PIL mtg 10

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INDEPENDENCE and EQUALITY of STATESRepublic of Indonesia vs. James Vizon G.R. No. 54705, June 26, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin. The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000. When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners (RTC) of Makati, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity. In turn, respondent filed on March 20, 2001, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can be sued.

RULING:

The Supreme Court on the matter ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity to suit. The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to dismiss it.

The Court stated that the upkeep of its furnishings and equipment is still part sovereign function of the State. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. The Supreme Court grants the petition and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

A public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.

It is, therefore, evidence that the State (GPI) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5

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of Article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR SOERATMIN, and MINISTER COUNSELLOR AZHARI KASIM,petitioners, vs. JAMES VINZON

FACTS:

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and was to take effect in a period of four years. When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter dated August 31, 2000. Respondent filed a complaint claiming that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss assailing that Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

RULING:

The SC GRANTED the petition.

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance and upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.

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KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents

FACTS:

Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement.

In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.

In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the ‘trumped-up’ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.

ISSUE:

WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

RULING:

The SC DENIED the petition.

Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only “diplomatic agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.

The “buy-bust operation” and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Minucher v CA

Doctrine: Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

Facts:Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attaché of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).

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Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.

Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.

It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.

TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.

Issue:Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.

Held:No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.

MINUCHER v. CA (September 24, 1992)Petitioner: KHOSROW MINUCHERRespondents: CA & ARTHUR W. CALZO, JR.Nature: PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of AppealsPonente: DAVIDE, JR., J.

1. CALZO FRAMES UP MINUCHER FOR POSSESSION OF HEROIN. Calzo, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of Department of Justice of the USA ordered from Minucher, a labor attaché of the Iran Embassy in Manila Iranian were introduced by a common associate, Inigo. Calzo offered to help Minucher with his problem with his family’s US visas for a fee of $2,000. Calzo also found buyers of certain Iranian goods which Calzo was selling such as silk and carpets. So, Calzo came to the residence of Minucher and asked to be entrusted with a pair of Persian silk carpets with a floor price of $24,000 each, for which he had a buyer. The following day, Calzo returned to Minucher’s residence, took the carpets and gave the latter $24,000; after about an hour, Calzo returned, claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts at the American Embassy concerning the visas and asked for $2,000. He was given this amount. It turned out, however, that Calzo had prepared an elaborate plan to frame-up Minucher for alleged trafficking; both were falsely arrested by Calzo and some American and Filipino police officers, and were taken to Camp Crame in their underwear. Calzo and his companions took petitioner’s 3 suitcases containing various documents, his wallet containing money and the keys to his house and car, as well as the $24,000 which Calzo had earlier delivered to him. Minucher and his companion, Torabian were handcuffed together for 3 days and were not given food and water; they were asked to confess to the possession of heroin or else they would be jailed or even executed by Iranian terrorists. Consequently, the two were charged for the violation of Section 4 of RA. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the Pasig RTC. They were, however, acquitted by the said court. Calzo testified for the prosecution in the said case.

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2. COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES. Minucher files a complaint for damages against Calzo and alleges that Calzo falsely testified against him in the criminal case. Minucher also avers that charges of unlawful arrest, robbery and estafa or swindling have already been filed against the Calzo. He therefore prays for actual and compensatory damages of not less than P480,000 ($24,000) representing the fair market value of the Persian silk carpet and $2,000 representing the refund of the amount he had given for the visas; moral damages in the amount of P5 million; exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000 and attorney’s fees of at least P200,000 to answer for litigation expenses incurred for his defense in the criminal case and for the prosecution of the civil case,

3. SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO QUASH SUMMONS. Calzo’s counsel, the law firm LUNA, SISON AND MANAS, filed a Special Appearance and Motion alleging therein that since Calzo is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the USA, and the acts and omissions complained of were performed by him in the performance of official functions, the case is now under study by the Departments of State and Justice in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of determining what defenses would be appropriate; said counsel also prayed that the period to answer be extended. Then, counsel filed a Special Appearance to Quash Summons alleging therein that: The action being it personal action for damages arising from an alleged tort, the defendant being outside the Philippines and not being a resident of the Philippines, Defendant is beyond the processes of this court,” and praying that the summons issued be quashed. The trial court denied the motion in its Order. Unsatisfied with the said order, Calzo filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. In its Decision, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Calzo elevated the case to the SC but was dismissed due to non-compliance with par 2 of Circular No. 1-88 and its failure to show that the CA had committed any reversible error.

4. CALZO FILED HIS ANSWER. Thereafter, Calzo filed with the trial court his Answer in the civil case wherein he denies the material allegations in the complaint, sets forth the following Affirmative Defenses: “The Complaint fails to state a cause of action: in having Minucher and Torabian arrested and detained at Camp Crame; a quantity of heroin, seized from plaintiff by Philippine police authorities and in seizing the money used in the drug transaction, defendant acted in the discharge of his official duties or otherwise in the performance of his official functions as agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice and interposes a counterclaim for P100,000 to answer for attorney’s fees and the expenses of litigation.”

5. CALZO’S MTD BASED ON A DIPLOMATIC NOTE. Calzo filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground that as per the copy of Diplomatic Note No. 414 issued by the Embassy of the United States of America,13 dated 29 May 1990 and certified to be a true and faithful copy of the original by one Donald K. Woodward, Vice Consul of the United States of America on 11 June 1990, the Embassy advised the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines that:

“x x x Arthur W. Scalzo, was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on October 14, 1985 until his departure on August 10, 1988. x x xx x x in May 1986, with the cooperation of Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, Mr. Scalzo investigated Mr. Khosrow Minucher, the plaintiff in the aforementioned case for allegedly trafficking in a prohibited drug. It is this investigation which has given rise to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Embassy takes note of the provisions of Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which provides that Mr. Scalzo retains immunity from civil suit for sets performed in the exercise of his functions, as is the caw here, even though he has departed (sic) the country.”

The trial court issued an order denying the motion for being “devoid of merit.”

6. CA DISMISSED CASE. Calzo then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. CA promulgated a Decision dismissing the case due to the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the latter possessed diplomatic immunity. MR denied because: “When therefore Mr. Scalzo testified in the Criminal Case against Khosrow Minucher it was in connection with his official functions as an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States and member (sic) of the American Mission charged with cooperating with the Philippine law enforcement agency. He therefore, enjoys immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving State under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.” Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON a complaint for damages should be dismissed on the sole basis of a statement contained in a Diplomatic Note, belatedly issued after an answer to the said complaint had already been filed, that the defendant was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the Philippines at the

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time the cause of action accrued? HELD: NO.

7. CORRECT GROUND TO DISMISS: FAILURE TO STATE A COA. While the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss, the CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the civil case on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply-because of the Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. It may at once be stated that even if the Calzo enjoys diplomatic immunity, a dismissal of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, but rather for lack of a cause of action because even if he committed the imputed act and could have been otherwise made liable therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against him in connection therewith and would prevent recovery of damages arising therefrom.

8. COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER CALZO. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired either by his voluntary appearance or by the service of summons upon him. While in the instant case, private respondent’s counsel filed, on 26 October 1988, a motion to quash summons because being outside the Philippines and being a non-resident alien, he is beyond the processes of the court, which was properly denied by the trial court, he had in effect already waived any defect in the service of the summons by earlier asking, on 2 occasions, for an extension of time to file an answer, and by ultimately filing an Answer with Counterclaim. There is no question that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the private respondent.

9. THE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. The complaint for damages filed by the Minucher still cannot be peremptorily dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that the private respondent committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. As described in the complaint, he committed criminal acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the Special Appearance to Quash Summons earlier alluded to, an the other hand, private respondent maintains that the claim for damages arose “from an alleged tort.” Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can be no question that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts committed outside his official functions duties. In the decision acquitting petitioner in the criminal case involving the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of which is attached to his complaint for damages and which must be deemed

as an integral part thereof, the trial court gave full credit to petitioner’s theory that he was a victim of a frame-up instigated by the private respondent. Thus, there is a prima facie showing in the complaint that indeed private respondent could be held personally liable for the acts committed beyond his official functions or duties.

10. REITERATED DOCTRINE IN SHAUF. In Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, after citing pertinent authorities, this Court ruled: “The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may haw mused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Dumlao vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 114 SCRA 247 [1982]).”

11. ARTICLE 31 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS admits of exceptions. It reads:“I. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State, outside his official functions. (Emphasis supplied).

12. NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE HE ACTED IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY. There is of course the claim of private respondent that the act imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. In short, insofar as the records are concerned, Calzo did not come forward with evidence to prove that indeed, he had acted in his official capacity. It does not appear that an actual hearing on the motion to dismiss was conducted and that Calzo offered evidence in support thereof. Thus, it is apropos to quote what this Court stated in United States of America vs. Guinto:

“But even as we are, certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of their official functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory factual allegations in this case

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deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs. The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.”

It may be mentioned in this regard that Calzo himself, in his Pre-trial Brief, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity.

The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, such should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which the CA yielded to the private respondent’s claim is arbitrary.

DISPOSITION. WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the CA is SET ASIDE and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila denying private respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby REINSTATED.


FACTS:




ISSUE:


RULING:


Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only “diplomatic agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is

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believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded



II. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY and RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY

THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALESENTERPRISES, INC.

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot5-A is contiguous to Lots5-B and 5-Dregistered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Enterprises. The squatters refused to vacate the lots sold to private respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters occurred. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).Private respondent

filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.

ISSUE:

WON (whether or not) the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit.

HELD:

YES. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.Lot5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envo yholds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

SALIENT POINTS:

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, according to the Supreme Court: (a) Classical or absolute theory

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a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign; and (b) Restrictive theory

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the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acof a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. JURE IMPERII AND JURE GESTIONIS. - "There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. x x x Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit." The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach. How does the Philippine government treat the Holy See or Vatican?

The Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957. This appears to be the universal practice in international relations. What is the treaty that governs the sovereign immunity of diplomats and other state agents?

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which was ratified on 18 April 1961, is a codification of centuries-old customary law affording protection to foreign diplomats. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include(a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,(b) envoys, ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d’ affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. Comprising the “staff of the (diplomatic) mission” are the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff.

Par in parem imperium non habet

. An equal has no power over an equal. Jenk. Cent. 174.Example: One of two judges of the same court cannot commit the other for contempt.

Holy See vs Rosario

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall

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form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court.

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly.

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

USA v. RUIZGR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985

FACTS:Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently, the company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June 1972, the copany received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. The company then sued the United States of America and individual petitioners demanding that the company perform the work on the projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties concerning the project.

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ISSUE:1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However, state immunity now extends only to governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. In this case, the projects are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of the USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government. As such, by virtue of state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction over the case for the US government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER, petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

Facts

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.

US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US.

In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.

The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was

no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.

Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity

Held:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.

Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary

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to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act

US v RUIZ

Brief Fact Summary. When Ruiz’s sentence was vacated because she refused to waive her rights to impeachment evidence, the government brought appeal on the grounds that its plea bargaining process was not unconstitutional.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a defendant receive exculpatory evidence at trial, a defendant may waive their right to this information in a plea agreement.

Facts. Federal prosecutors offered respondent, Angela Ruiz, a fast track plea bargain, after 30kg of marijuana was found in her luggage by immigration agents. Per the terms of the bargain, the respondent would have gotten a reduced sentence recommendation, in exchange for waiving the right to receive impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as to information supporting any affirmative defense she may raise if she were to go to trial. Ruiz rejected the waiver of her rights, the offer was withdrawn and she was indicted for unlawful drug possession. At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the sentence she would have gotten, had she taken the plea bargain, on the grounds that it was in violation of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial. The Court of Appeals ruled for the respondent, and vacated the sentence, and the government brought appeal.

Issue. Whether, before entering into a plea agreement, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal prosecutors to disclose impeachment information relating to informants or other witnesses.

Held. Justice Breyer, for the Court, held that although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do provide that a defendant be given exculpatory impeachment evidence from prosecutors, a guilty plea under a plea agreement, with a waiver of rights, can be accepted as knowing and voluntary.Concurrence. Justice Thomas concurs, noting that the purpose of requiring exculpatory evidence is so there be no “unfair trial to the accused,” which does not apply at the plea bargaining stage.

Discussion. While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are designed to protect the right to a fair trial, a defendant can knowingly and voluntarily waive those rights in a valid plea agreement.

Facts

After immigration agents found marijuana in luggage belonging to Ruiz (defendant), federal prosecutors offered her a “fast track” plea bargain, whereby a defendant will waive indictment, trial and an appeal in return for a lesser sentence. The agreement stated that any information establishing the defendant’s innocence would be turned over to the defendant. Moreover, the defendant must “waive the right” to receive “impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses” and the right to receive information supporting possible affirmative defenses if the case goes to trial. Ruiz refused the last condition, the government indicted her, but Ruiz ultimately pleaded guilty to the drug change. At sentencing, Ruiz asked for the same sentence that prosecutors would have given her had she signed the “fast track” plea bargain agreement, but the government opposed the request and the district court denied it, giving her instead the typical longer sentence. Ruiz appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that court vacated the lower court’s judgment, pointing out that the Constitution requires that prosecutors make certain impeachment information available to defendants before trial. The Ninth Circuit said that this obligation requires that a defendant receive the same information before a plea bargain. The same court said the Constitution prohibits defendants from waiving their right to that information and invalidated the “fast track” plea bargain because it included the waiver

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WAIVER

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING

Facts:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared

the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

Issues:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.

Discussions:

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

EXECUTION

43 F.2d 705 (1930)

DEXTER & CARPENTER, Inc.,v.KUNGLIG JARNVAGSSTYRELSEN et al.

No. 356.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

July 14, 1930.

*706 Haight, Smith Griffin & Deming, of New York City (Charles S. Haight, Wharton Poor, and Laszlo Kormendi, all of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Covington, Burling & Rublee, of Washington, D. C., and Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed, of New York City (Edward B. Burling, of Washington, D. C., William C. Cannon, of New York City, and Porter R. Chandler, of Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for W. Bostrom, Envoy Extraordinary, etc.

Shearman & Sterling, of New York City (Carl A. Mead and Otey McClellan, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellees. the National City Bank of N. Y. and A/B Svenska Amerika Linien.

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Before MANTON, SWAN, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

MANTON, Circuit Judge.

Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, also known as the Royal Administration of the Swedish State Railways, filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, in 1922, describing itself as a corporation under the laws of Sweden, and sought recovery of $125,000, claiming breach of contract by appellant for the sale of coal. The National City Bank of New York was made a party defendant because funds were on deposit in that institution to cover the payment of the coal purchased. An answer was filed to this complaint, also a counterclaim in which the appellant sought affirmative relief by way of money damages for breach of the contract for the purchase of the coal. All parties now agree that the Swedish State Railways was not in fact a corporation, as alleged in the complaint, and in no way a distinct entity from the Swedish government; that the Railways were part of the Swedish government and were owned solely by Sweden. In Sweden it was not subject to the laws specially applicable to corporations and economic societies of the kingdom of Sweden. All its officials are appointed by the Swedish government and operate the railways under its direction. The net revenues are paid to the Exchequer, which is the same office to which taxes and other such revenues of the Swedish government must be and are delivered. In reply to the counterclaim, a replication was filed, and a motion was made to dismiss the counterclaim because the railways were an agency of the government and the counterclaim was not maintainable against it without its consent. This motion was overruled and the replication stricken out. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, etc., v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. (D. C.) 300 F. 891. The mere allegation of agency, unsupported by any claim of immunity proceeding directly from the sovereign and unvouched for by our own government, was held to be insufficient.

The trial of the action resulted in a judgment dismissing the complaint, and a verdict was rendered by the jury for the plaintiff on the counterclaim. On appeal, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the counterclaim was reversed and the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed (C. C. A.) 20 F.(2d) 307; certiorari was denied, 275 U.S. 497, *707 48 S. Ct. 121, 72 L. Ed. 392. On the second trial, a judgment was rendered for the appellant for $411,203.72, which this court affirmed. 32 F.(2d) 195. An application for reargument was made, and a certificate, executed by the Swedish minister, stating the railways were not a corporation but an organic part of the Swedish government, and advancing the claim of immunity, was filed. Reargument was denied. When certiorari was again applied for, a

suggestion through the Solicitor General, as to the petitioner's legal status and claim of immunity was presented to the Supreme Court by the Swedish minister, Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532, 41 S. Ct. 185, 65 L. Ed. 383, and the petition was denied, 280 U.S. 579, 50 S. Ct. 32, 74 L. Ed. 629.

When the case was here last, 32 F.(2d) 195, 199, this court, referring to the claim that "`the plaintiff is an agency of the friendly foreign sovereign government of Sweden'; that the counterclaim is in effect a suit against such government, and `as such is not maintainable in this court without the consent of the plaintiff'; and that the plaintiff does not consent to the determination of the counterclaim," said, at page 200 of 32 F.(2d):

"This is not an appearance by the kingdom of Sweden as a party to the suit, nor the assertion of immunity by that kingdom. It is an assertion by plaintiff corporation of a claim of sovereign immunity. But the assertion of the sovereign's immunity cannot be made by a private party litigant. In Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 41 S. Ct. 185, 65 L. Ed. 383. * * *

"The reasons for requiring an accredited representative of a foreign government to present its claim of immunity are as potent when the claim is founded upon an assertion that a corporation defendant is an agency of the sovereign as when it is founded upon the assertion that an arrested vessel is the government's property. In either case the court presumptively has jurisdiction and may proceed unless the sovereign objects. Consequently, when a private corporation is sued at law, we do not think it is enough for an attorney to appear for it and say it is a governmental agency, and in his opinion immune from suit."

Therefore, there is a valid unsatisfied judgment against the Swedish State Railways as a corporation. But, as said by the judge below, "The outstanding feature of the case * * * is the fact that the Swedish Government has been in this suit from the beginning."

The government of Sweden represented its Railway Administration to be a corporation and voluntarily entered its suit in the jurisdiction of the District Court, and failed to file a proper plea of immunity from suit, answered the counterclaim, and litigated until eventually defeated, and now protests, in its present plea of immunity, against the effort of the judgment creditor to realize the fruits of its litigation by the medium of a writ of execution. It never amended or corrected the plaintiff's name.

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/254/522/



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The question presented is whether it may now intervene, appearing specially, and seek immunity. In the absence of consent expressed or implied, the court will not take jurisdiction of a suit against a sovereign or permit its property to be attached. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 46 S. Ct. 611, 70 L. Ed. 1088; Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.(2d) 659 (C. C. A. 2); The Maipo, 259 F. 367 (D. C. N. Y.). But, where a sovereign invokes the jurisdiction of the court, appears voluntarily, and pleads to a counterclaim interposed, contesting the merits of the respective claims until judgment is rendered against it, the court has jurisdiction, and there is both a waiver of immunity and a consent to the exercise of the jurisdiction. Richardson v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 44, 36 S. Ct. 476, 60 L. Ed. 879; Porto Rico v. Ramos, 232 U.S. 627, 34 S. Ct. 461, 58 L. Ed. 763; The Sao Vicente, 295 F. 829 (C. C. A. 3); The Sao Vicente, 281 F. 111 (C. C. A. 2). If the jurisdiction of the court continues in effect until the judgment is satisfied, the parties who have thus voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction are normally subject to its mandates, and the successful litigant is entitled to the fruits of the litigation. In Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, 187, 18 L. Ed. 768, the court said:

"Jurisdiction is defined to be the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy in the suit before the court, and the rule is universal, that if the power is conferred to render the judgment or enter the decree, it also includes the power to issue proper process to enforce such judgment or decree. * * *

"Express determination of this court is, that the jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of the judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be satisfied. Consequently, a writ of error will lie when a party is aggrieved in the foundation, proceedings, judgment or execution of a suit in a court of record. * * *

*708 "Process subsequent to judgment is as essential to jurisdiction as process antecedent to judgment, else the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution." Central Nat. Bank v. Stevens,169 U.S. 432, 18 S. Ct. 403, 42 L. Ed. 807; Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51, 6 L. Ed. 264.

In Pam-to-pee v. United States, 187 U.S. 371, 383, 23 S. Ct. 142, 147, 47 L. Ed. 221, the court approved the language of Taney, C. J., in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702, saying:

"The award of execution is a part, and an essential part, of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and

nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties. * * *"

This execution is directed against the moneys held in the National City Bank of New York, also against debts owing to the government of Sweden by the Swedish American Line, and the testimony is that the debts represent advances made by the Swedish government.

But the question presented is whether execution may issue on this judgment against this sovereign power's property because the court acquired jurisdiction by expressed or implied consent. And does the jurisdiction of the court continue in effect until its judgment is satisfied even against this sovereign power, though a plea of immunity is interposed against such execution?

The judgment is entered against Sweden, as a litigant under a name of its own selection, representing it to be a corporation. A judgment should be enforced against a debtor upon proof of the litigant's true identity. All concede that Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen and the government of Sweden are one and the same. The Swedish government is in fact a governmental corporation. If a defendant appears in a suit by incorrect name and does not plead in abatement, and judgment is rendered against him, the judgment is fully binding upon him, and he may be connected with the judgment. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 34 S. Ct. 779, 58 L. Ed. 1363; B. & P. R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 137 U.S. 568, 11 S. Ct. 185, 34 L. Ed. 784; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. Ed. 451.

But consenting to be sued does not give consent to a seizure or attachment of the property of a sovereign government. The clear weight of authority in this country, as well as that of England and Continental Europe, is against all seizures, even though a valid judgment has been entered. To so hold is not depriving our own courts of any attribute of jurisdiction. It is but recognizing the general international understanding, recognized by civilized nations, that a sovereign's person and property ought to be held free from seizure or molestation at all peaceful times and under all circumstances. Nor is this in derogation of the dignity owed to our courts.

When a sovereignty voluntarily appears in our court, it assumes the character of a private suitor. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328, 45 S. Ct. 112, 69 L. Ed. 313. This role as a litigant has been, however, limited to litigating the controversy. An interesting article discussing this subject is found at page 566 of the American Journal of International Law, vol. 22. The courts have been reluctant to seize property of a









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foreign government even where the government has consented to the jurisdiction for the purpose of litigating a claim. The basis of this is that giving such consent to litigation does not thereby give consent to an indiscriminate seizure of the property to satisfy the judgment. A report of the committee of jurists of the League of Nations (1927), found at page 743 of the American Journal of International Law, vol. 21, considers the question of the competence of the courts in regard to foreign states. The French doctrine, established by the decision of the Court of Cassation in the case of Lambege & Ponget v. Spanish government, which was a suit for breach of contract for the sale of merchandise, decides that one who enters into a civil contract with a foreign state or sovereignty, implicitly agrees to abide by the civil competence and jurisdiction of the foreign courts, but the later French decisions draw a distinction between the public and private acts of a state, not, however, to the extent of permitting a seizure of state property in causes of action arising out of the acts regarded as private.[1] The German *709 court, in Von Hellfeld v. Imperial Russian Government,[2] refused to issue an execution to enforce a judicial decree and pointed out that, even though Russia consented to the jurisdiction and a counterclaim was interposed, it must be limited to the judicial determination of the question of law and stopped short of execution of the judgment. Italy limits the scope of sovereign immunity and permits seizure of property of a foreign government. This, however, rests upon a theory of reciprocity. The basis of a decree in the cited case appears to be that immunity may be granted only where the foreign sovereign will extend similar immunity to Italy.[3] In Switzerland, an attachment is considered proper, and it seems to be controlled by a statute permitting the enforcement of judgments of the Swiss Tribunal against foreign states.[4] In Re Suarez, [1917] 2 Ch. 131, the Bolivian minister in England was appointed administrator of an intestate estate in England. He was sued by one of the beneficiaries, waived his diplomatic immunity and submitted to jurisdiction. Judgment went against him; he refused to pay it, and, when an application was made for a writ of execution, he asserted his immunity. It was held, by Mr. Justice Eve that he was still entitled to claim his immunity at execution. A similar ruling is to be found in Re Republic of Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Limited, [1914] 1 Ch. 139, where an action for damages was brought against directors of a defunct corporation for misfeasance in office. One of the directors claimed his privilege as secretary to the Peruvian Legation. The court said that no judgment or execution could be enforced or levied against him. See, also, In re The Tervaete (1922) Provate, 197, 203. It was held in The Parlement Belge, L. R. 5 P. D. 197, 207-214, that the courts of England had no jurisdiction under the laws of England to interfere with the property of a foreign sovereign, the court saying:

"The principle to be deduced from all these cases is that, as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority, and of the international comity which induces every sovereign state to respect the independence and dignity of every other sovereign state, each and every one declines to exercise by means of its Courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state or over the public property of any state which is destined to public use, or over the property of any ambassador. * * *"

In Duff Development Co., Limited, v. Government of Kelantan and the Crown Agents for the Colonies, Garnishees, [1923] 1 Ch. 385, House of Lords, [1924] A. C. 797, it was held that an execution could not be taken out on the arbitrator's award although by statute that award had the effect of judgment. One Law Lord dissented.

The Supreme Court, in Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 529, 15 L. Ed. 991, pointed out that permission to be sued may be voluntary on the part of the sovereignty, and it may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued and the manner in which the suit may be conducted and may withdraw its consent whenever it may suppose that justice to the public requires it. Our courts have recognized that jurisdiction may be conferred for the purpose of the rendition of a verdict and entry of judgment only. Memphis & C. Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 25 L. Ed. 960; Carter v. State, 42 La. Ann. 927, 8 So. 836, 21 Am. St. Rep. 404; Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Chambers (1915) 169 Cal. 131, 145 P. 1025. In such cases, when judgment has been rendered and the liability judicially ascertained, the power of the courts ends and the sovereign is at liberty to determine for itself whether or not to pay the judgment. In Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.(2d) 659, 667, this court, in vacating an attachment issued against the government of Mexico, said:

"The property sought to be reached in this country is the public property of Mexico, and is movable property, which that government holds for public purposes, and, being such, it is entitled to the same immunity as a sovereign, or an ambassador, or a ship of war, and for the same reason. The exercise of such jurisdiction by the courts of this country is inconsistent with the independence and sovereignty of Mexico."

*710 See, also, French Republic v. Inland Navigation Co. (D. C.) 263 F. 410.

In Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 38 S. Ct. 400, 62 L. Ed. 883, the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction, pursuant to article 3, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution, and the question was presented as to the means of enforcing a decree of that court.




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It was a case between two states. By ratifying the Constitution, these states forever waived their sovereign immunity and yielded to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court so far as it concerns actions brought against them by other sovereign states. The court had full jurisdiction, and the state retained no right to object to being sued. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 9 L. Ed. 1233. The Supreme Court held that such a judgment could be followed by execution against a state, and this, for the reason that it possessed none of the attributes of sovereignty so far as the suit by a sister state is concerned. But this is not a precedent for holding that an execution may issue against property of a foreign state. The national courts have always respected the immunity of a foreign state from coercive jurisdiction, and the Constitution, art. 3, § 2, and U. S. Code, title 28, § 41 (28 USCA § 41), which gives the District Court jurisdiction of actions between the citizens of a state and foreign states, is necessarily limited by the right of the sovereign state to plead immunity. The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216, 41 S. Ct. 308, 65 L. Ed. 592.

The Swedish minister has made the declaration, in the plea of immunity, that these properties "are public funds of the kingdom of Sweden owned by it in its capacity as a sovereign and employed by it for public governmental functions." Appellant's counsel refers to these funds as "apparently deposited there for the purpose of meeting payments on the Swedish national debt," and the testimony is that the moneys owed by the Swedish American Line represent advances made by the Swedish government for the purpose of building up its merchant marine. The declaration of the minister to Sweden is sufficient to characterize the funds as for governmental use. Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, supra; The Pesaro, supra. It is not essential to the jurisdiction of the court to determine a controversy that it possessed the power of execution or be able to carry into effect the relief granted in the determination of the litigation. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 279 U.S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499, 73 L. Ed. 918; Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 47 S. Ct. 511, 71 L. Ed. 959.

As indicative of the policy of Sweden toward the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a letter is referred to, written by an officer of Sweden, answering an inquiry of the League of Nations. The position of Sweden, there set forth, recognizes that the whole subject of immunity is one that should be made the subject of an international convention. In referring to the case law of Sweden, it is stated that the Swedish courts have displayed a tendency not to recognize such immunity in a case where the lawsuit arises out of the commercial activity of the foreign state, but nothing is said as to a policy which would permit forcible execution against public property of the state. The railroads are a part of the public property, and their

operation is a governmental enterprise. Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, supra.

Whether a sovereign government permits itself to be sued in its own courts has no bearing on whether it should be subject to suits in the courts of another jurisdiction. Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 29 S. Ct. 458, 53 L. Ed. 742.

Such weight of international authority should be respected as establishing the common consent of civilized nations in the formation of the international rule of law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320; West Rand Co. v. Rex, L. R. [1905] 2 K. B. 391.

It is regrettable that Sweden may thus escape payment of a valid judgment against it. Appellant has been misled in the belief that this plaintiff was a separate entity apart from the government and now, when a sufficient number of years has passed making possible a plea of limitation or laches against suing in Sweden (see letter to the League of Nations), appellee appears and pleads its sovereign immunity. Whatever may be appellant's remedy to collect its valid judgment, it should not be necessary to resort to further litigation. It is hoped that the judgment of our courts will be respected and payment made by the Swedish government. But we are required to affirm the order appealed from.

Order affirmed.

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

REPUBLIC ACT No. 75

AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR THE PROPER OBSERVANCE BY THE REPUBLIC AND INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister of any foreign State, authorized and received as such by the President, or any domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in







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executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court.


FACTS:




ISSUE:


RULING:


Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only “diplomatic agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and

developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious.

Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded



WHO v AQUINO

Facts:

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve

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(12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)

G.R. No. L-35131 November 29, 1972

THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION and DR. LEONCE VERSTUYFT vs. HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, Court of First Instance of Rizal

Facts: The present petition is an original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent judge's refusal to quash a search warrant issued by him at the instance of respondents Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft of the WHO (World Health Organization) notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic immunity, as duly recognized by the Executive branch of the government and to prohibit respondent judge from further proceedings in the matter.

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo pleaded to Hon. Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and further requested for the suspension of the search warrant. The Solicitor General accordingly joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quash hence, the petition at bar.

Issue: Whether or not personal effect of WHO Officer Dr. Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Ruling: The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the

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quashal of the search warrant.

The unfortunate fact remains that respondent judge chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents COSAC officers "that the other remaining crates unopened contain contraband items"

The provisions of Republic Act 75 declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. The writs of certiorari and prohibition from the petitioners were granted.

G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER vs. MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila

Facts: This petition is for a writ of prohibition overruled with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. The petitioner was an accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila. He was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection was overruled hence this present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner.

Ruling: The counsel for the petitioner contend that the CIF of Manila has no jurisdiction according to Aticle III Sec. 2 of the United States Constitution which stipulated that the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction which excludes the courts of the Philippines and that that such jurisdiction is

conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Although section 17 of Act No. 136 vests in the Supreme Court the original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, such jurisdictiona was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Hence, the Court of Instance has jurisdiction over the petitioner.

Scheneckerburger vs. Moran, 63 Phil. 249 (1943)

FACTS: Schneckenburger, who is an honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila was subsequently charged in CFI-Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to thissaying that under the US and Philippine Constitution, the CFI has no jurisdiction to try him. After his objection was overruled, he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the CFI from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. Aside from this, he contended that original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors and consuls is conferred exclusivelyupon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the US Supreme Court has Original Jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al and such jurisdiction excludes courts of the Phils.

No. First of all, a consul is not entitled to the privilege of diplomatic immunity. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. The inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935 caused the Philippine Constitution to go into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, consuls et.al.”

2. Whether or not original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, consuls, et. al. is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines

“The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by themSupreme Court of the Philippines at the time of

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the adoption of this constitution.” According to Sec. 17. of Act No. 136 and by virtue of it, jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus was also conferred on the CFI’s. As a result, the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippines at the time the Constitution was adopted was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the CFI’s. The original jurisdiction conferred to Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction.

Judgment: CFI has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied.

Schneckenburger v Moran (Civil Procedure)

SCHNECKENBURGER v MORAN G.R. No. L-44896July 31, 1936

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS:The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend(1) That the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and(2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively

upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: *CFI: overruled his motion. Hence, he filed this PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him.

ISSUE:WON that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner and not the SC as provided in the constitution

HELD:YES.the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was NOT exclusive. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union.

OTHER NOTES:1. This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides.

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