Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction

Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise onDesire and AttractionNaomi Reshotko

I Introduction

Plato's Lysis is commonly read as an early dialogue which takes up thequestion: 'What is friendship?' However, if we read the Lysis with thesole intention of understanding Socrates's views concerning when hu-man beings might properly be called friends to one another, we willlikely be confused and disappointed. In the Lysis, Socrates develops ageneral theory of attraction to which he refers using the word φιλία.Socrates also uses the term φιλία to refer to human friendship, becausehe takes human friendship to be a special case of desire which is itself aform of attraction. In order to appreciate what Socrates says about φιλίαbetween humans, we must first understand what he says about φιλίαgenerally. I will demonstrate that Socrates's discussion focuses on ageneral theory of attraction, I will elucidate that theory, and I will showhow it is applied to human friendship. I premise my discussion on thehypothesis that the Lysis is an early dialogue in which Plato attempts todisclose the views of the historical Socrates.1

1 I date as early and therefore, Socratic, the Apology, Cnto, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Ion,Protagoras, Euthydemus, Lesser Hippias, Menexenus, Euthyphro and Republic I. I takethe Meno and the Gorgias to be transitional. This is relatively uncontroversial. SeeDodds (1959), 18-30 and Brandwood (1990), p. 252.

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2 Naomi Reshotko

II Desire: A Force of Attraction

Socrates states his arguments concerning φιλία in very general terms; heuses verbs to express species of attraction broadly rather than narrowly.For example, he juxtaposes 'Is like friend to like?' (214b) with 'Do oppo-sites desire one another?' (215e), thereby treating being a friend to some-thing (φίλον) and desiring something (έπιθυμεΐν) equivalently. Socratesalso uses 'to desire' and 'to be a friend of interchangeably at 215de:

.. .for the things most opposite to one another are especially friendlysince each thing desires its opposite and not its like, (το γαρ έναντιώτοτοντω έναντιωτάτφ είναι μάλιστα φίλον. έπιθυμείν γαρ του τοιύτου εκαστοναλλ' ου του ομοίου.)

This same juxtaposition also suggests that the 'friend' (φίλον) in thefirst clause need not represent human friends any more than the 'ορρό-sites' (εναντίων) in the second clause need represent human opposites.This suggestion is confirmed when we look at Socrates's examples ofopposites that might attract (hot/cold, sharp/blunt): these examplesindicate that he is not concentrating on the human-centered examples ofattraction that would constitute human friendship. Rather, Socrates isspecifying general terms that would cover all cases of attraction (not justfriendship) between all kinds of attractants (not just humans).

The generality of Socrates's discussion suggests that he takes itssubject to be one which does not obey categorial distinctions betweenthe natures of the various entities which make up the metaphysicalenvironment. Whatever is being attracted (humans, physical objects,plants, cosmic entities), Socrates uses the same theory of attraction todescribe why one object is drawn to another. Thus, the same principleswhich govern gravitational force also govern human friendship.2

Socrates's discussion of reciprocity provides another clue that Socra-tes's use of φιλία is general and applies to a broad spectrum of relation-ships. Although reciprocity is a criterion for friendship between humanbeings at 212e-l 3d, there are many places in his discussion of φιλία wherehe ignores that criterion. This suggests that if Socrates were simply

Bolotin points out (130) that this suggests that Socrates is discussing general lawswhich delineate the forces which govern attraction between all of the various com-ponents of the metaphysical environment. He says that Socrates is taking what thewisest say about attraction in the most general way and applying it to friendship.



Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction 3

analyzing human friendship, we could expect reciprocity to be a centraland necessary criterion as it is for Aristotle.3 In cases where Socratesignores reciprocity as a criterion, his account of friendship will strike usas implausible if we assume that φιλία refers narrowly to human friend-ship (215e3-16a6,216cl-3). However, our more general ideas concerningdesire and attraction do not require that the relationship be reciprocated.People desire food, but food does not desire people. Plants are attractedto a source of light, but the source of light is not attracted to the plant.Thus, I suggest that the minor role which Socrates assigns to reciprocityin his discussion of φιλία is further evidence that Socrates uses the termbroadly. Further, I recommend that we understand Socrates's use of theterm φιλία as a reference to something akin to our notions of desire andattraction.

Ill A Friend to the Good on Account of the Bad

Careful examination of the Lysis shows that Socrates thinks that peopleexperience φιλία as a relation between a human being (themselves) andthe good. Where that relationship is mediated by another person, wefind instances of the relationship of human friendship. In order to seethe structure of the relationship between humans and the good, whichSocrates proposes can be mediated by a human friend, we mustexamine 212a8-22d8. Here, it is assumed that a friend must be a friendfor the sake of something other than itself and, indeed, that it must bedue to some bad thing (a foe) that friend is attracted to friend. Socrateseventually places this discussion in the same context as his discussionsof desire throughout the rest of the early dialogues — the hierarchy ofdesire which is also found at Gorgias 467 and Euthydemus 279.4 This

3 Aristotle's far better received account of friendship clearly states that mutual loveand reciprocity of good wishes are a necessary (although perhaps not sufficient)component of friendship (EN VIII2).

4 In two recent articles, Penner (1991,1994) elaborates on this hierarchy (which alsoappears in Irwin [78] and Santas [224]) and how it operates. However, whilePenner's comments might suggest that our understanding of the instance of thehierarchy which appears in the Lysis is enhanced when we assimilate it to otherinstances of the hierarchy of desire in the early dialogues, I suggest that the en-hancement actually runs in the other direction; it is the discussion in the Lysis whichforms the basis for the other instances of the hierarchy of desire.



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invites us, once again, to view his use of φιλία as the more general'desirous of rather than along the narrower lines of human friend-ship.

In the hierarchy of desire, Socrates divides the world into the mutuallyexhaustive categories of good, bad and neither-good-nor-bad (NGNB),and argues that all desire is ultimately for the good and that the NGNBthings (all objects and actions) are desired only as a means to the good.While little insight into φιλία is gained by analyzing this piece of text inlight of any notion which restricts φιλία to humans, the text is quiteunderstandable as an exposition of the nature of desire and attraction.As we analyze the Lysis, we will see Socrates discuss a foundationaltheory of attraction, and — ultimately — hypothesize that attraction isdeficit-based. In fact, in the Lysis we find the one instance of the hierarchyof desire where Socrates provides an ultimate answer concerning whathe takes the origin of motivation to be. The theory proposed by the endof the Lysis might underlie the examples of the hierarchy of desire whichare found in the other early dialogues.5

1 Like Friend to Like

The passage in the Lysis which makes it most clear that Socrates is notsimply referring to human friendship begins when Socrates debateswhether 'like is friend to like' (214b2-4) or, contrariwise, whether Oppo-sites attract' (216a4-5). It is agreed that like cannot be friend to like, firstbecause bad cannot be friend to bad:

For it seems, to us at least, that the nearer a bad person approaches to,and the more that person consorts with, a bad person, the more hatefulthat person becomes; for he is unjust and there is no possible way forthe unjust and the unjustly treated to be friends. (214blO-c3)

5 This is a suggestion which I discuss in Reshotko (1990) and intend to elaborate uponin the future. In the architecture of purposive behavior, desires must provide thenecessary link between physical motivation and intention — they must link thecognitive structure to the physical structure that moves via some sort of cona vestructure. Socrates's ultimate allusion to deficits as the irreducible sources of moti-vation gives us a glimpse into how he would fill the important architectural nichethat desire occupies.




and then, for more general reasons:

.. .when anything whatever is like anything else, what benefit does ithold or what harm might it be able to do the one like it that it cannotdo to itself? Or what could it endure that it could not inflict upon itself?Indeed how can such things be cherished by one another when theyhold no serve to one another? Is it possible? — No. (214e5-15a3)

Here Socrates is saying that things will not be friends to one another ifthey have no need of each other — if they are not attracted to one anotherthrough one being the source of something that the other lacks. Thisnotion that friends need each other conjures up the general notion ofattraction or desire because we conceive of these as unidirectionalforces. Why are plants attracted to light? — because one has somethingthat the other lacks. Why are animals in the desert attracted to water?— because the water fulfills a deficit which the animals are experienc-ing. Since the type of relationship to which Socrates alludes is onewhere there is a need of one party for the other and where, in addition,this need is not reciprocated, we return to our contemporary notionsof attraction and desire in order to make sense of what Socrates issaying, for desire and attraction are plausibly understood as unidirec-tional and based on need.

2 Good Friend to Good

Thus, Socrates concludes that like cannot be friend to like. Next, Socratestries a different approach to the hypothesis that good is friend to good:'.. .granting that like is not friend to like, the good may still be friend tothe good insofar as he is good, not as he is like' (215a3-5). This alternativeis rejected quickly:

But what of this? Will not the good person, insofar as that person isgood, be accordingly sufficient (ικανός) for himself? — Yes. And thesufficient one, at least, is in need (δεόμενος) of nothing due to thissufficiency. — For how not? And not being in need of anything thisperson will cherish (άγαπφη) nothing. — Presumably not. And the onewho does not cherish does not love. — It seems not. And since notloving, is not a friend. — Evidently. Therefore, how can we say the goodare friends to the good to begin with? They neither long (ποθεινοί) forone another when apart (for each is sufficient for itself even being



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separate) nor do they have any need for one another when present. —We can't. But if they do not at least set a high value on one another thenthey are not friends. — True. (215a6-cl)

Here, Socrates begins by considering features of attraction generally, andthen makes a transition when he applies what he has learned aboutattraction to love and human friendship. The general theory of attractionstates that things that are sufficient (in this case, good) will have no needfor anything else and so will not be attracted to anything else. Then theapplication to human friendship is made: so a person who is good willnot long for, love or cherish another individual.

In fact, Socrates's entire rejection of the hypothesis that like is friendto like comes on the basis of the general, almost physical, theory thatobjects are attracted to one another due to needs: bad cannot be friendto bad because bad things will only harm one another (increase eachothers needs rather than fulfill them); NGNB-like cannot be friend toNGNB-like because if two things are alike they do not contain thecomplements to fulfill one another's needs, as they have the same assetsand deficits as one another;6 good will not be friend to anything, like orunlike, as it is self-sufficient and has no deficits which allow it to beattracted toward some other thing which has what it needs. The connec-tion which Socrates draws between having needs and being capable ofbeing a friend foreshadows the end of the dialogue: Socrates sees defi-cit-imposed needs as the driving force that motivates human beingstoward objects external to them. So far, Socrates has done nothing todistinguish human friendship from other forms of attraction.

Since all possibilities of like being friend to like have been rejected,Socrates considers the hypothesis that everything desires its opposite.He finds this idea so implausible that he does not give it much consid-eration. He reasons that, while it is intuitive that 'dry [desires] wet; cold,hot; bitter, sweet; sharp, blunt and empty, fullness' (215e5-7), it is coun-terintuitive to suppose that a hating thing could be friendly to a friendlything, or just to unjust, temperate to intemperate or good to bad (216b2-

6 This is refined at the end of the dialogue as I will describe in my penultimate section.




5).7 Thus both horns of the dilemma in the original hypothesis aredestroyed:'... neither is like friend to like, nor opposite friend to opposite'(216b9-10).

3 Neither Good Nor Bad is Friend to Good on Account of Bad

When Socrates begins anew, he makes the same division that he makesevery time he talks about the hierarchy of desire in the early dialogues(cf. Gorgias 467, Euthydemus 279). At 216d5-7, he asserts that there arethree different kinds (γένη): good (αγαθόν), bad (κακόν) and neithergood nor bad (οΰτ' αγαθόν ούτε κακόν). Since good and bad are neitherfriendly to themselves nor to one another, and nothing is friendly tothe bad,8 the two remaining alternatives are that what is NGNB isfriendly either to itself or to the good. But the NGNB can't be friendlyto itself because that would be a case of like being friend to like; so theonly alternative that has not been ruled out is for the NGNB to befriendly to the good.

At this point Socrates gives an example to explain that the NGNB isonly a friend to the good on account of the bad: a healthy person needsno assistance and so will not seek a doctor; only a sick person, on accountof disease, is friendly to the doctor.9 The explanation for who seeks —and is, therefore, friendly to — the doctor, is that things which are truly

7 This appears to be a counter-example to my thesis that Socrates is taking a generaltheory of attraction and applying it, specifically, to human friendship. For, here, thephysical examples seem correct to Socrates, but he can't approve the transition tohuman friendship. However, there is an explanation for this anomaly given by thatwhich will become clear at the end of the dialogue: the physical examples areintuitive not qua opposites which desire one another, but qua deficits which findfulfillment in one another By contrast, in the examples concerning hating/friendly,temperate/intemperate, just/unjust and good/bad one is simply the negation ofthe other. Furthermore, Socrates reconsiders this premise at the end of the dialogue(221dl-5).

8 This is simply Socrates's assertion that no one desires anything bad but only thegood. (See Pennerand Rowe [1994] and Reshotko [1992]). More generally this is theclaim that nothing is attracted to that which will not benefit it (make it moreself-sufficient).

9 Concerning this example, Bolotin states 'this argument, then, seems to point less tofriendship between unlikes than to a one-sided attraction based on need' (137).



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(as opposed to superficially10) bad have no attraction to the good becausethey are too corrupt to operate normally (to operate normally is to seekthe good). Those things which are already good have no need for benefit,and so needn't seek anything. In conclusion, only something which isNGNB, but has been superficially afflicted with bad, is attracted to thegood so that it can be NGNB once more:

For, at any rate, we might choose to consider a healthy body: it needsneither doctoring nor benefit, for it holds its own (ίκανώς γαρ έχει), sothat no one who is healthy is friend to a doctor on account of health ....But the sick person is, I think, because of disease. Indeed, while diseaseis a bad thing, medicine is beneficial and good. And the body qua bodyis, I suppose, neither good nor bad .... But the body is compelled bydisease to welcome and love medicine. Thus the neither good nor badbecomes a friend to the good on account of the presence of bad.(217a4-b6)

Once Socrates has obtained agreement from his interlocutors, hedistinguishes between those things that are themselves bad (having beenmade bad by being too completely harmed) and those which are merelyafflicted with bad. The idea is that if something has been afflicted withtoo much bad for too long (exposed to great harm) it will eventually reacha point where it cannot be restored to NGNB. To illustrate this let's returnto Socrates's example of the body: if even a minor illness is allowed tolinger for too long, it can eventually destroy the integrity of the body, sono amount of doctoring can restore it to health. This clarifies Socrates'sassertion that the NGNB is attracted to the good due to the presence ofbad. It also shows us why things that are truly bad are not attracted togood, and why things that are truly NGNB, and not afflicted with bad,have no need of good.

This part of the discussion provides further evidence that Socrates'sprimary goal is not merely the exploration of some relation of mutual

10 It might even be better to say appropriately afflicted by the bad. In other words, a NGNBthing can be afflicted by the bad in such a way that, rather than becoming bad, it ismotivated toward the good. As Socrates demonstrates (218a-b), philosophers areafflicted by ignorance — a bad — in a way that makes them seek knowledge — thegood.




affection between humans:11 we must really struggle to find a translationof the attraction between the NGNB and the good that is applicable tothe realm of relations between people.12 How, for example, are we tounderstand the NGNB person who is temporarily afflicted with [the] bad[person] and therefore attracted to the good [person] in order to berestored to NGNB? Even if we could understand this, wouldn't therestoration to NGNB result in the dissolution of the friendship, makingall friendships temporary and short?13

In contrast, the above discussion provides an elegant explanation ofhow attraction and desire work. In fact, the distinction between good,bad, and NGNB provides an explanation of attraction and desire that ismore basic than that which is found in Socrates's discussions of desirein the other dialogues.14 There is much sympathy between this sort ofexplanation and our current explanations concerning attraction. How dowe explain why a mouse that has been lying quietly in a corner of hiscage for several hours suddenly stands and walks to get a drink of water?How do we explain why a plant that has been facing forward for dayssuddenly turns to the right? In each case we say that the organism wasin a stable (neutral) state for some time, and then, due to its internalmetabolic processes, acquired a deficit (was afflicted by bad) so that itcame to desire the good (that which would fulfill the need caused by itsdeficit), and that this desire for the good motivated its behavior. This

11 Bolotin (139) also draws attention to the fact that, whenever it appears that Socratesis stating his own views regarding friendship, he disregards 'reciprocal loving andhardly uses the word friendship.' I would add that Socrates frequently uses theword 'desire' (220B1-3, 217e9, 219a4). Furthermore, Bolotin points out (192) thatSocrates's final assertions concerning friendship bear no 'indication that bothfriends must be living beings.'

12 Both Taylor (70) and Guthrie (147) stretch to find a way to understand this. Guthrieis particularly perplexed at having to apply the example of the doctor and the illbody to friendship. Neither is satisfied and both conclude that the dialogue is afailure.

13 Further, what is the relationship between the NGNB (to which one is restored) andthe good (which one attempts to achieve)? This is a complicated issue which Iaddress in a paper which is currently in progress called "The Good, the Bad and theNeither Good Nor Bad in the Gorgias, Euthydemus and Lysis.'

14 I must, therefore, disagree with Guthrie's (146) assessment that 'anything of impor-tance in [the Lysis] can be found in other [dialogues].'



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explanation is even viable at the more basic level of physical attractionbetween inanimate objects. Why are some elements stable and othersnot? Because some are completely neutral while others, due to theorganization of their electrons, are unstable and, so, are attracted to othermolecules from which they can obtain what they lack.

In what remains of the passage, Socrates continues with his discussionof the hierarchy of desire, and reinforces the impression that he isthinking about the general notion of desire — perhaps, even so generica notion that it could be identified with attraction. The sick man, hereiterates, is a friend to the doctor because of his disease (δια νόσον) andfor the sake of health (ένεκα ήγείας). Thus the body (which is NGNB) isa friend to medicine (good) because of disease (bad). So, once again,Socrates applies a general, theoretical idea about attraction to health and,in turn, to φιλία by simply replacing good and bad with friend and foe:'the friend is a friend of its friend (the good) for the sake of its friend (thegood) and because of its foe (the bad).'

4 An Ultimate Friend

At 218e, Socrates returns to discuss two problems in his example con-cerning the body: first, contrary to what was concluded at 214e5-15a3above, the friend is now a friend to the friend, making like friend to like.Second, there seems to be an infinite regress of friends: medicine is afriend to the sick body for the sake of health; health is also a friend to thesick body for the sake of some further thing; that further thing is a friendto the sick body for the sake of some still further thing, etc.

These two problems have the same solution. With respect to theinfinite regress, Socrates simply elaborates the hierarchy of desire morefully, stating, 'All exertion such as this is not exerted toward these things— toward the things which we procure for the sake of something else —but toward that one thing which we procure all other things for the sakeof (219e). He illustrates this insight saying that a father who prized hisson above all else would, upon learning that his son had drunk hemlock,value wine very highly if he thought it would save his son's life. Further,he would value the vessel that contained the wine and anything else thatwas necessary or helpful to his son's ingestion of the wine. It's not thecase, of course, that the father makes no distinction in value between hisson and the wine: his concern is '... not entertained for the actual thingswhich are applied for the sake of something, but for that something forwhose sake all the rest are applied' (220a). So the infinite regress is




avoided through the assumption that there is an ultimate friend (πρώτονφίλον) for the sake of which we befriend all other friends.

Of course, the first problem is also solved as the ultimate friend is notthe same as the more proximate friend, so like is no longer friend to like.Instead, the attraction is between neither likes nor opposites (both ofwhich have been disallowed) but is between simple unlikes.15 Thus, hereespecially, when Socrates suddenly turns back to the term φίλον, itstrikes us as nothing more than a restatement of what has already beensaid with a new cognate for 'value' substituted into the same description:"The real friend is a friend [valued] for the sake of nothing else that is afriend' (220b4).

IV Desires as Deficits

Now Socrates makes an additional move. He points out that, on thecurrent analysis, friendship is motivated only by the bad, so that if onewere to abolish bad, then no one would desire anything. But, Socratesclaims, this is not the case: even in the absence of bad we would continueto desire those things in which we were deficient. This transition is sur-prising to those expecting an analysis of friendship as a relation betweenpeople, but it strengthens the present interpretation. Socrates clarifies hisobjection by bringing up examples such as hunger and thirst — verybasic physiological needs — as examples of desires that would remaineven if all evil were abolished.

Thus, we see, Socrates thinks that the phenomenon which he isinvestigating is found in even these very ordinary states of attractionwhich are motivated by deficit reduction. Socrates concludes that hisbreadth of analysis has been too narrow; whatever people desire—wine,vessels, medicine, health, silver, gold (and certainly whatever friendshipis, if it is some derivative of desire) — analysis must begin with anunderstanding of how a deficiency will cause an attraction between asubject and the object of that subject's desire. Socrates's discussion heremakes a direct connection between an attraction and a deficit.

15 Cold and hot are opposites, dog and horse are simple unlikes.



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The desirer desires that in which it is deficient (ενδεές) ... and thedeficient is friend to that in which it is deficient ... and it becomesdeficient in that in which it is depleted. ... indeed, it is the thingsbelonging to one, as it seems, that constitute the loved, desired andbefriended things (ο τε ερος και ή φιλία και ή επιθυμία τυγχάνει ούσα).(221d6-e4)

Here, Socrates makes a direct equation between 'the things belonging(του οικείου) to one/16 and the things natural to one: 'It appears necessaryto befriend that which is ours by nature (φύσει)' (222a5). This seems toindicate that he is talking about the most general kind of attraction — adesire which is basic to, and underlies, all motivation toward warmth,water, and food — in addition to people (friends). In fact, in the name ofdeficiency, Socrates could be describing physical attractions as well:attractions between plants and sources of light, or between iron filingsand magnetic fields. In bringing the discussion to this basic level, Socra-tes presents a foundational principle for a theory of purposive humanbehavior: any human activity, no matter how complicated, originatesfrom an effort to satisfy some sort of primal need that the organism hasby nature. In the case of humans, this is a need for good or happiness.17

16 One might also bring to mind the image from Symposium 202e-3a of two pieces of awhole which long for restoration to one another.

17 See Reshotko (1990) for a full argument concerning the plausibility of understandingall desires, no matter how complex, as originating from this basic form of motiva-tion. Bolotin (225) (and also, apparently, Pohlenz [Haden (334)]) agreed withSocrates that basic desires and needs are necessary for friendship.

Bolotin moves to a stronger and stronger interpretation of the relationship thatSocrates asserts between desire and friendship: on p. 180 he says '[Socrates] appearsto establish ... that desire is the cause of friendship .... If we look more closely,however, we see that Socrates's claim is probably the more limited one that desireis a cause of friendship.' Then, on p. 225 he says, Ί conclude, then, that love (orfriendship) for the Good would be impossible in a being that was perfectly free ofwants and needs. Moreover,... this conclusion is compatible with Socrates's restate-ment at the end of the Lysis (222d6-7) that he who is good is a friend of the Good.'As my interpretation makes clear, I don't agree with Bolotin (180) that Socrates'sclaim either is, or should be, the weaker claim that desire is merely a cause offriendship. Desires caused by bad and desires caused by deficits are both compo-nents of the theory Socrates is disclosing, as I show in my (1990), one is simply amore general form of desire than the other.




Thus, Socrates is not only discussing desire, but desire in its most basicform. He is describing the natural — practically mechanical — result ofthere being such a thing as a balanced, or NGNB, state, unique to eachkind of thing, toward which each thing automatically strives.18

To the extent that human friendship is his topic of interest, Socrateshas elucidated its nature by demonstrating that human friends are onepossible way for human beings to fulfill their desire for their ultimatefriend (πρώτον φίλον), which is their friend by nature and which is not aperson, but is the good. Socrates has, quite purposefully, described amore generic kind of φιλία — the kind that is instantiated both by thecosmic forces of the universe, and the philiac, or erotic, urges that attracthuman beings toward one another. In doing so, he has enunciated acompelling and fundamental theory concerning what lies at the heart ofattraction.

V The End of the Dialogue

I have argued elsewhere19 that, despite the aporetic character of the earlydialogues and the paradoxical declamations that Socrates makes therein,they can be read to yield a coherent and plausible theory concerning thenature of human motivation. The Lysis is no exception when it comes toaporetic endings: in the last lines, Socrates is laughing about what foolshe and the others are to call themselves friends, when they have no ideawhat a friend is.

As with other early dialogues, I believe that Plato alludes to the finalspin that he wishes to place on the view being disclosed via subtletiesand ironies contained in the final moments of the relevant passages. Inthis dialogue, these passages occur at 222b-23a. The beginning of the endcomes when Socrates asks whether that which belongs to a thing (τουοικείου) is different from what is like it, or if that which it is like and that

18 In the case of the sick body, Socrates appears to describe the goal state toward whichthe body strives as NGNB. Must we interpret Socrates as, either intentionally orunintentionally, identifying the NGNB and the Good? I believe that pp. 161-2 of my1992 point toward a resolution of this problem. I address this specifically in thepaper to which I refer in note 13 above.

19 Reshotko, 1990,1992.



14 Naomi Reshotko

to which it belongs are the same. Socrates admonishes that they hadbetter turn out to be different since the former argument has shown that'what is like is useless to its like ....' Since they are 'drunk with theargument' and cannot go on in earnest, they elect to resolve the issue bydefinition, simply declaring that that which belongs to a thing is otherthan that which is like it. The fact that this resolution is posited ratherthan concluded through argument seems to imply that it shouldn't betaken seriously.

In addition, there is a subtlety that should not escape the readerattuned both to this argument and to the overall character of the earlydialogues. The statement quoted above is incomplete, and in the textthere is a qualification added to it which I now italicize:

... it isn't easy to reject the previous argument, which says that what islike is useless to its like insofar as there is a likeness (ως ου το ομοιον τωόμοίω κατά την ομοιότητα άχρηστον) and it is a mistake to agree thatwhat is useless is a friend. (222b8-cl)

This qualification adds depth to Socrates's account, as it places histheory into practical dimensions. Certainly, like cannot be friend to like(nothing desires that which it already has); but people and the othersorts of things that Socrates's theory is designed to cover are notunidimensional, nor are such designations as 'like' and 'unlike' unam-biguous. So, something (or someone) might desire another thing orperson which is like it in some dimension, but that likeness will not bethe aspect of the thing desired which is the cause of that attraction. Thescience of attraction will never be fully enunciated if we treat the objectsunder study monolithically.

Thus, the situation has to be more complicated than the way it wasoriginally presented. The object of the desire is not going to be monolithicin either its goodness or its unlikeness. Even as qualified above, the factsabout the object of desire are presented too starkly. One's desire must beboth for that which is one's own and for that from which one is different.Socrates alludes to this sophistication next when he skips over his ownsuggestion that they posit that the good belongs to everyone and invitesthem to posit that what is good belongs to good, what is bad belongs tobad, and what is NGNB belongs to what is NGNB — to which theyassent. In treating the issue of who is attracted to what starkly anddichotomously, Socrates and his interlocutors arrive at a position whichis self refuting:




... we have descended upon those accounts of friendship which weinitially rejected, for now the unjust will be no less a friend to the unjust,and the bad to the bad and the good to the good. — It seems so. — Butif we posit that that which is good and that which belongs to one arethe same, we cannot avoid making the good a friend only to the good.(222dl-5)

The subtle sophistication of Socrates's qualification 'insofar as they arealike' has escaped his interlocutors, but Plato has brought it out for thereader. We shouldn't suppose that the good either belongs to everyoneor belongs only to the good (with the bad and the NGNB also belonging,each of them, only to themselves). The elements of attraction are likelyto be multi-faceted, and attraction relies on this complexity. The subjectof a unidirectional attraction or desire seeks that which is both like it andunlike it: unlike it in that the object provides what it lacks, but like it inthat what is supplied by the object is relevant to the subject. After all, thebad itself has been disqualified as either a subject or an object of desire,and the good has been disqualified as a subject of desire as it is notlacking in anything. Thus, the primary players in the game of attraction,desire and friendship are the NGNB's, which are complex enough tohave some deficits which must be fulfilled, and some goods which canbe offered. These NGNB objects could easily fulfill our intuitions con-cerning human friends.

Particularly in the human realm, where friendship is concerned, weare dealing with a subject and object both of which are NGNB. As willbe seen shortly, this is where reciprocity comes in. The implication ofhaving two elements that are unlike one another, yet that can fulfill oneanother's deficits, is that attractants are interdependent: they comple-ment one another like a right hand and a left hand. A right hand and aleft hand work well together because they have both important similari-ties and important differences. Socrates has intimated to us that the mosteffective and long-lasting attractions are between elements that areinterdependent in that they share both similarities and differences in anappropriate way.

Socrates has rejected one aspect of his original, simplistic view on likebeing friend to like. Earlier he assumed that NGNB-like cannot be friendto NGNB-like because two things that are alike will not complement oneanother's needs (216e7). Now, Socrates is considering objects of appro-priate complexity. Because NGNB objects are complex, they can lack onething while having an excess of another. Because NGNB objects are



16 Naomi Reshotko

varied, their lacks and excesses can complement one another. Socratesnow sees that two NGNB objects are drawn to one another if they areboth similar to, and different from, one another in just the right ways.

VI Conclusion: A Friend is a Means to the Good

In the Lysis, Socrates answers the question 'what is φιλία?' by disclosinga theory of attraction which is the basis for the theory of desire that isfeatured throughout the early dialogues. However, this does not meanthat the Lysis does not inform us about the relationship that existsbetween two people who are friends. Human friendship is no differentfrom any other kind of attraction. Human beings, like all other beings,are attracted to (desire) that which is theirs by nature.20 The fact thatSocrates finds the paradigm of human friendship to hold between aperson and the good, rather than between two people, can obscure ourinterpretation of the Lysis is we assume that φνλία refers to some sort ofpositive reciprocal relationship between two human beings. Socratessaw φιλία as a basic form of attraction that is instantiated by physicaland cosmological entities as well as by human beings.

When it comes to human φιλία, this generic sort of attraction isconstituted by a desire; it has the following structure: human φιλία is arelationship between a human being (who is at present NGNB) and thegood. The good is what this NGNB human being lacks, it is what he orshe needs in order to be good or happy him or herself, and it is naturalfor human beings to strive for happiness and happiness alone (all desirefor actions, objects and states other than happiness is entertained forthese objects only insofar as they are a means toward happiness). Thus,the good is the ultimate friend for a human being. However, it is notunusual for a NGNB human being to see the state of being in a relation-ship with another human being as a means to the good. Thus, if a humanbeing can supply something that another human being lacks with respectto his or her ability to become good, then the second human being wouldbe well-advised to befriend the first human being. These two human

20 Which is equally the good, happiness and virtue. See Reshotko (1992) for a discus-sion of how these three things are identified and why human beings are naturallyattracted to them.




beings will be friends to one another even though their friendship witheach other is for the sake of the good (not really for the sake of the other)— to which the friendship brings them closer. Neither one of them canbe a πρώτον φίλον to the other. The thesis that reciprocity is a criterionfor a successful friendship between humans can be explained by the factthat this association between two people, where one is the means to anend for the other, will likely to more satisfying to both parties, and willlast longer, if the need and deficit fulfillment are, somehow, mutual.

In order to understand the Lysis, it is important to understand that, onSocrates's view, it would not be possible to describe friendship betweenhuman beings as an isolated phenomenon. Friendship between twopeople can only be understood when a general theory of attraction is inplace. Only once we have such a general theory of attraction can we beginto isolate the good as that which human beings pursue via the hierarchyof desire. We can only understand one human being's pursuit of anotherhuman being through the hierarchy of desire, as well. Thus, even if wehave a special interest in human friendship, we cannot read the Lysissuccessfully without the intention of coming to understand Socrates'sgeneral theory of attraction and desire.21

Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Denver

Denver CO [email protected]

21 I am grateful to George Rudebusch for his helpful and insightful comments on anearlier draft of this paper. I am grateful to Roger Shiner for his patience, and for thecaring and supportive manner in which he offered his advice. I am also lucky tohave a friend like Ruth Saunders; she is readily engaged in philosophical discus-sions concerning whatever I happen to be working on, and is full of energy whenit comes to helping me tackle any stage of the process. I hope that our discussionsare as much a means to her happiness as they seem to be to mine.



18 Naomi Reshotko

Works CitedD. Bolotin (1979) Plato's Dialogue on Friendship (Ithaca. Cornell University Press)

L Brandwood (1990) The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge. Cambridge UniversityPress).

E.R. Dodds (1959) Gorgms (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Guthrie (1975) History of Greek Philosophy Vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

J. Haden (1983) 'Friendship in Plato's Lysis' Review of Metaphysics 37 327-56.

T.H. Irwin (1977) Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

D.M. Levin (1964) 'Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis', reprinted in Anton andKustas, eds. (1971) Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Albany: SUNY Press).

T.M. Penner (1987a) The Ascent From Nominalism (Dordrecht: Reidel).

. 'Socrates on the Impossibility of Belief-Relative Sciences', in Cleary, ed. (1987) Proceed-ings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy vol. Ill (Lanhanv UniversityPress of America).

. 'Plato and Davidson: Parts of the Soul and Weakness of Will' Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, Suppl. Vol. 19 35-74.

. 'Power and Desire in Socrates: The Argument of Gorgias 466a-8e that Orators andTyrants Have no Power in the City', Apeiron 24 147-202

T.M. Penner and C.J. Rowe (1994) "The Desire for Good1 Is the Meno Inconsistent with theGorgias' Phronesis 39 1-25.

N. Reshotko (1990) Dretske and Socrates: The Development of the Theme That All Desire is forthe Good in a Contemporary Analysis of Desire' (Ann Arbor MI: University Microfilms).

. (1992) "The Socratic Theory of Motivation' Apeiron 25 145-70.

R. Robinson (1941) Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Cornell. Cornell University Press).

G. Santas (1979) Socrates (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul).

D. Sedley (1989) 'Is the Lysis a Dialogue of Definition?' Phronesis 34 107-8.

A.E. Taylor (1926) Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Metheun & Co.).

G. Vlastos (1991) Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).



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Plato's Lysis: A Socratic Treatise on Desire and Attraction

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