to sign.

Jjhe^^Confereiiçe^the^Sioviet^

( anger at the role the Albanians had played by stepping up their hostile actions in every field. The military-naval base a I Vlora which Albania had agreed to establish as part of its com m itm ent to the defence o f the Warsaw Pact countries had already begun to be treated by the Russians as if it were then- own territo ry or at best an enclave in a vassal state. Then in May, 1961, eight submarines which belonged to Albania were taken by force and Albanian warships anchored at Sevastopol were taken over at the same time. Russian service men at the y io ra base had been instructed to conduct themselves in such a way as to provoke an incident which could serve as a p retex t for Soviet m ilitary intervention in Albania. But the vigilance of the Albanian government, firmly restraining tli Soviet personnel while n o t providing any unnecessary excuse for Soviet interference, frustrated the plan.

Meanwhile all the members of the Albanian army and

202

military specialists from Albania studying at military schools .Mid academies in the Soviet Union were expelled and the Albanian representative at the U nited Command Head- i|ii.irlcrs of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow was given 24 hours to I I i ou t o f the country.lilt nlot>ical differences with China to state relations and had Motllcd all the Soviet technicians from China ancTTTad i mUTiT( -railV1III 1,11iTi77 I l ie

y broken" I nm(In (Is o f~coTTtracTs ;n7(T~’;H')cciiicnls.____ Moscow Conference the sam e kind of wan

i • i • ■ 11", 11 1 lo bear on Albania. All the agreements concluded IiT”iween the Soviet Union and Albania were cancelled; all Hovid specialists were w ithdraw n; all economic, trade, |i i linical, scientific and cultural relations were suspended and mi economic, political and military blockade was imposed. Nil in .illy for a small country like Albania, already shut off limn the rest of Europe by two unfriendly powers, these In in I ilc actions by the Soviet leadership were very serious. Nni since the anti-fascist war had the Albanian people been loo i (I to endure such hardships nor to face such a grave In ' ii to their very existence. Then they were fighting to bring lo being their people’s dem ocratic state. Now they were III mg l or the survival of their socialist society. But through 1 10 shortages and anxieties of this period they never wavered I In ii support of the line defended by their leaders and their*v

^SoyieT ’TeaSër^*vic.ious 1 y attacked the AlbanianmmI 11ic People’s Republic of Albania, calling openly

jIm roTi?” nT" I a cou'n tcr-rcvolu Uon_JiiLjli£_All2iUliiin overthrow the Marxist-Leninist leadership andl o

n m n m

fin1M

fuflii

I wnTr a revisionist leadership which w ould be loyal uJmw.I n-lai, leader of the Chinese delegation, rose to the n T T f^ ^ J a n ia n s as Hysni Kapo liiuFaefended the,il (lie Bucharest meeting. He pointed out that

ml ( lilicism and the laying open of disputes between ljurties peiore The enemies of socialism could not bei f .i serious Marxist-Leninist attitude.

1 1vvi vn the Soviet leadership was n o t deterred from its

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attacks and immediately after the Congress recalled the Soviet ambassador from Tirana and dem anded the departure from the USSR of the Albanian ambassador. By cutting off dipjam alk-xelations the Soviet leadership no t only intendedin d d c a t^ th a ^ A lb a n i^ w a ^ a i^ g a m ^ ^ o r^ th ^ m g m a h s^ o w e rs or their client states.

I t was in this1" situation that Enver H oxha declared: ‘A lbania’s borders are insurm ountable, defended by a brave people and an eagle-like Party which will smash you if you dare attack us. Furtherm ore Albania is not alone, not isolated. If you touch our borders you m ust know that to assist socialist Albania to defend itself there are those who will no t recognise state boundaries.’ And to the revisionists he said: ‘If you raise your knife against us, under the cloak of your demagogy, you may rest assured that we shall point our rifle at you; and the cracking of our rifle will be heard throughout the Soviet Union raising around your heads a tem pest as the brave and fraternal Soviet people strike you with the terrible fist o f Leninism .’

One of the outstanding sights to greet the eye of the visitor to Tirana is the magnificent Palace of Culture, a huge structure of native m arble and glass which is the centre of cultural and social life in the capital. In January , 1959, the Central Com m ittee of the Com m unist Party of the Soviet Union decided to build in Tirana a palace of culture as ;i present to the Albanian people.

The design was agreed in April, 1960, and in May work began, proceeding rapidly through the close co-operation ol Soviet architects and the State Building Enterprise of Tirana. But by January , 1961, the supply of building materials from the Soviet Union had stopped and the work slowed down. The Albanians had already spent a sum of 48 million leks foi w hat remained, m onth after m onth, a vast unfinished building in the middle of town. In April a shipment of materials actually arrived in the port of Durrës but w;is w ithdraw n at once on the pretext that the materials ‘had been loaded by mistake and were not really intended lot A lbania.’ And at the end of the m onth all the Sovic specialists working on the building were suddenly withdrawn

( )ii May 5 the Governm ent o f Albania decided to carry out iln ((instruction work on its own. The plan was altered to make the Palace of Culture much larger than originally intended so that it could accom m odate even more social and• nilinal activities — a theatre for operatic perform ances, •mother concert hall and a spacious library as well as lent.mrants, cafes and conference rooms. This splendid building stands today as a popular m onum ent to the■ II reliance of the Albanian people. In many parts of the

m unlry the same thing happened in respect to industrial I'I.ml . like the huge cem ent factory at Vlora. Begun as jo in t |iinj< ( Is between Albania and the Soviet Union, they were > "Uiplelcd, after th^ Soviet Union had torn up all its u ,i'' incuts, by the Albanian people — often w ithout blue

III In I s or plans of any kind to guide their work.Among the agreements broken unilaterally by the Soviet

(iovnm ncn t was one concerning the training of a thousand i ''UU' Albanians in the Soviet Union on a shared cost basis. A Kuv.ian note in the late summer of 1961 pointed out that llu' |Hi-sent agreement had no real validity because it had In i n ,u l ived at verbally and there was nothing in writing. Thin was followed by a charge of the Soviet Ministry of I " I ' i",u Affairs tha t the Albanian students were ‘spreading il'imli i , about Soviet-Albanian relations and seeking to draw Im i. I students into provocative discussions.’ Having got all ||h* Albanian students deported from the country for t<||||i iniug revisionism the Soviet authorities then circulated III'! d in x that the young Albanians had been arrested and jlu lot! up on their arrival home for being friendly to the UNNUI lb c Albanian Government was able to reassure the WiiiinIh Iicv contingent on the score o f their concern about llni young people whose training in the Soviet Union had u n i abruptly term inated. They were alive and well and mil In ii ii i); their studies at the socialist University of Tirana.

|lg ucncral line of th e world com m unist movem ent which ~1h rn hammered out and signed by the 5T communist

•» 'HT 19( U Moscow Conterençe ( j id ^ T a t lT rp re v e n t "M In h rY revisionists from dragging the Soviet Union i ( niuiliies increasingly dependent on it along the road

ill.11 ion to imperialism m ternat'ohally and the restor-

205

ation of capitalism iii— whol e series o f events jdonp this retrograde path were analysed by the Albanian Party to dem onstrate in the clearest way the profound differences between the opportunist line of the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist line of the parties and peoples of Albania and China.mr ^ L mmmj* Two such events were the Cuban missile crisis and the Sino-Indian border dispute. ‘In the Cuban issue,’ the Albanians pointed out, ‘Khrushchev acted bo th as an adventurist and a capitulationist.’ Having placed rocket sites on Cuban soil w ithout considering the consequences, ‘he not only made unilateral concessions to the U nited States G overnm ent by hastily withdrawing tlj^m, bu t even exerted pressure on the sovereign state of Cuba to accept the international control o f U.S. imperialism operating through the United Nations in order to make good his promises to President K ennedy.’ This was like the Soviet G overnm ent’s support of United Nations intervention in the Congo when the U.N. forces carried o u t the wishes of the U nited States by destroying the liberation government and conniving at the m urder o f the popular Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba.

‘In the Sino-Indian border conflict,’ the Albanians charged, ‘Khrushchev claimed to be neutral b u t actually supplied military aid to the Indian reactionaries whose aggressive ‘forward policy’ in disputed territory led to a frontier war against a socialist country .’ The magnanimity of the Chinese in withdrawing from the territory in question having defeated the Indian forces and in releasing the prisoners taken and returning the arms captured, even repairing those which had been damaged in the fighting, is probably unequalled in history.

Q..£— the.—tri-nartitc. Moscow Treaty of 1963 and thfeMhi^tL^he-Soyiet leadership signed

'VI fh imprrinlUt ppwrHL-I0 trY to prevent China fromMchmet Shehu said in a speech

< > IJhe People’s Republic of China to become even stron;;< i because nuclear weapons in the hands of the 700 niilli..j. revolu tionary people of China, b rought up on the teachi m;* of our ureat Marxist-Leninist comrade, Mao Tsetung, are in

206

lllC_S£iyice o f real peace in Asia, in defence o f the sovereignty i .1 China and of the freedom of the w orld’s peoples and of uM ilution.’ Only China of the states possessing nuclear

t ipons has ever given a solemn undertaking never to useI In in lirst.

'While making a big fuss about the ‘aid’ which they give' (Ik- Vietnamese people,’ Mehmet Shehu continued, ‘the Soviet revisionists leave no stone unturned to help the Unitec Si,ilcs subdue the historic struggle of the people of Vietnam And while posing as friends of the Arab people, they betray ihc Palestinian struggle in collaboration with U nited State Imperialism.’

I hc final proof of the correctness of A lbania’s character h.ilion of Soviet revisionism came with the invasion anc military occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 — ‘Khrush-• In vism w ithout Khrushchev’, since Brezhnev who succeeded! iIh deposed revisionist leader followed the same line. The!i .il111 acceptance of this act o f aggressionJ^Llhe_ynited Statesj:

ired with the hyste rm w h ip p ed u £ _ o v e r J ^ n n ^ ^ | " ‘ r a M F m l lab oration between themi mstrated just how

fKll.

in splitting the world into respectivei c i cs of influence had gone in the twelve years between;

t!hc FoTi omeTxmF*70T3anTa haa neiuier Keen

owed to nor had wished to play any part in the Warsawl I'm I in whose name the invasion was carried out. On:

p id iibcr 12, 1968, Albania announced its withdrawal from;i I'm l altogether. The Warsaw Treaty had been drawn up as ih'tensive association of socialist countries, but it had been nicd by the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union into 1 1*111 lo enslave the very countries participating in it .’In i In- speech explaining A lbania’s stand on the Warsaw

11 \ , \lchm et Shehu described ‘the global strategy of the• 11 Siales-Soviet alliance as peace in Europe — war ir

And why are ail tneir spears pointed toward Asia: nc.r there stands great People’s China which has become

Ilium mountable obstacle to their imperialist and revisionis Imi'. I "i I lie dom ination of the w orld.’

ili Albania and China, neither o f which has a single beyond its own frontiers, have been consistently

I - 'I by I he imperialists, who have m ilitary bases all ove

207

the world and are engaged in wars of suppression in many parts n f A«ia Africa and Latin America and hv the Soviet Union whose army occupies a ‘fraternal coun try ’ and whose aid is used as a lever to dominate countries in the Middle

F a c t - m H ' i ' H o t .<j [ - > e r a n < ! p h n r [ ] f l j f v m i aa J ld £ h in a Jm £ J^ m ain ed i)a s tio n s o f socialism, continuing t o support liberation struggles against imperialism and to believe in the resistance to capitalism of the working c ia ss ju T n e imperialist countries themselves among whose num ber the Soviet Union must now be counted. By their very existence as countries com m itted to the construction of socialist societies by establishing socialist econom ic foundations and, most im portant of all, by creating socialist man and encouraging a quality of life at every level which is genuinely socialist in content, Albania and China do pose a serious threat to all regimes based on exploitation and oppression; bu t it is not the kind of threat represented by invading armies or nuclear blackmail.

And within the Soviet U nion-arid...the.-East European jieo n le ’s democracies, like Poland or H un^ary1 the so-called liberation of economics which Yugoslavia had ‘pioneered’rapidly resulted in a complete dismantling of socialism and a restoration of capitalism based on material incentives and the form ation of a new exploiting class. Differentials between the wages of workers in factories or on the land and directors, managers and professional experts became even greater than in some capitalist countries where no proletarian revolution had ever taken place. A^^Qjjfljes^jm tic^ havejDointed outj^ ‘fro m production to difttrihvttj^ji. from economic Lranchcs Jto>- v e m m e n to rg ^ m a tio n s i the>B rceso£j5jUijyyi^gjjjij y ^

Speculation, cornering the m arket, price rigging and cheating are the order o f the day: capitalist roaders in enterprises and government team up in grafting, embezzling, working for their own benefit at the expense of the public interest, dividing up the spoils and taking bribes. Socialist ownership of the whole n e o n l e degenerated into ownership by a privileged stratum , andm anipulated by a h andful o f new bourgeois elements . . . |.jjJINhas been a painful h istorjffl] lpccrml’

A nd wi^_this_ixalQJaliaa»Qi-£aBitalism in the economit

208

licld has gone a general bourgeois demoralisation over the ‘wholft Tffnsre of social life in the S ovie‘rTTnTon"‘The Albanian I'.n ly paper, Zeri 1 Populllt, in an editorial on April 3, 1968, i(escribed ‘the process of bourgeois degeneration developing in the sphere of culture, the arts, ethics and in the whole in.inner of living. Tt |-»eromps daily more difficult to differen-

“Tn the Sovietli.ilc between the c u ltu ra lli tc a iu lw a v ________________t iik mi and o th e ^ ^ v is^ m isT T ^ ^ J iJg g ^ a n ^ n W iec a ^ iT a lis t .......iiiies of the West. The pursuit o f an easy and lazy life,

I liis moral degeneration and general reversion to a more11 Mini live social and economic system was naturally used byI III* Ix mrgeois apologists o f capitalism to show that ‘you can’t i Ii Hif.r human n atu re’ and tha t socialism therefore is always humid to fail. The Albanians in their struggle against H \ Monism not only had the task of defending themselves buttil...... I defending the very ideals of socialism and giving the lie

i liilcicsted cynics who based their sneers on the betrayal of i i.ilism in the country of the great O ctober Revolution.A', well as successfully preserving and developing a_

^ ^ l ^ ^ n in is tJ in ^ u rJ ^ irT w n ^ c o u n tr^ h e ^ ^ re a t^ o o a tn^t i l lo ihc A lbanian people_out o f theirxiJlllXH iliilioiLw itn

SiaicL revisionist leaJ.-.-lni. in th,- n„i,l,l.-d vcars of ihc

■ In mu between the two lines in the world communist

Il ,11 lers. In his report to the Fifth Party Congress, Enverii ..iid: ‘You may rest assured, comrades, that come

I mtiy in the world at large, our two parties and our two felon will certainly remain together. They will fight llu i and they will win together.’ And Mao Tsetung lim 'd the same idea: ‘An attack on Albania will have to mi with great People’s China. If the U.S. imperialists, the

in Soviet revisionists or any of their lackeys dare to Alhiinia in the slightest, nothing lies ahead for them

i i ..... iplctc, shameful and m em orable defeat.’niiilii'ds of years before, the Albanians under the i»hl|i of Scanderbeg had finally been conquered by the

ii> mi inics o f the Turks because no allies were prepared

209

to join them in the struggle. Now many centuries later the Albanian people by their steadfast defence of socialism and their courage in the face of powerful enemies have won the greatest and m ost reliable ally they could wish for — People’s China. ‘The Albanian people consider it an honour,’ Enver Hoxha has said, ‘and are proud that they have friends and comrades-in-arms so loyal and resolute, in good as in bad days, as the fraternal Chinese people.’

< It may seem at first a strange alliance — this tiny European country and this great Asian power; bu t they have certain things in com m on in their past histories as well as in their present political and economic systems. £ ja ii,a re made up of people who have for long occupied the same territory and developed a national identity which endured subjugation by foreign invaders. were semi-feudal, semi-colonialcountries at the time of waging liberation wars o f epic proportions which were also revolutionary wars. Both went forward to the building of socialist societies w ithout passing through an intervening period of capitalist development.

enjoyed the leadership of great Marxist-Leninists who were able to take over and develop creatively in application to their own concrete conditions the revolutionary theory originated by Marx, amplified by Lenin and defended by Stalin, ^^oth^ learning from the experiences of the betrayal of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, have waged unrem itting struggles against revisionism within and w ithout.

The Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China destroyed any hopes of the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists that they would ‘capture the fortress from w ithin’. As Mehmel Shehu has said: ‘The Proletarian Cultural Revolution led by the great Marxist-Leninist Mao Tsetung swept away all the m uck in Chinese society, purged the Chinese people’s revolutionary ranks of the revisionists headed by China's Khrushchev, Liu Shao-chi, m ultiplied the forces and intcn sified the revolutionary vitality of the Chinese people and frustrated the counter-revolutionary hopes of the im perialist and revisionists.’ In Albania, too , it was necessary to de with their own early Khrushchev, Koçi Xoxe, and the fi ‘ against revisionist tendencies has gone on ever since. Bui 1

210

I his continuing cultural revolution there have been particu I.nly sharp phases such as that following on Enver H oxha’s i rpo rt subm itted to the Fifth Party Congress in 1966. ‘Our struggle for mastering M arxist-Leninist ideas,’ he said then Tor deepening the ideological and cultural revolution, cannot lie successfully carried ou t if all the Party members and working masses are n o t involved in it, and if the mass line, I lie line o f thorough socialist dem ocratisation, is not courage­ously im plem ented in a revolutionary way.^LaJUlL£uçh a line ijlo uxactice a sharp struggle m ust be waged against theilicorv. philosoph y , sciences and art are too difficult to he jji.isned bv the masses1 tha t they can only be graso&dJiy

arties and intellectuals. This woulcf mean that Marxism-t quinism could n o t be grasped by the masSS 11 must have been thought that the economic blockade in

which the Soviet leaders virtually joined hands w ith the imperialist powers to strangle Albania economically would •mi hi bring about its financial ruin. But to the redoubled i Hurls of the Albanian people was added assistance from the People's Republic o f China to prevent the Third Five Year I ' I . i i i from being sabotaged. It had been prophesied by the li visionists th a t having cut themselves off from Soviet aid the Alb,i n i;ins would approach the United States cap in hand. No miK eivable hardships could have prevailed on the Albanian people to do any such thing. In fact with the fraternal

*■1 Çliiiu'stn iiiin ithifi i YCifYi iitifflç*‘*^^'erisuppose{ L iu . a . _h£cn b R m g h tto ^ I Ie iri n d u s t r i a l , |im portant new

II (ijects.AI i lie end o f 1963 a delegation he;uljjJ_ii^i_Chou En-lai

m u Jf>«< I in Aihania‘T fJ ^ i^ p ^ d m t^ ^ ^ j1 o g ^ |J y n d ^ e tw e e i^ r ?p | h i iples. A jo in t „ s t a j^ m e n t issuedi a t _ d i ^ n ^ ^ n R ? v p r r , n i l I>\ C h o n ^^^^laTTInc^^HTm ^TTflTefuT^T^l>hiiSm al_lil^l

n i men I over the w hole field of inTemaVi'onal affairs and on i u reel lim ^'oT '^uiIding socialism in their two countries,

n editorial i n T ^ e n i F opu lff^y P 7 im u an ^^^""T O £ 4 , niimi'iiling on the visit o f the Chinese delegation concluded llli the following words: ‘The Albanian people are happy til comrade Chou En-lai has such a high regard for our

211

Party and Government in respect to questions of internal socialist construction and external relations with other countries. This will inspire the Albanian people to carry on with greater determ ination their struggle along the correct path charted by our Party headed by Comrade Enver Hoxha. The People’s Republic of China has given and is still giving our Republic valuable many-sided aid in the spirit of proletarian internationalism . This is an im portant factor in the socialist construction of Albania. We therefore express our thanks to the People’s Republic of C hina.’

The gratitude o f the Albanian people can be seen in spontaneous expression all over the country. ‘Long live the friendship of the Albanian and Chinese peoples’ painted on factory walls and inscribed on banners streaming in the breeze. T J jj^ jiU L ^ ç g iit^ j j js is ta n c e fro m th e C h m e s e in -y ^ sPM M nN whiffr., ' ' is tiiven because they k n c iw jh a U h n ^ i r

(Jrt o f the world struggle againsT imperialism and that their eTfortsTr making Albania a bastion

conscious o f the historic mission o f their class.In his 1966 R eport T ^ n v e rT Jo x a ^ ^ iso n many other

occasions, returned to this theme of the revolutionary friendship between Albania and China. ‘Convinced th a t I am expressing the purest feelings of our m ilitant people and our Party comrades, allow me from the high tribune of this Congress to convey to the fraternal Chinese people and to Chairman Mao Tsetung our profound gratitude for the invaluable aid they have given us.’ (Prolonged applause).

The Chinese on their side could not be more respectful of A lbania’s sovereignty and independence. They repudiate any hin t o f the great nation chauvinism for which they have condem ned Khrushchev and are well aware that A lbania’s im portance to them and to socialism lies precisely in its self-reliant developm ent as a socialist country in its own right. The aid they give is designed to enhance Albania’s independent socialist construction and by no means to tie the Albanian econom y to China’s. This aid is at once important and lim ited, representing about 10% of A lbania’s external trade. Its quality, as can be seen in the machine tools at the

Tirana spare parts factory or the fully-autom ated textile plant near Berat, is of the highest, comparable if no t superior to anything to be seen in the capitalist countries of the West.

In connection with the setting up of new industrial projects Chinese specialists come to Albania and stay only so long as is necessary to pass on their skills to Albanians, often having learned Albanian for the purpose. They live m odestly mi the same standard of rem uneration as Albanian workers, ,iiid are very popular with the people. They give all the Inim ical assistance they can bu t are (..ireful no t to try to impose their own way of doing things on their hosts. The Albanians cannot b u t com pare this friendly and helpful iillitude to the conduct of the Soviet specialists after S talin’s d«.ith whose arrogance and selfishness made them quite insufferable to a proud people. An engineer newly arrivedI mm Moscow no t only expected sum ptuous accom m odation, lull might dem and paym ent at four times the salary of the^ I ’ m sident o f the Albanian People’s Republic!

In 1968 Enver Hoxha addressing the Tirana regional Party h inference spoke of the delegation which had just visited ( litnia and signed an agreement by which Albania was given Inlcrcst-free credits for the construction of 30 im portant new |Hojects. These, included the metallurgic works at Elbasan whit li can process 800,000 tons o f iron-nickel ore a year and inoducc 250,000 tons of high grade rolled steel and theI h i/,a hydro-electric p lan t producing one billion seven hundred million kilow att hours a year. This, he pointed out, Wilt proletarian internationalism in its highest form — li midship and m utual agreement on all questions providing (hr hasis o f econom ic aid, not economic aid to buy ti|in rm ent.

Alliania’s foreign policy, like tha t o f China, has remainedIII inly socialist in a world where so much else has been

l.mtly shifting and changing. fundam ental.........I '1 es of socialist foreign polic

iijiiii.iljsm ai______________\ i I h2Jum m ci2a^ t^m seT vcs^m croT ^oy^nm en ts_ tha t

flfluc to exploit them. iili l.uian internationalism is expressed by the Albanian

213

state and people in their fraternal su p p ort for all those seeking to end their exp lo ita tion , w hether by a capitalist class w ith in their own countries or by capitalist governm ents follow ing colonial policies.

As the Foreign M inister o f A lbania, N esti Nase, said in a speech delivered in New Y ork on O ctober 2nd, 1972, during th e 27th session o f the General Assem bly o f the U nited N ations: ‘As the representative o f a co un try the noble principle o f whose policy is the su p p ort o f peoples fighting for freedom and independence, 1 canno t rem ain silent in the face o f the fact th a t these countries (of Asia, A frica and L atin America) are the object o f the greed o f neo-colonialists w ho th rea ten their political independence and sovereignty, nor can I fail at the same tim e to express the full so lidarity o f our people with their ju st, anti-im perialist and anti-colonialist struggle.’

A t the same tim e the A lbanians, as M arxist-Leninists, know th a t revolutions canno t be exported . T hey have to be m ade by the w orking masses them selves under their own M arxist-Leninist leadership. There can never be any question therefo re o f A lbanian in terference in the affairs o f any o ther sovereign state, how ever m uch sym pathy m ay be felt for the victim s o f oppression there. W hat they can o ffer is th e ir own experience o f how a correct line enabled them to overcom e

m endous odds.Jit, is this im p o rtan t consideration which makes it possible

~TO _jgconcil£_cornpIeteIy proletarian in ternationalism with peaceful co-existence which is the m aintenance of c o rru I relations betw een states witlL_different sociaLsYSlgms—based T ^ ^ ^ s p e ^ ^ o r e a d i o U i e ^ ^ ^ e m ^ n a ^ i n t e ^ r i t ^ j i o r ^ j i y ; -to eacTTotfler’s"aZv;Lr||';|[■'(■ ; w h r »»•«•<»»■> " p i ‘' ~...

O n this basis A lbania established d ip lom atic relations with Greece in May, 1971, Greece having abandoned the territori;il claims which had poisoned relations in the past. Relations w ith Yugoslavia have also been m uch im proved w ithoul A lbania’s playing dow n in any way the great ideological differences betw een the tw o countries.

kV r n r c’stentlv follnwinp a ling-foreign affairs while continuing to build socialism at hom e

214

I he Chines e^pe o ^ k h a v ^ h a t t e r e d thejittem £tsjof^% Irs and Soviet G overnm ents to keep them isolated fromi In- rest o f the world. A fter a series o f diplom atic victories by Inc People’s R epublic o f China, President N ixon’s visit to Peking was the final adm ission o f the com plete failure o f the policy o f trying to shut China behind a great wall o f in m -recognition.

Il has already been suggested in the U nited States th a t Albania m ust soon_be_recognised, if only as a coun ter to V i\ie i influence...in _UlC area increasjnij^__exeried th rough Yugoslavia. While the tw o super-pow ers, the U nited States iiiiiI the Soviet U nion, collude w ith each o ther in try ing to nharc w orld hegem ony, ‘it w ould be unrealistic ,’ as Enver lluxha has po in ted out, ‘to see in the Soviet-Am erican illli.incc only the rapprochem ent and co-operation o f the two super-powers, their com m on actions and interests. In \ ii w o f their im perialist character, the U nited States and the revisionist Soviet Union are also to rn asunder by conflicts, rivalries and deep contrad ictions w hich prevent them from in ling always in harm ony and in com plete un ity . Thei M .ience and w orsening o f these contrad ictions are inheren t in the very foundation o f th a t alliance, the social-capitalist lyMein of the tw o countries, the ir im perialist designs. Preparing for war, the two parties also plan to devour one

Hither.’ll does no t m atte r what m otives m av lead the U nited Jrs lo I he recognition o f A lbania. A lbania ’s re la tions w ith

t^niied Stales will be based on precisely the same..... 111Irs o f peaceful co-existence, o f com plete equality , asI'l mi in all A lbania’s o ther sta te relationships. If the U nitedli I«•• 711(11 resumeTcorrect sta te reiatiOris'w ith A lbania, there

I ii11 be little d o u b t th a t the B ritish G overnm ent, quickI iniiii'Ji to recognise reactionary regimes, w ould at last realise ill H no purpose is served in continu ing to ignore the 30-year

tl People's G overnm ent o f Albania.Albania’s Foreign M inister in his U nited N ations speech

friied to China as ‘an insurm ountab le obstacle to the plans iiM.C.icssion and hegem ony o f the tw o super-powers. The

ml' "I progressive m ankind enthusiastically applauded last ilu restoration o f the legitim ate rights o f the People’s

215

R epublic o f China in the U nited N ations. This represents a glowing victory o f the great Chinese People’s R epublic and o f its ju s t external policy, and a t the same tim e a victory fo r all the peace-loving and freedom -loving peoples o f the world. T hat was the crow ning o f the struggle th a t M em ber states, including the People’s R epublic o f A lbania, have carried on unceasingly for over 20 years to p u t an end to the incredible situation th a t had been created in our O rganisation. The presence of the People’s R epublic o f China in the U nited N ations has strengthened m any-fold the struggle o f the anti-im perialist and anti-colonialist forces even here in the O rganisation, the struggle o f peace-loving m em ber states against th e tw o great im perialist pow ers and in favour o f the rights o f peoples and th e cause o f p eace .’

So these tw o socialist peoples are linked by the closest fraternal bonds and ju s t as China dem onstrates th a t no co un try is too large and too populous for dem ocratic centralism A lbania proves th a t no coun try is too small and to o sparsely popu la ted to build a socialist society by its own independen t effort.

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THE QUALITY O F LIFE IN THE NEW ALBANIAChapter Sixteen

Socialist Man a t Leisurellnl having tried to explain the h istorical developm ent of All >ania and the revolu tionary struggles of the A lbanian people to create a new society , one is still le ft w ith the i|iu\stion o f w hat the A lbanian people are like, at w ork, at play, in their daily relationships w ith each o ther. W hat is the• 111.11i ty o f life in socialist A lbania?

I'hc Albanians are disciplined and hard w orking b u t they in i neither puritan ical nor austere. M oral lax ity o f any kind is tilled o u t by social disapproval and there are certainly no displays in public of behaviour even mildly offensive, bu t wluil one notices m ost in any place where A lbanians are

I lin ed together is their natural gaiety and good hum our.I hey frown on the extravagant fashions exhibited by some

ymmg visitors to A lbania from the w est because they are very in iu c rn ed ab ou t the influence on A lbanian y o u th o f the iiiiil.mdish ideas o f extrem e individualism and self expression which are characteristic o f the alienated y o u th o f capitalist fltlliilrics. But A lbanian w om en, w ho are very good looking, ill i n', altractively , use cosm etics and wear bikinis on the In iii lies as the m ost sensible form of swimwear. Indeed, the IfMkl sandy beach a t Durrës or any o f the o ther excellent li.ilIhiik resorts along the beautifu l coast o f the A driatic and Inman seas all the way dow n to Saranda, are good places to lilm nvr the A lbanians in a holiday m ood. T heir liking for ■live sports in the open air and sunshine accounts for the lllntifj, lithe, b ronzed bodies o f this handsom e people.

I hn' ol their greatest pleasures is sim ply the en joym ent of w |i Ii o th e r’s com pany. In every tow n or city the evening

t h'Mn n.ide is a feature o f social life. A t the end o f the d ay ’s 'mil the whole popu la tion com es o u t in to the . b road

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boulevards, to stroll abou t greeting friends, to have coffee or som ething to eat in one o f the m any open-air cafes or restaurants in this warm coun try — w hole families to th ree generations taking th e fragrant sum m er air together o r young couples walking hand in hand or, perhaps, happy bands o f children weaving in and o u t o f the crow ds in some ex tem porised game.

T here is som ething strange to the visitor from the West in seeing children running about through the streets in such abandon w ith o u t any surveillance. In his towns they w ould soon be decim ated by traffic. In A lbania, after the end o f the w orking day, there are no lorries n o r m o to r cars to be seen and the streets and avenues belong entirely to the people for their com m unal peram bulation which gives each wide thoroughfare the appearance o f a fair ground.

There are no private cars in Albania. Though m o to r cars and lorries are n o t y e t m ade there , the ex po rt surplus is am ple to buy from abroad all the tran sp o rt needed and there are the skills and factories to service them and supply all the spare parts required. A t first cars were made available to individual citizens on a points system , as in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, b u t som e owners were charging those who did n o t possess them y e t for lifts and there was keen com petition to get o n e ’s nam e higher up on the list. This was seen as generating the kind o f selfish bourgeois ethics rooted in private possession. So all cars were w ithdraw n and gathered in to pools from which collectives can take whal they need for w ork or recreation or for the use o f foreign guests. The effo rt and investm ent w hich m ight have gone in to supplying individual families w ith cars has gone instead into developing an excellent system o f public transpo rt w ith fares constan tly being reduced tow ard the p o in t o f a com pletely free system of transport.

If the sight o f so m any family groups of grandparents, paren ts, children and even ch ildren’s children walking, talking and taking refreshm ent together raises the question o f why fam ily relationships are so strong and satisfactory, the answer every one gives is th a t there is no econom ic restraint w hatsoever com pelling families to stay together. The only b on d is th a t o f m utual love and respect. T hat is n o t In

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suggest, as will be seen, th a t there are no problem s any m ore in connection w ith this aspect o f life; b u t the co n tex t in which solutions can be sought is provided by a collective concern w ith the role o f the fam ily in socialist society as, in I.liver H o x ha’s w ords, ‘the general spiritual atm osphere ( oloured by the ideals o f paren ts and grown-up m em bers of the family, the ir a ttitu d e tow ard labour and their con- Iribution to society , which exert a decisive influence on the form ation and cultivation o f young people as fu tu re w orkers, i ilizcns and revolu tionaries.’

Or the evening crow ds m ay seek various form s of i n lcrtainm ent in the local palace o f culture where there are i< < itals, concerts, pageants o r plays. T hey m ay go to cinemas where a growing num ber o f the films shown are A lbanian.1 hey m ay enjoy the p resen ta tion in some large auditorium of lli.it ever popu lar form , E strada, w hich is the A lbanian equivalent of the m usic hall — w ith acts by singers, m usicians mid acrobats, w ith dram atic sketches and com ic turns. And in till llicse am usem ents and cultural activities the audiences are u<>1 merely passive in their enjoym ent. N ot only do they Iiti1 1 icipate in the sense th a t every perform ance o f any kind hiiN developed collectively under the guidance o f constructive i iilii ism w hich everyone feels free to give b u t also because a |iH|',e p roportion o f any gathering will belong them selves to mMin cultural group w hich no factory , school, office, (ii operative farm n o r in s titu tio n of any kind is w ithout. Indeed one has the im pression th a t in leisure hours a good liiill of the popu la tion is always actively engaged in enter- liUnmg the o th e r half.

National holidays celebrating the founding o f the People’s Hepuhlic, h istorical anniversaries, victories in the liberation wmi in in socialist construction raise to a higher degree the h illive feeling to be encoun tered in the streets o f the m ajor Imvir. The broad treelined avenue leading from the statue of III iindeihcg in the centre o f T irana to the U niversity on the |Uliiku ts of the city will be filled w ith representatives o f the |li Him inlic Front organisations, of factories and farm s, of the HIHied services and young pioneers, m arching past the IgVli vviu i stand near the Dajti H otel under billowing red IlHiinii’., shouting revolu tionary slogans and paying their

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respects to Party and state leaders and guests from abroad.In coun try d istricts, too , there are regular occasions when

thousands o f people from the area and friends invited from the tow ns and the capital come together to celebrate some local event — like the annual fete at the village of Billisht, som e fifteen miles from K orça, in h on o u r o f the form ation o f the First Batallion o f partisans during the liberation war. Driving to the site o f the gathering along a bum py dusty road one sees stream s o f people walking along paths or across fields, m en dressed in their best dark suits and o ften carrying their shoes in their hands, the w om en in trad itional peasant costum es, red blouses, full gaily p rin ted skirts and sandals, the older m en wearing their m edals, bereaved m others of partisans killed in the fighting crying a little as they greet their dead sons’ com rades and children shouting and laughing as they hurry tow ard the scene o f the d a y ’s festivities.

On rising ground a grove of acacias provides shade from the h o t sun. All around the grove are bulletin boards w ith p ictures o f the activities o f the co-operatives in the area and the achievem ents o f the rural e lectrification program m e. Strung overhead are banners inscribed w ith such slogans as R ro fte Partie e Punes e Shqiperise — Long live the A lbanian Party o f Labour, Shqiperi, ‘land o f th e eagles’, is the A lbanians’ nam e for their coun try ; and am ong the dances perform ed by the m en in the course o f the m errym aking will be the fam ous eagle dance. O ther banners wish a long life to Enver H oxha o r set o u t the main them es to be taken up in a brief political m eeting by a representative o f the Central C om m ittee, perhaps the veteran partisan Birro K ondi whose b ro th er also a great partisan fighter died in an accident after the w ar — ‘W ithout unm asking revisionism one cannot defeat im perialism ’ and ‘the people o f A lbania and C hina’s millions are m ore than a m atch for any enem y’. The local Party Secretary speaks o f the changes in A lbania’s countryside and, specifically, in the Billisht district.

Then the vast crow d, m ore than 20,000, move to the lon>; tables under the trees which are piled high w ith roast chickens and slabs o f lam b, hom e m ade bread, cream cheese, boiled eggs, tom atoes and corn on the cob. V ast quantities of very good cold beer are drunk during and after the feast to

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Ihc sound o f the constan tly repeated toast Gezuer! — good health! There is m uch moving ab o u t and groups a t the tables are broken up and reform as old com rades are discovered and greeted affectionately . One o f the good survivals o f feudal custom s, along w ith the open-handed hospita lity one en­counters all over Albania, deepened and given a n e w fraternal significance by socialism, is the close dem onstrative friend­ship betw een m en. Partisans seeing each o th er after an interval em brace and kiss w arm ly. Moving abou t as freely and greeted as affectionately are the Party and S tate leaders who have com e from T irana to jo in in the celebrations — the foreign M inister w ho is also a d epu ty from this region, an am bassador, several m em bers o f the Political Bureau and I1',liver H oxha’s younger sister.

Moving also am ong the tables are rhapsodes who ex tem ­porise songs for any occasion in the com plicated polyphonic style o f A lbanian folk m usic — dressed traditionally in w hite ( aps, pleated w hite skirts and blouses w ith brow n trim m ing ami decorated w ith big black pom pom s. They sing o f the i lunges in the lives o f the people b rought by tw enty-five V< ais o f socialism, o f the advance tow ard com m unism . A yoimg girl accom panied by her husband playing the clarinet Nliigs a song exhorting wom en to respond to the P arty ’si all. Some o f the m en have form ed circles in the bright mmshine outside the grove and are perform ing energetic l l t u i i < s joined, to the en joym en t o f those w atching, by llilmslcrs and high Party officials.

This gay, colourful gathering in a coun try d istrict, finding In old forms o f m usic, dance and song an expression o f their icsolu lionary feelings ab o u t the new Albania, this inform al ill1 linn racy o f a com radeship in com m on tasks and aspira­t io n s which em braces everyone, no m atte r in w hat special iiipa itty he m ay serve, conveys as adequately as anything11 mid I lie quality o f life in socialist A lbania today.

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Chapter SeventeenY outh and Education

Albania, for all its con tinuous h istory o f a people occupying the same territo ry for thousands o f years and preserving their cultural id en tity th rough countless vicissitudes, for all its w ealth o f ancient m onum ents and living trad itions o f the past, gives the im pression o f being a young country . This is partly the rejuvenating effect o f the new social system which was born o u t o f the liberation war, is now vigorous and thriving and has a glorious fu ture to look forw ard to. But it is also because there is, in fact, a high preponderance of children and young people com pared w ith o th e r European countries. The popu lation under the conditions o f socialism has doubled since the war. Far from creating problem s this grow th in num bers has rem edied the chronic und er­popu la tion o f the coun try , which resulted from the hard conditions o f the feudal past. A lbania was and still rem ains a co un try w ith too few people — particularly with the expansion o f agriculture to fou r tim es its pre-war level of p roduction and the trem endous all round developm ent of industry.

In any factory o r industrial enterprise one is struck by the y o u th o f the w orkers, the great m ajority o f w hom are undci th irty . In the T irana spare parts factory , fo r exam ple, 80% ol the 1700 workers are below th irty years o f age and o f the 55% o f th e labour force who are wom en the greatei p ro p o rtion are girls o f tw en ty and younger — operating m achines w hich in the older industrialised countries would only be handled by male operators well beyond their first you th . The same is true o f m en and w om en director*, specialists and Party and trade union representatives a grr.it num ber o f w hom are in their early th irties.

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N ot only have those w ho were born and brought up under socialism adapted themselves m ore quickly to p roduction work in the new factories, they have also taken the lead in I he ideological struggle against bad custom s from the past .md religious superstition. To help pu t an end to the old subjection o f w om en, hundreds o f girls cam e together in an ,irca w here feudal trad itions were strongest and as a political iirt renounced the betro thals w hich their paren ts had contracted for them when they were only children. In m any towns and districts young people acting on their own initiative have taken over and converted in to gym nasia or< ultural centres m osques, churches and basilicas w hich had I Illi'n in to disuse.

Before the war o f all E uropean countries A lbania alone resembled the colonial and sem i-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin Am erica in respect to poverty and illiteracy. In 1938 m ore th an 80% of the popu la tion was illiterate and In parts o f the countryside it was as high as 95%. A lbania was (lie only coun try in Europe w itho u t a single university.

The struggle against illiteracy began during the war am ong I Ik* partisan units and in the liberated areas. In a reso lu tion of lln l’arty in M arch, 1943, com m unists were recom m ended 'In spread culture in the countryside, to organise courses M^iinst illiteracy in order to give o u r peasants the capacity to piiilicipate in the benefits o f cu ltu re which the form er Iimi lionary regimes had denied th e m .’

Alter the war the cam paign against illiteracy was waged onI W o fronts — teaching all m en and w om en up to 40 years o f MK1' l" read and w rite and establishing a netw ork o f schools to Mrrvnit the em ergence o f new illiterate masses.

t hganisations o f y o u th and wom en and the trade unions Win mobilised in this campaign under the slogan: ‘In order In build we m ust acquire knowledge and in order to acquire knowledge we m ust be able to study and learn .’ Tens o f feftiniN.mds o f those previously illiterate were enrolled in night Illinois w ithou t giving up p roduction w ork, graduating first Ili<iii elem entary classes, then from seven grade schools and |Vl'H com pleting secondary and higher school courses. By l 'i f ^ ,||,i eracy am ong all those under 40 had been w iped ou t mid not I, mg afterw ard it was abolished am ong older people

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too . The n ight schools were m aintained to consolidate this achievem ent and to keep people, particularly in the rural areas, from slipping back again.

The educational system which was established aims at the all round developm ent o f the younger generation to prepare them to take an active part in the construction o f a new socialist society . ‘Its task is to im part to young m en and w om en sound scientific knowledge, to inculcate the Marxist- L eninist w orld o u tlook , to give them professional skill and a correct a ttitu d e tow ard w ork, to im bue them w ith the spirit of socialist patrio tism and p ro letarian in ternationalism , thus ensuring their m oral, physical and cultural ed uca tion .’ The system includes pre-school education from th ree to seven years o f age, general education (the eight year schools) from seven to fifteen, vocational training in a short nine m onth course or a full tw o year general course o f technology and higher education a t the University for three or four years. The T irana S ta te University has m any departm ents covering 29 special studies and there are branches in m ost o f the m ajor cities. The system also includes night and correspondence schools for adults.

By 1963 the educational system had developed to the p o in t w here every m an and w om an in the coun try was obliged to com plete the course o f the eight year schools. In 1969 in 4 ,971 schools com pared w ith 674 before the war, there were 543,031 studen ts as against the pre-war num ber ol 58,339. V ocational schools were training 22,800 specialists as against 1,511. The greater p ro p o rtion o f students in eight year and high schools are boarders and o f the 19,500 student boarders 13,300 receive full sta te scholarships and 3 ,500 hall scholarships. There are no tu itio n fees in Albania.

B ut having created the basic system o f education the co un try since ab o u t 1965 has en tered a new phase ol im proving the system qualitatively to correspond with the needs o f the further developm ent o f socialist society. This has m eant no th ing less than revolutionising bo th the methods of teaching and the co n ten t o f courses. I t is really the point M arx m ade in the Feuerbach theses abou t ‘educating llir educa to rs’ and it represents one o f the m ost serious problems confronting any society in establishing a tru ly socialist

educational system . Those w ith the best technical quali­fications for teaching posts in the early days o f a new socialist sta te — and in a co un try as educationally backw ard .is A lbania had been, the choice w ould n o t be wide — m ight be the least qualified politically to fit y o u th for its role in the new society. Instead o f preparing young people to m ake their social con tribu tion by p u ttin g collective above self-interest .ind teaching them to defend the w orkers socialist state, s< Iiools could becom e centres o f bourgeois influence paving die way ideologically for the resto ra tion o f capitalism .

The m ovem ent in A lbania for revolutionising education li.id from the beginning taken the double d irectional form of ( l i e mass line — from the masses to the leadership and from d i e leadership to the masses. I t could only begin w hen the pnlilical consciousness o f the masses had reached such a level l l i . i l they could themselves becom e critical o f survivals from d i e past o f a ttitud es and institu tions inim ical to socialism. In l'l(tr>, revolutionary students, particularly in the educational I'll.iblishments o f the capital city T irana, becom ing aware o f | | t r discrepancy betw een M arxism-Leninism and the m ethods | y winch they were taught and the con ten t of th a t teaching, In I;.in to dem and a new relationship betw een teachcrs and linden Is, the right to have a say in the choice o f tex ts and the kluiming o f courses and closer contacts w ith the p roduction11 nin s where they w ould be w orking on leaving school.

I liver Ilo xh a welcom ed this initiative and form ulated tUhdoni com plaints and criticism s in to a revolutionary

Slliili'ny Ibr overhauling this w hole vital section o f society. In ill Miriit speech to the F ifth Party Congress on N ovem ber 1, Inin,, h e stressed the need o f linking teaching and education

C m Ii m ore closely to life and labour. Speaking n o t only as a ill scii Leninist b u t as one w ho had been a teacher him self, Hi iln Korça academ y before his dismissal on political pUluU. lie explained the political necessity of an ‘unceasing u liip inen l o f education to m eet the dem ands o f socialist ■ llyr and po in ted o u t th a t ‘O ur schools, for all the ■fiivi'inent in teaching and education , have n o t y e t rid ntftl'lves o f bourgeois pedagogy and revisionist influences

t i l is indispensable to revolutionise further the edu- lliihal system . . . It is particularly necessary to take radical

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m easures for the im provem ent o f ideological and political education and for educating y o u th through labour . . . There is still to o m uch form alism and verbalism, passivity on the part o f pupils and stifling the personality o f the young on the p a rt o f the teachers, too m uch officialdom in the relations betw een teachers and pupils resulting in conservative and patriarchal m ethods o f education . . . There can be no talk of revolutionising our schools w itho u t revolutionising the great arm y o f teachers w ho m ust set the exam ple o f a com m unist a ttitu d e tow ard labour and life .’

He exposed the ro o t o f the problem in the de tachm en t o f schooling from the rest o f com m unity life as a special realm where the teacher is dom inan t and everything is subjected to its pedagogical aspect; ‘and y e t teachers have usually been entirely cu t o ff from production . They felt the needs and p ro fited from the changes in our econom y b u t in their teaching they pursued m ethods which were com pletely anachronistic. The Party personnel who were mainly con­cerned w ith the political, econom ic and ideological trans­form ation o f our coun try were n o t in terested enough in schools to appreciate the changes th a t needed to be m ade in their developm ent.’

The co n tex t in w hich these revolutionary changes could be m ade was the understanding that ‘Life is a great school and school itself no th ing b u t an integral p a rt o f life. Therefore the school should be closely and harm oniously linked with the activities, the w ork and th o ug h t o f m en in society, serving them , and th rough them , society as a whole . . . Oni .schools are n o t m erely to provide additional personnel for governm ent and planning departm ents but to tu rn ou t cn masse people equipped w ith the knowledge and science lo play their full role as socialist citizens. Learning and education should n o t be considered as a means o f speculation and personal p ro fit, as it is in bourgeois countries, but as a pow erful w eapon in the hands o f the new m en o f social is I society , in o rder to build our society , to p rom ote 0111 com m on socialist p roduction and to develop socialist cultiili in the service o f our soc ie ty .’

A t Enver H oxha’s suggestion the Fifth Party Congress *t<| up , under the d irect supervision o f the Central C om m ittee, all

' durational com m ission draw ing its m em bers from the l irlds nl education , industry and mining, from state farms and....... pcratives, from the mass organisations o f you th andwomen and from the ranks o f physicians, m usicians, writers mil philosophers. I t was considered th a t such varied rep re n u ta tio n was necessary to ensure the co-ordination of■ hools w ith the whole econom ic and social developm ent of

I lie country and to so rt o u t priorities in the course of ili mands for trained personnel m ade on behalf o f each of iIh se fields o f activity.

In the schools and in the University teachers and pro- Irmors had to ad op t new m ethods and learn to accept thei m u ism o f studen ts as part o f their own socialist rehabili laiimi. A few found the extension o f dem ocratic centralism in the educational system , w ith students taking an active role In Minimising school life, to o m uch of a break w ith the oldii mlemic trad itions they had hoped to see re-established. Hit y were released to go in to p roduction w ork, perhaps, to li Him to teaching w hen they have learned from w orkers the |Mi ialisl ideology o f the w orking class. And students, too , llml lo learn m ore thoroughly that socialist education has ItulliiiiK to do w ith getting a degree in o rder to becom e ‘a Mi ni nl a u th o rity ’ or to ‘secure a com fortab le post w ith a fat mini y \ A studen t is judged n o t on the m arks he gets in liiinpeiiiion with his fellows but on the help he gives others III inaileiing subjects. So successful has this approach proved llliil in inch places as the T irana Secondary School o f C ulture

t lmli ills through m utual aid in lessons have realised a llllldn il percent p rom otion rate and earned com m endation fill iheii exem plary tidiness and p ro tec tion of socialist

|iinpi rly,I I ihii m s in M arxism -Leninism were m ade a living part of lln* imri< ulum and n o t just a rou tine subject to be got W |iiii,iIi in a m echanical way. Texts and lectures on dialcc-• j|-il mid historical m aterialism were related to A lbania’s own m nhiiliH i.uy h istory and studen ts and teachers learned to

| il\ 11 i i principles o f scientific socialism to their own lilih lie. and those o f their society. And since practice is the >1111 nl Marxism-Leninism, studen ts and teachers began to

Mllli Ip ili m ore actively in the political and econom ic life o f

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the coun try , leaving their books and laboratories to study the application o f theo ry on the p roduction and social fron t.

W hat all this ferm ent am oun ted to was carrying class struggle, the co nfro n ta tion betw een bourgeois and socialist ideology, in to the schools w here the y o u th o f the coun try were being form ed. Enver H oxha return ing to the subject o f ‘the further revolutionising o f our schools’ in a speech to the Political B ureau in M arch 1967 described w hat was h ap ­pening in the educational system . ‘During ail this process of restless, n o t spontaneous b u t genuinely revolutionary developm ent, the struggle o f opposites creates progress and the dialectical developm ent o f opposites brings ab o u t a qualitative transform ation w hich takes our society from a high stage o f socialist achievem ent to a still higher one. In this m ajor revolution the decisive role is p layed by the masses guided by the com m unist party o f the p ro letariat and its M arxist-Leninist id e o lo g y . . . O ur schools are an im p o rtan t arena in this process.’

As m uch as had already been done, he called for further e lfo rts still to m ake ‘our schools forges o f the new com m unist m an o f sound political and theoretical outlook , w ith the keen appreciation and taste of a M arxist-Leninist revo lu tionary , endow ed w ith a daring, creative and realistic s p i r i t . . . O ur schools m ust play their full p a rt in the ideological ba ttle to prevent socialist A lbania from ever changing its red revolu tionary co lo u r.’

This address was follow ed by the setting up o f a Central Com m ission on education to continue the w ork o f the previous com m ission b u t on a b roader mass basis. I t was headed by the great w artim e leader and m em ber o f the Political Bureau, M ehm et Shehu, w ho convened a national forum on education a t T irana in April. ‘A biding always by the mass line ,’ he to ld those assem bled at the m eeting, ‘oui Party has m ade it a hab it to consu lt the masses before takinc, any im p o rtan t decision. T herefore in connection w ith 11 it fu rth e r revolu tion isation o f our schools the Party considers il necessary to organise a public discussion th roughou t I lie coun try on every aspect o f this q u es tio n .’

Those taking p art in the nation-w ide forum were ill teachers w ithou t exception and all studen ts from the ninlli

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year on, th e w orking masses, prim arily the w orking class and I hose parents w ho w ished to take part. M any of the■ li .i tissions were held in the large p roduction centres where views could be exchanged w ith w orkers so th a t their m i (im m endations on m aking education respond to the i' i|uirem ents o f p roduction could be taken in to accoun t and I In working class could be m obilised for com pleting thei i volutionising o f the schools begun by the students them - n'lvcs.

I or over a year public discussions and debates took place hmii one end o f A lbania to the o th e r w ith com plete freedom I m i everyone to m ake any suggestions he liked. All proposals o llered , w hether they were co n trad ic to ry or n o t providedI In v were n o t at variance w ith the general principles of mu ulism, were collected in a final docum ent w hich was then M 'iulimittcd for fu rth e r discussion. During this vast demo-II ii In exercise, w hich was fully repo rted a t every stage by |tn nn and radio, over 21 ,000 m eetings were held a tten d ed by boil,000 people, o r m ore th an half the adult popu la tion o f 11111 whole coun try , at w hich con tribu tions were m ade and I n Midcd by 160,000 individual citizens. As M ehm et Shehu tiiiiimcd up the discussions: T h e y co rroborated in practice (In1 principle th a t the socialist revolution forges ahead lltlollgli class struggle w ith the active partic ipation o f the lltHiics who are n o t only the ob ject b u t also the subject o f (In ideological and cultural revo lu tion .’

Wl i< n the results o f th is great national forum on education llml In i n finally co-ordinated th ey were em bodied in a repo rt Itllnnilled to th e Central C om m ittee in Ju n e 1969 and ntMliliiHiusly approved. A m ong the practical steps taken after p t public discussions were the following:

All xi.i.l ents graduating from secondary school are required

t undergo a p robationary period at p roduction w ork before llt^ adm itted to any higher educational institu tion . No one fUrtln I»•*» not w orked for one year as a simple labourer and

■fplveil the approval o f his or h e r w orkers’ collective will be pM " il lor fu rther education .

hi In mis will provide courses at all levels and a t su itable ■ if* 1» accom m odate w orkers and peasants in part-tim e

III ii I Ii n i while continu ing in the ir jobs, during w hich period

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they will w ork only a six h o u r day w hile being paid a t the full rate.

Pre-school education will be ex tended to all children betw een th ree and six years o f age and the age for starting school will be low ered from seven to six.

Schools will be provided for national m inorities — particularly those in w hich G reek is taught as well as A lbanian.

Secondary schools will be places n o t sim ply for study bu t for study and w ork w ith a t least a quarter o f the s tu d e n t’s tim e devoted to p roduction .

E xam inations lay to o m uch stress on ro te learning. S tudents should study system atically over the w hole course o f their education n o t to receive m arks b u t to becom e useful to society.

The idea th a t the m ost suitable m eth od o f teaching is from books, th a t only theo ry learned from books is culture m ust be opposed. T heory is derived from practice, is enriched by practice, is confirm ed by practice and corrected by practice.

The idea th a t secondary vocational schools train m iddle grade technicians, th a t gym nasia tu rn o u t em ployees and that he w ho has com pleted higher education m ust necessarily be appo in ted a cadre is a careerist and bourgeois conception. Every one serves w herever he is needed.

While studen ts are free to com m ent and criticise and arc encouraged to partic ipate in the organisation o f school life there m ust also be p ro letarian discipline. ‘The spirit o f this discipline w hich should guide b o th teachers and studen ts lias n o th ing in com m on w ith indifferentism and liberalism , with p e tty bourgeois anarchy and vio lation o f rules, w ith abuse ol dem ocratic rights or accentuating only rights and forgetting obligations. Proletarian discipline requires the all round developm ent o f criticism and self-criticism on the pari ol teachers and studen ts alike.

During vacations there are holiday camps for young people and p ioneer camps for children. J u s t as study is com bine I w ith w ork in school, play is com bined with w ork in these cam ps in the m ountains o r on the coast. Y ou th groups can he seen everywhere during the sum m er p lanting trees on die hillside, terracing ab ru p t slopes or, perhaps, helping in die

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I asks o f co-operative farms; and even the children from seven in ih irteen in the p ioneer camps help w ith the cooking and ■.l i ving o f m eals, keeping the cabins and grounds clean and doing an h o u r’s w ork a day in th e vegetable gardens or in the In Ids. The same high spirits and cheerful enthusiasm th a t go inlo games and ath letic contests go also in to this collective wmk o u t in the sunshine am id the scenic sp lendour o f Albania’s m agnificent m ountains or along its varied coastline ill sandy beaches and coves o r rocky spines plunging sheer Inlo the blue translucen t w ater o f the A driatic. T hey look wi II on it, A lban ia’s y o u th , b ronzed and fit and h app y ; and limy arc learning from their earliest age the value o f things in li i ms o f the m uscular to il, sw eat and d ex terity th a t go in to making them . It is an appreciation o f value in this practical hi ir.i that underlies the understanding of, and the response In, all spiritual and cultural values.

I he p ioneer camp at Durres is nam ed Qemal S tafa after (In secretary o f the C om m unist Y outh section w ho died Ill'll>i( ally in the w ar. The cabins and play grounds are under

Iiliii trees in sight o f the sea. The 1,600 children are divided litn four batta lions which plan the ir ow n activities and min|>etc w ith each o th er in sports. T hey learn ab ou t the

III* lory o f th e ir coun try and cu rren t socialist developm ents |lV m ounting the ir ow n exhibitions o f pho tographs, drawings Mini i aptions. T hey visit factories and the dock area and m eet HVlilkiTs who explain their jo b s to them ; and well know n w 1111 i is, heroes o f labour from the m ines or various lm lm .n ial enterprises, come to the camp to lecture and watch (In i h ildren’s games.

I )ne popular game is the re-enactm ent o f episodes from the liiii Ii .aii fighting w hen som e veteran has described the event |o ilicin; b u t it is d ifficu lt to get the game started because no

ilhl wai l Is to play th e p a rt o f the fascists. A fter the game isi i both sides kiss each o ther. Every night a com pany o f a

im diid children w ith two blankets and som e food go up In the hills to sleep o u t and learn abou t cam ping. There are "N il , dram a and physical education teachers on the staff m .iir assisted by people w ho com e o u t from tow n to help. In visit the Qemal S tafa p ioneer camp ju s t behind the

mis »h( >re o f the A driatic, to see the children playing and

w orking, com pletely free b u t already disciplined, to o , from their life at school and in the fam ily and already expressing in their games and activities a w holesom e collective sp irit is to recognise th a t A lbania’s socialist fu tu re is assured.

Chapter EighteenW omen and the Socialist Fam ily

Hi I ■ >ic the w ar in the n o rth ern regions of A lbania a rigid Initial social system , codified under the nam e o f the Canon nl I .ok Dukagjini, was strictly observed. A ccording to this lini'Hi which had been form ulated in the Middle Ages and tlill dom inated social relations ‘the husband is en titled to In il Ii is wife and to tie her up in chains when she defies his ^m il and orders . . . The fa ther is en titled to beat, tie in i hums, im prison or kill his son or daughter . . . The w ife is tilth),ed to kneel in obeisance to her h usb and .’ In central and p ililhom A lbania the position o f w om en was n o t m uch |n ili I. Religious superstition had a strong grip on people. By Mohammedan law a m an was p erm itted four wives and could lllvmco any o f them by a simple unilateral declaration. A RliiMiaii was n o t even presen t a t the celebration o f her own

i ililmg and she had no rights in her children. C atholicism inI tin is! mediaeval form supported th e same enslavem ent and glndalion o f w om en and to rtu re d them spiritually as well.I In end o f those enslaving custom s began during the

Itthiiion war when wom en, shoulder to shoulder w ith m en, lii'hl all the fiercer to em ancipate them selves from a double (in 'ision. Ranged opposite them on the battlefie ld were

II mily the fascist occupying forces, b u t those reactionary llnmiaii elem ents th a t supported them , feudal chieftains like

III M.nkagjon, religious leaders and, indeed, all who in liliiir, to see th e coun try rem ain as it had been were id* inning w om en to the old life o f servitude. Heroinesi i died in the w ar like Zoja C urre, Buie Najpi, M argarita hlltmi, Firi G erro, Q eriba Deri, F loresha M yteveliu, (•mu llazo and Penelope Pirro had n o t only ensured the fit mi o f Albania b u t also the freedom of w om en in an

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A lbania from w hich the disgrace o f the past enshrined in such infam ous social laws as the C anon had been expunged by their b lood.

The C onstitu tion adop ted afte r the war guaranteed to wom en absolutely equal rights w ith m en in the political, econom ic and social life o f the co un try ; b u t it was in establishing a socialist base for society th a t the Party and people cu t o ff the roo ts o f fem inine subjection in the in stitu tio n o f private p roperty . Feudal econom ic interests had given b irth to the ‘superio rity ’ o f the male over the fem ale, to patriarchal au th o rity over children, to loveless marriages co n tracted by paren ts, to the disdain for girls who, since they w ould belong to som eone else anyw ay as far as succession rights were concerned, m ight as well be sold o ff or got rid of. Econom ic in terests in bourgeois society also make w om en dependen t on m en and children dependent on parents and, since there is no real freedom beyond the limils set by econom ic dependence and the laws o f private property and inheritance, any apparen t freedom of w om en takes purely individualistic form s and the liberation o f w om en does n o t exist — only ‘the em ancipation o f the coquettes o f the bourgeoisie’. Socialism by abolishing private property , creating equal econom ic rights and providing social education for children knocks the props o u t from under the submission o f wom en to m en and children to parents. Enver Hoxh.i describes the socialist em ancipation o f w om en ‘led by out Party as n o t a fem inist m ovem ent b u t the advancem ent ol w om en to equal rights w ith m en in all fields so th a t they m arch together shoulder to shoulder w ith the same send m ents, aims and ideals tow ard com m unism .’ Socialism transform s the relations betw een the sexes in to entirely personal relations.

But n o t at once and n o t sim ply m echanically by creating the econom ic conditions for such a transfo rm ation . Here ton there is the need for ideological struggle betw een old custom* and ways o f th o ug h t and new, a class struggle betw een tin feudal or bourgeois conception o f m arriage and the relations (if the sexes and the socialist conception .

C ertainly the drawing o f w om en in to every sphere uf j productive and social life by the provision o f creches, by

lightening o f dom estic w ork, by all the steps taken by the ■■(ate to enable them to exercise the equality legally granted I hem has played a m ajor p art in p u ttin g the relations betw een I he sexes on a new footing as well as m aking a trem endous i on tribu tion to socialist construction . As Enver H oxha said In a speech to the Central C om m ittee in 1967 on the fu rth er '11niggle for the com plete em ancipation o f wom en: ‘Only netual life in all its grandeur can give us an adequate idea of what a great vital force the Party set free in the em ancipation "I women. W hat progressive creative ta len t lay h idden in this i h .ii p art o f our population . W hat marvels they are doing mkI will be doing hereafter and w ith w hat incalculable m oral mid m aterial values they will enrich our socialist life!’

In 1938 there were 668 w om en w orkers in all A lbania, mostly girls o f 14 or 16 w orking a ten h o u r day for iippallingly low wages. By 1967 over 248 ,000 w om en, which In 12% of rural and urban w orkers, were engaged in production wnik on exactly the same term s as men. With the exception til hard o r dangerous jobs w hich would be injurious to theirIII .ill h, there is no profession and no b ranch of industry where liny are n o t em ployed at every level; and in som e sectors lilt y are a m ajo rity o f the w ork force, as in textiles at 73%, (it it I processing 52% and public health and san itation at 69%.

Iiy 1967 there were 40 w om en representatives in the nple’s Assem bly, 10,878 had been elected to the People’s mncils (36%), 1168 to the People’s C ourts (also 36%) and

were m em bers o f th e A lbanian Party o f L abour; b u t at I \ I 2% o f the to ta l m em bership this figure was criticised

I.iivcr H oxha as m uch to o low and by the tim e o f the - ili I'arty Congress in 1971 the p ro p o rtion o f w om en in the IIV had risen to 22%. O u t o f a popu la tion o f ju s t over two Hit i i i there are 300,000 wom en organised in the W om en’s i"M and w om en play a leadership role as fac to ry m anagers, le union secretaries and m em bers o f the planning commis-

I I II In o' has been a cam paign for m ore training facilities for H i i . A lthough 37% of all technicians are w om en, the mi l ion receiving specialised training or adm itted to the mies o f higher education and the U niversity o f T irana is i m isidered unsatisfactory . There is a general awareness o f

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the need to raise the num ber o f w om en in those branches o f industry w here they are still n o t sufficiently represented , like electrical engineering, construction w ork and m achine m aking — especially since young wom en in the trac to r m achine shop at T irana have dem onstra ted th e ir ability to handle all types o f m achinery.

N o t only does the full partic ipation o f w om en in p ro ­duction co n trib u te to th e so lu tion o f the continu ing problem o f a lab o ur shortage w hich is as characteristic o f a socialist econom y as unem ploym ent is o f capitalism ; b u t it is also im p o rtan t politically . ‘W omen w orkers,’ Stalin has said, ‘urban and rural w orkers are the greatest reserve o f the w orking class. This reserve represents half the popu lation . On w hether this reserve o f w om en is w ith or against the working class depends the destiny o f the p ro letarian m ovem ent, the trium ph or defeat o f the p ro letarian revolu tion and the trium ph o r defeat o f p ro letarian state p o w er.’

The com plete em ancipation o f w om en to share fully in p roduction w ork depends on establishing new socialist relations in the fam ily as well as on the sta te creation of conditions enabling w om en to com bine the ir roles o f workers and m others. They m ust also be delivered from the drudgery o f househo ld chores and liberated from any survivals of patriarchal a ttitudes. This is partly achieved by the adequate provision o f creches and nursery schools at m inim al costs, by cheap, wholesom e can teen meals at m idday, by half-cooked food w hich can be p icked up on the way hom e and quickl\ p repared in the evening, by launderettes and o th er labom saving devices. B ut m ore im p o rtan t is the reconsideration ol the division o f labour w ithin the household itself. I f there i'. n o w ork which w om en can no t do , it follows th a t there is also no w ork, like dom estic tasks, w hich is peculiarly theirs.

Many o f these tasks can be done by o lder children brought up w ith a co rrect a ttitu d e tow ard w ork; b u t m en, pal ticularly , are learning to take their full share o f domeslii responsibilities, dropping o ff young children a t creches on the way to w ork, doing the shopping, dividing the housewoth and, if the ir wives are a ttend ing n ight school or undergone special training, taking on the whole burden o f d o m ra n chores.

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It could n o t be said th a t all m en have taken readily lo those changes. In his speech on prom oting the role o f women in socialist society to the C entral C om m ittee, Enver lloxlia li.ul to adm it th a t ‘although m any prejudices have been "■moved, we w ould be erring if we th o ug h t we had set• verything right and could leave it to tim e to correct any ii'inaining deficiencies . . . D espite econom ic, political and ideological advances there still exist am ong m any people, and even am ong com m unists, erroneous patriarchal a ttitu d es .’ Mi Innet Shehu appealed to the m en o f A lbania to banish Im rver rem nants o f male chauvinism which were inimical to....ialist relations w ithin the family and to w rite to him(iiiKonally abou t some practical step they had taken lo " medy this defect.

Albania, probably because it did n o t pass through a «ii|>italist phase in which com m odity exchange dom inates m ltu rc and com m odities m ediate all hum an relationships, is.......pletely free o f the com m oditisation o f sex in term s of

Min unis form s o f the debasem ent o f wom en like pornography in the general bourgeois voyeurism of W estern ‘arts’ and 'III• i .it lire’; but there are o th e r wrong attitudes abou t relations

| | i tvveen men and w om en stem m ing from the backw ardness of (lie past. ‘Erroneous ideas abou t love exist am ong us,’ Enver ||« ihli.i has said, ‘Very o ften love is stigm atised as som ething lliiiiini.il which leads wom en to m oral laxity and men to (|i IV neracy. But if there is anything w hich has nothing to do

ilHfllli those vices it is genuine love.’ To explain the socialist Mllii udo tow ard relations betw een the sexes he q uo ted Engels.............. rriage based on love is m oral and it is only where lovefk l'iM l i.it real marriage exists to o ’; and M arx’s d ictum that ‘the

||V i'ln p m c n t o f a given h istorical period can always bo

t li (mined by the degree o f progress of wom en tow ard i i|i >iii, for the trium ph of hum an natu re is m anifested most ■|Milv in the relations betw een husband and w ife.’I'inbleins o f the family and family relations arc no t only a

B in iii concern b u t the concern o f society as a whole. Even fnun ides devoted to the line o f the Party who arc good K i l n i n endow ed w ith a com m endable socialist spirit may ■ll>'\> themselves behaviour in the family w hich is incom pat- ■iIh vn i 11i com m unist ethics. This cannot be perm itted to

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continue w itho u t prejudicing the role o f the fam ily as the ch ild ’s first in tro du c tio n to socialist life. A t the same tim e the Party m ust rem em ber the delicate and com plicated natu re o f family relations and avoid any in terven tion n o t guided by tac t and good judgem ent.

In Ju n e 1965 a new Fam ily Code was approved elaborating certain rights guaranteed in the C onstitu tion and it came in to force in 1966. Am ongst its provisions are the following:

Marriage is con tracted w ith the free will o f husband and wife and rests on solid feelings o f love, equality and m utual respect. Only m onogam ous marriages are recognised.

Partners in m arriage can choose as their surnam e th a t of husband or wife o r each m ay keep his or her original nam e or add them together.

A wife can choose her w ork or profession w itho u t her husband’s perm ission and the handling o f the fam ily income is m anaged by m utual agreem ent.

Personal p ro p erty held by e ith er before m arriage remains his or hers and anything acquired afterw ards is jo in t p roperty . All children regardless o f sex are en titled to eqmil shares in the inheritance o f jo in t personal p ro p erty and the wife is the heir o f first rank.

Divorce is allowed w hen a m arriage has lo st all meaning and cohab ita tion has becom e intolerable. Causes for divorce are continuous quarrels, m altrea tm ent, breach o f conjugiil faith , perm anen t m ental illness o r pun ishm ent for serious crimes. There is no d istinction betw een husband or wife in the right to sue for divorce and the rearing o f children is confided to th a t paren t w ho in th e c o u rt’s opinion is bctlci qualified to bring them up.

All paren tal rights belong to b o th parents equally and disagreem ents are se ttled by tutelage com m ittees or by I In courts.

Single m others enjoy all due respect and the si,id guarantees their econom ic security and p ro tec tion . Children born outside m arriage are equal in every way to those I h u m

within.A bortions are allowed after consu lta tion w ith a commit lt't»

o f doctors. B irth contro l is a m a tte r o f personal choice. T hru is no family planning in the sense o f national campaign'. i<t

limit births because A lbania is an underpopu la ted coun try in which all b irths are w elcom ed.

In the em ancipation o f w om en and the socialist transfor- m.ilion o f fam ily relationships, as in all o th e r aspects o f social IIIV, the A lbanians w ould n o t claim to have solved all problems finally; b u t it can be claim ed for them th a t family Ii 11 today is already a happy exam ple o f the wholesom e i< -.nils of setting ab o u t solving those problem s the right way in the right social contex t.

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Chapter N ineteenH ealth

Before the war A lbania’s backw ardness was reflected in the incidence o f those diseases m ost characteristic o f prim itive, poverty-stricken countries — m alaria, tuberculosis, syphilis and trachom a. People infected w ith tuberculosis kep t it quiel in o rder n o t to w reck a fam ily econom y already precarious enough — particularly in the n o rth w here undernourishm enl was prevalent and meals o ften consisted o f a single chunk of m aize bread.

But the disease causing the m ost harm was malaria. The swam py coastal region m ade A lbania one o f the most m alarial countries in the world. Even in the higher areas ol K orça and Pogradeç, w hich are now health resorts, stagnant w ater provided the breeding grounds for m osquitoes; and w hat are today the m ost fertile fields in the south wen u tte rly deserted because o f m alaria. Half the popu lation vv.i. infected. A nd y e t after the huge drainage program m e wlii i Ii cleared th e swam ps and stagnan t w ater and reclaimed hundreds o f thousands o f acres for farm ing, the situation h.ul changed so radically th a t recently w hen som e anophelci m osquitoes were required for labo rato ry tests none could lie found!

T he beautifu l people o f th e Pulati, Shala and Merlin highlands were o ften in fected w ith syphilis, sometime* whole villages being stricken.

There were only ten hospitals w ith some 800 beds in I lit* whole coun try , one m atern ity ward w ith 15 beds and dispensaries. There was one d octo r for 8,527 inhabiliuil*. com pared w ith one docto r for 1 ,200 inhabitan ts today; MM only 48 new doctors came in to practice during the whole I'l years o f Zog’s reign. The in fan t m ortality rate was |•c|’

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thousand and th e average span o f life only 38.3 years. N ow it is 08 years.

I'.ven befo re liberation partisan field hospitals n o t only Heated the w ounded b u t im proved the conditions o f health in the rural areas. The partisan dispensary set up in the Uamica caves near V lora in 1943 to care for the w ounded o f tlit* B attle o f G jorm i becam e the first field hospital and was billowed by the establishm ent o f o th e r field hospitals a t Kuç, l’tiliçan, V oskopoja and o th e r places inaccessible to the* nctny. I t was o u t o f these beginnings th a t the public health m i vice developed.

The first step taken after th e war was to provide free medical exam ination for everyone and free m edical service to I Ik isc em ployed by the sta te and their fam ilies, to all millering from contagious diseases and children under the age "I lour. By 1963 the free m edical service was ex tended to the• n ine popu la tion . No m atte r how long a person m ay be ill iiiid no m a tte r w hat the expenses o f his trea tm en t he pays ill.... lutely nothing.

I'Yom the beginning it was in ten ded th a t the health service kin mid be preventive and all the inhabitants o f any distric t Hlr under regular observation a t the d istrict clinic. O n a M m on’s first exam ination a file is opened and from then on lilt condition o f his health is kep t under constan t review. Ily^ii nic instruction is given to all — particularly children and y m i n g people. Preventive m edicine also includes campaigns tyii|M'(l against infectious diseases, mass inoculations, special i In i ks on the health o f those in the food processing industry Mini the supervision o f the conditions o f health in factories timl .ill places o f w ork.I My 1967 the num ber o f hospitals had increased to 97 w ith pit yen limes the num ber o f beds as in 1938. There were 113 h m n n ity wards, and five TB sanatoria. There are ten tim es ■Urc doctors; five tim es m ore dentists and fou r tim es m ore

t pftrmucists. Over 180 tim es as m uch is spent on public t ' l l lh .is in 1938.

Ili lorc liberation no docto r had ever set fo o t in such IfUl.MIH as Dukagjini or Skrapari, Puka or M irdita. N ow all K | | i ' once isolated places have their rural hospitals, ................. wards and clinics. Peasants are com ing from these

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rem ote d istricts to be trained in m edicine. T here are public health centres in each locality and m odel houses and m odel villages have been constructed to show peasants how to im prove their living conditions.

All b irths in the cities take place in m atern ity centres and m ost b irths in the countryside are under m edical supervision. Vaccine against scarlet fever is provided by China and d iph theria and polio have been com pletely elim inated. The natu ra l increase in the popu la tion has grow n from 16.9 per thousand in 1938 to 27.6.

Along w ith cam paigns against diseases has gone a campaign against superstitious ideas abou t health . Till fairly recently people in the m ore isolated regions still believed in the evil eye and carried talism ans and am ulets to w ard o ff its effects. Some p u t their faith in scraps o f paper on w hich priests had w ritten passages from the Bible. Shkodra m ountaineers though t th a t every person had a w orm in his ear w hich was the centre o f life and if the w orm ceased living the person also died.

A peasant nam ed Dervish Alla from Gosa had a three year old child w hose lim bs had gone num b from a touch of tetanus. Because a neighbour had lost tw o children by relying on the incantations o f the local pastor, Dervish Alla took his little daughter to the clinic which Dr Musa O hri had ju st scl up. The d o c to r to ld him to take the child to hospital a t onic, B ut on the way Dervish Alla began to w onder if he was doing the right th ing and if the jin n w ho had cast a spell on the child m ight n o t be angry. He w ent to the pasto r w ho said thi' child was u nd oub ted ly worse because she had been taken lo the clinic and he began calling up spirits to left and right. Bin the child got worse still. F o rtunate ly Dr O hri decided In follow up the case and w hen he did no t find the child in hospital he hurried to Gosa. T he child was saved and has now grow n in to a w om an w ith a child o f her own.

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Chapter Tw entyArts and C ulture

■lie key to th e developm ent o f A lban ia’s art and litera tu re hIim c the war is given in Enver H o x h a’s 1966 R eport. ‘O ur ini lulist art and cu ltu re should be firm ly based on our native m il, on our w onderful people, arising from the people and M'lvmg them to the full. They should be clear and com pre- ftpiisihlc bu t never vulgar and thoughtless. O ur Party is for lien live works in w hich the deep ideological co n ten t and theIII • i.i11 popular sp irit are realised in an artistic form capable of IIIi 11ii ; the feelings pro found ly and touching the hearts of j}||r people, in o rder to inspire and m obilise them for great ili 111'. We m ust intensify our struggle for a revolu tionary art •uni literature o f socialist realism . . . As in every o th e r field, a ■iMip class struggle is taking place here also betw een the tw o ■li iiliigies — M arxist-Leninist m aterialist ideology on the one

|| | l i l and feudal and bourgeois ideology on the o ther. Il'i ,nlent bourgeois cu ltu re and art are alien to socialism. We | | i i i n i ' them and a t the same tim e we appreciate and m ake |> nl everything th a t is progressive, dem ocratic and revo- llniMiy; critically viewed in the light o f our own proletarian• "logy.’All m il lire is class culture. All litera tu re and art belong to

III..... classes and serve quite specific political ends. It is asHi Ii iim illusion to suppose th a t culture transcends class n iT in r s as to believe th a t the sta te stands above con- ■IIn|i ( lass interests. Bourgeois cu ltu re is the ideology of III,ill,m which is based on explo ita tion . W orking class |IIH is the ideology o f socialism w hich elim inates the ||nll,ilio ii o f m an by m an. These tw o w orld views confron t | | iillier as a reflection o f the class conflict betw een the IIHriH'.ie and the w orking class w hich, in one form or

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ano ther, is universal in this epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism. A lbanian art and litera tu re are firmly com m itted in this w orld-w ide conflict.

But while A lbanian cu ltu re shares the same ideology with th e cu ltu re o f any o th er coun try w here the d ictato rsh ip of the p ro le taria t has been established, it still has, as Enver H oxha explained, a specific quality o f its own. ‘Our socialist a rt and culture have n o t com e o u t o f nothing b u t arc based on the historical developm ent o f our society , on its spiritual life and the best trad itions o f our people. To rely on these popu lar trad itions o f the past and o f our ow n tim es is essential to the creation o f true literary and artistic values and th e prom otion o f the originality o f A lbanian culture. It is p u ttin g in to practice the M arxist-Leninist princip le th a t our a rt and litera tu re m ust be socialist in co n ten t and national in fo rm .’

A good exam ple o f this is provided by A lbanian opera, w ith its them es taken from the epic liberation struggles o f the people or from their heroic efforts in socialist construction and w ith its m usical form based on the rich trad itional folk a rt in which A lbania abounds. O pera itself is n o t a traditional form , though the Ita lian operas o f Verdi, Puccini and othci com posers were very popular. I t is, for A lbania, a new ail form created to m eet the cultural needs o f the people.

T he Institu te o f Folklore in T irana has co llected a vaM store o f m aterial on dance, song and m usic dow n the centuries, culled from the d ifferen t regions o f the coun try — | th e single voice songs o f the n o rth and the complcx polyphonic folk m usic o f the sou th . Lyric, erotic, ritual is I i i , allegoric and epic works arc all available for the m usician and p o e t w ho w ant to draw on the past for m odes o f expression which are peculiarly A lbanian.

T he m agnificent Palace of C ulture at T irana has among iln m any am enities a well-equipped thea tre fo r opera seal mu m ore than a thousand. Adm ission is very cheap at two and it half leks a tick e t o r less than a p acke t o f cigarettes and tin it1 are special shows a t even lower rates for parties o f farrnt u , w orkers, soldiers o r students. T he operas, ballets n un pageants p resented at the th ea tre also travel around I It# co un try , even up in to the highlands. A t first only the sini|iln

uliuws were taken to rem ote areas b u t in consu lta tion w ith iIn people o f those regions it was decided to present m ore• 11>11isticated works w ith the villagers in terrup ting the per­

il nm ance if there was anything th ey w ished to have t iplained.

I he earliest presentations in the Palace of C ulture were ' 11 her trad itional dances and recitals or works from abroad.I In n in 1959 it was decided to create the first large-scale \ l I in nian opera. I t was called Mrika and its them e was the.......I ruction o f the great Karl M arx hydro-electric plant.Mi11.a was the hero ine w ho led the mass m obilisation o f Winkers to cap ture saboteurs sent in to the coun try from N (i)inslavia and G reece to blow up the dam. An epic opera on lIn life o f Scanderbeg involving a cast o f 230 was com posed !i\ I’reng Jakova w ith a lib re tto by the poet Lazer Siliqi. Oilier titles include The Heroines by Vangjo Nova and Luigj Im i.ikuqi, on the subject o f s tud en t resistance to the• i i imans and Girls o f the M ountains com posed for the i ill Ination o f the Ju b ilee Year in 1969 by N ikolla Zoraqi Wlili book by Loni Papa.

I here are also ballets like Fatosi Partizan, the child Kin 11 illas, and musical com edies on such them es as a group o f VVmin'ii building a new th ea tre for th e ir com m unity .

In (he arts, too , the mass line is applied to the creation o f Hhv works. B efore opening, an opera will be show n to ■iMrsi ntatives o f the ac to rs’ collective and workers from i| li operatives and factories, and the ir opinions are sought on ■p general co n ten t o f the new piece and on details abou t |H lilies, costum es and so forth . Such criticism s as ‘we w an t III* iIh lion to be clearer’ or ‘th a t d oesn ’t look like the insideIII H w orker’s h ou se’ are taken in to accoun t in getting the p lilk ready for th e first night. A nd even afte r th a t, H tylpupcr criticism s or suggestions by m em bers o f the l l l i l l r i i r e will result in additional changes during the actual Mill

O llrn a new presen tation will touch on a controversial •nli|i i I and there will be discussions up and dow n the iH tiiilry abou t the issue itself and abou t the way it has been ■|ilI willi in the w ork in question. An o pere tta on the lltlillii l betw een w om en w ho feel th a t there is no kind o f

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work which they canno t do and people w ho believe that there are jobs to o dangerous or too hard for wom en or, perhaps, sim ply to o unfem inine, gave rise to lengthy debates ab ou t w here the line should be draw n w hich involved people from every d istrict. A dom estic com cdy by Spiro Çom ora a b ou t progressive grandfather and grandchildren m aking com m on cause against a fa ther w ith reactionary ideas, raised a sto rm o f discussion ab o u t the a ttitud es o f different generations in relation to socialism.

D ram atic art after having rem ained undeveloped for a long period revived during the liberation war w ith partisan actors, scrip t in one hand and rifle in the o ther, helping to m obilise and inspire the masses by their portrayal o f the issues o f the national struggle. These groups becam e the nucleus of the People’s D ram atic T heatre. In addition to plays reflecting the revolutionary efforts o f w orkers in tow n and coun try are also p resented the w orks o f w orld playw rights like Shakespeare 01 Moliere.

In 1952 the N ew A lbania Film Studio came in to ope) a tion . The first p roductions were newsreels and docn m entaries — a visit by Enver H oxha to the n o rth e rn districts and the transfo rm ation o f the countryside, a feature on A lbanian folk dance and films dealing w ith various new developm ents on the agricultural and industrial front. Bill there was a great need for feature films so th a t cinem as, willi an a ttendance o f ten m illion a year, w ould no longer he dependent on unsuitable m aterial. This was particularly I me as films from the Soviet U nion or E astern Europe h.id increasingly to be classed w ith decadent bourgeois films ut n o t acceptable to A lbanian audiences. A m ong recently niiidfl full-length features have been ‘O ur L and’, ‘E cho on the Sen S hore’, ‘A Special D ay’, T h e Early Years’, ‘The CommisMC of L igh t’, ‘The Silent D uel’, ‘O pen H orizons’ and ‘ I liK A m bush’. M any films deal w ith heroic episodes in ihfl] liberation struggle, like T riu m p h over D ea th ’, the story i l l the heroines Buie Najpi and Persephone Kokedhim a whil defied th e G estapo or T h e E ighth in B ronze’ which uses die setting up o f a bronze bust o f a partisan hero in his nulivM village to recall the stirring days o f the anti-fascist wai Bui m any o f th e films also deal w ith contem porary problem s lil>i

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I lie conflict in ‘Two O ld W ounds’ betw een a husband and wife deeply devoted to each o th er w hose careers take them to d ifferen t places. ‘The T races’ begins like a m urder m ystery I>111 proves to be a tragedy o f a m an who forgets his class allegiance. One o f the la test films to be m ade, based on a screenplay by D him iter Xhuvani and called ‘The F itte r’, is die love s to ry o f a young m an and a young w om an w ho work in the same facto ry .

Reference has already been m ade to the popu lar art o f the I strada — vaudeville perform ances staged by the cultural groups o f every facto ry , farm and in stitu tio n o f any kind. Many o f the skits are as funny as the old silent film com edies nl the West w ith the additional ingredient of sharp political n;iI ire.

There is a con tinuous search for new ta len t by com m ittees i m nposed o f artists and paren ts. The m ost prom ising young people are sen t to the appropria te dram atic or m usic school in Tirana. All artists regard them selves as teachers as well as pi i formers o r creators and they are judged as m uch by their i m ouragem ent and training o f aspirants as by their own Work. A lthough there arc great artists o f the theatre like M.uia Logoreci and K adri Roshi, there is no star system and die whole em phasis is on collective effort. All actors and hi lists spend one m o nth a year a t some o th e r kind of Work — as m echanics, typographers, agricultural w orkers or priu'h hands — to m aintain their links w ith the w orking People and to keep their artistic values ro o ted in the knowledge o f th e value o f things w hich can only come l l innigli ‘sw eating on a jo b ’.

I here are no individualistic com posers or writers w orking mi I heir ow n and regarding various form s o f idiosyncratic Ii II expression as the highest form o f art. They belong either |li one o f the m usical o r dram atic collectives or to the W illeis’ Union.

I lie W riters’ Union has its roo ts in the national m ovem ent (Hid 11 le liberation struggle. Five hundred years o f Turkish ml. did n o t extinguish the A lbanian language nor the th irst

I I he people for their ow n art and culture. T hen in the n liid o f national revival from the m iddle o f the N ineteen th Hilnry to the early p art o f the T w entieth distinguished

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w riters and poets began to em erge — like Naim Frashëri, K onstan tin K ristoforidhi, Vaso Pasha and m any others. A fter national independence was proclaim ed in 1912 there was a period o f ‘critical realism ’ characterised by strong national feeling and a fierce ind ic tm ent o f feudal and bourgeois rule which was stifling all progressive sentim ents. W riters like Millosh Gjergi Nikolla, b e tte r know n by his pen nam e, Migjeni, F"an Noli and Ndre M jeda came to the fore; and in 1930 th e ‘G roup o f T h ir ty ’ was founded by Migjeni and n o t only criticised existing society b u t began to p o in t the way forward. L iterary magazines w ith a M arxist influence began to appear, like New W orld which came o u t in 1936.

O f this period o f bourgeois nationalism Enver H oxha has said: ‘The epoch o f revival is a dem ocratic revolutionary period o f m ajor im portance in the h istory and litera tu re of our people . . . They fought w ith rifle and pen for the freedom and enlightenm ent o f the people. We should im part to our ow n people today the positive m erits o f these m en of the revival . . . But we should n o t forget for a m om ent that they had a negative side too which m ust be sub jected to M arxist-Leninist criticism. These weaknesses lie in their idealistic philosophical concep tions.’

During the anti-fascist war there was a great sorting o u t of the would-be progressives w ho ended up collaborating with the enem y and the real progressives w ho com m itted them ­selves w holehearted ly to the libera tion m ovem ent. A fter the form ation o f the Party in 1941 these genuine progressives were p u t in charge o f propaganda in the various regions. Aleks Caçi, who supplied some o f the in fo rm ation used in this chapter, was one o f the w riters assigned to propaganda w ork in one o f the fro n t line areas. The first issue o f Zeri i Popullit, Voice o f the People, cam e o u t in A ugust, 1942, follow ed by a paper for y ou th , Call to Liberty. Poem s, ski Is and reportage circulated w idely and broadsheets, beautifully and inspiringly w ritten to appeal to the people, tu rned up everyw here — even o n the bulletin boards in fascist head quarters!

A fter the war w riters were fully involved in the fir,hi against illiteracy and the struggle over the co rrect ideologii al line during the period w hen the Yugoslav Party was trying I"

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i'.iin influence in Albania. A L iterary G azette was started at lhis tim e; b u t also in newspapers, periodicals and publications< >I all kinds space was reserved for literary contribu tions. With all these tasks there was a great need for m ore writers .md the talents o f workers and peasants were tapped on an increasing scale to bring new faces and fresh ideas in to the ' ircle o f practising w riters.

Naturally th e ideological conflicts w hich have arisen w ithin die com m unist w orld have been reflected in contem porary Albanian litera tu re . In 1956 a t the tim e of the so-called '(haw ’ in Soviet arts and le tters , which was really a let m descence o f bourgeois ideology, the A lbanian literary irview, N endori (N ovem ber), p rin ted an article a ttacking the idea that m an should be viewed as a m em ber o f a class ra ther ih.m as an individual w hose opinions and sentim ents were Worthy o f consideration sim ply because they w ere uniquely In .. Such inco rrect a ttitudes from a socialist p o in t o f view wi ie strongly criticised at a conference called by the Party in I 'l ri7 to discuss literary problem s; b u t the fight against bourgeois and revisionist tendencies has to be never ending.

In his 1966 R eport Enver H oxha to o k artists and writers In task for insufficient vigilance in this respect. A fter fprognising the good work they had done, he added: ‘It ulinuld be said, how ever, th a t the artistic and cultural IlMl il utions, the W riter’s Union, the S tate Publishing House mi id the literary press, the Party organisations o f those llixl it utions and the leading cadres in those sectors are n o t «11 iv in^ w ith adequate persistence to carry o u t the revolution- Imnr. of cu ltu re , do n o t show the necessary ideological v i i ' i I i i h c and continue to to lera te things in an unpardonable

■My, thus falling in to liberal errors . . . Foreign plays and |i|m i .is including works irreconcilable w ith our ideology still in ■ n|iy too large a place in the reperto ry o f theatres, books |i\ doubtfu l au thors are published and we translate bourgeois

ly o ik s en bloc as if we could n o t do w ith o u t th e m .’this was n o t national chauvinism. G reat w riters like

Hindu spcare are stud ied in A lbanian schools; b u t Enver lltmli.i rem inded his audience th a t even in the greatest writers Mild poets o f E urope ‘we will n o t find all th a t we are

I f It11 . . . since these w riters too reflect, if n o t d irectly , at

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least in one way or another, the bourgeois ideas th a t prevailed at the period in w hich they lived.’ A nd certainly the w orks o f foreign litera tu re could n o t be taken as m odels for A lbanian audiors in creating a socialist literatu re which was a t once revolu tionary and national in spirit. ‘L itera tu re and a rt m ust reflect the struggle, w ork and life o f our own w orking people, their ideals and aspirations, their noble feelings, their hero ic character, the ir m odesty and grandeur and th e ir revolu tionary upsurge. The Party dem ands th a t litera tu re and art tru ly reflect life in its revolutionary developm ent and focus a tten tio n on the heroes o f our tim e — w orkers, peasants, soldiers and revolutionary cadres, m en o f a new ty p e , w ho are w orking and fighting selflessly in build ing socialism .’

In order to be able to p o rtray this new m an w riters spend considerable tim e w ith the people of village and factory , w orking and living am ong them and learning n o t only to w rite authentically about them b u t to write in such a way th a t their w orks are accessible to them . Indeed one author, D him iter Xhuvani, w hose novel The Tunnel aroused a good deal o f discussion abou t w hether he had accurately described the people o f the village w here his book was set, w en t to live am ong them to check his im pressions and eventually made th a t village his ow n. New novels, like new operas and new dram atic w orks, ten d to becom e the subjects o f a wide ranging debate abou t their m erits and defects in which everyone takes part. Those in particu lar w hose sphere of activ ity m ay be touched on in th e w ork consider il collectively and repo rt their conclusions. This is very helpful to the a u th o r’s fu rth er developm ent as a w riter concerned w ith the masses and n o t sim ply expressing his own inner life in a highly individualistic style in tended to win the praise ol literary critics as alienated from the people as he w ould then have becom e him self. Criticism and self-criticism which characterise the relations o f the au th o r w ith his readers and w ith his fellow w orkers in the W riters’ Union prevent him from having an exaggerated opinion o f h im self and thinking o f literary creation as an extension o f his own ego ra ther th.in as th e form in w hich he serves th e w orking people.

In their efforts to revolutionise their own creative wmk

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f i l le rs always have the guidance o f the A lbanian Party o fI .iliour which dem ands th a t art and litera tu re m ust play their lull part in consolidating and advancing socialism. The bourgeoisie and the revisionists claim th a t the concern o f M iuxist-Leninist parties fo r the ideological purity o f lite ra­tim imposes a line on w riters which sm others creative thought and w ork. But this question , like any o ther, has to In seen from a class perspective. Creative for w hom ? For Individuals w ho have detached them selves from the masses mill hy their selfish pursu it o f their own subjective interestsI I msi iously o r unconsciously co llaborate w ith the class t in inies o f the masses, or creative for the great w orking |u o |i lr w ho alone are capable o f changing society andi hinging them selves in the process? It is precisely like 11111 lions o f freedom or dem ocracy. Freedom and dem ocracy |iii whom? For the exploiters and their hireling scribblers who in v r the in terests o f their m asters by ascribing the vileness o f ||n capitalist system to the plight o f man as such and by Hying to d istract peop le’s a tten tio n from the great issues o f

■Iiiss struggle o r freedom and dem ocracy for the w orking ■iHNNi's and those artists and writers w ho serve them .

All A lbania’s professional au thors are in the W riters’ |In litil; b u t it is by no means an exclusive body and isI mil inuously recru iting new m em bers from the ranks o f Hunkers and from new generations o f revolutionary intel- ■lliiiils who are them selves o f and w ith the w orking class. W ill'is in the U nion m ay have tasks assigned to th e m —

511H les on specific subjects for magazines or new spapers, a ■Cello for a new opera, reportage on som e m ajor develop- Iiii hi If a w riter has a p ro ject o f his own for a play or a pivi I, a collection o f poem s or short stories, he pu ts his

El i >1 k isiil to the praesidium of the W riters Union. If agreed, he 111v < n the tim e he needs while still being paid at the usual

Hli of some 800 to 1000 leks a m onth — com parable to the SM|(e <>f a skilled m echanic or specialist in a factory . W hen his Mink is com pleted, it will be discussed w ith his colleagues ^n in ihc po in t o f view o f helping him im prove it, co rrec t any IIIiii1. of detail o r m istaken ideological im plications. A uthors b f |i.ii(I for the ir w orks according to fixed rates b u t they

I t i v e no royalties.

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T here has been a rem arkable flourishing o f litera tu re in socialist A lbania crow ning with laurel all the o ther brilliant achievem ents and encouraging the people to greater efforts y e t in building their new society. Socialist realism has no t becom e a cut-and-dried form ula for churning o u t w orthy bu t dull books a b o u t stereo typed characters in the hands o f such gifted writers as D him iter Shuteriq i, P resident o f the W riters’ U nion, Shefqet M usaraj, Lazer Siliqi, D him iter Xhuvani, Pctro M arko, Jak o v X oxe, Qamil Buxheli, Ismail Kadare, V ito Koçi, Alqi K risto , Sterjo Spasse and so m any others. Far from being a stale and rigid form socialist realism in their books, which cover a wide range o f literary styles — docum en­ta ry , rom antic , satiric, hum orous, d ram atic and epic, sparkles and sizzles in perpetual developm ent th rough the struggle of opposites, th rough the struggle o f classes, th rough the struggle o f the new w ith the old. These w riters, grounded in M arxism -Leninism , take as their subject m atter the lives of the A lbanian w orking masses and light them up in an inspiring, instructive and en terta in ing way w ith their thorough understanding o f contrad ictions. R oo ted in reality they also give their works a trem endous lift w ith thaI indispensable feature o f genuine socialist realism — revolu tionary rom anticism .

T o get some idea o f the w ealth o f A lbanian literatu re , take the year 1970 alone in every m onth o f which som e tw o or three im portan t new novels becam e available to the reading public in the m any bookshops or th rough the tw enty-nine large lending libraries. A t the beginning o f the year there w;r. ‘A D ifficult B irth ’ by Eleana K adare, the first full length hovel by a w om an, w hich to o k as its them e the em ancipation o f A lbanian w om en.

‘Com m issar M em o’, a lyric evocation o f the liberation struggle, was the first novel by the w ell-know n p oe t, Drill m Agolli.

T he th ird novel by Ismail K adare, ‘The C itadel’, used .ill episode in the long w ar against the Turks in which I In Albanian people were led by the great national palrmi Scanderbeg to draw certain parallels w ith the present <!.i\ resistance against revisionism. Kadare, who though still in lill th irties has tw ice w on the L iterary Prize o f the R epub lic , h.m

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I lined a repu ta tion outside A lbania by the translation in to lien ch and English o f his tw o earlier novels — ‘The W edding’ which dealt w ith the clash o f the new social ideals and old Inidal custom s and the ironic ‘G eneral o f a Dead A rm y ’ in which an Italian charged w ith recovering particulars abou t allI In fascists who died in Albania goes around the coun tryII ying to call up from their graves a dead host.

A violent earthquake which in te rru p ted the life of the country in 1967 was the subject o f a novel ‘T roublous I >«*»e m b e r’ by an o ther distinguished p o e t, Fatos Arapi.

‘Standing up A gain’ by D him iter Xhuvani coun terpo in tedii tragedy suffered by one o f A lbania’s new socialist m en w ith I In surging life going on around him.

A satiric novel ‘T he Whole C ity Laughs’ by Qamil Buxheli, In lil up to scorn those bureaucratic elem ents who hinder the developm ent o f socialism.

Another well-know n w riter, Jak o v Xoxe, brought o u t a inivel T h e W hite S o u th ’ ab ou t the struggle of peasants in a |*o operative farm to narrow the differences betw een tow n iiimI countryside.

These are only some of the literary works brought o u t in one year by the Naim Frashëri S tate Publishing House. In mlilition m any historical and political works are being |niiiluced in ever-increasing num bers like K risto F rashëri’s T opular H istory o f A lbania’, a ‘H istory of A lbanian Litera- l i n e ’, the w ell-docum ented ‘H istory o f the A lbanian Party o f I iihour’ and the ‘C ollected Works o f Enver H oxha’.

This definitive collection o f the writings o f Enver H oxha is iin event o f great im portance n o t only to the people of Mliania b u t to revolutionaries all over the world. Their *i|i,nilicance is well sum m ed up in the w ords o f the Secretary id (lie Party C entral C om m ittee, Hysni Kapo, on the occasion ill I nver Ilo x h a ’s six tie th b irthday on O ctober 16, 1968:

‘And if we, the A lbanian com m unists and people review ■liiliiy with legitim ate pride the road th a t we have covered for Mlnie than a q uarte r o f a cen tu ry and the victories atta ined , if ■r say with unshakable conviction th a t we have honourab ly filllillcd our national and in ternational obligations, if we view |H(liiy w ith ce rtitu d e and optim ism the fu tu re of theI nllierland and the course o f socialism in A lbania, this is due

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exclusively to our Party, to its ju s t M arxist-Leninist line, to its founder and organiser, C om rade Enver H oxha who, th rough his wisdom , M arxist-Leninist capability and daring, succeeded no t only in organising the Party o f the pro letariat, n o t only in w orking o u t the p roper political and organis­ational line befitting every stage th a t our Party has gone through , b u t also in applying this line in a consistent m anner waging a struggle that knew no com prom ise against all hostile trends w ith in the Party and against all ex ternal enemies of every shade and colour, fighting openly or in secret.

‘The ideas and works o f Com rade Enver H oxha are a living exam ple o f M arxism-Leninism in action, of fidelity to and unwavering defence o f the fundam ental principles of M arxism -Leninism , o f the creative application o f these principles to the specific conditions o f A lbania in the present epoch, o f their enrichm ent with the historical experience of the Party o f L abour o f A lbania and o f the A lbanian people in the N ational L iberation War, in revolutionary socialist con­struction and in the new experience o f the international com m unist m ovem ent. The revolutionary experience that figures as our great asset in the balance sheet o f the Party ol' Labour of A lbania and th a t constitu tes its con tribu tion lo the com m on treasury o f the theory and practice o f revo lu tion and socialism is reflected, sum m ed up and elaborated in the m ost com plete, exact and p ro found m anner in the works and teachings o f Com rade Enver H o x ha .’

Chapter Tw enty OneA G enuinely Free Society

Albania as seen from the West through the haze o f the Cold War and, m ore recently , as a coun try as rem ote and lino m prehensible as its great fraternal ally, China, is no doubt o ften th o ug h t o f as grim and austere, w ith a people joylessly carrying ou t the stern dictates o f a party th a t has >,ic rificed everything to som e inhum an concep tion of ideo­logical p urity . I t is described by those w ho have seen the Albanian coast from Corfu as a brooding, m ysterious ab rup tl inil w ith the im plication th a t its inhabitants m ust also beI lunge and dour — a race o f zealots, perhaps, w ho have h.iilored away their individual liberty for the rigidly-ordered i nllective life o f a beehive.

No illusion is dispelled m ore quickly for those fortunate lit*High to have visited A lbania; and it is hardly A lbania’s I,mil if, from the time the A lbanians m ade it clear th a t they Would develop their ow n coun try in their ow n way w itho u t Hillside in terference, th e h ostility o f the West has prevented iiioie people from disabusing themselves of such miscon-II plions by first hand experience. N o t only are they a joyfu l, Vlfioious independen t people w ho bring trem endous zest to IvlliH and building a new society in their beautifu l sunny I'liitl, there is no coun try in the w orld which is freer from li uli.lint.

I’.irlly this freedom from restra in t operates at the level of jltiileiiiil conditions under socialism by which no one has to | m .illaid of being o u t o f a jo b , going hungry, n o t having a ill i i ni house to live in or ever being deprived o f the opportunity o f con tribu ting w hatever he has to offer for the linpn iveinent and enrichm ent o f the life o f the com m unity .

I' ii tly it operates at the level of m orals and social

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relationships which are based on popular respect for the decisions the people them selves have arrived at in their various collectives. Discipline there is, bu t it is a discipline the people im pose on themselves. Socialism canno t be exported , neither can it be im posed from above. People can be to ld how to m ake a revolution or how to build socialism ; b u t no one can do it for them or in sp ite o f them . A socialist society m ust always be an inner-directed society. R estrain t there is, bu t it is the self-restraint th a t comes from the constan t p ractice o f criticism and self-criticism in every social or productive organisation. The freedom o f A lbanian society is firm ly roo ted in the real dem ocracy o f the mass line.

An exam ple o f the mass line in action a t the ideological level is provided by the way the question o f religion has been dealt w ith in A lbania. Before the war there were th ree main religions. The m ajority o f the people, som e 65% of the popu la tion , as a result o f 500 years o f T urkish dom ination , were M oham m edans. The influence o f R om an Catholicism was strongest in the n o rth and in the sou th the Greek

O rthodox C hurch claim ed m any adherents. As has already been po in ted ou t, during the liberation struggle m any leading religious figures d iscredited themselves w ith the people by collaborating w ith the Italian or G erm an invaders; b u t the

hold o f superstition rem ained strong, particularly in the rural

areas. T he transition from a m ainly feudal society to

socialism was so quick th a t th e m osques and churches hardly had tim e to dress their practices and doctrines in more sophisticated forms th a t m ight have had som e appeal to .1 m ore enlightened public. T heir hold was o f a nature to

im pede social advance and their reactionary views on the

fam ily, on the privileges o f p ro p erty and on the spiritual role

of m ullahs and priests in ordering the lives o f the people, soon cam e in to conflict w ith the m ovem ent for the emant i pation o f wom en, w ith the expropria tion o f landlords anil

w ith scientific progress in the m edical and social services.The Party carried o u t an intensive ideological strug h

against these backw ard m anifestations w hich was taken up I > \

all the mass organisations in the D em ocratic F ron t. But then'

was no o rder from the sta te closing dow n m osques anil

churches nor restricting religious rites and observances. An

im portan t p art in this ba ttle of ideas v v . i <I ■ s • • I I■ n I’ m I y cadres w ho by the exam ple of the* it (Ii'vkihhi i" | >| m 11 in welfare did m ore than argum ents could In vmdl< ili M n i .m

Leninism as a philosophy at the service nl I lie m i ..........I I"dem onstrate the superiority o f science ovei •«111• • million', faith.

G radually , first in the cities and then in ............. in li\'iid i .the grip o f the holy m en was weakened. 1 In m<>n|ii< .mil ( Ilurches becam e em ptier and em ptier. Eventually tin |h ..|d< in this com m unity or th a t realised that they li.nl .1 lure building in their m idst w hich no longer had any Illin ium , Young people particularly to o k the initiative in piopo.ni}', .1 social use for these structures and, after m eeting In <I• . 11 with .my objections which m ight still rem ain, the w oik would begin on a voluntary basis o f converting the buildings into cultural centres, theatres, concert halls or storage depots, those religious houses o f great architectural beauty 01 historical in terest have been preserved as p a rt o f the peop le’s traditional heritage — like the delightful m osque with its |.;raccful m inaret in the very centre o f T irana around wliii Ii some o f the fiercest fighting in the liberation of the capital look place. A large m osque on a rocky slope rising above Dnrrës has been tu rned in to a m agnificent you th centre with views o f the blue A driatic through the arches in the while walls o f the high prom enade. The great cathedral at Shkodra has becom e a fine gym nasium w ith a huge indoor swimming pool, basket ball courts, boxing rings and well-equipped departm ents for every branch o f sport.

The ideological struggle against superstitious a ttitudes and in 11 social custom s still goes on in spite o f the successes nlieady achieved on the popu lar fron t o f creating a genuinely *n. 1 (list way o f life. It is waged by the people themselves in their study groups which are a characteristic feature o f every In< lory, farm, school or cu ltural organisation — each with its nwn library of essential books and periodicals. T he umlci Handing o f social custom s, analysing their positive and negative aspects, rejecting w hat is bad and keeping what is Hood, depends on exposing their class origin and appreciating tin roots o f backw ard and reactionary habits in the philo m phical, idealistic and religious ideology o f feudalism and

257

capitalism . But even w hen the econom ic basis o f these harm ful and stu ltify ing custom s has been to ta lly changed the custom s them selves m ay persist unless they are attacked directly and replaced w ith socialist habits.

In the countries w here revisionism has reversed the progress tow ard socialism, even before the resto ra tion of capitalism and bourgeois m orality had reached its present ex ten t, there was already a tendency to vacillate on the question o f religion betw een a tough atheistic line from above and a liberal policy based on expediency. The adherence to the mass line in A lbania has avoided these two com plem entary errors.

The absence o f ex ternal restrain t appears in a num ber of superficial social phenom ena which even the casual visitor m ay observe: the freedom everyone enjoys o f listening to whatever radio program m es he likes, though Radio Tirana provides an excellent dom estic service w ith particularly good news coverage; the fac t th a t one sees hardly any policem en at all excep t for those d irecting traffic a t busy in tersections; the lack o f any reticence in the subjects people are prepared to

talk abou t w ith u tte r frankness in the m ost public places. A nd y e t the streets are as clean, socialist p ro p erty as secure, inform al conversations as politically sound, tastes in the arts and in en terta inm ents as jud iciously selective as if the peoplt were under constan t surveillance. Because, o f course, they arc under co nstan t surveillance — provided by themselves. The

pressure o f an enlightened public opinion educated in the

socialist e th ic o f p u ttin g collective in terest above self-interest is very strong; b u t it canno t appear as outside pressure In

those, the whole w orking people, w ho en ter actively inlo iIn form ation and further developm ent. U nder the conditions ol p ro letarian dem ocracy the kinds o f offences w hich keep I In police busy in capitalist countries are n o t only declinhi!> rapidly b u t are increasingly dealt w ith in the variniu collectives w itho u t recourse to state coercion, ju s t as'nmrf and m ore legal cases are settled in the same way o u t o f com I,

But o f course p ro letarian dem ocracy has another I.mi which is tu rned tow ard the class enemies o f w orkers, towurd those w ho w ould revive bourgeois ways o f thinking .uni feeling as a prelude to diverting the co un try from its so< i.i lM

258

course and restoring capitalism . Thai is 111< l.i<< ol the* dictatorsh ip o f the p ro le taria t. There is no l i l ie ia l is in lor these hostile elem ents w ho w ould mislead w orker, through bourgeois influences in cu ltu re and education 01 try lo co rru p t them by replacing socialist incentives witli material incentives. The guardian Party and the soi i.ilisl leadership have n o t hesitated in the past and will not hesitate in the future to unm ask such enem ies at an early stage and mobilise the w orking masses against them .

N or is there any softness in A lbania’s readiness to defend the independence which has cost the lives of so many heroes and heroines and entailed such sacrifices on the part o f the people generally. N ot only are the arm ed services, whic h are also an exam ple o f p ro letarian dem ocracy with llieii absence of ranks and sta tus sym bols, in a constan t state o f prepared­ness; b u t all young people take their turn at m ilitary service and training. There could be no b e tte r p roo f o f the stability of A lbanian society and the correct relationship of m utual trust betw een state and people than the fact that all citizens possess weapons and know how to use them . The working• lass in A lbania is an arm ed p ro le taria t; and the defence o f socialism w ithin and o f national sovereignly w ithout rests ultim ately on the tested fighting qualities ol workers who still, and for m any years to com e, will have to build socialism with pickaxe in one hand and rifle in the o ther.

At the beginning o f N ovem ber, 1971, the Sixth Congress ul the Party o f Labour o f A lbania was convened at Tirana, live years after the F ifth Congress in 1966 at which Enver lloxha in the P arty ’s nam e had called for a great effort in Iurther revolutionising the w hole life o f the country .

This S ix th Congress was an historic socialist occasion, in.irking the successful com pletion o f the F o u rth Five Year I'I.in half a year ahead o f schedule, the launching o f the Fifth I'ive Year Plan and the 30 th Anniversary of the Party which had been founded there in the capital city back in the dark days o f the fascist occupation . The R eport o f the Central C om m ittee subm itted by Enver H oxha analysed the world nil nation drawing a tten tio n to the growing revolutionary «1 length o f the w orking masses, recorded the econom ic and •in i.iI achievem ents o f the past five years and looked forw ard

259

confiden tly to tackling the new tasks agreed for the fu ture in consu lta tion w ith the people themselves. The adm ission of China to. its rightfu l place in the U nited N ations, for which the Albanians had fought so long, was a d ip lom atic victory the Congress n o ted w ith appreciation .

This Congress afforded one the o p p o rtu n ity o f noting the p ro found contrast betw een the satisfaction o f the A lbanian people in w hat they had already accom plished in developing their ow n resources in their own collective in terest and their confidence in the fu tu re and the plight o f workers in the capitalist countries w ith their econom ic stagnation , financial crises, ram pan t in flation and mass unem ploym ent. As dele­gate a fte r delegate came forw ard to the rostrum of the auditorium in th e m agnificent Palace o f C ulture to con tribu te to the discussion on the R epo rt one was aware o f how deep socialist ideas and a ttitudes have p enetra ted the conscious­ness o f the people in this M arxist-Leninist land. Brigade leaders from rem ote upland co-operatives, trac to r drivers and engineers, m en and w om en w orkers from factories and industrial com bines, representatives o f the y o u th and wom ens organisations, Party cadres, technicians, University lecturers, writers and artists — all, in presenting their accounts o f goals achieved in their various fields, sh o rt­comings yet to be overcom e and dedication to further socialist advances in a revolutionary spirit, dem onstra ted the great changes that have been w rought in A lbanian society and the ex ten t to which the people have changed themselves in the process.

A detailed repo rt on the achievem ents o f the F ourth Five Year Plan and the targets accep ted for the F ifth was presented by M ehm et Shehu. Overall industrial and a^ri cultural p roduction in the five year period had gone up l>\ 61%, industrial p roduction by 83%, or some 30% higher th.m p lanned, while agricultural p roduction rose by a substantial 28% which was n o t as high as the estim ated increase hill included a spectacular grow th in the p roduction of I'mul grains and live stock essential to self-sufficiency in food. H it F ifth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) proposes an increase in industrial p roduction o f 66% a t an annual ra te o f 10.1%, Means o f p roduction , the heavy industrial base of I In

econom y, are to be increased by 78-83% and consum er goods industries by 40-44% representing a volun tary saving on the p art o f the people to ensure continued socialist grow th for the benefit o f fu tu re generations.

M ehm et Shehu concluded his repo rt w ith an acknow ledge­m ent o f w hat econom ic advance was all abou t. ‘We m ust always hold high the banner o f class struggle in the field of p roduction and d istribu tion . O ur c o u n try ’s socialist develop­m ent is a process o f com plex and continuous struggle waged by the w orking masses under the leadership o f the Party. The struggle for the socialist construction o f our coun try is a com plicated class struggle, its subject and its object is m an, with his views, convictions, m orality and consciousness, w ith his interests and relationships b o th as an individual and as a m em ber o f soc ie ty .’

A t the conclusion o f the week-long Congress, after the elections to th e Central C om m ittee, the Political Bureau and the C ontro l Com m ission, a mass rally o f over 100,000 people in the great square before the Palace o f C ulture, w ith the huge equestrian statue o f Scanderbeg at one end, heard a summary o f the proceedings o f the Congress from their heloved leader, Enver H oxha. R epeated cheers and chanted slogans filled the air w ith a m ighty roar as dusk gathered and the coloured lights on the public buildings blazed brightly . As darkness fell groups in trad itional costum es danced in the streets and thousands o f voices were raised in fam iliar partisan songs while overhead a brilliant display o f fireworks hi the capital city festively. The sto ry o f the A lbanian people C.oes on b u t we can fitting ly take our leave o f them in this i elebratory m ood.

It is a pleasure for a w riter, having som e knowledge of Albania w hich he hopes to deepen, to have to ld , how ever inadequately, this story o f her people, the ir Party o f Labour and their great M arxist-Leninist leader, Enver H oxha, because11 is a story , after so m uch heroic struggle and so m uch hard i leative w ork, w hich has com e o u t happy in the end — or,I tie m odest A lbanian people themselves w ould insist, in the middle. T hey see them selves as having taken only the firstI I m ee t steps along the road to com m unism . We can say on ihcir behalf th a t the ir courage, often during their h istory in

261

the face o f trem endous odds, and their steadfast dedication to the ideals o f socialism have fully deserved the quality of life enjoyed in A lbania today.

BOOKS OF REFERENCEKristo Frasheri The History o f Albania (A Brief Survey),

T irana, 1964.I'.nver H oxha R eport on the A c tiv ity o f the Central Com­

m ittee o f the Party o f Labour o f Albania (Subm itted to the V th Party Congress N ovem ber 1, 1966). T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1966.

I nver H oxha, C ollected Speeches (1967-68). T irana, The‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1969.Institu te o f M arxist-Leninist S tudies H istory o f the Party o f

Labour o f Albania T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1971.

Paul Lendvai Eagles in Cobwebs, Nationalism and Com ­munism in the Balkans. L ondon, M acdonald, 1970.

(Gilbert M ury Albanie: Terre de TH om m e Nouveau Paris, Francois M aspero, 1970.

Nicholas C. Pano The P eople’s Republic o f Albania Balti­m ore, Jo h n s H opkins Press, 1968.

Zeri i Popullit (People’s Voice) C ollected Editorials Oppose Modern Revisionism and Uphold Marxism-Leninism and the Unity o f the International Com m unist M ovem ent Vol I. Marxist-Leninist Ideology Will Certainly Overcome Revisionism Vol II. T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1964.

Authorship U nspecified Answers to Questions about Albania 1'irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1969.

263

BOOKS AND ARTICLES CONSULTED IN R EFER EN CE TO SPECIFIC CHAPTERS

C hapters One and TwoKristo Frasheri George Kastriot-Scanderbeg T irana, The

‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing House, 1962.Lord Byron Childe H arold’s Pilgrimage.S tate U niversity o f T irana In s titu te o f H istory and Linguistics

George Kastriot-Scanderbeg and the Albanian-Turkish War o f the X V th Century T irana, 1967.

C hapters T hree to SevenJu lian A m ery Sons o f the Eagle, A S tudy in G uerrilla Wai,

L ondon, M acmillan, 1948.L efter Kasneci Steeled in the Heat o f Battle T irana, The

‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1966.Selected Readings Pages o f Heroic Deeds Tirana.Hugh Seton-W atson The East European Revolution London,

M ethuen, 1956.M ehm et Shehu On the Experience o f the National Liberation

War and on the D evelopm ent o f the N ational A rm y Tiran.i, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1963.

C hapter EightLeslie G ardiner The Eagle Spreads His Claws Willi.mi

B lackw ood & Sons, 1966.Bruce Page, David Leitch and Phillip K nightley Philby, I In'

Spy Who Betrayed a GenerationZeri i Popullit (People’s Voice) C ollected Editorials I In

Belgrade Revisionist Clique — Renegades from M arsitffU Leninism and Agents o f Imperialism T irana, The ‘Niiliit F rasheri’ Publishing House, 1964.

264

The Truth about the Plight o f the Albanians in Yugoslavia T irana, 1961.

Titoite Yugoslavia at the Crossroads T irana, 1966.

C hapters Nine to ElevenConstitution o f the P eople’s Republic o f Albania English

ed ition , T irana, 1964.Enver H oxha I t is in the State Power Unity o f the Party and

People that Our Strength Lies T irana, The ‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1970.

Knver H oxha On the Role and Tasks o f the Democratic Front fo r the Complete Triumph o f Socialism in Albania T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1967.

Lenin’s Selected Works The Tasks o f the Y outh Leagues.Mao T setung ’s Selected W orks Get Organised; On Coalition

Government; On Practice; Concerning M ethods o f Leadership.

C hapters Twelve to F ourteen1’avlo A zdurian and Vangjel K ati L 'Electrification dans la

Republique Populaire D ’Albanie T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1968.

I lasan Benja Establishm ent and Prospects o f the Develop­m ent o f Socialist Industry in the P eople’s Republic o f Albania T irana, T he ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House,1968.

Com m ittee for Foreign C ultural R elations La R eform e Agraire en Republique Populaire D ’Albanie T irana, Milial Duri, 1961.

I’iro D odhiba On Stepping Up Agricultural Production and Developing the Co-operative Countryside In fo rm ation Bulletin o f the C entral C om m ittee o f the Party o f Labour No. 2, 1968. T irana, 1968.

I1',liver H oxha Tw enty-five Years o f Struggles and Victories on the R oad to Socialism T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1969.

Murat Klosi Twenty-Five Years o f Construction Work in

265

Socialist Albatiia T irana, The ‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1969.

Marx and Engels Selected Works Critique o f the Gotha Programme (Karl Marx)

Mao T setung’s Selected Works On Contradiction.Harilla Papajorgji Our Friends A sk . . . T irana, the ‘Naim

F rasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1970.Haki T oska Workers’ Control — C om ponent Part o f Our

Revolutionary Ideology and Practice In fo rm ation Bulletin o f the Central C om m ittee o f the Party o f L abour No. 2,1969, T irana, 1969.

A uthorship U nspecified State Social Insurance in the People's Republic o f Albania T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1963.

C hap ter F ifteenRam iz Alia Leninism — the Banner o f Struggle and Victories

Speech C om m em orating the C entenary o f L en in ’s Birlli. T irana, T he ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1970.

Ramiz Alia On Deepening Socialist R evolution through Developing Class Struggle and Carrying out the Mass Line In fo rm ation Bulletin o f the Central C om m ittee o f the Party o f L abour No. 4, 1968, T irana, 1968.

Central C om m ittee o f the A lbanian Party o f Labour The Facts about Soviet-Albanian Relations Including editorials from Zeri i Popullit, T irana, 1964.

Enver H oxha Speech Delivered at the M eeting o f SI C om m unist and W orkers’ Parties in Moscow on November 16, 1960. T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, n o t m ade public till 1969.

Peking Review April 17, 1970 Socialist Construction ami Class Struggle in the Field o f Economics.

M ehm et Shehu On the S tand o f the People’s Republu <»/ Albania towards the Warsaw Treaty T irana, 1968.

Zeri i Popullit (People’s Voice) Collected Editorials I In Dangerous Manoeuvres o f N. K hrushchev’s Group on I In So-Called Fight against the 'Cult o f the Individual’ Should [ Be Stripped Bare o f Their Mask T irana, The ‘N.iliil F rasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1964.

266

The Soviet Revisionist Clique Moves at a Quicker Pace toward the Re-establishm ent o f Capitalism T irana, The ‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1965.

Collaboration with American Imperialism to D om inate the World — the General Line o f the Soviet Revisionist Leaders T irana, T he ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1965.

The A ll-R ound Degeneration and Disintegration in the Countries and Peoples R u led by Revisionists T irana, The ‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing House, 1968.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Caught in the Grip o f Soviet Revisionist Invaders T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing H ouse, 1968.

C hapters S ixteen to T w enty OneKsanthipi Begaja W om en’s Rights and Her Role in the

P eople’s Republic o f Albania T irana, 1967.Ali Cungu (Translator) Specimens o f Albanian Contemporary

Prose T irana, T he ‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing House, 1969.Fnver H oxha On Som e Aspects o f the Problem o f Albanian

Women T irana, The Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1967.

Enver H oxha Toward Further Revolutionising Our Schools In fo rm ation Bulletin o f the Central C om m ittee o f the P arty o f L abour No. 2, 1968. T irana, 1968.

Knver H oxha Our Younger Generation Marches A long the Revolutionary R oad o f the Party Speech to Y outh W orking on the Rogozhina-Fier Railway, T irana, The ‘Naim Frasheri’ Publishing House, 1968.

Knver H oxha A rt and Letters Should Keep Step with Our Revolutionary Masses, with Our Working Class Part of a Speech Delivered to the T irana Regional Party Conference D ecem ber, 1968. T irana, The ‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing House, 1969.

I lysni K apo Comrade Enver Hoxha, the Beloved Leader o f Our Party and People on his S ixtieth Birthday Info rm ation Bulletin o f th e C entral C om m ittee o f the Party o f Labour No. 4 , 1968. T irana, 1968.

A^im M ero R eport on the A ctiv ity o f the Labour Youth

267

Union In fo rm ation Bulletin o f the C entral C om m ittee of the Party o f L abour No. 3, 1967. T irana, 1967.

V efik Qerimi Public Health Service in the P eople’s Republic o f Albania T irana, The ‘Naim F rasheri’ Publishing House, 1967.

Lazer Siliqi (In troduction ) Albanian Contemporary Prose T irana, 1963.

268

INDEXagrarian reform , 135, 143, fo rm ation

of co-operatives, 144 Albanian League, 17 Albanian national consciousness, 21;

under Turkish dom ination , 25; national resurgence, 26

Albanian sovereignty, 11, 58 , 82, 84, 204, 209

Ali Pasha Tepelena, 25 Alia, Ram iz, on th e revolutionary

party , 114; 125, on intellectuals, 175; base and superstruc ture , 176

arm ed services, 259 arts and cu lture, 243-254 au thors (novelists, p layw rights, poets),

248-253Balli K am bëtar (National F ront),

5 7 -6 2 ,6 5 , 71 Balluku, Beqir, 125 base and superstructure , 176, 177 Belishova, Liri, 189, 197 Berat Conference, Anti-fascist C om m it­

tee becom es D em ocratic Govern­m ent of A lbania, 75

Bernstein, 94 Bevin, E rnest, 85 Brezhnev, 207Britain, 31, 44, 58, 62, 63, 64, 79, 81,

sinking o f Saumarez and Volage, 83; plots against Albanian sover­eignty , 84-86; 115, 157, 165, 183

British military mission, 62, 64 Bukharin, 185 bureaucracy, 108 Byron, 14, 25i apital accum ulation, 157 (^arçani, Adil, 125Cham berlain, Neville, Italian invasion

of A lbania, 31 China, People’s R epublic, 158,

187-216, 255

Chou En-lai, 203, 211 Churchill, W inston, 63 Ciano, C ount, 29 class struggle, 101Com m unist Party o f Albania (Party ol

Labour o f A lbania), foundation ol Party , 39; m anifesto o f Provisional Central Com m ittee, 40; l.ah inot N ational Party Conference, 48; directive a t end o f Italian occu pation , 56; 80, 96, 100, 112-125

com m unists, 34, 35, what makes a good com m unist, 118

C onstitu tion o f A lbania, 98 , 1 10 Czechoslovakia, 207Davies, Brigadier, 64 dem ocratic centralism , 102, 1 21 dem ocratic elections, 103 D em ocratic F ront, 114, 128 dictatorship o f the pro letariat, 100,

108, 156, 259 Dishnica, Y mer, 61, 62Eden, A nthony , recognition o f Alba­

nian liberation struggle, 58 education , 222-232 Eisenhower, President, 194, 201 Engels, role of w om en, 237 estrada (music hall), 219, 247F abians, 94 fam ily, 218five year plans, 159-161 fletë rrufe (criticism and self-criticism),

128, 167 France, 183 Frasheri, M idhat, 59G erm any, invades Balkans, 37; 57,

Quisling G overnm ent set up, 58; w inter cam paign, 66-69; defe at by Albanian forces, 72-77

269

Gjinishi, M ustafa, 61, 62 G rechko, Marshal, 197 Greço, Kiço, 43Greece, 27, a ttem p t to annex p art of

A lbania, 37; 84, 87, 96 guerrilla tactics, against Turks, 20;

liberation w ar, 50-55Ho Chi Minh, 124Hoxha, Enver, A lbanian rights, 11;

b iography, 38; fo rm ation o f Com ­m unist Party o f A lbania, 39; elec­ted Secretary Genera] o f Political Bureau, 48; on people’s war, 55; on war against Nazis, 57; 61, on British mission, 64; elected Chairm an o f Provisional G overnm ent, 71; 75, on British infringem ent o f territoria l rights, 83; on post-w ar settlem ent, 86; 90, repo rt on Berat Conference, 91; election speech (1972), 103; on bureaucracy, 108; on single party dem ocracy, 116; what m akes a good com m unist, 118; Party fail­ings, 121; leading role o f the w ork­ing class, 122; 125, on Marxism- Leninism , 127; socialism, 142; m oral problem s, 146; tow n and countryside, 151; fo u rth five year p lan, 160; ideological revolution , 178; against revisionism, 189; on T w entieth Party Congress (USSR), 191; great speech a t 1960 Moscow Conference, 198; on Albanian sovereignty, 204; friendship with China, 209; gratitude to China, 212; revolutionising education , 225; em ancipation o f w om en, 235; on arts and cu lture, 243; criticism o f artists, 249; Sixth Party Con­gress, 259

Hull, Cordell, recognition o f A lbanian struggle and right o f self-determi- nation , 58

ideological revolution (cultural revol­u tion), 178-180, 210

Illyrians 1 1 ,1 2 incom e differentials, 169 industrialisation, 156-165 intellectuals, 175Islam, conversion o f Albanians, 25; 81,

256

Italy, 13, annexation o f V lora, 27; econom ic pen etratio n o f Albania, 28; invasion o f Albania, 30; Albania tu rned in to an Italian colony, 32; invasion o f G reece, 36; cap itu ­la tion , 56

Jacom oni, Francesco, 31, 45, 48 Jakova, T uk, 183 judicial system , 106Kadia, Branko, 43Kapo, Hysni, 48 , 83, 125, 196, on

Enver H oxha, 253 K autsky, 94 Kelcyra, Ali, 59 K ennedy, President, 201, 206 Khrushchev, N., 183-207 K okedhim a, Persephone, 69, 246 Koleka, Spiro, 125 K onitza, Faik, 36Kosova d istric t (Albanians living o u t­

side A lbania), 89, 95 K ostani, Midhi, 43 Kozlov, 184 Kruja, M ustafa, 40, 42 Kupi, Abaz, 44, 59, 62 Kushi, Vojo, 43I -abinot Conference, 48, 71 League o f Nations, recognition of

Albania, 27 Legaliteti (Legality, nationalist group),

57, 59, 62, 65 Lenin, against revisionism , 94; Marxisl

m orality , 199; 124, 126, 177, 188 Liu Shao-chi, 179, 210 I.leshi, Ilaxhi, 1 25Macmillan, Prime M inister, 201 Malcshova, Sejfulla, 89 m anagem ent o f factories, 165 Mao Tsetung, on people’s war, 50; on

the mass line, 102; 124, mass linr and Marxist theo ry o f know ledge 127; 193, friendship w ith Albania, 209

Marko, R ita, 125 M arkogjon, Jo h n , 52, 233 Marx, d ictatorsh ip o f the proletai i.H,

99; critique o f G o tha Programme, 156; labour pow er, 157; egoism, 175; 188, educating the educali >I *

270

224; freedom o f w om en, 237 mass line, 98, 102, o f Party, 113;

126-132 Misja, Jo rd a n , 43 M olotov, 58m onopoly-capitalism , British, 28;

Italian, 32 Mukje agreem ent, 61 Mussolini, 31, 32, on defeat of invasion

o f Greece, 36; overthrow , 56 M yftiu, M anush, 125Nagy, Im re, 190 Naipi, Buie, 69, 233, 246 National L iberation Council, form a­

tion , 44 Noli, Fan, 27, 248 Nushi, Gogo, 48, 125Pariani, General, 48partisan units, 45-47peasants and collectivisation, 147Pcci, Shefqet, 125People’s Assembly, 104People’s Councils, 106Peristeri, Pilo, 39Perm et Congress, Provisional G overn­

m ent established, 70, 71 Peza, Myslim, 44, 125 Peza Conference o f National L iber­

a tion , 4 4 ,7 1 , 99 Philby, K im , 85Radio T irana, 258 religion, 25, 81, 242, 256 revisionism, 94, 97, 114, 176, 179,

183, 187, 189, 208, 258 R exhepi, Perlat, 43 Rom an Catholicism , 81Scanderbeg (George K astrioti), 13,

1 5 -24 ,2 5 Shanto, Vasil, 38, 48 Shehu, M ehm et, 48, o n people’s war,

50-55, 9 2 , 96 , 125, on self-reliance, 141; 198, 201, China and the bom b, 206; 207, ideological (cul­tural) revolution, 210; revo lu tion­ising education , 228; Sixth Party Congress (T irana), 260

Sixth Party Congress (T irana), 259 Smith, Adam , 175

socialist ethics, 256social services, 171, health scrvicr,

240-242 Spahiu, Bedri, 183 Spiru, Nako, 48 , 90, 92, 96 Stafa, Qem al, 39, 41, heroic death , 42;

231Stalin, 91, 93, 95, 175, 181, 182, 184,

185, 187 Stoin ich , Velimir, 89 Suslov, M ichael, 189, 190Tashko, Koco, 197Tirana, libera tion of, 76T ito , 89, 93, 94, 181, 185, 190, 191Topulli, Bajo, 38Tpulli, Çer^iz, 69Toska, Ilaki, 125tow n and countryside, 146, 151trade unions, 128T rotsky, 35, 38, 185T urkey, 96Turks, 1 2, conquest o f A lbania, 1 5-24,

25T w entieth Party Congress (USSR),

183-188, 201USA, 58, 62, 63, 64, 79, 84-87, 1 15,

194USSR, Nazi a ttack on, 37; 58, 158,

181-211Venizelos, Sophocles, 195, 200

Verlaci, Shefqet, 40 Vlora, Nuredin bey, 59women, 130, 158, heroines o f the

resistance, 233; w om en's em anci­pation , 234-239 w orking class, 122, w orkers’ con tro l, 165-168; right to work, 1 70; heroic w orkers, 173-174

Xoxe, Koçi, 89-93; 179, 189, 210y ou th , 129, 222Yugoslavia, 87-96; 181, 182, 190, 200Zeri i Popullit (People’s Voice), l it it

issue, 43; 96, 248 Zinoviev, 185Zog, Ahmed, 28, 29, 59, 71, 81, 84,

200