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POLI6002
International Relations (IR) Theory: A Critical Introduction
AY 2009-2010 (First Semester), Monday: 1.30– 4.30Pm
Instructor: Prof. Tang Shiping
Office: Social Sciences Building (wen-ke-lou), Rm. 814
Office Telephone: 55664582; Email: [email protected]
Office Hours: Friday 3-5PM. No appointment needed during office hours.
General Introduction
This course emphasizes a critical approach toward different grand/major theories
of international relations (IR)/ international politics. The course is designed with two
convictions. First, all major theories (sometimes called schools, paradigms, or “isms”)
of IR are defective, one way or the other, in light of the fundamental paradigms of
social sciences. Thus, we must keep a critical but open mind toward these big theories.
Second, despite these defects, however, major theories are indispensable for
understanding international politics: all of us use some (crude) form of these major
theories as analytical tools when trying to make sense of international politics. Thus, a
critical understanding of these major theories (or macro-tools) helps us taking a more
critical view toward our own understanding of international politics.
For each session, a lecture, providing a brief historical account of the subject and,
lasting no more than 20 minutes, will be delivered. It will then be followed by
presentations from 3-4 students on the questions posed for each session. Each student
has about 15-20 minutes to make her/his cases on one question. Presentations will
then be followed by open discussion on the questions posed and students’
presentations. Additional questions of interest for the students can be added to the
discussion when time allows.
The instructor hopes that such a course design will enable students to think
independently from and challenge existing theoretical interpretations of IR.
Guide to Good Performance
1. Read the required readings carefully and take notes. You should finish at least
80% of the required readings (about 150-160 pages).
2. Read some of the recommended readings if you can, and especially if you are
assigned to do presentations for the session. Carefully consider which argument or
interpretation is most plausible, and why.
3. Write down what you have in mind on the questions posed, regardless whether
you are going to present or not.
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4. Be out-spoken and try to challenge others’ points. Silence is not gold here.
5. Re-think and re-formulate your thoughts on the questions after each session, in
light of the discussions during the class, and put your more developed thoughts on
paper (Laziness will never pay). The questions in the final examination will
consist of questions that are derived from (but are different from) these questions
posed for each sessions.
6. Do not be late for class, or in turning in your assignments.
Performance Assessment
Students in this course are presumed to have some, but not much, background
knowledge about the topics to be discussed. Students who do not have much
background knowledge are encouraged to read some general texts (Daughtery 2005).
Students are expected to complete the required readings and encouraged to do the
recommended readings prior to class and be prepared to participate in discussions.
For each session, three students are picked to present their thoughts on the
questions posed for each session. They must outline their arguments and explain why
they have come to the arguments. Students are required to pick their topics for
presentations in session 1.
Any student who misses more than 3 sessions of the class will be advised to drop
the class. The same rule applies to all students, even though attendance and
discussion will not be part of the grade for Ph. D. students.
M. Sc. Students’ performance will be assessed based on the following criteria:
1. Attendance and discussion 10%
2. Two presentations in the Class 20%
3. Two essays (1200-1500 words) on a question posed in the course, and one of the
essays can be based on one of the presentations. (Of course, this means that the other
essay must be different from the other presentations) 20%
4. Final: The final will a take-home final, students will answer three questions
in short essays, each about 1200-1500 words) 50%
Ph. D. Students’ performance will be assessed based on the following criteria:
1. Attendance and discussion 10%
2. Two presentations in the Class 20%
3. Two essays (1500-2000 words) on a question posed in the course, and one of the
essays can be based on one of the presentations. (Of course, this means that the other
essay must be different from the other presentations) 20%
4. A research article (5,000-6,000 words) that addresses a significant theoretical
issue. The article must be theoretically sophisticated enough to pass. Please consult
with me before you pick your topic. 50%
Books Recommended for General Reading
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The following two books are recommended not specifically for this course, but
for your general interest. These two books will provide invaluable intellectual support
for your understanding of the world around us, whether you stay in academia or work
in other professions.
1. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1997). This book is the crowning achievement of
Jervis’s intellectual odyssey, so far. A must read for any social scientist.
2. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York, Norton, 1997). A
macro-history of human society, from 11000 B.C. on, told in an amazingly
accessible way.
General Texts for the Course
1. James E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending theories of
international relations: a comprehensive survey. 5th
ed., 2004. This is a
standard introduction to various strains of IR theories (both macro- and
medium-).
2. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, 1978). This book is a true classic, essentially for understanding
international politics.
3. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern
Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science (New York: Picardo, 1998). This fun book
destroys much of the more radical side of the vast “post-modernist”,
“post-structuralist”, and “extreme social constructivist” literature, it will save
you enormous amount of time from reading (and more dangerously, being
captured by) a huge load of fashionable non-sense, especially from the more
cultural French philosophers (e.g., Lyotard, Derrida; Baudrillard).
Recommending this book, however, does not mean that I reject all
post-modernism, post-structuralism, and (social) constructivism literature.
Professional Journals
Please consulate the following journals. They mostly focus on theoretical issues,
although often with empirical evidences (and relevance).
International Organization, International Security, Security Studies, World
Politics, American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science,
European Journal of International Relations, International Studies Quarterly,
International Studies Review, Foreign Policy Analysis, Review of International
Studies, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Journal of Peace Studies,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Cooperation and Conflict, International Relations,
International Interactions.
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Outline
1: Introduction
Basic Labels and Notions: international/world politics, international relations.
Levels of analysis: man, state, and system
Theories of international politics
Theories of foreign policy: explaining state behavior.
Nationalism as given, state as the main actor (although other actors matter)
Ethnocentrism as barrier toward knowledge
Required
A brief guide to philosophy of social sciences (Tang 2005-2009)
Why a critical approach toward theory in general
1. Alberto O. Hirschman. 1970. “The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to
Understanding,” World Politics 22 (3): 329-343.
Recommended
Why a critical and a comparative approach toward theory in general
1. Giovanni Sartori, 1970. “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,”
American Political Science Review 64 (4): 1033-1053.
2. Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and Comparative Method.
American Political Sciences Review 65 (3): 682-693.
Some Sociology of Anglo-Saxon-dominating IR Theory
1. Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science: International Relations,”
Daedalus 1 (1977): 41-60.
2. Ole Waever, “The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American
and European Developments in International Relations,” International
Organization, 52 (4): 687-727.
3. “Why there is no non-Western IR Theory?” International Relations of the
Asia-Pacific, 7 (3), special issue, 2008.
2: Realism and Idealism through time, and the structural Revolution
Required
Realism vs. Idealism: Ancient, Classic, and Modern
1. Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1960 [1932]. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in
Ethics and Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons), “Introduction,” pp.
xi-xxv.
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2. Hans J. Morgenthau, 1946. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago), chap.
2, “The Age of Science and the Social World,” pp. 11-40.
3. Wolfers, Arnold. “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference,” World
Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1. (Oct., 1951), pp. 39-63.
The Structural Revolution in IR Theory
1. Kenneth A. Waltz, 1959. Man, State, and War (Columbia), chap. 6, “The
Third Image: International Conflict and International Anarchy,” (pp. 159-186),
and “Conclusion”, pp. 224-238.
2. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and Interdependence.
(Boston: Little and Brown), chap. 1 and 2, pp. 3-37.
3. Alexander Wendt, 1992. “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social
Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (2): 391-425.
4. Powell, Robert, 1994. “Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The
Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate.” International Organization 48: 313-344.
Recommended
Classical Texts in Realism (note: they might have been correct, but this does not mean
they are or will be correct)
1. Thucydides, “The Melian Dialogue”, in The Peloponnesian War, pp. 401-408.
2. Introduction to Kautilya on War and Diplomacy, Boesche, Roger. 2003.
Kautilya’s Arthasatra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India. Journal of
Military History 67: 9-38.
3. Joseph J. Spengler. 1969. “Kautilya, Plato, Lord Shang: Comparative Political
Economy,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 113 (6):
450-7. A brief comparative introduction to three ancient thinkers.
Other Expositions on Idealism and Realism
1. Roger T. Ames, The art of rulership: a study of ancient Chinese political
thought (Buffalo, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1986), chap. 1, “Philosophy of
History,” An introduction to the same debate in ancient China.
2. Carr, E. H. 1940. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 (London: McMillan),
chap. 4 & 5, “The Harmony of Interests,” and “The Realist Critique.”
3. Raymond Aron. 1966. War and Peace. New York: Doubleday, chapters XIX
and XX, “In Searcy of a Morality, I & II”
The Structural Revolution
1. Kenneth A. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, M.A.:
Addison-Wesley, 1979), chaps. 6 and 7.
2. Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics,”
in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (Columbia), pp. 1-25.
3. Keohane, Robert O. “Theory of World Politics,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed.,
Neorealism and Its Critics (Columbia), pp. 159-203.
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The Coming Collapse of Realism ?
1. Gilpin, Robert. 1996. “No One loves a Political Realist,” Security Studies 5 (3):
3-26.
2. Stephen M. Walt, “The Progressive Power of Realism,” American Political
Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (Dec., 1997), pp. 931-935.
3. Robert Jervis, “Realism in the Study of World Politics,” International
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 971-991.
4. Mearsheimer, John J. 2002. “Realism, the Real World, and the Academy.” In
Realism and Institutionalism in International Studies, edited by Michael
Brecher and Frank P. Harvey. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Human Nature and Realism: the “French Connection”?
1. Annette Freyberg-Inan, 2004. What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of
International Relations and its Judgment of Human Nature. New York: SUNY
Press.
2. Ish-Shalom, Piki, “The Triptych of Realism, Elitism, and Conservatism,”
International Studies Review 8 (2006): 441-468.
Questions
1. What are the key differences on human nature between realism and
idealism/utopianism? Does the structural revolution eliminate human nature
from realism? Why and why not?
2. Why has idealism (in various forms) persisted, if according to its realist
opponents, that idealism is profoundly misleading?
3. What is the essence of structural revolution? How much has it contributed or
hindered the growth of IR as a science (or a discipline)?
4. Does and can realism reject “normative” or “moral” principle per se, in
practice or in theorizing? Why? Why not?
A Question on the Sociology of Knowledge
1. Why did realism come to dominate in renaissance or modern world?
2. What is the value of realism and idealism, in academia and in the real world,
today?
3. Offensive Realism vs. Defensive Realism
Required
Offensive Realism
1. Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York:
Norton, chap. 2. (pp. 29-54).
Defensive Realism: The Foundation
1. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” Political
Science Quarterly, 67/4 (Dec., 1952), pp. 481-502.
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2. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World Politics, vol.
30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214.
The Security Dilemma: A More Rigorous (Re-)Statement
1. Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security
Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 587-623.
Defensive Realism: Development and Elaboration
1. Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter 1994-1995), pp. 50-90.
Offensive Realism vs. Non-offensive realism: a more rigorous differentiation
1. Shiping Tang, “Offensive Realism and Defensive Realism Revisited,”
unpublished manuscript (2007).
Recommended
Other Statements on Offensive Realism
1. Labs, Eric J. 1997. Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of
War Aims. Security Studies 6 (4): 1-49.
2. Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of
America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press), chap. 2, “A
Theory of Foreign Policy.”
Earlier and Less Rigorous Statements on Offensive Realism vs. Defensive Realism
1. Brooks, Stephen G. 1997. “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization 51
(3): 445-477.
2. Taliaferro, Jeffery W. 2000-01. “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive
Realism Revisited,” International Security 25:128-161.
3. Taliaferro, Jeffery W. 2001. “Realism, Power Shifts, and Major War,”
Security Studies 10 (4): 145-178.
Getting Realism Wrong? A Debate
1. Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Morvascik. 1999. “Is Anybody still a Realist?”
International Security 24/2 (Fall): 5-55.
2. Feaver; Peter D. et al. (with Gunther Hellman; Randall L. Schweller; Jeffery
W. Taliaferro; William C. Wohlforth; Jeffery W. Lergo; Andrew Moravcsik),
2000. “Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a
Realist?)” International Security 25/1: 165-193.
Earlier and Less Rigorous Statements on the Security Dilemma
1. Herbert Butterfield. 1950. The Tragic Element in Modern International
Conflict. Review of Politics 12 (2): 147-164.
2. Herz, John H. 1950. Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma.
World Politics 2(2): 157-180.
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3. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, 1978), chap. 3,
4. Booth, Ken, and Nicholas Wheeler. 2008. The Security Dilemma: Fear,
Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Questions
1. What is the central difference between the two realisms? Has the debate been
resolved? Why and why not?
2. Is the debate between offensive realism and defensive realism meaningful?
Why or why not?
3. Why is the security dilemma a foundational concept in the making of
defensive realism?
A more profound question (to be resolved in session 12)
1. Which versions of realism do you think have more validity for two historical
periods: pre-1648, post-1648 to pre-1945, and post-1945? Why?
Questions from Recommended Readings
1. Did Lego and Morvascik get realism wrong? Why or why not?
4. Cooperation in International Politics: The Divergent Point
between Offensive Realism vs. Non-offensive Realism Theories
Required
The possibility of cooperation: offensive realism vs. non-offensive realism
1. John Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 2, pp. 51-3.
2. Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding
the Debate. International Security 24 (1): 42-63.
3. Shiping Tang. 2008a. “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,”
International Studies Review (Sept., 2008)
Reassurance as Cooperation-building
1. Kydd, Andrew. 2000. Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. International
Organization 54 (2): 325-357. (Skip the modeling part for now)
2. Shiping Tang, “Reassurance: Toward a Coherent Understanding,” from
Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, forthcoming), chap. 5.
Institutions as Facilitators of Cooperation
1. Robert Axelrod; Robert O. Keohane, 1985. “Achieving Cooperation under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, 38 (1): 226-254.
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Recommended
The Study of Cooperation with PD Game
1. Jervis, Robert. 1988. “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation.” World
Politics 40 (4): 317-349.
2. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books,
1984)
Earlier Critique of PD Game as a Model of Cooperation in IR
1. Joanne Gowa, 1986. Review: Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The
Evolution of Cooperation and International Relations. International
Organization 40 (1): 167-186.
Structural Approach toward Cooperation and its (further) Discontent
1. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the security dilemma,” World Politics, vol.
30, no. 2 (January, 1978), pp. 167-214.
2. Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter 1994-1995), pp. 50-90.
3. Evan Braden Montgomery. 2006. “Breaking out of the Security Dilemma:
Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty.” International
Security 31(2):151-185.
4. Milner, Helen. 1992. International Theories of Cooperation among Nations:
Strengths and Weaknesses. World Politics 44 (3): 466-496.
5. Tang, Shiping. 2007. Correspondence: Uncertainty and Reassurance in
International Politics. International Security 27 (3): 193-197.
Reassurance: Further Readings
1. Osgood, Charles A. 1962. An Alternative to War or Surrender. Urbana:
University of Illinois Press.
2. Kydd, Andrew (1997) Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do
Not Fight Each Other. Security Studies 7:114-155.
3. Kydd, Andrew. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations
(Princeton), chap. 7
Questions
1. Why is the possibility of achieving cooperation other than temporary alliance
when facing common opponents a fundamental divergent point between
offensive realism and all the non-offensive realism theories?
2. What is the core logic of cooperation-building via reassurance? In light of
Mearsheimer’s denial that cooperation-building via reassurance is possible
(Mearsheimer 2006, “Interview”), how can you counter by arguing that
cooperation-building via reassurance can really work?
3. What is wrong with structural theories of international cooperation?
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Question from recommended reading (for the more capable)
1. In light of the more rigorous logic of cooperation-building via reassurance
developed by Kydd (2000, 2005) and Tang (2008), what is wrong with
Axelrod’s experiment as a platform for studying cooperation in international
politics, in addition to what Tang has pointed out?
5. Liberalism Theories of IR
Required
Kant’s Stone
1. Kant, Immanuel. 2003 [1795]. To Perceptual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.
Trans. Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis, I.N.: Hackett.
2. Doyle, Michael W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy
and Public Affairs 12/3 (Summer 1983), 205-235, 12/4 (Autumn 1983),
323-353.
3. Andrew Morvasick. 1997. “Taking Preference Seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Relations.” International Organization 51 (4): 513-553.
The Devastating Critique
1. Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.
American Political Science Review 97 (4): 585-602.
2. Jahn, Beate. “Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs,”
International Organization, 59 (Winter 2005), pp. 277-207.
Democratic Peace: Evidence and Explanation
1. David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American
Political Science Review vol. 86, 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 24-37.
2. Steve Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise.”
Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997), pp. 59-91.
3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and
Alastair Smith, 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,”
American Political Science Review 93 (4): 791-807.
Recommended
Reading Liberal Peace
1. Thomas Walker. 2008. Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the
Question of Intervention. International Studies Quarterly 52 (2): 449-468.
2. Kenneth A. Waltz, “Kant, Liberalism, and War.” American Political Science
Review, 56/2 (Jun. 1962), pp. 331-340.
Other Expositions of Liberalism
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1. Morvacsik, Andrew. 2003. “Liberal International Relations Theory: A
Scientific Assessment.” In Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman eds., Progress
in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge: MIT
Press), pp. 159-205.
Other Criticism of the Democratic Peace
1. Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 5-49.
2. Desch, Michael C. 2008. “Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of
Overreaction in US Foreign Policy,” International Security 32 (3): 7-43.
More on Democratic Peace
1. John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific
Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations,
1885-1992,” World Politics 52 (1), October 1999, pp. 1-37.
2. Lars-Erik Cederman, “Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a
Macrohistorical Learning Process,” American Political Science Review, vol.
95, 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 15-31.
3. John Macmillan, 2003. “Beyond the Separate Democratic Peace,” Journal of
Peace Research 40 (2): 233-243.
4. Bruce M. Russett, 1994. Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1994).
5. Bruce M. Russett and John Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations (W. W. Norton).
6. Kelly M. Kadera, Mark J. C. Crescenzi, and Megan L. Shannon, “Democratic
Survival, Peace, and War in the International System,” American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 47, No.2 (Apr., 2003), pp.234-247.
7. John Owen. 2004. Democratic Peace Research: Whence and Whither?
International Politics 41: 605-617.
Debating Rawls’s “Law of Peoples”
1. John Rawls, 1993. “The Law of Peoples.” Critical Inquiry, 20/1 (Fall 1993),
36-68.
2. Charles. R. Beitz, 2000. “Rawls’ Law of the People.” Ethics 110 (4): 669-696.
3. Allen Buchanan, 2000. “Rawls’ Law of the People: Rules for a Vanished
Westphalian World,” Ethics 110 (4): 697-721.
Questions
1. Is it fair for us (whether realists or not) to label liberalism as part of “idealism”,
if idealism is to mean “utopianism”?
2. Why does liberal internationalism (or international liberalism) have an
imperialistic dimension, in theory and in practice?
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3. What does “democratic peace” mean for a liberal theory of international
politics? (i.e., Can a liberal theory of international politics remain viable, if
“democratic peace” is not real? Why or why not?)
4. What does a liberal theory of international politics imply, other than
democratic peace? What does this mean for the theory in IR?
6: International Institutions and Order: “Neoliberalism” and the English
School
Required
What is institution?
1. John. S. Duffield. What are international Institutions? International Studies
Review, 9 (2007): 1-22.
Neoliberalism and its Critics
1. Keohane, Robert O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
World Political Economy (Princeton University Press), chaps. 1, 4-6.
2. John G. Ikenberry. 1998. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence
of Great Power Order. International Security (Winter 1998/99). 23/3, 43-78.
3. Schweller, Randall L. 2001. “The Problem of International Order Revisited: A
Review Essay,” International Security, 26 (1): 161-186.
The English School and its Critics
1. Bull, Hedley. 1995 [1977]. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics, 2nd
ed (New York: Columbia University Press), chap. 1-3, pp. 3-73.
2. Barry Buzan. 1993. “From International System to International Society:
Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School.”
International Organization, 47 (3): 327-352.
3. Dale Copeland. 2003. “A Realist Critique of the English School,” Review of
International Studies 29: 427-441.
4. Yuen Foong Khong, “The Elusiveness of Regional Order: Leifer, the English
School and Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review, 18/1 (March 2005), pp.
23-41.
A Synthesis?
1. Christian Reus-Smit. 1997. The Constitutional Structure of International
Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions. International
Organization 51 (4): 555-589.
Recommended
Debating Institutions
1. Mearsheimer, John J. (1994-95). The False Promise of International
Institutions. International Security 19:5-49.
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2. Schweller, Randall L. and David Priess, ‘A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding
the Institutions Debate,” Mershon International Studies Review, 41 (1997), pp.
1-32.
3. Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding
the Debate. International Security 24 (1): 42-63.
4. Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 2003. Institutional Theory as a
Research Program, in, Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman eds., Progress in
International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge: MIT Press),
pp. 71-107.
5. Krasner, Stephen D. 1982a. “Structural Causes and Regimes Consequences:
Regime as Intervening Variables.” International Organization 36 (2): 185-205
6. Krasner, Stephen D. 1982b. “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as
Autonomous Variables.” International Organization 36 (2): 497–510.
Debating English School
1. Richard D. Little. 2000. “The English School’s Contribution to the Study of
International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations, 6 (3):
395-423.
2. Richard D. Little. 2003. The English School vs. American Realism: a meeting
of minds or divided by a common language? Review of International Studies
29 (3): 443-460.
A History of the English School
1. Dunne, Timothy, 1998. Inventing international society: a history of the
English school. New York: St. Martin. (RSIS library JZ1249 DUN)
A (Re-)construction of the English School?
1. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From International to World Society? English School
Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Questions
1. What are the fundamental differences between neoliberialism and realism?
Have the differences been resolved?
2. What do you think of some of the realists’ attack against neoliberalism?
Contrast Mearsheimer/Schweller-Priess vs. Jervis. After realism’s attack, what
is wrong with neoliberialism? What is good?
3. How do norms, institutions (rules) come into exist? What have been
neoliberalism and the English school’s answer to this fundamental question?
Have they really answered this more fundamental question?
4. Is the English school really that distinct, from neoliberalism and
constructivism (discussed below)? (Hint: what is order, whose order, and
tackle the question along the pluralist vs. solidarist divide)
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A more fundamental question
1. Institutions (as rules) are simply ossified ideas. If this is the case, whose
institutions, whose ideas?
7. Culturalism and Civilizationalism
Required
Culturalism: From Political Culture to Strategic Culture
1. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. “Introduction,” Cultural Realism: Strategic
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
2. Colin S. Gray. 1999. Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation
Theory Strikes Back. Review of International Studies, 25:49-69.
Civilizationalism
1. Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72 (3):
22-49.
Counter-Culturalism and counter-civilizationism.
1. Jack Snyder, Anarchy and Culture: Insights from the Anthropology of War.
International Organization 56 (2002): 7-45.
2. Desch, Michael C. 1998. “Cultural Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas
in Security Studies.” International Security 23 (1): 141-170.
3. Etzioni, Amitai. The Real Threat: Essay on Samuel Huntington.
Contemporary Sociology 2005. 34 (5): 477-485.
4. Douglas Porch. 2000. Military "Culture" and the Fall of France in 1940: A
Review Essay. International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 157-180.
Recommended
General: Political Culture and Strategic Culture
1. Alastair Iain Johnston. 1995. “Thinking about Strategic Culture.”
International Security, 19 (4): 32-64.
2. Alastair Iain Johnston. 1999. “Strategic Cultures revisited: reply to Colin
Gray.” Review of International studies 25: 519-523.
3. Kier, Elizabeth. 1995. “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the
Wars.” International Security 19 (4): 65-93.
4. Jeffrey Legro, Culture and Preferences in the International Cooperation
Two-Step. American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp.
118-137.
5. Berger, Thomas. “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and
Japan,” in Peter Katzenstein eds., Cultural Norms and National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia). 1996.
15
6. Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity
and Security Dilemma. European Journal of International Relations 12 (3):
341-370.
7. Walter Russell Mead. God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the
Modern World. New York: Knopf. 2008.
Against Huntington
1. David Welch, 1997. The Clash of Civilizations Thesis as an argument and as a
Phenomenon. Security Studies, 6(4): 197-216.
2. Tal Alkopher. The Social (and Religious) Meanings that Constitute War: The
Crusades as Realpolitk and Socialpolitk. International Studies Review 49
(2005): 715-739
Questions
1. How much does culture and civilization explain when it comes to state
behavior? Can culture be the Ultimate Explanation? Why and why not?
2. The most devastating admission by Culturalists might have been Iain
Johnston’s admission that China’s strategic culture actually differed little from
realpolitik (supposedly a Western culture): if two very different cultures
produce the same kind of strategic culture, what is left for culture? Can you
explain why ancient China (esp. Ming dynasty) and European realpolitik were
so strikingly similar, without falling back on a cultural explanation?
3. What are the relationships between culture, preferences (over goals and
means), norm, and identity? Here, you inevitable come to a problem of (finite)
regress (i.e., logic being pushed back one step further and further). Interest (as
given by realists)--preferences (goals, motivations; not intentions)—identities
—culture. What is wrong with this scheme? What is right with this scheme?
A More profound questions
1. What is relationship between culturalist explanation and ethnocentrism?
Session 8: Constructivism
Required
Constructivism
1. Emanuel Adler. 1991, “Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the
study of International Relations and Their Progress,” reprinte in Emanuel
Adler 2005. Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic
Foundations of International Relations. London: Routledge, pp. 65-88.
2. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social
Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2.
(Spring 1992), 391-425.
16
3. Emanuel Adler. 1997. Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world
politics. European Journal of International Relations 3 (3): 319-363.
Critiques of Constructivism: Weak
1. Copeland, Dale. 2000. “The Constructivism Challenge against Structural
Realism: A Review Essay,” International Security 25 (2): 187-212.
2. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2000) Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather?
Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared. International
Studies Quarterly 44: 97-119.
Critiques of Constructivism: Fundamental and Strong
1. Palan, Ronen, 2000. “A World of Their Making: An Evaluation of the
Constructivist Critique in International Relations.” Review of International
Studies, 26 (4): 575-598
Recommended
More Constructing: Theoretical and Empirical
1. Alexander Wendt, 1999. Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge).
2. Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International
Relations,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2,
147-182 (2000).
3. Alastair Iain Johnston. 2001. “Treating International Institutions as Social
Environments,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487-515.
4. Alastair Iain Johnston. 2008. Social State (Princeton).
5. David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threat and Threatening Identities: The Social
Construction of Realism and Liberalism (Stanford, 2006).
State as a person and its identity
1. Hogg et al, 1995. “A Tale of Two Theories: Identity Theory with Social
Identity Theory.” Social Psychological Quarterly 58 (4): 255-69.
2. Alexander Wendt, “The state as person in international theory,” Review of
International Studies 30 (2004) : 289-316
3. Alexander Wendt, 2006. “Social Theory as Cartesian Science: an auto-critque
from a quantum perspective,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander eds.,
Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and his Critics.
London: Routledge, pp. 181-219.
Questions
1. Wendt claimed that he wanted a “rump materialism” (thus a middle ground
between materialism and ideationalism), whereas Adler believed that
constructivism stakes a “middle ground” between a “rationalist” stand and
“interpretive/reflexive” stand. In your opinion, which middle ground is more
critical for understanding international politics? Why so?
17
2. Does constructivism really occupy a middle ground along the two dimensions
noted above? (Hint, a genuine middle ground demands an organic synthesis
of the two dyadic approaches). Why? Why not?
3. There is no doubt that constructivism is an improvement over culturalism
(and much more so over civilizationism). In your opinion, what are the key
aspects that constructivism has improved upon culturalism and
civilizationism?
4. At the same time, constructivism suffers some of the same fundamental
deficiencies as culturalism and civilizationism. In your opinoin, what are
these key deficiencies?
9. Copenhagen School, Critical Theory, and Postmodernism
Required
The Copenhagen School
1. Ole Weaver, 1995. “Securitization and De-Securitization,” in, Ronnie D.
Lipschutz ed., On Security (Columbia), pp. 46-86.
2. Michael C. Williams. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and
International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 511-531
Critical Theory
1. Benhabib, Seyla. 1985. The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics.
New German Critique 35: 83-96.
2. Robert Cox. 1981. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies
10 (2): 126-155. (Reprinted in Robert O. Keohane ed., Neorealism and Its
Critics, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 204-254.)
3. Keith Krause, 1998. “Critical Theory and Security Studies,” Cooperation and
Conflict 33 (3): 298-333.
Post-Modernism vs. Critical Theory
1. Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” in Foucault, 1980. Power/knowledge:
selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New
York: Pantheon), pp. 109-133.
2. Ehrhard Bahr, 1988. “In Defense of Enlightenment: Foucault and Habermas,”
German Studies Review 11 (1): 97-109
Recommended
All kinds of Security and Securitization
1. Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States, and Fear, Chap. 10, “Concluding
Thoughts on International Security Studies,” 363-382.
18
2. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, 1998. Security: a new
framework for analysis (Boulder, Colo. : Lynne Rienner).
3. Mitzen, Jennifer. 2006. Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity
and Security Dilemma. European Journal of International Relations 12 (3):
341-370.
4. Holger Stritzel. 2007. Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and
Beyond, European Journal of International Relations, 13(3): 357-383.
Societal Security: Social Psychology to the Rescue?
1. Tobias Theiler, “Societal Security and Social Psychology,” Review of
International Studies 29 (2003): 249-268.
Critical Security Studies
1. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds.) 1997. Critical security studies:
concepts and cases. Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press
2. Ken Booth (ed.). 2005. Critical security studies and world politics (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Foucault, Postmodernism, and Political Science
1. Paul Brass. 2000. “Foucault steals Political Science,” Annual Review of
Political Science 3: 305-30.
Questions
1. What is right and wrong with the Copenhagen School? Did it get to the bottom
of the question? (hint, why and what do states/elite securitize?)
2. Why there is no post-modernism (especially Foucault-ism) in political science
in general, and IR in particular? Can Foucault-ism offer a solution to the
question left behind by the Copenhagen school? Why and why not?
3. The essence of critical theory is to criticize the prevailing social system/norms.
Has critical security studies been really that of critical, in the sense it seeks to
criticize the prevailing international institutions/system?
4. Nobody disputes that “critical theory” has an emancipatory goal from its
Hegelian-Marxist origin, thus a utopian goal. If this is the case, what have
been the progresses made by critical security studies over the utopian thinking
so fiercely attacked by Carr, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau?
A More Fundamental Question
1. Why utopian thinking has been so persistent-it always comes back in a new
name (old wine in a new bottle)?
10. Social Psychology of International Politics-I
Required Readings
19
Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Relations
1. Levine, Robert A. and Donald T. Campbell. 1972. Ethnocentrism: Theories of
Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behaviors. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, pp. 7-21 (NTU library).
2. Brewer, Marilynn. 1986. “The Role of Ethnocentrism in Intergroup Conflict,”
in, Worchel, Stephen, and William G. Austin (eds). 1986. Psychology of
Intergroup Relations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, pp. 88-102 (HSS library).
3. Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1979. The “Ultimate Attribution Error”: Extending
Allport’s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 5: 461-476.
4. Tajfel, Henri. 1982. “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations.” Annual
Review of Psychology 33: 1-39.
5. Hewstone, Miles, et al. 2002. Intergroup Bias. Annual Review of Psychology
53: 575-604.
Motivated Biases
1. Janice G. Stein, 1988. Bringing Politics into Psychology: The Misperception
of Threat. Political Psychology 9 (2): 245-271.
2. Ziva Kunda, 1990. The Case for Motivated Reasoning. Psychological Bulletin
108 (3): 480-498.
Learning: Overview
1. Jack S. Levy. Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Spring, 1994), pp. 279-312.
Perception and Misperception in Learning from History
1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, 1978), chap. 6, “How Decision-Makers Learn from History,” pp.
217-287.
Prospect Theory: Loss Aversion and endowment effect
1. Jervis, Robert. 1992. The Political Implications of Loss Aversion. Political
Psychology 13 (1): 187-204
2. Jack S. Levy. 1997. Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International
Relations. International Studies Quarterly, 41 (1): 87-112.
Recommended
Ethnocentrism, Prejudice, and Group Psychology
1. Allport, Gordon W. 1958. The Nature of Prejudice (abridged version). New
York: Double Day and Anchor.
General Overview
20
1. Jonathan Mercer. 2005. Rationality and Psychology in International Politics.
International Organization 59: 77-106.
2. James M. Goldgeier and Philip E. Tetlock, “Psychology and International
Relations Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 67-92.
3. James M. Goldgeier. 1997. “Psychology and Security,” Security Studies 6 (4):
137-66.
Prospect Theory
1. Robert Jervis, The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and
Values. Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 2. (Apr., 2004), pp. 163-176.
2. Jack S. Levy. Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of
Prospect Theory for International Conflict. International Political Science
Review Vol. 17, No. 2, Crisis, Conflict and War. (Apr., 1996), pp. 179-195.
A Misguided Application of Prospect Theory
1. Taliaferro, Jeffery W. 2004. Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the
Periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Learning from History
1. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, part
III, “Common Misperceptions.”
2. Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies of War (Princeton, 1992), chap. 2.
3. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Use of
History for Decision-makers (New York: Free Press, 1986).
4. Alexander George. 1997. Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for
Political Science and History. International Security 22 (1): 44-52.
Questions
1. What are ethnocentrism’s implications for international conflict and
cooperation?
2. How do leaders learn from history? How do you learn? Who will learn better,
you or leaders? Why?
3. Which is more difficult, learning from one’s own experiences versus learning
from others’ experiences? Why?
4. Can you identify some common “motivated biases” from leaders’ rhetoric and
behavior?
11. Social Psychology of International Politics-II
Required
Reputation for Resolve in Conflict
1. Tang, Shiping (2005) Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International
Conflict. Security Studies 14:34-62.
21
2. Huth, Paul. 1997. Reputation and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical
Assessment. Security Studies 7 (1): 72-99.
Fear and Trust
1. Shiping Tang, 2008. “Social Evolutionary Psychology of Fear (and Trust): or
why is international cooperation difficult?” Unpublished manuscript.
Emotions in International Politics
1. Neta C. Crawford, 2000. “The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on
Emotion and Emotional Relationship,” International Security 24 (4):116-156.
2. Jonathan Mercer. 2010. Emotional Beliefs. International Organization
(forthcoming).
Uncertainty in IR
1. Shiping Tang. 2009. “Dimensions of Uncertainty: A Social Evolutionary
Psychology Perspective.” Paper presented in 2009 American Political Science
Association annual meeting in Toronto.
Counterfactual Thinking in Learning
1. Roese, N. J. (1997). Counterfactual Thinking. Psychological Bulletin, 121,
133-148.
2. Richard Ned Lebow. 2000. Review article: What’s so different about a
counterfactual? World Politics 52 (3): 550-85.
Recommended
Reputation for Resolve
1. Daryl G. Press, 2004-05, “The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during
the “Appeasement” Crises of the 1930s,” International Security 29 (3):
136-169
2. Jonathan Mercer, 1997. Reputation in International Relations. Cornell
University Press.
3. Press, Daryl. 2005. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military
Threat during Crisis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press
Uncertainty in IR
1. Rathbun, Brian C. 2007. Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the
Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory.
International Studies Quarterly 51: 533-557.
Fear, Prestige, Interest, and Trust in International Politics
1. Markey, Daniel. 1999. “Prestige and the Origins of War,” Security Studies 8
(4): 126-173.
2. Lebow, Richard Ned. 2006. Fear, Interest and Honor: Outlines of a theory of
International Relations. International Affairs 82 (3): 431-448.
22
3. Brian Rathbun. 2010. It takes all types: social psychology, trust, and the IR
paradigms in our minds. International Theory (forthcoming).
Human Nature and IR Theories
1. Jonathan Mercer, 2006. Human Nature and the First Image: emotion in
international politics. Journal of International Relations and Development 9:
288-303.
2. Neta C. Crawford. 2009. “Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking
Man.” International Politics 23 (2): 271-288.
3. Chris Brown. 2009. “Structural Realism, Classical Realism and Human
Nature.” International Politics 23 (2): 257-270.
Counterfactuals in IR
1. Richard Ned Lebow. 2001. Contingency, Catalyst, and International System
Change. Political Science Quarterly 115 (4): 591-616.
2. Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2008). The Functional Theory of Counterfactual
Thinking. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12, 168-192.
Questions
1. Given the central of fear for one’s survival at the group level in international
politics, what things can states do to alleviate their fear about each other?
2. Why is concern for reputation (for resolve) an important driver of escalation?
What kind of roles reputation will likely play in international cooperation?
3. The psychology of counterfactuals holds some very interesting (and perhaps
depressing) implications for our learning from history. What are they?
12. Social Evolution of International Politics: Emerging Paradigm
Required
Overview
1. Sterling-Folker, Jennifer. 2000. “Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and
Liberal Theory,” in William R. Thompson ed., Evolutionary Interpretations of
World Politics. London: Routledge, 62-109.
Biological Evolution versus Social Evolution
1. Tang, Shiping. 2009a, On Social Evolution as a Phenomenon (unpublished
book manuscript)
2. Tang, Shiping. 2009b, The Social Evolution Paradigm (unpublished book
manuscript).
Applications of Social Evolutionary Theory in IR: Structural Level
1. Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. Institutional Selection in International Relations: State
Anarchy as Order. International Organization 48 (4): 527-557.
23
2. Tang, Shiping. 2009. “Social Evolution of International Politics: Mearsheimer
to Jervis,” European Journal of International Relations (forthcoming)
Applications of Social Evolutionary Theory in IR: State-level
1. Jeffrey W. Legro, 2000. “The Transformation of Policy Ideas,” American
Journal of Political Science, 44 (3): 419-432.
2. Shiping Tang. “From Offensive to Defensive Realism: An Evolutionary
Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng eds.,
China Ascent (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 141-142. (A longer
version of the chapter was published as RSIS State of Security and
International Studies Series, No. 3, July 2007).
Recommended
Understanding Evolution
1. Janet Radcliffe Richards, 2000. Human Nature after Darwin: A philosophical
Introduction. London: Routledge (Library 2, Bd450, R516). This is a Succinct
and Fun-to-read Introduction to Evolution and its implications for
understanding human life and society
2. Dennett, Daniel. 1995. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning
of Life. London: Allen Lane (LWN Library, QH375.D399). This book deals
with specific controversies within evolution theory in more detail.
(Semi-)Evolutionary Interpretation of History at Macro-level
1. Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis
of Systems Changes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2. Ruggie, John G. 1983. Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis. World Politics 25 (2): 261-285.
3. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social
Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2.
(Spring 1992), 391-425.
4. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, 1999),
chap. 7, “Process and Structural Change”
Evolutionary Thinking at the State Level
1. Jack S. Levy. Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield.
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2. (Spring, 1994), pp. 279-312.
2. Legro, Jeffrey A. 2005. Re-thinking the World. Cornell University Press.
Various Evolutionary Thinking in International Politics: Reviews
1. Kahler, Miles. 1999. “Evolution, Choice, and International Change.” In
Strategic Choices and International Relations, eds. David A. Lake and Robert
Powell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 165-196.
24
Sociobiology in International Relations: A Debate
1. Bradley A. Thayer, 2000. “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism,
and International Politics,” International Security, 25 (2): 124-151.
2. Duncan S.A. Bell, Paul K. MacDonald, and Bradley A. Thayer. 2001.
“Correspondence: Start the Evolution without Us,” International Security 26
(1): 187-198.
3. Bradley A. Thayer, 2004. Darwin and International Relations: ON the
Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethic Conflict. Lexington: University Press
of Kentucky.
Questions
1. In light of the evolutionary approach toward human society, what does
“human nature” mean now? Can IR theory (or any social theory) really get
away from “human nature”, however defined?
2. Has the evolutionary interpretation resolved the debate between offensive
realism and defensive realism? Why or why not?
3. What is the general challenge posed by continuity and change in human
society (and nature)? Do you think a social evolutionary framework offer
some powerful explanations?
A More Fundamental Question
1. Can you justify my claim that SEP is the ultimate paradigm in social sciences?
Why cannot a non-evolutionary interpretation do better?
13. Theories of Foreign Policy
Required Readings
Overview of (Realism) Theories of Foreign Policy
1. Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,”
World Politics, 51/1 (October): 144-172.
2. “Introduction”, In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy. Edited
by Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2009.
3. Shiping Tang, 2009. “Taking Stock of Neoclassical Realism,” International
Studies Review, 11/4 (Dec. 2009), pp. 798-803.
Theories of Foreign Policy in Conflict: expansion vs. under-balancing
1. Schweller, Randall L. 2004. Unanswered Threat: A Neoclassical Realist
Theory of Underbalancing. International Security 29 (2): 159-201.
2. Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 1998. Realism and America’s Rise. International
Security 23/2 (Fall): 157-182.
Theories of Foreign Policy in International Cooperation
25
1. Robert D. Putnam. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games." International Organization. 42(Summer 1988):427-460.
2. Schultz, Kenneth. 2005. The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves
Deliver the Olive Branch? International Organization 59 (1): 1-38.
3. Fravel, M. Taylor. 2005. Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation:
Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes. International
Security 30 (2): 46-83.
Toward a General Theory of Foreign Policy Change
1. Shiping Tang. “From Offensive to Defensive Realism: An Evolutionary
Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” in Robert Ross and Zhu Feng eds.,
China Ascent (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 141-142. (A longer
version of the chapter was published as RSIS State of Security and
International Studies Series, No. 3, July 2007).
Recommended
General
1. Zakaria, Fareed. 1992. Realism and Domestic Politics. International Security
17 (1): 177-198.
2. Schweller, Randall L. 2003. “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,”
in Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman eds., Progress in International Relations
Theory (MIT Press), pp. 311-347.
Specific Theories
1. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand
Strategy (Cornell 1993).
2. Thomas J. Christensen, 1996. Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic
Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton).
3. Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of
America’s World Role (Princeton).
4. Lobell, Steven E. 2002-03. War is Politics: Offensive realism, domestic
politics, and security strategy. Security Studies 12 (2): 165-95.
Questions
1. What are the challenges, thus problems for generalizing, theories of foreign
policy? Is a general theory of foreign policy possible?
2. What are the differences, if any, between explaining a particular policy and
explaining a particular change in foreign policy?
14. Theory of Region and Regionalism?
Required
The Classic Tradition
26
1. Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Power: The Structure of
International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap.
3, “Security Complexes: A Theory of Regional Security,” pp. 40-82.
2. Barry Buzan “Security architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and
global levels.” The Pacific Review 16/2 (June, 2003):143-173.
3. Amitav Acharya, 2007. Review Article: The Emerging Regional Structure of
World Politics. World Politics 59 (July): 629-52.
4. Yuen Foong Khong, “The Elusiveness of Regional Order: Leifer, the English
School and Southeast Asia,” The Pacific Review, 18/1 (March 2005), pp.
23-41.
A New Direction?
1. Solingen, Etel, 2008. The Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional
Institutions: Lessons from East Asia and the Middle East. International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1 (June 2008), pp. 261-294.
2. Solingen, Etel, 2007. Pax Asiatica versus Bella Levantina: The Foundations
of War and Peace in East Asia and the Middle East. American Political
Science Review 101 (4): 757-780.
A Deeper Problem
1. Alexander B. Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as political-territorial
ideal: historical and contemporary considerations,” in Thomas J. Biersteker
and Cynthia Weber eds., State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge,
1996), pp. 81-120.
2. David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong, Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New
Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, 27/4 (Spring 2003), 57-85.
Recommended
General Text
1. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 2nd
ed. (New York: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1991), Chap. 5, “Regional Security,” pp. 186-229. (This is a more
dated exposition of Buzan’s Regional Security Complex concept.)
2. David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan (eds.). 1997. Regional orders: building
security in a new world. College Park, P. A.: Pennsylvania State University
Press
3. Amitav Acharya, 2001. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.
London: Routledge. (2nd
edition, 2009).
Debating Kang’s Thesis
1. Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?” International Security,
28/3 (Winter 2003/04), pp. 149-164
2. David Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian
International Relations,” International Security, 28/3 (Winter 2003/04), pp.
165-180.
27
Background Readings on Kang and European System
1. Andreas Osinder, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalia
Myth,” International Organization, 55/2 (Spring 2001), 251-287.
2. John King Fairbank, “A Preliminary Framework,” in John King Fairbank, ed.,
The Chinese World Order: traditional China's foreign relations (Oxford,
1968), pp. 1-19.
Questions
1. There is no doubt that region has become an important variable for
understanding state behavior and international outcomes, especially after the
end of the Cold War. Why is region important now, and why has it been
(relatively) neglected before the end of the Cold War?
2. There is no doubt that the literature on regionalism has been mostly in the
neoliberals and constructivism tradition. What is the strength and weakness
of such a stand?
3. Almost everyone within the regional/regionalism literature focuses on
regional order and regional institutions as a key variable for explaining
regional peace and war. In light of Khong (2005)’s critique of the English
School, what is the danger of relying on regional order and regional
institutions as a key explanatory variable for regional peace and war?
15. Game Theory (“Rational Choice”) Approach toward IR
Required Reading
War
1. James D. Fearon, 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International
Organization 49 (3): 379-414.
2. Robert Powell, 2006. “War as a Commitment Problem." International
Organization 60 (1): 169-203.
3. Erik Gartzke, 1999. “War is in the Error Term,” International Organization 53
(3): 567-587.
Peace/Cooperation
1. Kydd, Andrew. 2000. Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation. International
Organization 54 (2): 325-357.
2. Schultz, Kenneth. 2005. The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves
Deliver the Olive Branch? International Organization 59 (1): 1-38.
Against Rational Choice: Normative and Epistemological
1. Stephen M. Walt. “Rigor or Rigor Mortis: Rational Choice and Security
Studies.” International Security, 23/4 (Spring 1999), pp. 5-58.
28
2. MacDonald, Paul K. “Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing
Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory.” American Political
Science Review 97/4 (Nov. 2003): 551-565.
Recommended
1. Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual
Review of Political Science, 5 (2002): 1-30.
2. Harrison Wagoner, Who is Afraid of Rational Choice Theory? On line paper
3. International Security, 24/2 (Fall 1999), the debate on rational choice theory
of war.
Questions
1. What is wrong with the Fearon-inspired rational choice theory of war?
2. What is the value for a “rational choice” theory of war? What is the value of a
rational choice theory of cooperation?
3. Can rational choice theory provide a robust and inclusive theory of foreign
policy (i.e., state behavior)? Why or why not?
4. To use Alberto O. Hirschman’s understanding on social sciences (from the
first session), what additional criticisms can you advance against the “rational
choice” approach toward war and peace?
More Fundamental Questions
1. In scientific enterprise, should knowledge always take priority over logical
beauty? Why or why not?
16. Systemic Complexity: Some Challenges in Theorizing IR
Required
Human Society as an extremely complex system: ontology and epistemology
1. Shiping Tang, “Foundational Paradigms of Social Sciences,” Philosophy of the
Social Sciences (forthcoming 2010).
Human Society as an extremely complex system: methodology
1. Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1997), chap. 2, “System Effects,” pp. 29-87.
We Shape Society via Theorizing
1. David Patrick Houghton. 2009. The Role of Self-fulfilling and Self-negating
Prophecies in International Relations. International Studies Review, 11: 552-584.
Recommended
We Shape Society via Theorizing
29
1. Robert Jervis, 2008. Bridges, Barriers, and Gaps: Research and Policy. Political
Psychology 29: 571-592.
2. Michel Foucault. 1980. Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings,
1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon).
Questions
1. Use the foundational paradigms of social sciences to dissect one or two major IR
theories, and then elaborate on their relative strength and weakness.
2. What are some of the most important drawbacks if one does not grasp all the
foundational paradigms of social sciences? Illustrate your arguments with cases
from IR theory.