Playing the Identity Card

8/12/2019 Playing the Identity Card

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Playing the Identity

Card

Mohit Gupta


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Introduction 3

National Identity Systems 6

UIDAI 8

Brief History of the Indian National Identification System 9

Identity, Identification and Mediation 12

The Card Cartel 15

Conclusion 19

Appendix I: Understanding a National Identification System 21

Endnotes 26

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Introduction

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), was created under the Plan-

ning Commission to develop and implement the necessary institutional, technical and

legal infrastructure to issue unique identity numbers to Indian residents. (UIDAI) The

project, aimed at providing and managing unique IDs to more than 1.2 billion residents

in India at an initial investment of close to $23 million in 2009-2010 is an huge under-

taking by any standards. It is this unprecedented scale and the rapid progress of the pro-

ject, that have invited the attention of the mainstream media, bloggers and academics.

Many titles of being the first or the largest are often discussed in relation to the project.

It is the first large scale biometric identification system in the world, and if successful

will be one of the largest database of individuals ever collected.

The scale and scope of the project has led to a flurry of activity by Indian bloggers,

discussing various aspects of the project with a mix of celebration, confusion and fear.

Since the project was launched in January 2009, it has been actively debated in schol-

arly journals in India, and some have identified it an opportunity for opening up debates

around state-citizen relationship in India (Maringanti 2009; Shukla 2010). Newspapers

closely follow the project, with popular dailies publishing stories about most of the new

reports published by the UIDAI. Even though the discussions have ranged from celebra-

tions around Indias technical prowess to the relevance of post-structuralist analysis in

modern India, there seems to be gaps when one tries to look at the purpose and history

of the project. This paper is an attempt to join in these myriad discussions around the

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UIDAI with a by connecting together dots from the history of the project, global discus-

sions on national identity systems and concerns expressed by academics and bloggers.

Identification and accounting of citizens is an integral part of modern states. The

process of authenticating identity is essential to the functioning of not only the nation-

state, but also for most interactions with private institutions. Entering a workplace,

travel, accessing a bank account, access to health services or just passing through a toll

booth rely on some kind of ID. In recent years, more of these transactions are based on

some kind of identification card. The cards however, are only the tangible edges of iden-

tity management systems and databases underlying such systems. These systems store

identity information to authenticate (check to see if you are who you say you are), col-

lect information about usage, and often responsible for just-in-time decisions about ac-

cess. Using pre-defined rules these systems are often responsible for sorting people into

categories to ensure the delivery of access to the some individuals and denying services

to others. In essence, processes for authenticatingusers and citizens are not new, they

have been essential for managing access for large groups of people. There are however,

some significant differences in contemporary identification systems due to develop-

ments in technology. These systems, motivated by immigration control, anti-terrorism,

electronic government, or delivery of social services are being debated in many countries

around the world (Lyon and Bennett 2008). Development of these systems involves a

complex mix of organizational structures, policies and technical infrastructure unique to

each implementation. They are shaped by differences in political climate, history of us-

ing identification systems, state-citizen relationships and cultures. Even though various

theoretical discussions and learnings from the experiences of setting up identification

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systems can be extremely instructive towards the understanding and analysis globally

the complex mix of social, cultural and political histories ecologies of each system can

not be ignored.

The UIDAI is unique amongst the many systems that are being developed globally as

it focusses primarily on authentication, without making clear the direct use for identifi-

cation, or the form in which the identification number will be distributed. This has

meant that there in an increased focus and discussion around the collection, storage and

management of authentication data, but obscures the purpose(s) and implications. Cou-

pled with the many changes in the way the system is presented to the media, it makes it

important to look at the history of the project, and the big events (Lyon and Bennett

2008) that have pushed it forward. Unlike some discussions around the project that fo-

cus on analyzing the benefits or faults of the project, my focus is to try and map out spe-

cific aspects of the project, especially its history. The belief is that looking at the UIDAIs

history in light of studies of national identification systems and case studies of other

large scale digitization and identification project can provide a more complete picture of

the project. It is also important to understand the various stakeholders in the project. By

disconnecting itself from the actual delivery of cards and services, the UIDAI does not

have to speak about the processes of identification involved, but only the technical de-

tails of authentication. Looking at the history could help trace the interests of various

groups that have invested in the system.

Impacts and implications of efforts at the scale of the UIDAI are extremely hard to

predict. To label the effort as something that would bring harm to all minorities, or to

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argue that it would result in broad surveillance and loss of privacy is more distracting

than useful. It does not mean, however that the project will automatically empower the

poor, alleviate issues of delivering social services and strengthen security (Maringanti

2009). It is a large administrative and technology regime of identity control and man-

agement, requiring a complicated series of social and policy issues. Identification sys-

tems are not necessarily bad, but they are also not neutral(Lyon 2009). Their scope

and reach demands an exploration of their histories, and the political and social condi-

tions that have shaped decisions. Hopefully this paper will contribute towards creating a

platform for further discussion around the UIDAI project, and identification systems in

developing regions.

National Identity Systems

Though systems of identification have a long history in the modern world, new pres-

sures have led to a marked increase in discussions about creating technological systems

to support authentication and identity management. Motivations around increasing

administrative efficiencies through e-governance and security imperatives coupled with

the need for authentication in commercial spheres such as banking and credit have

played an important part towards this. Contemporary identity systems that employ em-

bedded microchips, biometrics and other machine readable systems (e.g. RFID) con-

nected to centralized databases result in new possibilities for identification and tracking.

Automated systems allow a much expanded and pervasive organizational access to citi-

zen data, streamlining not only access to services, but also allowing for increased sur-

veillance. Capabilities of these new systems also go beyond authentication and identifi-

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cation to greatly reducing the cost of social sortingor the process of dividing those reg-

istered into different categories. Though these categories are required for increased effi-

ciencies towards providing services such as health services access and employment, they

can put certain groups at a disadvantage almost as much (and maybe more) as those

who are not included. National systems also require large personnel and financial costs,

which could not only divert attention from other efforts but also lead to financial trans-

actions around technology development and standards.

As outlined above, the impacts of national identity systems are almost always

broader than the proposed requirements and needs for a national identity system. It is

important to emphasize again, that even though these systems might bring about gov-

ernance efficiencies, security and increased access as promised, there are larger politi-

cal, social and organizational impacts that need to be considered.

Given that these systems are complex, multi faceted and uniquely designed and de-

veloped for each context, they present various issues when trying to get a comprehen-

sive picture. As part of my own process of trying to explore the Indian National Identity

System, I referred to various works that have focussed both specifically on individual

aspects and more general descriptions. Outlining the various aspects that allow for get-

ting more holistic sense of ID projects provides a basis for pulling out certain aspects in

discussion. Of course this is not meant to be a complete set of questions, but those that

have driven the understanding of the UIDAI in this paper. Bennett and Lyon, in their

publications that have looked at surveillance and identification globally, publications in

the Electronic and Political Weekly on the UIDAI and publications by the Committee on

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Authentication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications have informed these ques-

tions (Lyon and Bennett 2008, 2009; Maringanti 2009; Shukla 2010; Kent and Millett

2002, 2003). For details see Appendix I.

UIDAI

The centralized UIDAI effort towards addressing issues relating to identity comes

after the failure of various government departments aiming to provide identity cards to

citizens. Passports by the Home Ministry, PAN (permanent account number) through

the Income-Tax Department and the voter identity card issued by the election commis-

sion, are all aimed at simplifying their specific interactions with citizens. It is expected

that the UIDAI will aim to evolve an ecosystem (and architecture) to support creation,

verification and management of identity for the entire Indian population.

The UIDAI has expressed in its draft reports that they are primarily concerned with

the issuing of identity numbers, verification of data and management of the technical

and institutional aspects of data related to the unique identifier. It is not directly re-

sponsible for the issuing of identity cards, ..the authoritys role is limited to issuing the

number. This number may be printed on the document/card that is issued by the Regis-

trar. (UIDAI) This is done to leverage the various governmental institutions already

setup in the country at the state, regional and local levels for distribution of cards. The

discussions around UIDAI, due to its concern with the the numbers has been limited to

technical and financial concerns. To expand the view on the UIDAI the following sec-

tions explore the history of the system, as well place possible uses in context of theoreti-

cal concerns related to other national identity systems.

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Recent History of Identification in India and Security Concerns

This history is primarily focussed on how security threats have coincided with

the development of the UID project. A more multifaceted account of the devel-

opment, though useful, is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Universal Identification Authority of India was officially constituted in Novem-

ber, 2008 and established in January 2009 under the aegis of the Planning Commission

of India. The UIDAI was made responsible for the developing policies, planning the im-

plementation and managing the UID (Universal Identification) scheme. The universal

identification scheme however, has a history that can be traced back at least to the be-

ginning of the 21st century. A even looser conception would allow us to trace back the

roots of biometric authentication and identification in India to the colonial times.

There have been multiple efforts by the Government of India to establish an identity

system in India to provide clear identity to residents over the last two decades since

the launch of photo-identification cards by the Election Commission in 1993. In 2003,

the government approved the Multipurpose National Identity Card, which can be seen

as the direct predecessor to the UID project. It is an extremely instructive exercise to

look at the environment that led to the approval of the MNIC project, and shifts over the

years, from the original goals.

The MNIC pilot project in 2003 was initiated on basis of a recommendation by a

Group of Ministers (GoM) report on National Security. The report itself was formed in

2000 in accordance to a directive by the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) which has

been established to look into the causes of the Kargil conflict with Pakistan. The Kargil

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conflicts were an extended military engagement between India and Pakistan over the

border areas in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The conflicts involved heavy human

causalities largely attributed to insurgents supported by the Pakistani military. The KRC

report dealing with issues of Indian defense and internal security policies argued for the

issuing of identification cards to people in the border villagers. These cards, aimed to

provide identification to citizens would, according to the KRC report, allow for better

tracking of insurgents. The KRC urged that the cards be issued on a priority basis, to the

border villages and eventually be extended to areas that constantly deal with security

issues. Other areas mentioned in the report were north-east Sikkim and parts of West

Bengal, that border with China and Bangladesh respectively (Mehmood 2008, 114).

There was an attack on the Red Fort (considered a strong symbol of Indias sover-

eignty) in December 2000. This led to the launch of the first ever compilation of ten-

ants living in Delhi, by the Delhi Police. A couple of months later the GoM on National

Security submitted their report which appealed for a national registry for all Indian citi-

zens. They mentioned that non-citizens should be given visually different cards so that

nation wide identification of citizens would be facilitated. Identification cards in the

scope of this report were concerned primarily with Border Management, wherein all

but five out of the 28 states and 7 union territories were treated as a Border (Mehmood

2008, 121). MNIC, therefore was proposed as a citizen card, a feature that has been

dropped from the plans of the UIDAI because of the complexity of identifying citizen-

ship status1(Planning Commision 2007).

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The GoM report on National Security based the need for citizen cards on illegal im-

migration. Illegal immigration has assumed serious proportions. There should be com-

pulsory registration of citizens and non-citizens living in India. This will facilitate prepa-

ration of a national register of citizens. Controversies around the MNIC was focussed

primarily on the ambiguous and transient nature of citizenship in India as an important

issue towards the development of the MNIC (Chatterjee 2006, Mehmood 2006).2It is

interesting to note that even though citizenship status is no longer a part of the UIDAIs

mission, there was a change made in 2003 to the 1955 Citizenship Act mentioning that

the the Central Government may compulsorily register every citizen of India and issue

national identity card to him as well as maintain a National Register of Indian Citizens

and for that purpose establish a National Registration Authority. The National Popula-

tion Register also mentioned in related discussions, will be enumerated through the

2011 census in India (Chidambaram 2009).

The 2011 census itself has attracted significant attention reintroduction of casteas

one of the parameters collected, the first time after 1931. The census, which is a huge na-

tionwide exercise is expected to provide data for the UID project. Processes for collec-

tion have been modified so as to collect personal information and even biometric data

(in some cases) for the census. These changes align with the urgency of collecting identi-

fication data across the country after the November 2008 attacks in India (Chidamba-

ram 2009).

In 2001, another prominent attack on the parliament in New Delhi, had led to dis-

cussions about creating a registry of citizens. The attacks also motivated the passing of

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the infamous Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA) in 2002. POTA was repealed

by the current government due to pressure from human rights and civil liberty groups,

as well as publicly discussed cases of misuse. It is interesting to note though, that after

the attacks on Mumbai in November 2008 the parliament enacted the Unlawful Activi-

ties Act, which is similar to POTA. The attacks also resulted in the appointment of P.

Chidambaram as the Union Minister of Home Affairs (responsible for internal admini-

stration of the country) who was earlier the Finance Minister of India. Chidambram af-

ter appointment has spoken about increasing security preparedness, and cites the Na-

tional Population Registry and the UIDAI as important parts of the process.

Identity, Identification and Mediation

Though systems like the UIDAI are often called identity systems, they are concerned

more with identification and authentication, than with peoples identity. Since the

French revolution, nation states have depended on various kinds of identification sys-

tems to recognize the civil identity of individuals. Much research, in humanities and so-

cial sciences has focussed on the relationships between information, documentation and

governance (Caplan and Torpey 2001). Foucaults analysis has popularly explored the

processes of using technologies of enumeration and calculation towards governance

where the problem of governance is ultimately one of how to conduct the conduct of

populations in the most economic manner. (Maringanti 2009) How these systems of

governance, affect the identities of populations has been explored in depth by various

scholars (Foucault 3; Torpey 2001; Lyon 2009). These discussions highlight the rele-

vance of reducing the multiple identities of people (as parents, friend, employee etc)

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which are defined through changing contexts and histories to a singular number. Con-

trol over identity is further eroded through the process of defining it through the body,

using biometrics.

Introduction of the UIDAI as a singular system for identifying residents in India,

could greatly affect the relationships between the citizen and the state. Furthermore,

since the uses for the UID are disconnected from its initial implementation there are

various scenarios where residents would loose control over their identities. In particular,

a similar unintentional loss of control can be seen through the case study of Bhoomi.

The project involved digitization of land records that have led to a reduction of subjec-

tivity and the argumentative nature of previous processes. A report looking at the socie-

tal context of the project mentions that most small farmers and marginal groups find

themselves in situations where there land records have not been updated and consoli-

dated for years. Before digitization supposed inefficiencies in the system allowed mar-

ginalized groups to interact with local officials to update their records. However, with

the introduction of Bhoomi, such processes are handled centrally where excessive brib-

ery and complicated processes make it harder for certain groups to operate on their re-

cords (International Institute of Information Technology 2005).

Universal identification connects various aspects of a person over time into one im-

mutable history. The UIDAI currently structures its operations are read only, where re-

quests made to the server for authentication would only respond with a Yes or No.

Thus by restricting the amount of information that can be accessed when an authentica-

tion request is made, and having no provisions for recording such information does not

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impede on an individuals control over their history. This does not explain the many sys-

tems described in news and reports that would not function without tracing an indi-

viduals data. The UIDAI claims that access loans would become easier for the poor, by

ensuring identity. In practice, for financial institutions to ensure that loans are returned,

it would require aggregated financial histories of people. This is not to say, that preven-

tion of financial fraud is not an important part of extending credit access in India, but

points to some issues surrounding the disconnect between UIDAI and its uses. Fur-

thermore, the UIDAI strategy overview discusses a micro-payment architecture where

the UID-linked to a bank account would enable access for the poor. One of the actors

mediating the connections between banks and the poor are business correspondents

(e.g. self-help groups, post offices, small shops). As seen in the case of the Bhoomi pro-

ject, increased distancing of the person and their identity can create scenarios where in-

termediaries can exert additional leverage over end users.

The LSE report on the UK National Identity Cards bill explore the issue of mediation

and loss of discretion extensively in around policing and IDs. The improvements in po-

licing given conditions of mandatory possession of cards at all times, and limited track-

ing are primarily related to increase in efficiencies around stop and search. These bene-

fits however are seen in tension with increase in mediation between the police personnel

and the community. They mention that administration of order is an act of peacekeep-

ing that depends chiefly on discretion and common sense; these attributes open up a

range of possibilities for the administration of order. Maintenance of order, except with

some notable exceptions depends on the voluntary compliance of most citizens. Increase

in identification systems could lower necessary discretion that is part of peacekeeping

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efforts as increased surveillance of police personnel could lead to mechanistically using

available biometric identification technologies (LSE 2005). In summary, they argue that

though identification and biometric systems may increase efficiencies, it would also

change the relationship between the police and the public. Such relationships between

the community and systems of governance are extremely fluid, and broad (nationwide)

policies and rules around authentication technologies would disrupt social systems in

unpredictable ways.

The Card Cartel

"A concern with iris [scans] has been on cost. However, the current high prices

for iris technology are a result of low volume and its use in cost insensitive secu-

rity applications. Considering the large demand that will come from India for

iris devices and software, the UIDAI expects the prices for iris devices and soft-

ware will fall rapidly." Nandan Nilekani (The Economic Times 2010)

The confident statement by Nandan Nilekani, head of the UIDAI shows the huge fi-

nancial transactions that underlie the development of a national identification system.

The 2010-2011 budget has allocated $400 million for the project, and the UIDAI is ac-

tively setting standards for biometric devices and software systems. The organization

has already asked for various private entities to submit applications for developing the

software and biometric systems that are required for implementation. Recently, the UI-

DAI awarded a $6.6 million contract to MindTree, a medium-sized Hyderabad based

software company. This contract is small in comparison to the total amount of $1 bil-

lion, expected to be outsourced.

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In light of the financial incentives tied to national identity projects and the huge in-

crease in demand for biometric technologies, embedded microchips and other systems,

it is expected that there are many interests tied to the implementation of such systems.

Lyon has identified such economic and systemic motivations for identity systems as the

card cartel. He argues that the identity systems are no no longer be understood as inter-

actions just between the state and the citizen. We have to recognize that todays identity

cards are the product, not merely of formally constituted bodies, but of corporate enti-

ties competing for contracts to use their solutions, and also of technical standards which

shape the very architecture and the peculiar characteristics of the scheme i question

(Lyon and Bennett 2008, 11). Also as seen in the history of the UIDAI, pre-histories of

identity systems result in various expectations and pressures on design of the system.

Identity and identification are inherently social processes, that interact with the techno-

logical media they depend on. Similarly decisions around the implementation and de-

sign of an identity system is go through a political process, with unique power relations

for each case. Through the structures of organizations that support them, and the people

that make choices they are continuously shadowed by various narratives and histories.

Toropys work on identity systems makes the case that the state, through the pass-

port creates a monopoly on mobility. Tracing the history of authentication in relation to

mobility, he argues that the state, through control of mobility also manages identity

(and vice versa). By requiring identification for mobility, states make people depend on

them for identity. Furthermore, being able to identify with a state, is a often a long proc-

ess with many controls. Thus, by securing mobilities, states create a division between

the self and the other, which in various senses is essential to the very concept of a nation

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state. Lyons conception of the card cartelfurther expands on Toropys arguments to

recognize that the state and the citizens operate in relation to each other. In line with

Foucaults notion of governmentality, Lyon describes the state as it is constructed

through the process of interacting with the populations and organizations it seeks to

govern.

In case of the UIDAI, there are various standards and investments made by govern-

ment bodies that have experimented with the identity systems. The MNIC project, which

is still active, and sometimes in contention with the UIDAI plan had led to a huge explo-

sion in companies developing smart cards and related technologies in India. Many of

these companies, supported through contracts and partnerships with the government

are now looking for markets beyond the MNIC. Other corporations, in software and

technology support are offering their support to the UIDAI. Technology decisions made

by the UIDAI will lead to not only large revenues, but also large scale adoption in vari-

ous new and traditional areas that could shape standards. After 9/11, in the US Larry

Ellison of Oracle offered free software to the government for building a national identity

system, and similarly ex-Microsoft chief Bill Gates has mentioned publicly that Micro-

soft would support the UIDAI to build their infrastructure. The point here is not to say

that corporations are making decisions towards the development of these systems. The

examples show that there are various power relationships and invested costs that affect

the design of identity systems.

Another example to explore the various influences towards the adoption of large

scale technology systems is described by Ravi Shukla in his article about UIDAI. Shukla

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describes Winners work around decisions to build technology systems as one motiva-

tion for the UIDAI. Winner argues that technology is often used as a marker for pro-

gress, and combined with the celebration of technical systems creates a scenario where

socio-political issues are also interpreted as technical problems (Shukla 2010). There are

various sectors that have seen marked transformations brought about by information

and communication technologies. The rapid progress in these technologies, economic

growth, and increased attention to the technology sector as the rising star of the Indian

economy leads people to turn to technologies as a solution for any problems. Organiza-

tions such as the Department of Information Technology and commercial enterprises

are also looking to offer solutions towards fulfilling the promise of e-governance. Lastly,

pressures from security agencies and media to act decisively in response to threats fur-

ther motivate towards the development of centralized systems that promise dissolution

of issues. The UIDAIs chairperson has cautioned against people interpreting the UIDAI

as a panacea for all problems while arguing that the UID scheme will enable improve-

ments. In the mix of technological pressures, it is hard to predict the benefits of a system

that is still seen by many as an impossibility.

Additionally, the UIDAI has initiated projects around the standardization of biomet-

rics. The Committee on Biometric Standards, constituted in September, 2009 recom-

mended the use of iris scans in addition to fingerprint scans and photographs to be used

by the UIDAI. Due to apprehensions around the cost and need for iris scans, the com-

mittee released a report in May 2010 arguing that devices for iris scans can be cheaply

produced at scale. The UIDAI has been declared as the Apex body for setting standards

around biometrics and demographic data. It has released various reports describing the

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minimum requirements for biometrics. Organizations involved in the design and devel-

opment of biometrics technologies have a strong incentive to follow the standards re-

leased by the UIDAI. It is important to note, that the installed capacity at the scale re-

quired for the UIDAI is anticipated by the industry, and it would be increasingly difficult

to roll back on plans for biometrics. The UIDAI with its investment in biometrics will

create an environment where not only jobs and expertise in biometrics will grow, but

they will also find their way into other systems. The case for the second generation iden-

tity card for China allowed it to become the largest manufacturer of biometric devices in

the world. These installed capacities, and technology infrastructures further impose

pressures on the kinds of options that are evaluated in the future.

Conclusion

In this paper the attempt has been to look at the history of UIDAI and evaluate it in

relation to theories and concerns around other national identity systems. This paper

however, provides just a framework to start looking at the possible implications of the

UIDAI. The influential LSE report in UK and publications by the Committee on Authen-

tication Technologies and Their Privacy Implications have shown that studies around

the efficacies of national identity systems can influence both debate and popular opin-

ion. Given the scale and scope of the UIDAI effort, it is important that studies focus on

the micro and macro implications of such a system. The project is a reality, and is mov-

ing fast towards implementation, but a close look at the stakeholders and policies

around the system can influence lawmaking and controls that are built to support the

technical infrastructure.

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The history of the National ID system in India reveals the overlap of various interests

that have pushed the system towards implementation. Media coverage and public dis-

cussions around the project are focussed on some very specific aspects of the project.

Furthermore, the separation of the project from service delivery has meant that most

discussions around the impact of the effort are fluid, and deal primarily with the costs

and the scale of the project. A comparative look at the project in relation to similar sys-

tems in other countries reveals the various complications and issues around national

identity systems.

The UIDAI project like any other project would fundamentally change the way resi-

dents interact with the government and even with the private sector. Discussions that

focus primarily on the efficacy or validity of the project, though important should also be

supported by debates about the legal and policy framework within which the project

functions. These debates are essential to monitoring the progress of the project. It is im-

portant to outline the landscape of changes brought about by the system, and to explore

how the socio-political relationships and power structures evolve.

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Appendix I: Understanding a National Identification System

The most important question, which is many times only loosely identified in identi-

fication and authentication systems is the proposedpurposeof the system. Though the

reasons vary widely, studies frequently point out that the purpose of identity efforts is

only loosely defined and is often shifts constantly. Systems also differ in how they are

used by different organizations. Some are proposed towards a specific goal such as the

Social Security system in US, and others are multi-purpose like the proposed system in

UK or the UIDAI. Decisions about policy and design of the system (for e.g. the kinds of

data required, inclusiveness, and voluntariness) largely depend on the uses of the sys-

tem. In various cases, uses of identification systems grow beyond the original indented

uses - such as the use of driving licenses as proof-of-age. Such change in use can new

avenues for tracking by co-relation between different data sets, and the design of poli-

cies of the original system may no longer be secure. The addition of functions is not al-

ways organic. New systems are often built using data from existing systems, or by aggre-

gating data in different systems. Processes or laws that control the use of the system (or

card or number) in new contexts should be noted, as they greatly affect trajectories of

development. Also, the name of the project is often not indicative of its purposes. Stud-

ies around global identification schemes have shown that many such examples such as

the proposed federal Real ID programme in the US, which would build on state driving

license records. Critiques around the UIDAI argue that the database would support

stricter security and immigration controls, but is being presented primarily as a measure

for improved social services and extending the reach of financing options.

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Many identity systems that are not labeled as national, are used as proxies for identi-

fication. Often cited as the purpose for introducing universal identification, such cases

point towards the scope of populationsthat are covered. Questions about requirements

for requesting or being required to have register with the system, and the amount of

data collected for differing populations are important. In many scenarios the issue is

considered one of inclusiveness - will the minorities be able to get an identity, the dis-

abled, children and in case of citizens those who living outside of the country. Some-

times, however registration might focus only on the unemployed, refugees or those seek-

ing healthcare. These concerns are further complicated by the introduction of biomet-

rics, where many systems gather more and more data to deal with disabilities and work-

ing conditions as in the case of inclusion of iris scans in UK and India respectively. What

legal and policy frameworks exist for limited the use of the data, to ensure adequate con-

trol of information and protect against discrimination. How is the ID system marketed

to the population? How is the ID assigned and how can it be obtained by an individual?

People usually interact with identity systems by showing their card, or by presenting

information (from memory, through documents, or biometric) to some agent that could

be a person or a machine. How is theagents control over the informationmonitored.

Authenticating is often considered by many to be invasive, and the agent also acts as a

gatekeeper to services that can be accessed through authentication. Which choices in the

technical development, policy design and law protect the user from abuse by the agent.

This also includes issues relating to the protection of private information from agents,

and to prevent leaks of the same. Similar concerns arise around the forgery and fraudu-

lent use of the system. Is it possible for certain people to control the identity of others?

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How are duplicates resolved? These questions that may are shaped by the socio-political

environment, are often only dealt with at the technical level. Many systems describe the

use of biometric information as a prevention against fraud and forgery, but there are

other issues relating to the abuse of the identities of those who do not understand the

system. For instance, an analysis of the Bhoomi project in India, which is often seen as

an technical and managerial success resulting in efficiencies has pointed out such issues.

The project which involved the digitization of land records in Karnataka has in cases,

made it harder for the local poor to access land records, while making it more easily ac-

cessible to those with access to technical and financial resources. Small and medium

sized farmers, as well as marginalized groups have to increasingly depend on middle-

men to access the system. Also centralization of records has resulted in creating more

distancing from the poor, while providing more control to lobbies who can access the

state government. (International Institute of Information Technology 2005)

Along with policies and laws for protection from agents there are also issues of shar-

ing and access of data stored and collected. Is the data only accessible for verification, or

can the details of a person be accessed. Which organizations have access to the data, and

what are the costs of using the database. Is the database accessible remotely? If so, what

kinds of policies govern conditions in which a person can be authenticated. If commer-

cial and private sector can access services offered by the system, what controls are in

place to regulate their behaviors. Can organizations collect additional data from users

and co-relate the same with the unique identifiers? What kindsof queries that are al-

lowed on the data. Is analysis and mining of data allowed? These questions aboutusers

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of the system (as opposed to those recorded by the system)affect the kinds of aggrega-

tion, sorting and surveillance that are enabled by a national identity system.

Another salient dimension is whether it is mandatory for targeted populations. Cer-

tain systems such as those in France are mandated, where as others are voluntary. There

are however, many cases where essential services are tied to the system and registration

becomes mandatory not by policy but by use. In other cases, parts of the population that

have opted out are often treated by suspicion or have to go through alternative processes

that drastically increase cost of access. It is important to question the implications of not

having an entry in the system. The UIDAI plans to use demand for access to service as a

methodology for increasing adoption. By tying in the UID with a broad spectrum of gov-

ernment services such as the voting, food distribution and even the census, the UIDAI

hopes to be able to create a catalog of all residents in India. Voluntary registrations also

create inequities of access for those who do not posses information about registration,

the ill and the old, and the poor. These might be exactly the people who would need ac-

cess to the system (Lyon 2008). Many efforts such as the UIDAI and Chinas second-

generation identity card have developed special processes for targeting rural popula-

tions that might not be able to register through other methods.

Most systems store data for authentication, but the details of the storage and security

greatly varies. Storage can be centralized, and in control of a specific agency or aggre-

gated from different participating organizations. The storage of identifiers could also be

distributed geographically or across organizations. These decisions also affect the kinds

of access and the response times of authentication requests, which in turn change the

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kinds of services that can benefit from the system. Similarly, there are issues of physical

and technical security of the data.

Kent and Millet, in their report around nationwide identity systems raise various

questions relating to the kinds of data collected. What is the scope of the data that

would be gathered about individuals participating in the system and correlated with

their national identity? While colloquially it is referred to as an identification system,

implying that all the system would do is identify individuals, many proposals talk about

the ID as a key to a much larger collection of data. Would these data be identity data

only (and what is meant by identity data)? Or would other data be collected, stored,

and/or analyzed as well? With what confidence would the accuracy and quality of this

data be established and subsequently determined? (Kent and Millet, 2002)

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Endnotes

1.The creation of a data base of residents and assignment of a unique ID to each resident is much easier

than the creation of a data base of citizens, because of the difficulty of authentication of citizenship and

the legal implications that it may have. We are therefore focusing in the first stage on the creation of a

residents data base. (Planning Commision 2007, 5)

2.at Murshidabad, which[MNIC] failed to verify some 90 per cent of the population. Among them are

some Iranian families living in Murshidabad for 70 years. The Indian authorities think they are Iranians

and they should go back to Iran and the Iranian government believes them to be Indian.

Foucault is mentioned frequently in discussions around the relationships between technology, governance

and ethics. My understandings of governmentalityhowever, are based only on secondary sources and

through online non-academic resources. (Gary Sauer-Thompson 2004; Ali Rizvi)

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Playing the Identity Card

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