Placing protection at the centre of humanitarian …...5 Introduction There are two further aspects...

Study on Protection Funding in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

Julian Murray & Joseph LandryOttawa, 17 September 2013

Julian Murray Consulting

An independent studycommissioned by

Placing protection at the centre of humanitarian action

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Table of Contents

Acronyms .............................................................................................................................................. 3

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 4

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................................. 7

Trends in financing for protection ..................................................................................................... 10

1.1 Overall protection funding trends ..................................................................................... 11

1.2 Trends by Area of Responsibility (AoR) ............................................................................ 15

1.3 Funding trends by recipient country ................................................................................. 17

1.4 Funding trends by recipient organisation ......................................................................... 21

1.5 Funding trends by donor ................................................................................................. 24

1.6 Development funding sources ......................................................................................... 29

1.7 Overallconclusionsregardingthefundingflows .............................................................. 33

Reasons for the funding trends......................................................................................................... 34

2.1 Findings from the online survey ....................................................................................... 34

2.2 Findingsfromthein-depthinterviews .............................................................................. 40

2.3 TriangulationwiththeStateoftheHumanitarianSystemsurvey ....................................... 46

2.4 Additionalfindingsfromthedonorsurveyanddonorroundtables .................................... 47

2.5 Conclusionsfromtheonlinesurvey,in-depthinterviewsanddonorsurvey ...................... 49

Issues for consideration .................................................................................................................... 50

3.1 Strategiestoincreaseprotectionfunding ......................................................................... 50

3.2 What could the various members of the protection system do?....................................... 52

3.3 What could donors do to improve protection funding? .................................................... 53

3.4 Improving the system for protection funding .................................................................... 54

Annexe A: Study Methodology ......................................................................................................... 56

Annexe B: List of donors and experts interviewed ........................................................................ 59

Annexe C: Terms of Reference ......................................................................................................... 61

Annexe D: Bibliography..................................................................................................................... 64

Annexe E: Endnotes .......................................................................................................................... 70

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Acronyms

ALNAP:ActiveLearningNetworkforAccountabilityandPerformanceinHumanitarianActionAoR:AreaofResponsibility(establishedthemeswithinhumanitarianprotection)BPRM:BureauofPopulation,RefugeesandMigration(USStateDepartment)CAP:ConsolidatedAppealProcessCERF: Central Emergency Response FundCHF:CommonHumanitarianFundCRS:CreditorReportingSystem(anOECDfinancialtrackingsystem)DAC: Development Assistance Committee (a Committee of the OECD)DRC: Danish Refugee CouncilDRC: Democratic Republic of the CongoECHO:EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAidOfficeERF: Emergency Response FundFTS:FinancialTrackingSystemGPC:GlobalProtectionClusterHC:HumanitarianCoordinatorHCT:HumanitarianCountryTeamHLP:HousingLandandPropertyIASC:Inter-AgencyStandingCommitteeICRC: International Committee of the Red CrossIDP:InternallyDisplacedPersonIOM:InternationalOrganisationforMigrationINCAF:InternationalNetworkonConflictandFragilityINGO: International Non-Governmental OrganisationIRC: International Rescue CommitteeLCMM:TheLandmineandClusterMunitionsMonitorNNGO: National Non-Governmental OrganisationNRC:NorwegianRefugeeCouncilOCHA:UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinatorofHumanitarianAffairsODA:OfficialDevelopmentAssistanceOECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOFDA:OfficeforForeignDisasterAssistance(USAgencyforInternationalDevelopment)OHCHR:OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRightsoPt:OccupiedPalestinianTerritories(alternatelyknownasWestBankandGaza)RC/HC:ResidentCoordinator/HumanitarianCoordinatorSCI:SavetheChildrenInternationalSGBV:SexualandGender-BasedViolenceUNFPA:UnitedNationsPopulationFundUNHCR:UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesUNICEF:UnitedNationsChildren’sFund

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ThisstudywasconceivedbytheGlobalProtectionClusteratamoment(late2011/early2012)whenthetrendinprotectionfundingappearedtobeinsharpdecline.TheprecursorstudyonChildProtectionfunding:Too Little, Too Late1 wasalsocommissionedatamomentofapparent fundingdecline in2009.Whenwe lookedat the fundingtrendstoallareasofprotectionwithinthepurviewoftheCluster,2andoveralongerperiod(2007-2012),wefoundthat protection is usually underfunded in relation to the amounts requested in the consolidated appeals, and “more underfunded”relativetomostotherclusters.Butwealsofoundthatoverallprotectionfunding(includingtheamountsflowingoutsidetheappeals)hasremainedsteadysinceatleast2010,andthatfundingrelativetoappealspickedupin2012.Thepictureismademorecomplexbythefactthatsomuchprotectionfundingisnotrecordedassuch,andtherearesignificantvariationsbetweencountries,aswellasbetweenyears.Theproblemthenisnotsomuchthatprotection funding is reducing, but that it flows in different ways, it fluctuates, and also concentrates in some emergencies more than others.3Duringthecourseofthestudy,evidencemovedusawayfromtheoriginalhypothesisthatprotectionissimplyunderfundedandneedsrenewedadvocacy,towardsanattempttounderstandsomeofthedriversbehindtheobservedfundingtrends.Ratherthan lookingtowardthedonorsasthemainreasonfor thesetrends,weendedupreflectingalsoonhowprotectionfundingcanbestabilised,bettermanagedbyprotectionactorsanddonorsalike,andeventuallyincreased.

Wedothinkincreasedfundingforprotectionispossible.Recentandcurrentinitiativesofdonors,ofthehumanitariansystematlargeandofprotectionactorsareallpullinginthesamedirection,leavinguswithsomecausetohopethatprotectioncanrepositionitselfnearerthecentreofhumanitarianresponse,andthatitsworkcanattractmorefundingby better demonstrating its results.

During thecourseof this research,wewereoftenaskedhowwedefine “protection.”4 We do not challenge the establisheddefinition,5buthowprotectionisunderstoodbyitsmanystakeholdersis indeedanimportantstartingpointbothforthestudyandforthereader,asaproblemofinterpretationisonefactorunderlyingfundingtrends.ECHOcapturestheproblemwellintheir2012ProtectionFundingGuidelines, stating that “In its most basic interpretation, somerelateittothefundamentaldeliveryofhumanitarianassistanceinaccordancewiththeessentialsurvivalneeds(food,water,health,shelter)ofvulnerablepopulations.Othersplaceprotectionwithintheframeworkofinternationallegal instrumentswherethemonitoringandrecordingofviolationsof internationalhumanitarianandhumanrightslawisusedasatooltoconfrontthoseresponsibleinanefforttocausechange.Institution-building,governanceandjudicialprogrammesanddeploymentofpeacekeepingtroopsarefurtherexamplesofactionsalsocategorizedasprotection activities”.6

Protectiondefiesneatlabellingbecauseitisatthesametimethegoalunderlyingthewholehumanitarianresponse(the reason for humanitarian action), an approachor lensonthehumanitarianresponse(awayofunderstandingall dimensionsof humanitarian endeavour), andamorenarrowly-defined family ofactivities that aim to prevent and mitigate threats to vulnerable persons. In practical terms these activities are also of different types: some are mainstreamed (forexampleensuringthatfoodisprovidedinawaythatat leastdoesnoharm,andatbestmaximisesprotectionoutcomes),someareintegrated(forexamplewhenapsychosocialserviceisprovidedwithina larger health project), and some are specificinthewaytheyfocusuniquelyuponpreventingormitigatingharmfulbehaviours. It is this last group of activities that is normally circumscribed by the “protection chapter” of consolidated appealsandthatwillbethemainfocusofthisstudy;butalldonorstoprotection,aswellasallprotectionactors,recognisethatprotectionissomuchmorethanthissubsetofspecificprotectionactivitiesandthatappealfundingdoesnottellthewholestory.

Introduction

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Introduction

Therearetwofurtheraspectsofprotectionthatneedtobehighlightedrightupfront.Theprimaryresponsibilityforprovidingprotectiontoallpersonsonitsterritory inthecontextofconflictandnaturaldisastersalwaysrestswiththenationalgovernment–whetherornotthatgovernmentisableorwillingtoprovideit.Furthermore,allvulnerablepopulations (displaced or not) have their own ways of providing or enhancing their protection; all communitieshavetheirown institutions,supportsystems,risk-reducingstrategiesandhealingmechanisms.Becauseofthesetwoaspects,protectionactorshaveonlylimitedinfluenceoverprotectionoutcomes,andasElizabethFerrissaid: “A protection paradigm needs to be grounded in humility.”7

Methodological preludeIt is important tooutlineat theoutset thegeneralmethodologicalprincipleswehavefollowedfor thequantitativeaspectsofthisstudy.Firstandforemost,wefullyrecognisethatmostdonorsandmembersofthepublicconsiderthatthehumanitarianendeavourwhichprovidesshelterandbasicneedstoadisplacedandaffectedpopulation8 also provides some measure of protection. The major humanitarian agencies and NGOs all espouse protection principles and goals, and much of their programming in any geography or sector can fairly be described as protection. The problemfromtheviewpointofafundingstudyisthatintegratedandmainstreamedprotectionworkisnotseparatelytagged, trackedand reportedasprotection: thuswehavebeenunable tofindordevelopagenerallyapplicablemethodologyforestimatinghowmuchoftotalhumanitarianfundingcanbeconsideredasprotection.

Intheabsenceofsuchamethodology,weresorttoconsideringanarrowerdefinitionofprotection,namelyactivitieswhichhaveprotectionastheirspecificandprimarypurpose,withinthedefinitionalboundariesdevelopedbytheIASC.Thedatasourcesforthisareoftwotypes.PrimaryamongthemisthedatathatdonorsandrecipientorganisationsvoluntarilyrecordwiththeIASCcode“Protection/HumanRights/RuleofLaw”inOCHA’sFinancialTrackingSystem.This data is of poor quality because of inconsistent coding, so after considerable researchwe have chosen tolimitmostofourstatisticalanalysistothesubsetofthewholeFTS“Protection”categorythatisregisteredagainstconsolidatedappealsorsimilarOCHA-recordedappeals.InordertocorrectforinconsistentFTScodingpracticesforthethreemajorprotectionagencieswithfinancialdatarecorded inFTS(ICRC,UNHCRandUNICEF),weuseasasecondarydatasourcethepublishedannualreportsofthesethreeorganisations,which(withtheexceptionofUNHCRundertheirolderfinancialsystemof2007-2009)containwithinthemspecificexpenditurelinesthatserveasproxiesforprotection.OHCHRisalsoakeyprotection-mandatedagencybutitsprogrammingvolumeisrelativelymodestincomparison.GiventhathumanitarianactionisconsideredasacorepartofOHCHR’swork,spendinginthisareaisnotdisaggregatedinOHCHR’sannualreports.InthecaseofICRC,thisisdescribedsimplyas“protection”andrepresentsabout20%oftheirexpenditure.ForUNICEF,wehaveusedtheirannualreportstotheirExecutiveBoard,andconsidertheportionoftheirChildProtectionexpenditure(FocusArea4)thathasbeenfinancedfromEmergencyResources(about10%ofallemergencyexpenditure)asaproxyforUNICEFspendingonhumanitarianprotection(whichincludesUNICEFspendingonSGBV).AndfinallyforUNHCR,wehaveusedtheirGlobalReports,whichsince2010containforeachcountryabreakdownbypillarandbysector.ForthisstudywehaveincludedtheprotectioncomponentsofUNHCR’sPillar4(Pillar4representsIDPprojects)plusprotection-specificcomponentsofGlobalProgrammes.Werecognisethatforallthesethreeorganisationsthereisadditionalprotectionexpenditurethatismainstreamedorintegratedinotherprogrammingsectors–butwearenotabletodisaggregateandcountit.ForthedetailedmethodologyseeannexeA.

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Introduction

AcknowledgementsManypeoplehavegenerouslyofferedtheirtimeandadvicetousduringthisstudy,andseveralhundredparticipatedinthein-depthinterviews,onlinesurvey,donorsurveyandroundtablesinWashington,Geneva,Islamabad,Kabul,JubaandNairobi.Ourdeepestthanksgotoall.Inaddition,thefollowingpeoplewereparticularlyhelpfulincommentingondrafts,providingmethodologicaladvice,andaccesstounpublisheddocumentsandinformation:SarahBailey,KatyBarnett, JeffCrisp, JohnDurnford,ElizabethFerris,MikeKendellen, JaneyLawry-White,SarahLilley,AnitaMalley,JennyMcAvoy,UrbanReichhold,MeggiRombach,DanielaRuegenberg,RobertSmith,AbbyStoddard,JulieThompsonandAnneThurin.Fourclustercoordinatorsarrangedmostusefulfieldvisitsandgavevaluablefeedbackonoperationalrecommendations:ElisabettaBrumat,BediakoBuahene,GwendolynMensahandPeterTrotter.Andfinally,theGPCCoordinator,LouiseAubin,andherteamintheGPCsupportcellinGenevaprovidedsupportandguidance throughout.

Notwithstandingallthevaluableadvicereferredtoabove,thishasbeenanindependentstudy,andanyshortcomingsitmaycontainareentirelyourownresponsibility.

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Thebigpictureoftrendsinprotectionfundingismixed.Ontheplusside,thetotalamountoffundingtoprotectionhasremainedfairlysteady,despiteadeclineinoverallhumanitarianfundingsince2010.However,whenweexaminetheextenttowhichprotectionisfundedin appeals,itisalwaysfundedtoalesserextentthanthesectorsperceivedtobemore life-saving (food,shelter,WASH,health),andcharacterisedmorebyvolatility thanbyanoverall trendline.This lackofpredictabilitymeansthatwedonotknowiftherecoveryofprotectionfundingrelative to other clusters observed in 2012 is going to continue in 2013 and beyond. Our research suggests that this volatility in protection funding is not the result of conscious thematic preferences by donors – it ismore likely to be theunintendedconsequenceofthedifferent“weight”ofprotectionintheshiftinglandscapeofemergencies,andoftherangeofwaysinwhichtheterm“protection”isusedinvariedcontexts.

Considerableemphasiswasplacedonunderstandingwhatdrivesdonorfundingchoices.Notwithstandingthewidevariety of donor approaches and the differences in scale, we felt that we could derive five general conclusionsregardingdonors that have in turn shaped thegeneral directionof this study. The first is that donors (likeotherprotection actors) have varied interpretationsofwhatprotection is – to a large extentbecause it lacks a simpleconceptual frameworkwithauniversal terminology: it is hard to explain to thepublicand todecision-makers.The second is that donors for the most part do not make the major protection allocation decisions (indeed nodonorcansaywithconfidencehowmuchoftheirfundingisspentonprotection).Instead,mostdonorstendtoallocateresourcestoprioritycountriesandtrustedpartnersideallywithaslittleearmarkingaspossible,andimplicitlyplacetheonusupontheirtrustedpartners(eitherthroughtheirownallocationofunearmarkedfunding,orthroughthecompositionofpartnerproposals)todeterminewhatshareoftheirfundinggoestoprotection.Thirdly:manydonorsare concerned about the quality of protectionprogrammingandthenarrowrangeofcapablepartnersinthissometimessensitivefieldofhumanitarianwork.Atthesametime,donoradministrativeconstraintsleadtheminmostcasestopreferfewer,largerprojects.Fourth:mostdonorswouldliketoseebetter outcome-level reporting of protectionresults.Andfinally:somedonorsareplacingincreasedemphasisonprotection mainstreaming, as an importantcomplementtoprotection-specificprogramming.

Itseemsthattherearetwogeneralfundingstrategiesthatcanbedeployedbytheprotectioncommunityatthisjuncture:(a) increase the supply by advocating for more (especially more multi-year) funding to be allocated to protection, and (b) increasethedemandbyimprovingthestandingofprotectionwithintheoverallhumanitarianresponseandthequalityofprotectionwork.Thetwoarecloselyrelated,andweareconvincedthatadvocacytoincreasethequantity of protection fundingwillfallshortofexpectationsunlessitisaccompaniedbyclearcommitmentandactiontoimprove the quality of protection work.

In the short term, it is protection actors (more than donors) who can increase the focus on protection:

In terms of advocacy: beyond the prevailing practice of advocacy for particular issues, vulnerable groups or countries, thereisdefinitelyroomtoadvocate more within protection organisations for a greater shareofunearmarkedorprivately-raised funding to be allocated to protection, and for greater protection content in multi-sector or integrated programmespitchedtodonors.Thisisthemostlikelyavenueforincreasedprotectionfundingintheshortterm.

Onthedemandside:workthatisalreadyongoingthroughIASCandtheGPCtoplace protection strategically at the centre of the humanitarian response should continue, so that protection becomes a unifying narrative that tiestogetherthepurposeofhumanitarianintervention(thegoal),thewaytheresponseisorganised(theapproach),theorientationofitscomponentsectors(mainstreamingandintegrationgoals),andthespecificactivitiesofprotectionactors. A simpler, clearer conceptual frameworkforprotection–withanagreeduniversallexicon–wouldmakethistaskmucheasier. Inaddition,effortscouldbemadetobetterplan,manageandreportonprotectionresults.

Executive Summary

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Executive Summary

Andfinally,thereremainsaneedto strengthen the capacity of INGOs and particularly NNGOs to design and implementqualityprotectionprojects,especiallygiventhetechnicaldifficultyandheightenedlevelsofriskassociatedwithprotectionwork.Takentogether,abundleofsuchactionstoincreasethecentralityandthequalityofprotectionworkwilllaythefoundationforincreasedfunding.

In the medium term, some donors might increase their funding for protection, on the basis of results:

Asthisfoundationbecomesbetterestablished,somedonorscouldbeexpectedtoincreasetheircontributionstoprotection.9Whendonorshaveaclearerunderstandingofhowprotectionfitsintothebiggerpicture,andespeciallywhen they see better proposals from quality organisations achieving demonstrated outcome-level results, thendemandwillconnectwithsupply,andboth increasedandmorepredictable fundingspecifically for theprotectioncomponentofappealscanbeexpected.

Inparallel,membersoftheGlobalProtectionClustercanpursueworkalongtwotracksthatwillcontinuetoconsolidatefunding. One is to further strengthen the workings of the cluster system itself, including improved coordination betweentheAreasofResponsibility(AoRs)andtherestoftheprotectioncluster,andafocusonwhichaspectsofprotectionprogrammingare“foundational”inthattheyarecoreactivitieswhichanchorandenabletheactivitiesofallprotectionactorsandotherclusters,andassuchmerit fundingpriorityaswellassomemeasureofcollectivemanagement.Asecondtrackistoanalyseinmoredepththecosts and the results of protection mainstreaming, withaviewtodetermininginwhatcircumstancesandtowhatextentprotectionmainstreamingcanyieldbetterandmore measurable results. At the same time, all humanitarian actors should continue their efforts to improve the quality of the financial data available for planning and reporting.

In the long term, it is possible to access a greater share of development funding:

Finally, in the long run there are good prospects for protection actors to access development funding sources for someaspectsofprotection,althoughtodosowillrequiresomeculturechangewithinthehumanitariancommunity,and in particular some institutional and policy changes on the part of donor agencies. An increased focus on long-termdevelopmentproblemssuchasstatepoliciesthatencouragesocialexclusion,weaklegalsystemsandpoorstatesecurityserviceswillhelpshiftprotectionworkupstream–addressingsomeofthecausesofharmfulbehaviour.

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Executive Summary

Overall structure of this studyThe body of this study is divided into three sections. In Chapter 1weexaminetheavailablefinancialdatafromtheviewpointsof trendsacrosstime,evolutionof fundingtothevariousAoRs,variationbetweendonors,patternsofrecipient countries and implementing partners, and conclude (a) that overall protection funding appears to be fairly steadyandmuchgreaterthanwhatisrecordedinFTS;(b)thatprotectionisoneoftheleastfundedsectorswithinappeals–althoughitappearstoberecoveringsomewhatin2012fromaverylowpoint in2011;and(c)thatthemost important characteristic of protection funding is not so much its apparent decline or increase, but its volatility (betweencountries,betweenyears,betweenAoRs).

We feel that theprospects for connecting upwithdevelopment financing appear tobegood, given (a) that thecorrelationishighbetweentopdevelopmentfundingrecipientsandtopprotectionrecipients;and(b)theattentionthat isbeingpaid tobetter linkingrelief todevelopmentgenerally.However, furtherwork isneededto loosentherigidities of the donor machinery before this potential can be fully realised.

In Chapter 2weapplyoursurveys,in-depthinterviewsandfieldresearchtoanalysethereasonsfortheobservedfundingtrends.Onekeyconclusionisthatprotectionisinterpreteddifferentlybydifferentprotectionactors,andthusit isdifficulttoexplaininacoherentwaywhatprotectionisandwhyit isimportant.Withoutaunifyingconceptualframework,itischallengingforprotectionactorstocommunicatekeyconcepts,ortoadvocateeffectivelywiththegeneralpublic.Asecondconclusion is thatprotectiondoesnothaveanestablishedtrackrecordof reportingonoutcome-levelresults–andindeedit is inherentinthenatureoftheprotectionenterprise(workingintherealmofculturalandpoliticalsensitivity,andonlong-termbehaviouralchange)thatresultswillbehardtomeasureespeciallywithinanormalhumanitarianreportingcycle.Athirdisthatdonorsgenerallyconsiderhumanitariancrisesthroughthefiltersofeithercountriesand/orpartneragencies(butrarelysectors),andusuallyrespondtoappealsandproposalsratherthansolicitproposalsinspecificsectors.Forthesereasons,theinitialonusforincreasingprotectionfundinglieswiththeactorsreceivingprotectionfunding,whothemselvesshouldbeincreasingtheprotectioncontentoftheirappealsandrequests,submittingmoreprotectionproposals,andallocatingmoreoftheirownfundingtoprotection.Andfinally,weconcludethattheextenttowhichprotectioniswell-integratedwithinthehumanitarianresponsewilldeterminetheextenttowhichprotectionseemslikea‘natural’or‘obvious’componentwithinthehumanitarianplan,andthisisthekeytoimprovingprogrammecoherenceandfundingprospects.

Our concluding Chapter 3 offers pointers for increasing protection funding in the short, medium and long terms, includingsuggestionsastowhatprotectionactorsandespeciallyNationalNGOscandotoincreasethequalityofprotectionwork (and thereby to lay theground for increased funding).Recommendationsaremade thatdonorsrecognisesomespecificchallengesfacedbytheprotectioncommunityandaboveallholdfasttotheprinciplesofGoodHumanitarianDonorship,andfinallyweoffersomeobservationsonhowthesystem forprotection fundingcould be strengthened.

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1.0 Trends in financing for humanitarian protection

1.1 Overall protection funding trends

ThedataonoveralltrendsisderivedfromtheannualreportsofICRC,UNICEFandUNHCRusingamethodologydescribedinAnnexeA,andmergedwiththeon-appealprotectionsectordatasetinOCHA’sFinancialTrackingSystem(FTS).Wefeelthatthis“FTSModified”dataisthebestestimateofexpenditurethathashumanitarianprotectionasitsprimarypurpose.Figure1.1doesnotincludeMineActionexpenditureasthisishandledquitedistinctlybythedonorcommunity (see Figure 1.5), and the protection data is multiplied by a factor of ten in order to compare trends on the same graph:

Overallhumanitarianfundingrosein2008and2010(theresultoftwofactorscombined–a26%increaseinfoodprices in 2008 and another 19% increase in 2010,10 plus the combined effects of theHaiti earthquake and thePakistanfloodsin2010),anddippedin2011(partlytheafter-effectoftheexceptionalHaitiandPakistanresponsesaswasalsoobservedafter theextraordinary response to theTsunami in2005, andpartly the result of reducedODA funding due to European economic contraction). It then further declined, but less rapidly, in 2012. According toOCHA,between2011and2012,theglobalhumanitarianneed,asmeasuredbythenumberofpeoplerequiringhumanitarian assistance, also declined by about the same proportion.11

Finding 1.“FTSmodified”data inFig.1.1showsthatprotectionfunding ismuchmorestablethanoverallhumanitarian funding. Note that Fig 1.1 represents absolute amounts of funding, not the level of funding againstneed(whichasweseeinFig.1.2below,droppedin2011).Thesteadyprofileofprotectionfundingfrom2010to2012,whileoverallhumanitarianfundingreduced,suggeststhatprotectionfundinghasbeen“catchingup”withoverallhumanitarianfundingsince2010

AsdiscussedinAnnexeA,thefirstadvantageoflimitingtheanalysisofprotectionfundingtotheOCHA-recordedappeals is that this dataset is of higher quality, more consistently coded, and permits more reliable trend analysis.

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Trends in financing for humanitarian protection

Thesecondadvantageisthatonlythroughtheappealscanweobtainanapproximationofthelevelofneed,12whichisnecessaryinordertoassessanyunderfundinggap.Thefollowinggraphshowstheproportionoffundingprovidedto the total appeal requests,13 in comparison to the proportion of funding provided to the protection requests.

Finding 2.Withintheappeals(Fig.1.2),protectionalwaysreceiveslessfundingthantheoverallhumanitarianresponse,withasignificantdroptothewidestgapin2011(22%ofprotectionrequestsfundedasagainst63%ofallappealsfunded)andthen“catchingup”in2012(36%ofprotectionrequestsfunded,ascomparedwith62% of all appeal requests funded). This improving trend in the level of response to requests is a different measure,butconsistentwiththe“narrowinggap”trendnotedinFinding1above14

Weexaminedifthereasonforthis2008peakyearinFig.1.2wasaparticularlyhighleveloffunding,oraparticularlylowlevelofrequests(i.e.alowerdenominatorwhichwouldpresentasaproportionally higher level of funding). The answerisacombinationofboth.Theamountsoffundingrequestedforprotectionintheappealswerecomparablebetween2007($301m)and2008($290m)–sorequestsweremodest.Butalargeramountwasprovidedin2008–mostlikelyaconsequenceoftwofactors:(a)therecently-createdclustersystemandCAPprocess“takingoff”inkeycountriesthatsawabigprotectionfundingincreasein2008(Sudan,Somalia,Nepal),and(b)thelaunchingin2008ofnewprotectionprogrammesinafewsituations(Georgia,Myanmar,Iraq).

Inorder tosee if therewasapattern inprotection fundingbasedupon the timeelapsedsince theonsetof theemergency,weextractedthedataforthe20financiallylargestprotectionsituationsoverthe6yearperiodfromFTS(allappealcountrieswheretheamountoffundsreceivedoversixyearsforprotectionwasgreaterthan$15million),andthenalignedtheprofilesofthe20curvestothesamestartyear1.Thisway,forexample,theHaitiearthquakeof2010,theinitiationofaseparateSouthSudanprogramin2011,andthefirstYemenappealin2008areallsettothesameyear1.Whenthese20datasetsaresuperimposedandthenanaveragecurveisderived,inFigure1.3weseewhatwecandescribeasa“typical”fundingcurveforamajorprotectionsituation.

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Fig.1.3doesindeedshowaclearprotectionfundingpatternasemergencysituationsaredeclared,mature,evolveandtheneithergetresolved(inratherfewcases)orsettleintoaprotractedemergencies.Combiningfeedbackfromthein-depthinterviewsandthefieldvisitswiththeevidenceofthispattern,wesupposethatprotectionisrelativelyunderfunded (A) at the outset of an emergency (because it is not considered to be as “life-saving” in year one), that it thengetsbetterfundedinyeartwo(B)onthestrengthoftheperceived(andpossiblybythispoint,measured)needandinstalleddeliverycapacity,butthatinyearsthree,fourandfive(C)thefundingsteadilyreduceseitherbecauseorganisationsaremovingtheirprotectionworkoverfromstand-alonetomainstreamed15/integratedchannels(whichare not planned, funded or reported as protection), and/or because donor interest declines.16

Finding 3.Year two isusually the“boom”year forprotection funding,andthebestyear for investment intrainingandmanagementsystemsthatwillbuild the foundations forsustainedandqualityprogramming insubsequent years

The allocation of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) funding to protection has been carefully documented,17 and over the 6-year study period has supported protection projects in equivalent amounts from the Rapid Response andUnderfundedwindows,althoughonlyat3-4%oftotalCERFexpenditures.Fig.1.4showsthetrendsinfinancingtoprotection(allcontributionsnotjuston-appeal)fromCERF,fromtheCommonHumanitarianFunds(CHF)andfromthe Emergency Response Funds (ERF).18 For CERF, this represents a steady 3.3% - 3.6% of all CERF spending 2009-2012.ForCHF,thisrepresents5.8%-7.2%ofallCHFspending2007-2012,19andforERFthisrepresentsbetween1.2% (2009) and 5.0% (2007) of ERF spending 2007-2012.

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Finding 4.Thepooledfundsaresignificantdonorstoprotection,inapproximatelythesameproportionsasbilateraldonors (3-4%ofallhumanitarianspending).SinceCHFsmost favourprotection,protectionactorshaveaninterestinpromotingCHFs

Onefinalaspectofprotectionfundingtobeconsideredistheallocationofcarry-overamounts.Carry-overamountsarefundsprovidedinonecalendaryear,butallocatedtoexpendituresinthefollowingyear,usuallybecauseoflatedonor payment or a sudden onset emergency late in the year. They are a useful buffer for humanitarian agencies as theyprovidesomestart-upfundsattheoutsetofeachnewyear,andallowcontinuityofmission-criticalactivities.Overthe2007-2012period,FTSrecordsatotalof497carry-overentries,forasignificantsumof$4,719,473,375.20

ByfarthelargestFTSsectorsforcarry-overare“FoodSecurity”and“SectorNotyetSpecified”(usuallysectorallyunearmarkedfundingtothecountryappealsoflargeagenciessuchasUNHCR,ICRCandIOM),andaswouldbeexpectedwhendonorfundingismorelimitedandfundadministrationisgettingtighter,thecarry-overamountshavebeensteadilyreducingsinceapeakin2009.Ofthistotal,only$32,716,307iscarried-overprotection-codedfunding,andtherewasnosignificantcarry-overofprotection-codedfundingin2011or2012.Thisclearlyleavesthecontinuityofsomekeyprotectionactivitiesmoreexposed.

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Conclusions on overall protection funding trendsThebigpictureofprotectionfundingtrendsismixed.Ontheplusside,thetotalamountoffundingtoprotectionhasremainedsteady,despiteadeclineinoverallhumanitarianfundingsince2010.However,whenweexaminetheextenttowhichprotectionisunderfundedin appeals,itisalwaysfundedtoalesserextentthanthesectorsperceivedtobemorelife-saving(food,shelter,WASH,health),andcharacterisedmorebyvolatilitythanbyanoveralltrendline.Thislackofpredictabilityisimportant,becausewedonotknowiftherecoveryofprotectionfundingrelative to other clusters observed in 2012 is going to continue in 2013. Our research suggests that this volatility in protection funding is not the result of conscious thematic preferences by donors21–itismorelikelytobetheunintendedconsequenceofthedifferent“weight”ofprotectionintheshiftinglandscapeofemergencies,andoftherangeofwaysinwhichtheterm“protection”isusedinvariedcontexts.

Whetherprotectionis“underfunded”isalsonotastraightforwardquestion.Thereisaknownchallengewithprotectionneeds assessment,22andthereisafundamentalproblemwiththefinancialdata:wedonotreallyknowhowmuchisbeingspentonprotectionbecauseofdifferingviewsonthedefinitionalboundariesofprotection,theinabilitytoquantify towhatextentprotection ismainstreamed,anderratic reportingofevennarrowly-definedprotection (i.e.whatislabelledasprotectionwithinCAPs).

From thebest financialdatawehave,protectionappearsunderfundedbecause it usually receivesabouta thirdof the total amount needed (i.e. requested through the country appeals) and proportionately less than the overall humanitarian response (Table 1.2).23Surveysofprotectionactorsconfirmthisview.WeweregenerouslyprovidedaccesstodatagatheredbyHumanitarianOutcomesforALNAP’sStateoftheHumanitarianSystem:2012,where60%ofrespondentsfrominternationalorganisationsself-identifyingasfromtheprotectionsectorfeltthatfundingwas“insufficient”or“farbelowneeds”.Ouronlinesurveyrespondentsoverwhelmingly(90%)affirmedthatprotectionisunderfunded,buttheserespondentswereprotectionpractitionerswithmuchatstake.Likewise,asurveyconductedin2012of17ChildProtectioncoordinatorsinthefieldconfirmedtheviewthatChildProtectionisunderfunded.24

Humanitarianworkerswithouta focussedprotectionmandateare lesscertainaboutunderfunding,and implicitlyweighuptheeffectivenessandopportunitycostsofdifferentsectoraloptionstotrytoachieveanoptimalallocationof resources. Donors generally believe that their overall humanitarian response is framed by protection concerns, andemphasisethattheircoresupportforthemajorprotectionorganisations,aswellastheiremphasisonprotectionmainstreaminginallsectors,bothcomplementtheirprotection-specificcontributions.Insum:stakeholderswhoarenotdedicatedprotectionworkerstendtofeelthattheircontributionstoprotectionaresufficient,giventherelativeneeds and the cost-effectiveness of protection programming.

Onbalance,wecannotsaythatprotectionissystematicallyunderfunded,althoughthereareclearlycountrysituationsandmomentsintheevolutionofemergencieswhenprotectionislocallyortemporarilyunderfunded.Nevertheless,thereareanumberofmeasures thatcouldbe taken tobothstabiliseand increase funding forprotection,mostimportantly by better situating protection at the centre of humanitarian planning, and showing how protectionprogramming is cost-effective.

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1.2 Trends by Area of Responsibility (AoR)

Whentheclustersystemwascreatedin2005asoneofthepillarsofHumanitarianReform,therewasamajordebatearoundwhetherprotectionshouldbecomeaseparateclusteroracross-cuttingtheme–andtheanswerwasboth.Asaresult, theGlobalProtectionCluster (GPC)wasconstitutedwith,at that time,nineAreasofResponsibility.25 UNHCRleadstheGlobalProtectionClusterandcountry-levelprotectionclustersactivatedinconflictsituations.Innaturaldisastersituationsorincomplexemergencieswithoutsignificantdisplacement,inaccordancewithagreedIASCpolicyarrangements,thethreeUNprotectionmandatedagencies(UNICEF,UNHCRandOHCHR)consultandagree,undertheoverallleadershipoftheRC/HC,whichagencyamongthethreewillassumetheroleofprotectionclusterleadatthecountrylevel.EachAoRhasitsownFocalPointandindicativesetofactivities,whichprovidesareadychecklistoftheprotectionactivitiesundertakeninthoseareas.26 There is technical guidance on other areas ofprotectionaswell,suchasProtectionofCivilians,althoughnotaswelldefinedorasclearlylinkedtotheGlobalProtectionCluster.Asof2012,therearefourAoRsremainingatthegloballevel:MineAction,Gender-BasedViolence,ChildProtection,andHousingLandandProperty;theresponsibilitiesforallotherthemesrelatedtoprotectionremainwith the global cluster lead agency,UNHCR. The country level arrangements vary depending on the ability andpresenceofdifferentactorsanddonotnecessarilymirrortheglobalarrangement.Thefundingtrendsforthesefiveotherareasappearinthetablesas“GeneralProtection.”

In discussion with the GPC during the course of this research, we determined that there is a need to unpackthis category of “GeneralProtection,” including themesearlier covered asAoRs,27 in order todifferentiatewhichcomponents are “foundational” – i.e. essential or enabling activities for all protection actors including AoRs (for example:vulnerabilityassessments,IDPregistration,validationofsafeconditionsforreturn,protectionmonitoring,and cluster coordination including analysis to support a protection-focussed humanitarian strategy). Then there are someserviceswhich aremore response-oriented, suchas rule of lawand judicial referral, community capacity-building forprotection,demobilisationofchildsoldiers, focussedpsychosocialandmaterialsupport for IDPsandaffectedpopulations(includingforexamplethedisabledandolderpersons)whoareneitherchildrennorsurvivorsofsexualviolence.SomeoftheseservicesarecoveredbyAoRsand/orotherprotectionactors.Whilethisdistinctionisnotapparentinthefundingpatternsdiscussedbelow,itisimportantforthelaterdiscussion(section3.2)abouthowto improve planning, management and results.

TherelationshipbetweentheGPCandtheAoRsisnotstraightforwardeither.The2005IASCmandatedocumentstatesthattheAoRsarecomponentsoftheGPC.28 Each of the four thematic areas represented by an AoR has a historyofUNandinstitutionalmandatesthatpre-datetheclustersystem,manyofthemhavespecialrelationshipswithUN-mandatedSpecialRapporteurs,andallhaveextensivenetworksofmemberswhoworkontheirthematicissuesbeyondtheprotectionfieldandevenbeyondthehumanitariandomain.ItisperhapsmoreusefultoseetheAoRsasbroadthematiccommunitieswhichbringtheirspecialisedunderstandingtobearonthecommongoalofan improvedprotectionenvironment,andsomeofwhichworkverycloselyonshared issues (forexamplesexualviolenceagainstgirlsisclearlyaconcernforbothChildProtectionandSexualandGender-BasedViolence).Inthiscontext,GPCanditsfourAoRsandtheIASCitself(fortheprotectionofIDPsandaffectedpopulationsgenerally)hasdevelopeditsownsetofstandardsandguidelinesforbestpracticeandmainstreaming,sometimeswithcross-reference to the other AoRs.29

16


In the followingFig.1.530 theLandmineandClusterMunitionsMonitor (LCMM)data forMineAction isdisplayedseparately,butbearinmindthattheotherAoRdatainFig.1.5islimitedtotheon-appealdataset,whiletheMineAction data includes everything reported under the Landmine Convention.31

Finding 5.ChildProtectionfundingfollowsthegeneraltrend-withapeakin2010(especiallyHaiti),adipin2011andsomerecoveryin2012.SupportforSexualandGender-BasedViolence(SGBV)hasbeenincreasingsince2009.HousingLandandProperty(HLP)32 is the least-funded AoR and is gaining a little in 2012 (although wethinkthatourmethodologysomewhatoverestimatesHLPin2012).GeneralProtectionfollows–indeeddetermines– theshapeof theoverall trend.MineAction funding isconsiderableand remarkablyconstantthrough the reporting period,33althoughexpertsinterviewedforthisstudyexpressedconcernsthattheamountof funding available for mine victim assistance is reducing as responsibility for this is being handed off to national systems

Conclusions on AoR funding trendsItisevenmoredifficulttodeterminetheextenttowhichAoRsareunderfunded,becausethedataavailableinFTSdoes not showus the size of theAoR-level request againstwhich fundswere provided (the denominator in anunderfundingcalculation).Throughinterviewswithexpertsanddiscussionsduringthefieldvisits,weconcludethatMineAction is alwaysbest-fundedandconsidered tobe separate from theotherAoRs inmost respects.ChildProtectionisgenerallybetter-funded34relativetoitsrequeststhanSGBValthoughthisishighlycontextual,andHLPisgenerallymodestinitsrequests,seekingnicheswhenconditionsareconduciveratherthansystematicallyrequestingprogramfunding.GeneralProtectionissoimportantandhassuchawidescope,thatitwouldbenefitfromfurtheranalysis of the relative importance and funding trends of its various components.

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1.3 Funding trends by recipient country

Using data fromDevelopment Initiatives’Global Humanitarian AssistanceReport 2013 in Figure 1.6we set thecontextforourexaminationofrecipientcountriesbyhighlightingtheoverallhumanitarianfundingtrendstothetoptenhumanitarianassistancerecipientcountriesfrom2002to2011.WiththeexceptionofthesplitbetweenSudanandSouthSudanin2011,andtheclosureoftheresponsetotheIndonesiaTsunami,thistrendcontinuesinto2012-2013.

Finding 6.ComparingFig.1.6withTable1.1below,eightofthetoptenhumanitarianassistancecountries2002-2011 are in the top ten protection receiving countries 2007-2012, a very high degree of correlation. Only Ethiopia and Indonesia are not top protection funding-receiving countries

“There is no emergency where there aren’t protection concerns” – expert opinion

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Overthesix-yearperiodcoveredbythisstudy,weexaminedthecountry-leveltrendsinfundingtoprotection.Table1.1 lists the amounts requested for protection through appeals, and the amounts received for protection over the 2007-2012period,rankedaccordingtotheamountsreceivedforprotection.YellowhighlightedcountriesinTable1.1arealsointhetopfourteenOfficialDevelopmentAssistance(ODA)recipientcountries2007-2011.35 These are the nine countries of concentration of both humanitarian and development funding. This is important for the discussionofprospectsforaccesstodevelopmentfinancinginsection1.6below(page27).

Table 1.1 Funding for Protection Within Appeals 2007-2012

Appeal country $requested $received

Sudan 574,842,315 215,370,050

DR Congo 390,013,999 103,514,619

Syrian Crisis 155,087,946 73,054,977

Palestinian territory 109,762,420 70,047,154

Sri Lanka 115,161,153 69,553,908

Uganda 114,959,790 68,641,522

Somalia 223,615,601 68,337,910

Haiti 103,327,616 61,511,079

Pakistan 141,226,927 55,205,711

Iraq 89,032,343 42,015,310

CAR 70,627,086 34,523,530

Cote d'Ivoire 68,948,350 34,488,992

Nepal 41,211,599 34,400,729

South Sudan 122,361,778 33,143,215

Zimbabwe 105,535,817 28,247,617

Afghanistan 43,274,995 20,325,035

Yemen 54,072,783 19,031,370

Chad 88,681,657 16,683,852

Jordan 45,567,024 16,538,072

Liberia 35,012,291 16,391,638

Kenya 49,332,975 14,063,768

Mali 17,713,978 13,262,688

Kyrgyzstan 13,202,917 12,447,329

Myanmar 20,994,024 12,170,304

Philippines 17,505,431 6,552,010

Lebanon 13,757,847 4,959,262

Niger 14,091,200 955,181

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Table1.2providesadifferentperspective.ItusesFTSappealdata36overthesix-yearperiodtoshowtheextenttowhichprotectionisunderfundedinrelationtotheamountthatthetotalhumanitarianappealswereunderfunded–thisiswhatwecancalltheprotection funding gapanditindicateswhichemergenciesarerelatively speaking overlookedfromaprotectionperspective.Bywayofmoredetailedexplanation:Kyrgystan’stotalappealsoverthisperiodwere70%funded,butwithinthemtheprotectioncomponentswere94%funded,sointhisinstanceKyrgystan’sprotectionrequestswerefunded24%morethantheoverallappealresponse.Incontrast,althoughNiger’sappealswere64%funded,Niger’sprotectionrequestswereonly7%fundedsooverthisperiodtherewasanegativegapof-57%inprotection funding relative to overall appeal funding.

Table 1.2 Gap Between % of Appeals Funded and % Protection Funded 2007-2012

Appeal country % appeal received % protection received % gap

Kyrgyzstan 70% 94% 24%

Nepal 77% 83% 6%

Sri Lanka 55% 60% 5%

Mali 71% 75% 4%

Cote d'Ivoire 50% 50% 0%

Palestinian territory 67% 64% -3%

Jordan 41% 36% -5%

Iraq 52% 47% -5%

Haiti 68% 60% -8%

Syrian Crisis 57% 47% -10%

Uganda 71% 60% -11%

Myanmar 69% 58% -11%

Philippines 51% 37% -14%

CAR 64% 49% -15%

Liberia 65% 47% -18%

Afghanistan 65% 47% -18%

Pakistan 60% 39% -21%

Yemen 63% 35% -28%

Lebanon 66% 36% -30%

Sudan 69% 37% -32%

Zimbabwe 60% 27% -33%

South Sudan 65% 27% -38%

Somalia 71% 31% -40%

DRC 70% 27% -43%

Kenya 73% 29% -44%

Chad 72% 19% -53%

Niger 64% 7% -57%

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“Funding is guided by the way appeals and the industry are framed and categorized. It is influenced by the packaging” – expert opinion

Finding 7.Fivecountriesstandout-DRC,Somalia,SouthSudan,SudanandPakistan-asbeing(a)countriesinTable1.1.withlong-standingprotectionconcernsthat(b)inTable1.2alsoreceivedlessthan40%oftheirrequested protection funding over the 2007-2012 period. Arguably these are the countries most deserving of protection stakeholder attention (donors and actors alike). These five also share the characteristics ofbeingprotractedemergencies,withcombinationsof IDPsandrefugees/returnees,andsevereproblemsofhumanitarian access

Finding 8.Countrieswhicharerelativelywell-funded(nearerthetopofTable1.2)arethosewithemergenciesthatarealmostentirelymanagedbyUNHCR,ICRC,UNICEF,OHCHRorIOM(becauseofparticularcircumstancesuniquetoeachsituation):Kyrgyzstanwas89%multilateral,Nepal70%,SriLanka85%andMali99%.37 The highproportionof fundingmightreflecttheperceivedqualityofthe implementingorganisations,and/orthesimplicityoftheappeals(fewerandlargerprojects),and/ortherealismoftheappealrequestsbasedongoodunderstanding of implementing capacities

Finding 9. WeanalysedthecorrelationbetweenFieldProtectionClusteractivationandthenumberofprotectionprojectsinCAPsfullyorpartiallyfundedin2012.Wefoundextremelyhighcorrelation.Unfortunately,however,only16.7%ofallprotectionprojectsrequestedinCAPsin2012werefullyfunded,another29.9%werepartiallyfunded,and53.4%wereunfunded.Inouropinion,7of25countriesthatmadeprotectionrequestsin2012didnotattractenoughfundingtojustifytheeffortofassemblingaprotectionpackageintheirCAPs

Finding 10.Countrieswhereprotectionislesswell-funded(thebottomhalfofTable1.1.)tendtobelarge-scale protracted emergencies (Pakistan,Somalia, Sudan,DRC), or smaller emergencies outside themainmediaspotlightandgenerallyoverlooked(Yemen,Lebanon,Zimbabwe,Chad,Niger)38

TheLCMMdatashowsthatMineActionfunding issettled inapatternof fundingaccordingtotheprevalenceofmines,withvariationovertimedeterminedbygeopoliticalfactorsandtheevolutionofaccess.Forthemostpart,MineActionisfundedfromseparatedonorbudgetsourcesandworksthroughasmallsetofsingle-purposeorganisationsinalimitedseriesofmine-affectedcountries.Forthesereasons,MineActionisnotindirectcompetitionwithotherprotection actors for scarce funding.

Conclusions regarding recipient countriesThere is considerable literature arguing that responses to humanitarian crises are generally driven by need but then further shaped by the media and geopolitical or economic interests.39Protectionfundingseemstobeguidedbysimilarfactors.Whilethebulkofprotectionfundinggoestothelargestprotractedhumanitariancrises,withinthisgroupthereissomecorrelationbetweenhigherlevelsofprotectionfunding(inrelationtotherequests)forcountriesofgreaterpoliticalinterest(Iraq,oPt)ormediavisibility(Haiti).Similarly,protectionisproportionallylessfundedincountriesoflessgeopoliticalinterest,whosehumanitarianproblemsseemparticularlyintractable,andwherehumanitarianaccessismoredifficult(SouthSudan,Sudan,SomaliaandDRC).Smallercountriesattractingleastgeopoliticalinterest(Kenya,ChadandNiger)receivetheleastfundinginrelationtotheirrequests,whilesmallercountrieswithahighlycontainedcrisisorahighlymultilateralresponseseemtoreceivethemostfundinginrelationtotheirrequests(Kyrgystan,Nepal,SriLanka,Mali,Côted’Ivoire).Evidencefortheabovesuppositionsiscircumstantialatbest,andwouldneedmoreindepthresearchtoconfirm.

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1.4 Funding trends by recipient organisation

The top ten organisations receiving funding for protection40 2007-2012are shown in Table 1.3below.ReportedamountsforICRC,UNICEFandUNHCRareextractedfromtheirownannualreports.41 The amounts for the other seven organisations are extracted from FTS, and should be considered as minimum amounts as all of theseorganisations carry out substantial protection programming through integrated programmes that are reported under differentheadingsinFTS.42Thesetwodatasourcesarenotcomparable;howeverthisprovidesthebestaggregatepicturewecanobtainfrompublicsources.

ForthethreemajorprotectionagencieswithsignificantfinancialreportinginFTS(ICRC,UNHCRandUNICEF)weanalyzedthisdatainrelationtotheiroverallspending,anddeterminedthatnoneoftheseagencieshassignificantlyincreased or decreased its proportional spending to protection over the period 2007-2012

Finding 12.Since2008,the“marketshare”ofthefourthtotenth-placeprotectionorganisationshasfluctuatedbetween17and25%ofthetotal topten(notconsideringadditionalflow-throughfundingfromUNHCRorfundingfromprivatesources),butthereisnotasignificantshiftovertimetowardsorawayfrommultilateralpartners43

Table 1.3 Total Funding (US$ M) for Humanitarian Protection via the Top Ten Protection Agencies 2007-2012

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Totals

ICRC 148.0 168.7 162.7 165.2 196.1 197.3 1,038.1

UNHCR 65.2 80.3 89.5 96.1 99.8 132.1 563.0

UNICEF (CPHA) 79.5 66.9 63.5 92.0 82.0 70.1 454.0

NRC 5.1 16.4 22.9 15.5 10.7 21.6 92.1

OHCHR 15.4 22.3 9.3 13.3 11.4 13.7 85.5

IOM 5.4 11.0 8.3 13.7 15.7 29.6 83.6

DRC 2.2 6.9 12.8 15.6 9.1 20.0 66.6

SCI 7.8 13.3 9.5 12.6 9.5 12.4 65.0

IRC 3.9 7.2 3.1 11.5 3.3 9.2 38.3

UNFPA 6.0 5.3 4.3 8.4 8.9 4.6 37.5

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Aswecanseeintable1.3,overthe2007-2012studyperiod,thetopfourNGOsreportingfundingthroughFTSforprotectionare theNorwegianRefugeeCouncil,DanishRefugeeCouncil,Save theChildren International,andtheInternational Rescue Committee. For all of these organisations, protection is only a small percentage of their total fundinginanygivencountry.Inordertoseehowmuchoftheirhumanitarianfundingisallocated44toprotection,wecangraphinFigure1.7the%ofeachINGO’stotalhumanitariancontributionsreportedtoFTSthatareforon-appealprotection.45

AmongthefourmajorINGOs,overthesix-yearperiod(averagingthe%valuesperyear)it isNRCthathasspentthe largestproportionof itshumanitarianfundsonon-appealprotection(7.8%average),closelyfollowedbyDRC(7.6%),IRC(7.2%)andfinallySCI(4.8%).Thereisnodoubtthattheseareunderestimates,sinceinmanycountrysituations theseorganisations (particularlySCIand IRC)willhave large integrated/multi-sectoralprogrammesthatincludesignificantprotectionspendingbutthatarenotcodedinFTSasprotectionprojects,andthatthereforearenot captured by this analysis.46

Thequestionofprotectionmainstreamingarosethroughoutthecourseofthisstudy.Inthecontextofthissectiononrecipientorganisationswehaveoneobservationtomake:

Finding 13. The extent of protectionmainstreaming is significant but not recorded, sowithout additionalresearch it is not possible to determine the dollar value of protection mainstreaming or to measure its results – withoutwhichwecannotdetermineitsvalueformoney.Inresponsetotheonlinesurvey,63%ofrespondentsstatedthattheyhaveasignificantorveryhighlevelofprotectionmainstreamingintheirotherhumanitarianordevelopment programming

23


Finding 14.WeanalyzedsampleyearsofFTSrecordstodetermine ifandwhenNationalNGOs(NNGOs)receiveprotectionfundingthroughtheestablishedappealsystem.WiththenotableexceptionsofDRC(whichhasaCHFpolicyofbroadinclusion)andoPt(whichhasawell-developedNNGOsector),thereareveryfewexamplesofNNGOsaccessingappealfundingforprotection.Ofthetwopooledfundingmechanismstowhichtheyhaveaccess:ERFsgenerallyprovidebetween10%and20%toNNGOs,47andin2012CHFsprovided22%oftheirprotectionspendingtoNNGOs.CHFsarethemostlikelyvehicleforNNGOfundingforprotection,followedbyERFs

Conclusions regarding recipient organisationsWhen analysed from the perspective of appeal funding,afeworganisationsreceivethevastmajorityofprotectionfunding:itisaverynarrowandspecialisedfield.NNGOshaveaparticularchallengewithaccessingfundingthroughthe formal appeal system.

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1.5 Funding trends by donor

TheDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee’sCreditorReportingSystem(DACCRS)isthemostreliablesourceofdataon total humanitarian spending.48

WeanalysedinconsiderabledetailthedonorbreakdownofprotectionfundinginFTS.However,the“total”protectiondatasethassuchinconsistentsectoralreportingpracticesthatweconcludeditisnothelpfultopublishthatdatainthis report.

Table 1.4 DAC: All Humanitarian Assistance (US$ M)

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total

United States 3,156 4,419 4,701 5,612 4,097 21,984

EU Institutions 1,481 1,516 1,605 1,652 1,784 8,039

Japan 207 343 334 720 894 2,498

United Kingdom 387 407 740 389 408 2,330

Canada 557 347 313 524 513 2,254

Sweden 301 331 433 360 529 1,954

Germany 255 343 407 383 418 1,805

Norway 360 367 386 333 355 1,801

Netherlands 632 374 404 124 168 1,702

Australia 109 328 339 450 419 1,645

Spain 214 309 398 330 256 1,507

Switzerland 283 283 163 281 320 1,329

Denmark 121 144 137 156 201 759

Ireland 198 178 98 79 89 643

Belgium 107 115 118 132 162 634

Finland 94 103 117 124 144 582

Italy 83 125 99 81 76 465

UAE .. .. 135 89 155 379

France 47 26 24 58 83 238

Luxembourg 38 34 39 40 53 204

Totals 8,631 10,092 10,989 11,917 11,123 52,751

25


Finding 15.AnoverarchingconclusionofthedonorsurveyisthatnodonorfeelsFTSdatafairlyrepresentstheirprotectionfunding.AlldonorsnotethatFTSdoesnotcapturetheircorefundingtothemajorprotection-mandated organisations particularly UNHCR and ICRC, nor their contributions to protection that aremainstreamed or integrated into other humanitarian sectors. In sum, there is no protection spending data thatdonorshaveconfidencein–neitherinFTS(poorqualityofsectorcoding)norinDAC-CRS(noprotectioncoding). There is no good donor data on protection funding

However,throughthehigher-qualityon-appealdataset,FTSdoesgiveusageneralpictureofwhichdonorsemphasiseprotection in appeals,andtosomeextentwhatAoRstheyfocusonin appeals. This provides useable general trend informationeventhoughtheabsolutenumbersareweak.ThetopthreedonorstoprotectionaretheUSA,ECHOandNorway.Below,inFigures1.8–1.10thesethreeprotectiondonors’contributionsarecharted.49

Finding 16.USAplacesemphasisuponChildProtection,especiallyin2009-2010,withinagenerallyincreasingon-appeal protection portfolio.50

26


Finding 17. ECHO’s funding emphasises activities that generally fallwithinwhatwehave called “GeneralProtection” (typically the countryprogrammesofUNHCR, IOMandprotectionmulti-sector51 organisations likeNRCandDRC)withinanoverallprofilethatsawasharpincreaseinon-appealfundingin2010,adipin2011andastrongrecoveryin2012(thisisanexaggeratedversionoftheoverallprotectionfundingprofileofall donors)

Finding 18.Norwayisbyfarthemostsignificantdonortotheon-appealHousingLandandPropertysub-sector (mainly throughNRC’s flagship “Information,Counselling andLegalAssistance”programme,whichwehavecodedasHLP)andotherwiseaminordonortotheprotectionappeals(mostofNorway’sprotectionfundingiscorecontributionstoprotectionorganisations).Theapparentdownwardtrendinthegraphabovesimplyreflectsareductionintheamountofspendingallocatedtoon-appealprotection,anddoesnotreflectNorway’soverallspendingonprotection

Finding 19.Weanalysedinsomedetailthedonors’geographicspendingpatternsshowninFTS.TheUSAfundingdistributionshowsconsistentsupportforafewprotractedemergencies(DRC,Sudan/SouthSudan,Central African Republic), and in addition, a pattern of focussing on different countries each year depending onwheretheemergencyhaspeaked(thepeakcountriesbeing,inorder,Nepal,Sudan,Iraq,Haiti,oPtandagainoPt).ECHO’sprotection funding ismoreconcentratedonUganda,Sudan,SriLanka,oPtandDRC,withoccasionalspikesinothercountries.Inbothcases,thisrepresentstheearmarkingdecidedbythedonor(earmarkingdecidedbythepartneragenciesisnotconsistentlyreportedinFTS)

Finding 20. The twomajor changes inMine Action funding in recent years are the decline of Canadiansupport,andtheendingoftheEuropeanUnion’sdedicatedMineActionprogramwhichhasresultedinMineActionbeing fundedonacase-by-casebasis through theEU’scountryprograms.52Provisional2012datasuggeststhatthelargerdonorsareholdingfirmorincreasing,whilethesmallerdonorsarereducing–withtheneteffectthatthereisagradualconcentrationofMineActionfundinginfewerdonors

27


Finding 21.Thedonorsurveyaskeddonorstoidentifyiftheyhavespecificprotectionpoliciesorstrategiesatthegenerallevel,orforsub-sectorsofprotectionsuchasSGBV,ChildProtectionorMineAction.Onthewhole,onlyafewdonorshaveseparateprotectionpoliciesorstrategies,butmosthaveprotectionprinciplesembedded in their general humanitarian strategies53

Finding 22. In recent years, non-DAC/emerging donors are gaining prominence in recent emergencies, and areimportantdonorstoERFinparticular.However,whentheemergingdonors’contributionsforprotectionare added together,55theymakeuponequarterofonepercentoftheprotectioncontributionsforthesix-yearstudy period

Finding 23.PrivatefinancingistheBermudatriangleofhumanitarianspending,andprotectionisnoexception.FTSrecords39projectsforatotalof$5.2millionasbeingprovidedbyprivatedonorsforprotectionover2007-2012.TheCentreforGlobalProsperity(HudsonInstitute)’s2012IndexofGlobalPhilanthropyandRemittancesestimatedthatUSprivatecontributionsforInternationalDevelopmentandReliefNGOsamountedto$14billionin2010,ofwhich$4.9billionisestimatedasspentonDisasterReliefandRefugees.56 We can assume that a significantproportionofthis$4.9billionprovidedtoNGOsforemergenciesendedupinprotection:buthowmuch is a matter for conjecture at this point

Table 1.5 Perceptions of donor support for Protection (DARA 2011):

Scale from 0=low to 10=high54

Donor Scalefrom0=low to10=high

Advocacy for protection of civilians

Australia 8.08 4.74

Denmark 7.68 6.15

Finland 7.65 6.58

Switzerland 7.18 5.3

Norway 7.11 6.67

Luxembourg 7.05 5.63

Sweden 7.05 5.77

Japan 6.9 5.39

France 6.88 6.23

Spain 6.85 5.21

ECHO 6.69 5.93

USA 6.67 5.77

Canada 6.62 5.86

Netherlands 6.54 6.8

UK 6.53 4.75

Belgium 6.31 5.57

Italy 6.15 5.78

Ireland 6.12 3.3

Germany 5.01 4.32

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Conclusions regarding donor funding trendsThisistheareawheredataisthemostproblematic.ThereisnodoubtthattheUSAandECHOarethedominantdonors to protection,57particularlyfromtheperspectiveofappeals.Norway,Sweden,DenmarkandJapanareinasecondtierofdonorsinabsolutequantities,butsignificantintheweightingtheyplaceuponprotectionwithintheiroverallportfolios.Thefieldpartnerperceptions(DARAsurvey)generallysupporttheviewthat“Nordic”donorsplacepriorityonprotectionintheirfundingandadvocacy,butitisimportanttorecallthatsomedonors(notablyUKandSweden) are significant unearmarkedandpooled funddonors, so theywill alwaysbe lessvisible as protection donorswhile remaining important. Donors seem to displaymild AoR preferences, but the geographic and AoRdistribution of spending is so varied and volatile from year to year and donor to donor, that our overarching conclusion isthatthefluctuationinon-appealprotectionspendinggenerally(Fig1.2),inabsoluteamounts(Fig1.5)andbyAoRs(Figs1.8-1.10)ismorelikelyaconsequenceofthe“protectiontopography”ofdifferentemergencies,andlesslikelyaconsequence of deliberate donor choices.

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1.6 Development funding sources

Intheleaduptothisstudy,wewereaskedtoconsidertheextenttowhichhumanitarianprotectioncouldlinkupwithdevelopmentfundingsources.Forthisreason,thissectiondoesnotanalysepasttrends,somuchasdiscusstheextentofoverlapbetweenthesetwofundingsources,andwhetherthefundingtrendscouldbeencouragedtoconverge.Inthesectionbelowhumanitarianfundingisunderstoodasaddressingimmediatehumanitarianneedsaccordingtoestablishedhumanitarianprinciples,andshouldnotbedivertedfordevelopmentinvestments.Nevertheless,withinthisparadigm,humanitarianactorsstillhave theresponsibility tounderstandthecontext, tocoordinatewith theirdevelopmentcolleagues,and,wewillargue,shouldbeabletoaccessdevelopmentfundinginordertoenhanceandsustain their initial humanitarian achievements.

“… DAC members are now committed … (ii) through humanitarian assistance, to respond to crises; and (iii) using a mix of humanitarian and development assistance, to achieve a better transition from a humanitarian situation to long-term development”. Brian Atwood, Chair of the DAC, in the Introduction to Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship: 12 lessons from DAC peer reviews, 2012

Thefirstthingtonoteisthatprotection problems have roots outside the emergency. Every society has a set ofprotectionrisksthatareshapedbyitssocio-economic,political,culturalandhistoricalfactors.Mostfragilestateshaveveryhighlevelsofprotectionriskthatpre-existahumanitarianemergency,andtheeffectofaconflictornaturaldisasteristoaccentuatethoserisksandabusivebehaviours.58 A good illustration of this is forced early marriage in PakistanandAfghanistan,wherecircumstancesofdisplacementanddestitutioncanleadfamiliestopushdaughtersoffintoearlymarriage,ironicallybecausethisisperceivedasprovidingthemwithmore“protection”thanremainingwiththedeprivedfamilyespeciallyifthecircumstancesaresuchthatthegirliswithoutthe“protection”ofanadultmalerelative.Inthisexample,earlymarriagewasnotinventedbytheemergency,butitspracticeisaccentuatedbytheexceptionalconditionsoftheemergency.Asimilarpatterncanbeseeninmostareaswhereprotectionactorswork:childlabour,adultandchildsexualabuse,deprivationofthevulnerable,theelderlyandthedisabled,deliberatewithholdingofservicestoethnicorreligiousminorities,lackofaccesstojustice,seizureoflandandpropertyetc.Inall thesecases theprotection risks (risk= threatxvulnerability)aregreatlyenhancedby thecircumstancesofdisplacementanddeprivation,particularlywhenthethreatsarefurtherincreasedbyarmedconflict.

“Over 80% of aid to fragile states and economies is non-humanitarian aid” – OECD (2013)

Secondly, humanitarian protection actors miss opportunities to ally with those working on the root causes.Generally speaking, humanitarian actors limit theirwork to the immediate circumstances and needs oftheaffectedpopulation,especiallyiftheycharacterisethemselvesas“needs-based”.Insomecases–ECHObeinga good example – the donor agency has a very clear understanding of the link between the humanitarian andthedevelopmentcontexts,59butneverthelesstheboundariesofthehumanitariandomainaresetsoastoexcludethis“environment-building”dimension (mostoftenvisualised through ICRC’s2001“eggmodel”60).Separating thehumanitariananddevelopmentdomains in thisway is ineffectiveonseveralcounts,hereare justa few.First,bydiscouragingengagementwithhostgovernmentsitenablesthosegovernmentstoavoidtheirprimaryresponsibilityforprotection.Second,byconsideringonly consequencesandnotcauses, suchactivitiesmissopportunities to

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encouragesignificantandlastingchangeinsystemsorbehaviour.Third,humanitarianprotectionactivitiesconductedexclusivelyinhumanitarianspaceareseverelylimitingtheirprospectsforsustainability(i.e.thesolutionswillnotbedurable).61Andfinally,inaworstcasescenariothatviolatesthe“donoharm”principle,activitiescouldbeinitiatedin humanitarian space, such as shelters for rape survivors or the aggregation of vulnerable minorities into camps or settlements,whichcouldleaveaffectedpopulationsatgreaterriskifthehumanitariansupportdisappearsandtherehas not been a responsible managed transition to a more permanent support system.62 In conclusion, even if some humanitarianactorsdonothavemandatesorresourcestotacklethesystemicaspectsofprotection,wewouldarguethattheyallhavearesponsibilitytoensurethattheiractionsarefullyinformedby,andtotheextentpossibleconnectupwith,therelatedactivitiestakingplaceinthedevelopmentrealm.

Figure 1.11 attempts to map sources of abuse against the programme responses of protection actors:

Inthisgeneralmodelabove,theredtextindicatescausesorsourcesofdeliberateabuse,andthegreentextindicatesresponsesorsolutions.Onthewhole,therearefewactorsworkingonpreventioninthelowerleftquadrant:thosewouldbemainlyICRC,tosomeextentUNHCR(especiallycommunitycapacity-buildingforprotection)andOHCHR,and a few specialisedNGOsproviding humanitarian accompaniment. In the upper left, it could be that nationalNGOsandreligious/communityleadersareactiveinthisarea,andsomeNGOsworkingonchildprotectionorSGBVawareness. The upper right quadrant iswhere the bulk of cluster-coordinatedCAP-appealed programming lies:mainlyaddressingtheconsequencesandlessfrequentlythecausesofabuse.Inthelowerrightquadrantaremanyoftheactionsthatfallwithinthedevelopmentrealm,astheyarelong-termchangesorsystem-building.Thismodelisfarfromcompleteandwedonotexpectittofindconsensusinthehumanitariancommunity,butwehopeitillustratesthatasignificantamountofprotectionprogrammingfocussesonindividualsandconsequences,andlessoncausesandprevention.Thismodelalsopresents,inadifferentway,therelationshipbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentprogramming.

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Third: there is funding available for protection from development sources.With fewexceptions, themostimportantprotractedemergencieswithsevereprotectionneedsareinfragilestatesthatarealsotoprecipientsofdevelopmentassistance.Table1.1showswhichnineprotection-receivingcountries2007-2012arealsointhetopfourteen ODA recipient countries 2007-2011 – clearly implying that ODA resources are available if the connection can bemade,inparticularinAfghanistan,DRCongo,Pakistan,Sudan(andnow,separatelySouthSudan),theoccupiedPalestinianterritoriesandHaiti.

Socantheconnectionbemade?Insomesectorsandwithsomedonors,thisshouldbepossible,butitrequiresresearchon howdonors have set their priorities at the country level. It also requires awillingness and ability toengagemoreandearlierwithhostgovernments–howeverdifficultthismightbe.Bywayofexample,ifwewanttofinddevelopmentfinancingforprotectionactivitiesthatreferaffectedpopulationstolegalrecourse,table1.6showsDACdatafrom2011forUSandEUdisbursementsforDACcode15130“LegalandJudicialDevelopment”,allfromdevelopment sources.63

Some organisations understand these linkages very well and have joined-up or even integrated programs thatstraddlethedevelopmentandhumanitariandomains.UNICEFisacentralexamplewithitsChildProtectionFocusArea4fundedfrombothEmergencyandRegularresources,eveninthesamecountry;anotherisSavetheChildrenInternationalwithitspreferenceforintegratedcountryprogramsfocussedontheirtargetpopulationandabletoblendfundingsources.Indeed,oftherespondentstotheonlinesurvey,13%saidthatfundingfortheirprotectioncontextwas“onlyhumanitarian”,53%saidthatitwasamixofhumanitariananddevelopmentbutmostlyhumanitarian,15%saidthatitwasabalancedblend,and18%saidthefundingsourceswereblendedbutmostlyfromdevelopmentsources.UN-HABITATismoreatthedevelopmentendofthisspectrum,withHousingLandandPropertyprogramsthatarerarelyfinancedfromhumanitariansourcesattheoutsetofanemergency,butwhousetheirparticipationintheGlobalProtectionClustertokeepconsiderationoflandandpropertyissuesonthehumanitarianradar64 and, whenpossible,leverageworkonlandtitlingandregistrationwithinanemergencycontextintosuccessfuldownstreamdevelopment programs.65

Thepossibilityofworkingwithnationaladvocatesanddomesticprivatephilanthropyshouldalsonotbeoverlooked.DomesticaswellasinternationaloutrageattheattemptedassassinationofMalalaYousafzaiinPakistan,andtherapeand murder of “Nirbhaya” in India, have become endogenous drivers for policy and legal reform in the areas of Child ProtectionandSGBV,andtriggeredseveralinitiativesthathumanitarianprotectionactorscanconnectwith.

Table 1.6 2011 ODA Disbursements on Legal and Judicial Development (US$m)

USA EC

Afghanistan 226.0 4.8

DR Congo 12.5 5.0

Haiti 14.4 0.0

Pakistan 30.5 9.3

o Palestinian Terr. 50.7 12.7

South Sudan 9.1 0.0

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Fourth: the problems lie more with the structure of the aid machinery than with the amount of funds available. Several recent reports tackle the decades-old conundrum of bridging the gap between relief and development. AcomprehensiveoverviewinUNHCR’srecently-publishedevaluationStillmindingthegap:areviewofeffortstolinkrelief to development in situations of humanitarian displacement, 2001-201266 argues that despite long-standing policycommitmentsinvariousUNforadatingbacktothe1982GeneralAssemblyResolution37/197andmultipledonorpolicies(notablytheEU1996policyLinkingRelief,RehabilitationandDevelopment),between2001and2012theinternationalcommunityhasfailedtomakeprogressinbridginggapsofthreedifferenttypes:thestrategicgap(inability todevelop integratedplans), thefinancialgap (inability toprovide fast,flexiblebridgefinancing),and thecapacity gap (in particular in building national and local capacities).

Stillminding thegapdoeshoweverconcludethat recentdevelopments leaveroomforoptimismthat the turningpointisnear.SignalsinthisdirectionincludeincreasedengagementonthepartoftheWorldBankfollowingonthe2008UN-WorldBankPartnershipforCrisisandPost-crisissituations,67the2010TransitionalSolutionsInitiative,68 the INCAFlineofworkcontributingtothe2011High-LevelForuminBusan,69 one of three items on the 2012-2013 Good HumanitarianDonorshipworkplan,70andtheSecretary-General’sDecision2011/20,whichsetsoutclearguidanceforallUNagenciesonhowtocollaborateonthetransition,andincludesverydetailedguidanceregardingprotection.71

TheculminationofthismoreintensefocusofthelastfewyearsaretheDAC Guidelines on Transition Financing,72 whicharguethattheissueisnottheamountoffinancialresourcesavailable,butasetofproblemsintheaidsystemitself: (a)financingistoocompartmentalised(i.e.humanitarian,developmentandsecurityarmsofdonoragenciesare firewalled from each other); (b) policies and procedures are not properly tailored to the context of transitionenvironments(notablytoomuchriskavoidanceandnotenoughriskmanagement);(c)planningprocessesarebasedon unrealistic needs assessmentswith no link to necessary funding (leading to failures of prioritisation); and (d)financinginstrumentsarefragmented(basedoninstitutionalmandatesnotonobjectivestobeachieved).

AmongtheseveralrecommendationsintheDACGuidelines,therearetwowhichseemtobeofparticularrelevancefor the protection community: (1) “An international agreement on objectives should be used to facilitate prioritisation during transition.Furthermore, strictprioritisation shouldbe linked toa specific financingstrategy that combinesdifferent aid instruments”,73 and (2) “Coherent and collective approaches can be promoted through the use of transition compacts.Compactsare lightandflexibleagreementsbetweennationaland internationalpartners…Compactsreducetheriskofstrategicfailure,improvethefocusonresultsandproviderealisticstepstowardsstrongernationalinvolvementandleadership”.Wewouldarguethatthesearemoreeasilyattemptedintransitionsituationswherethereisaclearpathtoasolution,forexampleincaseswithstronggovernmentcommitmentlikeColombia,IndonesiaorPhilippines,orfollowingnaturaldisastersincontextslikeHaiti.

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1.7 Overall conclusions regarding the funding flows

While overall humanitarian funding data is fairly robust, particularly at the donor/target country level, the available data at the sector level (protection) is so incomplete and inconsistently coded that it can only be considered as an approximationoffundingtrends.74 At the same time, the amounts requested for protection in appeals are subject tomanycontextualfactorsandonlyserveasanapproximationofneeds.Intheabsenceoffirmdenominatorsornumerators,we cannot conclude that protection is underfunded.Whatwe can say, is (a) that overall protectionfunding(whatwecall“FTSmodified”)appearstobefairlysteadyandmuchgreaterthanwhatisrecordedinFTS,(b)thatprotectionisoneoftheleastfundedsectorswithinappeals-althoughitappearstoberecoveringsomewhatin2012fromaverylowpointin2011,and(c)thatthemostimportantcharacteristicofprotectionfundingisnotsomuchitsapparentdeclineorincrease,butitsvolatility(betweencountries,betweenyears,betweenAoRs).Inthenextsectionweexamineprobablereasonsforthisvolatility,withaviewtoseeinghowprotectionfundingcanbebetterrecorded, stabilised and possibly increased.

AvailabledataontheAoRs,recipientcountriesandrecipientorganisationsissaddledwiththesamedataconstraints.Assuming that thewaysprotection is reported toFTSareconsistentover time (i.e. thatmiscodingofprotectionentriesisdoneinasimilarwayeveryyear,orthatthesameorganisationunderreportsitsprotectionspendinginasimilarwayeveryyear)thenwecanobservesomeapproximatelongitudinaltrendsevenwithinaweakdataset.Onthisbasis,wecanseethatthebulkofon-appealprotectionfundinggoesto“GeneralProtection”,followedbyChildProtection,SGBV(graduallyincreasingovertime)andfinallyHLP.MineActionisconsistentlywell-fundedandnotinthe same funding ecosystem. In geographic terms, very contained or politically visible emergencies attract a higher proportionofprotectionfunding(inrelationtorequests)thancomplexprotractedemergencies–fiveofwhich(DRC,Somalia,SouthSudan,SudanandPakistan)standoutasbeingeitherchronicallyunderfundedorchronicallyover-requested–ineithercaseinneedofacriticalassessmentofthestandingofprotectionwithintheoverallhumanitariananalysisandresponse.Andfinally,threeagenciesreceiveabout75%ofallprotectionfunding,andfourNGOsreceiveabout75%oftheon-appealprotectionfundingtoNGOs,fromwhichweconcludethatprotectionfundingishighlyconcentratedinasmallnumberofactors,andalmosttotallyexcludesNationalNGOs.

Theprospects forconnectingupwithdevelopmentfinancingappear tobegood,given (a) that thecorrelation ishighbetweentopdevelopmentfundingrecipientsandtopprotectionrecipients,and(b)theattentionthatisbeingpaidtobetterlinkingrelieftodevelopmentgenerally–butfurtherworkisneededtoloosentherigiditiesofthedonormachinery before this potential can be fully realised.

Asweshallseeinthefollowingchapterpresentingthequalitativedata,itseemsthatthemainissueisnotsomuchthequantityofprotectionfunding,butthequalityofprotectionwork,includinghowitisexplained,howitisplanned,coordinated, implementedandaboveall, reported.Mostobserversfeelthatpathto increasedfunding lies less inadvocacy, and more in performance.

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Amajorcomponentofthisstudywasanattempttounderstandthereasonsforthevariationinprotectionfunding,and inparticularwhy it isgenerallymuch less than requested.Weexamined thisquestion throughsixmethods:literaturereview,in-depthinterviewswithapproximately40researchersorexpertsintheprotectionfield,21donorsurveys,anonlinesurvey,meetingswithclustersanddonorsinthefieldinAfghanistan,Kenya(forSomalia),PakistanandSouthSudan,andanalysisof54protectionactorrepliestotheStateoftheHumanitarianSystem survey.75

“I believe that protection is underfunded because there is no clear strategy that is realistic and that brings in relevant actors. Protection is treated with a humanitarian perspective, on a yearly basis, whereas the solution, including access to land and conflict resolution, is acknowledged to be a long term process. The protection cluster should establish clear landmarks that it can achieve with humanitarian funding but also make a better link to longer term initiatives” – survey response

2.1 Findings from the online survey

Theonlinesurveywasbilingual76 and elicited 143 complete and an additional 93 useable partial responses from 32 countries,withsevenormorereplieseachfromsixteencountries.Surveyrespondentswere41%InternationalNGO,38%UNorIOM,13%NationalNGO,3%ICRCorIFRCS,2%field-basedrepresentativesofdonorGovernmentsand3%others.Intermsofprotectionsub-sectors,respondentsself-identified26%withChildProtection,18%withSexualandGender-BasedViolence,18%withGeneralProtection,16%withHumanRights/Justice/RuleofLaw,10%withprotectionmainstreamedinanotherhumanitariansector,5%withHousingLandandProperty,and4%withotheraspectsofprotection.Aswithsimilarsurveysthatuseaglobalweb-basedmechanism,77respondentswerenotrandomly selected78andasaconsequencethereisameasureofself-interestintheresponses.Unsurprisingly,90%ofrespondentsfelttheirunderstandingofprotectionwasgoodorverygood.79

Intheonlinesurvey,respondentswereofferedalistofelevenpossiblereasonsforunderfundingtoprotection,80 and wereaskedtorankthem(Figure2.1).Respondentsweresimilarlyaskedtoranknineoptionsforwhattheythoughtwouldincreasefundingtoprotection:resultsshowninFigure2.2.

2.0 Reasons for the funding trends

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Reasons for the funding trends

Finding 24.Thestatementthat“othersectorsarefelttobemoreimportant”wasexpressedintheopen-endedsurveyresponses(aswellasinthein-depthinterviews)inthreemainways:(1)“protectionisnotconsideredtobe life-saving”,or (2) “othersectorsgrabpublicattention” (implying theyaremoremedia-worthy–alsoknownasthe“CNNeffect”),orfinally(3)“donorspreferthingsthatcanbevisiblylabelled-ideallywithaflagand photo-op”

Finding 25.Problemsofhumanitarianaccess to vulnerablepopulationswas felt tobeasignificant factorlimitingdonorsupportinsituationswherethehostGovernmentisuncooperative,orwherethereareserioussecurity concerns (Afghanistan andSomalia), orwhere there are physical access challenges due to poorinfrastructure(DRCandSouthSudan)

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Finding 26. Onthewhole,fieldactorsfelt(butnotstrongly)thatdonorHQsstaffneededtobeahigherpriorityforadvocacythandonorfieldstaff81

Asweshall seebelow, thedonorperspectiveonadvocacy ismarkedlydifferent insome respects:mostdonorsfeelthattheirawarenessishigh,andthatfurtheradvocacydirectlytodonorswillnotsignificantlychangethedonorresponsebecause(inthemajoritydonoropinion)itistheimplementingorganisationswhoultimatelydeterminehowmuchisspentonprotection.Wewillreturntothiscentralquestionlaterinsection2.4.

Finding 27.Thesurvey,expertinterviewsanddonorquestionnairealltestedtheideaofadedicatedpooledfundforprotection,orofaprotectionset-asidewithinexistingpooledfunds.Whilesome(butnotamajority)ofthesurveyrespondentswereinfavour,thedonorswereunanimouslynot.Thosedonorswhoalreadysupportpooledfundswouldliketoseethemworkbetterratherthancreateanewone,andthosewhodonotsupportpooled funds do not intend to start. In the absence of donor interest, this idea is a non-starter

Finding 28. Field actors did not feel that the appeal quality, protection program quality, availability of capable organisations or overestimation of needsweremajor constraints. In contrast, the donor surveys revealedadifferentpicturewithsignificantconcernsaboutprojectquality, implementingorganisationalcapacityandcredibility of needs assessments

Onthehypothesisthatresultsreportingisamajorchallengefacingtheprotectioncommunity,weaskedformoredetailonhowfieldactorsreporttheirresults(Fig.2.3):

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Tosomeextent, funding isa functionofhowwell themachinery isworking–orseenanotherway,underfundingcanbeaconsequenceofperceivedweaknessesofcoordinationandpartners.Thesurveyandin-depthinterviewsprobedthisrelationshipfurther,examininganumberofwaysinwhichcoordination,reportingandcapacitycouldbestrengthened: see Fig. 2.482

Finding 29. Whenaskedhowtheycouldobtainbetterprotectionresults,fieldactorssignalledmoreinvolvementofaffectedpopulationsas thesinglemost importantaction theycould take (84%scored thisasveryhighor high), consistentwith the increasing attention to beneficiary accountability throughout the humanitariancommunity,thatisnowembodiedintheJuly2012initiativeoftheIASCtocreateaTaskForceonAccountabilitytoAffectedPopulations.Thiswasclosely followedbymulti-year funding (theonly itemon this list that thefieldactorsdonotfullycontrol),andprofessionalisation/trainingofstaff.Theemphasisonprofessionalisation/training(andfordonorstosetasidefundingforthispurpose)wasechoedbyclustercoordinatorsandotheractorsinterviewedduringthefieldvisits

Finding 30.Theperceivedrelationshipbetweenweakresultsreportingandunderfundingseemsconsistent.The inability to report results annually is rated relatively high as a reason for underfunding in Fig 2.1, and both evidenceaswellasbetterresultsreportingareveryhighly-ratedfactorstoincreasefundingtoprotection(Fig.2.2),togethersuggestingthatfieldactorswidelyrecognisethatresultsreportingisanareaofweakness.Thisisconfirmedbythesurveyresponse(Fig.2.3)thatonly23%ofrespondentsreportonresultsattheoutcome-level(thelevelthatdonorsaregenerallymostinterestedin),andtheview(Fig2.4)of64%ofrespondentsthatstandardizedindicatorsandmonitoringisveryimportantor importanttoobtainingbetterprotectionresults.Donorandexpertinterviewscorroboratedtheconclusionthatthechallengesofshowingprotectionresultsareasignificantlimitingfactorforfunding

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BothChildProtectionandSGBVhaveglobalmonitoringsystemsinplace.Attheformalsystemlevelthere istheMonitoringandReportingMechanism(MRM)fromSecurityCouncilResolution1612of200583forChildProtection,and itscounterpart forSGBV is theMonitoring,AnalysisandReportingArrangement (MARA),mandated in2010bySecurityCouncilResolution1960.84 Both of these require reporting of the incidence of abuse and identity of abuserstotheUNinassociationwiththerespectiveSpecialRapporteurs.Attheleveloffieldcase-managementandincidentreportingtherearesimilartoolsinbothareas:theInter-AgencyChildProtectionInformationManagementSystem,85andtheGender-BasedViolenceInformationManagementSystem.86However,neithertheformalnorthecase-management systems measure the outcome-level results of their respective protection activities at a country level–whichispreciselythegapthatmostdonors,plannersandadvocateswanttoseefilled.

Inordertoexplorewhatisbehindthisperceivedweaknessinplanningandperformancemeasurement,weaskedwhetherfieldactorsusetherangeofprotectionguidesandtoolsavailable(Fig.2.5).

Finding 31.Withregardtoprotectiontools,theproportionofrespondentswhoarefullyorwellawareof,andusetherangeoftoolsis42%,significantlyfewerthanthosewhohaveaprotectionpolicy/strategy(90%)orwhopracticehighorveryhighlevelsofprotectionmainstreaming(63%),whichsuggeststhatthereisstillagapbetweenawareness and actual useoftools.Open-endedsurveyresponsesdidnotshowaclearneedforadditionaltools,butratherapreferenceforconsolidation,simplificationandtranslationofexistingtools

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Finally,weaskedaboutlevelsofprotectionawareness,inordertogetafieldperspectiveonwhoshouldbeprioritisedforawareness-raisingandtraining(Fig.2.6).

Finding 32. Surveyrespondentsoverwhelminglyfeltthatnational/localactors(securityforces,government,communityleadersandnationalNGOs)weremuchmoreinneedofawareness-raisingandtrainingthantheinternational actors

In addition, 90% of survey respondents said that their organisation had a protection policy, strategy or action plan, 63% said that their organisation mainstreams protection in their other humanitarian or development programming, 49% (in the context,we feel this is a relatively low proportion) of respondents felt that the quality of the needsassessment intheirsituationwasgoodorexcellent,and33%statedthattheaffectedpopulationwasinvolvedinneeds assessment or priority-setting.

Overall conclusions from the online surveyProtectionfieldactorsfeelthattwoimportantconstraintsonprotectionfundingaretheinabilitytoshowresults,andtheneedforprofessionalisationoftheprotectionsector.Accessisseenasasignificantfundingconstraintinsomeinstances.Anareaofstrongdivergencebetweentheonlinesurveyoffieldactorsandtheseparatedonorsurvey,isthatfieldactorsfeelthatadvocacywithdonorscanincreasetheamountoffundingallocatedtoprotection–whereasthe donors generally feel that the main allocation decisions are made by implementing organisations.

Intermsofprotectionresults:fieldactorsbelievethattheabsenceofmulti-yearfinancingisamajorproblem,andthatthere is room for improvement in the coordination of needs assessments and of planning.

Theredoesnotseemtobesufficientsupportforaprotectionpooledfund,norisitfeltthatthereisastrongneedforadditionalplanningandreportingtools,justbetteradaptationoftoolsforfieldusers.

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2.2 Findings from the in-depth interviews

Theliteraturereview,donorsurvey,in-depthinterviewsandfieldvisitslookedmorequalitativelyatthereasonswhyprotectionmighthavedifficultyattractingfunding.Threeimportantaspectsofthefundingpictureemerged,andwereexploredinmoredepthaswewentalong:(a)thewayprotectionissituatedwithinthehumanitarianresponse,(b)theperformanceofprotectionprogrammesandpartners,and(c) theextent towhichdirect fundingofprotectionisoffsetbymainstreamingprotectionin“other”humanitariansectors.Protectionexpertsinvariousagencies87 and independent researchers generally agree on several points, grouped here under loose headings:

Protection is difficult to explainFinding 33. Protectionisnoteasytoexplain–nottotheworld’staxpayers,nottopoliticiansandstrategicdecision-makers,oftennoteventoactorswithinemergenciesandlocaldonorrepresentatives--unlessthoseactorsarealreadyinsidetheprotectioncultureandfamiliarwithitstaxonomyandvocabulary.Inparticular,itstechnicalICRC/IASCdefinitionistootheoreticalandlegal.Asaresult,thetermprotectionisappropriatedbyawiderangeofpartiesincludingarmedactors–therebymakingexplanationevenmoredifficult

Finding 34. Protectionisnotasvisible,photogenicormedia-worthyasothermoretangiblecomponentsofthehumanitarianresponsesuchasfood,water,healthandshelter.Asdonorsbecomemorepreoccupiedwithvisibilityintimesofeconomicstressandtaxpayerscrutiny,thiscandrawfundingawayfromprotectionovertime.

“The lack of a clear overarching narrative is an elephant in the room. Is protection an activity or an outcome? If you think it is an activity you only think about outputs. But if you see it as an outcome then you think more about change” – expert opinion

The protection community has not helped, by using several ways and methods to describe their work. Manyprotection actors use similar three-element “Responsive, Remedial, Preventive/Environment-Building” models todescribeprotectionobjectives,butthesedonotaligneasilywithprogrammingapproachesorwiththeAoRstructureofappeals.Similarly,thesametermsaregivendifferentmeaningsindifferentcontexts.Allofthishasitsownlogicthat is more or less understood by protection insiders, but put together it paints a confusing picture to outsiders -- including to the generalist senior management of donor agencies.

Donors can help by ensuring that any policies and strategies they develop, either for protection or for different themes likeChildProtectionandSGBV,areanchoredtoexistinginternationalframeworks.

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Protection is difficult to doFinding 35.Inconflictemergencies,IDPsandaffectedpopulationsareusuallydisplacedbecauseoftheactionorinactionoftheirowngovernment.Eitherway,thehostgovernmentislesslikelytobecooperative,solutionsaremore likelytobedifficult,andthesituation ismore likelytobesensitivefordonorsseekingtomaintainconstructivebilateralrelationswiththehostgovernment88

Finding 36.Someaspectsofprotectionworkcanconfrontdeep-rootedculturalnorms,dependingonthespecificcontext

Finding 37. Themore humanitarian access is anobstacle, themore likely it is that protection actors arephysicallylockedout.Itseemsthatprovidingprotectionismostdifficultinpreciselythosesituationswhereitis most needed

Finding 38. Insomesituations,particularlywhenthehostgovernment isnotdependentondonorfundingandhasawell-developedsecurityapparatus,hostgovernmentscanputprotectionoff limitsasasectorofintervention or dialogue. In these situations, protection sometimes goes underground and is supported by humanitarianactorsunderother labelsorclusters,ortherecanbeabreakdowninthedelicateequilibriumbetweenaccessandservices

Finding 39. Protectionneedssensitivitytolocalhistoricalandsocialcontexts,interpersonalcommunicationskills,excellent judgement,andsometimesalsospecialised legal,psychologicalormedicaltraining.Peoplewiththeseskillsandwhoarewillingtoworkindifficultusuallyconflict-affectedfieldsituationsareinshortsupply

“Protection funding is highly conditioned by the nature of donor – host country political relations, and sometimes an emphasis on protection expresses a donor conscience when there is a political failure at another level” – former RC/HC

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The costs and results of protection mainstreaming are not captured“It is vital to ensure that protection concerns are mainstreamed into the planning and programming cycle of any humanitarian assistance programme”.89ProtectionmainstreaminghasbeenagoaloftheGlobalProtectionClustersinceitwascreatedin2005,90itfiguresprominentlyintheencyclopaedicHandbookfortheProtectionofInternallyDisplacedPersons,91anditisoneofsevenprioritiesfortheGlobalProtectionClusterinits2012-2014workplan.92

“Donors want protection on paper – and on the cheap – through mainstreaming in proposals, but too often will not fund specialists to realize this mainstreaming” – survey response

Everymajorprotectionpolicyandstrategysincethe2002IASCfoundationaldocumentGrowingtheshelteringtree:protecting rights through humanitarian action93hasemphasisedprotectionmainstreaming,andthelastfewyearshasseenthepublicationofageneroussuiteofguides,handbooksandtrainingprogramsbyNGOs94andUNAgencies.Mainstreamingisnowwidelyaccepted,asreflectedintheonlinesurveywhere85%ofrespondentsstatedthattheyhaveamedium,significantorveryhighlevelofprotectionmainstreaming.

NotableamongtheseistheinitiativetakenbyWFPin2012todevelopandapproveaspecifichumanitarianprotectionpolicy,95supportedbydedicatedprotectionmainstreamingadvisersinWFP’smajoroperations.ThesefiveWFPactionpointsconstituteabestpracticeforUNagencies:(1)investininstitutionalcapacityforcontextandriskanalysis,(2)integrateprotectionobjectivesintothedesignandimplementationof…programmes,(3)developstaff’scapacitytounderstand protection, (4) establish informed and accountable partnerships, and (5) establish clear guidance and systems for managing protection-related information.

Amongthedonors,ECHOclearlyemphasisesmainstreamingintheirhumanitarianprotectionfundingguidelines,butUSAID/OfDAtakethistoanindustry-leadinglevel intheir2012editionoftheirGuidelinesforProposals,96whereinUSAIDrequires all proponents to mainstream protection into every proposal in every sector, in order to be eligible for funding.

Finding 40. Despite this considerable level of commitment and effort, the efforts to mainstream protection can stilldobetterintworespects.Thefirstwouldbetostartcapturing the results of mainstreaming, assessing towhatextentmainstreamingeffortisreducingvulnerabilities.Thiswillrequirehumanitarianactorstomeasureprotection-specificoutputsandoutcomesintheirnon-protectionprograms–therecouldbebestpracticesinthisregardbutwewerenotabletofindanyinourreviewoftheliteratureandduringourfieldvisits.Thinkingthatthemuchlongerhistoryofgendermainstreamingmightprovidesomemodels,weconsideredwhetheraprotectionmarker (akin to thecurrentgendermarker)mightenable thehumanitariancommunity tobothemphasiseprotectionandalsotocaptureprotection-mainstreamedasdistinctfromprotection-specificresults.Theconsensusofthefieldactorswasthatthereisalreadymarker-fatigue,andthatintheabsenceofastrongtheoreticalframeworkbackedupbysubstantialexpertresourcestotrain,supportandvalidateasystem-wideapproach,itwouldbebetternottoembarkonthispath

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Finding 41. The second area where the protection community can do better is in joining up their mainstreaming work within each country context.Theexistingsuiteofpoliciesandguidelinesallrelatetothe“vertical”responsibilitiesofeachorganisation(andmakingthingsmorecomplicated,bothSGBVandChildProtectionhave theirownstrategies formainstreamingseparate fromgeneral “protectionmainstreaming”),butdonotconsidertherisksofdifferentmainstreamingapproachesworkingatcross-purposes(forexample,competingapproachestolightingorsafercookingfuel)orconfusingthelimitedpooloffieldactorswhoareeachexpectedtomainstreaminthesameintegratedprogramindifferentways.Perhapsmoreimportantly,intheabsence of a shared overarching analysis of the protection problematique to frame the different mainstreaming efforts,therearemissedopportunitiestoshareexpertise,achieveefficiencies,dividelabourandgetamorecomplete protection response

Figure2.7showstheviewsoftheonlinesurveyrespondentsonthisissue(rankedinorderofthetoptwocategories“most” and “significant” combined). It doesnot showaclearway forwards– instead theevenspreadof repliessuggeststhatthecommunitywouldbenefitfromareflectiveexercisetosetpriorities:

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Value for money97 is hard to showFinding 42.Protectiondoesnotshowresultsasreadilyasothersectorsofhumanitarianresponse(“successis measured in things that do not happen”). It does not have established baselines and indicators, it seems to belackingageneraltheoryofchange,nordoesithaveabodyofevidenceregardingperformanceuponwhichtoplanwithconfidence

Finding 43.Protection requiresmore time (toanalyse thecontext,plan,buildup relationships,strengthencapacities) than the usual one-year humanitarian funding cycle

Finding 44.Protectionisaninherentlylabour-intensiveenterprise.Protectionprojectsareperceivedashavingalargeproportionofstaffandoperatingcosts,andforsomedonorsactivitiessuchasworkshopsandtrainingare seen as less essential in the midst of an emergency. For funding mechanisms that have a salary or overhead cap (sometimes described as an 80-20 ratio), this can shut protection proposals out altogether

Finding 45.Becauseitisarelativelynewsectorofhumanitarianactionitdoesnothaveasmuchdepthofexperience,establishedbestpractice,professionalcadreandtoolsasothersectors

Finding 46. Becauseprojectsizestendbesmaller,98 it is harder to get economies of scale and apply a critical mass of effort to bring about a system-level change

Mainly for the above reasons, the quality of protection needs assessment, programplanning, proposal drafting,projectimplementationandreportingisoftenweak;insomecasesusingcookie-cutterapproachesthatdonotshowevidenceofcontext-specificneedsassessmentorpriority-setting.ICRCbeingtheuniversally-recognisedexceptiontothisstatementvariouslydescribedastheCadillacortheRollsRoycedependingonthegeographyofthespeaker.

Protection has not yet found its place within the humanitarian systemFinding 47.UnderstandingofprotectiononthepartofRC/HCsisuneven,andeveninformedRC/HCsbringsome element of home-institutional bias to their approaches

Finding 48.Protectionisnotgenerallyseenas“life-saving”.Despitetherevised“life-savingcriteria”,99 even protectionagenciesneedtomakethecase-by-caseargumenttoOCHAforprotectiontobeeligibleforCERFfunding

Finding 49.ProtectionissometimesnotgivensufficientemphasisintheCAP,particularlynotintheunderlyinghumanitarian strategy that frames the proposed response in any given situation. As a result, protection can presentasan“add-on”intheCAP’sscene-settingsectionsonthehumanitariancontextandneedsanalysis,andtheproposedprotectionprojectscanappearlesswelljustifiedorintegrateddownstream

Finding 50. Within UN agencies and NGOs, protection often struggles to gain recognition in relation tocompetingprioritiesthatmightbeseenasclosertothecoreinstitutionalmandate,ormorelikelytoelicitpublic/donor interest and support

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Transformative Agenda:

• The strengthening of leadership capacities

• Improved strategic planning

• Strengthened needs assessment, information management, planning, monitoring, and evaluation

• Improved cluster coordination, performance

• Enhanced accountability for collective results, based on a performance framework linked to the strategic plan

• Strengthened accountability to affected communities

UNHCR has a particular challenge juggling the relative priorities of refugees, conflict-affected IDPs, and naturaldisaster-affectedIDPs.Inraresituationswithallthreedynamicsatplayatthesametime,UNHCRstaffwithlimitedresourcesunderstandablyneedtomakedifficultchoices.

Theprotectionclusterhas(andseemstobeseizing)animportantopportunitytorepositionprotectionclosertothecentreofthehumanitariansystembyengagingfirmlywiththeTransformativeAgenda,whichisfullyalignedwiththebroad conclusions of this study (notably the emphasis on strategic planning, improved cluster performance, and the importanceofresultslinkedtostrategicplans).

There is room for the protection cluster system to become more focussed Atthecountrylevel,theclustersystemisacompetitiveenvironment,andclusterswiththeirA-teaminchargeanddedicatedfull-timetotheclustergoalswillbemoreeffectiveatstrategicplanning,advocacy,assuringprogrammequality and attracting funding.

Finding 51. TheGlobal ProtectionCluster has particular challenges stemming from the complexity of itssubjectmatter,thesub-structureofmultipleAoRseachwiththeirownleadagencies,andunder-resourcingofthe vital cluster coordination function

Finding 52. TheidentificationofAoRshasledtosomeclarityofpurposeandprogrammingcoherence,butatthesametimethishashadtheeffectofmisrepresentingthemulti-dimensionalcomplexityofprotectionandinhibiting a strategic approach

Finding 53. In a field setting, each of theClustermembers has divided loyalties, and often their primaryloyaltiesliewiththeirinstitutions’corebusinessnotwithprotection

“The AoRs are separate advocates for special interests: there is no proper protection overview and unifying strategic plan for each situation” – donor view

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2.3 Triangulation with the State of the Humanitarian System survey

The StateoftheHumanitarianSystem 2012 survey sheds some light on reasons for funding trends for protection. The databelowisextractedfromthesub-setof54SOTHSsurveyrespondentsworkingforInternationalOrganisationsorNGOsandwhoidentifiedprotectionastheirmainsectorofintervention.

Inreplytothequestion:“Inyouropinion,whatisthesinglebiggestproblem,orareaofweaknesshinderingeffectivehumanitarianresponseinyoursetting”,thetopthreeanswersselected(withequalscores)were(a)poorlycoordinatedresponse efforts, (b) inadequate funding, and (c) limited access due to restrictions placed by host governments. The secondtierofanswers(alsothreeitemswithequalscores)was(d)lackofeffectiveleadershipatHClevel,(e)poorneeds assessment, and (f) not enough involvement of local actors.100

Whenasked for their “opiniononhowwell you thinkyoursectorperformed inyoursetting” theareaofgreatestunderperformancefromsevenoptionswas“participationofaidrecipientsindesignandassessment”,followedby“participation/consultation of local authorities” and “coordination of effort”.

Onthe“qualityofleadershipinyoursetting”,thetwoweakestscoreswereobtainedforlocalauthoritiesandtheRC/HC,agencyheadsscoredbetter,andcluster/sectorleadsscoredhighest.

The“demandsofhumanitariancoordinationmechanisms”wereconsideredtobe“fartoohigh”or“somewhattoohigh–onbalancenotworththeburdenfortheorganization”by50%ofrespondents.

Considering “how the following actors have demonstrated respect for and adherence to the core humanitarianprinciplesof independence, impartialityandneutrality,”39%of respondents felt thathostgovernmentauthorities’respect for humanitarian principles has declined, and 27% felt that donor respect for these principles has declined.

WiththeimportantcaveatthattheSOTHSsurveywasnotdesignedinsuchawayastodrawconclusionsaboutpossible reasons for underfunding of protection, these perception survey responses cited above support some of the findingsoftheonlinesurveyandin-depthinterviews,notablythat:

Finding 54.Moreefficientcoordination,morelocalinvolvementandstrongerleadershiparelikelytoimproveperformance(and,wewouldargue,toimprovefunding)

Finding 55.Thereislittleconfidenceintheleadershiporadherencetohumanitarianprinciplesonthepartoflocalgovernments,whosewithholdingofhumanitarianaccessisamajorobstacletoprotection

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2.4 Additional findings from the donor survey and donor roundtables

Donorperspectiveslargelyechothe“expertviews”listedabove,withafewrathersignificantadditionalelementsthatemergedfromthedonorsurvey.Theseelementsreflecttheparticularplacementofdonorsasthechannelbetweendonorcountrytaxpayersandprotectionactors.Donorsareunanimousinbelievingthatprotectionisimportantandshouldbefunded,buttheyarelesscertainthatprotectionisunderfunded.Thequestionofunderfundingiscomplexpartlybecauseithassomanyvariables.Thefollowingfindingsbreakthisdownintodifferentaspectsfromthedonorviewpoint,andalsocapturetheirviewsontheCAPprocess:

Finding 56. Most donors claim that their overall response tomajor emergencies is framed by protectionconcerns, and emphasise that their core support for the major protection organisations as well as theiremphasisonprotectionmainstreaminginallsectorsbothcomplementtheirprotection-specificcontributions.Mostdonorsfeeltheyareprobablygivingenough

Finding 57. While they recognise the empirical evidence that protection requests are underfundedwithinappeals, some donors question if protection requests truly represent needs–andmorepreciselytowhatextenttheestimationofthequantityofneedsexpressedinproposalsisdeterminedbyexpertanalysisofasituation,and/orbyasenseof“whatthemarketwillbear”,and/orbytheestablishedmechanismsofprotection“suppliers”

Finding 58. Because the effectiveness of protection activities has been so little documented, donors also do notknowhowmuchitcoststoattainaparticularprotectionoutcome(orevenifacertaintypeofactivitywillachieveanexpectedoutcome).101Inacomparativecontextinrelationtoothercrisesorothersectors,thisisa critical point of vulnerability

Finding 59.Donorsdonotgenerallyknowhowmuchof theirownmoney is spenton “protection”atall,sinceinthevastmajorityofcasestheydonotcode“protection”separatelyintheirownfinancialmanagementsystems.Howeveronethingisforsure,mostdonorsfeelthattheyarespendingmuchmoreonprotectionthanFTSsuggests.102Thismattersforadvocacy,becauseadonorwhofeelsthatitisgivinga lot already is going to be less inclined to give more,suggestingthatadifferentadvocacystrategywillbeneeded

In sum, donors are generally uncertain about the needs, the costs or the amounts provided. Where the donor community isdivided, is inhowmuch thismatters.Somedonorsunderpressure from theirmachineryofpublicaccountabilityareveryconcernedwiththedifficultyofidentifyingresults,103 and constantly struggle to justify protection fundinginrelationtoothermorevisibleandquantifiablesectors.Otherdonorsstartfromthepremisethatprotectionisacorehumanitarianprinciple,thenplaceconsiderabletrustinprotectionactorsandinwhateverperiodicreportingthey provide.

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Finding 60. Thedonorconcernwith results isalsonuanced.Whilealldonorswant toseeoutcome-levelresults,104 smaller donors are less interested in tables of indicators that they do not have the resources to analyse. Instead they are more interested in a clear performance narrative that is built on strong foundational evidenceofeffectiveness,butthenexplains,intermsthatpolicy-makersandthepublicalikecanunderstand,howthe investment is improvingthe livesof themostvulnerablepeoplewhoareexperiencingoratriskofdeliberate harm

Finding 61.DonorsdonotgenerallyusetheCAPasthebasisfortheirproject fundingdecisions.105 While alldonorsagree that theCAP is importantasa framework foranalysisandcoordination,andexpect theirpartnerstosituatetheirprojectswithintheCAPs,onlyafew(smaller)donorsperusetheCAPprojectliststopickoutprojectsforfunding.106Instead,donorsgenerallyrespondtoorganisationalappeals(whicharemadevariouslyattheglobal,regionalorcountrylevels),andsometimesacceptCAPprojectsheetsasequivalenttoproposals.Thefewdonorswithdedicatedhumanitarianfieldstaffwillsometimestargetfundingtoaparticularsectorwithinanorganisation’scountryprogram,especially if theirownanalysistells themthere isacriticalunmet need

Finding 62.Donorsgenerallydonotmakethemaindecisiononhowmuchfundingtoallocateforprotection.Donorsall feel thatprotection is important,all themajordonorshaveexplicitprotectionpolicystatementswithintheirhumanitarianstrategies,andtheyallchoosetosupportcertainorganisations(universallyUNHCRand ICRC) because they provide protection. But in the end, most donors trust the judgement of partners, allocate funding with loose (usually organisation/country) earmarking,107 and leave it for the partners to determinesub-nationalprioritiesandtosettheweightingforprotectionwithintheircountryprogramme,108 or if donorsareorganisedforprojectfunding,thenitistheproposingorganisationswhosettheterms

Finding 63. Most donorswho fund on a project basis state that they respond to what organisations request, of course considering proponent track record, proposal quality and likelihood of results. Theyfurthermorestatethattheywouldfundprotectionmoreifhumanitarianorganisationssubmittedstronger(andpreferablyfewer,larger)protectionproposals109

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2.5 Conclusions from the online survey, in-depth interviews and donor survey

Severalbroadconclusionsemergefromtheselinesofenquiry,andthesewillnotbesurprisingtomostprotectionactors.

“To attract more funding: come together with common objectives and one clear set of messages, use a common definition to build a shared strategy, build a stronger M&E framework, professionalise the sector, push the donors to put frameworks in place and then to deliver within more long-term funding” – expert opinion

Protectiondoesnothaveasimpleconceptualframework:anarrativethatallowsprotectionactorstoexplain inafewwordswhatprotectionisandwhyitisimportant.Partoftheproblemisthatitdoesnothaveasharedlexicon.Withoutthesefoundationstones,itischallengingforprotectionactorstocommunicatekeyconceptstonon-nativeEnglishspeakers,ortoadvocatewiththegeneralpublic.Intheabsenceofauniversalterminology,itisalsodifficultfor protection actors to coordinate their planning and reporting.

Protectiondoesnothaveanestablishedtrackrecordofreportingonoutcome-levelresults110 – and indeed it is inherent inthenatureoftheprotectionenterprise(workingintherealmofculturalandpoliticalsensitivity,andonlong-termbehaviouralchange)thatresultswillbehardtomeasureespeciallywithininanormalhumanitarianreportingcycle.Multi-yearfundingwillenableimprovementinthecapacityofprotectionactors,increaseperformanceofprotectionactivities,andtheabilitytoshowresults.

Donorsgenerally consider humanitariancrises through the filtersof (a) countries and (b) partner agencies (rarelysectors),anddonorsusuallyrespondtoappealsandproposalsratherthansolicitproposalsinspecificsectors.Forthese reasons,mostdonors feel that the initial onus for increasingprotection funding lieswith the implementingpartners:whothemselvesshouldbeincreasingtheprotectioncontentoftheirappealsandrequests,submittingmoreprotectionproposals,and(accordingtotheirexpertanalysis)allocatingmoreoftheirown(unearmarkedorpubliclyraised) funding to protection.

Theextenttowhichprotectioniswell-integratedwithinthehumanitarianresponse,andwellunderstoodbytheHCandtheHCT,willdeterminetheextenttowhichprotectionseemslikea‘natural’or‘obvious’componentwithinthehumanitarian plan. The more investment there is upstream in placing protection at the centre of the humanitarian analysis, the better the prospects for funding.

Coordinationofprotectionisparticularlycomplex,becauseofthefactthatprotectionisconceptuallysomuchmorethan“asector”,andbecauseofitsAoRstructure.Well-coordinatedclustersinsituationswithwell-framedappeals,aremorelikelytoattractdonorfunding.

Itispossiblethatthe(appropriate)emphasisonmainstreamingisdrawingsomeresourcesawayfromdirectprotectionprogramming, but this is hard to confirm in the absence ofways to quantify the costs and benefits (results) ofprotection mainstreaming activities.

Andfinally, investment inthecapacityof internationalandespeciallynationalprotectionorganisationswill improveprogramquality,andtherebyearngreaterconfidenceandfinancialsupportfromdonors.


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3.1 Strategies to increase protection funding

Intheshortterm,themost likelysourceof incremental funding isfromtheprotectionactorsthemselves,mostofwhomhavecomplex,multi-themedandmulti-donorprogrammesandtosomeextentchoosewhatproportionoftheirfundinggoestoprotection.Simplyput:thoseorganisationswithunearmarkedordirectprivatefundingcanchoosetoallocatemoreoftheirownresourcestoprotection,andthoseorganisationsthatarehighlyreliantonearmarkedorproject-specificdonorfundingcanrequestmoreforprotectionthantheydo.

Inthemediumterm,somedonorsstatethattheywouldbemoreinclinedtoincreasetheirfundingforprotectioniftheyweremoreconfidentthattheseinvestmentswereeffective,andparticularlyiftheywereproventobeacomparativelygooduseoffiniteresourcesinrelationtootherhumanitariansectors.Supportedbyastrongerresultsframework,111

it isanticipatedthatmostdonorswouldwelcomealargershareofprotectionwithinintegratedprogrammes,theywouldrespondtomoreprotection-specificprojectproposals,andtheywouldbemoreinclinedtosupportthecostsof cluster coordination. To get to this point, further investment in the theory and practice of managing for results in the protectionfieldwillbeneeded.Twosuchexercisesarecurrentlyunderway:(1)aUKinitiativetobetterunderstand“Whatworksinprotectionandhowdoweknow”,112 and (2) the InterAction initiative to develop and promote a results-based approach to protection.113 It is important that these initiatives not only focus on the problem of counting results, butthattheyalsomoveupstreamtoworkonthequalityofplanningandimplementationtobetterachieveresults.

Inthelong-term,themostlikelysourceofincreasedfundingforprotectionwillcomefromthedevelopmentsideofthehouse.Theproblemhereisthatthisisbutasubset,andpossiblyalow-prioritysubset,ofthemuchlargerproblemofhowtoorganisecontinuousfinancingthroughthetransitionfromrelieftodevelopment,anditislong-termbecausethismight require rewiringofpartsof theentireODAarchitecture.Responsibility for fixing this is sharedbybothdonors and implementing agencies.

Thetaskofadvocatingmoreforprotectionwithintheprotectioncommunityandwithdonorswouldbemucheasierif there were a simpler and more coherent conceptual framework for protection. Leaving the formal definitionsunchanged, therewouldbeconsiderablebenefit forall inacollective initiative toexplainprotection in terms thateveryone can relate to, and to converge the various conceptual models and terminologies used by protection actors. Anaccessibleandcoherentnarrativewillgreatlysimplifytheprocessofdevelopingcomprehensivecountryprotectionstrategies, drafting realistic action plans, establishing mainstreaming objectives, designing effective projects, delivering themefficientlyandreportingonthemreliably.AsimplerconceptualframeworkshouldincludeanagreedterminologythatallowstermstobeunderstoodinthesamewayacrossgeographiesandAoRs.Themoresuchaconceptualframeworkisuniversal,thenthemorelikelyitwillbethatlessonscanbelearnedandappliedacrossculturesandcontexts.Andthemoreitisaccessible,thenthemorelikelyitistoserveadvocacyaswellasplanninginterests.

3.0 Issues for consideration

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Issues for consideration

Ten success factors for a well-funded protection project: “delivering the goods”

1. Strongprotectionprojectdesign,basedonanalysisofrisk,andunderstandingofexistingself-protectioncapacity;showingaclearlineofsightfromthebudgettoactivitiestocleararticulationofrealisticandmeasurableoutputs,andlikelyprotectionoutcomes.Ifyoudonotpresentalogicmodel–useonetoworkthroughthecausallogicin the design.

2. Showhowyouhaveanalysedtheprotectioncontextandtheprojectrisks,andwhatspecificmeasuresyouhavetakeninthedesignandinthefieldtomitigatethoserisks.

3. Makesureyourproject isclearlyalignedwith theprotectionstrategy in thecountry, that it showshow it iscoordinatedwith,andbuildsontheworkofotheractors,andbeexplicitinhowitalignswiththegeneralandcountry-levelpolicyframeworkofthetargetdonorincludingcross-cuttingthemes(tweaktheproposalforeachdonor, and use the language of their priorities).

4. Showhowyouhaveconsideredsustainability,exit,ortransitiontodevelopmentornationalfinancing.Ifthisisasingle-yearprojectthensetitwithinamulti-yearframeworksodonorscanseehowitfitsintothelargerpicture.

5. Have,andthenhighlightyourstaffexperienceandknowledge,andshowhowtheyarecomplementedbylocalstaff,alocalnetworkand/orlocalpartners.

6. Wrapitallupinagoodproposal.Makesureyourprojectproposalkicksoffwithaclearnarrativethatshowswhythismatters,what“protection”meansinthisprojectandhowitaddresseslife-savingrisks,whatyouwilldo,andwhatkindofresultsyouexpecttoachieve.Logicaldesign+Stronganalysisandriskstrategy+Excellentstaffteamwithlocalknowledge+Alignment+Sustainabilityplan+Goodpitch=Winningproposal.

7. Haveyourproposalpeer-reviewedin-countryorbyanothercountryofficeteam.

8. Doyourhomeworkbeforeapproachingyourdonors.Understandtheircountrystrategy,theirprojectselectioncriteriaandgeographicfocus,theirdifferentfundingmechanisms,theirtimetables,whomakesthekeydecisions.Followthegivenproposalformatclosely.

9. Get credible local champions and advocates, and have them talk up your organisational capacity and theproject to donors before you approach them. Ideally capture the interest of a humanitarian leader (respected donoragencyhead,UNagencyhead)andhavethatpersoncoachyouandbecomeyouradvocate–even(especially) if they are not funding your program.

10. Workwithyourcounterpartsindonorcapitalstosupportyouwithcapital-leveladvocacy,andusethosecontactstoopendoorsifyouaregoingtopitchaprojecttodonorHQs.Butavoidcircumventingthedonorfieldteam:they might not decide - but they need to be supportive.

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3.2 What could the various members of the protection community do?

Attheverypracticallevel,theAoRscanimprovethereportingofprotectionprogrammesinFTS,sothatthefundingdata available becomes of progressively better quality. One important aspect of this is to encourage all protection actorstoentertheirprivatefundingdataintoFTS.Onthecodingside,averysimpletechniquealreadyinitiatedbytheChildProtectioncommunityistouseuniquecodewordsinthetitlesofprojectssubmittedwithinthecontextofCAPs.If,forexample,allSGBVprojectsusetheterm“GBV”intheprojecttitle,andlikewiseforHLP,thenitwillberelativelyeasytoextractalltheAoR-relatedprojectsoutofFTSatanypointintime,eveniftheyaresectorallymiscodedbythedonorsorimplementingagenciesenteringthedataintoFTS.114

WithregardtoGeneralProtection,itwouldbebeneficialtoseparateoutwhatwehavedescribedas“Foundational”Protection from “General Protection”, and then ensure that “Foundational Protection” is planned,managed andreported more as a “public good.” In some circumstances, it might be appropriate for the parties responsible for “FoundationalProtection”initiativestohaveadistinctidentityattheClusterCoordinationtable.

Weobserved thatChildProtectionandSGBVactorssharemanyof thesamemethodologicalproblemssuchasneeds assessment, strategic planning, results measurement, mainstreaming strategies, accessing development fundingsources,advocacy,trainingandfield-leveltools.ItispossiblethataclosercomparisonoftheirAoRworkplanswouldrevealinstanceswherethesetwoAoRsinparticularcoulddeepentheirexistingcooperationtotacklesomeshared challenges more systematically.

Thereareacoupleofitemsofunfinishedbusinesswithregardtoprotectionmainstreaming.Whilesolidmainstreamingguidelinesandtoolsareinplace,theinternalisationanduseofthosetoolsisuneven.Inparticular,thereisinsufficientunderstanding of the costs and results of protection mainstreaming.

NationalNGOshavemanyadvantagesoverINGOs:nationalsunderstandtheculturalandinstitutionalcontextbetter,they often have better access and in some instances are essential for “remote management”, and in the long run theyhavegoodprospectsforconnectingwithnationalsystemsanddevelopmentfundingsources.Butintheshortterm they face capacity constraints, and fall outside the parameters of some donor and pooled funding mechanisms. TheseniorandestablishedINGOsandUNagenciesshould(andmostdo)seeNNGOsasstrategicpartners,andenterintolong-termcapacity-buildingrelationshipswiththem.Atthesametime,NNGOsthemselvescanfollowthreestrategiestoaccess fundingandbringtheirvaluetotheprotectionenterprise: (1) formastrategicalliancewithastrongINGOorUNagencythatcanprovidethemwithcoaching,trainingandexperience;“(2)engageearlyandfullywiththeprotectionclusteraspartofabroaderprotectionnetworkthroughparticipationinappropriatefora;and(3)enter into consortium arrangements.

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3.3 What could donors do to improve protection funding?

ThebestwaytosummarisethisistosuggestthatdonorsshouldfollowtheprinciplesofGoodHumanitarianDonorship,whichencapsulatemostofthemaindonor-sideissuesregardinghumanitarianprotection,inparticularpredictableandmulti-year funding,reducedearmarking,fillingcriticalgaps,mainstreamingage,genderanddiversity, fundingcoordinationcosts,andbridgingthegapsbetweenreliefanddevelopment.

Specifically, we heard from the field visits and in-depth interviews that donors could, to the extent that theirvariedmandates, policies and legislative frameworks allow, do the following eight things to improve the fundingandperformance of protection: (a) provide fundingwith as little earmarking as possible, and then hold partnersaccountablefortherelevance,timelinessandeffectivenessoftheiractivities;(b)bereadytostepuptotheplateinsituationsofflagrantunderfundinginrelationtoprotectionneeds;(c)providemulti-yearfundingwhenpossible;(d)setaside“overheadcaps”whenconsideringprotection,oracceptthatmoststaff,travelandtrainingcostsofprotectionprojectsaredirectdeliverynotoverhead/administrativecosts;(e)activelypromoteprotectionmainstreamingthroughalltheirhumanitarianprogramming;(f)fundthecostsofprotectioncoordination,115 and of initiatives to improve the systemthroughthecollectivedraftingofpoliciesandguidelines,throughtraining,andthroughevaluation;and(g)makesincereeffortstobridgethefirewallsbetweenthehumanitariananddevelopmentdomainswithinthedonoragencies,sothatkeyopportunitiesfortransitionareseizednotmissed.AnironyisthatthemoredonorsmainstreamandadheretotheprinciplesofGHD,116thelesstheircontributionswillbevisibleandcountableasprotection.

Ofcourse,inadditiontotheseprogrammaticmeasures,donorsshouldcontinuetoexertpoliticalpressureonhostgovernmentsandpartiestoconflict–aspoliticalpressureisoftenmoreeffectiveataddressingthesourcesofabusethanprogrammeactivities,manyofwhichaddressconsequencesandsymptomsmorethancauses.

Fourpracticaldonormeasuresthatemergedspecificallyduringthecourseofthisstudywere:(a)improvefinancialreporting to FTS (in particular improve sector codingpractice), (b) fund someof the “next steps”work that hasbeensignalledelsewhere inthisstudy,suchasfurtheranalysisofhowtoplanandmeasureresults inprotection,and research into how tomeasure the costs and benefits of protectionmainstreaming, (c) continue to supportthe professionalisation of the protection sector, recognising its particular technical and cultural challenges, and (d) encourage programming approaches that allowNational NGOs to work together with established partners andtherebygainexperienceandcapacity.

Ifthecircumstancesareappropriate,andthisseemsmorelikelytobethecaseatthetailendofanaturaldisasteroraconflictwithadefinedend-point,thendonorscouldworktogetherwithUNagenciestodevelopa“transitioncompact” for protection, along the lines recommended by the DAC.

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3.4 Improving the system for protection funding

Thesinglebestwaytoensurethatprotectionplanningandprojectsfitnaturallywiththeoverallhumanitarianresponse,thus appearing integrated and “self-evident”, is for the overall humanitarian response to be based upon a protection analysis.Withintegrationatthetopofthesystem,thenprotectionoutcomeswillbestronger,andeffortstomainstreamandtogetfundingforprotection-specificinitiativeswillallfallintoplace.Theconverseisalsotrue.Ahumanitarianplanbuiltuponanassistancemodelwillalwaysstruggletoshowhowprotectionprovidesvalueformoney.BorrowingfromamodelusedbyOCHAtodescribetherelationshipbetweentheoverallhumanitarianstrategy,theclustersandtheorganisations/projects,wecandepictanidealmodelforprotectionplanninginFigure3.1below:

Inthismodel:thekeyaspectfromwhichtherestoftheprotectionplanningflowsisattheapex,wheresignificantinvestment is made early and at the highest strategic levels to ensure that the humanitarian strategy for a country is built around a protection analysis. This sets the frame for outcome-level protection results to be achieved, composed of(a)theprotectionresultsofthewholecountryprogramme,(b)theprotectionmainstreamingresultsofallthevarioussectors,and(c)thespecificresultsoftheprotectioncluster.

Somedonorsstatedthattheywouldbewillingtoacceptproject-levelresultsreportingattheoutputlevel,providedthattheprotectionclusterwasworkingwithinaprotection-focussedhumanitarianplanthatwascapturingprotectionoutcome results at the country level.

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Ten success factors for a well-funded protection country program: “cracking the code”

Thecombinedviewfromthemanyreadingsanddiscussionsbehindthisstudyisthatthesearetensuccessfactorsunderlyingawell-fundedprotectionprogram:

1. AHumanitarianCoordinatorandHeadsofprotection-mandatedAgencieswhounderstandthatprotectionisanoverarchingprincipleunderlyingthehumanitarianresponse,akeycross-cuttingthemeinallclusters,andanimportantareaofinvestmentinitsownright

2. AStrategicResponsePlanthatisbuiltaroundaprotectionvision

3. Adedicatedprotectionclustercoordinator,experiencedandaboveallwithleadership,strategicplanningandfacilitation skills, accompaniedbya cluster co-lead ideally fromanestablishedNGO,and supportedbyanInformationManagementOfficer

4. Active participation by the protection cluster coordinator in theHumanitarianCountry Team – distinct fromUNHCR,andthusenablingtheStrategicResponsePlantobewell-informedbyexpertprotectionadvice;andactiveengagementdirectlywithlocaldonorrepresentatives

5. Amulti-yearprotectionstrategyandactionplanwithbroadstakeholderbuy-in , incorporatinganadvocacystrategy, and including country-level outcome-level results indicators

6. Resources set aside for establishing a protection baseline, for measuring outcome-level protection results, for support to mainstreaming, and for implementing the advocacy strategy

7. A conducive host government is ideal but rare. If the host government is supportive, then many factors line up positivelyincludingtheoverallpostureofthedonorsandtheRC/HC,humanitarianaccess,andtheconnectiontonationalsystemsanddevelopmentfunding.Intheabsenceofaconducivehostgovernment,thenthenextbestthingisstrategicallianceswiththosepartiesinthehostgovernmentwhosharetheinterestsoftheprotectioncommunity

8. Acriticalmassofhumanitariandonorswhoareactivelypreparedtosupportprotectionprogramming,ideallyresidenthumanitarianfieldpresenceforthemajordonors.Rapidrotationofhumanitarianfieldstaffisachronicproblemforcontinuityandknowledge,soinsuchsituationstheprotectionclustercoordinatorshouldregularlyandfrequentlybriefandengagewithalllocaldonorandhumanitarianactorsonthecountry’s“Protection101”

9. A critical mass of capable INGOs committed to protection, with advocacy capacity and some access toindependentfinancing

10. Mediaattention,oraplanandresourcesforattractingtherightkindofmediaattentionattherightmomentsinthe humanitarian planning and funding cycle


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This study is built from five information sources:

Statistics

• OCHA/FTSanalysisincludingAoRdisaggregationusingtextfilters• LandmineandClusterMunitionsMonitorreports• OECD/DAConlinefinancialdata• UN/ICRCdatasourcesforannualexpenditureinformation• GHAandDARAdataanddocuments

Surveys

• Onlinesurvey(bilingual–143completedsurveys,16countrieswith>7replies)• Detailedquestionnairesurveyof21donors• StateoftheHumanitarianSystem(2012)surveydataset• OCHA/CAPsurveydata2012

Targeted interviews and roundtables

• InterviewswithGlobalProtectionClustermembers• Interviewswithprotectionexpertsandresearchers• Interviewswithselecteddonors,anddonorroundtablesinGenevaandfieldlocations• ProtectionclusterroundtablesinGeneva,Washingtonandfourfieldlocations

Field visits

• Pakistan,Afghanistan,SouthSudanandKenya(forSomalia)

Literature review

• Generalliteratureonhumanitarianfinancingtrends,andprotectionfinancing• Precursorstudies(SavetheChildren,GICHDstudyofMineActionfunding)• Companionstudies(GPPi,StateoftheHumanitarianSystem,GHDreview)

Annexe A Study Methodology

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Annexe A: Study Methodology

Statistical analysisThisstudy’stermsofreference,andthoseoftheprecursorstudybySavetheChildren“TooLittle,TooLate”117 are premisedontheassumptionthatOCHA’sFinancialTrackingSystem(FTS)hasreliabledatathatcanbeanalysedtoshowfundingtrends.Whilethedatasetisimpressiveandwidelyused,118 it is prone to a number of shortcomings. For the most part, the basic data concerning donor country, target country, amount, year and implementing organisation isgiventhemostqualitycontrolattentionbyFTSstaffandseemsreliable.However,theuseoftheIASCsectorcodesissignificantlyproblematic.Weobservedseveraltypesofproblem,someofwhicharelargeandcompounded,callingintodoubtthevalidityofanalysisbasedsimplyupontheFTSsectorcode“Protection/HumanRights/RuleofLaw”.Specificproblemsinclude:(a)miscoding–clearlynotprotectionactivities,(b)inconsistentcoding–thesameprojectcodedagainstdifferentsectorsbydifferentdonors,(c)undercoding–aswhenprotectionisdeliberatelycodedunderadifferentsectorcodesometimesbecause“protection”isconsideredtoosensitiveinthatcontext,(d)aggregatedcoding– forexamplewhencountryappeal responses for largeagencies like ICRCarecodedunder“SectorNotYetSpecified”eventhoughtheyclearlycontainasignificantamountofprotectionfunding,and(e)changeincodingpracticefromoneyeartothenext–whichmakeslongitudinalanalysisproblematic.Thereasonsformostoftheseerrors seem to be an imperfect understanding of sector codes on the part of those submitting the data, the fact that EuropeandonorsenterdatathroughECHO’shumanitarianreportingsystemEDRISwhichdoesnothaveobligatorysectorcodesandwhoseoptionalcodesarenotalignedwith IASCcodes,andthe lackofresources inOCHAtoprovidequalitycontrolonallbutthemostessentialdatafields.

Afurtherproblemwiththedata,notanerrorsomuchasaninevitableconsequenceofasingle-codingsystem,isthatprotectionisnotcountedatallwhenitismainstreamed.Thereisaverysignificant(butnoteasilyquantifiable)amountoffundingthathasprotectionasasecondarybenefitbutthatiscodedagainstanothersector–forexamplelightingatwaterstationsprovidesprotectionbutiscodedaswaterandsanitation,saferschoolsarecodedaseducationetc.Indeed, it is an irony of the coding system that the more diligent organisations are in meeting the high standards of protectionmainstreaming,thelessvisibleandlessquantifiableistheircontributiontoprotection.119

However,wecangetasomewhatbetterqualityofdatasetwhenwelimititsscopetothoseFTSrecordsthataresector-coded as “protection” and that are also tagged against a specific CAP or CAP-like appeal. The reasons forthisarestraightforward:whenacontributionisbeingcodedagainstaspecificrequest,thenthewholecommunityinterestedinthatCAP(andmostofall,theorganizationshopingtoreceivefunding)tracksthe“on-appeal”entriesonafrequentbasis,andcancross-checkifadonororanorganizationthatmakesanentrythatiserroneousorthatprovidesafalsepictureofhowwellanappealisbeingfunded.

Forthesereasons,thedatasetthatwemostoftenuseinthisstudyfortheanalysisoftrendswithintheprotectionsector,suchascomparisonbetweenrecipientcountriesorsub-sectorsofprotection,isthedatasetofall“Protection/HumanRights/RuleofLaw”recordsthatareenteredagainstCAPsorCAP-likeappealsbetween2007and2012,120

lessanyentriesthatconcernde-mining,mineawareness,smallarmsandlightweaponsorclustermunitions.ForanalysisoftrendsinfundingtoMineAction,wesimplyusetheexistingandcomprehensivedatasetpublishedintheLandmineandClusterMunitionsMonitor(LCMM),whichhasthegreatbenefitsofbeinganchoredtotreaty-boundreportingrequirementsandinamuchmoredefinedareathanprotection.

While the on-appeal dataset gives us better comparative data that we can use to analyse relative trends, it significantlyunder-representstotalamountsofspendinganddoesnotallowustotrackoverallspendingpatterns.

Inordertoobtainanapproximationofthetotal amount of funding provided to protection in humanitarian situations, weconsideredusingDACdata,butdeterminedthat italsoisunreliableatthesub-sectorcodinglevel,at least inthehumanitarianrealm.Intheend,wedevelopedandusedthefollowingmethodology:startingfromtheon-appealprotection-coded dataset described above,121weremovedallrecordsthatrelatetoUNHCR122andUNICEF,thenwe

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addedbacktheamountsthatICRCandUNICEFthemselvesconsiderintheirownAnnualReportstobeprotection,123 andfinallyweaddedbackamountsfromUNHCR’sGlobalReportsthatweconsidertorepresent IDPprotection.Specifically,forUNHCRfor2010-2012wehavetakentheprotectionentrieslistedunderPillarFour(IDPs),andwethenaddedinselectedelementsofGlobalProgrammesexpenditure2010-2012thatarespecifictoprotection.For2007-2009,whentherewasnoseparationofIDPsorprotectioninUNHCR’sformerfinancialreportingsystem,weappliedaco-efficienttoUNHCR’stotalexpenditure(6.1%)whichreflectstheaverageofthe2010-2012periodthatIDPprotectionrepresentedasaproportionofallUNHCRexpenditure.

Weconsiderthis“FTSmodifieddata”tobeabestestimateoftheamountofhumanitarianprotectionfundingthat has protection as its primary purpose.Itisveryimportanttonotethatthisexcludesmainstreamedprotection,UNHCR’s contributions to refugee and returnee protection,124 and also unreported funding provided directly by private donors to protection-providing international NGOs, protection services provided by the primary duty-bearing host governments, self-protection activities by affected communities themselves, protection provided by UN ormultinationalpeace-keepingmissions,orprotection“environment-building”activitiesfundedfromnon-humanitariansources(whichdonotreporttoFTS).

Area of Responsibility analysisInordertodeterminethefundingtrendstothedifferentAreasofResponsibility(AoRs)withintheGlobalProtectionCluster,125wedevelopedbilinguallistsofkeywordstodescribeeachoftheAoRs,andthenappliedthekeywordstotheFTSon-appealprotectiondataset126usingtextfiltersinExcel.GeneralProtectionisaresidualcategorymadeupofsomespecificprotectionactivitiessuchasvulnerabilityassessment,IDPregistration,profiling,protectionmonitoring,validation of conditions for safe return of IDPs, protection by presence, conflict early warning, legal assistance,community protection capacity-building, support for the elderly and the disabled and coordination – but for the most partthiscategoryismadeupofundifferentiatedcontributionsto“protection”throughUNHCR,OHCHRandNGOsprovidingprogram-wideresponses.Wethenmanuallyresolvedcaseswherethesamerecordwasdouble-countedunder twodifferentsub-codes,127 and manually resolved those records that had not fallen into one of the coding basketsandwereleftuncoded.Finally,totestforerrorsthatwouldintroducemajordistortions,wemanuallycheckedalldataentriesover$2,000,000 inanygivencountryandyear.Wecodedall Information,CounsellingandLegalAssistance(ICLA)projectsunderHousingLandandProperty,recognisingthatthistosomeextent“overcounts”HLP.

Annexe A: Study Methodology

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Donors responding to the donor survey either in writing and/or by telephone interview, many of whom were also interviewed in the field:

Annexe B List of donors and experts consulted

Individual experts providing methodological advice or substantive views:

AustraliaAustriaBelgiumCanadaDenmarkEuropeanUnionFinland

FranceGermanyIrelandItalyJapanKoreaNetherlands

NorwaySpainSwedenSwitzerlandUnitedKingdomUSA–StateDepartment(BPRM)USA–USAID(OfDA)

LouiseAubin, UNHCRSarahBailey, IndependentConsultantKatyBarnett, UNICEF(CPWG)Isabelle Barras, ICRCManuelBessler, formerRC/HCAxelBisschop, UNHCRElisabettaBrumat, UNHCRPakistanBediakoBuahene, UNHCRSomaliaNeilBuhne, UNDPWilliamChemaly, UNHCR(JIPS)StephenCornish, MSFCanadaJeffCrisp, UNHCRJohnDurnford, DatalakeSolèneEdouard, IndependentConsultantNicoleEpting, UNHCRMelissaFernandez, OHCHRElizabethFerris, BrookingsInstitutionSzilardFricska, UN-Habitat(HLPAoR)BetsyGreve, UNHCRPaulHannon, MineActionCanadaRafaelHermoso, UNICEFLenaLarlsson, SCF-SwedenJackieKeegan, UNHCRMikeKendellen, InternationalCampaigntoBanLandmines

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Annexe B: List of donors and experts consulted

ErinKenny, UNFPA(GBVAoR)MarinaKonovalova, UNHCRMiriamLange, ONOCHAGustavoLaurie, UNMAS(MineActionAoR)JaneyLawry-White, IndependentConsultantAmraLee, WorldVisionAustraliaIainLevine, HumanRightsWatchDanLewis, UNHabitatSarahLilley, SCF-UKDanieleMalerba, DevelopmentInitiativesMendyMarsh, UNICEF(GBVAoR)JennyMcAvoy, InterActionGwendolynMensah, UNHCRAfghanistanLydiaPoole, IndependentConsultantAnnieRaykow, OHCHRHaitiUrbanReichhold, GPPiRachelRicoBalzan, OHCHRJanisRisdel, PlanInternationalUKMeggiRombach, UNICEF(CPWG)PatrickRooney, OHCHRDaniela Ruegenberg, DARARachelScott, OECD/DACKerrySmith, DevelopmentInitiativesRobertSmith, UNOCHAMirjamSorli, UNOCHAAbbyStoddard, HumanitarianOutcomesJulieThompson, UNOCHAAnneThurin, UNHabitat(HLPAoR)PeterTrotter, UNHCRSouthSudanMargrietVeenma, UNHCRJeanneWard, IndependentConsultantLaurieWiseberg, PROCAPAfghanistan

Inaddition,weconsultedUNHCR,UNDP,UNOCHA,UNMISS,UNICEF,ICRC,NRC,DRC,IRC,SCFstaffinindividualmeetingsinthefield,andthefollowingstakeholdersinroundtableformat:

Washington-based protection actors (hosted by InterAction)DonorfieldrepresentativesinPakistan,AfghanistanandKenya(forSomalia)ProtectionclustermembersinroundtablemeetingsinPakistan,Afghanistan,SouthSudanandKenyaGeneva-basedprotectionactors(hostedbyUNHCR)

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Review Study on Funding to the Protection Sector in Non-Refugee Humanitarian Emergencies

CONSULTANT

Project TitleReviewStudyonFundingtotheProtectionSectorinNon-RefugeeHumanitarianEmergencies

Duration of this assignment and datesTheconsultancyisexpectedtocommenceon23November2012andterminateon31/05/2013.Itwillbeimplementedinthreephases.Anyextensionallowableisnotenvisagedtogobeyond30June2013.

DutyStation:Ottawa,Canada

Travelplan:Ottawa-Geneva-Ottawa.Possibilityforafieldlocationtravel(Haiti)oralocationinAfricatobedeterminedbythestudyfindings.

General Background of Project or AssignmentTheGlobalProtectionCluster(GPC)isthemaininter-agencyforum,atthegloballevel,forcoordinatingprotectionpolicy and operational support to field operations in non-refugee humanitarian situations, especially in locationswhere theclusterapproach isbeing implemented.TheGPCalsoprovides resourcemobilizationsupport to fieldoperationsmainlythroughadvocacyinitiativesaswellas,adhoc,reviewoffundingappealdocumentstoensurethecomprehensivecoverageofprotectionneedsandadherencetotheprinciplesofpartnership.Thus,theGPCplaysakeyroleinsupportingfieldoperationstoclarifyfundingrequirementsandprioritizationwithintheoverallcontextofhumanitarian funding considerations.

For several years there hasbeen concernwithin theprotection sector that protection activities are considerablyunderfundeddespitetherecognitionbydonorsandhumanitarianorganizationsof thefundamental importanceofprotection inhumanitarianemergencies.Underfundingofprotectionactivities raisesconcernsabout theabilityofhumanitarianorganizationstosupporteffectiveandadequateprotectionresponses.Inordertobetteraddressthisissue,theGPCisconductingareviewofhumanitarianfinancingfortheprotectionsectorinnon-refugeehumanitarianemergencies

Annexe C Terms of Reference

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Annexe C: Terms of Reference

Purpose and Scope of AssignmentTheconsultantisexpectedtoundertakeareviewstudyoffundingtrendsandpatternstotheProtectionSectorinnon-refugeehumanitarianemergencies.Tothisend,theconsultantwillundertakethefollowing:

1. Reviewa representativesample, ranging from2007 to2012,ofexistingnon-refugeesituationhumanitarianemergencies funding appeal documents concerning the protection sectorwith the viewof establishing thetimeliness, scale, trends and patterns in donor contributions, in close consultation with key stakeholders,includingparticipantorganizationsoftheGPCaswellasdonorsandOCHA;

2. Ascertain,throughthereview,keystakeholderconsultationsandtrackingofcontributionsforprotectionactivities,whethertheprotectionsectorinnon-refugeesituationhumanitarianemergenciesissufficientlyfunded,lookinginparticulartogapsbetweenidentifiedneedsandfundingreceived;

3. Conclude a report on the funding trends for the protection sector, in non-refugee situation humanitarian emergencies,providingtheGPCanddonorpartnerswithconcreteobservationsandrecommendationsonthesubject,includinganyadvocacyworkthatneedstobeundertaken;

4. Organizeapartnerde-briefingworkshopatwhichthefundingreviewreportwillbepresentedtokeystakeholders,includingdonorpartnerorganizations;

5. Ensureaninformedunderstandingofprotectionfundingtrendsandpolicies,specificallypatternsinanyfundingshortfallsforprotectioninorderfortheGPCtomoreeffectivelyadvocatefortheclosingofgaps.

The consultant is expected to implement the Project in three phases PhaseI:ReviewSampleFundingAppealDocumentsandPatternsinContributionstotheNon-RefugeeEmergencyProtectionSector

a) ElaboratearesearchandreviewplanthatwillbeagreedtobytheSteeringCommitteeoftheGlobalProtectionCluster;

b) DesktopandconsultativereviewofthetypesofprojectsandtrendsandpatternsintheactualfundingoftheProtectionsector innon-refugeehumanitarianemergenciesfromarepresentativesampleoffundingappealsrangingfrom2007-2012;

c) Thereviewshouldalsomap funding trendsandpatternsas theyspecifically relate tochildprotection,mineaction, housing, land and property and gender based violence activities.

d) TakestockofsimilarfundingreviewprojectsthathavebeenundertakenbyparticipantsoftheGlobalProtectionCluster,especiallyincludingthestudyundertakenbythegloballevelChildProtectionAreaofResponsibilityonfundingtrendswithregardtochildprotection;

e) Examinedonorguidanceforproposalsaddressingprotectionandprioritizationofresourceallocation;

f) Provideevidencebasedfindings,dataandobservationsofthetrendsandpatternsinthefundingoftheprotectionsectorinnon-refugeehumanitarianemergencies;

Review Phase: To be Completed within 3 months

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PhaseII:ConcludeareportontheProtectionSectorFundingTrendsandPatterns

a) Conclude a report on the funding trends for the protection sector in non-refugee humanitarian emergencies providing the Global Protection Cluster with concrete observations and recommendations on the subject,includinganyadvocacyworkthatneedstobeundertaken;

b) PresentthereporttotheGPCSteeringCommitteeforitsconsideration,commentsandsuggestions

c) Finalizethereport

Report Phase: To be Completed within 2 Months

PhaseIII:DesignDe-briefingWorkshop

a) Designandorganizeanallstakeholderde-briefingWorkshopinGeneva,Switzerland;

b) Presentthefindingsofthestudyreviewtoanallstakeholderde-briefingWorkshopinGeneva,Switzerland;

c) Completeafinalreportofthereviewincorporatingthefindingsofthestudyaswellastheviewsandcommentsoftheallstakeholdersofferingconcreterecommendations;

De-Briefing Workshop Phase: To be completed within 1 month

Duration of the Consultancy: 120 Days PhaseI(60WorkingDays):CompletionofReview.

PhaseII(40WorkingDays):CompletionofReportontheStudyReviewwithRecommendations

PhaseIII(20Days):AllStakeholdersDe-briefingWorkshop.

Monitoring and Progress Controls (reports requirements, periodicity, format, deadlines) will be done as per theresponsibilitiesasspecifiedintheTOR.Ingeneralthefollowingstepswillbecloselylookedinto:

• The assignmentwill be closelymonitored anddirectedbyUNHCR staff in theGlobal ProtectionClusterSupportCell.TheConsultantwillworkundertheoverallguidanceoftheGlobalProtectionClusterCoordinatorandthedirectsupervisionoftheHeadoftheGlobalProtectionClusterSupportCell.

• The Global Protection Cluster’s Steering Committee will be kept closely informed of the progress andsatisfactorycompletionofeachphaseoftheproject.Duringthecourseoftheproject,theSteeringCommitteewillhave theopportunity toprovideguidanceand in-put recommendations inorder toensuresuccessfulimplmentation.

• Theconsultantistodeliverthefinalproductonorbefore30June2012.

DefinitionoftheFinalProduct:Tworeports:1)Analyticalreportonthetrendsandpatternsinfundingtotheprotectionsector in non-refugeeemergencies. The reportwill contain concrete recommendations tobeused for advocacypurposeswithdonorpartners to increaseprotection funding;2)Asummary recordreportof thestakeholderde-briefing.

Annexe C: Terms of Reference

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ALNAP.(2012).StateoftheHumanitarianSystemReport. Available at: http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-sohs-2012-lo-res.pdf

Anderson,Mary;Brown,Dayna&Jean,Isabella.(2012).TimetoListen–hearingpeopleon the receiving end of international aid. Available at: http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/book/time_to_listen_pdf_Pdf1.pdf

Bailey,Sarah.(2010).EarlyRecoveryinHumanitarianAppeals.HPG/ODI. Available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/5910.pdf

Buchanan-Smith,Margie&Randel,Judith.(2002).Financinginternationalhumanitarianaction: areviewofkeytrends.HPG/ODI. Available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/280-financing-international-humanitarian-action

CAFOD.(2013).SouthernNGOs’accesstohumanitarianfunding. Available at: http://www.cafod.org.uk/Policy-and-Research/Emergencies-and-conflict

Caverzasio,SylvieG.(2001).Strengtheningprotectioninwar:Asearchforprofessionalstandards.ICRC. Available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0783.htm

CentreforGlobalProsperity(HudsonInstitute).(2012).IndexofGlobalPhilanthropyandRemittances. Available at: http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/2012IndexofGlobalPhilanthropyandRemittances.pdf

CERFSecretariat.(2010).CentralEmergencyResponseFundLife-SavingCriteria. Available at: https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CERF/FINAL_Life-Saving_Criteria_26_Jan_2010__EFS.pdf

CERFSecretariat.(2011).CERFFundingSpecificSectorProtection. Available at: https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Funding%20of%20Protection%20FINAL%2023%20September%202011.pdf

ChannelResearch.(2011).5-yearevaluationoftheCentralEmergencyResponseFund–FinalSynthesisReport.Available at: https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/110811%20CERF%20Evaluation%20Report%20v5.4%20Final.pdf

ChildProtectionWorkingGroup.(2012).MinimumStandardsforChildProtectioninHumanitarianAction. Available at: http://cpwg.net/minimum-standards/

Collinson,Sarah;Buchanan-Smith,Margie&Elhawary,Samir.(2009)GoodHumanitarianDonorshipPrinciplesinPractice:AssessinghumanitarianassistancetointernallydisplacedpersonsinSudanandSriLanka.HPG/ODI. Available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7131.pdf

CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities.(2008).GuidelinesonEuropeanCommunityMineAction. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/anti_landmines/docs/guidelines_08_13_en.pdf

Cosgrave,John;Ramalingam,Ben&Beck,Tony.(2009).Real-timeevaluationsofhumanitarianaction: AnALNAPguide. Available at: http://www.alnap.org/resources/guides/evaluation/rte.aspx

Annexe DBibliography

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https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Funding%2520of%2520Protection%2520FINAL%252023%2520September%25202011.pdf

https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Funding%2520of%2520Protection%2520FINAL%252023%2520September%25202011.pdf

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http://www.alnap.org/resources/guides/evaluation/rte.aspx

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Annexe D: Bibliography

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Darcy,James&Hofmann,Charles-Antoine.(2003).Accordingtoneed?Needsassessmentanddecision-making in the humanitarian sector. Available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/285.pdf

DevelopmentInitiatives.(2011).EmergencyResponseFunds(Profile). Available at: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ERF-profile-final.pdf

DevelopmentInitiatives.(2012).PrivateFunding:Anemergingtrendinhumanitariandonorship. Available at: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/private-funding-an-emerging-trend-in-humanitarian-donorship-2

DevelopmentInitiatives.(2012).GlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport. Available at: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/gha-report-2012

DevelopmentInitiatives.(2013).GlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport. Available at: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/4216

Devlin,Jean.(2010).MineActionFunding:Trends,ModalitiesandFutureProspects. GenevaInternationalCentreforHumanitarianDemining. Available at: http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/LMAD-Funding-Report-Nov2010.pdf

DFID.(2011).DFID’sApproachtoValueforMoney(VfM). Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49551/DFID-approach-value-money.pdf

Dubois,Marc.(2010).Protection:Fig-LeavesAndOtherDelusions.HumanitarianExchangeMagazine. Available at: http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-46/humanitarian-protection

Egeland,Jan;Harmer,Adele&Stoddard,Abby.(2011).Tostayanddeliver:Goodpracticeforhumanitariansincomplexsecurityenvironments.UNOCHA. Available at: https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Stay_and_Deliver.pdf

Entwisle,Hannah.(2013).ProtectionissuesandtheroleofUNHCRinnaturaldisasters.UNHCR. Draft document not yet published.

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GlobalProtectionCluster.(2012).ProtectionClusterCoordinatorModelTermsOfReference. Available at: http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/tools_and_guidance/GPC_ToR_Cluster_Coordinators_2012_EN.pdf

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1 http://www.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/libraries/Too-Little-Too-Late-Report.pdf

2 TheGlobalProtectionCluster’smandateislimitedtonon-refugee(i.e.IDP)situations,andUNHCRretainsitssoleresponsibility for refugee protection. This study does not consider funding for refugee protection

3 This characteristic of volatility is underlined by the GlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport(2013): p 46 http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/4216

4 Thethreemainreferencedocuments forprotectionare the ICRC’srecently-updatedProfessionalStandardsForProtectionWorkCarriedOutByHumanitarianAndHumanRightsActorsInArmedConflictAndOtherSituationsOfViolence (2013) http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0999.pdf, IASC’sHandbook for theProtectionofInternallyDisplacedPersons(2010) http://www.refworld.org/docid/4790cbc02.html,andSphere’sHumanitarianCharter andMinimumStandards inHumanitarianResponse (2011)http://www.spherehandbook.org/. In addition thereisacomprehensiveALNAPguidetoevaluationofprotectionhttp://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/tools_and_guidance/ALNAP_Guide_Humanitarian_Agencies_2005_EN.pdf

5 According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) protection is defined as: “…all activities aimed atobtainingfullrespectfortherightsoftheindividualinaccordancewiththeletterandthespiritoftherelevantbodiesoflaw(i.e.HRlaw,IHL,refugeelaw)”.IASCIDPProtectionPolicy,1999availableathttp://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx?docID=4415&type=pdf.Thedefinitionwasoriginallyadoptedbya1999WorkshopoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)onProtection.

6 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/2012_protection_funding_guidelines_en.pdf

7 http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2011/thepoliticsofprotection

8 Anaffectedpopulationincludesthedisplacedandthoseatriskofdisplacement,conflictaffectedpopulations,hostcommunities, and others affected by a humanitarian situation

9 Inprotection,perhapsmorethaninanyotherfieldofhumanitarianwork,contextiskey.Beyondthegeneralfactorsindicatedhere,thedonorapproachtoprotectioninanygivensituationislikelytotakeintoconsiderationpoliticalandeconomic factors unique to that donor in that country

10 FAOFoodPriceIndexhttp://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/

11 https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/World%20Humanitarian%20Data%20and%20Trends%202012%20Web.pdf

12 Imperfect though the appeals might be, “there is currently no comprehensive, objective measure of humanitarian need,complicatingadvocacy formoreappropriatehumanitarian funding levels.Theclosestapproximation is theConsolidated Appeals Process.” DAC report Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/12lessons.pdf.FTSdoesprovidedataontheoverall levelof fundingrequestedforprotectionwithintheappeals,butdoesnotprovidethisbrokendownatthelevelofAreasofResponsibility.ForadiscussionofthelimitationsofusingtheCAPsasaproxyforhumanitarianneed,seeGlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport2013,page 12 http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/4216

Annexe E Endnotes

http://www.savethechildren.net/sites/default/files/libraries/Too-Little-Too-Late-Report.pdf


http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0999.pdf

http://www.refworld.org/docid/4790cbc02.html

http://www.spherehandbook.org/



http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx%3FdocID%3D4415%26type%3Dpdf

http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/downloaddoc.aspx%3FdocID%3D4415%26type%3Dpdf

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/2012_protection_funding_guidelines_en.pdf

http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2011/thepoliticsofprotection

http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/foodpricesindex/en/






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13 ConsistentwithotheranalysesofFTSdata,notablytheGlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport2013,wehaveusedthemorelimiteddatasetwithinFTSoftheCAPandCAP-likeappeals.ThisdatagenerallyexcludesICRCandgreatlyunderreportsUNHCRfunding.Thereasonswhythe“underfundedgap”datainFigure1.2showsamarkeddipin2011,while“overallprotectionfunding”remainedconstantinFigure1.1,isinpartexplainedbytheunderreportingofICRCinFigure1.2(in2011ICRC’sspendingwasboostedby$30m,mainlyduetoafavourableCHF/USDexchangerateshift),andinpartbyanincreaseinrequestedprotectionfundingfor2011(up10%between2010and2011)

14 WealsoanalysedtheDACdatafor2007-2011.DAC-CRSdoesnotprovideasub-sectorcodethatfairlyrepresentsProtection,buttheapproximatedataavailableintheCRScode“Reliefco-ordination;Protectionandsupportservices”alsoincreasedsteadilyeveryyear,andthereisdefiniteconvergence(narrowingofthegap)relativetoallDAC-recordedhumanitarianspendingbetween2010and2011.SotheDACdataisconsistentwiththeFTSdataprovidedhere

15 We can adapt DAC guidelines relating to gendermainstreaming, and use the followingworking definition: “Amainstreaming strategyhas twomajor aspects: 1. The integrationof [protection] concerns into theanalysis andformulationofallpolicies,programmesandprojects;and2.Initiativestoenable[populationsatriskof,orexperiencingdeliberateharm]to formulateandexpresstheirviewsandparticipate indecision-makingacrossall [humanitarian]issues.Amainstreamingstrategydoesnotprecludeinitiativesspecificallydirectedtowardsvulnerablepopulations”.Mainstreamingisusuallybuiltuponcontextualanalysis,planningandconsciousallocationofresources,sometimescomplementedbyatheoryofchange,aresultsframeworkandperformanceindicators.TheGPCdefinesitintheirprotectiontoolkitas“theprocessofincorporatingprotectionprinciplesandpromotingmeaningfulaccess,safetyanddignity in humanitarian aid”

16 Severaldonorsincapitalsandinthefielddescribedapatternwherebytheyprovidedgenerousinitialfundingonthebasisofapassionateappealforanevidentlyimportantproblemofprotection,butthenafteryeartwoorthreethey reduced their fundingbecause–notwithstanding the importanceof these issues – either the implementingorganisationswerenotable toachieve the results (due toproblemsofaccessorcapacity thathadbeen initiallyunderestimated),orwerenotabletoreportonoutcome-levelresultsevenaftertwoyearsoffunding,orweresubmittingformulaicprojectrequeststhatshowedlittleevolutionfromthebeginningandinsufficientevidenceofeitherongoingneedsorlikelyprogress.Asonedonorputit“wearenowinyearsixofaprotractedemergencybutthepartnersarestillproposingexactlythesameactivitiesasinthebeginning”

17 CERFSecretariatReportdated22September2011:CERFFundingSpecificSectorProtection

18 Thisdata isextracteddirectly fromFTSanddiffersslightly,butwewouldarguenotsignificantly, fromthedatareportedbyOCHAinthe22Septemberreportcitedabove

19 ThefactthatCHFvolumesaresteadilyincreasingasCHFsarebeingintroducedintoadditionalcomplexemergenciesbodeswellforprotectionfinancing.GlobalHumanitarianAssistanceReport2013: p 65

20 AlltheCarry-overdatawasextractedfromFTSon20March2013

21 Thisisdiscussedinmoredetailinsection2.4.ThegeneralconclusionthatdonorsdonotoftenmakeconscioussectoraldecisionswhenallocatinghumanitarianfundingisconfirmedbytherecentGoodHumanitarianDonorshipreview,notablyindonorresponsestothesurveyquestion8:“Detailthecriteriaandtoolsyouusetodecidewho,where,andwhattofund”http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/Libraries/Members_pages_Key_Documents/GHD_indicators_report_2012.sflb.ashx

Annexe E: Endnotes

http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/Libraries/Members_pages_Key_Documents/GHD_indicators_report_2012.sflb.ashx

http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/Libraries/Members_pages_Key_Documents/GHD_indicators_report_2012.sflb.ashx

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Annexe E: Endnotes

22 Protection isalsounlikesomeothersectorsofhumanitarianassistance inthat,asarights-basedconcept, it isinherentlyelastic.Withfood,water,shelterorahealthservice–qualitycanvarybutatleastanobservercancrediblycountwhether it is adequate or not. Protection needs are bettermeasuredby risks than by incidents, they arecomplexandoverlapping,and(asinWesternsocieties)needsthatarebasedonrightscanneverbefullymet.Sotheresourcechallengeistodeterminethebestbalancepointinanygivensituationbetweentheeffectivenessofeffortstoreducerisks,andthecostsofdoingso.Totheextentthattheconceptofprotectioniselasticandcontextually-defined,andspreadssidewaysintoareasofdevelopmentaswellasforwardsintime,ithasmuchincommonwithits similarly undefinable andunderfundedcousins “EarlyRecovery” or “Transition”, and its better-fundedcousins“DisasterRiskReduction”and“Resilience”

23 ThisgeneralconclusionthatprotectionisunderfundeddoesnotapplytoMineAction.Notwithstandinganexpecteddeclineinthenearfuture(astreatymembersendandrenewtheirmulti-yearcommitments)andconcernspecificallyaboutdeclineinsupportforvictimassistance,ingeneraltheidentificationofMineActionneedsandtheobligationsto fund them are supported by a treaty, funding has remained high and constant, and donor survey respondents unanimouslyfeltthatfundingissufficient

24 CommunicationwiththeChildProtectionWorkingGroupcoordinator

25 Rule of Law and Justice; Prevention and Response toGBV; Protection of Children; Protection of Persons orGroupsofPersonswithspecificprotectionneeds(e.g.IDPs,single-headedhouseholds,minorities,olderpersons,disabledpersons,etc);PreventionandResponsetoThreatstoPhysicalSafetyandSecurityandotherHumanRightsviolations;MineAction;Land,HousingandPropertyIssues;PromotionandFacilitationofSolutions;LogisticsandInformationManagementSupportfortheCluster

26 http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=type&type=THEMREPORT&publisher=IASC&coi= &docid=4ae9acb6d&skip=0

27 RuleofLawandJustice,ProtectionofPersonsorGroupsofPersonswithspecificprotectionneeds,PreventionandResponsetoThreatstoPhysicalSafetyandSecurityandotherHumanRightsviolations,PromotionandFacilitationofSolutions,LogisticsandInformationManagementSupportfortheCluster

28 “Thefocalpoint [is] responsibletothecluster leadforensuringthatthose[protection]activitiesareundertaken,irrespective of the fact that the agency is implementing the activities or had delegated this role to a partner”. IASC,ClusterWorkingGrouponProtectionProgressReport,12December2005

29 ForexampleinChildProtection:http://cpwg.net/minimum-standards/ inGBV:http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-subsidi-tf_gender-gbv inHLP:http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/99774.pdf for mainstreaming: http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/tools_and_guidance/WV_Interagency_Minimum_Standards_2012_EN.pdf and generally: http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/news_and_publications/IDP_Handbook_EN.pdf

30 ForthemethodologyusedfortheAoRbreakdown,seeAnnexeA.GeneralProtectionisnottechnicallyanAoR

31 2012dataispreliminaryandsubjecttoconfirmation

32 With the text-filter sortingmethodologyweused,wehave leastconfidence in theHousingLandandPropertyportrait

http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain%3Fpage%3Dtype%26type%3DTHEMREPORT%26publisher%3DIASC%26coi%3D%20%26docid%3D4ae9acb6d%26skip%3D0

http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain%3Fpage%3Dtype%26type%3DTHEMREPORT%26publisher%3DIASC%26coi%3D%20%26docid%3D4ae9acb6d%26skip%3D0

http://cpwg.net/minimum-standards/

http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx%3Fpage%3Dcontent-subsidi-tf_gender-gbv

http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/99774.pdf



http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/news_and_publications/IDP_Handbook_EN.pdf

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Annexe E: Endnotes

33 TheAnti-PersonnelMineBanConventionobligatesaffectedstatestoclearmines,andobligatesthosecountries“inapositiontodoso”toprovidecooperationandassistance,therebyformingacompactenshrinedinatreatywhereindonors agree to fund if mine-affected countries agree to clear

34 ItisimportanttonotethatUNICEFhassignificantresourcesandflexibilitytoallocatebetweensectorsandcountriestofillcriticalgaps–therebyprovidingacushionthatisnotavailabletothesameextenttoSGBVorHLP

35 source: Development Assistance Committee (DAC)

36 A reminder – this is not all the protection funding, but this is the funding that is coded as protection and on-appeal, astheappealrequestistheonlyproxywehavetosystematicallymeasuretheextentoftheprotectionneeds.ThiswouldforexamplealwaysexcludeICRCaswellasUNHCR’ssupportforrefugeeprotection

37 NotethattheMalidataonlycovers2011-2012andMali’semergencywaspoliticallyhighlyvisiblefromthemomentof its sudden onset

38 Wecompared this ranked listof the“ProtectionFundingGap”withECHO’sForgottenCrisesAssessment.For2013ECHOlistsSriLanka,Myanmar,CAR,PakistanandYemenasForgottenCrises:alistingthatdoesnotcorrelatesignificantlywiththe“ProtectionFundingGap”2007-2012

39 Seeforexample,Darcy,James&Hofmann,Charles-Antoine (2003);Smillie, Ian&Minear,Larry (2003);Walker,Peter & Pepper, Kevin (2007); Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2013); and the entire discussion aroundfundingaccordingtoneedsundertheaegisofGoodHumanitarianDonorship.79%ofrespondentstoouronlinesurveyalsofeltthatforeignpolicyconcernshaveVeryHighorHighinfluenceoverprotectionfundingintheirsituations

40 TheFTSportionofthistablewasextractedon26March2013andnotlimitedtothe“on-appeal”dataset.NotethatthistabledoesnotincludeUNHCRfundingforrefugeeprotection

41 SeeAnnexeAforthedetailedmethodology

42 GiventhatOHCHR’sworkinhumanitariancrisissituationsisalsoapartofitscorework,itisnotsufficientlyreflectedinhumanitarianplanningandfundingdocuments, includingFTS.Thiscould leadtoanerroneousconclusionthatOHCHRdoesnotobtainfundingforitsactivitiesinhumanitarianaction

43 Withinthedonorcommunitytherearecompetingforcesatplay:ontheonehandthereisanincentivetopreferUNagenciesbecauseapprovalsareeasier,projectsarelargeranddonorrisksaremoreshared,butatthesametimedonorsarestrivingformoreofthevisibilitythatisprovidedbysupportingNGOs(especiallyNGOsassociatedwiththedonorcountry).TheabsenceofasignificantshiftintheUN-NGOratiooverthestudyperiodsuggestseitherthatthesetwoforcesareincancellingeachotherout,orthattheseforcesarenotexperiencedintheprotectiondomain

44 It is important to bear in mind that a proportion of the sectoral allocation of these funds, varying by organisation and emergency country, is decided by the donors and pooled fund managers

45 FTSdoesnotshowthosefundsthatareprovidedtoUNHCRforIDPsorrefugees,andthatUNHCRthensub-contractstoNGOsforimplementation.And,unlesstheNGOsvoluntarilyenterthedata,FTSalsodoesnotshowthe considerable contributions made by members of the public to the direct fundraising appeals of NGOs, or funding received from non-humanitarian sources

46 Tosomeextentthisbundlingofactivitiesisdoneinordertoachieveoperationalefficienciesandeconomiesofscaleforboththeimplementingorganisationandthedonoragency,butitalsohastheverypowerfulvalueofpermittingorganisations to tap into both general and specialised funding sources

74

Annexe E: Endnotes

47In2009thefigurewasapproximately16%andfallingtoaround8%in2010:http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/ERF-profile-final.pdf

48 DACcode700“HumanitarianAid”.ThereliabilitystemsfromthecompulsoryreportingwhereasFTSisvoluntary,and the better quality of coding at the sector coding level (sub-sector coding is more problematic)

49 Thesethreegraphsusethemethodologicallymorerigourousandnarrowerdatasetofon-appealprotectionfunding,and theAoR text filters described in theMethodological annexeA.However, theHLP figures are over-reportedherebecausethetextfilterscodedsomeIOMandall ICLAcontributionsasHLPeveniftheywerenotpartofanestablishedHLPprogram

50 Although FTS does not differentiate between USAID/OFDA and State/BPRM contributions, this graph almostcertainlyreflectsUSAID/OFDApatternssinceBPRM’sfinancingismostlyunearmarkedattheinstitutionallevel,andOFDA’sfinancingisalltargetedatspecificprojects–manyofwhichwillbeon-appeal

51 ECHOinthefieldemphasisedthatwithfewerstafftomanageanincreasingworkload,therearestrongadministrativeincentivestofinancefewerbutlargerprojectswithineachemergency–whichinturnencouragesorganizationstosubmitmulti-sectorproposals,orideallyoneproposalperorganizationpercountryperyear.Theresultofallthisisthattherearefewerprotection-onlyprojectsintheECHOportfolio

52 http://eeas.europa.eu/anti_landmines/docs/guidelines_08_13_en.pdf

53 AsofJuly2013,USA/BPRM,AustraliaandSwitzerlandhaveseparatehumanitarianprotectionpolicystatements.USA/OfDAandECHOhaveextensiveguidelinesonprotectionembeddedintheirhumanitarianfundingguidelines.BelgiumandtheUKhaveclearprotectionstatementsincludedwithintheiroverallHumanitarianstrategies,andotherEUmembercountriesgenerallysubscribetoEUregulationsandtreatieswhichincludeprotectioninvariousways

54 Table1.10replicatesdatafromDARA’s2011HumanitarianResponseIndex(assessingthe2010programmingyear),andscoreshowfieldpartnersperceivethevariousdonorsfromtheviewpointof“Fundingprotectionofcivilians”and“Advocacyforprotectionofcivilians”,rankedaccordingtothefundingperception.DARA:HumanitarianResponseIndex2011.ThequestionaskedinDARA’sfieldsurveywas“Doesyourdonorfacilitateprotectionofcivilians:Intermsoffunding?Intermsofadvocacy?”Thesurveyhad877responsesfrom9samplecountries,howeverthenumberofresponsesforeachofFinland,BelgiumandLuxembourgwaslow,andthroughoutthewholesurveytherewerenoresponsestothesetwoquestionsfrom23-25%ofrespondents.ForfurtherdiscussionoftheDARA2011qualitativeindicators see http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Qualitative_indicators_construction1.pdf

55 UAEaccountsfortwo-thirdsoftheentireamountofemergingdonorcontributions:approximately$4,000,000

56 Seep.12.SeealsotheGHABriefingPaperPrivateFunding:Anemergingtrendinhumanitariandonorship,GHA2012, and Figure 1.1 of GHA2013,whichshowsthatprivatefundingestimatesforhumanitarianresponsewere$6.3billionin2010,$5.7billionin2011and$5.0billionin2012:broadlyconsistentwiththeUSAdata

57 They are also the donors with the most-developed protection funding guidelines, and specialised protectionexpertiseonstaff

58 InthefieldweparticipatedinspiriteddiscussionsonwhethertheGPCisresponsiblefortacklingprotectionproblemsthatareinherentinthesociety–afteralltheGPCisavoluntaryassociationofprotectionactorsmanyofwhomhavedevelopmentmandatesaswell.OuropinionisthattheGPCshouldonlyaddresstheprotectionconcernsthatarecreated or aggravated by the circumstances of threat or displacement resulting from a crisis



http://eeas.europa.eu/anti_landmines/docs/guidelines_08_13_en.pdf

http://daraint.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Qualitative_indicators_construction1.pdf

75

Annexe E: Endnotes

59 “exit strateg[ies] for protection programmes must be envisaged at the earliest possible stage. A very earlycollaborationwiththelocalornationalauthoritiesandwithotheractorsabletopursuelongertermprogrammes(otherEUservices,UnitedNationsagencies,WorldBanketc.)isneeded”http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/Prot_Funding_Guidelines.pdf

60 ICRC,StrengtheningProtectioninWar:ASearchforProfessionalStandards,Geneva,2001http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0783.htm Similarly,forECHO“protectionactivitiesareunderstoodasnon-structural[definedas“alongtermprocessofbuildingorstrengtheningofinstitutions”]activitiesaimedatreducingtheriskforandmitigatingtheimpactonindividualsorgroupsofhuman-generatedviolence,coercion,deprivationandabuseinthecontextofhumanitariancrises,resultingbothfromman-madeornaturaldisasters.”

61 Thecloserelationshipbetween“protection”and“earlyrecovery”wasrecognisedbytheIASCatthemomentofHumanitarianReformandthecreationof theclustersystem,asdemonstratedby thesharedguidelinesof2008: http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/news_and_publications/gpc_iasc_protection_idps_assessment_action_2008-EN.pdf

62 ECHOandUSAIDstandout in theirclearexpectationsthatprojectproponents immediatelyconsider theirexit/transition strategies at the moment of initial project design, but neither donor appears to have put in place mechanisms tofacilitatetransitionfinancingbeingprovidedbythedevelopmentarmsoftheirownAgencies

63 Similarly,DAClistsin2011(alldonors)thefollowingcontributionsthatcouldhaveasignificantprotectioncomponent:CivilianPeace-buildingandConflict-Prevention:$1.585billion;HumanRights:$1.006billion;andWomen’sEqualityorganisationsandinstitutions:$566million.FurtherlinkagescouldbemadeforChildProtectiontodonorfundingofEarlyChildhoodEducationandBasicHealthServices,whichareoftenprovidedtoIDPswithinthecontextofChild-FriendlySpaces.

64 Foracurrentexample,seetheSyriaBriefingNoteof30January2013athttps://www.sheltercluster.org/MENA/Syria/pages/default.aspx

65 AremarkableexampleofthiswasobservedinPakistan,wherea$6millionhumanitariancontributionfromJapantodigitizedamagedmanuallandrecordsinflood-affectedareasofKPKProvincewassosuccessfulin(a)restoringlandrightstodisplacedpeople,(b)resolvingandpreventingviolentconflictsoverland,and(c)providingasourceofrevenueforlocalgovernment,thattheProvincialgovernmenthasadoptedthemodelandtheimplementingpartner,andcontinuestorolltheprogramoutoveralargerareausingtheGovernment’sownfunding.

66 http://reliefweb.int/report/world/still-minding-gap-review-efforts-link-relief-and-development-situations-human

67 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/UN-WBFramework.pdf

68 http://www.unhcr.org/4e27e2f06.html

69 http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/international-engagement-in-fragile-states_9789264086128-en

70 http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/activities/current-workplan.aspx

71 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1265299949041/6766328-1265299960363/SG-Decision-Memo-Durable-Solutions.pdf

72 http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/international-support-to-post-conflict-transition_9789264168336-en

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/Prot_Funding_Guidelines.pdf

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/Prot_Funding_Guidelines.pdf



http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/news_and_publications/gpc_iasc_protection_idps_assessment_action_2008-EN.pdf

http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/news_and_publications/gpc_iasc_protection_idps_assessment_action_2008-EN.pdf

https://www.sheltercluster.org/MENA/Syria/pages/default.aspx

https://www.sheltercluster.org/MENA/Syria/pages/default.aspx


http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTLICUS/Resources/UN-WBFramework.pdf

http://www.unhcr.org/4e27e2f06.html


http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/activities/current-workplan.aspx





76

Annexe E: Endnotes

73 Wewouldarguethatthiswouldbebestappliedincontextsthatareawashindevelopmentfunding,forexampleAfghanistan,PakistanandSouthSudan–itisnotclearhowtoproceedinsituationslikeCARorChadwherethereisnosignificantdevelopmentprogramtohookonto

74 Furtherevidenceofsectorunder-reportinginFTScanbefoundbycomparingFTSreportsagainsttheOCHA4Wreportsfortheprotectionsector inanygivencountry.Typicallytherearesignificantlymore,sometimesdoublethenumberofagenciesreportingprotectionactivitiesandoutputsthanarelistedinFTS

75 Thisstudywascommissionedasastudynotasa formalevaluation,but itusesanumberofbasicevaluativetechniques.Inevaluationterms,itcouldbecharacterisedasaformativeevaluationfocussingonprocessefficiency,withoutageneraltheoryofchange.Itusesanon-experimentalapproach,andpredominantlydescriptivetechniques.Ageneral picture of relationships and causalitywasdeveloped through triangulation of the results of donor andstakeholdersurveys,roundtables,semi-structuredexpertinterviewsandliteraturereview

76 TherewasasignificantandunderstandabledifferenceinthecountrydistributionoftheEnglishandFrenchsurveys,suggestingthatanEnglish-onlysurveywilloverlookCoted’Ivoire,DRCongo,HaitiandMauritania

77 Forexample,theStateoftheHumanitarianSystemsurvey of 2012

78 Encouragementtocompletethesurveywaspushedoutbye-mailthroughtheGlobalProtectionClusternetwork,supplementedbytargetedfollow-upthroughcountry-levelclustercoordinatorsandOCHA/UNHCRmailinglists.ThesurveywasalsoavailableonthefrontpageoftheGPCwebsiteforapproximately5months

79 Thisisconsistentwiththerespondentprofileof44%withatleast10years’experienceinthehumanitarianfieldand44%with4-9years’experienceinthefield

80 The list of elevenoptionswasdevelopedbasedupon initial interviewswithprotectionexpertsand field-testedbeforebeingfinalised.Thesurveysoftwarepresentedtheseoptionstorespondentsinrandomorder

81 Ourdonor interviewsshowed thatwhilemostdonorcapitalsarepopulatedbyhumanitariangeneralists, some(the larger donors) have specialised protection capacity. In these latter cases, an additional advocacy strategy is toprovideinformationandespeciallyevidencetotheseprotectionexperts indonorHQs,sothattheycaninturneffectivelyadvocateforprotectionwithintheirorganisations

82 Thissurveyquestiondidnotrequirerespondentstorankreplies,butrathertoscorethem,hencethedominanceof“very important” and “important” in the responses

83 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8458.doc.htm

84 http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-scr1960.pdf

85 http://www.childprotectionims.org/service.php

86 http://www.gbvims.org/

87 Theseviewsincorporatedetailedopen-endedexplanationsofferedintheonlinesurvey

88 Arguably,onlyECHOisfirewalledfromsomemeasureofpolitical influenceandinapositiontoactsolelyon itsassessment of protection needs

89 HandbookfortheProtectionofInternallyDisplacedPersons:IASC,2010http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4790cbc02p. 378

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8458.doc.htm

http://womenpeacesecurity.org/media/pdf-scr1960.pdf

http://www.childprotectionims.org/service.php

http://www.gbvims.org/

http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain%3Fdocid%3D4790cbc02


77

Annexe E: Endnotes

90 http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=publisher&docid=4ae9acb71a3&skip=0&publisher=IASC&querysi=cluster%20working%20group&searchin=title&sort=date

91 http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=4790cbc02

92 http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/about_us/GPC_Strategy_2012_2014-EN.pdf

93 http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-products-products&bodyid=3&publish=0

94 ThemostcomprehensivebeingWorldVision’s2012MinimumInter-AgencyStandardsforProtectionMainstreaminghttp://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/fi les/tools_and_guidance/WV_Interagency_Minimum_Standards_2012_EN.pdf

95 http://www.wfp.org/content/wfp-humanitarian-protection-policy

96 http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/resources/files/accg/guidelines_for_proposals_2012.pdf

97 ForanexampleofhowValue forMoneydrives thedonoragenda,seeDfID’sapproachathttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49551/DFID-approach-value-money.pdf

98 Therearedifferentviewsonwhetherthisisacauseoreffectofunderfunding.The“TooLittle,TooLate”studyandin-depthinterviewsconcludethatthisisaneffect–asorganisationshavebeennumbedbyconsistentunderfundingtoreducetheambitionoftheirproposals,feedingaviciouscycleoflowerexpectationsandlowerstandards.Incontrast,some donors feel that protection project requests overstate the needs and the delivery capacity of implementing partners

99 https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CERF/FINAL_Life-Saving_Criteria_26_Jan_2010__EFS.pdf There might be some value in differentiatingmore clearly which protection activities prevent acts of deliberate harm (and couldreasonablybeseenasmore“life-saving”i.e.inthelowerleftquadrantofFig1.11),fromactivitiesthataddresstheconsequencesofabuse(andwhich,howeverpersonallyandsociallyvaluable,couldbeseenasless“life-saving”

100 Noneofthe54respondentsidentified“poormonitoringandevaluation”(oneof12options)as“thesinglebiggestproblem hindering effective response”, suggesting that some protection actors – even if they see monitoring and evaluationasacredibilityproblemwithdonors,donotseeitasamajorprogrammingperformanceconstraint

101 TheGPPistudyofWhatworksinProtectionandhowdoweknow“revealedonlyafewsophisticatedattemptsatmeasuringthesuccessofdifferenttypesofprotectioninterventions.”Notenoughtodrawanyconclusions,butenough to suggest directions for further research

102 InthedonorsurveyweaskeddonorshowmuchoftheirfundingforthemajorUNandNGOorganisationswas“protection”andtheamountsdonorsestimatedwereuniversallygreater,insomecasestwoorthreetimesgreater,than the amounts reported by those same organisations

103 The concern about results does not seem to correlate with preference for project vs core/pooled fundingmechanisms:USA/BPRMandDfIDare results-focussedandprefercore/pooledchannels,whileUSA/OFDAandECHOaresimilarlyresults-focussedandpreferprojectfunding

104 Inadditiontothedonorquestionnaireresponses,expertinterviewsanddiscussionswithdonorsduringfieldvisits,thiswasalsoemphasisedintheopen-endedrepliesprovidedtoOCHAintheir2012surveyofdonorsinpreparationfor the2013CAPseason. In thatcontext,donorsstressedtheneedforbaselines in theCAPs,trueprioritisationaccordingtoneeds,andmoreoutcome/impactreportingonthepreviousyear’sprogram

http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain%3Fpage%3Dpublisher%26docid%3D4ae9acb71a3%26skip%3D0%26publisher%3DIASC%26querysi%3Dcluster%2520working%2520group%26searchin%3Dtitle%26sort%3Ddate




http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/about_us/GPC_Strategy_2012_2014-EN.pdf

http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx%3Fpage%3Dcontent-products-products%26bodyid%3D3%26publish%3D0



http://www.wfp.org/content/wfp-humanitarian-protection-policy





https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CERF/FINAL_Life-Saving_Criteria_26_Jan_2010__EFS.pdf

78

Annexe E: Endnotes

105 Concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of the CAP process from the viewpoint of obtaining projectfundingwereexpressedbyseveralexperts interviewedinthecourseofthisstudy,aswellasthroughoutthefieldvisits.InOCHA’s2012surveyreferencedearlier,donorsagreethattheprojectisationaspectsofCAPsisimportantforplanningandcoordination,butdonorsweresplitabout1/3statingthattheypayseriousattentiontotheCAPprojectlistswhenmakingfundingchoices,1/3statingthattheyaccordthemsomeattention,and1/3paylittleattentiontothe project lists

106 TheOCHA survey information is not published butwas kindly sharedwith us byOCHA for the purposes oftriangulatingdonorviewsinthecontextofthisstudy

107 Donor contributions to Pooled Funds are a special category, because in this case the allocation choices aredeliberatelyhandedoverbydonorstotherelevantbodyatthecountrylevel,usuallytheHCT,whothensetprioritiesanddecideontheprotectionweighting.

108 In the case ofmulti-sectoral organisations, bothmultilateral aswell as the big INGOs, donors do not usuallyearmarkatthesectorlevel

109 Thisbeingsaid,thereciprocalviewpointwasalsoheard:thatNGOswillprioritisewhatthedonorsprioritise.Thereisnodoubtmuchtobothpointsofview,andadvocacyneedstotargetbothsidesoftheequation

110 See the GPPi study at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GPPi_2013_DFID_scoping-study-protection.pdf

111 Ideally,aresultsframeworkwouldconnecttogethertheglobal,nationalandAoRlevels.ItwouldhaveacoherentsetofSMARTindicatorswhichwouldallowaggregationofresults,butthetargetsandapproachestoachievethoseresultswouldbevariableaccordingtothecontextoftheactivities.Anappropriateresultsframeworkwouldneedtoconsiderthatprotectionresultsarelikelytobeasmuchqualitativeasquantitative,andthatbehaviourchangetakesplace over a long time

112 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GPPi_2013_DFID_scoping-study-protection.pdf

113 http://www.interaction.org/document/results-based-protection-final-roundtable-report http://www.interaction.org/document/results-based-protection-consultation-summary http://www.interaction.org/document/results-based-protection-project-brief

114 WedonotthinkitwouldbepracticaltointroduceAoR-levelcodingintotheFTScodingsystem.ThegeneralFTSpriorityshouldbe tocontinue itsworkwithdonorsandrecipients to improve reporting frequencyand thequalityof informationprovided–includingthebreakdownofunearmarkedfunds--throughamorecompleteonlinedatahandbookexplainingdatastandardsandcodingpractices,tipsheets,training,andone-on-oneconsultations

115 Thefundingofcoordinationcostsisawholeseparatetopicthathasnotbeenexploredinthisstudy.Forahelpfuloverviewoftheissuesandapproachesseehttp://clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/Framework%20on%20Cluster%20Coordination%20Costs%20and%20Functions%20at%20Country%20Level.pdf

116 The GHD is currently under review. The report was not available at the time of drafting, but it is likely thatrecommendationsofparticularinteresttoprotectionwillinclude:effortstostandardisereportformatsandimproveaccountability(GHD23)–thisisparticularlyimportantgiventhecurrentpressureondonorstodemonstrateresultstotaxpayersandparliamentarians;methodstoimprovetheinvolvementofbeneficiariesinthedesign,implementation,monitoringandevaluationofthehumanitarianresponse(GHD7);engagementwithoperationalpartnerstopromotestandardsandenhanceimplementation(GHD2,4,15,16)thatcouldbemoreeffectiveiftheGHDgroupdevelopedjointadvocacypositions;andimprovedburdensharing(GHD11and14)andpredictability(GHD12)thatcouldbenefitfrommoreproactivecoordinationoffundingintentionswithinthegroup.Finally,sharingtheresultsofmonitoringand

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/GPPi_2013_DFID_scoping-study-protection.pdf



http://www.interaction.org/document/results-based-protection-final-roundtable-report

http://www.interaction.org/document/results-based-protection-consultation-summary

http://www.interaction.org/document/results-based-protection-project-brief



79

Annexe E: Endnotes

evaluationexercises(GHD21and22),andconductingmorejointassessmentsofoperationalpartners,couldalsobeuseful learning tools. http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/activities/overview.aspx

117 http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/4382

118 It is the basis for statistical analysis in theGlobal Humanitarian Assistance Reports, the DARAHumanitarianResponseIndex,andtheStateoftheHumanitarianSystemsurveys,aswellasmostUNanalysisofhumanitarianfunding

119 85%oftheonlinesurveyrespondentsindicatedthattheirorganisationpracticedamedium,significantorveryhighlevel of protection mainstreaming

120 Theonlysignificant IDPsituationthat isnotcoveredbythisscanisColombia,whichhasatotalof$49millionrecordedinFTSforprotection2007-2012

121 WhichalreadycontainsallocationstospecificprotectionactivitiesfromCERF,CHF,ERF,UNICEF,UNFPAaswellas from donor countries

122 UNHCR’sdataisoneoftheleastconsistentlycodedinFTS,andtheUNHCRdataisnotusuallybrokendownbypartnerorganisationorprojectbelowthelevelofthecountryappealandsector

123 AsamatterofprincipleICRCdoesnotassociateitselfwiththeCAPs,sotheCAPdatasetnecessarilyexcludesICRC

124 UNHCR’sspendingonrefugeeprotection(pillar1only)in2010,2011and2012wasrespectively$215m,$297mand$236m,equivalentto3.5–4timesmorethantheirprotectionspendingonIDPsintheseyears.ThisreflectsthatUNHCRistheonlyprotection-mandatedagencyforrefugees,andhasasharedmandateforIDPprotection

125 WhentheGlobalProtectionClusterwascreatedin2005,therewerenineAoRs:RuleofLawandJustice,Gender-BasedViolence,ChildProtection,ProtectionofgroupswithSpecialNeeds(includingtheelderly,disabled,minorities),HumanRights,MineAction,HousingLandandProperty,FacilitationofSolutions(UNDP),LogisticsandInformationManagement.TheGlobalProtectionClustercurrentlyhasfourAoRs:ChildProtection,SexualandGender-basedViolence,HousingLandandProperty,andMineAction.ImplicitlythereisafifthAoR,whichis“GeneralProtection”–acatch-allcategorythatincludesarangeofprotection-focussedactivitiessuchasregistration,populationprofiling,communitycapacityforself-protection,legalassistance,preventionofforcedreturn,confidence-buildingmeasuresetcthatnolongerhavetheirownAoRs

126 Afterconsiderableandcloseexaminationofthedatafor2009-2010,whichcontainedsomeinconsistentcodingpracticesforUNHCRdata,wemadethreemanualcorrections:theamountsforUNHCRforthe“Iraqsituation”in2009and2010weremanuallyadjustedtoreflecttheactualUNHCRIDPprotectionamountsnotedintheUNHCRGlobalreports,andthe2010UNHCRamountforprotectionofWestAfricanrefugees(allrefugees)wasremovedfromthedatasetasnoneofthisrepresentedUNHCRsupportforIDPprotection(thisexpenditurewouldnormallybecodedbyUNHCRundertheMulti-Sectorcategory)

127 Acommonproblemwasprojectswhosetextdescriptionscoveredsexualviolenceagainstchildren.Generally-speaking,double-countsofthissortwithUNICEFastheimplementingAgencywereresolvedasChildProtection,anddouble-countswithUNFPAwereresolvedasGender-BasedViolence–followingtherespectiveleadershiprolesofthetwoAgencies

http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/activities/overview.aspx

http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/4382

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