POLI-Batch 9 Reviewer.doc

7/28/2019 POLI-Batch 9 Reviewer.doc

1/26

Arroyo v. de Lima

November 15, 2011

SC a Temporary Restraining Order againstDOJ Sec. de Lima from implementing theDOJ Circular 41 and the Watch List Orderprohibiting GMA and Mike Arroyo to travel.

GMA should be allowed to travel.

While the right to travel is a constitutional right that may be impaired only "in theinterest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided bylaw," there are recognized exceptions other than those created by law. Foremost is therestriction on the right to travel of persons charged of crimes before the courts.Another is the restriction on persons subpoenaed or ordered arrested by the Senate orHouse of Representatives pursuant to their power of legislative inquiry.crIn the present case, petitioners are already undergoing preliminary investigation in

several criminal cases, and charges may be filed before the courts while petitionersare abroad.

LEAVE DIVISION,OFFICE OFADMINISTRATIVESERVICES-Officeof the CourTAdministrator(OCA),Complainant,vs.WILMA

SALVACION P.HEUSDENS, ClerkIV Municipal TrialCourt in Cities,Tagum City,Respondent.December 13,2011

Respondent, a clerk of an MTC in Tagumfiled for application for foreign travel.Before her application could be acted upon,she left. Her application was rejected.When she came back, she was sought to beadministratively charged for leavingwithout the required authorization. Sheargues that the Circular requiring priorapproval infringes on her right to travel.

Does it?

NO. The Circular is valid.

Relevant Consti provision: Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the samewithin the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order ofthe court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of nationalsecurity, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The exercise of ones right to travel or the freedom to move from one place toanother, as assured by the Constitution, is not absolute. It may be impaired providedthat such impairment is in the interest of national security, public safety, or public

health, as may be provided by law.

with respect to members and employees of the Judiciary, the Court issued OCACircular No. 49-2003 to regulate their foreign travel in an unofficial capacity. Suchregulation is necessary for the orderly administration of justice. If judges and courtpersonnel can go on leave and travel abroad at will and without restrictionsor regulations, there could be a disruption in the administration of justice. Asituation where the employees go on mass leave and travel together, despite the factthat their invaluable services are urgently needed, could possibly arise. For saidreason, members and employees of the Judiciary cannot just invoke and demand theirright to travel.

To permit such unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if not chaos, in theJudiciary and the society as well. In a situation where there is a delay in thedispensation of justice, litigants can get disappointed and disheartened. If theirexpectations are frustrated, they may take the law into their own hands which resultsin public disorder undermining public safety. In this limited sense, it can even beconsidered that the restriction or regulation of a court personnels right totravel is a concern for public safety , one of the exceptions to the non-impairmentof ones constitutional right to travel.

WHEREFORE, respondent Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens, Clerk IV Municipal Trial Courtin Cities, Tagum City, is hereby ADMONISHED

ELISEO F.SORIANO,

Petitioner,vs.

In his show (Ang Dating Daan), Eli Sorianomade the following remarks:

Lehitimonganakngdemonyo; sinungaling;

NO

There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing anyparticular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact


2/26

MA. CONSOLIZAP. LAGUARDIA, inher capacity asChairperson ofthe Movie andTelevisionReview andClassificationBoard, et al.,

Respondents.April 29, 2009

Gagokatalaga Michael, masaholka pasaputangbabae o di ba. Yungputangbabaeanggumaganalangdoonyungibaba, [dito] kay Michaelanggumaganaangitaas, o di ba! O, masaholpa saputangbabaeyan.Sabinglolakomasahol pasaputangbabaeyan.

Sobraangkasinungalinganngmgademonyong ito.1 x xx

Is this protected by the Free Exercise ofReligion Clause?

that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does notautomatically accord them the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simpleinsults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status ofreligious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words in context show thathe was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any religiousconviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted hisstatements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does notconvert the foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot acceptthat petitioner made his statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they

constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by arival religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the levelof name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen tocontradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.

ALEJANDROESTRADA,complainant, vs.SOLEDAD S.ESCRITOR,respondent.August 4, 2003

Escritor, a court interpreter, is beingcharged administratively. Grounds: GrossImmoral Conduct. Basis: For living with aman not her husband and having childrenwith him. Note that at the time therelationship started, both Escritor and her

partner had spouses of their own althoughseparated in fact.

Escritor argues that such relationship wasin conformity with their religion (JehovahsWitnesses). Their relationship is officiallyrecognized by their congregation.

Should she be held administratively liable?

The OSG still has to intervene first before the court can make a decision.

As a general rule, the State shall respect all forms of religious exercise EXCEPT whenthere is a compelling state interest that would justify the State in overriding suchexercise.

The State has to intervene first in order for the State to prove that there is acompelling state interest.

Case remanded

ALEJANDROESTRADA,Complainant,vs.SOLEDAD S.ESCRITOR,Respondent.

June 22, 2006

Continuation of the case above after theOSG has intervened.

Escritor should not be administratively charged

The OSG contends that the State has a compelling interest to override respondentsclaimed religious belief and practice, in order to protect marriage and the family asbasic social institutions.

There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting theinstitutions of marriage and the family. Be that as it may, the free exercise of religionis specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is afundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights "themost inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it isnot enough to contend that the states interest is important, because our Constitutionitself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specificterms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must becompelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limitthe fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate

the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_164785_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_164785_2009.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_164785_2009.html#fnt1


3/26

The Solicitor General also argued against respondents religious freedom on the basisof morality, i.e., that "the conjugal arrangement of respondent and her live-in partnershould not be condoned because adulterous relationships are constantly frowned uponby society";

Although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality couldallow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offendcompelling state interests;

Our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that gives roomfor accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. 171

Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as thearrangement she had was "illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards,it is inherently or by its very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to goodconscience," the Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality couldallow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offendcompelling state interests.

Since the conduct of petitioner has already been accepted (therefore consideredmoral), such conduct has passed the benevolent neutrality test.

CRISTINELLI S.FERMIN,Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Respondent.March 28, 2008

Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and EddieGutierrez filed a complaint for libel againstCristiFermin

Fermin allegedly printed and circulated anarticle in Gossip Tabloid the followingstatements:

"Mas malakinghalagaangnadispalkonilasastates, may mganaiwan dingasuntodoonsiannabelle"

"imposiblengnasaamerikangayonsiannabelledahilsakalat din angasuntoniladun, bukod

pasanapakaramingpinoynahumahantingsakanila masmalakingproblemaangkailanganniyangharapinsa states dahilsaperangnadispalkonila,naghahanaplangngsakitngkatawansiannabelle kung sa statesnganiyamaiisipangpumuntangayonparalangtakasanniyasi ligayasantos atangsintensiyasakanya"

Is this statement covered by the Freedomof Expression Clause?

NO.

Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials inthe performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of publicinterest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionallyprotected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a publicofficers performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involvingpublic figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.36 Whilecomplainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainmentbusiness, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators suchas petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity byindiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcastmedia or in print, about their personal lives.

We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of thehigh ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble profession. [W]ithoutx xx a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily become a powerfulinstrument of injustice.

Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in whichexpression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly maintained, aswe do now, that freedom of expression is mans birthright constitutionally protectedand guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role of the press to act as its"defensorfidei" in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping inmind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry, and its freedomdoes not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.

TULFO v. PEOPLE Tulfo, the national and managing editors, Petitioners guilty, in lieu of imprisonment, they were made to pay
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/am_p-02-1651_2006.html#fnt171http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_157643_2008.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jun2006/am_p-02-1651_2006.html#fnt171http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_157643_2008.html#fnt36


4/26

OF THEPHILIPPINES(2008)

and the president of Remate wereadjudged guilty of writing and publishingdefamatory articles against Bureau ofCustoms Atty. So and sentenced toimprisonment.

P1,000,000 in moral damages. A newspaper especially one national in reach andcoverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the publichas a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group oranother on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects andkeeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the generalcommunity.It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrinerequires thatliability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in theabsence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelousstatement.Actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless

disregard of whether it was false or not.The exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent with good faith andreasonable care." This was abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the articles.Thesecolumns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced asbeing privileged simply because the target was a public official.

NEW SOUNDSBROADCASTINGNETWORK, INC.v. DY(2009)

On the ground of lack of mayors permit,Mayor Dy of Isabela issued a Closure Orderagainst BomboRadyo, the competitor of theformers family radio station whoaggressively exposed election regularitiesthat favored the Dy political dynasty.

Closure invalid, a content-based form of prior restraint that should besubjected to the strict scrutiny test. Free speech and free press may beidentified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of publicinterest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint onthe communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecutionfor sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clearand present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.Priorrestraintrefers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms ofexpression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. While any system ofprior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality, notall prior restraints on speech are invalid.Strict scrutiny test. The immediate implication of the application of the "strictscrutiny" test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government toprove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. Ascontent regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason,theburden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe theright to free expression.

CHAVEZ v.GONZALES(2008)

Chavez questions the press statements ofDOJ Sec. Gonzales and NTC warningmedia outfits that the playing of the GarciTapes is a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and violative of thecondition of their Certificate/ProvisionalAuthority to refrain from broadcasting ortelecasting false information or willfulmisrepresentation.

The mere press statements of the DOJ Sec. and NTC in question constitute aform of content-based prior restraint.Any act done, such as a speech uttered, forand on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on priorrestraint.Considerations for broadcast media. All forms of media, whether print orbroadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech andexpression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continuesto be the clear and present danger rule (when the restraint is content-based),that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as tocreate a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils thatthe lawmaker has a right to prevent.Nature of clear and present danger test. It rests on the premise that speech maybe restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to anevil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evilconsequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious andthe degree of imminence extremely high." As articulated in our jurisprudence, we haveapplied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present dangertest to resolve free speech challenges.A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on

content is given the strictest scrutinyin light of its inherent and invasive impact.Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will


5/26

it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcomingthe presumed unconstitutionality. Unless the government can overthrow thispresumption, the content-basedrestraint will be struck down.

CONCERNEDBOHOLANOS v.CALIBO(2007)

An anonymous complaint was filed againstRTC Judge Calibo for conduct unbecoming ajudge and highly unethical act for "publiclyspeaking on radio and in public foraregarding his bias and parochial views oncertain controversial issues against public

personalities and public officials."

Judge guilty of serious misconduct, but not for the acts complained of.As regards going on the air to express ones opinion over a matter of public concern,the undersigned believes that respondent Judge cannot be held to answeradministratively simply because he was only exercising his constitutionalright to be heard in a petition for the redress of grievances. As a consumerand as a member of the body politic, it was his right, nay his duty to air what he

honestly believed to be an incipient irregularity.However, his two telephone calls toJudge who was presiding over the petition to stop the governor, definitelyviolates the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Section 3 of Canon I, whichstates that "Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome oflitigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency."

GRETA

In the Matter

Letter of UPLaw

Senate vErmita

BantayRepublic

AKBAYAN vs.Thomas Aquino

(2008)

The petitioners, Congresspersons included,wanted to get a copy of the full text of theJPEPA and the offers of the twogovernments. The executive branchrefused to give the requested documentsclaiming executive privilege. Thepetitioners claim their right of members ofCongress to demand information onnegotiations of international tradeagreements from the Executive branch.

The privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked in the context oflegislative investigations. The documents asked are privileged.

The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange ofexploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations frompublic view.It seeks to protect the independence in decision-making of the President,particularly in its capacity as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, andits sole representative with foreign nations.

Neri vs. SenateCommittee

2008

DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE forthe supply of equipment and services for

the NBN Project. Joey De Venecia issued astatement that severalhigh executive officials and power brokerswere using their influence to push theapproval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited totestify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. Heappeared in one hearing wherein he wasinterrogated for 11 hrs and during which headmitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried tobribe him with P200M in exchange for hisapproval of the NBN project. Neri refused toanswer three questions invoking executive

privilege: (a) whether or not PresidentArroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)

The contempt order is nullified.

The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only tothe extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. The communications elicited bythe three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.

1st, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable powerof the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with othercountries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreementswithoutthe concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognizedin Philippine jurisprudence.2nd, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under theoperational proximity test,petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being amember of President Arroyos cabinet. And3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify thelimitation of the privilege and of theunavailability of the information elsewhere by an

appropriate investigating authority.


6/26

whether or not she directed him toprioritize it, and (c) whether or not shedirected him to approve. The SRBC citedNeri for contempt.

The Province ofNorth Cotabato v.Peace Panel

(2008)

Invoking the right to information onmatters of public concern, petitioners seekto compel respondents to disclose andfurnish them the complete and officialcopies of the MOA-AD including its

attachments, and to prohibit the slatedsigning of the MOA-AD, pending thedisclosure of the contents of the MOA-ADand the holding of a public consultationthereon. Supplementarily, petitioners praythat the MOA-AD be declaredunconstitutional.

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of publicconcern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD isindeed of public concern.

Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and

negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract.

Intended as a "splendid symmetry" to the right to information under the Bill of Rightsis the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts andimplements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving publicinterest.The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found inthe Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people todemand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to giveinformation even if nobody demands.The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conductof public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as thecenterpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential tohold public officials at all times accountable to the people.

ManalotovsVeloso III

(2010)

An unlawful detainer case was filed byPetitioners Manaloto et al againstRespondent Veloso. The controversy isrooted in the dissemination by petitionersof the MeTC judgment against respondentto Horseshoe Village homeowners, whowere not involved at all in the unlawfuldetainer case, thus, purportedly affectingnegatively respondent's good name and

reputation among said homeowners.

Respondent has a cause of action against Petitioners.

The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute between petitioners and respondent,and the MeTC decision against respondent was then still pending appeal before theRTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners' intentions for distributing copies of saidMeTC decision to non-parties in the case. While petitioners were free to copy anddistribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whetherthey did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter's goodname and reputation in the community.

Anne

Guingona

Antolin

Republic

Land Bank

BANAT v.COMELEC

(2009)

BANAT assails the constitutionality ofSection 34 of RA 9369 which fixes the perdiem of poll watchers of the dominant

majority and dominant minority parties atP400 on election day. BANAT argues that

Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.

First, the non- impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from

prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intentionof the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a


7/26

this violates the freedom of the parties tocontract and their right to fix the terms andconditions of the contract they see as fair,equitable and just. BANAT adds that this isa purely private contract using privatefunds which cannot be regulated by law.

contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreedupon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.

In this case, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right ordemandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than threemonths prior to the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority andminority parties hired their respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections,they were deemed to have incorporated in their contracts all the provisions of RA9369.

Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. Theconstitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of thepolice power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and generalwelfare of the community.

Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still beconstitutional because the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of theState to promote the general welfare of the people. The SC agreed with the COMELECthat the role of poll watchers is invested with public interest.

Hacienda LuisitaInc. v. LuisitaIndustrial ParkCorporation

(2011)

The martial law administration filed a suitbefore the Manila RTC against Tadeco, etal., for them to surrender Hacienda Luisitato the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform(MAR) so that the land can be distributed tofarmers at cost. Responding, Tadecoalleged that Hacienda Luisita does not havetenants, besides which sugar lands ofwhich the hacienda consisted are notcovered by existing agrarian reformlegislations. The Manila RTC renderedjudgment ordering Tadeco to surrenderHacienda Luisita to the MAR. During theadministration of President CorazonCojuangco Aquino, the Office of theSolicitor General moved to withdraw thegovernments case against Tadeco, et

al. The CA dismissed the case, subject tothe PARCs approval of Tadecos proposedstock distribution plan (SDP) in favor of itsfarmworkers.

There is no violation of Sections 1 and 10 of Article III of the Constitution.A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contractual relations betweenor among parties is deemed read into the contract and its implementation cannotsuccessfully be resisted by force of the non-impairment guarantee. There is, in thatinstance, no impingement of the impairment clause, the non-impairment protectionbeing applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts or contracts by enlarging,abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. Impairment, in fine,obtains if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties,imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws existingremedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. Necessarily, theconstitutional proscription would not apply to laws already in effect at the time ofcontract execution, as in the case of RA 6657, in relation to DAO 10, vis--vis HLIsSDOA.

As held in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.:The prohibition [against impairment of the obligation of contracts] is aligned with thegeneral principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and

cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already inexistence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus,the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II [of the Constitution] is limited inapplication to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existingacts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention ofthe parties thereto.Needless to stress, the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 is not the kind of issuancewithin the ambit of Sec. 10, Art. III of the Constitution providing that "[n]o lawimpairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."

Serrano v.Gallant MaritimeServices, Inc.

(2009)

Serrano was hired by Gallant MaritimeServices, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,Inc., under a POEA-approved contract ofemployment for 12 months, as Chief

Officer.

Section 10 of RA 8042 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution.

Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation ofcontracts shall be passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have onlya prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected;


8/26

Respondents did not deliver on theirpromise to make Serrano Chief Officer.Hence, Serrano refused to stay on assecond Officer and was repatriated to thePhilippines serving only two (2) months andseven (7) days of his contract.

Serrano questioned the constitutionality ofthe last clause in the 5th paragraph of

Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:Sec. 10. Money Claims. x x x In case oftermination of overseas employmentwithout just, valid or authorized cause asdefined by law or contract, the workersshall be entitled to the full reimbursementof his placement fee with interest of twelvepercent (12%) per annum, plus his salariesfor the unexpired portion of hisemployment contract or for three (3)months for every year of the unexpiredterm, whichever is less.

however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts anddeemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II islimited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate fromexisting acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing theintention of the parties thereto.

The enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employmentcontract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued thatR.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of

the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, theywere deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not bedeclared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, forthe law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate abusiness, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs,with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWswherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State topromote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfareof the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to thosealready in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimatemeasures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

PAGCOR v. BIR

(2011)

PAGCOR was created pursuant to PD 1067-A. Simultaneously, PD 1067-B was issuedgranting to PAGCOR an exemption from thepayment of any type of tax, except afranchise tax of 5% of the gross revenue.PD 1399 was also issued expanding thescope of PAGCORs exemption. PD 1869was issued consolidating laws pertaining tothe franchise and powers of PAGCOR.PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed inthrough P.D. No. 1931, but it was laterrestored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430,which was issued in September 1984.

The NIRC of 1997 (RA 8424) provided thatGOCCs shall pay corporate income taxexcept PAGCOR, GSIS, SSS, PHIC and PCSO.RA 9337 was enacted in 2005 amendingthe 1997 NIRC by excluding PAGCOR fromthe GOCCs exempt from paying corporateincome tax. It also made PAGCOR liable forpayment of 10% VAT on sales of goods andservices.

PAGCOR now argues that RA 9337 is voidfor being repugnant to the equal protection

clause, to the non-impairment clause, andfor being beyond the scope of the basic law

RA 9337 does not violate the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.

The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article IIIof the Constitution,which provides that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. Thenon-impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts orcontracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of theparties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contractbetween the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon orwithdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.

As regards franchises, Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution provides that nofranchise or right shall be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to

amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires.

In this case, PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain gamblingcasinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e.,basketball, football, lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorialjurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. Under Section 11, Article XII of theConstitution, PAGCORs franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal byCongress such as the amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, theprovision in Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 bywithdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affectany benefits to PAGCORs transactions with private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.


9/26

which should be interpreted as notapplicable to licensees and franchisees.

NIEL

Surigao

Learning Child

P. Estrada

Presidental Adhoc

KenethMikeRoi

Republic

Valeroso

Victorias

Villar

Go

Bureau of Customs

Sec. of DefenseManaloto

In the Matter

Tapuz

Canlas

Ampatuan

Salcedo vBollozos(2010)

Petitioner filed a letter-complaint chargingJudge Bollozos with Grave Misconduct andIgnorance of the Law in the handling of aspecial proceeding relative to a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus and writ of amparo,filed by the detainees sister. It alleged thatdetainee was arrested and brought in forquestioning for allegedly employing self-help (forced himself inside his propertywith heavily armed men) in preventingsquatters from putting up improvements onhis property. The Writ of Amparo wasissued and served on the same day of thefiling of the petition.

The Writ of Amparo only applies to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances orthreats thereof and does not involve concerns that are purely property andcommercial in nature.The Writ ofAmparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge since the

petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege that he is avictim of "extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or the threats thereof." Thepetition merely states that he is "under threat of deprivation of liberty with the policestating that he is not arrested but merely 'in custody.

Roxas vMacapagal-Arroyo(2010)

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipinodescent who joined an exposure programto the Philippines with the group BAYAN-USA, of which she is a member. While doingvolunteer work in La Paz, Tarlac, she was

Doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liabilityand, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent inan amparo petition.Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation ofindividual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative


10/26

allegedly detained. She was allegedlyinterrogated and tortured for five straightdays to abandon her communist beliefs infavor of returning to the fold. Petitionerwas finally released and released to heruncles house in QC, with a cellphone,among others. She continued to receivecalls from RC through the phone given toher. Out of apprehension that she was

being monitored and also fearing for thesafety of her family, petitioner threw awaythe cellular phone.

case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding.The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consistingof the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court,in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rightsto life, liberty or security.While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whetheran enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpiredthewrit does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive

lawWrit of Habeas Data a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especiallythe right to informational privacy of individuals; operates to protect a persons right tocontrol information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where suchinformation is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawfulends.An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is theshowing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of theright to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim

Burgos v PGMA(2010)

Jonas Joseph T. Burgos a farmer advocateand a member of KilusangMagbubukidsaBulacan (a chapterof the militant peasant organization) wasforcibly taken and abducted by a group of 4men and a woman from the extensionportion of HapagKainan Restaurant inQuezon City.

We resolve to refer the present case to the CHR as the Courts directly commissionedagency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction andthe gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings andrecommendations to this Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the CHRis a specialized and independent agency created and empowered by the Constitutionto investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rightsand to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of allpersons within the PhilippinesUnder this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigativeproceedings, including field investigations acting as the Courts directlycommissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

Boac v Cadapan(2009)

Armed men abducted Sherilyn, Karen andManuel from a house in San Miguel,Hagonoy, Bulacan. They were herded into ajeep bearing license plate RTF 597 thatsped towards an undisclosed location.Parents of Karen filed a petition for writ ofhabeas corpus with SC, impleading

Generals Tolentino and Palparan, Lt. Col.Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Maribelle asrespondents. By Return of the Writ, therespondents denied that the three are inthe custody of the military. CA dismissedthe petition on the ground that there wasno evidence of detention, thus, the petitionis not the appropriate remedy

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminalliability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil oradministrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specifiedcourses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life,liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.Command responsibility has no application in amparo cases to determine criminalliability.

Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identifythose accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whateverprocesses an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court doesnot impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to bein the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

The Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if theRules strengthen, rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, theRule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, libertyor security of the aggrieved party.Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary andexpeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.


11/26

Cuayo

manila electric

So

Rodriguez

Balao

MRS. ALBERTAYANSON/

HaciendaVALENTIN-BALABAG vs.THE HON.SECRETARY,DEPARTMENT OFLABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT

(February 2008)

DOLE Bacolod issued a Compliance Order,directing petitioner to pay private

respondents and to correct existing laborstandards violations.

Upon receipt of the Writ of Execution whichis based on the Compliance Order,Petitioner filed with public respondent aVerified Appeal and Supplement to theVerified Appeal, posting therewith anappeal bond of P1,000.00 in money orderand attaching thereto a Motion to beAllowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motionfor Reduction of Bond.

The DOLE Bacolod and CA both rejectedpetitioners appeal.

Petitioner failed to pay the bond therefore she did not perfect her appeal.For its perfection, the appeal was subject to the requirements prescribed under

Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730: Anorder issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor andEmployment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said orderinvolves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only uponthe posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company dulyaccredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to themonetary award in the order appealed from.

When petitioner filed her Verified Appeal and Supplement to the Verified Appeal, sheposted a mere P1,000.00-appeal bond and attached a Motion to be Allowed to PostMinimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond.

Guico, Jr. v. Hon. Quisumbing: the posting of the proper amount of the

appeal bond under Article 128 (b) is mandatory for the perfection of anappeal from a monetary award in labor standard cases. The rationale behindthe stringency of such requirement is that the employer-appellant may choosebetween a cash bond and a surety bond. Hence, limitations in his liquidity should poseno obstacle to his perfecting an appeal by posting a mere surety bond.

PAYAKAN G.TILENDO vs.OMBUDSMAN andSANDIGANBAYAN

(September 2007)

The "Concerned Faculty Members" of theCCSPC filed before the Ombudsman aletter-complaint against Tilendo forviolation of RA 3019.

The OMB received the NBI report charging

petitioner with violation of RA 3019.Subsequently, the OMB ordered that theinformations be filed with the proper court.

Tilendo contends that the casesagainst him dragged for more thanthree years in preliminaryinvestigation phase without his fault.The anonymous letters addressed to theOmbudsman were dated 4 and 28December 1998. The OMB referred thematter to the NBI which required Tilendo tofile his counter-affidavit, which he did onlyon 22 October 1999. Nothing was heardfrom the NBI or the Ombudsman until

There was no unreasonable delay because there was failure to assert such right by theaccused.Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons shall have theright to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial oradministrative bodies."

This right, however, is considered violated only when the proceedings isattended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, which are absent inthis case.

The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible. A simplemathematical computation of the time involved is insufficient. The facts andcircumstances peculiar to each case must be examined. In ascertaining whetherthe right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the followingfactors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for thedelay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Furthermore, petitioner did not make any overt act like, for instance, filing a motion forearly resolution. He asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases only when theDeputy Ombudsman-Mindanao required him to file his counter-affidavit to the NBI


12/26

January 2003 when the Ombudsmandirected Tilendo to submit his counter-affidavit to the various criminal chargesagainst him. According to Tilendo, theinordinate delay in the termination ofthe preliminary investigation violateshis right to speedy disposition ofcases.

complaint.

ZENON R. PEREZvs. PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINESandSANDIGANBAYAN

(February 2008)

Petitioner was charged and later convictedbefore the Sandiganbayan withmalversation of public funds under Art. 217of the RPC.

Petitioner is now on appeal, asserting thathis right to due process of law and tospeedy disposition of his case was violatedbecause the decision of the Sandiganbayanwas handed down after the lapse of morethan twelve years. The years that he had towait for the outcome of his case wereallegedly spent in limbo, pain and agony.

Petitioner slept on his right by failing to assert the right to a speedy disposition of thecase.

Barker vs. Wingo: the balancing test was used to determine whether or not therewas a denial of the right to speedy disposition of the case. Under this test, the conductof both the prosecution and defendant are weighed. A balancing test necessarilycompels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, by identifying someof the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particulardefendant has been deprived of his right: (1) length of the delay; (2) the reasonfor the delay; (3) the defendants assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice tothe defendant.

Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a differentdimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting hisright to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some overt acts, like filing amotion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right.

ALFREDO R.ENRIQUEZ,GENER C.ENDONA, andRHANDOLFO B.AMANSEC vs.OFFICE OF THEOMBUDSMAN

(February 2008)

Six (6) years from the filing of thecomplaints- affidavits and morethan four (4) years after the partiesformally offered their evidence,petitioners filed a Motion to Dismissall the cases against them asrespondents "inordinate delay"constitutes a violation of theirconstitutional right to a speedydisposition of their cases.

Respondent however maintains that it didnot violate petitioners right to a speedydisposition of their cases, contending that"the prosecutors assigned to these casesare merely exercising extreme care inverifying, evaluating and assessing thecharges against petitioners to enable themto arrive at a just determination of thecases" and that "the delay in the ongoingreview is not vexatious, capricious oroppressive."

Respondent has failed to resolved expeditiously the case field against he petitionerswhen such was already submitted for resolution six years prior.

The DOCTRINAL RULE is that in the determination of whether that right hasbeen violated, the factors that may be considered and balanced are thelength of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the aggrieved partysassertion or failure to assert such right, and the prejudice caused by thedelay.

The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman requires that the

hearing officer is given a definite period of "not later than thirty (30) days" toresolve the case after the formal investigation shall have been concluded .Definitely, respondent did not observe this 30-day rule. Respondents belated excuse,as alleged in its Comment on the present petition, that the prosecutors assigned tothese cases are still reviewing and evaluating them with extreme care to arrive at ajust determination is not only unreasonable but also an afterthought.

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the dispositionof cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the peoplein the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals.The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is inaccord with the established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly decidedto better serve the ends of justice.


13/26

Paco

Ombudsman

Mari

Phil Coconut

P. Taruc

Cruz v. People

(2008)

WON Cruz was denied due process: (1)when his trial was pursued without prior

clearance from the DOLE before takingcognizance of complaints for preliminaryinvestigation and the filing in court of thecorresponding information of cases arisingout of, or related to, a labor dispute; (2)when he was indicted for qualified theft,even as he was initially investigated forestafa/falsification of private documents,thus he was not given the opportunity toanswer during the preliminary investigationof the crime of qualified theft.

Ferdinand Cruz was not denied due process.

The prior clearance requirement before taking cognizance of complaints under thecited DOJ circular is not applicable to this case. The crime was first committed beforethe accrual of the money claim. This being the case, it is not remote that it wasFerdinand who used the labor case, which he filed before the Labor Arbiter, to haveleverage against the company in the criminal case.

The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to havewaived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularitythat surrounds it. Cruz did not present evidence that arraignment was forced upon him.On the contrary, he voluntarily pleaded to the charge and actively participated in thetrial of the case.

Cruz was able to answer the initial charge of estafa/falsification of private documents

through his counter-affidavits. Based on the same complaint affidavit and the samesets of evidence presented by the complainant, the prosecutor deemed it proper tocharge Ferdinand with qualified theft. Since the same allegations and evidence wereproffered by the complainant in the qualified theft, there is no need for Ferdinand to begiven the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits anew, as he had already answeredsaid allegations when he submitted counter-affidavits for the original indictment ofestafa/falsification of private documents.

Villarin v. People

(2011)

Petitioner Villarin and others were chargedwith violation of PD 705, 68 (illegalpossession of timber or other forestproducts). The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao denied Villarins Petition forReinvestigation.

Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, in denying Villarins motion forreconsideration, validly relied on the certification contained in the Information that apreliminary investigation was properly conducted in this case. The certification wasmade under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who is

resumed to have regularly performed his official duty.

The absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised and must nothave been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance andconduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation,which, necessarily involves a re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidencealready submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding ofprobable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisitepreliminary investigation.

By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to havewaived his right to preliminary investigation.

Social JusticeSociety v.Dangerous Drugs

Petitioner Laserna, as citizen and taxpayer,seeks in his Petition for Certiorari andProhibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c),

Sec. 36 (f) is unconstitutional.

The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and


14/26

Board

(2008)

(d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck downas unconstitutional for infringing on theconstitutional right to privacy, the rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure,and the right against self-incrimination, andfor being contrary to the due process andequal protection guarantees.

SEC. 36.Authorized Drug Testing.

Authorized drug testing shall be done byany government forensic laboratories or byany of the drug testing laboratoriesaccredited and monitored by the DOH tosafeguard the quality of the test results. xx x The drug testing shall employ, amongothers, two (2) testing methods, thescreening test which will determine thepositive result as well as the type of drugused and the confirmatory test which willconfirm a positive screening test. x x xThe following shall be subjected to undergodrug testing:

(f) All persons charged before theprosecutor's office with a criminal offensehaving an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) yearsand one (1) day shall undergo a mandatorydrug test;

"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor'soffice, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas ofrandomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants ina criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyondsuspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they aresingled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by thebare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submittingthemselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to theprocedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on

the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminalprosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this casewould violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of theConstitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminatethemselves.

Senate v. Ermita

(2006)

EO 464:SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage ofExecutive Privilege. (b) Who are covered. The following arecovered by this executive order:Senior officials of executive departmentswho in the judgment of the department

heads are covered by the executiveprivilege;Generals and flag officers of the ArmedForces of the Philippines and such otherofficers who in the judgment of the Chief ofStaff are covered by the executiveprivilege;Philippine National Police (PNP) officers withrank of chief superintendent or higher andsuch other officers who in the judgment ofthe Chief of the PNP are covered by theexecutive privilege;Senior national security officials who in the

judgment of the National Security Adviserare covered by the executive privilege; and

Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 are not valid.

Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested informationprivileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorizedhead of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturnedthat determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how therequested information could be classified as privileged.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to discloseinformation, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. Absent then a statement of thespecific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whetherit falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances inwhich it is made, it should be respected. Due respect for a co-equal branch ofgovernment, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating thegrounds therefor.

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons forthe claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which theprivilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree ofparticularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v.

U.S. declares:


15/26

Such other officers as may be determinedby the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other PublicOfficials Before Congress. All publicofficials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereofshall secure prior consent of the Presidentprior to appearing before either House ofCongress to ensure the observance of theprinciple of separation of powers,adherence to the rule on executiveprivilege and respect for the rights of publicofficials appearing in inquiries in aid oflegislation.

The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in sodoing he would incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself establish the hazardof incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to requirehim to answer if it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken. However, if thewitness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense inwhich a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled tosurrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustainthe privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in thesetting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanationof why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure couldresult." x x x

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thusinvalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise andcertain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with anannouncement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficientfor Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under thecircumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

Sabio v. Gordon

2006

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiagointroduced Senate Resolution 455 directingan inquiry in aid of legislation on theanomalous losses incurred by thePhilippines Overseas TelecommunicationsCorporation (POTC), PhilippineCommunications Satellite Corporation(PHILCOMSAT) and PHILCOMSAT HoldingsCorporation (PHC) due to allegedimproprieties in their operations by theirrespective Board of Directors.

Chairman Sabio and other Commissionersof PCGG as well as officers of PHC weresubpoenaed. Despite this, however, theyrefuse to attend and testify before thesenate. Hence, Senate ordered for theirarrest for contempt.

Chairman Sabio invoked EO 1, Sec. 4(b)which states that "No member or staff ofthe Commission shall be required to testifyor produce evidence in any judicial,legislative or administrative proceedingconcerning matters within its officialcognizance."

Right to Self Incrimination is NOT VIOLATED. (Hence, Refusal is not justified and Sec.4(b) of EO 1 is declared repealed.

This right maybe invoked by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat HoldingsCorporation only when the incriminating question is being asked, since they have noway of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondentSenate Committees their power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power isabused, such issue may be presented before the courts.

StandardChartered Bankv. SenateCommittee onBanks, Financial

Institutions andCurrencies

Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speechentitiled Arrogance of Wealth based on aletter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobodenouncing SCB-Philippines for sellingunregistered foreign securities in violation

of the Securities Regulation Code. He alsointroduced Senate Resolution 166 which

Right to Self Incrimination was not violated.

Officers of SCB-Philippines, are not being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding.They were summoned by respondent merely as resource persons, or as witnesses, in alegislative inquiry.

Accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an


16/26

2007directs the Respondent Committee toconduct an inquiry in aid of legislation intothe illegal sale of unregistered and high risksecurities by Petitioner.

Officers of SCB were invited to attend thehearing. The officers, however, refuse tocomply arguing that criminal and civilactions were already pending with theCourt.

ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilegeas each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, an accused mayaltogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and allquestions.

However, in this case, petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor willthey be subjected by the respondent to any penalty by reason of their testimonies.Hence, they cannot altogether decline appearing before respondent, although theymay invoke the privilege when a question calling for an incriminating answer ispropounded.

People v.Concepcion

June 27, 2008

Concepcion brothers were arrested in a buybust operation. One of their contentions fortheir acquittal is that they were notapprised of their constitutional rights whenthey were arrested. Trial Court convictedthem.

Conviction upheld. (implied waiver of their rights in custodial investigation)

Appellants contention that they were not apprised of their constitutional rights upontheir arrest cannot lead to their acquittal. The arresting officers alleged failure toinform them of their Miranda rights or the nature of their arrest should have beenraised before arraignment. It is too late in the day for appellants to raise these allegedillegalities after a valid information has been filed, the accused arraigned, trialcommenced and completed, and a judgment of conviction rendered.

Eugenio v.People

March 26, 2008

Eugenio was arrested in an entrapmentoperation by the NBI, upon the complaint ofMangali. She was charged and convicted ofestafa and falsification of publicdocuments. Among her contentions for heracquittal are, that her arrest following theNBI entrapment operation was illegalbecause it was "conducted by a division ofthe NBI which does not deal with estafa orfraud" and without the participation of thepolice. Petitioner also alleges that after shewas arrested, she was neither informed ofher constitutional right to counsel norafforded her right to a phone call. Petitionerconcludes that these irregularities taintedthe NBIs entrapment operation, renderingthe same without any "probative value in

determining whether or not a criminal acthas been committed."

There is implied waiver of her rights during custodial investigation.

Such irregularities, assuming they did take place, do not work to nullify petitionersconviction as this Court is neither the proper forum, nor this appeal the correctremedy, to raise this issue. Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused,depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her person, should be raised in a motion toquash at any time before entering her plea. Petitioners failure to timely raise thisobjection amounted to a waiver of such irregularity and resulted in her concomitantsubmission to the trial courts jurisdiction over her person. Indeed, not only didpetitioner submit to such jurisdiction, she actively invoked it through her participationduring the trial. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim the contrary.

As for the failure of the NBI agents to inform petitioner of her right to counsel duringcustodial investigation, this right attains significance only if the person underinvestigation makes a confession in writing without aid of counsel counsel which isthen sought to be admitted against the accused during the trial. In such case, thetainted confession obtained in violation of Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution

is inadmissible in evidence against the accused.

Here, petitioner merely alleges that following her arrest, she gave a "statement" to theNBI agents. The records do not contain a copy of this "statement" thus we have noway of knowing whether such statement amounts to a confession under Section 12(3)in relation to Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. At any rate, no allegation hasbeen made here that the prosecution submitted such statement in evidence duringthe trial.

ABAY v. PEOPLE

(2008)

Information was filed charging Petitionerswith the crime of HighwayRobbery/Brigandage.

They contend that the lower courts erred in

relying on Petitioner Aban's extrajudicialconfession which was coerced.

It was not Aban's extrajudicial confession but his court testimony reiterating hisdeclarations in his extrajudicial admission, pointing to petitioners as his co-participants, which was instrumental in convicting petitioners of the crime charged.Settled is the rule that when the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmedat the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a

testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates. Here,the extrajudicial confession of Aban was affirmed by him in open court during the trial.


17/26

Thus, such confession already partook of judicial testimony which is admissible inevidence against the petitioners.

PEOPLE v. MUIT

(2008)

Appellants were charged withkidnapping for ransom with homicideand carnapping. Appellants claim that theywere separately forced to sign the writtenconfession of participation in the crimes,without assistance of a counsel.

Held: Assisted by lawyers.

There is nothing on record to support appellants claim that they were coerced andtortured into executing their extra judicial confessions. One of the indiciaof voluntariness in the execution of appellants extra judicial statements is that eachcontains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have knownand could not have supplied, without the knowledge and information given byappellants. Moreover, the appellants were assisted by their lawyers when theyexecuted their statements.

People of thePhilippines vs.Andan3 March 1997

- Accused-appellant Pablito Andan yHernandez alias "Bobby" was accused ofthe crime of rape with homicide. TCconvicted appellant. It based its decisionconvicting appellant on the testimonies ofthe three policemen of the investigatingteam, the mayor of Baliuag and four newsreporters to whom appellant gave hisextrajudicial oral confessions. Accusedassails the admission of the testimonies ofthe policemen, the mayor and the newsreporters because they were made duringcustodial investigation without theassistance of counsel.

Appellants confession to the police was made during a custodial investigation,hence policemens testimony as to his unconselled admission is INADMISSIBLE.However, testimonies of the Mayor and some media people regarding the appellantsconfession to them are ADMISSIBLE.

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny personunder investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when itis no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particularperson as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exactinga confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. As intended bythe 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by policeauthorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PCand the NBI and such other police agencies in our government. HERE, when the policearrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the deathof Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the policefound him at his parents' house.

When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcementofficer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation donot apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by theauthorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted havingcommitted the crime. Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properlyadmitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, notby the police or any other investigating officer.

People vs.Mayo26 September2006

RTC and CA found the accused guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of Arson. In theaccused second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the admissibility of heruncounselled extrajudicial confession givento prosecution witnesses, namely RemigioBernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to themedia. Accused-appellant Edna contendsthat being uncounselled extrajudicialconfession, her admissions to havingcommitted the crime charged should havebeen excluded in evidence against her forbeing violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of

the Constitution.

The barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particularinstance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applyingArticle III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution.

Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to situations in which anindividual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited forquestioning. To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicialconfessions made must satisfy the following requirements:(1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance ofcompetent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and(4) it must be in writing.

When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed


18/26

several houses as well as killed the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was,therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by ArticleIII, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or applied toher.HOWEVER, the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not applyto those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in anordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits to having committed theoffense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted toMercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started thefire in the Separas house.

People v. Gil

(2008)

An information was issued alleging that Gilcommitted the crime of Destructive Arsonwith Homicide. Accused verbally confessedto Kagawad then wrote an extrajudicialconfession.

Verbal confession to Kagawad aas admissible. Written extrajudicial confession alsoadmissible.Regarding her extrajudicial confession, the plaintiff-appellee correctly adverted to theruling in People v. Andan as to the admissibility of the verbal confession made by theaccused-appellant, which she made not only to Kagawad William Lim but also toKagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo while the fire was in progress. Moreover, as correctly heldby the CA, even if the written extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the evidencepresented by the prosecution is more than sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Jaselva v. People

(2011)

Petitioner was accused of frustratedhomicide. Days after the incident,petitioner, together with his first cousinFiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went tothe police station, wherein he voluntarilyintimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4Desder) that the victim jumped out of hisvehicle.

Constitutional procedure for custodial investigation did not apply to voluntaryconfession of accused.

Custodial investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law enforcement

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of hisfreedom of action in any significant way." This presupposes that he is suspected ofhaving committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information ora confession from him. The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as theinvestigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and directionis aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whomthe police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicitincriminating statements. The assailed statements herein were spontaneouslymade by petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It wasestablished that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went

to the police station and voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out ofhis vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA didnot, therefore, err in holding that the constitutional procedure for custodialinvestigation is not applicable in the instant case.

PEOPLE V.LUCERO

2011

Lucero was charged with rape withhomicide of AAA. He was invited to thepolice station, where he admitted to PO2Gurrea that he killed AAA but denied rapingher. They then accompanied him to hishouse where they found a bloodied white t-shirt. PO2 Gurrea asked Lucero where hehad placed the knife used in killing AAA,and Lucero pointed to the bottom of hisbed. They found the knife after turning the

PO2 Gurrea himself admitted that Lucero wasnt informed of his rights andthat there was no waiver of such rights. Likewise, the bloody shirt and theknife are inadmissible in evidence since they were found as a result of asearch after Lucero had been questioned without the presence of counsel.

The questioning of Lucero was made in violation of Article III Sec 12(1) of the 1987Constitution, which states:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shallhave the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If


19/26

bed over. The accused was then told totake off his shirt, and when he did so, PO2Gurrea and Jao saw scratches on the backand right thigh of the accused.

the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be providedwith one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in thepresence of counsel.

However, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused.PEOPLE V.CAPITLA ANDNAGARES

2010

Barangay Chairman Pagalunan was gunneddown by 4 men, 2 of whom were lateridentified as Capitla and Nagares. WhileNagares was under the custody of the NBI,he executed an extrajudicial confessionbefore Atty. Dizon, Chief, SOG, NBI. Headmitted to killing Pagalunan andimplicated Vice Mayor De Guzman as themastermind. He also identified Capitle,Santos, and a John Doe as his cohorts. Hewas assisted by Atty. Galang, who was atthe NBI following up the implementation ofa warrant of arrest in one of the cases shewas handling, in making his confession.

The extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given.

As found by the CA, (1) there is no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on theperson of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not complain to the officers administering the oathduring the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he did not file any criminal oradministrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for maltreatment; (4) nomarks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have himselfexamined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellants confession isreplete with details, which makes it highly improbable that it was not voluntarily given.Likewise negating Nagares claim of a coerced confession are the photographs takenduring the signing, thumbmarking, and swearing of the extrajudicial confession. All thepictures depicted a cordial and pleasant atmosphere devoid of any sign of torture,threat, duress or tension on Nagares person. In fact, the photographs showed Nagaressmiling.Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective andindependent counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. After Nagares was

informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty. Galang whether he acceptsher as counsel. During the trial, Atty. Galang testified on the extent of her assistance.According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his constitutional rights,advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not want to answerany question, he may inform Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal tothe NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation.Moreover, Nagares extrajudicial confession was corroborated by evidence ofcorpusdelicti. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of acrime.

People vBokingco

2011

Bokingco was charged with the crime ofmurder. During the preliminaryinvestigation, he confessed to the

commission of the crime, unassisted bycounsel.

The uncounselled confession of Bokingco during preliminaryinvestigation is inadmissible in evidence.

The right to counsel applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed criticalstages in the criminal process. The preliminary investigation can be no different fromthe in-custody interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in apreliminary investigation will be subjected to no less than the State's processes,oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing those who might be liable forcriminal prosecution.

Miclat v People

2011

A police officer, conducting surveillance,saw Miclat, through a window in Miclatshouse, arranging sachets containing whatappeared to be shabu. The police enteredthe house and introduced himself to Miclat.Miclat then voluntarily handed the plasticsachets to the police. Miclat was then

placed on arrest. Upon conviction of thecrime, Miclat assails the validity of the

The warrantless arrest was valid since the arrest was made in flarantedelicto.

An exception to the Section 2 of the Bill of Rights is that of an arrest made during thecommission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. Suchwarrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of

the Rules of Court. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court


20/26

warrantless arrest. has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested mustexecute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, oris attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence orwithin the view of the arresting officer.

CHEN

Ho wai pang

Borlongan

BUNYI

Trillanes

Pantilo

JOSE ANTONIO C.LEVISTE,Petitioner,vs.HON. ELMO M.ALAMEDA, HON.RAUL M.

GONZALEZ, HON.EMMANUEL Y.VELASCO, HEIRSOF THE LATERAFAEL DE LASALAS,Respondents.August 3, 2010

Petitioner was charged with murder for thedeath of Rafael de las Alas. After petitionerposted a cash bond which the trial courtapproved, he was released from detention,and his arraignment was set on January 24,2007.The private complainants-heirs of Delas Alas filed, with the conformity of the

public prosecutor, an Urgent OmnibusMotion praying, inter alia, for the defermentof the proceedings to allow the publicprosecutor to re-examine the evidence onrecord or to conduct a reinvestigation todetermine the proper offense.Petitioner opposed the reinvestigation.Private respondent argued that thepetitioner may no longer question theMotion considering that he has alreadyactively participated in the bail hearing.

ISSUE: W/N by virtue of his activeparticipation in the bail hearing, petitionercan no longer question the motion

He can still question the motion.

Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminaryinvestigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused fromchallenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or

from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigationof the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. Thecourt shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of thetrial of the case.

By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of thereinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission of theAmended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended Information,as he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. During the arraignment onMarch 21, 2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea since the issues he raised werestill pending resolution by the appellate court, thus prompting the trial court to enter aplea of "not guilty" for him.

The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning theillegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies "only if hevoluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking hisobjections thereto."19There must be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had anactual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause.When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be somanifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocallyrelinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.20

From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid waiver on thepart of petitioner to preclude him from obtaining a definite resolution of the objectionshe so timely invoked. Other than its allegation of active participation, the OSG offeredno clear and convincing proof that petitioners participation in the trial wasunconditional with the intent to voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In

fact, on January 26, 2010, petitioner still moved for the early resolution of the present
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_182677_2010.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_182677_2010.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_182677_2010.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_182677_2010.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_182677_2010.html#fnt20


21/26

petition.21

LORNA M.VILLANUEVA,Complainant,vs.

JUDGEAPOLINARIO M.BUAYA,Respondent.November 22,2010

Tupa, Vice-Mayor of Palompon, Leyte, wascharged with a violation of the Child AbuseLaw. He filed a An EX-PARTE Motion toGrant Bail.Respondent judge granted themotion the same day that the motion wasfiled in court. No hearing was thereforeconducted. The prosecution was notnotified of the motion.Private complainantin the Child Abuse case filed thisadministrative case of Gross Ignorance ofthe Law against respondent judge.Arguments of the judge:the crime chargedagainst Tupa was a bailable offense; whenbail is a matter of right, no hearing ofthe motion to grant bail is required.

Should the judge be administratively liable?

YES.Fined Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)

Basco v. Rapatalolaid down the rules outlining the duties of a judge in case anapplication for bail is filed:

(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail orrequire him to submit his recommendation x xx;(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or notthe prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of theaccused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise itsdiscretion x xx;(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on thesummary of evidence of the prosecution x xx; [and](4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon theapproval of the [bail bond]. x xx Otherwise, petition should be denied.

In the present case, Judge Buaya granted the ex-parte motion to grant bail on thesame day that it was filed by the accused. He did this without the required notice andhearing. He justified his action on the ex-parte motion by arguing that the offensecharged against the accused was a bailable offense; a hearing was no longer required

since bail was a matter of right. Under the present Rules of Court, however,notice and hearing are required whether bail is a matter of right ordiscretion.27 Likewise, jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the proceduralnecessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,especially in cases involving offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or lifeimprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.28

Judge Buaya further argued that in granting the ex-parte motion, he was merelycorrecting a reversible error. Believing that the offense committed was bailable innature, he opined that when the investigating prosecutor revoked the bail alreadyposted by the accused, the prosecutor gravely violated the accuseds constitutionalright to bail. Judge Buaya firmly relied on the previous order of the investigating MTCjudge who, according to him, correctly fixed the amount of bail. Thus, conducting a

bail hearing on the ex-parte motion was no longer necessary. Even assuming,however, that the previous order of the investigating MTC judge was correct ingranting bail to the accused, reliance on a previous order granting bail does not justifythe absence of a hearing in a subsequent peti

Date post:	03-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	anonymous-vqaksg
View:	227 times
Download:	0 times

POLI-Batch 9 Reviewer.doc

Documents