ORI GIN AL PA PER

Pirate Ports and Harbours of West Cork in the EarlySeventeenth Century

Connie Kelleher

Published online: 31 October 2013� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract In the early part of the seventeenth century in Ireland select harbours along the

southwest coast of Munster acted as the North Atlantic headquarters for pirates, primarily

made up of English mariners. The places picked by the pirates as their bases were spatially

strategic and three harbours in particular dominated this West Cork landscape—Baltimore,

Leamcon and Crookhaven. Complicit English officers facilitated this activity and pirates

and their families settled on the estates of the local officials while others used this pirate

landscape as a staging point for plundering adventures further afield. As a consequence,

piracy in Irish waters at that time had a profound influence on local economies, social

activities and, in some cases, political events. Indeed the tolerance shown to it in the early

seventeenth century in the southwest may be explained by the fact that it facilitated the

colonial effort ongoing under the Munster Plantation and thus, inadvertently, suited the

purposes of official government.

Keywords Piracy � Munster � Plantation � Admiralty � Wrecks

AbbreviationsAPC Acts of the Privy Council

HCA High Court of Admiralty papers (The National Archives, London)

SP State Papers (Ireland and England)

Cal. S.P Calendar of State Papers (Ireland, England and Foreign)

Introduction

The piracy that dominated the coastal region of southwest Munster in Ireland in the early

part of the seventeenth century occurred under the umbrella of a plantation policy that was

C. Kelleher (&)Underwater Archaeology Unit, National Monuments Service, Department of Arts, Heritage and theGaeltacht, Room G19, New Road, Killarney, County Kerry, Irelande-mail: connie.kelleher@ahg.gov.ie

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being played out among politicians and government officials, Old English elites, New

English aristocrats, entrepreneurs, merchant venturers and ordinary settlers. Most were

looking to enhance their standing and their wealth, extend their landholdings and find new

homes (Ohlmeyer 2012: 101–125; Appleby 1998: 70–78; Kelleher 2013). The majority of

the pirates relocated from the south coast of England to the southwestern harbours of

Ireland when King James (VI of Scotland and I of England) outlawed privateering fol-

lowing the joining of the two crowns in 1603 and clamped down on piracy in the ports of

southern Britain, in particular Devon and Cornwall. Many may have viewed the move as

an extension to their areas of operations rather than a geographic or colonial migration as

most would have been familiar with the region as accomplished mariners (MacCarthy-

Morrogh 1986: 171–190). The escalation in general lawlessness at that time must also be

seen within the context of peace with Spain under James. The expansion in global trade

with associated richly-laden ships plying the waters of the Atlantic and consequent

increase in social prosperity made piracy more attractive during times of peace (Senior

1972: 155).

A loophole in the law in Ireland, not amended until 1613, meant that those suspected of

piracy had to be transported to England for trial and execution. This acted as an added

enticement for such individuals to relocate to Ireland. They did not move alone, however,

and many of their families came and settled on developing coastal demesnes that were in

the process of being legitimately planted by English undertakers. With the westward

expansion in trade and settlement came associated opportunities in social needs, and both

prostitution and the alehouse trade flourished (see Kelleher 2013: 332–339). Clandestine

trade and activities continued and grew in these remote areas but rather than being mar-

ginalised, they were central to the developing commodification of goods and services

within a colonial setting. As identified by Breen in his study of the neighbouring western

territories of the O’Sullivan Beara in Bantry, the coastal areas of West Cork for that time,

rather than being insular were in fact integral to ‘‘broader Atlantic socio-economic

spheres’’ (2005:213). The influx of pirates, their families and associates, the majority of

whom were English, served the political purposes of the developing English state as their

presence augmented the settlement process. Their numbers not alone supported newly-

established market towns like Baltimore and Bandon, but ensured that trade, albeit

unlawfully obtained, and their activities overall formed part of the process of expanding

international mercantile networks and emerging British Empire.

Historical Context

The historical backdrop to the arrival of the pirates into West Cork was the ongoing second

phase of the Munster Plantation. The first phase began with the murder of Gerald FitzJames

Fitzgerald in 1583, the 14th Earl of Desmond, and the defeat of the Desmond Rebellion. It

provided the opportunity for New English (predominantly from England and Wales) to

settle his vast estate in southwestern Ireland. About 4,000 arrived and settled between 1585

and 1598. The uprising of the 1590s, when the Gaelic-Irish lords, with Spanish support,

rebelled again English rule, disrupted the progress of plantation. The rebellion played out

for 4 years, during which the Gaelic-Irish lords in Ulster marched south to meet the

English forces in Munster, culminating in the battle of Kinsale and defeat of the Irish and

Spanish in 1601. Famine followed and the English settlers who had arrived in the first

phase were decimated. With the coming to power of James as king of ‘Great Britain and

Ireland’ in 1603, the second phase of plantation began. Munster was once more the focus

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for settlement, but now too Ulster from 1606 onwards saw the migration of large numbers

of Scottish settlers. From this period to the middle of the seventeenth century, an estimated

22,000 settlers from Britain settled in Ireland, with 4,000 of those again planting the

southwest (Power 2007: 23).

The arrival of the pirates into Munster must therefore be seen within the context of the

Munster Plantation. Many though not all of those active in Munster and who comprised the

pirate alliance were ex-privateers or had previously formed part of a privateer crew from

the time of Elizabeth I. They would have considered themselves legitimate sailors that

were forced into piracy by James’ prohibitory actions. Other crew members no doubt

identified the opportunity afforded by the rejuvenation of the Munster plantation to access

new plundering routes and avail of fresh local economic prospects in remote areas that

afforded seclusion beyond official scrutiny. The business of piracy in Munster formed part

of an established illicit trading network that operated to the socio-economic benefit of all

those involved. A vibrant regional economy supported an operation that focused on black

marketeering of goods brought directly ashore by the pirates in their ships, into the main

ports and harbours there or smuggled ashore in the smaller coves and havens of the

southwest. In turn the pirates were supplied and revictualled with local industrial and

agricultural produce at inflated prices, as detailed by ex-pirate Captain Henry Mainwaring:

‘‘[the pirates] land the goods or money in exchange, which by custom, they [locals] expect

[to get] 2 or 3 times the value’’ (Mainwaring and Perrin 1922:17). As will be seen, a well-

organised trade and communications network existed that serviced this clandestine chain.

The amphibious industry thus married piracy, smuggling and embezzlement within a tight

landscape setting.

Mainwaring’s treatise or discourse titled Of the beginnings, practices and suppression

of pirates, written for the king in 1616 following his pardoning, describes the character,

environment, functioning and suggested means to curb the activities of the pirates of the

North Atlantic (Mainwaring and Perrin 1922). Mainwaring was a contemporary and thus

provides a firsthand account but other contemporary sources too include information on the

pirates and their movements, including the ‘Letter-Book’ of the Lord Deputy Sir Arthur

Chichester (Edwards 1938) and the ‘Council Book for the Province of Munster’ contained

in the Harleian Manuscript in the British Library (Curtis Clayton 2008). The various State

Papers for the period and invaluably, the High Court of Admiralty (HCA) papers in the

National Archives in London, contain substantial information on the activity of the pirates

and their cohorts (Appleby 1992).

Cartographic material too has led to an almost tangible link to the pirates and their

harbours and this comes from a hitherto unknown chart of the southwest coast of Ireland.

The chart or sailing map dates to 1612 and, along with two other charts of the east coast

and a general map of Ireland, is contained within a document printed in Old Dutch entitled

Beschrijvinghe van de Zeecusten ende Haenen van Yerlandt, translated Description of the

Seacoasts and Ports of Ireland (Fig. 1).1 Until its discovery in 1924 in the University

Library of Gottingen in Germany, its existence appears to have remained unknown

(Cannenburg 1935: 49–51). The chart forms part of a ‘rutter’ published by the Dutch East

India Company’s hydrographer Hessel Gerritszoon, with English cartographer John Hunt

writing the sailing directions and drawing the maps. The impetus for the commissioning of

the document by the Dutch States-General was to inform their men-of-war on the harbours

in southwest Ireland. The pirates there were proving to be a scourge on Dutch trading ships

1 I am grateful to Dr. Edda Frankot for translating the document from the Old Dutch and for clarifyingseveral elements of it.

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crossing the Atlantic and the States-General received a commission from James to enter the

harbours and rid them of the pirate problem. The chart of the southwest coast can more

correctly therefore be called an ‘anti-pirate’ chart, as it was just that, with it being stated in

the document that it was John Hunt’s chart of the pirate havens near Cape Clear (Gerr-

itszoon/Hunt 1612: f.15; Kelleher 2013: 58–60, 503–512; Kelleher 2014).

Official Links and Illicit Partnerships

The harbours of Baltimore and Crookhaven had, by 1607, emerging English settlements

overseen by well-connected government representatives, chief among them were under-

taker Thomas Crooke and Deputy-Vice Admiral William Hull (Appleby 1990: 76–104;

Kelleher 2013: 219–221, 224–275). Crooke had been granted the lands of Baltimore in

1607 following a protracted legal case involving the hereditary Gaelic-Irish lord of the

area, Fineen O’Driscoll and Crooke quickly set about establishing a vibrant settlement in

Baltimore (Cotter 2010: 44; McCarthy 2012: 22). Though he was suspected very early on

of collusion, his success at developing the town of Baltimore by 1609 was commended and

his presence in Munster was identified as more valuable to the plantation effort than would

be his removal for associating with pirates (SP 63/225, f. 222r; SP 63/225, f. 223r).

William Hull, a Devon mariner and deputy to the vice-admiral of Munster and Lord

High-Admiral in London, Charles Howard, the earl of Nottingham, arrived into the West

Cork area in the early part of the seventeenth century. Hull may have been a pirate in his

early days, or more appropriately, a privateer, as a proclamation from 1604 refers to a

William Hull indicted for attacking a French ship. He was subsequently found not guilty,

probably due to the influence of his father who was mayor of Exeter (Appleby 1990: 78)

and this early account of Hull’s exploits may certainly help to explain his aptitude for

straddling the thin divide between legitimate business and illegitimate trade (STC, 2nd ed./

8363, STC/1875:25: By the King a proclamation, 1604). He is perhaps best viewed as

being the link between official governance and illegal operations that appear to have been

part of everyday coastal life. What is known of Hull from this time is that from his arrival

Fig. 1 1612 Dutch chart by John Hunt of the southwest coastal pirate harbours of West Cork (bypermission of Georg-August-Universitat, Gottingen, Germany)

350 J Mari Arch (2013) 8:347–366

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into Cork until the outbreak of the 1641 Rebellion, he became one of the most influential and

wealthy local settlers in the area. He acquired large tracts of land, was directly involved in

several business ventures, including trade and fishing and his liaisons with the pirates

supplemented his escalating prosperity throughout his tenure as deputy vice-admiral, and in

fact may have been the fiscal basis for his resultant wealth as indicated by his deposition of

1642 (1641 Depositions: MS 824, f 253r–259v). He acquired the lands around the harbour of

Crookhaven from the church and developed and capitalised the fishing industry there in

partnership with Richard Boyle, the 1st Earl of Cork (Went 1947: 55–68; Appleby 1990:

79–80). He established his main demesne at Leamcon, a small harbour that lies to the

immediate east of Crookhaven and from where he could control shipping, trade and industry

within an environment protected by secrecy, seclusion and self-interest (Appleby 1990:

76–104; Kelleher 2013: 244–256). Hull epitomised an entrepreneur who took full advantage

of a developing capitalist system and became one of the emerging mercantile elite, working

out of his remote demesne in the heart of rural Munster under the guise of legitimate

employment as an officer of the Admiralty (Breen 2005: 209).

Other admiralty officials too played significant parts in facilitating the pirate trade.

Chief among them were the Jobson brothers. Humphrey and Richard both arrived into the

southwest in 1607, with Humphrey appointed vice-admiral of Munster early in that year.

He was not long in his post in Munster when he, in association with his brother, were

similarly dealing with the pirates and indeed such was the extent to this that Humphrey is

recorded as having engaged a pirate named William Thompson in 1609 to serve on jury

duty during a session of an admiralty court hearing on Sherkin Island in Baltimore Harbour

(SP 83/226, f. 14; Senior 1972: 379–431).

Another, Captain Henry Skipwith, also played a central role in local affairs. From 1606

he quickly established himself as part of the expanding commodities market that was to

form the basis to the business of piracy in the southwest. Skipwith dealt openly at Leamcon

and Kinsale with several individuals, including pirate Captain William Baugh, who

actively courted Skipwith’s favour, plied Skipwith’s wife with jewels and silver, all in the

hope of marrying their daughter (Appleby 1986: 68–84).

Such was the symbiotic relationships that existed in the remote harbours and villages of

Munster at that time that government officers, plantation undertakers and the individuals

within the Atlantic pirate alliance operated explicitly within a communal setting that

allowed economic enhancement and social aggrandisement.

A Pirate Code: Hierarchy of Command

To operate successfully the pirates required organisation and a command system that,

while allowing for individual independence, equality and mobility, also comprised struc-

ture, order and loyalty. The pirate alliance of the southwest had just that—a chain of

command within the ranks of the pirate crews, coupled with the eagerness of those on land

to accommodate them. They operated individually when they so chose but came together

when strength in numbers was needed. This was noted by Roger Middleton in 1611, the

government official tasked with negotiating pardons with the pirates, when he wrote ‘‘in

all, nine ships [are] divided into three factions, being as it were in a mating among

themselves’’ (SP 63/231. f/182r).

In about the year 1609, the pirates elected Richard Bishop as their admiral. Individuals

like Bishop seem to have had the maritime expertise and necessary legitimate connections

to ensure that, while they operated as pirates for a time, their previous careers as lawful

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mariners ensured they were looked upon favourably by the crown and when the time was

right were able to negotiate pardons on their own and colleagues’ behalf. Bishop could

perhaps correctly be called the pirates’ broker as he successfully bridged the gap between

official and unofficial operations, middleman to the middlemen. His close ties with Wil-

liam Hull at Leamcon attest to this, including building a house ‘‘in the English fashion’’ on

Hull’s lands (HCA 13/42, f. 214r; Appleby 1990: 77). Here he settled, at least for a time, as

a pardoned pirate with his family, though still involved in aiding and abetting with pirate

colleagues thereafter (HMC Buccleuch, I: 194). By 1609 Richard Bishop reputedly com-

manded eleven ships and over a thousand men, while his vice-admiral, Peter Easton was

recorded as entering Villafranca, then part of the Duchy of Savoy in the Mediterranean,

with a fleet comprising nine hundred men (Cal. S.P. Ire. 1608–1611: p. 277). In the same

year, the lord deputy, Sir Arthur Chichester, writing to Salisbury, solemnised that ‘‘they are

grown to a height of strength and pride that he doubts his endeavours will hardly prevail

without the assistance of some of His Majesty’s good ships’’ (Cal. S.P. Ire. 1608–1611:

273).

At this point too the names of individual pirates who came to dominate the waters of the

North Atlantic begin to appear on a regular basis in the contemporary sources. Those like

Bishop, his Vice-Admiral Peter Easton, Rear-Admiral Thomas Francke, and pirate captains

John Jennings, James Harris, William Harvey, Gilbert Roope, Tibalt Suxbridge, William

Baugh, Robert Stephenson and Robert Walsingham stand out. The majority was English

but other nationalities appeared among their ranks too, including Irish men like Patrick

Myagh (later anglicised to the surname Meade) who captained the pirate fleet in Crook-

haven, and Arthur Drake, the only ‘‘negro’’ recorded to have held a position of rank at that

time among a pirate crew. He was noted in 1609 as acting lieutenant to captains John

Jennings and Gilbert Roope (HCA 13/40, f. 161v).

The alliance had a code of practice that provided formal stability and agreed behav-

ioural patterns, including only attacking the ships of those who were the traditional ene-

mies of Britain. The code of operations went beyond the basic practice of everyday piracy

or carrying out opportunistic acts of plunder on passing foreign ships at sea. The fact that

many of the pirates had settled family and kin in the coastal areas of Munster established a

sense of familial permanence to their operation, including being part of a social set-up

ashore that in turn engendered a sense of legitimisation to their activities. This also assisted

with the commodification of goods and services within local communities—in a sense,

though they were pirates under the strict letter of the law, from a local or regional per-

spective it could be argued that they were perhaps viewed more as privateers, but operating

without formal commissions. This amphibious element to the pirates’ operation meant they

traversed the lines between piracy and smuggling, settlement and life at sea, and thus

ensured control of the acquisition, deposition and dispersal of goods, men and ships. This

juxtaposition is what makes the study of the pirates in Munster at this period so interesting

and so important, with comparative evidence coming from other pirate histories, but from

much later periods (see for instance: Hamilton 2006: 13–30; Finamore 2006: 64–78).

North Atlantic Pirate Bases

The Irish climate afforded the pirates a strategic summer base that formed a key part of

their North Atlantic operations. The seasonality of this activity ensured a continuous source

of potential pickings. Sailing to Ireland from early May onwards, they based themselves

primarily along the south and southwest coast until the weather began to change again in

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August. They then looked across the Atlantic to the harbours of North Africa and New-

foundland to spend their summer in sunnier climes (Mainwaring and Perrin 1922: 31–40).

Several of the smaller ports along the Moroccan Atlantic coastline provided open markets

for the pirates’ goods as well as being provisioning and stopover points when needed.

Mamora (now Mehdya) was one of the bases in Northwest Africa and acted as an entrepot

and main winter base for the Atlantic pirate alliance. North of Mamora and located

southwest of the larger port of Tangier, Asilah and Larache were key havens, along with

anchorage places like Cape Spartel (Cal. S.P. Ven, 1609: 575). South of Mamora were Sale

and Rabat, Fidallah, Safi, Mogador (now Essaouira), Santa Cruz (now Agadir) and Massa

(Mainwaring and Perrin 1922: 34). Unlike Mamora, not all of these ports were fully open

to free trade for the Atlantic pirates: when in Massa, for example, the pirates could sell

their booty only with the agreement of the ‘‘Moors’’ (Mainwaring and Perrin 1922: 36).

Local tribal leaders were, with the sanction of the ruling Sultan, allowed to commerce with

foreign traders including pirates, in specific ports of trade along the Moroccan coast as a

means to controlling goods, services and those travelling to the interior, as well as ensuring

a valuable source of revenue (Ponasik 1977: 197–199, 205).

Newfoundland, while acting as an all season pirate base, also provided them with ready

supplies of fish, bread, wine and cider and in return they supplied plundered goods to the

settlers there (Mainwaring and Perrin 1922: 37). Migratory fishing communities were

located around Harbor Grace and Ferryland but there was also the developing Grand Banks

fishing industry at St. John’s, which was to become a thriving business from 1615 onwards.

The pirates exchanged goods, at times targeted the fishing fleets but overall Newfoundland

was a valuable source of able men to add to existing crews and both Mainwaring and

Easton regularly augmented their pirate bands with Newfoundland fishermen (Whitburn

1622: 12, 42; Rogers 1861: 58; Cell 1982: 81–83, 239).

The pirate predation in the North Atlantic, while technically opportunistic, was to

escalate into a strategically targeted operation within the confines of a triangular pirate

seascape, linking Ireland with the northwest coast of Africa and across to Newfoundland,

and underlined the success of the pirate confederacy in Munster.

Munster as an Ideal Pirate Landscape

For any pirate activity to work productively, certain geographical and logistical elements

needed to be in place to guarantee coordination and cooperation among involved parties

and thus an efficient, economically viable operation. These included elements within the

physical landscape—a territory and terrain conducive to clandestine activity and suitable

ships to guarantee speed, manoeuvrability and transport of men and goods. Similarly a

reliable and experienced crew were required to man the vessels; secure harbours in which

to anchor, to land plundered goods, restock and repair when needed and willing locals, both

native and newcomer, to complete the commercial circle. More intangible fundamentals

were also required, which were equally as critical—knowledge of the coastline and coastal

processes; intelligence on shipping, trade and naval patrols; a network of communication

that extended beyond traditional hunting grounds; commitment and loyalty from com-

manders and crew to see a pirate venture through to the end.

Not all of these requirements were necessarily in place all of the time but certain

geographical criteria can be present in a given landscape to ensure a successful pirate coast

(Semple 1916: 134–151; Galvin 1999). The pirate alliance in Munster did seem to have

most if not all required elements in place, for at least some of the duration of its success.

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This can best be understood when considering the context within which the alliance

operated. It was not just about plunder on the high seas for the pirates involved, or at least

the main leaders, but was in fact about being part of a network comprised of differing

levels of political, social and economic developments that were taking place within the

wider Munster landscape and broader Atlantic at that time. The regional demography was

changing with the influx of settlers under the Munster Plantation, and with this came new

mindsets about using the ports and harbours for greater and more diverse mercantile

activity, including those in the remoter areas of the southwest which remained outside

central authoritarian scrutiny, remote but in no way marginal.

The coastal regions of Munster had long been a receptacle for pirates—both local

Gaelic-Irish and visiting opportunists and indeed would remain so long after the demise of

the North Atlantic pirate alliance. Ruling Gaelic-Irish lords often played game-keeper and

poacher when necessity required it. It is evident that many of the native lords, and in

particular those with maritime capabilities like the O’Driscolls of Baltimore, at times

actively worked with the English authorities to curb piracy in their area, with Fineen O’

Driscoll’s ‘‘good actions against pirates’’ being noted in the year 1583, for example (SP

63/104 f. 44). That being said, lords like the O’Driscolls and their western neighbours, the

O’Sullivan-Beare maritime lords, played both sides and at times openly facilitated and

dealt with pirates who arrived on their shores, with dues being paid to the lords by all ships

using their harbours, and with local ruling elites availing of the opportunity to acquire wine

and other exotic goods (Breen 2005: 117–121; Kelleher 2007: 139–142). Indeed it was

noted that ‘‘Fineen of the Ships’’ O’Driscoll had an ‘‘open roadstead in Roaringwater Bay’’

where pirates were unequivocally welcomed (Mathew 1924: 341–344). Though the Gaelic-

Irish power base had been destroyed following the battle of Kinsale in 1601, the English

pirates arrived into a ready landscape of still willing natives who continued their traditional

maritime trading habits but now identified new opportunities to enlarge trade networks and

acquire goods coming from a rapidly expanding international market.

Pirate Ports and Harbours: Settings and Evidence

Of all the harbours along the southwest coast, during the latter part of the sixteenth and first

two decades of the seventeenth centuries, Baltimore appears from the documentary

accounts to have been the most favoured by the pirates. In 1608 Chichester wrote to the

lords of the English Privy Council stating:

[ ] though all of them [the harbours in Munster] be very commodious and safe for

pirates to come unto, yet Baltimore is most frequented by them (SP 63/223, f. 137r–

138v).

No doubt it was the overt facilitation by the local populace, not least among them Fineen

O’Driscoll who was still resident but no longer ruler, and the emerging settlement under

Thomas Crooke that encouraged the use of Baltimore. More importantly from a knowledge

point of view, it is suggested that it was the maritime capability of lords like the

O’Driscolls that was an even greater enticement for the pirates to frequent Baltimore over

other harbours like Kinsale or Cork, where the king’s ships tended to anchor. The fact that

traditionally there had been local and foreign fleets of ships using the harbour of Baltimore

meant that there had to be the infrastructure there to accommodate such vessels—slipways,

landing places, careening and repair facilities and men that had the knowledge and ability

to carry out this work. The use of harbours like Baltimore therefore has to be seen in light

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of its geo-political landscape, where environment, topography and the local residential

powers inevitably allowed clandestine activity to continue as it always had, as part of the

everyday life of the area, from the earliest of times. Piratical pursuits were thus it seems,

standard; it was only the pirates themselves or those associated with acts of piracy who

changed over time.

Physical cultural links to this period are the upstanding remains that dot the coastal

harbours of southwest Munster like those of the O’Driscoll, O’Mahony and O’Sullivan-

Beara castles and towerhouses dominating the southwestern coast of Cork, as well as

industrial structures like fish palaces, quays and slipways associated with the legitimate

fishing and trading activities of speculators like Crooke and Hull. The earlier fortified sites

stand testament to the ruling lordships, as places for military, maritime, administrative and,

in some cases, recreational usage and of sites that continued in use under the plantation

regime (Kelleher 2007: 150–158). Two examples are located in Baltimore Harbour—those

of Dun na Sead castle, the primary seat of the chief of the O’Driscolls and later admin-

istrative centre for Crooke’s settlement and across the harbour, the towerhouse of Dun-

along on Sherkin Island. Both controlled the main anchorage there (Kelleher 2003: 277).

The site of Dun na Sead castle as it stands today, situated on a height over-looking the

harbour, are of a later fortified house built by Thomas Crooke on the site of the earlier

O’Driscoll castle (Fig. 2). Contemporary archaeological remains like Dun na Sead provide

visible upstanding evidence for the associates of the pirates and by extension with the

activity itself. When called to England to answer the charge of collusion, Crooke claimed

that rather than assisting them, they broke into his ‘‘house’’ and robbed him of his goods,

with the house in question being Dun na Sead (HCA 1/46/310r–311v).

Such monuments also bridge the transformation between the former ruling Gaelic-Irish

order and the subsequent incursion of English plantation settlers into Munster. This site is

clearly depicted on the 1612 John Hunt chart, shown as ‘‘Croock’’, with the later fortified

house attached to and probably built from the stone of the earlier O’Driscoll castle (Fig. 1).

Both can be seen on the chart, along with the bawn wall and possible peel towers to the

southwest near the harbour’s edge. Though recently renovated into a private residence, the

existing two storey rectangular structure, with high gables, is attached to an enclosing

defensive bawn wall on its eastern extent. It also retains several domestic as well as

defensive features, including a bartizan at its southwest corner, a gun-loop in the eastern

Fig. 2 Dun na Sead castle, Baltimore (C. Kelleher)

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bawn wall and a wall walk on the west wall (Cotter 2010: 31–54). In proximity to the castle

are depicted various structures that may have been either domestic or industrial buildings,

with the earlier settlement in the Cove shown to the south and the anchorage places

indicated within the harbour itself. Dun na Sead may well be where Crooke lived and

entertained but it is certainly where he administered. Its depiction on the 1612 Dutch chart

suggests its centrality to the harbour at that time and its importance within the overall

Munster landscape, indicating its links with the piracy there and where such liaisons

between official and unofficial operators made it easier for all to do business within a

remote coastal landscape (Cal. S.P. Ire. 1606–1608: 434).

Leamcon Harbour played a central role in the daily activities of the pirates, referred to

as the northern equivalent to Mamora (Senior 1972: 114). Leamcon Harbour was shallower

than the other main harbours used by the pirates and curiously is not as emphatically

denoted within the 1612 Dutch sailing directions, with little if any mention of Leamcon,

apart from ‘‘Skolhaven’’ (Schull Harbour) described as to the east of ‘‘Limcon’’. It is

clearly depicted on the 1612 chart, however, with Hull’s two castles shown but no other

details highlighted (Fig. 1). Long Island Sound is illustrated immediately to the east and

which was the main anchorage, servicing both Leamcon Harbour and its neighbouring

Croagh Harbour, the latter known for its careening facilities utilised by the pirates (Bag-

well 1909: 104) and an essential requirement for any mariner.

The author has recorded two careening sites within the study area; one at the outer

reaches of Croagh Harbour and the other to the southeast of Baltimore village. The site in

Baltimore lies on the southwest side of Cove strand, on the foreshore with the natural

sloping rock face utilized for the purposes of vessel mooring and cleaning. Apertures have

been cut out of the rock in a number of places along the 30 m stretch of the rock face, with

putlog recesses and rock-cut slots visible that received lengths of scaffold timbers to

support the vessels during careening or for platforms for those cleaning the hulls. At the

Cove the rock-cut holes, with distinct rope wear, are clearly evident and still in use as

mooring points, but which would have been used to facilitate the movement of ropes that

were tied to masts that assisted with pulling a vessel onto one side of its hull and then the

other (Fig. 3). As with other stone-cut sites, dating to a specific use period is difficult but

what can be said is that this is a traditional careening place and as such would more than

likely have been in use at the time when the pirates frequented Baltimore, with the site still

in use today (Kelleher 2013: 112–116). Former studies have coherently looked at the art

and physical nature of careening and careening sites (Goelet 1986; Barker 1991), but

further, more intensive archaeological survey and recording of actual cleaning and repair

areas, particular in remote settings, is needed to fully develop a typological framework for

these site types.

From both historical accounts and archaeological features identified at Leamcon, it can

be said with certainty that sizeable vessels utilised the area in the past. Previously unre-

corded landing facilities are evident here in the form of the basal remains of an old quay

known locally as ‘‘the long dock’’; an associated eroded slipway, steps attached to a second

stone pier and three stone mooring posts which show enduring abrasion from ropes; all

located within an area known as the ‘boathouse field’ and indicative of Leamcon’s earlier

maritime usage (Fig. 4). The creek that denotes Leamcon’s waterway is today very shal-

low. Its depth, or lack thereof, is due to inundation by mobile sands over the years, with the

build up of mudflats and the development of salt marsh environments. Thus only vessels of

slight draft or small row boats can now access the waterway.

From sites identified during the course of fieldwork, it is obvious that there must have

been sufficient depth at some point in the past to allow at least small to medium craft

356 J Mari Arch (2013) 8:347–366

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access the facilities there. In 1612 pirate William Baugh was in Leamcon seeking his

pardon, from where he then proceeded to Kinsale (Cal. S.P. Ire. 1611–1614). Baugh and

pirate colleague, Captain William Wollmer, provided Deputy Vice-Admiral Henry Skip-

with with wheat and rye out of a ship named St. Saviour of Lubeck (Appleby and O’Dowd

1985: 323). Though such cargo could have been landed by smaller boats, the involvement

of William Hull in the fishing industry in the area and the presence of sites like the fish

palace there points to formal facilities being in place along the foreshore at that point for

the landing of fish and other goods and the export of by-products like train oil. Fish

palaces, though not always located directly on the foreshore, were used to press fish,

primarily herring and pilchard, to extract train oil which was traded as a commodity and

shipped in barrels (Went 1946: 82–83). The necessity therefore to have had in place

dedicated maritime infrastructure at Leamcon is obvious.

A deposition by William Hull mentions that pirate Captain Robert Stephenson arrived at

Leamcon about 2 March, 1613, in his 200-ton flyboat and anchored in the harbour. They

met at the ‘‘Battering place’’ in Leamcon, when the pardon for Stephenson arrived (HCA

13/42, f. 153v–155). What is meant by the ‘‘Battering place’’ is debatable, whether it refers

to the site known as the ‘‘Battery’’ (Fig. 5) and which is all that now remains of Hull’s

castle at Leamcon, or if it refers to another type of site not previously identified, is open to

discussion. It can be inferred therefore that facilities were in place at Leamcon to

accommodate the mooring of ships and landing of personnel and goods.

Fig. 3 Carved holes in the rockface of careening site, the Cove,Baltimore (C. Kelleher). I amgrateful to Brian Marten ofBaltimore for bringing this site tomy attention

J Mari Arch (2013) 8:347–366 357

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The difficulty lies in dating structures such as quays and mooring posts, particularly in

the absence of archaeological excavation, though transitory evidence can provide some

indicative evidence for trade during the seventeenth century. During a walkover survey of

the foreshore at Leamcon by the author, a number of shards of seventeenth-century util-

itarian wares were recovered, along with a handle fragment from a Tuscan oil jar. While

these wares cannot be tied directly into the heyday of the Atlantic pirates, it is firm

evidence for both localised activity and trade with the Continent at some point during the

general time period (Kelleher 2013: 340–341, 252–253).

Fig. 4 Stone mooring post andquay walls recorded at LeamconHarbour (C. Kelleher)

Fig. 5 The ‘Battery’ tower at Leamcon, all that now remains of William Hull’s fortification (C. Kelleher)

358 J Mari Arch (2013) 8:347–366

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At Crookhaven the main deep water and sheltered mooring place was located within the

inner harbour immediate to the town. This allowed, as it does today, vessels to access their

shore base via tender craft or by mooring along the quay in front of the village. The 1612

chart provides specific details for Crookhaven, including the depth ranges within the

harbour and, again, signifies the need by the Dutch to know such details in advance of their

attack on the harbour in 1614 (Fig. 6). Under Captain Moy Lambert, the attack resulted in

some thirty individuals being killed, both on land and in the harbour, with the main pirate

fleet under Captain Patrick Myagh being destroyed. Myagh’s own 180-ton ship was among

the vessels lost (HCA 13/226, f. 338; Kelleher 2014).

A scroll containing a contemporary description of the battle by English trader Edward

Davenant can be found among the HCA documents. In an attempt to escape, Captain

Myagh, his two sons and fellow crew members jumped overboard but were caught and

murdered by Lambert’s crew; his third son survived but was seriously wounded. Others

also attempted to make it ashore and were assisted by locals. Many of the official settlers,

including Thomas Smith, the local admiralty officer, were killed during the attack (HCA

13/98, f. 209v–211r; HCA 13/226, f. 338). The assault on Crookhaven by the Dutch was

one of the defining events in the demise of the pirate alliance but also caused outrage

among government ranks, as it went far beyond the remit as agreed between the king and

the Dutch to seek out the pirates in the harbours of West Cork, capture them and hand them

over to the local authorities. Instead, Moy Lambert took the law into his own hands and

acted as judge and executioner (APC 1615–1616: 513–514).

The main anchorage point at Crookhaven, immediate to the town, is the probable place

where most of Myagh’s fleet would have been moored in 1614. The admiralty record stated

that Myagh’s ship was on the foreshore at the time and thus openly vulnerable to attack,

but whether it was beached in the immediate area or further to the west within the inner and

shallower part of the harbour, is not clear. Neither do the admiralty records detail if there

were any Dutch ship casualties that would add to the archaeological record for these

vessels, with a depiction of Dutch yachts represented on the 1612 chart by Hunt (Fig. 7).

As Myagh’s ship was on fire following the attack, the Dutch Captain Moy Lambert was

unable to board it. He eventually managed to salvage some of the sails and all the goods

Fig. 6 Crookhaven Harbour, looking from the west (C. Kelleher)

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and money off the ship, but left the guns, anchors and cables. What he did manage to take

included 3 whole pieces of satin, 3 whole pieces of silk grograine, about 1 whole piece of

velvet, 120 whole pieces of Holland cloth, 24 whole pieces of canvas, 1 chest containing

about 300 turbans, 2 great chests of sugar, 1 chest of sweetmeats, silver and gold, coined

and uncoined, to the value of £3,000. The goods taken were given an overall value of some

£5,000 (HCA 13/226, f. 338).

While this highlights the diversity of goods that were carried on board the pirate ships, it

also informs on what may yet lie buried within the seabed if the wreck remains are still

there—the guns, the anchors and their cables but also residual material from the cargo.

Salvage of the wrecked vessels would inevitably have taken place immediately after and

over the following years but cultural material in the form of actual ship structure or

artefactual material may still be present, buried and awaiting discovery.

Islands and Rivers

Derwent Whittlesey in his work on political geography The Earth and the State was one of

the first to identify the importance of islands and river courses to pirates. Whittlesey

suggested that islands acted as ‘‘springboards’’ with political significance as they had the

qualities to ensure unity of settlement, isolation to guarantee non-government interference

and strategic locations for control of waterways and for advancing political or piratical

power (1939: 59–70; Galvin 1999: 16–18). The many islands that dot the waters of

Roaringwater Bay, the islands immediate to Baltimore (Sherkin and Cape Clear being the

chief among them) and those guarding the waterways in front of Leamcon and Schull (the

largest being Castle Island and Long Island) were all utilised by the pirates at one time or

another. Their strategic importance to the pirate harbours is indicated by their inclusion in

the 1612 Dutch chart (Fig. 1). Long Island protected the entrance to Leamcon creek and

Croagh Harbour, thus serving the purpose of providing shelter to shipping while allowing

safe anchorage within the Sound between the island and mainland. Long Island similarly

acted as an ideal lookout base for the pirates to control those using their waterways, and

may well have become the focus for legitimate settlement when members of the pirate

alliance were eventually pardoned. Certainly from the representation of Long Island,

Fig. 7 Dutch yachts as depicted by John Hunt on his 1612 Dutch sea chart (by permission of Georg-August-Universitat, Gottingen, Germany)

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written as ‘‘Long Iland’’, on the 1612 chart, there was a vibrant community with substantial

structures there even at that time and sources like this provide the historical and repre-

sentational evidence for natives and newcomers engaged in mutual endeavours within a

colonial context.

Sherkin Island, like Long Island, provided protection to shipping in Baltimore Harbour

from the prevailing southwesterly winds and attendant sea conditions, and with the main

anchorage, as already discussed, located immediate to the primary landing place on the

island near Dunalong castle, Sherkin’s strategic importance to the pirates and those using

the harbour is obvious. Like Long Island, the main settlement on Sherkin was on its

northern extent, parallel to the main anchorage place in the harbour.

Coastal Access Points: To Land or Not to Land

Accessing the coast in more remote areas, where no formal harbour facilities were located,

required planning, innovation and prior knowledge of where access could be found. Certain

site types have come to light during the course of fieldwork by the author that have not

been archaeologically surveyed or recorded previously. Indeed, some have not been

recognised in the archaeological record in Ireland before now and it is suggested here that

they represent a new site type with specific functions. A generic title is suggested for these

sites, at least in an Irish context, namely ‘coastal access points’ as they provided the

cultural link in a coastal hinterland between the land and the sea that merits wider dis-

cussion on these as distinct site types. These coastal access sites are predominantly carved

out of the bare rock and present in a number of forms, including steps, slipways, platforms,

niches and recesses, with some having associated sea caves and caverns (Kelleher 2013:

157–177). Similar sites are known from around the coast of Ireland and, no doubt, are

equally present within a global context. Indeed Christina Marangou’s recent published

research has recorded similar rock-cut features at Myrina Kastro on the island of Lemnos

in the northeast Aegean Sea, for example (2012: 269–276). A comprehensive comparative

geographical and archaeological study of such coastal access sites is, however, awaited

before a definitive discussion can take place as to their distribution, characterization, uses

and significance within the cultural record.

When viewed spatially, topographically and stylistically, their placement within a

maritime landscape reveals them to have had a firm focus on the sea that allows contact by

those on land with those arriving by boat or those on the water to access the interior and its

resources. Some were located remotely, away from any established settlement or formal

residence, constructed in isolated, almost inaccessible areas that, while not perhaps being

the only function of the sites, would certainly have accommodated surreptitious and covert

activity. Other sites identified, and in particular rock-cut steps, are associated with known

monuments, particularly castle sites. A fine example are those leading up to Dun na Sead

castle in Baltimore.

These carved sites would have been the focus of multiple and repeated usage over time

which could have ranged from the lading or offloading of goods and people in remote parts

of the coastal mainland and islands, to piratical and smuggling activity; other uses could

have formed part of their wider function, including providing access to fresh water, with

several sets of rock-cut steps located near a fresh water source—a well, spring or river/

stream outlet. It is thus difficult to directly attribute such sites to piratical and smuggling

activity. Some, however, due to their geomorphological aspect, including location, fash-

ioning, size and shape, hint at direct usage for illegal purposes. Dating remains a problem

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and linking them to a specific period of usage a similar issue, but the nature and extent of

some of the sites identified provide ample evidence for continuing and future debate as to

why they were made, who made them and, more importantly, who used them. Two sites in

particular stand out.

The first is that of Dutchman’s Cove. Located in what is now Castletownsend but which

was previously called Castlehaven, to the east of Baltimore.2 The main part of the site

comprises a series of 14 carved but eroded rock-cut steps that lead to the water and that can

be used during mid-to-high water tides. Orientated E-W and running parallel to the shore,

these steps lead to a rock-cut platform at the top, which in turn, leads to another set of 5

carved steps. These steps turn N, where another carved rock platform then turns NW and

inland.

To the southwest of the top steps a rock-cut platform is located that provides access to a

rock face directly overlooking the main set of steps and within which is carved two niches.

The niches, which are both arch-shaped and measure c. W 0.12 m 9 H 0.14 m 9 D

0.14 m, were recesses to house candles or small lanterns to facilitate signalling to smug-

glers and pirates and act as a guide to bring them safely to shore (Fig. 8). On the rock

outcrop directly across from the main set of steps are a number of carved recesses not

dissimilar to shallow putlog holes, cut into the rock and may be evidence for some support

mechanism, perhaps to accommodate scaffold for a wooden platform, hoist or derrick, to

assist with the movement of smuggled goods. Similar recesses have been identified by the

author at other carved step sites on Sherkin Island (Kelleher 2013: 166–157) and again,

Marangou recorded what appear to be similar niches and recesses at Myrina Kastro (2012:

270–275). To date, the site at Dutchman’s Cove is the only known example by the author

of steps with associated light niches. Others must surely exist, however, but are still to be

identified.

The second site is located at the very edge of the headland that leads into Crookhaven

Harbour. Known locally as Streek Head or Gokane Point, this is a wild and wonderful

place, but windswept coastal edges and precarious cliff faces predominate. Eleven steps are

visible from the landward side, but more could have been present in the past and have now

collapsed into the sea. The site is located at the edge of the promontory approximately

1.5 km to the southeast of the village of Crookhaven (Fig. 9). Running N–S parallel to the

sheer rock face that forms its eastern edge, the steps have been cut at such an acute angle

that they are almost vertical. Only wide enough to allow a single individual to use them at

any given time, they overhang a one hundred foot drop to the sea below. Access to the

lower part of the steps is extremely difficult, with safety considerations preventing full

survey, but they do not appear to have gone all the way down to the water. Instead it seems

that they were to access the subterranean cavern below that runs through the promontory

from east to west and thus goods could be moved up or down with the use of ropes and

pulleys from ships’ boats that came through the cavern to moor underneath the steps.

The sheer spectacle presented by the steps in their remote, dangerous location suggests

that they were carved for the specific function of facilitating smuggling and piracy. Clearly

they were placed on the headland to allow contact with the sea but at a distance from the

main settlement in Crookhaven. Certainly goods could be smuggled silently and secre-

tively, but not in a haphazard way. The nature of the site would have meant that com-

munication, knowledge and planning were essential to ensure safety and success. A

network of knowledge and men must have been in place to allow for the productive use of

2 I am grateful to Thomas Somerville for first showing me this site and on whose land in Drishane,Castletownsend it is located.

362 J Mari Arch (2013) 8:347–366

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such sites as that on Gokane Point, an arrangement of individuals who worked together, on

land and at sea, to fulfil the necessary tasks to rendezvous, load and offload cargo,

exchange people and information and carry on the business of contraband.

Conclusion

The pirates used the southern coast of Munster as one of their main bases. Dominated by

English mariners, they were a tight-knit group of independent individuals who organised

themselves into a cohesive confederacy. Their hierarchical makeup allowed them to

capitalise on their strengths and when not successfully plundering ships they could be

found liaising with locals, including government officials, in remote harbours in an

intermingling of mutually beneficial commercial engagements. They adapted well to their

Fig. 8 Dutchman’s Cove rock-cut steps and light niches (C. Kelleher)

Fig. 9 Steps on Gokane Point, Crookhaven (C. Kelleher)

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geographic setting, exploiting, manipulating and commanding the southwestern coastal

fringe of West Cork and which became over a very short period of time a successful pirate

landscape, with three main bases at Baltimore, Leamcon and Crookhaven. Though directly

tied in with the settlement of English planters under the second and final phase of the

Munster Plantation, it was the nature of this landscape, however, that allowed the pirates to

become prosperous predators, with key geographical criteria in place not least its

remoteness that ensured anonymity in obscurity beyond the reach of official authority. The

multitude of islands within the confines of a relatively short stretch of sea provided natural

protection and safe anchorage, allied with suitable staging points from which they could

target passing trade ships and control the waters within Roaringwater Bay. Such was this

landscape and the ease within which they operated, that many brought family and kin to

settle on the estate lands of officials like William Hull.

Within this landscape there are a number of archaeological sites emerging that, while

not being readily datable, have the hallmarks of sites that would have been useful to and

perhaps used by the pirates. More enigmatic among the sites include coastal access points

on the mainland and islands that have been carved out of the bare rocks to facilitate contact

between those ashore with those at sea. They more than likely had multiple uses and users

over long periods of time, not least in providing access to fresh water sources and ter-

restrial resources. They were also ideal secluded contact points from where contraband

could be delivered or collected. Indeed cultural evidence from a number of the recent

archaeologically recorded sites by the author, in conjunction with their geographical set-

ting, directly links them with piracy and smuggling.

Other more easily recognisable sites too may have provided the facilities for the pirates to

use with greater efficiency the landscape in which they chose to operate. The diversity of

intertidal archaeology coming to light along the foreshore of harbours like Leamcon, for

instance, attests to these facilities. Quays, docks, landing slips, mooring posts and careening

sites are evidence for the past maritime infrastructure that existed in those places that may

well date to the time of the pirates or indeed before. The close liaisons that took place

between local officials and the pirates ensured success and commercial advancement for all

parties, and understanding these relationships is critical to our understanding of how the

pirates operated, the sites they used and how they were able to monopolise, manipulate and

utilise the southwestern coastal landscape of Munster to such success. In turn, the nature of

that landscape allowed for the lucrative use of its remote ports and harbours within a policy

framework of plantation, settlement diversification and trans-Atlantic economic expansion.

While it may be difficult to identify the evidence for individual pirates or their families,

the cumulative study of historical and cartographic material in tandem with archaeological

assessment of coastal access points, emerging evidence for maritime infrastructure and

individual monuments within remote areas may instead lend itself to identifying the

fundamentals of a definitive pirate landscape, not least its main ports and harbours, in

Munster for that time.

Acknowledgments This paper synopsizes aspects of a doctoral thesis undertaken at Trinity CollegeDublin. The author would like to thank Prof. Jane Ohlmeyer for supervisory guidance, support andencouragement throughout the study. Thanks are due to Trinity College Dublin for accepting the thesis andto the Department of Arts, Heritage and the Gaeltacht for funding it; I am grateful to Georg-August-Universitat, Gottingen, Germany for permission to reproduce the Gerritszoon/Hunt 1612 chart; to theexternal reviewers who provided invaluable feedback and advice on a draft of this paper; finally to myhusband Rob, work colleagues, family, friends and the people of West Cork, all who were ever a source ofknowledge, support and companionship.

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