POLICE FUNCTIONS

IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Report from a workshop organized by

the United States Institute of Peace

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

Foreword v

Key Points vii

1 Peace Operations in Historical Context 1

2 Strategic Issues 4

3 Current Technical Issues and Reforms 7

4 Case Studies 9

5 Conclusion 14

Afterword 16

About the Author 17

About the Institute 18

CONTENTS

Guaranteeing the safety of persons and prop-erty and restoring the public’s trust in themaintenance of order and stability are the

keys to any effort to reestablish a working society afterviolent conflict. When the United States and its alliesinvest billions of dollars in a peace operation to repaira war-torn country—which frequently is an essentialpart of any conflict-settlement process—the ultimategoal is to set the country on the path toward long-termstability. Physical security is a basic precondition forsuch stability, and security—while initially enforced byan international presence—ultimately must be main-tained by the society’s own police and legal system,not by outsiders. Thus, crucial tasks for the militarydetachments conducting peace operations are to as-sist in the revival of indigenous mechanisms of lawand order and to provide appropriate means of sup-port while the police forces and judicial apparatus ofthe operation’s host country undergo the arduousprocess of reconstruction.

There is little disagreement over the assertion thatthe rule of law is crucial to the success of peace opera-tions, and that international civilian police (CIVPOL)play an important role in these efforts. One indicationof just how far we have come in accepting this interna-tional role is that the training of foreign police forcesin these types of operations is no longer a contentiouspolitical issue. In fact, most nongovernmental and,specifically, humanitarian-relief organizations in the

United States and abroad now appreciate the crucialrole of CIVPOL and military contingents in creatingthe secure environment necessary for the success ofcontemporary peace operations. Nevertheless, whilethere is almost universal agreement that peace opera-tions require an international civilian and militarypresence in the effort to reconstitute a society that hasbeen severely damaged by internal or regional con-flict, the appropriate range of responsibilities to be as-signed to CIVPOL and military forces remains thesubject of intense debate. In cases where the country’ssystem of law and order has completely disintegrated,should CIVPOL attempt to rebuild the country’s legalsystem and direcly take over police functions for theduration of the peace operation? Or should their rolebe limited to monitoring, training, and advising locallaw-enforcement personnel regardless of the condi-tions in the operation’s host country?

Much of the current debate on police functions inpeace operations is informed by a distinct set of strate-gic and policy concerns that have acquired specialprominence in the 1990s, as these operations havegrown increasingly complex because of their deploy-ment in countries whose societies have completelycollapsed. The debate took on an even greater urgencywhen the United Nations was perceived to have“failed” in its law-enforcement duties during the disor-derly transfer of Sarajevo’s Serb-controlled suburbs tothe Bosnian federation government in March 1996. Asa result, the role of the International Police Task Force(IPTF) in Bosnia came under close scrutiny, and themandates of NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR)and the IPTF, along with their strategic linkage and op-erational coordination, also put a new spotlight on therole of international police functions in peace opera-tions. Yet the need for international oversight of policeconstabularies in countries that are in the postconflictstage of reconstruction and reconciliation was under-scored again in Bosnia in November 1996, when U.S.Army peacekeepers made surprise inspections of localpolice headquarters in an area under their control anddiscovered arms caches suited more for small armiesthan for police.

The United States Institute of Peace decided to ad-dress these issues in view of its ongoing work on therule of law and other postconflict issues. To this end,the Institute convened a workshop for policymakersand practitioners on “Police Functions in Peace Opera-tions” in Washington, D.C. on May 10, 1996. This wasthe first meeting of its kind to bring together an inter-national group of policymakers, soldiers, and officials

v

FOREWORD

with operational responsibility to discuss their opera-tional experience with CIVPOL monitoring, training,and law enforcement during peace operations. Whilethe Dayton Accords framed much of the discussion inthe day-long workshop, several other case studieswere discussed in some detail. This report suggeststhat the issues participants vigorously debated willcertainly be a part of future peace operations.

This workshop emerged from the efforts of the In-stitute’s Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program, di-rected by Joseph Klaits, and two 1995–96 fellows,Erwin A. Schmidl of the Austrian Defense Ministry,and U.S. Army peace fellow Colonel J. Michael Hard-esty. Schmidl and Hardesty took the lead in organiz-ing this event as part of their research projectsexamining different aspects of the military’s role inpeacekeeping operations. Their projects also dove-tailed with the Institute’s efforts in support of post-conflict reconciliation in Bosnia, headed by executive

vice president Harriet Hentges. Peter Fitzgerald, IPTFcommissioner in Bosnia, and Robert Oakley, formerU.S. special envoy to Somalia, kindly consented toparticipate, thus providing both a comparative ap-proach and a Bosnia focus for the workshop.

The enthusiastic response of participants to theworkshop suggested that the issues it addressedshould be shared with a wider audience in the policyand academic communities. This report is a summaryof the workshop’s presentations and discussions,with an emphasis on the underlying policy issues in-volved in peace operations’ police functions as well asspecific operational challenges as revealed in the re-port’s case studies.

RICHARD H. SOLOMON

PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

vi

- The keys to any effort at reestablishing a workingsociety after a destructive conflict are the guaran-tees of personal safety and the safety of property,and the restoration of the public’s trust that orderand stability will be maintained.

- Maintaining or reestablishing the rule of law is acrucial element in the success of peace opera-tions, and international civilian police (CIVPOL)play an important role in any peace operation’seffort to reestablish a working society. CIVPOLtypically refers to personnel contributed by mem-ber states of the United Nations to monitor andtrain local police in the host countries of UN-endorsed peace operations.

- In the past, training foreign police forces was acontentious political issue; but in the UnitedStates, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),particularly humanitarian-relief organizations,now appreciate the crucial role that police andthe military play in establishing the security andorder necessary for the success of peace opera-tions.

- The mandates and missions of international civil-ian police and military forces need to be definedclearly to ensure the success of police functionsin peace operations. However, addressing thegaps between the civilian and military mandates

and missions is a political issue that national andinternational leaders must address.

- Coordination of peace operations’ policing activi-ties is essential to their success. Such coordina-tion must involve CIVPOL contingents, themilitary, and the United Nations at the interna-tional level, and among these organizations andcivil, judicial, and law-enforcement authorities inthe peace operation’s host country.

- Retraining the indigenous police force in thepeace operation’s host country is a high priority.Careful vetting of candidates and cooperationwith community leaders are necessary if the localpolice are to become an effective force supportingthe rule of law.

- Vocational training and alternative sources ofwork should be provided to members of local se-curity and police forces upon their reorganiza-tion, demobilization, and disarmament, lest theybe forced to resort to crime, thus underminingthe climate of security the peace operation isworking to foster.

- The United Nations should continue working toimprove the selection and training process for in-ternational civilian police in order to reduce ad-ministrative costs to the United Nations andimprove the quality of police monitors. Addi-tional resources would be helpful, but creating apermanent UNCIVPOL force is financially andpolitically unfeasible.

- The United Nations should also continue its ef-forts to establish international standards forpolicing, but the application of these standardsshould be appropriate for the region and thecountry.

- The UN civilian police in Bosnia are restricted tomonitoring, training, and advising local law-en-forcement authorities. Expanding their missionwould diminish their capacity to do the difficultwork they have already been assigned to perform.

- Whether the international community has the po-litical will and capability to rebuild entire crimi-nal justice systems, not just police forces, over anextended period remains an open question. Re-constructing a country’s criminal justice system

vii

KEY POINTS

requires a serious and extensive commitment ofpersonnel and resources. Political realities that fo-cus attention on the “exit plan” make it difficult todesign effective operations that are not tempo-rary or short term.

- Policing brings into question the validity of thedecision to participate at all in some peace opera-tions. Given the inherent limitations of peaceoperations, expectations for what they can ac-complish should be practical and not unrealisti-cally high.

- One crucial issue that remains to be resolved iswhat the appropriate missions should be for themilitary and CIVPOL. Some U.S. military and po-litical leaders are concerned that during a periodof highly contested budgetary outlays, participa-tion in peace operations will detract from the mil-itary’s war-fighting capabilities.

- When local authorities refuse to cooperate withinternational forces whose intervention seeks to

reestablish the rule of law, international forcesneed to evaluate what status and power these offi-cials have, how much they hinder the success ofthe peace operation, and how the situation will betransformed if actions by participants in a peaceoperation are perceived as an external attack onan individual or movement rather than a neces-sary part of reestablishing stability and providinghumanitarian relief.

- The trend toward the expansion of police func-tions in peace operations is likely to continue.The success of future missions will depend onthe progress made in addressing some of thetechnical problems associated with CIVPOLmonitors, as well as in resolving some of thelarger strategic and political difficulties that stemfrom a lack of resources, unclear mandates andmissions, and a lack of commitment to long-termefforts to rebuild the rule of law in countrieswhose problems have summoned an interna-tional response.

viii

1

Contemporary peace operations typically com-prise two types of international police forces:military and civilian. Military police, whose

usual task is to police the military forces involved inthe operation, occasionally have been used in con-junction with, or to supplement, local law-enforce-ment personnel. For the most part, however,international civilian police (or “CIVPOL” in UN par-lance) have played the major role in peace operations.In general, CIVPOL refers to personnel contributedby member states of the United Nations whose workin the host countries of UN-endorsed peace opera-tions falls into three general categories:

- monitoring and supervising local law-enforce-ment organizations;

- training and providing assistance to local law-en-forcement organizations; and, in some cases,

- directly exercising law-enforcement functions.

International police and peace operations, however,are not recent inventions of the international commu-nity and the United Nations. Nor did internationalpolicing begin with the first UN peacekeeping mis-sions in the 1950s.

Rather, as noted by United States Institute of Peacesenior fellow Erwin A. Schmidl, historian for the

Austrian Ministry of Defense, peace operations andthe use of international police forces have a long his-tory. What we now call peace operations evolved outof five types of military operations:

- colonial interventions and counterinsurgency op-erations, as in British Malaya in the 1940s and1950s;

- the use of military forces in occupation duties, asin U.S.-occupied Japan and Germany after WorldWar II;

- the use of military forces to assist civil authorities,as in disaster relief and riot control;

- frontier operations, as in the United States in thenineteenth century and in the Hapsburg Empire;and

- multinational military operations, as in the actionagainst the Barbary pirates in the early 1800s.

Peace operations have often had a police component;in fact, such operations used to be known as “policeactions” or “police operations,” in contrast to full-scalewar, to emphasize the maintenance of law and orderin the host country. International police forces wereused, for example, in Crete in 1896–97 and the Saar-land in 1935 and operated in Shanghai’s Interna-tional Settlements during the interwar years.

The five types of military operations cited above,especially counterinsurgencies and occupations, of-ten contained elements of civilian administration andpolicing. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps’ SmallWars Manual of 1940 contains chapters addressing“armed native organizations,” “formation of a constab-ulary,” “administration,” and “free and fair elections.”In an approach similar to that of the United Nationstoday, these chapters outline steps to reestablish or-der in unstable societies. In counterinsurgency opera-tions, military units have undertaken policelikefunctions and have not been used exclusively as fight-ing forces. In past operations, military officers, in con-trast to current concerns, have usually adjusted wellto the required “constabulary ethic” of their missions.Indeed, Charles C. Moskos noted in his 1975 study ofthe UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus that it wouldbe erroneous to consider the requirements of peace-keeping to be incompatible with military profession-alism. Conversely, while military forces in these

1PEACE

OPERATIONS

IN HISTORICAL

CONTEXT

operations became more “police-oriented,” the regularpolice forces in countries conducting counterinsur-gency operations tended to take on the characteristicsof paramilitary organizations and had to redefinetheir missions to return to civil policing tasks once theemergency had ended. Examples of this include thecases of the South African Constabulary, establishedas an antiguerrilla force by the British during the An-glo-Boer War of 1899–1902; the American-organizedGarde d’Haïti (1916–34); and the Rhodesian securityforces in the “Bush War” of the 1970s.

The role of international police in internationalpeace operations has evolved much as the nature ofsuch operations has also evolved.The first UN peacekeeping mis-sions did not go much beyond thetraditional use of military power toassist the host country’s civil au-thorities in maintaining law and or-der during periods of unrest. In thefirst UN peacekeeping operation,the Emergency Force betweenEgypt and Israel (UNEF I,1956–67), the UN force handlednearly 75 percent of the civil func-tions during the transfer of PortSaid and Port Fuad from the Britishand French expeditionary forces inDecember 1956. Three monthslater, in March 1957, UN unitsguarded UN installations and dispersed crowds ofdemonstrators during the Israeli withdrawal from theGaza Strip. However, the Emergency Force’s mandaterelated to armed conflict between states, and any ad-ministrative or security functions it undertook wereentirely temporary. Ghanaian and Nigerian policecontingents were dispatched to help maintain orderin the Congo (now Zaire) during the UN Operation inthe Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1965. During the1962–63 administration of West New Guinea by theUN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), policefrom the Philippines were recruited to assist local offi-cers in maintaining the functioning of the police force.

The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)marked the beginning of the next stage in the evolu-tion of international policing. The UN mandatespecifically called for a CIVPOL component (calledUNCIVPOL) to monitor and supervise the localCypriot police. This operation, which began in 1964,initially posted small detachments of about thirtypolice officers in each district of the island.

UNCIVPOL’s duties included serving as liaison toGreek and Turkish Cypriot police, accompanying andcontrolling local police patrols and checkpoints, in-vestigating cases of missing persons, and helping withrefugee relief work. These duties changed after theTurkish invasion in 1974. Today, only twentyAustralian and fifteen Irish police officers continue to serve in Cyprus.

The United Nations continued to take on new po-lice operations until the beginning of the post–ColdWar period, which also heralded a new era of UN op-erations in general and international police missionsin particular. The first of these new operations oc-

curred in 1989 in Namibia. Thedemise of the Soviet Union andthe withdrawal of its proxies fromsouthern Africa made it possiblefor the former German colony ofSouth-West Africa, originally ad-ministered by South Africa under a mandate dating back to theLeague of Nations, to declare itsindependence. To supervise thisprocess, a UN Transition Assis-tance Group (UNTAG) was estab-lished in 1989, comprising fifteenhundred police monitors, forty-five hundred troops (three battal-ions and three hundred militaryobservers), and two thousand

civilians. UNTAG’s civilian police were commandedby a police commissioner from Ireland, Steven Fan-ning, who also acted as police adviser to Martti Ahti-saari, the special representative of the UN secretarygeneral. The country was divided into six (laterseven) UNTAG police districts, with a total of forty-nine police stations. Twenty-five countries providedpolice personnel, but the operation was plagued bywidely different training standards and a lack of for-eign-language and competent driving skills in theranks of the police-force contributions; these deficien-cies weighed heavily in the operation’s significantlogistical problems.

The UN police monitors cooperated closely withthe South-West African Police, although contacts were tense in the beginning. Especially in the north,UNTAG police at first had to borrow mine-resistantCasspir vehicles (which were painted white andquickly dubbed “friendly ghosts” by the local popula-tion) from their South-West African and South Africancolleagues. The UN police monitored local police

2

The most prominent

UN peacekeeping

missions in recent

years . . . all involved

training, reorganizing,

and monitoring local

police forces.

forces’ conduct of investigations and their presence atpolitical rallies. While the United Nations had nopowers of arrest and only an indirect influence on thehost country’s policing standards, its internationalpolice force gradually began conducting its own pa-trols and investigating complaints about the local po-lice. Most police officers stayed in Namibia throughthe elections until the country’s formal independence(on March 21, 1990), but they were quickly with-drawn afterwards.

The United Nations’ interim administration ofWestern Sahara—the UN Mission for the Referendumin Western Sahara (MINURSO)—was established in1991 to prepare for a referendum on the future of theformer Spanish colony, whose administration by Mo-rocco has been challenged for years by a “liberationmovement.” The Western Sahara operation includespolice officers not only to monitor the Moroccan po-lice, but also to assist in the voter registration andelection processes; yet it has still not progressed be-yond the first stages of voter registration.

All examples so far have addressed situationswhere well-trained police forces already existed in thepeace operations’ host countries and where the inter-national activities were limited to monitoring local po-lice and assuring the population that law enforcementwould be carried out in an unbiased manner. How-ever, the United Nations soon became involved in op-erations where supervision alone was not enough,and where international police officers became in-volved in training police forces. Examples of thesetypes of operations were the various international ob-server missions sent to South Africa during 1992–95,the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) in1994, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)during 1992–95, and the UN Transitional Authorityin Cambodia (UNTAC) during 1992–93.

UNTAC included a strong civilian police compo-nent under the command of Police CommissionerKlaas Roos. With thirty-six hundred police officersfrom thirty-two countries, there was one police

monitor for every fifteen local police officers, or onefor every three thousand Cambodians. While theirmandate included—as in Namibia—monitoring thelocal police and assisting in the resettlement ofrefugees, they were also involved in training to helpthe local police overcome the legacy of poor training,low pay, and corruption. Training activities helped toestablish better relations between UN personnel andCambodian police officers. In the final phase of the1993 elections, police observers also were involved inguarding polling stations across the country.

The UN police, however, suffered from languageproblems: many police officers, especially from devel-oping countries, understood neither English norFrench. Michael Doyle has noted in a recent paper onUNTAC that, compared with the military, police inpeace operations are particularly disadvantaged.* Thekeys to effective policing in such operations are trust,knowledge of local conditions, and small-unit cohe-sion; but Doyle notes that foreign police weredropped into a remote Cambodian town with noknowledge of Khmer, no common standards, and noexperience working together. As a result, the interna-tional police units faced formidable hurdles. In addi-tion, CIVPOL was plagued from the beginning withinternal problems, such as the incompetence and in-appropriate behavior of individual officers and con-tingents, which badly tarnished UNTAC’s image withthe local population.

The most prominent UN peacekeeping missions in recent years—the two UN Operations in Somalia(UNOSOM I and II), the UN Mission in Haiti(UNMIH), and the UN International Police TaskForce (IPTF) in Bosnia—all involved training, reorga-nizing, and monitoring local police forces. Variousaspects of these missions will be detailed in the casestudies that follow.

* Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UN-TAC’s Civil Mandate. International Peace Academy Occa-sional Paper (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

3

Foremost among the broader issues of policefunctions in peace operations is the question ofthe proper definition of mandates and mis-

sions for CIVPOL and the military. With greater fre-quency, contemporary peace operations are deployedin countries where conflict has destroyed the rule oflaw. When a partial or complete breakdown of thecriminal justice system has occurred, reestablishingthe rule of law is the key to stabilizing society and re-constituting civilian authority. Both the military andCIVPOL have roles to play in this aspect of a peace-keeping mission, but assigning the appropriate mis-sions to both forces at the appropriate times requiresdecisions by political authorities at the national andinternational levels.

Different diplomatic and domestic political needsaffect how the international community defines man-dates, how the United Nations and contributing coun-tries interpret those missions, and whether gaps existbetween missions and mandates. Politically imposedlimitations on such missions and mandates are a re-sult of compromises to garner the widest possible in-ternational support for this component of theoperation, but these limitations also effectively restrictthe scope, duration, financing, and quality of peaceoperations as a whole. Even if the international com-munity undertakes technical reforms to improveUNCIVPOL’s selection, training, deployment, and in-theater operations, these political limitations on the

use of CIVPOL and military forces will likely remainand affect the quality of operations. However, popularexpectations of what peace operations can accom-plish, usually driven by media reports, often exceedthe political realities of limited resources and politicalsupport.

The U.S. government, for example, has limited re-sources to devote to police functions. The U.S. Armyhas been the military’s instrument for peace opera-tions and has had to assume some limited policing re-sponsibilities in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti. Seniorpolicymakers in the U.S. Department of Defense arewell aware of the public security issues at stake, butlimited domestic political support, more pressing pri-orities, and scarce resources have made military lead-ers oppose taking on the responsibility for publicsecurity functions, particularly those other than moni-toring. The military eschews involvement in situationslike Bosnia, where the local police have to be retrainedand reorganized. At the same time, domestic legisla-tion has restricted U.S. government law-enforcementtraining abroad to combating terrorism, drug traffick-ing, and insurgencies. The U.S. Department of Jus-tice’s International Criminal Investigative TrainingAssistance Program (ICITAP), created in 1986, hasbeen the prime vehicle for this type of assistance,working with the Defense Department in Panama, So-malia, and Haiti. Nevertheless, ICITAP has a limitedmission and lacks the funds and the organizationalstructure to conduct other than long-term training. Asa result, there is no U.S. agency able or willing to per-form short-term law-enforcement functions in peaceoperations where local law-enforcement authoritiesmust be reorganized and retrained over the long term.Nor does the United Nations possess the political willor ability to perform both functions simultaneously.

One suggestion for improving police functions inpeace operations is for the United Nations to establishits own international police force or police reserve asan alternative to the current system in which memberstates contribute contingents of officers. Presently, theUN Department of Peacekeeping has a staff of five de-voted to CIVPOL and would like to increase the num-ber of supervisory officers from four to eight or nine,but budgetary restrictions prevent such an increase.Workshop participants agreed that creating a perma-nent UNCIVPOL force is unrealistic, given the UnitedNations’ financial crisis and the political unwilling-ness of member nations to fund this type of force. In-stead, many believe the United Nations’ ability todraw upon the past experience of police officers in the

24

STRATEGIC ISSUES

5

international community will provide the basis for im-proving policing in future peace operations. What isimportant for UN policing efforts is that officers pos-sess the requisite experience; that they come from di-verse backgrounds in terms of nationality, religion,and culture; that they have community policing expe-rience; and that they be responsive to the people theyare policing. Others note that as missions get morecomplex, as in the case of Cambodia, the internationalcommunity will need to recruit lawyers, criminolo-gists, judges, and others to assist in rebuilding crimi-nal justice systems.

Some workshop participants questioned whetherUNCIVPOL realistically could be expected to assumeexecutive authority and responsibility for entire crimi-nal justice systems in countries where conflict or hu-manitarian crises have destroyedcivilian authority. Past UN mis-sions in Cambodia and Haitiencountered civilian authoritysystems so dysfunctional thatUNCIVPOL had to assume re-sponsibility for prisons, amongother things, once it acquired exec-utive authority, straining the per-sonnel and financial resources ofthe missions. Some argued that itis therefore not practical forUNCIVPOL to rebuild criminaljustice systems.

First, not only are UN financialresources limited, but memberstates are taxed in terms of seconding civilian policefor UN missions. Austria, for example, has a limit offifty, and Australia has a limit of twenty. In addition,nonpolice personnel—prosecutors, lawyers, judges,criminologists, and others—would have to be re-cruited. Thus resource limitations would make itdifficult to deploy sufficient numbers of CIVPOLpersonnel to handle expanded police functions.

Second, law-enforcement duties in some situationsmight require that CIVPOL be armed. Some memberstates would likely perceive such a requirement asposing a security risk to their detachments and thuswould be reluctant to dispatch contingents on suchmissions. This safety issue would likely weaken politi-cal support for peace operations from member states.

Third, there is the larger issue of standards and val-ues in reestablishing the rule of law. In reconstructinga criminal justice system, just what are internationallyrecognized standards for policing, human rights, and

the rule of law? Should international standards inthese cases draw on Western principles or those of thecountry or region? The United Nations is currently de-veloping general standards for policing that take intoaccount human rights standards and will be used infuture UNCIVPOL operations. Should the host coun-try’s criminal justice system be simply revived, par-tially altered, or created anew? Participants felt thatwhether and how to change the criminal justice sys-tem depend on the country, the mandate, and the spe-cific mission of the peace operation. Key elementsaffecting such changes are the status and functioningof the criminal justice system prior to the onset of cri-sis, the degree of consensus in the host country on theneed for change, and the extent of cooperation be-tween local authorities and representatives of the in-

ternational community. The issues of whether CIVPOL

should be armed and what therules of engagement should bewere the subject of considerabledebate. Some workshop partici-pants contended that interna-tional civilian police should notcarry weapons for a number ofreasons. First, bearing arms in-creases the likelihood of humanrights violations. Second, if policehave weapons and executive pow-ers, they are likely to be drawninto situations where they will becompelled to use them. Third, one

of the important roles of CIVPOL is to create and re-store confidence in the criminal justice system, aneffort that requires the powers of decorum, respect,negotiation, and diplomacy; carrying weapons wouldmilitate against this role. Fourth, in places like Bosniaand Somalia, side arms are no match for the weaponsthat local forces possess, and CIVPOL members’ bear-ing arms will make no difference in police effective-ness—and may even be counterproductive; in suchsituations, police are better off without weapons.

Nevertheless, other participants maintained thatwhether CIVPOL should be armed depends on themission. In some countries, like Iraq, carryingweapons is prevalent among the general population.The UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) carriedweapons for self-protection, since there were situa-tions where UN guards were ambushed and killed.

Workshop participants agreed that rules of engage-ment also should be mission-specific. In Haiti, for

The military eschews

involvement in

situations like Bosnia,

where the local police

have to be retrained

and reorganized.

example, UNMIH’s mandate specified that both theMultinational Force’s military police and CIVPOLwere to be used as police forces. Both forces werearmed, and the rules of engagement permitted the useof deadly force to prevent Haitian-on-Haitian violence.Military police and CIVPOL, stationed in urban andrural police stations, accompanied the interim Haitianpolice on patrols. The presence of armed backup wasessential in establishing the effectiveness of the in-terim police, which was marginal at best. Sometimesthe rules of engagement need to be adjusted duringthe course of the mission. In Haiti, the rules of engage-ment were changed to permit the use of deadly forceto prevent Haitian-on-Haitian violence.

Participants also agreed that the problems of dis-arming, demobilizing, and downsizing local securityforces should be handled sensitively on a mission-by-mission basis. Disarming security forces is very laborintensive and dangerous, and many missions lack theresources or force levels for effective implementation.

In some missions where complete disarmament wasnot feasible, voluntary disarmament (Somalia andMozambique), garrisoning heavy weapons (Somalia),and isolating the most dangerous armed groups (theKhmer Rouge in Cambodia) did reduce the level ofviolence. However, partial disarmament poses distinctdangers, particularly if some forces continue to pos-sess arms while others do not. In Somalia, garrisoningheavy weapons in cities was effective, but those with-out arms became easy targets for bandits and militiasoutside urban areas. Weapons also confer power, sta-tus, and income on their owners, who are understand-ably reluctant to give them up. Disarmament must beoverseen by functioning police forces, and alternativelivelihoods or vocational training must be provided.Otherwise, crime and unemployment will rise, under-mining the security climate and requiring further sta-bilization. Such developments obviously complicatepolice functions in peace operations.

6

7

Michael Emery of the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations emphasized theincreasing complexity of UNCIVPOL

missions in the 1990s: The mandates and missions ofinternational police have become more challenging,because the peacekeeping operations they are part oftake place in countries where civil authority and thecriminal justice system have partially or completelycollapsed. The necessity of deploying large numbersof monitors in increasingly complex peacekeepingoperations poses technical challenges to maintainingand improving the quality of CIVPOL.

First, there is the speed of deployment. Once theUnited Nations makes the decision to deploy policemonitors, requests for CIVPOL go through UN mis-sions to the member countries’ governments. Contin-gents then undergo in-country predeployment trainingand testing, including language and driving examina-tions. As a result, some contingents of police monitorsin IPTF, for example, do not arrive in the mission areauntil well after the mission has begun. Second, twotypes of language difficulties pose problems. Each mis-sion has an official language—usually English—in whichCIVPOL members must be proficient, but English is of-ten a second language for many monitors. In addition,the national language of the mission’s host country istypically a second language for many CIVPOL mem-bers; this posed particular difficulties for UNTAC

because there are so few speakers of Khmer outside of Cambodia. Third, many monitors lack the ability todrive standard four-by-four vehicles, despite havingostensibly valid licenses, or are unaccustomed todriving in extreme weather conditions.

In addition, constraints that hamper operational ca-pabilities are often logistic. The United Nations’ fund-ing crisis has made it more difficult to secure adequatevehicle fleets, communications equipment, housingand operations facilities, and other vital supplies.Some monitors also lack the years of police experiencerequired for such missions (eight years are requiredfor the IPTF). Some monitors find it difficult to adjustto either the multicultural environment or the conflictsituations of peacekeeping operations and thus sufferfrom “deployment shock” when they begin workingunder highly unfamiliar and austere conditions.

Finally, there are problems with the impartialityand basic integrity of monitors. Some CIVPOL mem-bers, simply because of their nationality, may be per-ceived as partial to a particular side in a peacekeepingoperation and thus encounter problems in buildingtrust with the local law-enforcement authorities andthe population at large. In addition, while some diffi-culties arise when monitors come from countries withdifferent standards for public integrity, there are alsoproblems resulting from corruption among individu-als within contingents.

Emery emphasized the necessity of the interna-tional community’s working together to address someof the technical problems encountered in deployingCIVPOL in peacekeeping operations. The United Na-tions and its individual member states, along withsuch organizations as the United States Institute ofPeace, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, and theLester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeep-ing Training Centre, should collaborate to help theUnited Nations establish standards for selection anddeployment, as well as in-theater training guidelines.As a short-term solution, the United Nations has cre-ated selection assistance teams (SATs), which are sentto countries contributing large CIVPOL contingents.The SATs work with the training departments of mem-ber countries to improve predeployment training andto conduct English-language and driving tests hithertocarried out only in the theater. The in-country testingsaves the United Nations money, since the cost ofrepatriating failed test-takers runs into the hundredsof thousands of dollars. Regarding selection guide-lines, the April 1996 conference at the Pearson Centre

3CURRENT TECHNICAL

ISSUES AND REFORMS

proposed that to meet minimum standards, CIVPOLmembers must

- have five to eight years of active policing experi-ence;

- be sworn officers in their own countries;

- be able to meet UN health requirements;

- be capable of written and oral communication inthe official language of the peacekeeping mission;and

- possess a driver’s license and be able to operate afour-by-four vehicle as established by mission re-quirements.

Other suggestions included psychological testing ofmonitors and experience with foot patrols, commu-nity policing, and domestic intervention.

The United Nations also is developing trainingguidelines for peacekeeping operations in generaland for specific missions. The general training

curriculum will include human rights training, thehistory of peacekeeping, the role of CIVPOL, the roleof peacekeeping operations, the privileges and dutiesof CIVPOL in peacekeeping operations, first aid,stress management, and police monitor duties. Forexample, mission-specific guidelines for IPTF includethe history of the conflict; the history and cultural, re-ligious, and social traditions of the peoples of the for-mer Yugoslavia; a survey of significant culturalmonuments; and radio communications. In-theatertraining and orientation cover the standard operatingprocedures of the mission, a current update of the se-curity situation and threat assessment, mine aware-ness, radio communications, what to do if detained orheld hostage, and a review of the mission commandstructure. The United Nations also is developing rec-ommendations for debriefing monitors when they re-turn. Upon the publication of these materials, theUnited Nations plans to hold a series of regionalworkshops on these issues. However, the quality ofCIVPOL will not improve unless the new selectionand training guidelines and materials are applied inpractice.

8

BOSNIA: Mission Gap and IPTF

The different mandates of IFOR and IPTF, particularlyduring the transfer of Sarajevo’s Serb-controlled sub-urbs to Bosnian control, serve as a prime example ofthe gap between mandates and short- and long-termlaw-enforcement needs and functions. IFOR’s man-date includes no responsibility for policing duties, al-though IFOR had agreed to back up IPTF personnelin dangerous and difficult situations as needed. IPTFwas created under Annex 11 of the Dayton Accordsand has an authorized strength of 1,721 monitors; asof May 1996, its strength was 1,311. IPTF commis-sioner Peter Fitzgerald reports to the Office of theHigh Representative and the UN secretary general.IPTF’s mandate is to

- monitor, observe, and inspect law-enforcementactivities and facilities;

- advise law-enforcement personnel;

- train law-enforcement personnel;

- assess threats to public order and advise accord-ingly;

- advise on law-enforcement restructuring;

- facilitate assistance to law enforcement; and

- assist by accompanying law-enforcement person-nel as they carry out their duties.

IPTF’s objective is to attempt to ensure that civilianlaw-enforcement agencies operate in accordance withinternationally recognized standards, including thosefor human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The major tasks for IPTF during the transition ofthe Sarajevo suburbs were maintaining public safetyservices before and after the transition; establishing asense of community confidence to minimize the exo-dus of Bosnian Serbs from the suburbs; maximizingthe use of IPTF monitors during the transition; con-trolling the numbers, ethnic balance, and activities ofBosnian Muslim–Croatian federation police in transi-tion areas; controlling the influx of refugees into tran-sition areas; and coordinating activities among localofficials, IPTF, IFOR, the Office of the UN High Com-missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other organi-zations involved in the peacekeeping operation. IPTFhad neither responsibility for actual law-enforcementduties nor sufficient numbers to deploy for perform-ing such functions. Thus when things went awry dur-ing the transfer of the suburbs, the United Nationswas perceived to have failed in its responsibilities,even though IPTF lacked the capabilities, communi-cations equipment, and mandate to maintain law andorder. Similarly, IPTF’s limited mandate makes it diffi-cult to ensure freedom of movement throughout theethnically divided country, which is one of the pre-conditions for free elections. The responsibility formaintaining law and order rests with the local police.Additional duties would hinder IPTF efforts to re-structure and retrain the federation police force. Therestructuring effort has focused on reducing the num-bers of police by 50 to 60 percent to meet a westernEuropean standard of one police officer for every 350persons. Retraining has involved the development ofinternationally accepted standards of policing in a de-mocratic state, the training of senior- and mid-levelpolice supervisors, and the provision of expert law-enforcement management advice.

HAITI: Close Coordination Between Militaryand Civilians in Monitoring and Training

U.S. Army Lt. Col. Robert Caslen Jr. attributed the suc-cess of the Multinational Forces (MNF) and the UNmissions in Haiti to advance preparations, a clear andwell-designed mandate, and close coordination

9

4CASE STUDIES

among U.S. and UN military and civilian elements.UN Security Council Resolution 940 (passed on July31, 1994) authorized the operations of both the U.S.-led MNF from July 31, 1994 to March 31, 1995 and,thereafter, UNMIH. The MNF had both military andpolice monitors, whose mission was to establish a sta-ble and secure environment, assist in the restorationof democracy in Haiti, support the training of the in-terim Haitian police force, and monitor police activi-ties to ensure compliance with international humanrights standards and Haitian law.

Military police and international police monitors(IPMs) were used to fill the security vacuum createdby the dissolution of the Forces Armées d’Haïti(FAd’H), the country’s old military and police force,until a new force was established. Since the govern-ment faced no organized armed threat, the duties ofthe MNF and UNMIH mainly consisted of crimesuppression and protection of relief supplies. Jointpatrols (160 per day) of the interim police, U.S. mili-tary police, and IPMs provided for the stabilizationand effectiveness of the interim police. The interimpolice, numbering three thousand, were vetted andreceived six days of training; many had little equip-ment and had to wear the old FAd’H uniform.

On March 31, 1995, operations were transferred toUNMIH, whose mission was to assist the democraticgovernment of Haiti in sustaining a secure and stableenvironment that was conducive to the conduct offree and fair elections, protecting international per-sonnel and key installations, and creating a Haitianpolice force. The U.S. Department of Justice’s ICITAPprogram assisted in establishing the Haitian NationalPolice (HNP) by providing training in a police acad-emy that has graduated fifty-five hundred recruits forthe new police force. UNCIVPOL played a key role inUNMIH’s mission, conducting field training andmentoring, accompanying the interim police and thenewly created HNP on patrol, assisting in investiga-tions, and, when necessary, guarding prisons anddistributing food to prisoners. Good coordinationpermitted the military elements of UNMIH andUNCIVPOL to complement each other’s work andallowed the military police and UNCIVPOL to with-draw from policing duties once the HNP was able toassume a full complement of police functions.

Caslen detailed the lessons of the Haitian mission,whose largely successful strategic focus was to buildan internal security force to replace the military ele-ment temporarily providing security, to break the cy-cle of violence in order to give reestablished civilian

institutions a chance to succeed, and to integrate de-mobilized FAd’H members into society by providingthem with twelve weeks of vocational training and jobcounseling. Key elements in constructing the new se-curity apparatus proved to be affordability, leader-ship, training, equipment, and building respect. Thenew force had to be paid enough to prevent corrup-tion, yet had to be affordable for the government.New police leadership was essential, with a trainingfocus on senior- and mid-level management. At thesame time, training for beat cops had to be expandedto include other areas of policing, such as investiga-tion and judicial security. Lack of equipment—cars, ra-dios, and a standard uniform—hampered policeeffectiveness. Establishing popular respect for the po-lice was necessary for their effectiveness in policing ademocratic society. Finally, the U.S. Department ofDefense’s role in coordinating and supporting otherU.S. government agencies and the United Nations,and ICITAP’s support of UNCIVPOL, were necessaryelements for mission success.

SOMALIA: Reestablishing the Police

U.S. Army Lt. Col. Steve Spataro described how an in-digenous police force was reconstituted to reestablishthe rule of law in Somalia. Under the guidance of Am-bassador Robert Oakley, a political committee com-posed of members of the more powerful Somali clansmet in Mogadishu to discuss basic municipal func-tions. In these discussions, clan leaders decided that asecurity force was needed to resettle refugees but thatmilitias were not acceptable for such a task. The politi-cal committee established a police committee, whichincluded former members of the National Police. Thepolice committee identified key personnel and wherethey were located, necessary training standards andequipment, and procedures for assessing the qualifi-cations and backgrounds of candidates. In addition,the police committee specified that the court and cor-rections systems also needed to be reestablished. Theprocess hit a temporary snag when political leadersinsisted on creating a national police force, which theUnited Task Force (UNITAF) did not favor; local po-lice forces were created after religious and communityleaders interceded with the political leaders.

Although the Somali National Police Force had notfunctioned since January 1991, its members werecompetent, well equipped, honest, respected, andlargely free from the taint of former leader Siad Barre’srule. Many former members of the National Police

10

were willing to put clan differences aside and servetheir country and fellow citizens. The vetting processwas arduous and time consuming, but UNITAF under-took efforts to reestablish the police in all areas underits control. Clan elders and religious leaders partici-pated in discussions of the appropriate legal regime;Somali law predating Siad Barre’s rule was reestab-lished throughout most of the country and was en-forced by the police and the courts.

Initial police functions were simple, including traf-fic and crowd control, neighborhood patrols, securityof food distribution sites, and security of such criticalareas as the port and airport. Police were not used fordemobilizing the military or militias since they lackedthe requisite training and equipment. Though scarce,funding and equipment for the police were providedby the United Nations, UNITAF forces, and variouswarlords who cooperated in the effort to reestablishlocal police forces. The reconstituted police forceswere most effective in areas where UNITAF providedcoordination, oversight, and support; however, onefactor that promoted their acceptance was their will-ingness to let members of the local community believethat they controlled the police.

Spataro concluded that the Somali police were ini-tially successful for four reasons. First, the police wereaverage men and women who believed that they had aresponsibility to their fellow citizens and were willingto come forward, accept, and fulfill their roles. Second,clan leaders and the Somali populace realized thatreestablishing the police was in the best interests of allparties and eagerly supported that effort. Third, mili-tary leaders on the ground realized that providingsupport for the community to police itself was thequickest way to establish a secure environment. Fi-nally, UNITAF never attempted to use the police forfunctions they were not equipped or able to handleand therefore did not set them up to fail.

SOUTH AFRICA: International PoliceAdvisers as a Catalyst for Change

Peter Gastrow, special adviser to South Africa’s Min-istry for Safety and Security, examined how interna-tional observers sent to South Africa acted as a catalystfor change with regard to policing issues. In 1992, UNResolution 772 authorized the deployment of UN ob-servers in South Africa to monitor the country’s politi-cal violence and to work with and strengthen theNational Peace Accord structures. The resolution fur-ther called on international organizations such as the

Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Common-wealth, and the European Union to consider deploy-ing their own observers in South Africa in conjunctionwith the United Nations and local monitors attachedto the National Peace Accord structures. In 1993, therewere sixty-one observers from the UN Observer Mis-sion in South Africa (UNOMSA), twelve from theCommonwealth, fifteen from the European Union,and thirteen from the OAU. These observer missionsworked with local peace committees established un-der the National Peace Accord; the peace committees,which were supported by all of South Africa’s majorpolitical actors, monitored political rallies, funerals,and protest marches to ensure that violence would notbreak out. The very presence of international ob-servers worked to restrain some political leaders fromrallying their supporters to violence.

However, the Commonwealth and EuropeanUnion observers assumed a more interventionist role.Rather than involve themselves in more operationalpolice matters, they brought their influence to bear ontransforming fundamental police functions and re-lated policy issues, with the idea that reforming theSouth African Police was essential to facilitate the tran-sition from apartheid to democracy. The Common-wealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA)was a particularly effective catalyst in this regard.Staffed by five police officers, a criminologist, and sev-eral lawyers with extensive policing experience,COMSA attempted to maximize its influence on theSouth African Police leadership through lectures, par-ticipation in meetings, and the provision of technicalassistance and advice. COMSA police experts adopteda nonthreatening, low-key approach that garneredtrust among members of the South African Police.

COMSA and other international observers identi-fied the hostile relationship between South Africa’sblack communities and the country’s white policeforce, which was characterized by its militarized andreactive law-enforcement approach, as an obstacle topeace. COMSA understood that the status quo couldbe changed only if the police were clearly willing toundergo a fundamental transformation toward an ap-proach of community-oriented, consensual policing.COMSA police observers and reform-minded seniorSouth African Police officers worked together to en-sure that improved community-police relations be-came a subject of ongoing and close cooperationthrough lectures and discussions.

COMSA also brought its influence to bear bymaking suggestions for improving crowd-control

11

measures that were adopted by political parties andthe South African Police as the April 1994 electionapproached. In addition, COMSA and EuropeanUnion police observers continually engaged theSouth African Police in discussions on a range of mat-ters that required fundamental change, includingtraining, demilitarizing the police, conflict manage-ment, investigation techniques, the structures of theSouth African Police, and the need to introduce an or-ganizational culture that promotes the observance ofhuman rights.

Without having been specifically mandated to doso, the police officers in the international observermissions were able to act as a catalyst for change withregard to policing issues. Their task was made easierby the national consensus on the need for interna-tional observers. In addition, by working in conjunc-tion with the local organizations of the National PeaceAccord, they could operate from a neutral base as partof an indigenous police operation. As such, the policeobservers were widely viewed as representatives of in-ternational agencies who were assisting in the effortto make local peace initiatives work, not as foreignersintent on imposing preconceived solutions. The Na-tional Peace Accord, which addressed the need forpolice reforms at great length, gave the police compo-nents of international observer missions the neces-sary opportunities to engage the South African Policeon issues relating to transformation and change. Theensuing discussions not only bolstered the pragmaticself-interest of reformist elements in the police, butalso gave reluctant reformers the hope that funda-mental change would best serve their own future ca-reers under a new government.

Under the circumstances, the overall nature of theUnited Nations mandate can be considered appropri-ate. Any specific provisions relating to police func-tions in the mandate most likely would have resultedin the government’s direct opposition or passive ob-struction, seriously undermining the task of interna-tional police personnel and preventing them fromimproving police policies. However, UNOMSA’s pas-sive approach toward police issues, while in line witha restrictive interpretation of the UN resolution, didnot fully meet the challenge of transforming policingfor the better.

The creative approach adopted by COMSA and theEuropean Union police observers provided a positivestimulus to the tentative reform measures that theSouth African Police already had initiated. Under thepeculiar conditions prevailing in South Africa, police

reform probably contributed more to achieving theshort- and long-term objectives of the internationalpeace operation than would have been the case hadinternational police personnel been given the man-date to conduct operational tasks exclusively. While itis impossible to measure the impact, one indicator ofsuccess is that after the April 1994 election, the newlyelected government requested that police expertsfrom the Commonwealth and the European Union re-main involved with transformation issues. Most ofthese experts, including some of the police who weremembers of the international observer missions priorto the April 1994 election, are still in the country.

IRAQ AND MOSTAR: Unclear Mandatesand Local Intransigence

Capt. Andreas Pichler of the Austrian Gendarmeriepresented two cases of policing missions whose suc-cess was undermined by unclear mandates and localintransigence. UNGCI was deployed in 1991 to pro-tect relief convoys dispatched by UNHCR to northernand southeastern Iraq after Saddam Hussein refusedto permit allied forces to support humanitarian-reliefefforts in these areas. Although the hope was to pro-vide some sense of security to the local population,the operation lacked a clear mandate and was over-seen by the UN Secretariat rather than the SecurityCouncil. The mission suffered from poor logisticalsupport; lack of equipment, weapons for self-protec-tion, communications, and medical facilities; and thepoor training level of UN guards from some nationsthat sent contingents.

The Hussein regime hampered the operation’s ef-fectiveness by blocking shipments of needed equip-ment and organizing opposition against the UNGCI.In addition, many Kurds in these areas became in-creasingly hostile to the UN guards, since they ex-pected the mission to provide some protection and ameasure of stability, which the guards were nottrained, equipped, or mandated to do.

Despite these obstacles, the mission was success-ful. The Hussein regime refrained from launching mil-itary attacks against the Kurds in the presence of theUNGCI, and the humanitarian-relief program was car-ried out with no major setbacks.

In Mostar, the Western European Union (WEU)established a Unified Police Force in 1994 to assistand train the local police in the city, which is dividedbetween Croat and Bosnian Muslim control. The mis-sion was well equipped, and the quality and work of

12

the personnel were, by all accounts, quite good. Allmonitors except the British were armed. However, themandate did not grant executive powers, which lim-ited mission effectiveness, particularly since theCroat-dominated local police refused to cooperate

with the WEU police and their Bosnian Muslim coun-terparts. In fact, some local civilian authorities and thepolice were jointly involved in criminal activities. As aresult, the goal of a Unified Police Force combiningCroats and Bosnian Muslims proved unattainable.

13

Workshop participants concurred withUnited States Institute of Peace presi-dent Richard Solomon when he stated

that the keys to any effort at reestablishing a workingsociety are the guarantees of personal safety and thesafety of property, and the restoration of the public’strust that order and stability will be maintained.Solomon stressed that when the United States investsbillions of dollars in a peacemaking operation—an es-sential part of any conflict-settlement process—it mustcreate a secure environment so that its investmentleads to long-term stability. There is little argument re-garding the observations that maintaining or reestab-lishing the rule of law is a crucial element in thesuccess of peace operations and that CIVPOL playsan important role in any effort to reestablish a work-ing society. In the past, training foreign police forceswas a contentious political issue; but in the UnitedStates, NGOs, particularly humanitarian-relief organi-zations, now appreciate the crucial role that policeand the military play in establishing the security andorder necessary for the success of peace operations.As a result, it is generally recognized that more atten-tion and resources must be devoted to peacekeepingmissions in order to ensure the functioning of the po-lice components of such missions.

Other highlights and areas of consensus amongworkshop participants are as follows:

- Police functions in contemporary peace opera-tions can be broadly defined, ranging from crowdcontrol, as in Gaza in 1956–57, to establishingand maintaining a new judicial system, as inCambodia in 1992–93.

- In the 1990s, an increasing number of peace op-erations with CIVPOL contingents are being de-ployed in countries where the criminal justicesystem has totally collapsed. As a result, CIVPOLresponsibilities occasionally have expanded intothe realm of actual law enforcement.

- The United Nations should continue working toimprove the selection and training processes forinternational civilian police in order to reduce itsadministrative costs and improve the quality ofpolice monitors. Additional resources would behelpful, but creating a permanent UNCIVPOLforce is financially and politically unfeasible.

- The United Nations should also continue its ef-forts to establish international standards forpolicing, but the application of these standardsshould be appropriate for the region and thecountry.

- The mandates and missions of CIVPOL and mili-tary forces need to be defined clearly to ensurethe success of police functions in peace opera-tions. However, addressing the gaps between thecivilian and military mandates and missions is apolitical issue that national and internationalleaders must address.

- Whether CIVPOL should be armed depends onthe host country, its culture, and the nature of theconflict.

- Coordination of peace operations’ policingactivities is essential to their success. Such coordi-nation should take place at two levels: interna-tionally, among CIVPOL contingents, themilitary, and the United Nations; and locally,among these organizations and civil, judicial, andlaw-enforcement authorities in the peace opera-tion’s host country.

- Retraining the indigenous police force in thepeace operation’s host country is a high priority.Careful vetting of candidates and cooperation

5CONCLUSION

14

with community leaders are necessary if the localpolice are to become an effective force supportingthe rule of law.

- Vocational training and alternative sources ofwork should be provided to members of localsecurity and police forces upon their reorganiza-tion, demobilization, and disarmament, lest theybe forced to resort to crime, thus underminingthe climate of security the peace operation isworking to foster.

- UN civilian police in Bosnia are restricted to mon-itoring, training, and advising local law-enforce-ment authorities. Expanding their mission woulddiminish their capacity to do the difficult workthey already have been assigned to perform.

Workshop participants remained divided on whetherthe international community had the political willand ability to rebuild entire criminal justice systems,not just police forces, over an extended period. Re-constructing a country’s criminal justice systemrequires a serious and extensive commitment of per-sonnel and resources. However, the United Nations,the United States, and other countries seem reluctantto undertake such long-term operations. Political real-ities that focus attention on the “exit plan” make it dif-ficult to design effective operations that are nottemporary or short term. Some even questioned thevalidity of the decision to participate at all in somepeace operations, contending that the missions inSomalia, for example, had changed little in the hostcountry. Others argued that the costs of not interven-ing would have been much higher and that severalhundred thousand lives were saved as a result of thepeace operations. Given the limitations, expectationsfor what peace operations can accomplish should bepractical and not unrealistically high.

Other issues remain to be resolved: What shouldbe the appropriate missions for the military andCIVPOL? The question is not so much whether theU.S. Army is capable of carrying out police functions—practically every workshop participant seemed tobelieve that many army units have the experience and training to discharge these responsibilities,

particularly when the situation calls for establishing asecure environment until an interim or permanent lo-cal police force can be reconstituted. Instead, the is-sue is essentially strategic and political: U.S. militaryand political leaders are concerned that during a pe-riod of highly contested budgetary outlays, participa-tion in peace operations will detract from themilitary’s war-fighting capabilities.

Finally, there is the issue of what to do when localauthorities refuse to cooperate with internationalforces whose intervention seeks to reestablish therule of law. In the absence of a domestic consensus,and particularly when local law-enforcement bodieshave either collapsed or become political tools of op-pression, CIVPOL tasks become difficult to accom-plish. Trust and mutual respect must be establishedbetween host-country authorities and internationalforces; otherwise local intransigence will underminethe work of the international civilian police. In theface of such intransigence, two questions arise:Should the peace operation’s officials work towardbypassing intransigent local authorities? If so, willsuch efforts be counterproductive? Internationalforces need to evaluate what status and power theseofficials have, how much they hinder the success ofthe peace operation, and how the situation will betransformed if such an action is perceived as an exter-nal attack on an individual or movement rather than anecessary part of reestablishing stability and provid-ing humanitarian relief.

The trend toward the expansion of police func-tions in contemporary peace operations is likely tocontinue. The issues discussed above will require theattention and cooperation of civilian, governmental,and military policymakers and practitioners in theUnited States, in the United Nations and its memberstates, and in the broader international community.The success of future missions will depend on theprogress made in addressing some of the technicalproblems associated with CIVPOL monitors, as wellas in resolving some of the larger strategic and politi-cal difficulties that stem from a lack of resources, un-clear mandates and missions, and a lack ofcommitment to long-term efforts to rebuild the rule oflaw in countries whose problems have summoned aninternational response.

15

Workshop presenters: Ambassador Robert Oakley, visiting fellow,National Defense University, and special envoy to Somalia for Presi-dents Bush and Clinton; Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, IPTF policecommissioner, Sarajevo; Col. J. Michael Hardesty, commander, U.S.Army Garrison, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and 1995–96 U.S. Armypeace fellow, United States Institute of Peace; Dr. Erwin A. Schmidl,head of publications at the Austrian Ministry of Defense’s Military His-tory Institute and Museum and senior fellow at the United States Insti-tute of Peace in 1995–96; Michael Emery, UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations; Lt. Col. Robert Caslen Jr., U.S. Army WarCollege, and liaison officer for CIVPOL in Haiti; Lt. Col. Steve Spataro,commander, 705th Military Police Battalion, Fort Leavenworth,Kansas, and provost marshal for UNITAF in Somalia; Capt. AndreasPichler, district commissioner, Austrian Gendarmerie, Weiz (Styria),Austria, and former commander of the Austrian police contingents inIraq (with UNGCI) and Mostar; and Peter Gastrow, special adviser tothe Ministry of Safety and Security, Republic of South Africa.

Special thanks go to Frederick Williams and Jason Ellis of the Institute’sJennings Randolph Fellowship Program for their assistance in organiz-ing the workshop. This report was written by Program Officer RoxaneD. V. Sismanidis of the Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program andwas edited by Peter Pavilionis.

AFTERWORD

16

17

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis writeson Chinese and Asian affairs inWashington, D.C. She receivedher A.B. and A.M. degrees in EastAsian studies from Harvard Uni-versity. Sismanidis has worked atthe Library of Congress andJohns Hopkins University’s Nitze

School of Advanced International Studies. She is therecipient of a grant from the United States Institute ofPeace and wrote Police Functions in Peace Opera-tions while working as a program officer in the Insti-tute’s Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program.

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created byCongress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, includingresearch grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s board of directors is appointed by the Presi-dent of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. CrockerVice Chairman: Max M. KampelmanPresident: Richard H. SolomonExecutive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

18

Peaceworks No. 14. First published March 1997.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone. They donot necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NW, Suite 700Washington, DC 20005-1708

Phone: 202-457-1700Fax: 202-429-6063E-mail: usip_requests@usip.orgInternet: www.usip.org

Other titles in the Peaceworks series:

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 1)

Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (PeaceworksNo. 2)

From the Managing Chaos conference:

Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3)

Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming Anarchy’ and the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4)

NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5)

Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6)

Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession by PatriciaCarley (Peaceworks No. 7)

Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis by Vesna Pesic (Peaceworks No.8)

Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism by Denis McLean(Peaceworks No. 9)

State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, andChileby Wendy Hunter (Peaceworks No. 10)

Zaire: Predicament and Prospects/A Report to the Minority Rights Group (USA) by J. C. Willame et al. (Peaceworks No. 11)

Training for Peace Operations: The U.S. Army Adapts to the Post–Cold War Worldby Colonel J. Michael Hardesty and Jason D. Ellis (Peaceworks No. 12)

Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict? by Milton J. Esman (Peaceworks No. 13)

UNITED STATESINSTITUTE OF PEACE

1550 M Street NWWashington, DC 20005 Peaceworks No. 14