Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

8/10/2019 Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

1/34

nternational Phenomenological Society

Pleasure and Illusion in PlatoAuthor(s): Jessica MossSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 72, No. 3 (May, 2006), pp. 503-535Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040948.

Accessed: 01/02/2014 04:57

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

International Phenomenological Societyis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 161.116.100.92 on Sat, 1 Feb 2014 04:57:32 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ipshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40040948?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/40040948?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips


2/34

Pleasurend llusionnPlato

JESSICA MOSS

Philosophy

nd

Phenomenological

esearch

Vol.

LXXII,

No.

3,

May

2006

UniversityfPittsburgh

Plato links

pleasure

with

llusion,

nd

this

link

explains

his

rejection

of the view that all

desires

are rational desires

for the

good.

The

Protagoras

and

Gorgias

show connections

betweenpleasure and illusion; theRepublic develops these into a psychological theory.

One

part

of

the

soul

is

not

only prone

to

illusions,

but also

incapable

of the kind of

reasoning

that

can

dispel

them. Pleasure

appears

good;

therefore this

part

of the soul

(the

appetitive

part)

desires

pleasures

qua

good

but

ignores reasoning

about what is

really good.

Hence the

new moral

psychology

of the

Republic:

not all desires are

rational,

nd

thus virtue

depends

on

bringing

ne's

non-rational desires

under

the con-

trol of reason.

Introduction

In

the

many, deception

seems

to

come about on

account of

pleasure.

For

while it is not the

good,

it

appears

to

be.

They

choose

the

pleasant

as

being good,

then,

and avoid

pain

as

being

bad. Aristotle,

Nicomachean

Ethics

1

1

13a33-b2)

Plato

s

suspicious

f

pleasure.

e

devotes

he

whole

of

thePhilebus

nd a

significant

ortion

f

the

Gorgias

to

attacks

n

hedonism. e declares

hat

"the

oul

of a true

hilosopher...

eeps

way

from

leasures

nd

appetites

nd

pains

nd

fears s

much s

it

an"

Phaedo

83b5-7)

nddenounces

leasure

s

"evil's

greatest

ure"

Timaeus

69dl).1

And

even

when

cknowledging

hat

somepleasuresregood,andthat hegood life thephilosopher'sife) s

supremely

leasant,

e

holds hat

he

very

est

ife the

ifeof the

gods

is

a

life

with o

pleasure

t all

{Philebus

3b).2

Why

s Plato

o

mistrustful

f

pleasure,

nd

why

does he devote

o much

attention

o

the

topic?

ome

have

takenhis

concern

with

pleasure

o stem

from

lain

prudishness,

r

from

n excessive eaction

gainst

ontemporary

advocates

f

hedonism.

y

contrast,

will

argue

hat

Plato's

suspicion

f

1

Translations

are mine

unless otherwise

noted.

2

The apparent exception

to Plato's

general

anti-hedonism

is

the

Protagoras,

in

which

Socrates

gives

an

argument

based

on the

premise

that

pleasure

is not

only

good,

but the

good.

It is

a

testament

o

the

strongly

nti-hedonistic

endency

of the other

dialogues,

however,

that this

passage

of the

Protagoras

has

generated

so much

interpretative

debate.

PLEASURE

AND

ILLUSION

IN

PLATO 503

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/34

pleasure

is

systematic

nd

philosophical,

and tied

to

his most central

views.

Pleasure is

dangerous

because it

is a

deceiver.

It

leads

us

astray

with false

appearances,bewitching

nd

beguiling

us,

cheating

nd

tricking

s.3 In

par-

ticular,

t

deceives us

byappearing

o

be

good

when t s not.

This

paper

traces

the

development

f the association

between

pleasure

and

illusion

through

hree

dialogues,

the

Protagoras, Gorgias,

and

Republic.

I

argue

that this association

explains why

Plato's

account of the desire

for

pleasure

thedesire for

hings ua

pleasant changes

radically

betweenthese

dialogues,

and

thereby xplains

a more

general

hift

n his

theory

of

virtue

and

desirefrom

he

early dialogues

to

the middle.

While

there re

important

refinementsf the association between

pleasure

and

illusion

in

the Philebus

and

Laws,

a

discussion of those

dialogues

lies outside the

scope

of

this

paper.)

In the

earlydialogues,

Plato

argues

that ll

desires

including

he desire for

pleasure)

are rational

desires for the

good.

On this view of

desire,

vice is

merely

matter

f

ignorance

bout

good

and bad: once we learn

which

things

are

reallygood

and

bad,

we can

rely

n our desires to lead us to virtue.

n the

Republic,

by

contrast,

lato

argues

that some

desires,

including

desires

for

pleasure

understood

now as

belonging

o

the

appetitive

art

f

the

soul),4

are

distinct rom nd can

conflictwith rational

desires

for the

good.

Correspond-

ingly,

he

Republic

rejects

the ntellectualistmoral

psychology

of

the

earlier

dialogues: it holds thatvice is a matter f psychicdisorder, ot mere igno-

rance,

and that

virtue

an be achieved

only

when

the

parts

f the soul with the

wrong

kind

of desires are ruled

by

the best

part

f the

soul,

reason.

Why

does

Plato

change

his view of

desire

n

this

way?

I will

argue

that he

is motivated

to do

so

by

his

developing thoughts

bout

pleasure

and illusion.

If

the

account offer s

correct, hen,

he association between

pleasure

and

illusion is central to

Plato's

thought.

For the most

part,

however,

the asso-

ciation has been little

noted,

and,

where

t has been

noted,

not

well under-

stood.5The

only

context

n

which the

connection

has

been

widely recognized

is Republic X, wherePlato seems to argue thatthe partof the soul that

desires

pleasure

s

the

part

that s

deceived

by

optical

illusions.

No satisfac-

tory

account has been

given

of

why

Plato would

group

these traits

ogether

3

This s an

accusation

hat

latomakes

throughout

he

dialogues.

The

soul

is

bewitched

(yoriTEuoiiEvr))y

the

body

nd ts

pleasures

Phaedo 81b3);

people

are bewitched

nd

charmed

Kr|Xr)6evTes)

y pleasure

Republic

13c

-2,

f.

Rep.

584a

10);

pleasure

does

whatever er

will

wishes

by

meansof

persuasion

with eceit

TT6i0oT eto

andiTis)"

(Laws 863b7-ll).

In

the

Philebus,

Protarchus

alls

pleasure

"the

greatest

mpostor"

(ctAa^ovtoTaTov,

Phil.

65c5).

See section 11 or

xplanation

nd

defense

f this

laim.

Shorey

nd

Gosling

nd

Taylor

notice

ome

spects

f

pleasure's

deceptions,

ut

mainly

in

connection ith

odily leasures

n

thePhaedo

(Shorey

1903:

28,

Gosling

nd

Taylor

1982:

86);

Price

notes

a

connection

etween

pleasure

and

illusion,

ut

only

in the

Timaeus

Price

1995:

86).

504

JESSICAMOSS



4/34

here, owever,

nd ndeed

many

nterpreters

ave

found

he

claim bizarre.

s

Annas

puts

t,

"desire as

nothing

o do

with

ptical

llusions."6

y tracing

the onnections

etween

leasure

nd llusion

n

the

Protagoras

nd

Gorgias,

I providenaccounthatmakes ense fRepublicX's argument:show that

on

Plato's

view

thedesire or

leasure

oes,

n

fact,

ave

much o do with

optical

llusions.

In

Section

,

I show hat

lato ssociates

leasure

nd

llusion

n

thePro-

tagoras

n

order

o

explain

why

desires or

pleasure

ead

peopleastray:

when

we

pursue

armfulr

vicious

leasures

nstead f

doing

what

s

good,

we

do

so because

we have

beendeceived

y

llusions

eneratedypleasant

nd

pain-

ful

things.

ections

I

and

II

argue

hat he

Gorgias

and

Republic

expand

this

dea,

with n

important

evision.Whereas

ccording

o

the

Protagoras

rational alculation as thepowerto overcome he illusions nherentn

pleasure,

o that

they

no

longer

ffect ur

desires,

hese

ater

dialogues

develop

n

account

f

why

hedesire or

pleasure

s

subject

o illusion hat

entails

very

ifferent

iew

of that esire. leasure

ppears

o

be

good

even

when t s

not

section

I);

one

part

f our souls

is

inherently

usceptible

o

illusion,

nd

mmune o the

correctiveffects

f

reasoning;

his

part

f

the

soul

therefore

esires

leasure

s

good,

nd

when

his

part

ules

ur souls we

pursue

leasure

section

II).

Furthermore,

lthough

his

part

of the soul

desires

leasure

s

good,

ts

ognitive

imitationsits

nability

o see

beyond

appearancesrendertsdesires nfit o leadtheagent owardwhat s truly

good

section

V).

Once

Plato

adopts

his

view

of thedesire or

pleasure,

e

rejects

he ntellectualist

sychology

fthe arlier

ialogues

nd the

theory

f

virtue

t

entails,

nd

in the

Republic

defines irtue

s the state

n

which

reason

ules he

ower,

nonrational

arts

f the soul.

Section

V

traces he

history

f

the dea

that

leasure

ppears ood

n

laterGreek

hought;

n

the

last ection

indicate

lato's views

on

the

metaphysical

spect

f

pleasure's

deceptions.

I. Pleasureand illusion n theProtagoras

In order

o

understand

he

Protagoras'

ccount

f

the

desire

or

pleasure,

we

must

istinguish

wo

views f

this esire

mplicit

n thediscussion

f

pleas-

ure

t

Protagoras

51b

ff.

This is the

passage

n which

Socrates,

rguing

from

he

premise

hat

leasure

s

the

good,

maintains

hat o one ever

fails o

do

what

e knows

s bestbecause

he

s

"overcome

y pleasure,"

nd

thatvir-

tue s

therefore

matter

f

knowledge.7

e

directs is

rgument

gainst opu-

6

Annas1981: 339.

Why

oes Socrates

remise

is

rgument

n

the laim hat

leasure

s the

good,

whichhe

explicitly

ontradicts

n

other

ialogues, ncluding

ne

considered

oughly ontempora-

neous,

he

Gorgias

495e-499b)?

1

will

not address this

question

here,

as

it does not

directly

ear

n

my

discussion

f thedesirefor

leasure.

PLEASURE

AND

ILLUSION

IN PLATO

505



5/34

lar

opinion,

or "the

many,"

who

initially

claim that

they

often do

what is

pleasant

nsteadof

what

they

know s

good.

Although

here

s no

explicit

discussion of desire

n

this

passage,

behind

the claims Plato

attributes o the

many

there

learly

ies a view of the

desire

for

pleasure

as

an

impulsive

desire for

mmediate

gratification.

his view has

a

good

deal of intuitive

ppeal.

It

says

that the

pleasure-seeker

ats a second

piece

of

cake

just

because the cake will

give

her

pleasure

now,

even

if

she

knows

she

will

feel sick

or

sorry

ater. Someone who resists

the

immediate

temptation

n

order

o obtain

long-term

leasures

s

not,

on this

view,

ruled

solely by

her desire for

pleasure:

she is

subjugating

her hedonistic

mpulses

to her more

rational,

alculating

side. Left

to

itself,

the

desire

for

pleasure

will

lead us

to

pursue

immediate

gratification.

When

Socrates

argues

that

there s no reason

to care about when a

pleasure

will

come,

an

imaginary

representative

f

the

many protests,

But

Socrates,

the immediate

pleasure

(to

TTapaxpfjua

^50)

differs

reatly

rom

he

pleasure

and

pain

of a later

time"

(Prot.

356a5-7).

This

imaginary

nterlocutor

means,

of

course,

that

immediate

leasure

s

more attractive han

distant

pleasure;

when

he

claimed

that

he sometimes

does

something

bad

just

because it is

pleasant,

it was

immediate

leasure

he had in mind.

Socrates

advances an

opposing

view:

thedesire

for

pleasure

is a desire not

for

what

will

provide

immediate

gratification,

ut

rather or what will be

morepleasantthanpainfuloverall. When the imaginarynterlocutorrotests

that

mmediate

leasures

differ

rom

emote

nes,

Socrates

replies:

They

don't differ

n

any

other

way

than

by

pleasure

and

pain,

do

they?

For

there is

no other

possible way.

But like a man

good

at

weighing,

having put

the

pleasures together

and the

pains

together

nd

having weighed

both the near

and the far on the

scale,

say

which one is

greater.

For if

you weigh pleasures

against pleasures,

the

greater

and more must

always

be

taken

(Ar]TTTea)...and

if

you weigh pleasures against pains...

that action

must

be done

(TrpaKTeov)

in

which

pains

are exceeded

by

pleasures.

(Prot.

356a7-b8)

The

contextmakes clear

that the 'must' here denotes a

psychological

neces-

sity.Socrates is tellingthe manythat whenknowingly acedwith an oppor-

tunity

o

get

more

pleasure

than

pain

overall

they

will

inevitably

take

it,

even

if

t means

passing

up

immediate

ratification

n

favor

f

deferred.

Socrates needs to make this counterintuitivelaim in order o

argue

that

the

"art of

measurement"

e

proposes

can lead

people

to virtue.For on his

account,

both the

apparently

mpulsive

person

who

overindulges

and the

temperate erson

who abstains re

motivated

y

the

ame

desire: thedesire for

what will

bring

more

pleasure

than

pain

overall.

The

difference

s

only

that

the

apparently mpulsive

person

has false beliefs about

what will

gratify

his

desire,because she has false beliefs about the relative izes of

specific pleas-

ures

and

pains.

If

we can instruct er in

the

art

of

measuring pleasures

and

pains,

teaching

her

to calculate

correctly

whether he

pleasures

nherent

n and

506 JESSICA MOSS



6/34

consequent

on

an

act

will

outweigh

he

pains,

she will become

virtuous. The

very

desire

that

now

leads her

stray

will

then ead her oward he

good.8

Why

do

people

make mistakes

about which

things

will best

gratify

heir

desires whydo we need an artof measuremento guide us in our choices?

And

why,

f

the desire

for

pleasure

s in

fact

a desire for more

pleasure

than

pain

overall,

do the

many

falsely

think

f it as a desire for mmediate

gratifi-

cation?

Plato answers

both

questions

with

the

claim that we are

subject

to

systematic

llusions

about

pleasures.

Things

of the

same

size

appear

to

your sight

to be

bigger

from

nearby,

and smaller

from

afar,

don't

they?...

f

then our

well-being lay

in

this,

doing

and

choosing

the

large

things, voiding

and not

doing

the

small,

what would

appear

to

be our salvation

in life? The art of measure-

ment,

or the

power

of

what

appears

[or

"of

appearance"

(toO

cpaivopevou)]?

(Prot.

356c5-

d4)

Pleasant

and

painful

hings

re

analogous

to the

objects

of vision: those

that

are

near

in

time)

appear arger

han

hose that

re far

way.

Thus,

while

what

people

really

care

about

in

desiring

pleasure

is

getting

more

pleasure

than

pain

overall,

"people

who

make

mistakes

concerning

he choice

of

pleasures

and

pains

make

these

mistakes

through

lack

of

knowledge...

f measure-

ment"

Prot.

357d3-7).9

People pursue

near

pleasures

in

the mistaken

view

that

hey

re overall

greater,

nd

thus eem

to care

only

for mmediate

gratifi-

cation

nstead

of

for

what

s

truly

ood.

Socrates

insists,

however,

that this

fault s

perfectly

orrectable.The art

of

measurement"

the

knowledge

f how

to

judge

the

true

overall

pleasant-

ness

of different

ptions,

regardless

f

their

mmediacy

or

distance

"would

make

the

appearance

ose

its

power

aKupov

hev

av

EiToiriaE

toOto

to

cpdvTaoLia)"

(Prot.

356d7-8).10

Once

a

person

learns to

judge

that some

particular

mmediately

ratifying

leasure

will be

outweighed

by

the

pains

to

8

For this

account

to

work,

of

course,

it must be

the case

that virtuous

acts

yield

more

pleasure

than

pain

in the

ong

run,while vicious acts do not; this s clearly an underlying

assumption

of

the

Protagoras.

Irwin

argues

that Plato

abandons

this dea

in

the

Gorgias

(Irwin

1995:

112-113).

Irwin s

certainly right

hat Plato's

view

in

that

dialogue

is

more

complex:

the

vicious

person

experiences

pleasures

that are

more intense

than

the

virtu-

ous

person's

(cf.

Philebus 45a

ff.),

while

the virtuous

person

experiences

a

greater

bal-

ance

of

pleasure

over

pain

overall;

this

makes

a

purely

quantitative

ranking

of

lives

by

pleasure

difficult

r

impossible.

Nonetheless,

Plato

always

holds onto a

modified

version

of the

dea that

the

life of

virtue

s the

most

pleasant

life:

see

Republic

58Od-588a

and

Laws

732e-734d.

9

The

analogy

recurs

and

is made

more

explicit

at

Philebus

41e-42a.

10

How should

we understand

he

dea

that an

appearance

"loses

its

power":

does

an illu-

sion for nstance,

the

llusion that

the second

piece

of

cake

is

pleasant enough

to

out-

weigh

the

pains

that

will

follow

on

eating

it

actually disappear,

or

does

this illusion

merely

lose its

power

to affect our

desires? The second

alternative is

more

plausible,

although

nothing

Plato

says

here

rules out

the first. ee

my

discussion of

Republic

X

in

section

III

below.

PLEASURE

AND ILLUSION

IN

PLATO

507



7/34

follow,

she

will

lose her

desire for

that

pleasure,

and

desire the

better

ourse

of action nstead.11

It is

important

o note

that

Socrates' confidence hat

the

illusions

gener-

ated

by pleasure

can be overcome

by

the

right

kind of

reasoning

the art of

measurement is

directly

related

to his characterization f the desire

for

pleasure

as a desire for more

pleasure

than

pain

overall. For

on

this

charac-

terization esires

for

pleasure

are

sensitive

to,

and often

even

arise

out

of,

calculations about

the

relative

izes of

pleasures

and

pains.

The

apparently

intemperate

edonist

pursues

what

she

pursues

n

the belief that t

will

bring

her

more

pleasure

than

pain,

and to

acquire

such beliefs he

will

oftenhave to

perform udimentary

alculations.

("The

cake

may

make

me sick

later

on,"

she

might

hink,

but that discomfort

will

be

outweighed

by

the

pleasure

of

eating t " It is thiscalculation that makes herdesirethecake.) Furthermore,

her

desire

will

also be

sensitive to

further

alculations:

if

she comes

to

believe that the

discomforts o follow

will in

fact

outweigh

the

pleasure

of

eating

the

cake,

she

will

no

longer

desire the cake

at all. Her

desires

for

pleasure

are thus

like our

udgments

bout

optical

illusions,

and

unlike our

mere

perceptions

f

them,

in

that

they

can be influenced

y

illusions

but

thoroughly

orrected

y

rational

alculations.

Contrast the

desire for

pleasure

understood s an

impulsive

desire

for

immediate

ratification.

o calculation s

required

o

generate

uch desires.

A

piece of cake strikes omeone as pleasant,and right way withoutneeding

to

consider

beforehandwhat

would

ensue from

ating

he

cake,

nor how much

pleasure

the cake

would

give

her

relative to

any

other

pleasant

or

painful

activity

she desires that

piece

of

cake.

Likewise,

her

desire s

not

sensitive

to

subsequent

calculation:

if

she

learns

that the

painful

after-effectsf

the

cake will

outweigh

the

pleasure

of

eating

it

she

might

restrainherself nd

decide notto

gratify

er

desire,

but

the desire

will remain.

f she

is ruled

by

such

desires as the

many

claim

to be

when

they

act

against

their

beliefs

about what s

best

Prot.

352d)

-

she will

go

for

what strikes

her as

pleasant

evenwhen sherecognizesbetter easonsto abstain.

To

say

that

n Socrates'

accountthedesire for

pleasure

depends

on calcula-

tion while on the

many's

account it

does

not

is to

say

that

on Socrates'

account it

is

a

rational

desire while

on

the

many's

account it

is

irrational.

Measurement,

nd

more

broadly

alculation,

s for Plato a

paradigmatically

11

It

cannot be that

the

agent

continues to desire

(e.g.)

the cake

qua

pleasant

but

is

moti-

vated

by

some

other desire to

eschew

it,

for this other

desire would have

to be a desire

for what is

good

in

contrast

o what s

pleasant,

and the

many

have

conceded

that

pleas-

ure is the

only thing hey

hink

good {Prot. 355a).

Neither an it be that the

agent

contin-

ues to desire

the

cake

qua

immediately pleasant

but

is

motivated

by

a

distinctdesire

for

an overall

balance

of

pleasure

over

pain

to eschew

it,

for the

many

have

conceded that

all

they

care

about is the

overall

balance;

they

never

desire

things qua

immediately

pleasant

at all

{Prot. 356a-c).

508

JESSICA MOSS



8/34

rational

ctivity.12

n

the

Republic

latodefines eason s the

part

f

the oul

that

ngages

n

calculation,

here his ncludes

measurement

Rep.

602el-2);

the word

tandardly

ranslateds 'rational'

AoyiaTiKOv

literally

means

calculative. urthermore,

he

Republic

holds that t

is

through

alculation

thatreason

generates

ts

desires

Rep.

439dl,

see

section

V

below).

The

desire

or

leasure

s Socrates

resents

t n

the

Protagoras

would

hus ount

in the

Republic

s

a desire f reason. his is

a

very

ifferent

iew

from

he

one

the

Republic

tself

will

present:

here,

he

desire

or

pleasure

s a non-

rational esire

elonging

o

a non-rational

art

fthe

oul.

Of course

we

expect significant

ifferencesetween he

Protagoras'

account

fthe esire or

leasure

nd

that

f

other

ialogues,

ecause he

Pro-

tagoras'

discussion

s basedon a

premise

hat

Plato nowhere

lse

accepts:

that leasures thegood.Furthermore,heProtagorasmplies hat hemany

only

ursue

what

hey

hink

leasant:

heir

oncession

hat

hey

hink

ood

only

what

will

bring

hem

leasure,

ogether

ith

ocrates'

view

that ll our

actions

re

n

pursuit

f

the

good, mplies

hat,

or hem t

least,

pleasure

s

the

generic

bject

of desire.13

his means hat hemoral

psychology

f the

dialogue

annot

istinguish

etween esires

or

pleasure

nd

desires

or

ny-

thing

lse:

the

Protagoras mplies

hat soldier

hooses to

go

to

war not

because

he desires

onor s

distinct rom

leasure,

s

in

the

Republic,

but

because

hehonorable

ction s more

pleasant

Prot.

359e-360a).

These are

views hat itwell neither ith ommon ensenorwithPlato's own views

in other

ialogues;

ne

may

husbe

tempted

o dismiss heentire

iscussion

of

pleasure

n

this

ialogue

s anomalous.

onetheless,

f

we

step

back

from

the

dd context

fthe

Protagoras'

iscussion,

e see

that he

dialogue

makes

a

compelling

bservationbout

leasure

and

one that

will

have serious

on-

sequences

or lato's ater

hought):

hat here

s a

special

onnection etween

desiring leasure

nd

being usceptible

o llusions.

Close-at-hand

leasures

o

have

special

ttraction

hat

elayed

nes

lack,

and

Platohas

expressed

his

well

by aying

hat

hey

eem

pleasanter,

ust

as

close-at-handbjectsseemlarger. he analogywithoptical llusionsmay

seem

so

apt

that

we

hardly

otice

hat t calls

for

xplanation.

or not

all

12

Note for

xample

he lose connection

etween

measurementnd science or

knowledge

(ETTiOTrmn)

t

Protagoras

57b4

nd

Philebus 5d5-e3.

Socrates

oes

not tate

heview hatwe

always

and

onlypursue

whatwe think

ood

as

explicitly

n the

Protagoras

s he does

at

Gorgias

68b-c r Meno

77c-78b,

but t s

very

clearly mplied

y

his defense

f the

power

of

knowledge

o control

ur actions. For

when

ocrates

laims

hat

if

omeone

nows

what s

good

and

what s

bad,

he wouldn't

be

prevailed pon

by

anything

o

do

anything

lse

other hanwhathis

knowledge

om-

mands"

Prot.352c4-6)

that

s,

he will

do

what he knows to be

good

he

clearly

assumes hat

veryone

as thedesire

o do

only

whathe thinks

ood.

He

comes close

to

saying

his

xplicitly

t Prot.

358c6-d2:

No one

goes willingly

oward

bad

things

or

toward

hings

hat e believes

ad,

nor

s

this,

s it

eems,

n

human

ature,

o

want

o

go

toward

hings

hat ne believes ad nstead f

things

hat ne

believes]

ood."

PLEASURE AND

ILLUSION

IN

PLATO 509



9/34

objects

of desire work

on

us

this

way:

someone who

pursues

wealth

for ts

own

sake,

for

nstance,

will

easily

recognize

a

smaller,

immediate

gain

as

less lucrative han

a

larger

ne

that

will come

only

in five

years.

Nothing

about

the

nearness

n

time of the

firstmakes it seem largerthan it is, or

larger

than the

second.

(It

may

of course

seem more attractive

n

another

sense,

but

think t

would

be

fair o

explain

this

by

saying

with Plato that t

seems

more

gratifying,

more

pleasant).

14

The same is true of

health,

and

knowledge,

nd

many

other

hings

ne

might

esire.

Why

then should desires

for

pleasure

be

different

why

should these

desires,

more

than

other

desires,

be

subject

to illusions of

distance;

why

should

pleasures,

more than other

objects

of

desire,

behave

in

this

ense

like

objects

of vision?

A

quick

(although mysterious)

olution to this

puzzle

would

be

to claim

thatdesiringpleasure ust is a matter f perceiving ome sort of appearance;

below

I

shall

argue

that

this is

precisely

Plato's account. But

if

desiring

pleasure

is

akin

to

perception,

hen

Socrates'

suggestion

in the

Protagoras

that

the

desire for

pleasure

s sensitive to

rationalcalculation s

very likely

wrong.

Reasoning

can

make

optical

illusions "lose their

power"

over a

per-

son's

judgment,

but not

over

her

vision:

her

eyes

will see the

nearer

object

as

larger

ven when she

knows that t is not. If desires for

pleasure

are

really

analogous

to

perception,

hen

we should

expect

that

reasoning

can make

pleasure-illusions

ose their

ower

over a

person's udgment,

ut

not

over her

desiresforpleasure: she will still desire the nearer bject even when she

knows that she should not.15

Moreover,

we have

empirical

reason to think

that

omething

ike this

may

be

right.

ocrates'

argument

bout the

power

of

the

art of

measurement eems too

optimistic:

sometimes

even afterrational

deliberation hows us

that n

immediate

leasure

s

to

be avoided

we

still

feel

the

pull

of

that

pleasure, ust

as

sometimes

even after alculation shows

us

that the two lines in

the

Miiller-Lyer

llusion

are

equal

we

still

see one

as

longer.

No

one makes

this case about

the desirefor

pleasure

n

the

Protagoras.

But Plato himselfwillmake it,as I arguein the nextsections,in his charac-

terization f

the

appetites

n

the

Gorgias

and

later

dialogues.

He will

recog-

nize the

desire for

pleasure

as a

distinctively llusion-prone

desire,

and

will

offer

xplanations

for this

susceptibility

o illusion

that

will

entail that

it

cannotbe

overcome,

nd

thereforehat he

desire

for

pleasure

s

not

in

fact

a

rational

desire at all.

Compare

Parfit:

[Bjias

toward the

near...

applies

most

clearly

to events that

re

in

them-

selves

pleasant

or

painful"

Parfit

1984:

160).

For

an

interesting

iscussion of

this

parallel,

put

to

very

differentuses

from

mine,

see

Penner 1971.

510

JESSICA

MOSS



10/34

II. Pleasure and illusion

n

the

Gorgias

Pleasure

nd

llusion

re

firstssociated

n

the

Gorgias

via the

description

f

what ocrates alls

"flattery,"category

hat ncludes he

dialogue's

main

subject, hetoric.arly n theconversationithPolus, Socrates enies hat

rhetoric

s a

craft

texvti), saying

nstead hat t is a knack

EpTTEipia) ty-

mologically,

omething

erived rom

xperience),

nd

part

f the

practice

f

flattery

KoAaKEi'a).

e then ivides

ractices ealing

with he

body

ndthe

soul nto rafts

n theone hand

nd

flattering

nacks n the

other,

ndcate-

gorizes

hetorics one of the

flattering

nacks

ealing

with he oul.

Crafts,

he

explains,

re based n

knowledge

nd

aim

to benefit he

body

or

soul;

knacks

rebased n

guessing

nd

xperience,

nd aim

only

to

provide ratifi-

cation.16

As he characterizeslatterynddescribes he relation f the flattering

knacks o thecrafts

f

body-

nd

oul-care,

lato condemns

lattery

n both

metaphysical

nd thical

harges:

irst,

t

deals

n

appearances

nd

not

reality;

second,

t

deals

n

pleasure

ndnot the

good.17

he

implication

s that hese

two

traits re

oined: pleasure

nd

appearance

re

naturallyrouped ogether.

More

pecifically,

lato

mplies

hat

lattery

ses

pleasure

s

a

tool of

decep-

tion,

nd

that his s effectiveecause

people

who

go

for

pleasure

re

easily

deceived

easily

aken

n

by

llusions.

16

The crafts set over the body are medicine and physical training;the corresponding

knacks

are

pastry-baking

nd cosmetics. The crafts et

over the soul are the

administra-

tion

of

ustice

and

legislation;

the

corresponding

knacks

are

rhetoric nd

sophistry

Gorg.

464b-c).

17

First,

the

metaphysical

charge:

flattery

deals

in

appearances, pretence,

illusion and

deception.

Flattery

makes the

body

and

the soul

seem to be

in

good

condition

BokeTv

eu

exeiv),

but

not to be so one

bit more"

Gorg.

464a8-bl).

It

hides

its own

true nature

and

pretends

o

be

something

lse:

"having put

on the

mask

(\ rrro5uoa)

of each of the

parts

[of

the crafts of soul-care

and

body-care]

it

pretends

to be that

part

whose mask

it

wears"

(464c7-dl);

pastrybaking

seems

(6oke7)

to be

a

craft,

but

I

say

it

isn't a craft

but a

knack and

a routine"

(463b3-4);

"Pastrybaking

has

put

on the mask of

medicine,

and

pretends

to know

what

foods

are best

for the

body"

(464d3-5);

flattery

deceives

(E^aTTaTg), so as to seem to be of the greatestworth" (464d2-3); cosmetics is "decep-

tive

aTraTrjArj)"

(465b3;

cf.

aTraTcboa,

465b5).

Rhetoric is defined as a false

image

(eTSgoAov)

of

the

craft of

administeringustice

(463d2),

and Socrates

says

that

rhetoric

"has

discovered

a certain

mechanism of

persuasion

so that it

appears (


11/34

Like the

Protagoras,

then,

the

Gorgias

suggests

a

general

correlation

between

desiringpleasure

and

being

susceptible

to

illusion;

unlike

the Pro-

tagoras,

it also

suggests xplanations

for hiscorrelation.

One

explanation

s

that llusions are

pleasing,

often

more

pleasing

than the truth.18 ut

implicit

in

the

description

f

flattery

s another

uggestion

with

important

onse-

quences

for

Plato's

thought.

We

desire whatwe think

ood

(Gorg.

468b);

but

what s

pleasant

appears

to be

good,

whether r not it is

(see below).

People

who tendto

pursuepleasure

thusdo

so because

they

are deceived

by

the illu-

sion

that

pleasure

qua

pleasure

is

good

because

they

fail to

distinguish

appearances

from

eality.

Socrates introduces he idea that what

is

pleasant

is

good

in

making

his

distinction

etweenknacks nd crafts.He

argues

that n thecase of both

body

and soul there s such a thingas good condition eueia), and also such a

thing

as

merely

pparentgood

condition

BoKoOaa

EUE^ia,

464a3).

Crafts

aim

to

produce

the

good

conditionof

body

and

soul,

while knacks aim

only

to

produce

the

apparent ood

condition not what

s

genuinelygood

for

body

or

soul,

but what

appears good

whether r not it is so.19

In

each case

the

apparent

good

statethe

flattering

nacks

produce

s

a

pleasant

state.

The case

of

pastry-baking,

nd the craft f

medicine

which

t

mitates,

s most

straight-

forward:medicine ims

to

produce

he

genuinelygood

conditionof the

body,

health;

pastries

do not of

course make

people physically

healthy,

but

they

do

providephysical pleasure. Likewise, cosmetics gives us pleasing physical

appearances, ophistry

gives

the

sophist

a

pleasing appearance

of

wisdom,

and

rhetoric

leases

us

by

making

us

appear

to

ourselves

to

be wise.

People

who are taken

in

by appearances

will

believe

that the

pastry

hefs

pleasing

We can

find

an

argument

for this

suggestion

in the Encomium

of

Helen of

Gorgias,

the

dialogue's

namesake. Here

Gorgias

not

only

describes

rhetoric as

deceptive

but also

implies

that

t

persuades

because we take

pleasure

in

being

deceived. He describes

one

form of

speech,

divine

incantations,

s

"bringers

of

pleasure

and

banishers

of

pain"

which work

by "enchanting, persuading

and

altering

the soul

through

sorcery

(yorjTEiai)"

(Helen

10).

The

incantations

bring pleasure

because

(yap)

they

work

magic on us, and magic is deceptive. He also claims that"Whoever persuaded or per-

suades

anyone concerning

anything

oes so

by molding

a false account

(yeu5f) Aoyov)"

(Helen

11).

Wardy interprets

he

passage

as

follows:

"now

Gorgias' promise

to

retail

pleasure

rather han

known)

truth

see

Helen

5]

appears

to reach

disconcerting

fruition

in

the statement hat

persuasion

results from

misleading pleasure

induced

by

rhetorical

skill inimical to truth"

Wardy

1996:

45).

Of

Gorgias' argument

that Helen can't

be

blamed for

what

she did

if

she was a victimof

persuasion, Wardy says

"The

implication

is that Helen

might

have

enjoyed

Paris' verbal

seduction;

in

fact,

it

was

precisely

the

pleasure

she took in his

logos

which caused her to

yield Perhaps,

in

the last

analysis,

we

who are

persuaded

are

all

more or less

willing

victims

of

persuasion"

(Wardy

1996:

37).

In

principle

t

seems that

good

condition and

apparentgood

condition

might

oincide,

but

Plato

clearly

does not have this kind

of case

in

mind,

"...what

about

a condition that

seems

good,

but sn't

really

BoKoOoav

pev

EUE^iav,

ouaav 5'

ou)?"

(Gorg.

464a3-4).

Here as elsewhere

in

the

corpus

Plato uses words for

appearance

to connote

mere,

mis-

leading appearance,

not the manifestation f

reality.

512 JESSICA

MOSS



12/34

confections

re

good

for hem

Gorg.

464d5-e2),

and that the

orator's

gratify-

ing

counsels

will

benefit

hem

(Gorg.

459b3-4,

459b8-c2).

These

things

appear

to be

good, simply

because

they

are

pleasant;

when someone

pleases

us,

we thinkhe

is

doing

us

good.

This

is an idea that Plato

holds

onto

until

theend: at

Laws 657c he

argues

that

whenever

we

are

pleased,

we thinkthat

we

are

faring

well."20

In

saying

that

flattery

s concernedwithwhat

eems

good

but s

not,

then,

Socrates

means

that t s concernedwith

pleasure.

The

metaphysical

nd

ethi-

cal

charges

against

flattery ltimately

mount o the same

charge.

Knacks are

mere

mitations

f

crafts

Gorg.

464c7-dl),

and the

pleasure

they produce

s a

mere mitation

f the

good

that rafts

roduce.

According

o the

Protagoras,

the

illusions

generated y pleasure

can

be

neutralized y a certainkindof rational ctivity, he art of measurement.21

suggested

that

more

pessimistic

view

may

be more

plausible.

The

Gorgias

takes

no

explicit

stance on

this

question,

but several

passages suggest

that

the

illusion

that

pleasure

s

good

is

very

hard

to

dispel.

One cannot

easily

correct

omeone who

is under

he llusion that harmful

ut

pleasant

thing

s

good;

one cannot

asily

redirect erdesire for

good

toward

ts

proper bjects.

There are several

nstances

n the

dialogue

in

which

people

reject

or

ignore

arguments

hat

omething

s

good,

on the

ground

hat that

thing

s

unpleas-

ant.

On

my interpretation,

hese

are

cases

in

which,

because the

thing

is

unpleasant, tsimply ppearsbad to them just as a pleasant thingwill sim-

ply

appear good),

and

arguments

o

the

contrary

annot

compete

with the

appearances.

An

exchange

between ocrates and Polus

provides

a

particularly

clear

example.

Socrates has

argued

that

it

is better o

pay

the

penalty

for

one's

injustices

han

o

go

free;

Polus

responds

with a

graphic

ist

of

painful

punishments

Gorg.

473bl2-c5).

Socrates accuses

him of

failing

o

refute he

argument

Gorg.

473d3),

but the

meaning

of Polus'

response

s clear: he

is

saying,

How

can

you

claim

that his

s

good,

when can show

you

that t is

bad?"

where

the

description

f the

pains

is

meant

to

do the

showing.

Pun-

ishment s painful;thereforet just evidentlys bad. Polus believes he has

refuted

ocrates'

claim.

A second

example

occurs

in

Socrates'

allegory

of the

pastry

chef

who accuses

the doctor of

having

harmed he children on the

20

As

well

s vice

versa:

aipopev

otov

oicbueBa

eu

npaTTeiv,

kcu

ottotcxv

aipMEv.

oiopeSa

eu

TrpaTTeiv

u

,

Laws 651

5-l.)

(For

clear evidence

that

aipeiv

is

here,

s

usually,

onnected

ith

leasure

nSovrj),

ee Laws

658a

10.)

Compare

lso

Xenophon's

Socrates,

who

ays

that

we feel

pleasure

nd

rejoice eu9paiveo0cu)

when

we

believe

we are

doing

well

oionevoi

eu

TrpaTTeiv)

Memorabilia

.vi.8-9),

nd

that thosewho

perceive

hat

hey

re

becoming

etter

ive most

leasantly"

Memorabilia V.viii.6-7).

Here

pleasure

s the

blessedreward

f

those

who are in

genuinelyoodcondition,

ot

thedelusion

f thosewho

gnorantly

ppear

o themselveso

be

so.

The llusions

n

question

n

the

Protagoras

nd

Gorgias

differ

lightly,

ut

their

ffect s

the ame:both

dialogues

hold that

eople

pursue

harmful

leasures

r

avoid beneficial

pains

because

hey

re

taken

n

by

llusions

enerated

y

the

pleasures

nd

pains.

PLEASURE AND

ILLUSION IN

PLATO

513



13/34

grounds

hathe

caused them

pain.

The

pastry

hefdetails the

pains

the

doctor

causes

(Gorg.

521e7-522a2).

Socrates

adds:

"[if

the doctor hould

say]

'I did

all these

things,

hildren,

n the interest f health

uyieivcbs),'

how

great

n

uproar

do

you

think

udges

like that

the children]

would

make? Wouldn't it

be a

great

uproar?"

Gorg.

522a5-7).

The

doctor laims his work was benefi-

cial;

the children hout him down.

Because he

pained

them

they

believe that

he harmed

hem,

and

they

are deaf to the claim that the

pain

was benefi-

cial

that

n

this ase

pleasure

and benefit ome

apart.

The same

explanation

underlies he

enormous

persuasive powers

of rheto-

ric which both

Socrates and

Gorgias emphasize early

in

the

dialogue.

The

orator an

convince the

citizensto

appoint

him

doctorrather han a real medi-

cal

man;

in

fact he can win

such a contest

gainst

any

craftsman

r

expert,

even thoughhe has no knowledge f their rafts 456a-c). Why are doctors

and

generals

nd

architects

owerless

to

convince the citizens of what should

be

obvious,

that

the orator s

completely gnorant

bout

these crafts

and

should be

ignored?

Because,

as Socrates

emphasizes throughout

he

dialogue,

the orator's

words

please

the

audience. The

pleasure

he

provides

makes the

audience think

e does them

good,

and

arguments

hat

his advice

is bad can-

not

compete

with

hat

ppearance.

The

dialogue

thus

uggests

that

the belief that

pleasure

s

good

(and

pain

bad)

is

often mmune o

argument.

leasure

appears

to be

good,

and for most

people, appearanceswinout over reasoning.22 ompare the beginningof the

Philebus,

where nstead

of

arguing

that

pleasure

and not

knowledge

s the

good,

the hedonist

Philebus

declares

argument

rrelevant: I

think,

and

I

always

will

think,

hat

pleasure

wins

altogether"

Philebus 12a7).

Here Plato

nicely anticipates

he

attitude f

Epicurus,

who

according

to Cicero "denies

that

ny

reason

or

argument

s

necessary

o show

why

pleasure

s

to be

pur-

sued,

pain

to

be avoided. He

holds that we

perceive

these

things,

as

we

per-

ceive that fire s

hot,

snow

white,

honey

sweet;

it is

unnecessary

o

prove

any

of

these

things

with

sophisticated easoning;

t is

enough ust

to

point

Note that

n

the

cases of both Polus

and

Callicles,

however,

Socrates does

make some

headway

in

getting

them to

recognize

the distinction

etween

pleasure

and

benefit.

He

does so not

precisely

by

argument,

but

rather

by

appeal

to shame. In

the

conversation

with

Polus,

he

gets

Polus to admit that

he sometimes thinks

thing

k


14/34

them

ut"

De

Finibus

.30).

One

can

simply

ee that

leasure

s

good,

the

line

goes;

what eed r

use s

there

or

rgument

ere?

On this

view,

person

who

pursues leasure

will

seldom

ay

to

herself,

'Thispleasanthing ppears ood orthisunpleasanthing ppears ad),but

perhaps

hat s

a mere

ppearance;

shouldbe

open

to

arguments

hat t is

not

n fact s

it

appears."

ather,

he

will

stop

at the

appearance:

he

will

accept

t,

he

willnot onsider

hat t

may

be a

mere

ppearance

or hink o

look

beyond

t,

and

will

thusbe

deaf o

arguments

hat

hallenge

t.

Com-

pared

o

the

Protagoras,

hen,

he

Gorgias

offers

more

pessimistic

iew

about eason's

ower

oovercome

he

llusions

nduced

ypleasure.

oes

the

dialogue

ffern

explanation

or his

essimism?

ne

possible xplanation

s

that

eople

ake

leasure

n

the llusion

hat

leasure

s

good.

t is

pleasant

to believe hatnpursuing hat ratifiesou,you redoingwhatyoushould

be

doing

nd

getting

hat

s

good

for

you.

The contrast etween he

pastry

chefs

popularity

ndthe octor's

ll

fame orbetween

he rators'

uccess

n

persuading

eople

ndSocrates'

ailures

suggests

his view.

Flattery

makes

us

feel

good

about

ourselves;

heharsh ruth for

nstance,

ocrates'

rgu-

ments

hatwe

care about

the

wrong

hings

nd

should redirectur

lives

toward

irtue

does not.

Because

he

llusion hat

leasure

s

good

is

itself

pleasing,

omeone

who tends o

pursue

leasure

will

of course

esist

etting

go

of this

llusion.

Thefinal ection f the ialogue,where ocratesmplies hat he ppetites

occupy

distinct

ocation

n

the

oul,

nd

that

temperateerson's ppetites

are

different

n nature rom

hose

fan

ntemperate

erson

Gorg.

493a-494a),

gives

he

beginnings

f

an

argument

or second

nd far

tronger

eason

why

the llusion

hat

leasure

s

good

may

be intractable.

his

argument

elies n

a

theory

f moral

sychology

t

which he

Gorgias

only

hints:

hat

he oul

is

divided

nto

ifferent,

onflicting

ources

f

both

motivation

ndbelief.

n

thenext

ection

will how

hat he

Republic

evelops

his

theory

n

such

a

way

s

toentail

hat

eople

dominated

y

heir esires

or

pleasure

re unable

to ookbeyondppearances,nd hus annot epersuadedyreason. t is left

to the

Republic,

hen,

o

develop

view

only

suggested y

the

Gorgias;

n

so

doing,

he

Republic

will

present

n account f

thedesire

or

pleasure

adi-

cally

different

rom

hat

we

saw

n

the

Protagoras.23

23

The

Gorgias

seems

in fact

to

suggest

two

conflicting

ccounts of the desire for

pleasure.

Socrates'

argument

hat

whatever

we

pursue

we think

good

(Gorg.

468b-c)

entails

that

this

desire must

be

a

species

of the desire for

the

good.

The discussion of

the

appetites

in

the conversation

with

Callicles,

however

(49

Id

ff.)

seems to

imply

an account much

closer

to that of the

Republic:

desires for

pleasure

are rooted

in

their own

part

of

the

soul,

do not

aim at the

good,

and can conflict

with

desires for

good.

Irwin 1979

argues

that

he

Gorgias

is

internally

nconsistent

n this and related

ways.

The account

I

offer

in

section

IV

is intended

to reconcile the

apparent

nconsistencies.

PLEASURE

AND

ILLUSION

IN

PLATO

515



15/34

III.

Pleasure and illusion

n

the

Republic

The desired and

wished for

s eitherthe

good

or the

apparent

good.

Therefore the

pleasant

is

also desired:

for t is an

apparentgood.

Some believe that t is

[good],

while to

some

it

appears

so even thoughtheydo not believe that it is. For appearance-perception (9avTao(a) and

belief

(S6a)

are not in the

same

part

of the soul.

(Aristotle,

Eudemian Ethics

1235b25-9)

In the

Republic,

lato ntroduces new

theory

f desire.

Now rational

esire

for

he

good

s

only

one

species

of

desire,

nd

has its source

n a

particular

part

f the

oul,

he

easoning art;

here re

also non-rational

esires,

ooted

in non-rational

arts

f the soul. Where

o

desires or

pleasure

it

n

this

scheme? hold that he

Republic

distinguishes

esiresfor

pleasures

ua

pleasures

rom ther orts f desires desires

or ruthnd

honor,

or xam-

ple,

whichwhen

gratifiedield

heir wn

particularleasures,

ut

are

not

properly

onstrueds desires

or

pleasures

and

ssigns

hese esires o

appe-

tite

to

TTi6unr)TiK6v).

The

Republic

ntroduces

ppetite

s the

part

with

whichwe "desire

he

pleasures

f food

drink,

ex,

and whatever

thers re

akin o

them,"

he

companion

f

certain

ndulgences

nd

pleasures"

436alO-

bl,

439d8);

while hisfalls

short f

the

explicit

definition

f

appetites

s

desires

or

leasure

hat

we

see

in

the

Charmides

nd

n

Aristotle,

take he

underlying

iew

o be the

ame.)24

Plato defines ettiSumi'cus desires for pleasure at Charmides l67el-2, Aristotle at

Niconiachean Ethics 1 1 1

bl7 and

De Anima 414b5-6. There are two

possible

objections

to the claim that

the

appetitive part

s

well

characterized as the

pleasure-desiring part

of

the soul.

First,

n

Book

IX

{Rep.

580d

ff.)

Plato

assigns

each

part

its own

pleasures;

this

may

be

thought

o undermine

the claim that

desiring pleasure

is

distinctive f

appetite.

But

nonetheless there s a

special

connection between

pleasure

and

appetite,

which

we

can

account for

by

saying

that

ppetitepursues pleasure

for its

own

sake,

pursues things

just

for the

pleasure

they

bring.

While

Plato introduces

the

appetitive part

of the soul as

the

part

desiring

and

related to

pleasures

(436alO-bl,

439d8),

pleasure plays

no role

in

the

definition

f the

other

parts,

nor do we even

discover

that

they

have their own

pleas-

ures

until

Book

IX.

Moreover,

in

describing

the democratic

man in

Book

VIII

(561c ff.),

he

ascribes to the

appetitive

soul

desires for a wide

variety

of

objects, including objects

associated withreason (the democratdabbles in philosophy) and withspirit the democ-

rat

may

have a whim

for

politics

and

military

ffairs) (56 Id).

This

passage implies

that

we must

distinguish

his

part

of

the soul not

by

the kind of

thing

t desires

(e.g.

sensory

indulgence),

but

rather

by

how

it

desires these

things just

for the

pleasure they

will

bring.

See

Cooper

1984:

appetites

are

those desires that have theirultimate

origin simply

in...

the fact that the

person

in

question happens

to

get

a certain

pleasure

from

doing

these

things,

nd

this

ustifies

classifying

desires

such as the democratic man's

appetite

for

philosophy]... together

with the

bodily appetites"

Cooper

1984:

130).

Second,

some

object

that

pleasure

is not

precisely

what

appetite pursues.

The

6Tn8unr)TiKOv

s

sometimes referred to not

as the

pleasure-desiring

part,

but rather as

the

part

that

pursues

mere

"desire-satisfaction"

(see

e.g.

Santas 2001:

144).

However,

this

suggestion

is not

really

a

rejection

of the view of

appetites

as

pleasure-seeking.

Desiring

an

object only

because it will

satisfy your

desire for

it

amounts

to

desiring

the

experience

of

having

your

desire

satisfied,

namely

(on

Plato's

account)

pleasure.

This is

very

clear in

the

Gorgias,

where

the claim

that

pleasure

is the

good

(495d4)

is

treated as

equivalent

to

the

claim that

ppetite-satisfaction

s

the

good

(491e-492a).

516

JESSICA

MOSS



16/34

What motivates

his

change

in

Plato's

view

of

desire,

nd

of

the desire for

pleasure

n

particular?

n

this

ection

and

the

next,

shall

argue

that

Plato

is

providing

an

explanation

for

what

we saw

hinted

at

in

the

Gorgias:

that

although ll desires

are

in

some sense for the

good,

when we

desirepleasure

we

pursue

what

only appears

good,

and are immune to

reasoning

about

what

is

really

good.

The

Republic

explains

this

by

assigning

desires

for

pleasure

to a

part

of the soul that acks

the

cognitive ability

to see

beyond

appear-

ances.

In

this

section,

I

show

that

the

Republic

characterizes

ppetite,

the

pleasure-desiring art

of the

soul,

as

illusion-bound.

n

the next

section,

I

show

the

significance

f

this

factforPlato's

theory

f

desire.

Let

us

begin

with

Plato's

distinction

f

the

appetitive part

of the soul

from

he

rational

part,

n Book

IV.

Here

he

argues

for a division of the

soul

usingwhat s sometimes alled theprinciple fopposites:

It's clear

thatthe

same

thing

will not

be

willing

to do or

undergo opposite things

n the

same

part

of

it

kcxt&

toutov)

and in relation

o

the same

thing

t

the same

time,

so that

f

we

dis-

cover these

things

the

soul's

motivations),

we will know that

herewas not one

thing

but

many.

(Rep.

436b8-cl)

He

applies

the

principle

o

show that when someone

is

thirsty

ut does

not

wish to

drink,

heremust

be two distinct orces

t work withinhis soul

(Rep.

439b3-5).

What

pushes

the

person

to

drink,

Socrates

says,

is

something

"unreasoningdXoyiaTov)

and

appetitive, ompanion

of

certain

ndulgences

and

pleasures"

Rep.

439d7-8).

What

forbids

im to

drink

s

something

differ-

ent:

the resistance

rises

"out of calculation

ek

AoyianoO)"

(Rep.

439dl),

and

has

its

source

in "the

calculating

part

of

the soul

(t6...Xoyiotik6v...

Tfjs

MA/xnsV

namely

reason

Rep.

439d5-6).

This

argument

hus serves

to

distinguish

wo

distinct,

otentially

onflict-

ing

sources

of motivation

n the soul: the

part

that desires

pleasure,

and

the

part

hat

alculates

what s

best.

Recall the

significance

f

calculation

in the

Protagoras:

only through

he

weighing

and

measuring

f

pleasures

can the

illusions attending leasures

be

dispelled.

n

the

Protagoras,

where there

s

no distinction

etween

pleasure

and

goodness

and no

partition

f the

soul,

desiring leasure

nd

engaging

n calculation

are

in no sense

opposed.

Now,

in the

Republic,

the

part

that

calculates

is

not concerned

with

pleasure

but

rather

with

what

is

best,

while

the

part

that

desires

pleasure

does not calcu-

late.

Plato

puts

this

emphatically

by

calling appetite

dAoyiaxov

(unreason-

ing

or

incapable

of

calculation)

while

emphasizing

the role

of calculation

in

forming

hedesires

of

reason.

In

Book

X,

Plato

again

appeals

to the

principle

of

opposites

to distin-

guish distinct ources in the soul

for

different

ental states. This time

the

states

n

question

are not

motivationalbut

cognitive:

believing

illusions on

the one

hand,

nd

calculating

he

truth n the other.

n a

passage

that

ncludes

examples

familiar

rom he

Protagoras,

Socrates contrasts

hese

two states:

PLEASURE

AND

ILLUSION

IN

PLATO

5 17



17/34

The same

magnitude

viewed

from

nearby

and from far does not

seem

equal

to us.... And the

same

thing

ooks bent when seen in

water and

straight

ut of water....

And

are

not

measuring,

counting

and

weighing

most welcome aids

in

these

cases,

so thatwhat

appears

bigger,

smaller,

more numerous or heavier does not rule

in

us,

but rather

what has calculated

(to

Xoyiod|aevov), measured or weighed? (Rep. 602c7-d9)

Now he

applies

the

principle

of

opposites,

arguing

that the

experience

f

optical

illusions reveals two distinct

arts

f

the soul:

And this

calculating, measuring

nd

weighing]

s the work

of

the

rational

(XoyiOTiKoG)

part

of the soul.... But often when this

part

has

measured

and

has shown

that

some

things

are

greater

or

smaller or the

same size as

others,

the

opposite

appears

at

the same time about the

same

things

....Didn't we

say

that

t is

impossible

for

the

same

thing

at the same time to

believe

opposite things

bout the same

things?....

Therefore the

part

of the soul

that believes

contrary

o the

measurements can't be the same as the

part

that believes

in accord with the

measurements.... But

surely

the

part

that trusts n measurementand calculation

(Aoyiopcp)

is

the best

part

of the soul.... Therefore what

opposes

it is one of the inferior

parts

in us.

(Rep.

602el-603a8)

Socrates is

arguing

that

reasoning

belongs

to

one

part

of the

soul,

while

belief

n

appearances belongs

to another.When a

rational

person

perceives

n

optical

illusion,

one

part

of her

soul believes

that

e.g.)

the

submerged

tick

is

bent;

only

because another

art

f

her,

which

sees

through

he

illusion,

is

dominant n her

soul does

she

resist

acting

on this belief.

The distinction

looks verylike the distinction f Book IV: cognitivedissonance is being

explained by

the same

mechanism

s

motivational onflict.

Plato makes

the

analogy

explicit

a few ines later:

Just s

in

the

case

of

sight

a

person]

took

sides

against

himself

and had

opposite

beliefs

in

himself t

the same time about the same

things,

hus

also

in

actions

will

he take sides and do

battle

against

himself.

Rep.

603dl-3)

The

question

arises,

then:

s

Plato

explaining

both motivational

nd

cog-

nitive

onflictwith

reference o the

same

parts

f the soul? Both Book

IV

and

Book

X

identify eason (to XoyiaTiKOv ) as one playerin the conflicts

(Rep.

439d5

and

602el).

The

part

of the

soul

that n matters

f action looks

to our

overall

good

is the

same

part

hat n

cognitive

matters ses calculation

to resist

the

power

of

appearances.

But what is

the

"inferior

part"

that

opposes

reason

in

the

cognitive

case,

being

taken n

by

the

illusions? Is it

The

claim that ne

thing

"rules

in

us

(dpxeiv

ev

nplv)"

recalls Book

IV's definition f

the

virtues s

relations of rule

between

parts

of the soul

(Rep.

441e

ff.).

There a

person

is

wise,

courageous,

moderate

and

just

when

reason

"rules"

in him

and the inferior

parts

are

ruled;

here a

person

is

cognitively

virtuouswhen the

calculating part

rules in him

and

the

llusion-believingpart

s

ruled.

On

the translation

f

this

problematic

entence see the

following

footnote.

518

JESSICA

MOSS

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.

Date post:	02-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	katpons
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times

Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

Documents