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PolicyCoherenceand
theFutureoftheUKsInternational
DevelopmentAgenda
AreporttoWorldVisionUKByMatthewLockwoodandSarahMulley,withEmilyJones,AlexGlennie,KatiePaintinand
AndrewPendleton
March2010
ippr2010
InstituteforPublicPolicyResearchChallengingideas Changingpolicy
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Aboutippr ........................................................................................................................... 3
Abouttheauthors............................................................................................................... 3
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................. 4
ForewordbyWorldVision ................................................................................................... 5
Listofabbreviations........................................................................................................... 7
Executivesummary ............................................................................................................. 8
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 13
1.Conflict.......................................................................................................................... 19
2.Tradeandinvestment.................................................................................................... 30
3.Corruption..................................................................................................................... 40
4.Climatechange ............................................................................................................. 46
5.Internationalmigration ................................................................................................ 52
6.Towardsgreatercoherence............................................................................................ 60
7.Conclusionsandrecommendations .............................................................................. 74
References......................................................................................................................... 77
Appendix:Listofinterviewees.......................................................................................... 85
Contents
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TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUKsleadingprogressivethinktank,producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticandsustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakingintheUK.Throughourindependentresearchandanalysiswedefinenewagendasforchangeandprovidepracticalsolutionstochallengesacrossthefullrangeofpublicpolicyissues.
WithofficesinbothLondonandNewcastle,weensureouroutlookisasbroad-basedaspossible,whileourGlobalChangeprogrammeextendsourpartnershipsandinfluencebeyondtheUK,givingusatrulyworld-classreputationforhighqualityresearch.
ippr,30-32SouthamptonStreet,LondonWC2E7RA.Tel:+44(0)2074706100E:[email protected]
www.ippr.org.RegisteredCharityNo.800065
ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinMarch2010.ippr2010
Aboutippr
MatthewLockwoodisanAssociateDirectorinipprsGlobalChangeProgramme.Matthewhasover20yearsexperienceofglobaldevelopmentissueswithafocusonAfrica.HestudiedattheUniversityofOxford,wherehetookanM.Philineconomicsin1984andaD.Philin1989.HewasthenaResearchFellowattheUniversityofCambridgeandaLecturerinSociologyattheUniversityofSussex.From1997to2000hewasHeadofInternationalPolicyatChristianAid,andwasHeadofUKAdvocacyatActionAidbetween2002and2004.In2005hepublishedaninfluentialcritiqueofconventionalgovernmentandNGOthinkingonAfrica,TheStateTheyreIn(June2005,2nded.October2006,ITDGPublishing).Before
joiningipprin2006,hewasanadviseronclimatechangetothethenDeputyMayorofLondon,NickyGavron,andworkedfortheLondonClimateChangeAgency.
SarahMulley isaSeniorResearchFellowinipprsGlobalChangeProgramme.Beforejoiningippr,SarahwascoordinatoroftheUKAidNetwork,acoalitionofUKNGOsworkingtogethertodeveloppolicyandadvocacyoninternationalaid.ShewaspreviouslyaresearchassociateattheGlobalEconomicGovernanceProgrammeinOxford,andaseniorpolicyanalystatHMTreasury,workingonarangeofdomesticandinternationalpolicyissues.SarahhasanM.PhilinInternationalRelations,andaBAinPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomics,bothfromtheUniversityofOxford.
AlexGlennie hasworkedonarangeofinternationalandsecurityissuesatipprsince2006.
Duringthistime,shehasservedontheSecretariatofipprsCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury,contributedtoaprogrammeofresearchonmigrationanddevelopmentandhasledtheInstitutesworkonpoliticalIslamintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.PriortothissheworkedatAccountAbility,aninternationalNGOcommittedtopromotingaccountabilityforsustainabledevelopment.AlexholdsaMastersdegreeinInternationalStudiesandDiplomacyfromtheSchoolofOrientalandAfricanStudies,andaBAhonoursdegreeinInternationalHistoryfromtheLondonSchoolofEconomics.
KatiePaintinwasaresearcheroninternationalandnationalsecurityissuesatippruntilJuly2009andamemberofthesecretariatforipprsCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury.SheholdsaMastersdegreeinconflictsecurityanddevelopmentfromtheWarStudiesDepartmentatKingsCollegeLondonandaBAhonoursdegreeinhistoryfromthe
UniversityofCambridge.
AndrewPendleton isaSeniorResearchFellowatipprandconvenoroftheGlobalClimateNetwork.HepreviouslyworkedatChristianAid,whereheledpolicyandresearchonclimate
Abouttheauthors
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issues,workedonWorldTradeOrganisationnegotiationsandwrotetheagencyslandmarkBehindtheMaskreportdebunkingthemythofcorporatesocialresponsibility.Andrewspent10yearsasareporterandproducerinBBClocalandnetworkradioandisthewinneroftwoSonyRadioAwards.
EmilyJones isreadingforaDPhilintheInternationalRelationsandPoliticsDepartment,OxfordUniversity,wheresheisexaminingthepoliticaleconomyoftheEconomicPartnershipAgreementnegotiationsbetweenEuropeandthegroupofAfrican,CaribbeanandPacificcountries.Priortothis,sheworkedasatradepolicyadviserforOxfamGBwheresheledresearchandpolicydevelopmentonbilateralandregionaltradeagreementsacrosstheOxfamInternationalfederation.EmilyholdsaMastersinDevelopmentEconomicsfromtheSchoolofAfricanandOrientalStudies,UniversityofLondon,andaBAinPhilosophy,PoliticsandEconomicsfromOxfordUniversity.
Theauthorswouldliketothankallthosewhogenerouslygaveuptheirtimetobeinterviewedduringtheresearchforthisreport,andthosewhoprovidedcommentsandfeedbackonthedraft.WeareindebtedtoWorldVisionUK,withoutwhosesupportthisworkwouldnothavebeenpossible.ParticularthanksareduetoPatrickWattwho,whileatWorldVision,playedaninvaluableroleinshapingtheresearch,andtoChrisPage.
Note:Theopinionsinthisreportarethoseoftheauthorsonlyanddonotnecessarily
representthoseofWorldVisionorippr.
Acknowledgements
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Poverty,forWorldVision,isanissueofjustice,or,morecorrectly,anissueofinjustice.Poverty,exploitationandviolencearenotinevitable.Theproblemsthatmillionslivingin
economicallypoorcountriesface,andwhichclaim30,000youngliveseachday,aretheresultoffailurestoensurethatsystemsandstructuresatinternational,nationalandlocallevelssupportthewell-beingofthosewhofindthemselvesatthemarginsofsociety.
Itisthetransformationofsocietyandcommunitiesthatwilldeliverimprovedwell-beinginthelivesofthoseintendedtobenefitfromdevelopmentefforts.Dramaticincreasesinaidoverthelastdecadehavesavedandimprovedthelivesofmillionsofpeopleinpoorercommunities,particularlychildren.Thecommunitiesweworkwithcanseethechangethataidmoneyisdeliveringandthecontributionitismakingtosustainabledevelopment,buttheseincreaseshavealsohighlightedthelimitsofaidasadevelopmenttool.
Factorssuchasgovernanceandcorruption,securityandpeacebuilding,trade,finance,migrationandclimatechangeareallimpactingondevelopment,andtheinterplaybetween
thesefactorsisincreasinglyimportantifwewantdevelopmenttobesuccessfulandsustainable.Tacklingstructuralandsystemicinjusticemustgohandinhandwiththeprovisionofdevelopmentaid.ThismeansthatawiderangeofUKpoliciesbeyondaidhavesignificantimplicationsforthelivesofpeopleineconomicallypoorcountries.
ForWorldVision,amajordevelopment,humanitarianandadvocacyorganisationworkingintownsandvillagesinnearly100countriesaroundtheworld,theimpactofeachofthesepoliciesonchildrenisofparamountimportanceasweseektoalleviatethepovertyandsufferingexperiencedbysomanyintheworldtoday.Ourprimarygoalthrougheveryaspectofourworkistocontributetochangesinsocietyandcommunitiesthatresultinimprovedwell-beinginthelivesofchildrenthroughtherealisationoftheirrights.
Ourfocusonchildrenisinformedbyabeliefthatchildrenarecentraltothedevelopmentprocess,andpoliciesimpactingondevelopmentthatignorethewell-beingofchildrenwillultimatelyfailtotransformthelivesofallthoselivinginthepoorestcommunities.Afocusonchildwell-being:
supportssustainableandequitablehumandevelopmentbybreakingcyclesofpovertyandinequalitytheeffectsofpovertyonchildrentoday,whoconstitutethemajorityofthoselivinginpoverty,haveconsequencesthatareoftenpassedontotheirchildrentomorrow
providesanentrypointintoaddressingthewell-beingoffamiliesandcommunitiesandactsasabarometerforthewell-beingofthewiderpopulationchildwell-beingisbestimprovedthroughensuringthatthecontextsinwhichtheyliveareonesin
whichtheycanthrive.Assuch,childwell-beingisanimportantmeasureofimpactforanyinterventionaimedatsupportingsocialandhumandevelopment
recognisesthatchildrencanplayasignificantroleasagentsoftransformationintheircommunities
recognisesachildrightsframeworkasthemosteffectivetooltoachieveminimumstandardsofwell-beingforchildreninareassuchashealth,care,protectionandeducation.
Failingtoputchildrenatthecentreofdevelopmentweakenstheimpactoftodaysdevelopmenteffortsbothnowandforthefuture.Butourcallforchildrentobeplacedattheheartofthedevelopmentagendaisnotpurelyutilitarian.Childrenarerights-holders,as
outlinedintheUnitedNationsConventionontheRightsoftheChild,and,assuch,developmentactors,includingtheUKGovernment,haveanobligationtoaddresstherightsofchildrenthroughallpoliciesandactionsthatimpactondevelopmentoutcomes.
ForewordbyWorldVision
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Recognitionthatpositive,sustainabledevelopmentoutcomescanonlybeachievedthroughengagementwiththeunderlyingcausesofpovertyexpandstheareasofpolicyrelevanttothedevelopmentendeavourbeyondthosewithapurefocusondevelopment.Theimpactsofotherareasofpolicythathaveimplicationsoninternationalpovertyreductionobjectives,
suchasthoserelatingtoconflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,climatechangeandmigration,mustberecognised.
WorldVisionisconcernedthattherelationshipbetweenthesefactorsanddevelopmenthasnotbeenadequatelyexplored.ThoughwestronglybelievethattheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentshouldremainastrongandindependentdepartmentwithinGovernmentwithacabinet-levelSecretaryofState,developmentpolicymustbeconsideredbyotherUKdepartmentsincludingtheForeignandCommonwealthOffice,MinistryofDefenceandtheDepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkillsifwearetomakeprogressindevelopmentoutcomesandtoimprovethewell-beingofchildrenlivinginpoverty.Asweapproachacrucialelection,andtheworldconvenestoreviewtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,nowistherighttimetoaskthesequestionsandtodeterminehowUKdevelopment
policywillbetakenforward.WecommissionedtheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)tocarryoutthisindependentresearchasaleadingUKthinktankandwethankthemfortheirconsiderableworkonthisprojectandthecontributionwehopeitmakestothefuturedevelopmentdebate.Wearealsogratefultoallthose,bothinsideandoutsideoftheUKGovernment,whoparticipatedininterviewsandprovidedcommenttoinformthefindingsandconclusionsofthisreport.
Whilethedetailedconclusionsandrecommendationsinthereportarethoseofippr,WorldVisionsupportsthefindingsandthecallforgreaterpolicycoherencefordevelopmentacrosstheUKGovernmentwithacontinuedstrongandindependentrolefortheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment.HowtheUKcontributestodevelopmentpolicyandusesits
positionontheglobalstageneedstoberevisited,andWorldVisionhopesthatthisresearchhelpsshapethatdebate.
JustinByworth
ChiefExecutive,WorldVisionUK
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Overthelast12years,theUnitedKingdomhasbuiltaninternationalreputationasaleadingaiddonor,andasaninnovatorindevelopmentpolicy.TheDepartmentforInternational
Development(DFID)isastrong,independentactorbothinLondonandinthecountriesinwhichitworks.Furthermore,aconsensushasnowbeenestablishedacrossmuch(ifnotall)ofthepoliticalspectrumforthedepartmentsexistence,forthecommitmenttomeetthe0.7percentofGDPaidtarget,andforthelegitimacyofthedevelopmentagenda.Theseachievementsshouldbecelebratedandbuilton.
Butbeyondaid,aseriousattemptbytheUKoranyotherdevelopedcountrytoengagewiththeunderlyingcausesofpovertyalsorequirespolicychangesbeyondthetraditionalterritoryofdevelopmentpolicyinforeignaffairsanddefence,inmigrationandtrade,infinanceandenvironment.Thisagendaisusuallyreferredtoaspolicycoherencefordevelopment,andisthefocusofthisreport.
AlthoughaidfromtheUKcanhaveanimportantimpactonthelivesofsomepoorpeoplein
thedevelopingworld,theimpactsofarangeofotherfactorsonpovertyandrightsarebothmoreprofoundandfarwider.Theseinclude:insecurityandviolentconflict;theopportunitiesforandreturnsfromtradeandinternationalmigration;corruption,andclimatechange.TheUKscommitmentto,anddeliveryof,internationalpovertyreductionobjectivesthusneedstobejudgedacrossarangeofpoliciesfarbeyondwhatisusuallythoughtofasdevelopmentpolicy,andwhichareoutsidethedirectcontrolandremitofDFID.
ThisdebateisoftenexpressedthroughamorespecificdiscussionofDFIDsplacewithingovernment.DFIDofficialsarguethatthedepartmenthasbecomeadevelopmentministry,notanaidagency,focusingasmuchoninfluencingpoliciesinWhitehall(andinternationally)asondeliveringhigh-qualitydevelopmentassistance.Critics(insideandoutsidegovernment)arguethatDFIDstilloperatesprimarilyasanaidagency,separatefromtherest
ofgovernment;thatwiderUKpublicpolicyindefenceandsecurity,environment,migrationandtradeisrarelyapproachedthroughapovertyreductionlens(particularlywheretherearegenuineconflictsbetweenUKinterestsandthoseofpoorcountries);andthattheresultisalackofclearfocusorcoherenceintheUKssupportfor,andengagementwith,thepoorestcountries.Ofcourse,intherealworldofpoliticstherearegenuinetrade-offsbetweentightly-focuseddevelopmentpoliciesandwiderinfluence,betweenshort-termpovertyreductionobjectivesandlonger-termchangeprocesses,and,insomecases,betweentheinterestsofrichandpoorcountries.Thisreportdoesnotclaimtohaveeasyanswers.Rather,weaimtosetoutthenatureofthetrade-offsthatexist,explorethe(explicitorimplicit)decisionsthathavebeenmadebytheUKgovernmentinthefaceofthesetrade-offsanddrawsomeconclusionsaboutareasinwhichtheevidencesuggeststhatdifferentchoices
shouldbemadeinthefuture.
TheUKrecordonpolicycoherence
Theambitiontoachievepolicycoherencehas,inprinciple,beenpresenteversincetheestablishmentofDFID.AseriesofgovernmentWhitePapershaveallgivenprominencetopolicycoherence,althoughthefocushasshiftedovertime.TheGovernmenthasalsotriedtouseitscentralpolicyandtarget-settingmachinerytopromotecoherence.Aplethoraofcross-Whitehallmechanismshavealsoevolvedovertime,reflectingattemptstoachieveamorejoined-upgovernmenteffortondevelopment.Thesebodiesoftenoverseespendingfromanaidbudgetthathasincreasinglyspreadoutacrossdepartmentalboundaries.
Thisreport,basedinpartoninterviewswitharound25civilservantsfromarangeof
departments,aswellaspoliticaladvisersandexternalexperts,suggeststhattheGovernmenthasmaderealstepstowardsgreatercoherence,especiallyinsomeareassuchastrade,climatechangeandconflictresolution.However,moreremainstobedone.DFIDstillappears
Executivesummary
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tohaveacorefocusonconventionalaidprogrammesandin-countryreformprocesses,andiscriticisedbysomeforitslargelytechnocratic(ratherthanpolitical)approachtoputtingthedevelopmentcaseingovernment.Otherdepartments,whiletheydoincreasinglyvalueDFIDsinput,alsohaveawaytogoinreflectingtheimportanceoftheUKsinternational
developmentobjectivesintheirpoliciesandpractice.Policycoherence,andtheinteractionbetweenDFIDandothergovernmentdepartments,hasevolvedinaratherunevenway,oftenawayfromthepoliticalspotlight.
TradepolicywastargetedfromtheverystartofDFIDsexistence:anearlydecisionwastakentoinvestinexpertisewithinDFID,andtoengagewiththethenDepartmentofTradeandIndustry(DTI)tomaketheargumentthatoncetradepolicymovedawayfrommercantilism,developmentbecamethemainissue.TherewasalsoanevolutioninDFIDsapproachtoconflictquiteearlyon,withhumanitarianmilitaryinterventionintheBalkansandSierraLeoneforcingthedepartmenttothinkabouthowitworkedalongsidetheMinistryofDefence(MOD),andabouttherelationshipsbetweenstabilisation,reconstructionandlong-termdevelopment.Asomewhatdifferentsetofissueshasarisenin
themorerecentcasesofIraqandAfghanistan.WhileworkinthesecountriesaccountsforarelativelysmallpartofDFIDsprogramming,ithasattractedalargeamountofpoliticaldebate.
Morerecently,therehasbeenmajorengagementwithNumber10andtheDepartmentforEnergyandClimateChange(DECC)ontheinternationalaspectsofclimatechange.DFIDhasalsopressedsuccessfullyforactionbyotherdepartmentsonquitespecificissues,suchasthebanningofclustermunitionsbytheUKandthepromotionofaninternationalagreementonthesameissue.
Onarangeofotherissues(suchasmigration),DFIDhaseithermadelittleefforttoshapepolicyinothergovernmentdepartments,orhaslackedtheresources,argumentsorpoliticalweighttodoso.
DFIDhashadgoodreasontoholditselfslightlyapartfromtherestofgovernmentthebenefitsofDFIDsindependenceareclearinthepovertyfocusofUKaidspending,andinitsinternationalreputationbutthegainsmadeinthelastdecadeneedtobesecuredbyadvanceintoawideragenda,notbyaretreatintoanarrowlydefinedaidagencyrole.
Whypolicycoherencemattersnow
Developmentoutcomesdependcruciallyonfactorsbeyondaid,andUKGovernmentpoliciesacrossarangeofareasmatterforpovertyreductionandforsecuringbasichumanrights.Ontheotherside,UKinterestsareincreasinglyboundupwithsuccessfullyrespondingtoarangeofinternationalissues(suchasclimatechange).Inthiscontext,anarrowviewoftheUKsnationalinterestislookingincreasinglyoutdated.
ButcuttingacrossthepolicycoherencedebatearetheimplicationsofarapidlychangingfiscalandpoliticalsituationintheUKandelsewhere.AmassivesqueezeonpublicexpenditureandapossiblechangeofgovernmentwilldefinethenextfiveyearsofUKdevelopmentpolicy.ThestatedpositionoftheConservativePartyisthatmanyofthewiderparametersoftheconsensusestablishedsince1997willnotchange.AConservativegovernmentwouldkeepDFIDasaseparatedepartmentandwouldmaintainorevenincreaseaidspending.Therearenoproposalstoamendthe2002ActwhichlimitsDFIDspendingtopovertyreduction,althoughtheConservativeshaveindicatedthattheywanttoexplorethepossibilityofusingmoreoftheaidbudgetforsecurity-relatedspending.Inanycase,therearelikelytobeconsiderablepoliticalpressuresonDFIDsbudget,independenceandwaysofworking.
Therearedifferentviewsonthequestionofwherenext?forDFID,andforUKdevelopmentpolicy.Somearguethat,facedwithincreasingfiscalandpoliticalpressuresinthecomingyears,DFIDshoulddefenditsseparatenessandindependenceevenmore;othersthatthe
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changingnatureofpovertyrequiresamorejoined-upapproachacrossgovernment.SomeevenarguethatDFIDshouldbemergedbackintotheForeignandCommonwealthOffice.
MuchofthecontroversyhasfocusedonhowDFIDoperatesincountrieswheretheUKisatwar,andIraqandAfghanistaninparticular.Thesesituations,whileveryimportantpolitically,
representonlyasmallpartofwhatDFIDdoes.Particularproblemsdoariseinsuchsituationsbutwesuggestthattheyrequiretargetedsolutionsratherthansystematicchanges.ItwouldbeamistaketoreconfigureDFIDsentireapproachonthebasisofthedemandsoftheseparticularcases.Insuchsituationsitiscriticaltohaveclarityaboutthemissionandobjectives,andanagreedstrategyforthewholeofGovernmentbasedonsharedanalysis.Itthenmakessensetoapplyprinciplesofflexibilityandtransparencyintheuseofresources.Governmentspendinginsuchcircumstancesshouldnotbeaboutastrugglebetweenthosewhowanttoraidtheaidbudgetandthosewhowanttodefendtheaidbudgetatallcosts.Theimportantdistinctionshouldnotbebetweenwhichspendingcancountasofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)andwhichcannot,butbetweeneffectiveandineffectivespending.ThismightmeanDFIDrecognisingthatsecurityobjectivesarelegitimatefor
povertyreductionaswellasforwiderUKinterests,andagreeingtospendonnon-ODAcategories,butthiswillalsomeantheGovernmentbeingclearthatthisexpenditurecannotbecountedasODA.
Intheend,concernsaboutprotectingaidspendingforpovertyreductionandmaintaininganappropriateallocationofDFIDspendingbetweencountriesarebestaddressedthroughhavingastrongDFIDvoicemakingthedevelopmentalcaseattheheartofgovernment.WethinkthatthebenefitsofastrongDFID,independentoftheFCO,clearlyoutweighthecosts,andthereisnoquestioninourmindsthatDFIDspositionasaseparatedepartmentwithaCabinet-levelsecretaryofstateshouldbemaintainedandstrengthened.
However,thisdoesnotmeanthatDFIDshouldstandapartfromtherestofgovernment.ItisimportantbothforUKdevelopmentpolicyandforDFIDasadepartmentthatthecoherence
ofgovernmentpolicyandpracticedeepensandbecomesmoresystematic.DFIDshouldcontinuetobeindependentandtomakedecisionsbasedonaclearsetofdevelopmentandpovertyreductionobjectives(particularlyaboutaidprogramming),whilealsoengagingmoreeffectivelywiththerestofgovernmentatthepolicylevelandontheground.
Inthecurrenteconomicandpoliticalclimate,apublicandpoliticaldefenceofaidspending,andoftheUKssuccessfulinternationaldevelopmentpolicies,mustrecognisetheinterdependencyofdifferentobjectives.ThedevelopmentdebateintheUKwillincreasinglybelinkedtodebatesonissuesincludingconflictandsecurity,climatechange,andmigrationandtrade.Similarly,whenconsideringthecircumstancesofthepoorestcountries,itseemsimpossiblenottorecognisethelinksbetweendevelopmentandissuessuchasconflictandclimatechange.
So,therearebothpragmaticandprincipledreasonstoconsiderpolicycoherence.ItseemslikelythattheUKsinternationaldevelopmentcommunitymayneedtomaketheseinterdependencyargumentsmorestronglyinthefuturethanithasinthepast,inordertoprotecttheaidbudgetandDFIDsindependence.ThisaddsanotherdimensiontothedebateaboutwhetherDFIDissufficientlyjoined-upwithotherpartsofGovernment,andonwhatterms.
WherenextforUKdevelopmentpolicy?
DFIDneedstocontinuebuildingcloserrelationshipswithothergovernmentdepartments,whichbringsrisksforthepurityofDFIDspovertyreductionmission.However,DFIDcannotaffordtokeepbeingseenastheNGOdowntheroad,asithasbeencaricatured
withinotherpartsofgovernmentperceptionscanmatterasmuchasreality.Instead,inthewordsofoneinterviewee,thedepartmentmustbecomemoreofaWhitehallwarrior.
Successfulpolicycoherencefordevelopmentmustbejustthatfordevelopment.Thismeansthatthereneedtobeclearpoliticalandofficialmechanismstoensurethatthe
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Governmentsdevelopmentobjectivesaresystematicallyconsideredacrossarangeofpolicyareas.Whenotherobjectivesorinterestslegitimatelysupersededevelopmentobjectives,thisshouldbetransparent,andstepsshouldstillbetakentominimiseharmandmaximisedevelopmentbenefits.Policycoherencedoesnotmeanabandoningpoliciesthatseek
developmentandpovertyreductionfortheirownsake.Butconfidenceisneededtoengageonchallengingissues,andtorecognisethatmessycompromisesarepartofmakingprogress.Thekeyrisktobemitigatedisthat,inseekingcoherence,thedevelopmentagendagetslostordowngradedrelativetootherissues(forexample,security),andthattheUKscoredevelopmentpoliciesbecomelesseffectiveasaresult.
Acentralconclusionofthisstudyisthatgreatercoherenceisnotusuallybeingpreventedbyalackofcross-governmentmechanismsfordialogueandcooperation;therearemanysuchmechanismsonmostissues,oftenatverysenioraswellasoperationallevels.Amoreimportantissueistheincentives(orlackthereof)withingovernmenttomakethesemechanismsworkwellinpractice.Wearguethatthekeytocoherenceisagreed-uponjointstrategyacrossgovernment,basedonsharedanalysisandclearpoliticalleadership,and
supportedbyaneffectivecasemadetothepublic.Summaryofrecommendations
Developmentconcernsandobjectivesshouldformakeypartofdecision-makingacrossthefullrangeofUKpoliciesthatimpactondevelopingcountries.Attemptstoincreasepolicycoherencefordevelopmentshouldalwaysincludeachildwell-beingandrightsperspective.Wheretensionsexistanddevelopmentobjectivescannotappropriatelybegivenpriority,harmshouldbeminimised,developmentbenefitsmaximisedanddecisionsshouldbemadeopenlyandaccountably.
TheGovernmentshoulddevelopawhole-of-governmentinternationaldevelopmentstrategy,andshouldcarryoutasystematicanalysisofthedevelopmentimpactsofUK
policies(including,butnotlimitedto,conflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,climatechangeandmigration).Thisshouldhavestrongownershipacrossgovernment,andastrongfocusonnon-DFIDpolicylevers.
TheGovernmentshouldensurethatDFID,theFCO,theMOD,theDepartmentforBusiness,InnovationandSkills(BIS),DECC,theUKBorderAgency(UKBA)andotherrelevantdepartmentsagreejointUKGovernmentstrategiesforallimportantdevelopingcountrieswheretheUKhasbothasubstantialaidprogrammeandsignificantstrategic,commercialorsecurityinterests.Thesecountrystrategiesshouldbebasedonsharedanalysiscontributedtobyalldepartments.
FCOpostsandDFIDcountryofficesshouldplayakeyroleintheprocessofformingjointcountrystrategiesandwiderthematicstrategies.DFIDshouldretainoperational
independenceatthecountrylevel,butneedstooperatewithincross-governmentalstrategicframeworks.
Alldepartmentsshouldcreateincentivesforexamplethroughappraisalsandpromotioncriteriaforspendingtimeandresourcesoninter-departmentalworking.Theseincentivesshouldextenduptoseniorlevels(includingviaPublicServiceAgreementframeworks)toencourageseniorcivilservantstoprovideanexampletomorejuniorstaffandcreateaculturewhereworkingwithotherdepartmentsisvalued.Careerprogressionstructuresshouldalsoreflecttheimportanceofcross-departmentalworking.
Alldepartmentsshouldreviewtheskillsoftheirstafftoensurethattheyareappropriateforachievinggreatercoherence(forexample,DFIDshouldemploymorepoliticaladvisers).
DFIDssolespendingfocusonpovertyreductionundertheInternationalDevelopmentActshouldberetainedandevenstrengthened,butshouldbebasedonabroad
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analysisofwhatdrivespovertyreduction.TherestrictionsoftheActshouldapplytoODAspendingacrossgovernment,notjustinDFID.ThedefinitionofODAshouldnotbereopened,butDFIDshouldhaveaccesstomorenon-ODAfunds,particularlyinordertoengagemoreeffectivelyinsituationsofconflict.
TheGovernmentshouldencouragetheOECDsDevelopmentAssistanceCommitteetoprovidebetterreportingonnon-ODAspendingonalimitedtypeofclearly-definedactivitiesthatpromotedevelopment,inordertograntsuchspendingmorerecognitionandpoliticalcredit.
Alldepartmentsshouldengagewiththeircivilsocietyconstituencies,andwiththepublic,ontheimportanceandvalueofthecoherenceagenda.DFIDinparticularneedstoproactivelycommunicatewiththepublicandwithParliamentinordertoexplainthecomplicatedrealitiesandambiguitiesofthedevelopmentprocess.Iftheyarereallyinterestedinachievingeffectiveoutcomesindevelopingcountries,theFCOandMODhavearesponsibilitytopromotethelegitimacybothofdevelopment,andofDFID,withtheirownconstituencies.
Ministersandpoliticiansmustmakethepoliticalandpubliccaseforpolicycoherence,andshouldhavetheconfidencetoengagewiththecomplexrealitiesofdevelopment.
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TheaimofthisreportistoinformthedebateaboutthefutureoftheUKsdevelopmentpolicy.WeassesshowfarUKpoliciesarecoherentfromadevelopmentperspective,and
whatthebalanceisbetweeninternationaldevelopmentandotherobjectives,acrossarangeofareas.Weidentifysomeofthebarrierstomorejoined-upgovernment.OnthebasisofthisanalysiswemakeaseriesofrecommendationsforboththeDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheworkingsofgovernmentmorewidely.
Thecontext
Overthelast12yearstherehavebeendramaticchangesintheUKinternationaldevelopmentpolicylandscape.Whenitcametopowerin1997,theLabourGovernmentcreatedanewDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)andaseatfordevelopmentpolicyintheCabinet.Thiswasfollowedbytheuntyingofaidin2001andanInternationalDevelopmentActin2002,whichgaveBritishaidanexplicitpovertyreductionremit.Spendingonaidsteadilyincreasedto6.3billionby2008,a140percentincreaseinreal
termssince1997.Itcurrentlystandsat0.43percentofnationalincome,andin2005theGovernmentcommitteditselftotheUnitedNationstargetofgiving0.7percentofnationalincomeinaidby2013,acommitmentitnowproposestolockinthroughlegislation.
Inmanyways,Britainsinternationalaidefforthasbeenanenormoussuccess,especiallyintheareasithasprioritised,suchashealthandeducation.Infantandchildmortalityrateshavefallenacrossthedevelopingworld,morechildrenareinschool,andrealprogresshasbeenmadeintacklingtheHIV/AIDSepidemic.Whilethesechangeshavebeenbroughtaboutbymanydifferentactors,DFIDestimatesthattheUKaidprogrammehelpstolift3millionpeopleoutofpovertyeachyear(DFID2009).
DFIDisnowanacceptedpartofgovernment.Oppositionpartieshavepledgedtoretain
DFIDsCabinetplace,andtomeettheUNaidtargetof0.7percentofnationalincomeby2013atthelatest.Intheinternationaldevelopmentsystem,theUKcarriesgenuineinfluence.ItisnowthebiggestsinglecontributortotheWorldBanksprogrammeforlow-incomecountries,andhasspearheadeddiscussionsintheOECD,alongsideotherEuropeandonors,onhowtoimprovethequalityofaid.DFIDisrecognisedasaworld-leadingdevelopmentagency,andiswidelyseenasanexampleofbestpractice.AlthoughtheUKaidprogrammeisbynomeansperfect,significantprogresshasbeenmadetheGovernment,andDFID,canrightlybeproudofthevolume,qualityandpovertyfocusofUKaid.
However,thereisalsoafundamentaltensionattheheartofUKdevelopmentpolicy.EversincethecreationofDFID,policymakershavewrestledwithabalancebetweenthedesiretofocusonaddressingthemanifestationsofextremepovertyontheonehand,andtheneed
toengagewithitsunderlyingcausesontheother.ThefirstapproachhasbeenframedintermsoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs).TheMDGshavealsoplayedacentralroleinpubliccampaignstoincreasetheaidbudgetintheUK,suchasMakePovertyHistory.Inbothpublicandpoliticaldebate,internationaldevelopmenthasbecomealmostsynonymouswiththeMDGs.Inturn,aidhasdominateddiscussionsabouthowtheMDGscouldbemettheUKseffortshavefocusedonDFIDdeliveringaideffectivelyinordertosupportbasicservicesindevelopingcountries,especiallyhealthandeducation.
Thesecondapproachhasbeenlessabouttacklingtheimmediatemanifestationsofpoverty,andmoreaboutshapingpoliciesinbothrecipientanddonorcountriesacrossawiderangeofareas,fromtradeandmigrationtogovernanceandconflictprevention,andmorerecently
climatepolicy.Therehasbeenagrowingrecognitionthatpovertyisaffectedbyawiderangeoffactors,andthatgivingaidwithoutengagingwiththemisnotaneffectivelong-termstrategyforreducingpoverty.ThisanalysishasbeenapparentinUKaidprogramming,andDFIDhasbeenincreasinglyusingaidtoaddresssomeoftheseissues,andengagingwith
Introduction
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developingcountrygovernmentstoimprovewiderpolicyframeworks.
ChangesinaidprogrammingandDFIDsstrategyinthedevelopingcountrieswhereitworksareanimportantpartofthisbroaderapproachtodeliveringpovertyreduction.Butbeyondthis,aseriousattemptbytheUKoranyotherdevelopedcountrytoengagewiththe
underlyingcausesofpovertyalsorequirespolicychangesathomebeyondthetraditionalterritoryofdevelopmentpolicyinforeignaffairsanddefence,inmigrationandtrade,infinanceandenvironment.Thisagendaisusuallyreferredtoaspolicycoherencefordevelopment,andisthefocusofthisreport.Coherenceisamoreambitiousagendathancoordination.Coordination(forexamplebetweenDFIDandFCOofficialsworkinginthesamecountry)suggestscommunicationanddivisionoflabour,whilecoherencesuggestsamorefundamentalalignmentofpolicyobjectives.
DFIDhasbecomeincreasinglykeentoemphasisethatitisadevelopmentministry,notanaidagency.AkeypartofthisisinfluencingthewiderUKGovernmenttoensurethattheUKspolicieshelpdeliver(oratleastdonothinder)internationaldevelopmentobjectives.
Itisimportanttonotefromtheoutsetthatthetwoapproachestointernationaldevelopmentandpovertyreductionsetoutabovearenotmutuallyexclusive.Theyshouldbemutuallysupportiveandreinforcing.However,DFIDhastodeliverambitiousobjectiveswithfiniteresources,negotiatingcapitalandpoliticalwill.Quiterightly,prioritiesmustbeset,anditisnotalwaysclearwhichapproachesandstrategieswillreapthegreatestrewardsforpeopleinthepoorestcountries.
OurargumentinthisreportisnotthattheGovernmentorDFIDhasgotitwronginthepast,butratherthatnowmightbeapropitioustimetore-examinethewayDFIDengageswiththerestofgovernmentonthewidersetofissuesthataresoimportanttodevelopment.
Whycoherencemattersnow
TheevidencepresentedinthefollowingchaptersdemonstratesthatwhileaidfromtheUKcanhaveanimportantimpactonthelivesofsomepoorpeopleindevelopingcountries,theimpactsofarangeofotherfactorsonpovertyandrightsarebothmoreprofoundandfarwider.Theseinclude:thelevelofinsecurityandviolentconflict;theopportunitiesforandreturnsfromtradeandinternationalmigration;theextentofcorruption;andtheimpactofclimatechange.ThismeansthattheUKscommitmentto,anddeliveryof,internationalpovertyreductionobjectivesneedstobejudgedacrossarangeofpoliciesthatextendfarbeyondwhatisusuallythoughtofasdevelopmentpolicy,andthatareoutsidethedirectcontrolandremitofDFID.
Thisfacthasparticularimportanceforagenciesthatfocusonchildwell-beingandrights,likeWorldVisionUK(seeForeword,above).Partlybecauseofthegreaterphysicalandsocialvulnerabilityofchildren,theysufferparticularlyfrompovertyandhunger,exploitation,violenceandinsecurityandabusesofrights.Conversely,theyalsobenefitthemostfrommoresecureandbetterlivelihoodsfortheirfamilies,frombetterschoolingandhealthservicesandfrompeaceandenvironmentalstability;inshort,childrenhavethegreaterstakeinthefuture.Becausemanyoftheseoutcomesdependfarmoreontherangeoffactorsoutlinedabovethanonaid,thecoherenceagendashouldbeatthecentreofthinkingaboutchildrenshealth,educationandrighttoprotectionandcare,bothinhumanitariancrisesandmorewidely.
Theimportanceofpolicycoherencehasalwaysbeenunderstood(intheUKandelsewhere),butithasneverbeenaneasyagendatodeliver,eventhoughithasarguablygrowninimportanceinrecentyears.Inthelast18monthstheseissueshavemovedtothecentreofUKdebatesaboutinternationaldevelopmentandpovertyreduction,1 promptingcallsto
1.Forexample,in2009thesekindofargumentsfeaturedprominentlyinboththeGovernmentsInternationalDevelopmentWhitePaper,BuildingOurCommonFuture,andintheConservativesPolicyGreenPaper,OneWorldConservatism:AConservativeAgendaforInternationalDevelopment.
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thinkafreshaboutthefuturedirectionofUKdevelopmentpolicy.Thereareanumberofreasonsforthis.Thefirstisthattheworldfeelsincreasinglyinter-connected.Newglobalissues,likeclimatechange,haverisenuptheagenda,whileoldonesliketheglobalimpactsofbankingandfinancepolicyhavereturnedwithavengeance,causingaseverecrisiswith
deepimpactsonmanyofthepoorestcountries.Crisescanhaveparticularlynegativelong-termimpactsonchildrenbyinterruptingtheireducation,orbylimitingtheiraccesstonutrition,healthcareandsocialsupportduringkeystagesoftheirdevelopment.Inturn,thelong-termimpactsofcrisisonchildrenwillservetodeceleratedevelopmentmorebroadlyduetotheinter-generationalnatureofpovertytransmission.
Anotherreasonfortheincreasingrelevanceofthecoherencedebateisdue,paradoxically,tosuccessfuldevelopmentinmanycountries.Aspovertyinthesecountriesdeclines,developmentpolicyislikelytobecomeincreasinglyfocusedonthebottombillion(Collier2008,WorldBank2007b)thosepeoplelivingincountrieswithmultipleandparticularlyintractableproblems,wherestatesarefragileorfailing,whereinstitutionsareweak,whereconflictisoftenrife,wherechangesintheinternationaleconomymoreoftenhavenegative
impactsthanpositiveones,andmostimportantly,wheretraditionalaidapproachesdonotworkverywell(PublicAccountsCommittee2009).Developmentpolicyinthesecontextshastobeaboutmuchmorethanjustdeliveringbasicservicesasusuallydefined,andinparticularmeansbeingabletounderstandandhelpresolveviolentconflicts.InsettingslikeAfghanistan,Pakistan,Somalia,Sudan,KenyaandSierraLeone,theconceptualfirewallsbetweenpoverty-focuseddevelopmentinterventionsandgovernance,securityandwiderforeignpolicyobjectiveshavebrokendown.
Inprinciple,theambitiontoachievepolicycoherencehasbeenpresenteversincetheestablishmentofDFID.AseriesofgovernmentWhitePapershaveallgivenprominencetopolicycoherence,althoughtheparticularpolicyfocushasshiftedovertime.The1997WhitePaperthatestablishedthedepartmenthasawholechapteronpolicycoherenceand
explicitlystatedthatDFIDshouldnotsimplybeanaidagency.The2000WhitePaperfocusedontheimportanceoftradeandtradepolicyinthecontextofglobalisation(followingthefailureoftheWorldTradeOrganisationsummitinSeattle).Thekeythemeofthe2006WhitePaperwasimprovinggovernance,whilethe2009WhitePaperprioritisedclimatechangeandconflict.
Atthesametime,theGovernmenthastriedtouseitscentralpolicyandtarget-settingmachinerytopromotecoherence.In2007itcreatedanumberofrelevantpublicserviceagreements(PSAs),usedtoholddepartmentstoaccounttotheTreasuryandthePrimeMinister,whichapplyjointlyacrossanumberofdepartments.ThusPSA29,whichcalledforquickerprogresstowardstheMDGs,appliestoDFID,theFCO,DECCandtheTreasury.PSA30,whichisaboutreducingtheimpactofconflict,appliestoDFID,FCOandtheMOD.PSA
27onclimatechangeisledbyDECCbutalsoinvolvestheFCOandDFID.Inturn,thesePSAsaretranslatedintodepartmentalobjectives.Forexample,oneoftheFCOsdepartmentalobjectivesis:Sustainabledevelopment,underpinnedbydemocracy,goodgovernanceandhumanrights.
Beyondtarget-settingandobjectives,aplethoraofcross-Whitehallmechanismshaveemergedovertime,reflectingattemptstoachieveamorejoined-upgovernmenteffortondevelopment.TheseincludeajointDFID-BIStradeunit,thejointfundingpoolsforconflictsharedwiththeFCOandtheMOD,andajointunitwithDECConclimatechange.Thesebodiesalsooftenoverseespendingfromanaidbudgetthathasincreasinglyspreadoutacrossdepartmentalboundaries,suchasthe800millionenvironmentalfundsharedbetweenDFIDandDECC,anda260millionpost-conflictfundmanagedjointlybyDFID
andtheFCO.However,thereisanongoingdebateonhowfarpolicycoherencehasbeenachievedintheUK.DFIDofficialsarguethatthedepartmenthasindeedbecomeadevelopmentministry,notanaidagency,focusingasmuchoninfluencingpoliciesinWhitehall(andinternationally)
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asondeliveringhigh-qualitydevelopmentassistance.Critics(insideandoutsidegovernment)arguethatDFIDstilloperatesprimarilyasanaidagencyandistooseparatefromtherestofgovernment;thatwiderUKpublicpolicyindefenceandsecurity,environment,migration,andtradeisrarelyapproachedthroughapovertyreductionlens
(particularlywheretherearegenuineconflictsbetweenUKinterestsandthoseofpoorcountries);andthattheresultisalackofclearfocusorcoherenceintheUKssupportfor,andengagementwith,thepoorestcountries.
ThisdebateisoftenexpressedthroughamorespecificdiscussionofDFIDsplacewithingovernment.SomebelievethatdefendingDFIDspositionasafullyindependentdepartmentwithaspecificpovertyreductionremitistheonlywaytopreventtheencroachmentofotherinterestsintotheUKspolicyapproachtothepoorestcountries.OtherssuggestthatitisthisveryindependencethatlimitscoherenceinUKpolicy,andthatreducesthevoiceofdevelopmentinwiderUKpolicydecisions,andsomeevenarguethatDFIDshouldbereintegratedintotheFCO.
ipprthinksthatthebenefitsofastrongandindependentDFIDclearlyoutweighthecosts
thereisnoquestioninourmindsthatDFIDspositionasaseparatedepartmentwithaCabinet-levelsecretaryofstateshouldbemaintainedandstrengthened.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatDFIDshouldstandapartfromtherestofgovernment.
InsomesensesthisdebateaboutDFIDspositioningovernmentisamicrocosmofwiderdebatesaboutthemosteffectiveapproachtopolicycoherence.Intherealworldofpoliticstherearegenuinetrade-offstobemadebetweentightlyfocuseddevelopmentpoliciesandwiderinfluence,betweenshort-termpovertyreductionobjectivesandlonger-termchangeprocesses,and,insomecases,betweentheinterestsofrichandpoorcountries.Thisreportdoesnotclaimtohaveeasyanswers;rather,wetrytosetoutthenatureofthetrade-offsthatexist,explorethe(explicitorimplicit)decisionsthathavebeenmadebytheUKinthefaceofthesetrade-offs,anddrawsomeconclusionsaboutareasinwhichtheevidence
suggeststhatdifferentchoicesshouldbemadeinthefuture.
Developmentinthedownturn
CuttingacrossthepolicycoherencedebatearetheimplicationsofarapidlychangingfiscalandpoliticalsituationintheUKandelsewhere.AmassivesqueezeonpublicexpenditureandapossiblechangeofgovernmentwilldefinethenextfiveyearsofUKdevelopmentpolicy.
ThestatedpositionoftheConservativePartyisthatmanyofthewiderparametersoftheconsensusestablishedsince1997willnotchange.AConservativegovernmentwouldkeepDFIDasaseparatedepartmentandwouldmaintainorevenincreaseaidspending.Therearenoproposalstoamendthe2002ActwhichlimitsDFIDspendingtopovertyreduction
(ConservativeParty2009),althoughtheConservativeshaveindicatedthattheywanttoexplorethepossibility(withinOECDDACrules)ofusingmoreoftheaidbudgetforsecurity-relatedspending(forexample,onanewStabilisationandReconstructionForce)(ConservativeParty2010).
However,therearelikelytobeconsiderablepoliticalpressuresonDFIDsbudget,independenceandwaysofworking.ThesemaycomelessfromthecurrentleadershipoftheConservativePartythanfromexistingbackbenchers,peers,andthenewgroupofMPsexpectedtocomeintoParliamentatthenextelection.2
2.Forexample,DouglasHurd,formerlyForeignSecretaryandnowaConservativepeer,recentlycalledforDFIDtobemergedbackintotheFCO(DODSNetwork2009).Asurveyof144ConservativeprospectiveParliamentarycandidatesbythewebsite
ConservativeHomeshowedonly4percentarguingthatinternationaldevelopmentshouldbeimmunefromspendingcuts,ascomparedwith39percentinfavourofprotectingdefenceand34percentforprotectinghealthspending(ConservativeHome.com2009).ThePoliticsHomewebsitealsofindslittlesupportforprotectingtheaidbudgetamongagroupofrespondentsthatincludesConservativefrontbenchers,senioradvisersandinfluentialcommentatorsintheright-leaningpress(PoliticsHome.com2009).
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EveniftotalUKaidspendingisprotectedbythecommitmenttomeetthe0.7percenttarget,thelikelyscaleofpublicspendingcutselsewheremeansthattherewillbepressurestore-routespendingviaotherdepartments.Indeed,thisisalreadyhappeningtosomeextentwithODAspendingoutsideDFIDrisingfasterthanDFIDsownprogramme
spendinginthelastspendingreview.TherearealsolikelytobecallstoallocateDFIDsspendinginsuchawayastogivegreatersupporttoobjectivesbeyondpovertyreduction,especiallynationalsecurity.Forexample,arecentpolicyGreenPaperindicatesthataConservativegovernmentwouldprobablyincreaseaidspendinginAfghanistanandPakistan(ConservativeParty2009).3
UnderlyingtheseanticipatedpressuresistheviewheldincertainpartsoftheConservativePartyandamongitscorevoters,andalsopartsofthepressthatthetraditionallyliberal,welfare-centredapproachtodevelopmentaidisweak,andthatwherewegiveaidtoothercountries,itshouldprimarilyservetheUKsnationalinterest,supportingoursecurityandforeignpolicies,andcommercialinterests(forasenseoftherecentdebate,seeMaxwell2007).Thisargumentexplicitlyrejectstheideathatinternationaldevelopmentpolicy(andin
particularaid)shouldbedeliberatelyisolatedfromthenationalinterestsofrichcountriesliketheUK.ThelatterideahasarguablybeenadrivingforceinUKpolicyinthelastdecadeandhas,forexample,ledtoDFIDsstatusasanindependentdepartment,withlegally-limitedpovertyreductiongoals.
Thisargumentisalsorelatedtothepolicycoherencedebate,becauseoneprogressiveresponsetoitreversesthepolicycoherenceargument.Thatresponseisthatreducingpovertyoverseasisanessentialandirreplaceableprerequisiteforasustainableendtoconflictandterrorism,andforathrivingworldeconomyinwhichtheUKcanprosper(see,forexample,ippr2008).Inthisargument,developmentandpovertyreductionareimportantforwiderpolicies,aswellasthereverse.
Inpractice,anydefenceofdevelopmentpolicyandaidinthecurrenteconomicandpolitical
landscapemustrecognisetheinterdependencyofdifferentobjectives.Indeed,whenconsideringthecircumstancesofthepoorestcountriesitwouldseembizarrenotto.Thisnotionofinterdependencybetweenpolicyobjectivesisnotconfinedtoprogressives.Forexample,theideathatachievinglastingsecurityinplaceslikeAfghanistanrequiresnon-militaryactionsuchaseconomicreconstructionandtheestablishmentoflawandorder,reinforcingeachotherlikestrandsofarope(Browne2006),isthebasisfortheso-calledComprehensiveApproachtointervention,embracedbytheUKarmedforcesandNATO.
ItseemslikelythattheUKsinternationaldevelopmentactorsmayneedtomaketheseinterdependencyargumentsmorestronglyinthefuturethanithasinthepast,inordertoprotecttheaidbudgetandDFIDsindependence.ThisaddsanotherdimensiontothedebateaboutwhetherornotDFIDissufficientlyjoined-upwithotherpartsofGovernment,andon
whatterms.
Reportmethodologyandstructure
Aswellasawide-rangingreviewofevidenceondifferentpolicyimpactsondevelopment,thisstudyisbasedonaround40interviewswithacademics,NGOs,civilservantsfromanumberofgovernmentdepartments,andspecialadvisersandpoliticiansfromallthemajorpoliticalparties.Toencouragefrankness,weallowedallintervieweestospeakanonymously.Namesofcurrentgovernmentofficialsandadvisersarenotlisted,butotherintervieweeswhowerehappytobenamedarelistedintheAppendix.Adraftofthisreportwassharedwithallthosewhowereinterviewedaspartoftheresearch,andthefinaltextreflects,whereappropriate,furthercommentsandfeedbackfrominterviewees.
3.DFIDcurrentlyspendsaround10timestheamountinAfghanistanasitwouldinacountrywithacomparabledegreeofpovertybutnoconflict.SeecommentsbyMichaelFoster,UnderSecretaryofState,DFID,inevidencetotheDefenceSelectCommittee,7July2009.
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Sections1to5examineanumberofissuesinturn:conflict,tradeandinvestment,corruption,climatechangeandmigration.TheseissuesdonotrepresentacomprehensivesurveyofalltheUKpoliciesthatarerelevantfordevelopmentobjectives,butwehopethattheyprovideasenseoftherangeofchallengesandissuesthattheUKneedstoconfront.
Eachsectionreviewsthecurrentstateofevidenceontheimpactsoftheissueinquestiononpovertyandrights,especiallyforchildren,whoformthemainfocusofWorldVisionswork.
Wethenlookathowjoined-upUKpolicyandgovernmentdepartmentsareintheseareas,fromtheperspectiveofinternationaldevelopment.Weidentifyareaswhereobjectivesare(orcouldbe)alignedandthosewherethereareconflictingagendas.Theobjectiveistoassessactualcoherenceinpractice,asopposedtojustpolicystatements.AlthoughmanyoftheissuesdiscussedhereareshapedbyinstitutionsandpoliciesataEuropeanand/orinternationallevel,wedonothavespaceheretodojusticetotheseinternationaldimensions.WewouldalsosuggestthatthefirststeptosuccessfulengagementwithEuropeanandinternationalpartnersontheseissuesisacoherentUKapproach.
Section6drawsoutsomegenerallessonsthatemergefromandarecommonacrossallthe
particularpolicyareas.Afinalsectionconcludesandsummarisesourrecommendations.
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Ifhumandevelopmentisregardedasaprocessofexpandingchoiceandadvancingrights,assuggestedbytheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),thenviolentconflict
mustsurelybeconsideredoneofthemostsignificantobstaclestoachievingit(UNDP2005).Westartthissectionbyreviewingtheeconomicandsocialcostsofconflict.
Theeconomiccostsofconflict
Inadditiontodeprivingmillionsofcitizensoftheirbasicrightstolifeandsecurity,protractedviolentconflictsarealsolikelytocauseaconsiderabledropinlevelsofproductiveeconomicactivity,withsomestudiesestimatingthatitcantakeatleastadecadeforcountriesemergingfromamajorcivilconflicttoreturnpre-warlevelsofGDPpercapita(Haughton1998).Whileattemptstoquantifytheglobalcostsofconflicthavebeenhinderedbyalackofaccurateandcomprehensivedata,PaulCollierandothershaveestimatedthatthetypicalcostofacivilwarisatleastUS$50billion(Collier2004).Otherssuggestthatcivilwars,onaverage,causeapermanentlossinincomeofaround2percentofGDP(Knightetal1996).
Thishasseriousimplicationsforlevelsofpovertyincountriesthatexperienceconflictandforthedynamicsofpovertyinpost-conflictsituations(Justino2006).
Duringaconflict,thediversionofacountrysresourcesfromproductivetodestructiveactivitiesinvolvesadoublelossfordevelopmentinthatittakesawayfromspendingonprogrammesrelatedtoeconomicandsocialgrowth,whilesimultaneouslyinflictingcostsintermsofthekeyinfrastructure(includingtelecommunicationssystems,railways,roads,bridges,portsandenergygenerationfacilities)thatmustberebuiltaftertheviolenceends(Collieretal2003).Conflictalsohasanimpactontheresourcesavailablefordevelopment,sincepoliticalandeconomicinstabilityoftenpromptsresidentstotransfertheirfinancialassetsoutofthecountry,aswellasdiscouragingpotentialexternalinvestors.Furthermore,civilwarservesasapowerfulstimulusforemigration,andasCollieretalnote,someof
theseemigrants,especiallythoseinindustrialcountries,thenprovideapost-conflictchannelforfurtheremigration(Collieretal2003:21).Notwithstandingtheboostthismightgivetoremittancelevelsintheshorttomediumterm,theforcedflightoffinancialandsocialcapitaltendstohaveanadverseeffectondevelopmentincountriesravagedbyconflictinthelongerterm.
Atthelevelofindividuals,householdsandcommunities,conflictcanclearlyhaveasevereimpactonsustainablelivelihoods.Manyofthosecaughtupinconflictwillloseimportantassetslikeproperty,modesoftransportandlivestock.Onestudyofthe1994civilwarinRwandaestimatedthat12percentofallhouseholdslosttheirhomes,whilecattlestockdiminishedbyaround50percent(Verpoorten2003).Otherslosejobsoraccesstoincome-generationopportunities(oftenduetothedeathormilitaryconscriptionoffamily-memberbreadwinners).Ithasbeensuggestedbysomeresearchthatafteracivilwarsevenyearsinduration,incomesaretypicallyabout30percentlowerthantheywouldhavebeenifthewarhadnotoccurred(Collieretal2003).Conflictcansometimescreateopportunitiesfortheverypoorestindividuals,ifjoininganarmyormilitiagroupsinvolvesmonetaryorotherformsofreward,butthenetoutcomeforsocietyisusuallyasignificantincreaseintheincidenceofabsolutepovertyandinequality.
Thesocialcostsofconflict
Beyonditsimpactoneconomicgrowth,conflictinvolvessignificantsocialcoststhatarenotsimplylimitedtothenumberofbattledeaths.Forexample,arecentInternationalRescueCommitteereportontheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)estimatesthatnearlyfiveand
ahalfmillionexcessdeathshaveoccurredinthecountryasaresultofmorethanadecadeofarmedconflictsincethelate1990s.Just0.4percentofthedeathsintheIRCssurveyperiodarethoughttohavebeenthedirectconsequenceofviolence,whilemostarethought
1.Conflict
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tohavebeencausedbyinfectiousdisease,malnutritionorneo-natalandpregnancyrelatedconditions(InternationalRescueCommittee2007).
Anotherstudy,onSierraLeone,surveyedfourruraldistrictsinconflict-affectedregionsandfoundthatthreeyearsaftertheendofadecade-longcivilwar,theaveragecrudemortality
rateintheseareaswasnearlyfourtimeshigherthantheSub-Saharanbaseline.SimilarfindingshavebeenmadeinrelationtocivilwarsinAngola,LiberiaandSouthernSudan,whileawiderstudyof51countriesaffectedbyarmedconflictshowsastronglinkbetweenconflictandtheriskofdeathanddisabilityforyearsaftertheviolencehasended(seeMdecinsSansFrontires2006,SapirandGomez2006,Beckeretal1993,Ghobarahetal2004).
Masspopulationdisplacementisanotherconsequenceofviolentconflictthathasseriousimplicationsfordevelopment.In2007,theestimatednumberofpeopleinternallydisplacedasaresultofconflictandviolenceexceeded26millionforthefirsttimesincetheearly1990s,with52countriesaroundtheworldhavingexperiencedsignificantlevelsofdisplacement(InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentreandNorwegianRefugeeCouncil
2008);notethatthreecountriesinparticularSudan(5.8million),Colombia(4million),andIraq(2.5million)accountedforalmosthalfofthisglobaltotal.Internallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)oftenhavelimitedornoaccesstothebasicnecessitiesoflifesuchasfood,waterandshelter,andasaresultofthebreakdownoflawandorderthataccompaniesconflict,theyfrequentlysufferviolationsoftheirhumanrightsthrougharbitraryattacks,detentionsorarrests.WomenandgirlsamongtheIDPpopulationareexposedtorapeandexploitationwhilechildrenoftenloseaccesstoeducationalopportunitiestheymayhavehadpreviously.
InternallydisplacedpopulationsalsofaceseriousrisksfrominfectiousdiseaseasaresultofpoorconditionsinmanyIDPcamps,andbecauseofdisruptionstoessentialhealthservices.Forexample,malariahadvirtuallybeeneliminatedinAfghanistanbytheendofthe1970s.However,thecollapseofcontrolprogrammesduringthe19781995civilwaralloweditsre-
emergence,andby2002,morethan50percentofthepopulationwaslivinginmalaria-endemicareas(Gayeretal2007).
Thedisplacementthatusuallyaccompaniesprotractedconflictshasafurtherspill-overimpactondevelopment,inthatviolenceinonecountryoftenaffectsthestabilityofitsneighbours.TheinterconnectedconflictsinWestAfricaoverthepastdecadeinLiberia,SierraLeone,Guinea,CtedIvoire,GuineaBissauandSenegalareaprimeexampleofthis,whilethemovementofrebelgroups,refugeesandsmallarmsandlightweaponsacrosstheborderbetweenUgandaandtheDRChasalsoservedtoperpetuateconflictandinhibitdevelopmentinbothcountriesuntilveryrecently.
Conflictandchildwell-being
Exposuretoconflictandviolencehasaparticularlynegativeimpactonchildrenandyoungpeople.Ashighlightedbyakeyreportin1996,childrenarerarelybystandersinwarsandcivilconflicts,butareoftendirecttargetsoractiveparticipants.Inadditiontothenumberofyoungpeoplethatarekilledorinjuredbywar,countlessothersgrowupdeprivedoftheirmaterialandemotionalneeds,includingthestructuresthatgivemeaningtosocialandculturallife(Machel1996).Violentconflictusuallyputssubstantiallimitsonthestatescapacitytoprovideessentialhealthandeducationservices,andthereareanumberofstudiesthatdrawonempiricalevidencetodemonstratetheadverseeffectsthatthishasonyoungpeople(seeBundervoetetal2008andShemyakina2006).
Forexample,theprevalenceofmalnutritionandtherateofmortalityamongchildrenundertheageoffiveinUgandaaresignificantlyhigherinareasofthecountryaffectedbyconflict.
Schoolattendanceisalsomuchlowerinsomeconflictareas,withonly43percentofchildrenintheKaramojaareaattendingprimaryschool,comparedwith82percentatthenationallevel.Thisrecognitionoftheparticularharmcausedtochildrenbyconflicthasled
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tothecreationofspecificinternationallegalprotectionsforchildreninsituationsofarmedconflict,includinga2005SecurityCouncilresolutionwhichestablishedaUNWorkingGrouponChildrenandArmedConflict,includingamonitoringandreportingmechanism.
Althoughtheemotionalconsequencesofgrowingupinanenvironmentofconflictare
hardertomeasure,thereisabroadconsensusintheliteratureabouttheharmfulimpactsdoingsohasonyoungpeople.Childrenthatlosetheirparentsorotherrelativesasaresultofconflictarefrequentlyrequiredtotakeonadditionalresponsibilitiestohelpsupportthefamily,whichmayinvolvedroppingoutofschool,workingonthestreetsorengaginginsexworkandotherdangerousactivitiesasameansofmakingmoney.Othersmaybeconscripted(eitherbyforceorvoluntarily)byarmedgroupsandusedassoldiersorfornon-combatpurposes,includingtheprovisionofsexualservices(UNICEF2009;seealsoUNDP2006).Aftertheconflictends,theseyoungpeopleareoftenstigmatisedbytheirsocietiesforhavingcommittedwarcrimesandfinditdifficulttosuccessfullyreintegrate,compoundingthetraumatheyexperienceasaresultoftakingpartinconflict(Zakaria2006).
DFIDsapproachtoconflictanddevelopment
DFIDhashadadedicatedsectionworkingonconflictsincethelate1990s.Initially,thedepartmentsengagementinsituationsofconflictwaslargelytoprovidehumanitarianrelieftoaffectedcivilianpopulations.Overtime,workinginconflict-affectedorinsecurecountrieshasbecomemorecentraltoDFIDswork,anditisnowspendingaround1.5billionayearalmostaquarterofitstotalspendingincountriesclassifiedasinsecure.SomeofthelargestincreasesinDFIDsprogrammesinrecentyearshavecomeinhighlyinsecurecountries,suchasAfghanistanandtheDRC(PublicAccountsCommittee2009).DFIDprogrammeshavealsobranchedoutintoconflictpreventionandrehabilitationandreconstructionafterconflict.Thedepartmenthasbecomeincreasinglyinvolvedinwidergovernmentpolicyonsecurityandconflicttoo(suchascontributingtonationalsecurity
strategiesandassessingUKarmsexports4).
The2009DFIDWhitePaperplacesaspecialemphasisonconflictresolution(seeBox1.1),providingadeeperanalysisthatbringspeace-buildingtogetherwithstate-building(thatis,buildinginclusivepoliticalsettlementsandstrengtheninginstitutions),andacommitmenttotreatingsecurityandjusticeasabasicservice,alongsidehealthandeducation(DFID2009).Ithasbeenwidelywelcomed,bothbyexternalstakeholdersandbyothergovernmentdepartments.
SeveralofourintervieweesfeltthatinsomeareasthenewWhitePapercatchesupwithwhatDFIDisalreadydoingontheground.ButasastatementofGovernmentpurpose,italsosetsoutanewagendaforconflictreductionandstate-buildingwhichneedstobeput
intopractice.TherearevaryingviewsonhoweasilyDFIDcanachievesuchashiftinfocus.Someobservers,bothwithinDFIDandoutside,seeatensionwithinthedepartmentbetweenthosewhoworkdirectlyonconflictanalysisandprevention,andclassicaidpractitionersordevelopmentprofessionalsfocusedonachievingtheMDGsthroughthedeliveryofbasicserviceslikehealthandprimaryeducation.Itisarguedthatthelattergroupmakeupthecoreofthedepartment,holdthemajorityofseniordecision-makingposts,andcomefromaparticularprofessionalperspectiveofdevelopmentpolicywhichissometimestechnocratic,whereasreallytacklingconflictandbuildingstatesrequiresamorepoliticalperspective.Oneimplicationofthisviewisthatnewstaff,withnewskills,willincreasinglybeneededasDFIDsfocusshiftsovertime.
4.Thearmsexportregimeisoneofseveralimportantissueswhich,forreasonsofspace,wehavenotbeenabletodiscussindetailinthisreport.
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Others,includingsomeseniorstaffinDFID,arguethatthedepartmentmovedawayfromaservicedeliveryapproachseveralyearsago,thattherearenowveryfewpureaidadministratorsleftthere,andthatmoststaff(atleastinLondon),aremainlyconcernedwithwiderpolicyissuesasthequotefromNematShafikbelowshows,forexample.Theypoint
tothefactthatDFIDhasbeencarryingoutanalysesofwhatdriveslocalcapacityandinstitutions,suchastheDriversofChangeseriesandmorespecificstrategicconflictassessments,foranumberofyears,andnotethatgovernancewasamajorthemeofthe2007WhitePaper(DFID2007).InthewordsofthePermanentSecretary:Whatwehavelearnedoverthelastfewyearsisthatavoidingoneconflictisequivalenttoall[the]foreignassistanceintheworld,soifwecanjustmaintainstabilityinthecountryforaperiod,thathashugeeconomicbenefits(NematShafikinevidencetothePublicAccountsCommittee2009:Ev8).
OnereasonforwhytherearesuchdifferentviewsaboutthenatureofDFIDmaybethatwhileithasprogressivelyinvestedinpoliticalanalysesofweakandfailingstates,andindeedofopenconflicts,ithasstruggledtoputtheseanalysesintopractice(Unsworth2008).CasessuchasNepal,whereastrategicconflictassessmentfundamentallychangedDFIDsaidprogramme,stillappeartoberelativelyrare.
Box1.1:Conflictanddevelopmentinthe2009WhitePaper
TherearethreeelementstotheapproachtoconflictintheWhitePaper.Thefirstisafocusontheunderlyingcausesofconflict,andtherecognitionthatbuildinginclusivepoliticalsettlementsthataremorethanjustbargainsbetweenelitesiscritical,sinceitisonlythese
settlementsthataresustainable.Thisapproachwilloftenmeanaddressingproblemssuchassocialandpoliticalexclusion,poorgovernance,andhighlevelsofunemployment,aswellasstrengtheningformalandinformalconflictresolutionmechanisms.TheWhitePaperrecognisesthatinfragilestatestheformalandinformalmechanismsrequiredtomediateconflictspeacefullyareoftenlackingandthatformalmechanismsaremoreoftenthannotsubvertedbycorruption.
ThattheWhitePaperincludessuchanexplicitlypoliticalapproachisstriking,becauseanoft-statedcriticismofDFIDisthatitistootechnocratic(andconservativeinitsthinkingasaresult).Thispointismadenotonlybythoseelsewhereingovernment(forexampletheFCO)andbyexternalcommentators,butalsosometimesfromwithinDFIDitself.Forexample,therecentevaluationofDFIDsprogrammeinAfghanistannotedthatunderlying
politicalproblemswererecognisedonlybelatedly(Benettetal2009).Itisalsoimportantbecauseitallowsfortherecognitionthataiditselfcanexacerbateconflictundercertaincircumstances(seeHouseofCommonsInternationalDevelopmentCommittee2006,CRISE2007).
Thesecondelementrelatestostate-building,whichisaboutstrengtheningthesurvivalfunctionsofthestate,themostimportantofwhichistoprovidecitizenswithsecurityandtheruleoflaw.Atthesametime,theWhitePaperisclearthatitiscriticalthatthesurvivalfunctionsarestrengthenedwithaccountabilitytopopulations,recognisingthatif,forexample,securitystructuresarestrengthenedwithoutaccountability,thereisariskofincreasingrepression.
Athirdelementisaboutmeetingtheexpectationsofthepopulation.Withinthiscontext,oneinterestingattempttolockconflictreductionintothecoreofDFIDsactivityistheframingofsecurityasabasicservice.OneintervieweearguedthatthiswasparticularlyimportantbecauseDFIDiscommittedtospending50percentofitsbudgetonbasicserviceprovision.However,meetingpeoplesexpectationsisnotjustaboutbasicservices:itisaboutabroaddefinitionofaccountability,includingdemocraticinclusion,humanrights,dealingwithcorruptionandpoorgovernance.
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Moreover,becauseDFIDissohighlydecentralisedontheground,thewayinwhichtheWhitePaperconflictagendacanbepushedfromthecentrewillbelimited.Forexample,thereiscurrentlynooverarchingcentralstrategyforthedeploymentofconflictadvisers(CAs),whoareoftencriticalfordevelopingcountryaidprogrammesthatrecogniseand
addressconflicts.WhetherornotanofficehasaCAdependsontheheadofthecountryofficeandtheissuestheyarechoosingtoprioritise.Thiscanleadtowhatappeartobeanomaloussituations.ThereisnoCAinPakistan,forexample,althoughtherearetwoinNepal.5 ThereisnoCAinZimbabwebutthereisoneinUganda.SomeworkhasbeendonewithinDFIDtotryandsystematisethemainstreamingofconflictissuesintoaidprogrammingin-country,butnotenough.
AfinalbutcrucialpointisthatinmostcaseswhereDFIDistryingtopreventorresolveconflicts,itisnotworkingalone.Britishtroopsaresometimesdirectlyinvolved,asincaseslikeSierraLeone,ornowAfghanistan;ormoreoften,UNpeacekeepers.Inanincreasingnumberofcases,conflictsinthecountrieswhereDFIDisworkingarerelatedtowiderissues,suchasterrorismorinternationalcrime,whereUKnationalinterestsareatstake.
HowcoherentareUKpolicyobjectivesonconflictanddevelopment?
Overthelasttwodecades,addressingviolentconflictindevelopingcountrieshasmoveduptheUKpolicyagenda.Thisispartlybecauseofthegrowingrecognitionofitsimportancefordevelopmentasdescribedabove,butalsobecausetheUKhasbeeninvolvedinanumberofdirectmilitaryinterventionsindevelopingcountries,includingSierraLeonein2000,Afghanistanfrom2001andIraqfrom2003.Changingpolicyhasreflectedthelessonslearnedfromtheseexperiences.
Basedonitsexperienceoverthelast20years,theMODhasbecomemuchmoreawareoftheimportanceofthewidercivilcontextforachievingsecurity.OneintervieweepointedoutthatbecausetheBritisharmedforceshaveincreasinglybeendeployedasmuchforreasonsof
humanitarianinterventionasaforceforgoodasforstrategicnationalinterest,we[theMOD]haveaninterestinworkingwithDFIDandothersinpreventingandresolvingconflict.
TherecognitionofthefailureofapurelymilitaryapproachinsuchcontextshasgivenrisetowhatisknowninmilitarycirclesastheComprehensiveApproach,whichistheneedforthemilitarytoworkinajoined-upwaywithciviliancounterpartstounderpinsecuritywitheconomicdevelopmentandinstitutionalreconstruction(MOD2006).
TheformaloverarchingframeworkforpolicyisnowgivenbyPSA30,whichhasappliedjointlytoDFID,FCOandtheMODsince2007,andisaimedatreducingtheimpactofviolentconflict.6 EachdepartmentinturnhasobjectivesandtargetsrelatingtoPSA30.
Meanwhile,theFCOisalsogovernedbyPSA30,andhasitsowntargetsforconflictresolution.Itcurrentlyspendsover400millionayearonconflictitslargestsingleprogramme.Atthesametime,theFCOalsohasanexplicitobjectivetopromotesustainabledevelopmentinternationally.TheFCOalsohasaspecificworkstreamonchildreninsituationsofarmedconflict,andisseekingtoimprovecoherenceacrossgovernmentonthisissueinparticular.
Howjoinedupisgovernmentinpractice?
Belowthesehigh-levelstatementsofprinciple,itisclearthatthestoryofUKpolicycoherenceismuchmorecomplex,andthatjoined-upgovernmentonconflictindevelopingcountriesisstillverymuchaworkinprogress(asdescribedbyLordMarkMalloch-Brown,
5.WeunderstandthataconflictadviserisnowbeingrecruitedinPakistan.
6.Actiononconflictcouldbebrokendownintoseveralconstituentparts,forexample,conflictprevention,conflictresolution,providingsecurityandpeace-keeping,andpost-conflictreconstruction.Thusfar,thefocushastendedtobeonthelastthreeareas,withconflictpreventionsomethingofanorphanissue,partlybecauseofthelackofvisibilityofimpactandthereforethedifficultyofgainingpoliticalsupportforexpandingit.ForDFID,thismaychangewiththeapproachtakeninthe2009WhitePaper.
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MinisterforAsia,AfricaandtheUNattheFCO,ontheComprehensiveApproachtotheDefenceSelectCommittee[2009,Q304]).Apictureemergesofsomebasichistoricalandstructuraltensions,withsignificantrecenteffortstoovercomethese.
ItiseasytoforgethowdifferentthemachineryoftheUKGovernmentlookedjusttwo
decadesago.TheFCOwasthemainleadonalloverseasissues,andtheMODwaspreoccupiedwiththeColdWar.Overthelast15years,inthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee,everythinghasbecomemorecomplex,moreoverlapping.MODnowworksinfragilestates.DFIDnowexists.Leadsarelessclear.7
Andwhilenewheadlinepoliciesforcoherencehavebeenintroducedinthelastfewyears,theFCO,MODandDFIDallhavedifferenthistoricalraisonsdtresandcultures,whichhavenotdisappearedovernight.Coreskillsetshavenotyetadjustedtothenewpolicylandscape.TheFCOandMODaredrivenprimarilybyUKinterestsandsecurity,andtheirhumanitarianobjectiveshavetobebalancedbyothers,suchasreducingtheriskfrominternationalterrorism.Bycontrast,DFIDhasafarmoreinternationalist,humanitarianagenda,andthroughtheInternationalDevelopmentAct,DFIDspendingcannotbetiedtonational
interest.AsBillRammellMP,MinsterfortheArmedForces,putittotheDefenceCommittee:
IfIamhonest,Ithinktherearestillculturalchallengesbetweenallthreeofour
departmentsinthatthemilitary,aidworkersanddiplomatshaveadifferentmindset
whentheycometoaprobleminitiallybutsomefundamentalsharedinterests.I
thinkwestillneedtodomoretoensurethatwecanbreakdownthosebarriers.
(HouseofCommonsDefenceCommittee2009:Q303)
OneofthemostimportantwaysinwhichthedifferentculturesandapproachesofDFID,FCOandMODaremanifestedisintheirtimeframes.WhereastheMODoftenhasanimmediatesecurityfocus,andtheFCOisusedtodealingwithcrisesandpoliticaleventsoccurringoverweeksormonths,DFIDsfocusonpovertyreductionandsustainabledevelopmentnecessitatesmuchlongertimeframes,oftenstretchingtodecades.Thiscontrastintimeframes,linkedtodifferenttraditionsandwaysofthinking,appliesevenwithinareasofactivitythatallagreeareimportant.Asoneintervieweeputit,DFIDwantstobuildthecapacityofacountrysoitcanbuilditsownschools,whiletheBritisharmywantstobuildtheschoolsandgetout.Foranumberofinterviewees,includingsomeatveryseniorlevels,thisdifferenceisthenubofthepolicycoherenceproblemwhenitcomestoconflictandfailingstates.
Thesedifferentbackgroundagendas,departmentalculturesandtimeframesforactionandthinkingmeanthat,despiteprogresstowardscoherenceandbetterjointworking(seebelow),thereareneverthelessstilltensions,withsomeintervieweesfeelingthatdepartmentsarenotclosetooneanotherandstilldonotowneachothersobjectives.Acommon
perceptionofDFID,fromFCOandMODintervieweesbutalsomorewidely,includingfromseniorpoliticaladvisersatthecentreofGovernment,wasthatithadnotalwaysbeenateamplayer,andsawitselfasstandingapartfromothergovernmentdepartments.
MuchoftherecentdebateontherelationshipbetweenDFID,FCOandMODhasbeendrivenbycasessuchasIraq,Afghanistan(seeBox1.2)andPakistan.InthesecasestheUKhasamilitarypresencerelatingtointernationalsecurity,orasetofnationalsecurity
7.ThefullcomplexityofhowdepartmentalrelationshipscanworkoutonthegroundwasbroughtoutbyoneintervieweeintheMOD:TheFCOhavetheleadonforeignpolicyin-country,butifthecountrygoesdownthetubes,atsomestagewemightbecalledinasthearmedforcetotryandstabilise,doapeacesupportoperationorsomethinglikethatAtwhichstageletssayIraqin2003weendupsortofbeingtheleadagencywhilewar,fighting,peacesupporthappens.Assoonaswecan,wewant
totransitionbacktooneoftheothergovernmentdepartments,andwewanttogo,butquiteoftenwerecaughtinthereforalongerperiodoftime.Ideally,ifitsacountrythatneedsstabilisation,becauseitsafailedorfailingstateorithasnoinfrastructure,DFIDwouldbethenextorganisationafterwevedealtwiththeenemytodosomeofthedevelopmentwork.Oncethatshappened,inconjunctionwiththeFCO,thenclearlyitwoulditwouldgobacktotheFCO.
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concerns,orboth,andagreatdealisatstakepolitically.Asaresult,thetensionsbetweenDFIDandtheotherdepartmentshavecomeoutmorestrongly.Thereisariskthatthesehighprofilecases,whicharealsosomeofthemostchallengingbutaccountforarelativelysmallpartofDFIDswork,willdominatethinkingaboutDFIDswiderroleorapproach.
Afghanistanisadifficultcountrytoworkin,withhighlevelsofinsecurity,anopiumpoppy-basedeconomyandwidespreadcorruption.TheexperienceofjointworkingbetweenDFID,MODandFCOinAfghanistanillustratessomeofthechallengesandtensionsthatariseindeliveringdevelopmentinsuchcountries.
DFIDstartedaprogrammeinthecountryin2002,
followingthemilitaryinterventionin2001,andwillhavespentoverUS$1billionby2013.DFIDsprogrammehasevolvedindistinctphasessince2002,fromlimitedhumanitarianassistance,throughattemptstobuildthecapacityofthecentralgovernmentinKabul,toanadditionalfocusonHelmandProvinceintheSouthWestsince2006(Bennettetal2009).
OnepastproblemwithDFIDsattemptstodevelopthecapacityoftheAfghangovernmenthasbeenthatithasbeenquitetechnical,focusingonpublic
administrationbyformalinstitutions.Inthewordsofarecentevaluation,untilrecently,relativelylittleattentionwasgiventodevelopingapoliticaleconomyandconflictanalysistounderpinstrategicchoicesmade(Bennettetal2009).Progressivelylessattentionhasbeengiventosecuritysectorreform,whichhasalsobeencriticised.
FurthercontroversyhasarisenfromtheroleofDFIDinHelmand,wheretheUKmilitarywasdeployedin2006.ThedepartmentsufferedfromthefactthatitwassometimebeforetheUKGovernmenthada
sharedstrategyforsecurityanddevelopment,andinthewordsoftheevaluation:PursuingmultipleobjectivesinHelmandwasinitiallyproblematicbecauseapproachestowardscounter-insurgency,stabilisation,counter-narcotics,peaceanddevelopmentwerenotnecessarilymutuallyreinforcing(Bennettetal2009:xiii).
TensionsbetweenDFIDandtheMODinHelmandaroseintwomainareas.Inimmediatepost-conflictsituations,themilitarywerekeentopursuewhatarecalledQuickImpactProjects(QIPs),givingtangible
benefitstolocalpopulations,suchasbuildingschoolsordiggingwells.QIPshavebeenthefocusforsome
discontent.TheMODtendedtoseethemasaboutenhancingthelegitimacyofBritishforces;DFIDwasinsomecasesreluctanttosupportthisapproach,becauseitsawenhancingthelegitimacyofthelocalhostgovernmenttobemoreimportantforlong-termsustainability,and/orbecausethequalityofsomeQIPshasbeendubious.Additionally,accordingtooneinterviewee,itproveddifficultforDFIDtofunddeliverypartnersinAfghanistanandtogetthingsupandrunningasquicklyasthemilitarywanted:
TherehasbeenalotofcriticismofDFID.Butitis
toosimplistictoblamefailuresinAfghanistanon
lackofrisktakingandlackofwillingnessbyDFID.
TheGovernmenthadunrealisticexpectationsof
whatcouldbeachievedbyDFIDinthese
circumstances.NotafailureofDFIDbutafailureof
thebroaderstrategy.Therelationshipisalotbetter
now.
Theotherproblemhasbeenaboutsecurity.InthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee:
Themilitaryoperatedunderunrealistic
expectationsofwhatwouldhappen.Partofthis
camefromHelmandwherethemilitaryoperateda
veryforwardstrategyandexpectedDFIDtobe
thereinstantlyinordertofollowupwithaidand
reconstructionwork.Butthemilitarywasnotable
todeliverthesecurity,orprovidearmouredcars
andvehicles.
TheUKstrategyinAfghanistanhasevolved,andlessonshavebeenlearnt.DFIDreportsthatcross-Whitehallworkinghasbeentransformedbymorejoined-upstrategysince2007/8.Inadditiontoasinglecross-governmentstrategy,ministersnowmeetmorefrequently,andgovernmentspendingprioritiesareagreedacrossdepartments.Ontheground,asinglecommandstructurewithcivilianleadershipfortheHelmandProvisionalReconstructionTeam(PRT)hashelpedtoresolvetensionsbetweenDFID,MODandtheFCO.TheHelmandexperiencehasalsopromptedeffortstocoordinateajointmilitaryandcivilian
capabilitywithspecialtraining,specificallyforpost-conflictstabilisationandreconstruction(seebelow).
Box1.2:Afghanistan
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IncasessuchasPakistanorAfghanistan(andincreasinglyinplacessuchasSomaliaandYemen)thechallengeforDFIDistoensurethatthedevelopmentperspectivedoesnotgetlostintheprioritisationofmilitaryandcounter-terroristobjectives.ButinmostofthecountriesinwhichDFIDworksthereisaverydifferentkindofproblem,namelythattherest
oftheUKGovernmentdoesnotpaysufficientattention.TheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)isagoodexample.DFIDhasitsfifthlargestprogrammethereandtheFCOnowhasasignificantpresencetoo.DespitethefactthatthehumanitarianimpactofconflictintheDRCisonafargreaterscalethanitisinAfghanistanorPakistan,thesecuritythreatstotheUKaremuchlessevidentandtherearenostrategicalliancesatstake,andasaresulttheUKonlydeploystwomilitaryadvisers.
Howfarthiswillchangeinthefuture,withPSA30andothermechanisms,isunclear.However,itwillalmostcertainlyrequireDFIDtomakeastrongerandmoreeffectivecasetoalltherelevantpartsofgovernmentforengagingwiththedevelopmentagenda.ThisinturnwillrequireDFIDtobeclosertootherdepartments.
Wefoundsomeevidencethatthisisalreadyhappening.WhiletherewasmuchawarenessofthetensionsanddifferencesbetweenDFID,theFCOandtheMOD,itwasstrikingthatofficialsfromallthreedepartmentsemphasisedtheprogressmadeinmutualunderstandingandforgingsharedobjectives.InthewordsofoneFCOinterviewee:Myimpression,basedonbeinginandaroundWhitehallfor20yearsis,actually,werefarmorejoinedupnowthanweveeverbeen.8
Similarly,aDFIDintervieweeemphasisedthattheimportanceofstate-buildingisincreasinglyrecognisedbytheMOD,whileanMODintervieweearguedthatDFIDhascomealongwayoverthepastfewyearsandthereisamuchbetterunderstandingthatsecurity,stabilisationanddevelopmentallgohandinhand.WithinDFID,theviewwasputthatthedepartmentisbelatedlywillingtoengagewithobjectivesofothergovernmentdepartments,andgettingbetteratmakingitscase.
Ourintervieweesemphasisedagrowingrecognitionanduseofskillsinonedepartmentbyanother,withexamplesofDFIDdrawingontheanalysisandintelligenceofmilitaryattachsinCentralAfrica,andtheMODcomingtorecognisethevalueofadevelopmentperspectiveinAfghanistaninthelasttwoyears.Perhapsmostcrucially,thereseemstohavebeenarecognitionandacceptanceofthedifferenttimeframesthatdifferentdepartmentsareworkingto.
Departmentshavealsogainedvaluableexperienceofeachotherthroughcross-governmentmechanisms,especiallytheConflictPoolsandtheStabilisationUnit(seeBox1.3).
TheviewthattherehavebeensignificantchangesinthewaythatthethreedepartmentsregardeachotherandworktogetherisechoedinrecentcivilservicecapabilityreviewsundertakenbytheCabinetOffice.ThereviewofDFIDconcludesthat:DFIDsrelationswithothergovernmentdepartmentshavesignificantlyimproved(CabinetOffice2009a:9).TheFCOreviewnotesthat:Atseniorlevel,theworkingrelationshipswiththeDFIDandtheMODhaveimprovednoticeably.ThisisasaresultofconcertedeffortsbythePermanentSecretariesinparticular,who,forexample,nowundertakejointtripstokeypoststogatherevidenceofprogressontheground(CabinetOffice2009b:10).TheMODispraisedfor:continuingtosupportimprovedwaysofworkingbetweenthemilitaryandtheForeignandCommonwealthOfficeandtheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentonoperations(CabinetOffice2009c:10).
8.DiscussingtheComprehensiveApproach,MichaelFoster,Under-SecretaryofStateatDFID,putitthus:WhenIworkedin
industryIwasabelieverincontinuousimprovement,andIthinkthatiswhatwehaveseenfromtheearlyexperiencesofjointworking,forexampleinBosniainthe1990scomparedwithwherewearenow.Therehasbeenarealimprovementintherelationshipsandhowthethreedepartmentsanddifferentpersonnelworkontheground.(HouseofCommonsDefenceCommittee2009:Q304)
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Thereisalsoaviewthatamomentumnowexists.Sufficientefforthasbeenputintoinvestinginrelationshipsandapproachesonconflictthatthisattitudeisnowinthebloodstreamofallofthethreemaindepartments,inthewordsofoneinterviewee.Withfailedandfailingstatesverylikelytobehighontheagendaoverthenextdecade,theMOD,FCOandDFIDarelikelytobeworkingtogethercloselyinanumberofcountriesforthe
foreseeablefuture.
Box1.3:Cross-governmentmechanismsonconflictanddevelopment
Closerworkingbetweendepartmentsonconflictandsecurityhasbeenbothfacilitatedandfurtherencouragedbythedevelopmentofsomepost-1997cross-Whitehallmechanisms.ThemostimportantaretheConflictPreventionPools(CPPs)andthe
StabilisationUnit(SU).
ConflictPreventionPools(CPPs)
CPPswereoriginallysetupin1999bythenSecretaryofStateforInternationalDevelopment,ClareShort,asawaytofundthetrainingoftroopsinAfrica,whichinthewordsofoneinterviewee,wasntonMODsradaratthetime.TheideacameoutoftheexperienceofSierraLeone,whichshowedboththeneedforandthedifficultiesinvolvedinorganisingfundingforconflictpreventioninterventionsthatinvolvedbothDFIDandtheMOD.TheAfricaCPPwassoonfollowedbyaGlobalCPP.TheworkofthePoolshaswidenedovertime,andnowincludeskeyactivitiesrelatingtochildrenswell-beingandrights,includingtryingtoensureeffectiveimplementationofUNSecurityCouncilresolutionsrelatingtowomenandchildreninconflict,andtothedemobilisationandreintegrationofchildsoldiers.
DFID,theMODandtheFCOallputresourcesintotheCPP(althoughDFIDcontributesthelionsshareandalsofinanciallymanagesandownsthepooledfunds),butonlysomeoftheexpenditurecountsasODA.Themechanismhasasteeringboardwithtri-departmentalrepresentation.
TheCPPwasviewedbyallourintervieweesasagoodideaintheory,andatoolthatsomeothercountries(particularlytheUS)lookatwithenvy.TherewasaviewthattheCPPdoesencouragejoined-upthinking,andthattheculturalchangesithasbroughttoallthreedepartmentshavebeenasvaluable,iflesstangible,thanprogrammeoutcomes.However,therewasalsoageneralconsensusthattheimplementationofprojectswaspatchy,
dependingontheindividualsleadingthem,andthatthebudgetsinvolvedweretoosmallforitsworktohavelastingimpact.
StabilisationUnit(SU)
TheSUwassetupmuchmorerecently,outoftherecognitionthattheearlyapproachinAfghanistansufferedfromalackofcommonunderstandingandstrategyacrossdepartments,andinsufficientskills.TheSUtriestomeetthesegaps,workingtothethreeparentdepartmentsofDFID,theFCOandtheMOD.Itskeyresponsibilitiesincludeorganisingthetraininganddeploymentofcivilianswhocanworkininsecureenvironments,andlearninganddisseminatinglessonsfrompastexperience.Thishasrecentlybeenbroughttogetherintheformofthe1000-strongUKCivilianStabilisationCapacity(CSC),whichismadeupofcivilianexpertsfromarangeoffields,includingcivilservantsfromanumberofgovernmentdepartments.
TheUnitwasdescribedbyoneintervieweeasanenableritcanbringpeopletogethersotheycangetabetterunderstandingofeachothersculture,butitcanonlyachievewhattheparentdepartmentsarewillingtoputinandallow.
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Thesituationin-country
OutsideofWhitehall,onthegroundindevelopingcountriesthemselves,thereappearstobeconsiderablevariationinhowjoined-upUKGovernmentthinking,strategyandactiononconflictandsecurityis,bothacrossdevelopingcountries,andwithinanyonecountryover
time.Asdiscussedabove,DFIDisquitedevolved,sotheheadofthecountryofficehasalargesayinhowprogrammeresourcesaredeployed,suchasthedecisionaboutwhetherornottohaveconflictadvisers.Themaininter-departmentalrelationshipiswiththeFCO,anddependsquiteconsiderablyontheindividualheadofofficeandHighCommissionerorAmbassadorinvolved.
InsomecasesDRCandIndiahavebeencitedascurrentexampleswherecountry-specificobjectivesareagreedandwherejointunitslookingataspecificproblemaresetup,therelationshipisclose.Inothercases,especiallywherethereisnoagreedtri-departmentalstrategy,andwheretheDFIDofficeisnotlocatedintheHighCommissionorEmbassy,itmaynotbe.Thedifferenttimeframesofthedifferentdepartmentsdiscussedaboveareoften
asmuchofaproblemin-countryastheyareinWhitehall.
ThereareanincreasingnumberofcountriesinconflictforwhichtheUKGovernmentdoeshaveagreedcross-Whitehallstrategies(seebelow),andinsomecases,evenjointdepartmentalcountryunitsinLondon.Sucharrangementsshouldhelpjoined-upapproachestoconflictin-country.However,thiswillonlyworkwhenthereisalsocoherencebetweentheapproachin-countryandinWhitehall(seeBox1.4onSudan).
Atthesametime,itisclearthatnewtoolsareneededforimmediatepost-conflictsituationswheretheUKhasitselfbeenactivelyinvolvedinmilitaryaction,partlybecausedomesticpoliticalexpectationsareunderstandablydifferentinsuchsituations.Ajointmilitary-civilian
Box1.4:Sudan
Sudanprovidesanexampleofhowdifficultitcanbetoachievethiscoherence,andalsohowhavingacross-governmentmechanisminplace,suchasacountryunit,isnotsufficientbyitself.Inprinciple,theFCOandDFIDhavejoinedupobjectivesonSudan:achievingaComprehensivePeaceAgreementandreducingpoverty.ThereisaSudanUnitinLondon,locatedintheFCO,aswellasaSpecialEnvoy,whoworkstoboththeForeignSecretaryandtheInternationalDevelopmentSecretary.
IntheconstantlyshiftingandcomplexenvironmentofKhartoum,DFIDandtheFCOhavehadagoodrelationship,andovertimehavedevelopedconsiderablecapacitytoanalysetheSudanesegovernmentsroleandmotivationsinrelationtotheDarfurconflict,whichis
thedominantprobleminthecountry.ThisrelationshipisparticularlyimportantforDFID,astheFCOhasgenerallyhadbetteraccesstotheSudanesegovernmentwhichhasbeenmoreinterestedinforeignpolicyincentives,suchasthenormalisationofrelationswiththeUSoropeninguptheissueoftheindictmentoftheSudanesePresidentattheInternationalCriminalCourtintheHague,thanindevelopmentalones,likedebtrelief.
TheSudanconflictisahighlypoliticalissueattheinternationallevelforexampleitisahighprofileissueintheUSandministers,waryofnegativeheadlinesaboutsupportfortheregime,havefavouredalowriskfocusonhumanitarianaidandbasicservices.Thechallengeforthearguablybetter-informedDFIDandFCOofficesinKhartoumhasbeentopersuadeministerstotakerisksinadifficultenvironment,bytakingonmorecomplexinstitutionalissues,suchassecuritysectorreform,orindeedthelargerpoliticaltrade-offs.
TheSudancasewhereacentralunitinLondonhasmorepowerthanbetterinformedin-countryofficesmaybeanunusualone,butitshowstheneedtothinkaboutrelationshipsbetweenLondonandposts,aswellasbetweendepartments.
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Overthepastfewdecades,ithasbecomeclearthattradeandinvestmentarecentraltothedevelopmentdebate.Themostbasic,butperhapsmostimportantlessonthathasbeen
learnedisthattheeconomicresourcesavailabletopoorcountriesthroughtradearemuchlargerthanthosecomingfromaid.In2008,totalaidfromOECDcountrieswasaroundUS$120billion,withtheleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)receivingaroundone-thirdofthis,atjustoverUS$40billion.Bycontrast,totalexportsfromdevelopingcountriesin2007wereworthUS$5.2trillion,over40timesthesizeofaidflows.ThecontrastforLDCsismuchlessexportsin2007wereworthaboutUS$126billion,butthisisstillroughlythreetimestheamountofaidtheyreceived.
Tradeanddevelopmentoutcomes
Historically,exportinghasusuallybeenanessentialpartoftheprocessbywhichverypoorcountrieshaveescapedpoverty.IntheregionsthathaveseenthemostdramaticfallsinpovertyEastandSouthEastAsiathegrowthofexportshasplayedacentralrolein
economicgrowthandpovertyreduction(WorldBank1993).Thisremainstruetoday,withexamplessuchasVietnamandBangladeshshowingtheimportanceofexportsforincreasingincomes.InChina,around200millionpeoplehaveescapedfromextremepovertysince1980,largelythroughworkingintheexportsector.Veryfewcountrieshaveeliminatedpovertywithouttradeplayingamajorrole.
However,thedevelopmentalbenefitsoftradedependonanumberoffactors.Theseinclude:thetypeofproductstraded,howfarthegainsfromtradearepassedthroughtoworkersandfarmers,andhowfartraderesourcescapturedbygovernmentsareusedefficientlyandaccountablyforpublicservices(UNCTAD2004).
Manyoftheworldspoorestcountries,especiallythoseinAfrica,areactuallyquiteexport-
oriented.Buttheirexportsareoftenheavilyconcentratedinlow-valueagriculturalcommodities(UNCTAD2002).Theseeconomieswillbenefitwhenthereisasurgeincommodityprices(aswasthecaseinthefewyearsleadinguptomid-2008).However,theinternationalfinancialcrisishasunderscoredthefragilityofAfricasrecentexpansion,andexportvaluesareexpectedtofallby40percentasaresult(CommitteeofAfricanFinanceMinistersandCentralBankGovernors2009).Afterafewyearsofsustainedstronggrowthandhighlevelsofoptimism,economicgrowthrateswereexpectedtofallto1.5percentin2009(IMF2009).
Moreover,inthelongterm,thevalueofcommoditiesrelativetomanufacturesisindecline.Itisonlybymovingupthevaluechain,andbydiversifyingintoprogressivelymorevaluablemanufacturedproducts,thatcountrieshavehistoricallyusedtradeasanescaperoutefrom