Policy Review, February & March 2011, No. 165

8/7/2019 Policy Review, February & March 2011, No. 165

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THE ROAD TO (AND FROM) THE 2010 ELECTIONSDAVID W. BRADY, MORRIS P. FIORINA,

& R. DOUGLAS RIVERS

A CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE REAL WORLD

PAUL J. SAUNDERS & VAUGHAN TUREKIAN

THE PERSISTENCE OF GENOCIDE

DAVID RIEFF

PTSDS DIAGNOSTIC TRAP

SALLY SATEL

ALSO: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS BY

MICHAEL GONZALEZ, GREGORY CONKO &HENRY I. MILLER, JAMES KIRCHICK,

PETER BERKOWITZ, HENRIK BERING, YING MA,DAVID R. HENDERSON

February & March 2011, No. 165, $6.00PO

LICYReview

A Publ icat ion of the Hoover Inst itut ionstanford univers ity


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the hoover institution was established at StanfordUniversity in 1919 by Herbert Hoover, a member of Stanfordspioneer graduating class of 1895 and the thirty-first president ofthe United States. Since 1919 the Institution has evolved from a

library and repository of documents to an active public policyresearch center. Simultaneously, the Institution has evolved into aninternationally recognized library and archives housing tens ofmillions of books and documents relating to political, economic,and social change.

The Hoover Institutions overarching purposes are:

To collect the requisite sources of knowledge pertaining toeconomic, political, and social changes in societies at home

and abroad, as well as to understand their causes and conse-quences

To analyze the effects of government actions relating to pub-lic policy

To generate, publish, and disseminate ideas that encouragepositive policy formation using reasoned arguments andintellectual rigor, converting conceptual insights into practicalinitiatives judged to be beneficial to society

To convey to the public, the media, lawmakers, and others

an understanding of important public policy issues and topromote vigorous dialogue

Ideas have consequences, and a free flow of competing ideas leadsto an evolution of policy adoptions and associated consequencesaffecting the well-being of a free society. The Hoover Institutionendeavors to be a prominent contributor of ideas having positiveconsequences.

In the words of President Hoover:

This Institution supports the Constitution of the UnitedStates, its Bill of Rights, and its method of representative

government. Both our social and economic systems are basedon private enterprise from which springs initiative andingenuity. . . . The Federal Government should undertake no

governmental, social or economic action, except where local government, or the people, cannot undertake it forthemselves. . . . The overall mission of this Institution is . . .to recall the voice of experience against the making of war,and . . . to recall mans endeavors to make and preserve

peace, and to sustain for America the safeguards of theAmerican way of life. . . . The Institution itself mustconstantly and dynamically point the road to peace, to

personal freedom, and to the safeguards of the Americansystem.


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POLICYReviewFEBRUARY & MARCH 2011, No. 165

Features

3 THE ROAD TO (AND FROM) THE 2010 ELECTIONS

What happened to the president and his party?

David W. Brady, Morris P. Fiorina, & R. Douglas Rivers

15 A CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE REAL WORLD

Less international negotiation, smarter domestic decisionsPaul J. Saunders & Vaughan Turekian

29 THE PERSISTENCE OF GENOCIDE

Never Again, again and again

David Rieff

41 PTSDS DIAGNOSTIC TRAP

Locking some veterans into long-term dependence

Sally Satel55 CUBAS LOST HISTORY

Reclaiming the pre-Castro national character

Michael Gonzalez

69 THE RUSH TO CONDEMN GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS

Impractical regulations and nuisance lawsuits

Gregory Conko & Henry I. Miller

Books83 THE CENTER-RIGHT HONORABLE TONY BLAIR

James Kirchick on A Journey: My Political Life by Tony Blair.

90 THINKING ABOUT TORTURE

Peter Berkowitz on Because it is Wrong: Torture, Privacy, and Presidential

Power in the Age of Terror by Charles Fried and Gregory Fried.

96 BRUTISH AND SHORTHenrik Bering on Brute: The Life of Victor Krulak, U.S. Marine by

Robert Coram.

102 MARKET CAPITALISM, STATE-STYLE

Ying Ma on The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between

States and Corporations? by Ian Bremmer.

108 HOME ECONOMICS

David R. Henderson on At Home: A Short History ofPrivate Life by Bill Bryson.

A Publ i cat i o n o f th e Ho o ver I nst i tut i o nstanfo rd uni vers i ty


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PO

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February & March 2011 , No. 165

Editor

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Consulting EditorMary Eberstadt


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Office Manager

Sharon Ragland


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The 2008 elections gave the Democrats the House, the

presidency, and a filibuster proof Senate. Pundits spoke

of the election as a game changer. Evan Thomas wrote

that Like Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 and Reagan in

1980, the Obama run of2008 marks a real shift in real

time. It is early yet, but it is not difficult to imagine that we will, for years to

come, think of American politics in terms of Before Obama and After

Obama.1 According to Borsage and Greenberg: But election 2008 was

not simply a testament to the remarkable candidacy of Barack Obama, nor a

product of Bushs catastrophic presidency. Rather, the results suggest that

this may not be simply a change election but a sea-change election . . . we

may be witness to the emergence of a new progressive majority, that con-

trary to conservatives claims, America is now a center-left nation.2 Even

The Road to (and from)

the 2010 ElectionsBy David W. Brady, Morris P. Fiorina,& R. Douglas Rivers

David W. Brady, Morris P. Fiorina, and R. Douglas Rivers are senior fellows ofthe Hoover Institution and professors of Political Science at Stanford University.

February & March 2011 3 Policy Review


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4 Policy Review

James Carvilles 40 More Years: How the Democrats Will Rule the Next

Generation did not seem as outlandish when published in early 2009 as it

does in the aftermath of the 2010 congressional elections.

This article examines what happened to the president and his partybetween the electoral zenith of November 2008 and the nadir of November

2010. We begin by reviewing an analysis that appeared in these pages early

in 2009. Contrary to much commentary at the time, that analysis showed

that the Obama victory was less a reflection of an electorate that had moved

to the left than it was a negative judgment on the performance of the Bush

administration. We extend that analysis, showing that in 2009 and 2010

the public came to view the performance of the new administration increas-

ingly negatively, in part because of policies it pursued that did not enjoywide popular support. In particular, we show that the administrations focus

on health care and, to a lesser extent, cap and trade probably cost the

Democrats their House majority. We conclude with brief speculations about

the prospects that the new Republican House can make progress on its

avowed goal of reducing government expenditures.

The road to 2008

As we pointed out in our earlier article, between 2004 and

2006 , numerous public opinion polls reported a significant

increase in Democratic Party identifiers and a corresponding

decrease in Republican identifiers.3 Since these polls were cross-sectional

snapshots, however, the causes of the change were unclear. Thus, we com-

missioned YouGov/Polimetrix, an internet-based poll, to sample nearly

13,000 respondents who had been in their large database since 2004. Thisallowed us to track change in party identification over the four-year period

and relate them to questions about the policies and performance of the Bush

administration.

Figure 1 shows that 2004 Republicans who stuck with their identifica-

tion in 2008 were much more likely to approve of the Bush administrations

overall performance as well as its handling of the war in Iraq and the econo-

my than were stable independents and 2004 Republicans who had moved

to Independent in 2008 . The latter in turn were more favorable to the

administration than stable Democrats and 2004 Republicans and

Independents who had moved to the Democratic side in 2008.

Brady, Fiorina & Rivers

1. Evan Thomas and the staff of Newsweek, A Long Time Coming: The Inspiring, Combative 2008Campaign and the Historic Election of Barack Obama (Public Affairs Press, 2010).

2. Robert Borsage and Stanley B. Greenberg, The Emerging Center-Left Majority, American Prospect(November 13, 2008), available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_emerging_center-left_majority. (This and subsequent weblinks accessed December 17, 2010.)

3. David Brady, Douglas Rivers, and Laurel Harbridge, The 2008 Democratic Shift, Policy Review152 (December 2008 &January 2009).


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But while disapproval of the Bush administration was strongly associated

with movement away from the Republican Party, disapproval did not indi-cate that voter sentiment was shifting to the left across a range of policy

issues. We used the same survey to examine public positions on a set of

issues where party differences were clearly evident: universal healthcare,

global warming, gay marriage, abortion rights, and illegal immigration. The

Republican response was coded as: oppose universal health care, think

effects of global warming are overstated, oppose any legal recognition of

same sex couples, allow no abortions or only in case of rape and incest, and

favor deportation of illegal immigrants. Figure 2 plots the percent taking theRepublican response for each of the three categories of respondents: stable

Republicans, stable and new independents, stable and new Democrats.

Large majorities of those who remained Republican between 2004 and

2008 favor the Republican position on these issues, but the opinions of

those in the independent category are much closer to the opinions of stable

Republicans than to the Democratic side. Thus, the battering the

Republicans experienced in 20062008 was much more a result of dissatis-

faction with the performance of the Bush administration than an indication

of a policy realignment in the electorate.

From 2008 to 2010

Contrary to our 2009 conclusion, many commentators

assumed that the 2008 elections had ushered in a new progressive

era. President Obama came to Washington with an ambitious poli-

cy agenda featuring a stimulus package, health care reform, energy and envi-

February & March 2011 5

The Road to (and from) the 2010 Elections

figure 1

Evaluations of Bush administration performance, 2008

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

DemocratRepublican

bush approval iraq economy

Independent


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6 Policy Review

ronmental legislation, financial reform, and foreign policy change, among

other lesser goals. At first things went smoothly. The stimulus package

passed handily with the promise that it would keep unemployment at 8.2

percent or less. But the health care and environmental proposals faced

tougher sledding than the stimulus. The Democratic majority in the House

was more liberal than the Democratic majority in the Senate. In particular, it


figure 2

Issue positions, 2008

figure 3

Health care bill approval

100%90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

DemocratRepublican

Health Care Global Warming Gay Marriage Abortion Illegal Immigration

Independent


9/115

was clear from the beginning that the single payer and public option plans

favored by the most liberal wing of the Democratic Party had no chance of

passing the Senate. After months of contentious politics, even a much weak-

er version of health care reform appeared doomed as late as February 2010.But through a series of parliamentary procedures and House compromises,

the Democrats finally enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care

Act in March of2010.

The story on cap and trade was simpler. The House passed it but Senate

Democrats representing coal producing states and states dependent upon

coal for energy joined with Republicans to prevent consideration. After a

lengthy process the two chambers agreed on a financial reform bill in July of

2010. All in all, despite the failure of cap and trade and the compromisesentailed in passing health care and financial reform, the Democrats had

enacted a stimulus package, a major health care bill, financial reform, and

other less significant legislation. From the standpoint of legislative produc-

tion, the 111th Congress excelled. For Joe Klein in Time, the legislative

achievements have been stupendous, and in the judgment of Doris Kearns

Goodwin, I dont think weve ever seen anything like Obama since

Roosevelt.4

From an electoral standpoint, however, this legislative productivity was adifferent story. As Figure 3 shows, from the summer of2009 to the election,

more Americans opposed the health care reform than favored it, although

parts of it were popular. The burst of legislative activity on multiple fronts

made middle-of-the-road voters receptive to Republican charges that federal

power and spending were out of control. Moreover, by summer 2010, the

claim that the stimulus would keep unemployment below 8.2 percent had

clearly proved wrong. The combination of a very slow and weak economic

recovery, concern about the deficit, and negative opinion toward the presi-dents policies combined to bring the presidents approval ratings down. The

most significant drop in approval and increase in disapproval occurred dur-

ing the health care debate from late May 2009 through December. From

more than 70 percent approval at the time of his inauguration, the presi-

dents approval ratings fell below his disapproval ratings by the summer of

2010. Perhaps most significantly, approval among independents fell most

quickly; a plurality of them already disapproved by late summer of 2009

(Figure 4).

According to our YouGov/Polimetrix surveys, many Americans were

skeptical about their prospects under the new health care regime. By mid-

2009 about 40 percent said they would receive worse care if the bill passed

compared to slightly less than 20 percent who thought they would be better

off than before the bill. After passage the gap between worse and better care



4. Quoted in Howard Kurtz, Beware the gop Coronation, Daily Beast(October 31, 2010), available

at http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-10-31/republican-election-wins-will-draw-glowing-press-just-like-obama-once-did/.


10/115

8 Policy Review

widened slightly, with 40 percent holding worse off and about 15 percentbetter off. And on the cost side, Americans were skeptical about claims that

they would get improved care with less cost: Over 50 percent of those

polled believed that their costs for health care would increase compared to

10 percent or so who thought their costs would decrease.

Independents had moved very sharply to the Democrats in the 2006 con-

gressional elections by a margin of18 percentage points according to the

national exit polls. Thus, their growing disenchantment with the president

threatened Democratic prospects in 2010. In addition, the number of self-professed independents had increased from about 31 percent in October of2008 to over 36 percent in October 2010. The increase in Independents

came at the expense of Democrats who declined from about 36 percent to

about 32 percent. During the same period Republicans stayed at the same

level about a quarter of the electorate.

The 2010 Democratic shellacking

The preceding developments superimposed on a long, deep

drop in employment and a very slow recovery generated stiff head-

winds for Democrats in the 2010 elections. Democratic members

from moderate and conservative districts were left particularly vulnerable.

That condition proved fatal for many of them as Republicans targeted dis-

tricts where Obama had lost to McCain, as well as districts that had been

lost to Democrats in the previous two elections. In the election, eleven of21

members of the class of2006 lost their seats while 21 of24 members of the


figure 4

Obama approval among independents


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class of2008 lost. In total Republicans gained 63 seats in the House, the

largest gain in a midterm election since 1938. Republicans also gained six

Senate seats, seven governorships, control of nineteen state legislative cham-

bers, and almost 700 new state legislative seats.Exit polls revealed huge shifts to Republicans between the 2006 and

2010 midterms. Republicans turned an 18 point 2006 deficit among inde-

pendents into a 17 point lead in 2010. Rural voters, older voters, and

Catholics all showed four-year swings over 20 percentage points.

Republicans gained nearly as much among white voters and high school

graduates. They gained 13 percentage points over 2006 among those mak-

ing less than $50,000 and those above $250,000 in income. They gained

heavily in the Northeast and the Midwest. In 2010,pluralities thought Republicans better able than

Democrats to handle the economy (+23%), spend-

ing (+27%), and taxes (+31%). In sum, voters,

almost across the board, turned away from the

Democrats.

As usual, post-election analyses by pundits and

party spokespersons differed according to their

political orientation. For the most part Republicansviewed the election as repudiation of Obama and his

policies, while Democrats claimed they had not

properly communicated their policy achievements or

that Republicans had benefitted from illicit corpo-

rate contributions. Thus, the day after the election

Rush Limbaugh exulted that Nancy Pelosi, whom he referred to as the

wicked witch of the West, had a House fall on her.5 In contrast, in her day-

after column Maureen Dowd wrote, Republicans out communicated a sil-ver-tongued president who was supposed to be Ronald Reagans heir in the

communications department. They were able to persuade a lot of Americans

that the couple in the White House was not American enough, not quite

normal, too Communist, too radical, too Great Society.6

In spite of the predictability of the responses to the election, the question

of what factors caused the Democratic debacle is an important one to

answer. In the remainder of this article we turn to an analysis of the election

results in an attempt to discern how much of the Democratic loss is attribut-

able to the economy and how much attributable to the choices made by

Obama and the Democratic congressional leadership.

The presidents party typically loses seats in midterm elections; the aver-

age loss for first term Democratic presidents in the postwar era is 30 seats.

A very poor economy and a president below 50 percent in approval by



5. See http://noisyroom.net/blog/2010/11/03/wipe-out-rush-limbaugh-celebrates-2010-election/. .

6. Maureen Dowd Republican Party Time, New York Times (November 3, 2010), available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/opinion/03dowd.html?ref=maureendowd.

As usual, post-

election analyses

by pundits

and party

spokespersons

differedaccording to

their political

orientation.


12/115

themselves would generate significant losses for the incumbent party. But

political science forecasting models based on the fundamentals badly

under-predicted the Democratic seat loss several even forecast that the

Democrats would easily retain their House majority.7

Our hypothesis is thatby pursuing a policy agenda to the left of the electorates comfort zone the

president and the House leadership exacerbated the problems for Democrats

from moderate to conservative districts especially the districts captured in

the 2006 and 2008 elections. Three-quarters of the Democratic candidates

running in the 48 districts carried by McCain in 2009 lost. Tellingly, eight

of fifteen who voted no on both health care and cap and trade survived,

while only three of sixteen who voted yes on one or the other survived, and

all seven of those who voted yes on both bills lost.By pushing highly controversial legislation, the

Democratic leadership in the House of

Representatives caused the party to lose significantly

more seats than they would have from the poor

economy alone.

In the analyses that follow we have used standard

statistical procedures to estimate the electoral harm

of the health care and cap and trade votes.8

Thesewere not the only controversial votes that figured in

the campaign, of course, but tarp II had only ten

Democrats in opposition and the stimulus only

eleven. Moreover, several of these defectors did not seek reelection in 2008,

so there is simply not enough variation on these votes to analyze.

We use the vote cast for the member in 2008 to measure his or her elec-

toral vulnerability, and Obamas 2008 vote in the district to measure district

support for Obama. We also include variables for members elected in 2006and 2008. We expect that the more conservative the district, the more that

support for issues like health care and cap and trade hurt Democratic candi-

dates. Conversely, the more liberal the district the smaller the damage from a

vote in support of such issues, and in very liberal districts, of course, a yes

vote would be an electoral benefit.

We used four different statistical estimation procedures to insure the

robustness of our findings. Tables 1 and 2 report the results most favorable

and least favorable to our hypothesis.

From Table 1, yes votes on health care and cap and trade severely dam-

aged Democrats from marginal districts. In districts where Obama got only

45 percent of the vote and the Democratic incumbent voted yes on health

care, we estimate a 9 percent vote penalty. At the 50 percent Obama vote


7. See James E. Campbell, ed., Forecasts of the 2010 Midterm Elections, PS: Political Science &Politics 43 (2010), 625648.

8. See David W. Brady, Morris P. Fiorina, and Arjun Wilkins, The 2010 Elections: Why Did PoliticalScientists Forecasts Go Awry?, forthcoming in PS: Political Science & Politics 44 (2011).

The question

of what factors

caused the

Democratic

debacle is an

important oneto answer.

10 Policy Review


13/115

level, a yes vote hurts less than it did at 45 percent, but still carries about a 7

percent vote penalty. The more liberal the district, the less it costs to vote yes

on either bill. At 60 percent 2008 Obama support the penalty is less than 4

percent. The penalties for voting yes on cap and trade are smaller, and at 60percent Obama support in 2008 a yes vote becomes a positive.

table 1

Vote share loss from yes v. no votes on health care and cap and trade

Health care Cap and trade

vote share vote share

Obama vote yes no yes no

.45 41.4 50.7 42.3 49.1.50 46.4 53.9 47.2 51.9

.55 51.5 57.1 52.2 54.8

.60 56.6 60.3 57.1 57.7

The analysis underlying Table 1 examines the gain or loss in percentage

of the vote, but a drop in vote percentage does not automatically translate

into loss of a seat, so the analysis that underlies Table 2 examines the proba-bility of winning versus losing a seat. The results are again instructive.

Democrats who came from districts where Obama won 45 percent of the

vote in 2008 and who voted yes on either health care or cap and trade had

almost no chance of reelection compared to a reelection probability of 40

percent or more if they voted no. At an Obama 2008 level of50 percent

reelection probabilities are still two to three times higher for nay voters. A

yea vote on cap and trade becomes a positive factor as the 2008 vote for

Obama in the district nears 55 percent, and a health care vote becomes apositive factor as Obamas 2008 vote climbs from 55 to 60 percent.

table 2

Probability of defeat given district Obama vote and votes on

health care and cap and trade

Probability of winning contingent on vote

Health care Cap and trade

Obama vote yes no yes no

.45 .02 .45 .05 .40

.50 .20 .60 .27 .25

.55 .63 .74 .66 .69

.60 .93 .85 .92 .80

While there is something of a gap between these most favorable and least

favorable statistical analyses (this is not rocket science, after all), the preced-

ing results clearly indicate that Democrats coming from more conservative




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12 Policy Review

districts were hurt by votes in favor of health care and cap and trade.

Democrats from districts that had given Obama a big majority in 2008

were helped by a yes vote on either health care or cap and trade, but they

were generally likely to win anyway.How many seats did it cost the president and his party to push for health

care and cap and trade legislation? To suggest an answer to that question,

we take the statistical equations underlying Tables 1 and 2 and set all

Democratic votes on health care and cap and trade at no, which takes away

(as much as can be done) the effect of yes votes on health care and cap and

trade. In this counterfactual case, where every Democrat opposes these two

pieces of legislation, Democrats would have saved between 22 seats (from

Table 2) and 40 seats (from Table 1), probably allowing them to save theirmajority.

Counterfactual exercises like that just reported are problematic in that

other things presumed to stay constant would not have stayed constant had

rank-and-file Democratic House members voted down health care and cap

and trade. In that event they might have provoked primary challenges

and/or defections from angry voters in the Democratic base. But this exercise

strongly suggests that members from more-conservative districts who sup-

ported health care and cap and trade, either out of personal belief or partypressure or both, paid an electoral penalty. The economy and the presidents

middling ratings indicated that the Democrats would lose seats. But by

advancing controversial legislation the Democratic leadership appears to

have turned a probable big loss into one of historic proportions.

Implications for 2012

What does the Republican shellacking of Democrats in2010 portend for 2012? If history is any guide, the answer is

not good news for Republicans, at least for the post-World War

II period. In 1946, the Republicans gained 55 seats in the house and 12 in

the Senate to take control of Congress for the first time in 16 years.

Democratic prospects for 1948 looked so poor that Senator Fulbright, a

Democrat, proposed that President Truman appoint a Republican secretary

of state (next in line for the presidency after Trumans elevation), resign, and

cede the presidency to the Republicans. Contrary to expectations, Truman

campaigned against the do-nothing Republican Congress and won reelec-

tion. A generation later, after the 1994 elections gave Republicans control

of Congress for the first time in 40 years, some in the media wondered

whether a weakened President Clinton was still relevant. But after two gov-

ernment shutdowns Clinton was reelected overwhelmingly in 1996. The

key to understanding how these two new Republican Congresses managed

to reelect sitting Democratic presidents lies in the policy choices they made.

In the flush of a big victory they overreached.



15/115

In the 112th Congress, a key issue will be government spending. The one

common principle across all the Tea Party movements in states and localities

was that the country cannot afford our current deficits, let alone those loom-

ing in the not too distant future. Addressing the deficit problem involvesraising taxes, cutting spending, or some combination of the two. Thus far,

Republicans have been insistent on cutting spending while keeping the Bush

tax cuts in place and enacting no new taxes. In principle, very strong eco-

nomic growth could increase incomes sufficiently to increase revenue with-

out increasing the tax rate; however, few expect the economy to do this in

the near future. Given that the next election will occur before economic

growth can solve the problem, the key issue for Republicans is reducing gov-

ernment spending.While the electorate in 2010 yelled a loud no to the policies of the

president and Democratic Congress, the negative verdict was by no means

carte blanche for Republicans to carry out their own wish list. Given the

centrality of spending issues, we conducted a YouGov/Polimetrix poll on six-

teen federal programs, asking whether spending on each should be

increased, decreased, or kept the same. Table 3 presents the results of this

poll.

table 3

Do you think federal spending on the following programs should be

increased or decreased or kept the same?% % % %

Increase Keep the same Decrease Not sure

Social Security 42 42 9 8

National Defense 31 39 25 6

Medicare 40 42 12 6Aid to the Poor 34 39 20 7

Medicaid 32 46 15 7

Veterans Benefits 52 39 4 6

Health Research 43 42 9 5

Education 53 30 12 5

Highways 28 53 13 6

Mass Transit 29 41 20 10Foreign Aid 3 22 67 8

Unemployment Benefits 31 40 23 6

Science and Technology 36 45 12 7

Agriculture 23 44 24 9

Housing 21 42 30 7

The Environment 37 36 21 6




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14 Policy Review

In fifteen out of sixteen programs, a majority of the public would like

spending to be increased or kept the same. The only program that a majority

of Americans would cut is foreign aid. Most importantly, in the large entitle-

ment programs, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, only small minori-ties favor the cuts that must come if the budget deficit is to be brought under

control. Defense enjoys a similarly privileged status, with 70 percent favor-

ing either current spending or an increase. Even in agriculture and housing,

over 60 percent of Americans favor keeping expenditures where they are or

increasing them.

Data like these should inform the agenda of the new Republican House

majority. In 2010 the country voted no on Democrats, not yes on

Republicans, and certainly not yes to across-the-board spending cuts. Thenew majority faces the hard reality that, in general, voters want spending

reduced, but when it comes to specific programs, there are none that stand

out, save foreign aid, which, if eliminated entirely, would not dent the deficit

of the United States.

Leading the country on a new spending path will require skill and leader-

ship. The obvious place to start is to begin a serious effort to educate the

American public about both the seriousness and complexity of the problem.

Everything must be on the table. For example, Democrats can no longerlabel any proposal to slow the growth rate of social security benefits as

unacceptable. And for their part Republicans must address Ron Pauls

query about why the U.S. has more than 700 military bases overseas. In

recent days we have heard a lot about the need to have an adult conversa-

tion with the American public. That conversation must begin with some

serious political leadership.



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G

overnment officials worldwide are trying to put the

best face on the 2010 United Nations climate change negotia-

tions in Cancun, especially after 2 0 0 9 s debacle inCopenhagen. But the talks produced little real progress and

led many to wonder whether the two global climate meetings

represent a necessary, albeit somewhat sideways step in the long process

towards an eventual global treaty reducing greenhouse gases or, alternative-

ly, the gradual and unsurprising end to a nearly twenty-year effort to achieve

binding international mandates.

Advocates of a binding global treaty on greenhouse gas emissions are

divided over the importance of the new agreement coming out of Cancun.

For any who might harbor doubts, the Obama administrations approach to

the negotiations is revealing: Neither the president nor the secretary of state

(nor the vice president, for that matter) traveled to Mexico, leaving the

A Climate Policy for

the Real WorldBy Paul J. Saunders &Vaughan Turekian

Paul J. Saunders is executive director of The Nixon Center. Vaughan Turekian isa non-resident fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and holds aPh.D. in atmospheric geochemistry. They worked together on climate issues as

advisors to the under secretary of state for global affairs during the George W.Bush administration.



18/115

16 Policy Review

negotiations in the hands of State Department Special Envoy Todd Stern.

Key congressional leaders also skipped this years talks.

The administrations reduced emphasis on the un meetings, and continu-

ing international disagreements over climate change, demonstrate an uncom-fortable fact for many greens: U.S. efforts to stem climate change thus far

have largely vindicated the Bush administrations approach to global action

on climate change during its final years. The failures of the high-profile

Copenhagen talks and of U.S. domestic legislation reflect structural

political and economic realities that will be profoundly difficult to over-

come, if they can be overcome at all. Obama would do well to understand

the lessons of Copenhagen and cap-and-trade and move on to a more practi-

cal approach especially after the 2010 midtermelections.

The pragmatic wing of the activist community

has cautiously praised the Cancun summit, which

produced a deal that brought a voluntary interna-

tional climate agreement reached on the margins in

Copenhagen inside the un process and created a

fund to help poor developing countries reduce their

greenhouse gas emissions and manage the conse-quences of a warming Earth. At the other end of the

spectrum, the climate movements doctrinaire ideo-

logues have denounced the talks failure to produce

a binding agreement on deep reductions. They are

all the more bitter after the Copenhagen fiasco,

years of resentment of the Bush administrations approach, and earlier surety

that the Democrats controlling the White House and the Congress would

accomplish what the prior Republican president was unwilling to try. Thefact that they have no Plan b for addressing the climate problem and

apparently cannot conceive of a solution other than unprecedented and

therefore very unlikely global regulation only adds to their frustration.

Equally troubling to both of these camps is the Kyoto Protocols looming

expiration in 2012, with its results limited and no follow-on arrangements

in place. Since Kyotos modest emissions targets were secondary to its goal

of establishing a global system for deeper future reductions, supporters of

binding international targets and timetables for emissions are alarmed by the

relentless ticking of the clock.

Compounding activists worries is the refusal of key parties to the Kyoto

Protocol including Japan and Russia to agree to an extension through

a new so-called commitment period. Japan sensibly refuses to accept

deeper emissions reductions without commitments from the United States

and China. Russia whose ratification brought Kyoto across the threshold

that made the pact legally binding seems more interested in its ability to

sell emissions credits than in preventing climate change. Moscow was an

enormous beneficiary of Kyotos 1990 base year for measuring emissions

Paul J. Saunders & Vaughan Turekian

The pragmatic

wing of the

activist,

climate-change

community has

cautiouslypraised the

Cancun summit.


19/115

reductions; the combination of the Soviet Unions vast and highly inefficient

industrial base and Russias subsequent economic collapse meant that the

country did not have to do anything to meet its targets and could sell both

its natural gas and its leftover emissions to Europe.With the most invested in Kyoto, European leaders may be particularly

eager to make a deal in the remaining time before 2012 and they may

eventually do so. However, neither of the two options available is likely to

produce meaningful results. Efforts to negotiate a new global agreement will

force a choice. One option is to include the United States and China, the two

largest emitters, and India, where emissions are rising rapidly; but this

would weaken any deal because none will commit to significant emissions

reductions. The alternative is to exclude them, which would limit the impactof an agreement by leaving out the nations together responsible for over 45

percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. It could be worse if Japan,

Russia, and others are unwilling to accept new limits without a comprehen-

sive deal. This makes a meaningful international agreement on climate

change very improbable.

The reasons for this are clear. While both developments were shocking to

many inside the echo chamber that surrounds climate change discussions,

the breakdown of the Copenhagen negotiations and the slow death of emis-sion-limiting legislation in the United States were eminently predictable.

Moreover, while the Obama administration has clearly tempered its ambi-

tions, at least for the time being, there is little evidence that the president and

other senior officials have drawn necessary conclusions from their first two

years and reassessed U.S. climate change strategy. This is a mistake; the

United States needs new pragmatic and creative policies to address climate

change at the local, national, and international levels. But making these

changes requires clearly understanding what has happened so far.

What really happened in Copenhagen?

One problem in the December 2009 Copenhagen climate summit

was that expectations had soared wildly beyond the limits of ratio-

nality, in part due to wholly unrealistic hopes tied to President

Barack Obama. As a result, the meetings evolved into a summit of heads of

state without adequate diplomatic preparation. Climate change is far too

complex an issue to resolve in negotiating sessions among national leaders if

the central parameters of the deal have not been resolved in advance. Absent

this, the administration allowed the United States to be drawn into a high-

stakes gamble that was very unlikely to succeed, especially in view of the

many other flaws in its approach to the talks.

The second problem was one of strategic sequencing. Since the adminis-

tration had not succeeded in passing climate legislation prior to Copenhagen,

it was trying to pursue an international agreement without a domestic con-


A Climate Policy for the Real World


20/115

18 Policy Review

sensus on climate policy. Broadly speaking, this repeated the major error in

the Clinton administrations decision to sign the Kyoto Protocol in the face

of clear Senate opposition. Thus, even if the administration succeeded in

reaching a deal that went beyond a political declaration, subsequent eventshave demonstrated that it would not have been able to deliver at home.

Given this, the lack of a deal at Copenhagen which the press and others

fortunately and accurately blamed as much on Chinas reluctance as U.S.

policy paralysis was probably the best outcome for the administration

itself. Reaching an agreement with major emitters in the developed and

developing world only to see it die in the Senate would have been a major

blow to American credibility and to Obamas domestic leadership.

The third problem with the U.S. approach toCopenhagen (a problem shared by the Europeans,

who often appeared to be observers rather than par-

ticipants in the negotiations) was tactical and diplo-

matic. Washington and European capitals gave far

too much attention to China which is admittedly

central to any successful effort to reduce greenhouse

gas emissions at a global level thereby placing

Beijing in the drivers seat and limiting Americanand Western negotiating leverage. This was especial-

ly damaging in the wake of the global financial cri-

sis, when Chinas sense of indispensability was

already unprecedented (not to say inflated). China luxuriated in its

Copenhagen role, sending a second-tier diplomat to a negotiating session

among heads of state and repeatedly making them sit and wait during phone

calls to decision-makers.

The final two problems are fundamental structural weaknesses of the unFramework Convention on Climate Change. One is that un-based negotiat-

ing processes inherently give all parties equal formal status (though obvious-

ly not equal influence). It is simply too difficult to negotiate a highly com-

plex agreement incorporating emissions limits, verification measures, devel-

opment support, and other components with 200 parties around the table.

While they are well-meaning and legitimately concerned and involved, the

vast majority of the delegates in such a conversation have little to contribute

beyond their grievances. Denmarks weak chairmanship didnt help this

already difficult situation.

A similarly deep underlying problem of the unfccc is the historically

and morally reasonable but impractical and unmanageable legal concept of

common but differentiated responsibility, the idea that all nations share

responsibility for managing climate change but that the developed world has

greater responsibility because of its past contribution to todays greenhouse

gas concentrations in the atmosphere. Unfortunately, the climate problem is

well beyond the point at which it could be solved through even drastic mea-

sures by the U.S., Europe, and Japan alone. In fact, even if the U.S. became a


In Copenhagen,

Washington

and European

capitals gave

far too much

attention toChina.


21/115

zero-emission economy by 2030, Chinas expected new emissions driven

by an economic engine increasingly important to global growth would

expand to fill nearly all the gap, leaving the world with essentially no net

change in emissions.The statistics tell the story. According to the Department of Energys

Energy Information Administration, the developing worlds portion of glob-

al carbon dioxide emissions has grown from 46.4 percent in 1990 to 57.0

percent in 2010, and is projected to reach 64.2 percent by 2030. Chinas

share of global co2 emissions have grown from 10.7 percent in 1990 to

23.4 percent in 2010, now somewhat exceeding the U.S. share, and is pro-

jected to hit 29.2 percent by 2030, close to double Americas expected

share at that time. It is not realistic for developed countries, now making upsignificantly less than half the total global co2 emissions, to make vast

reductions in their own emissions simply to allow developing countries more

room to increase emissions.

Separately, while the developed worlds past emissions may be fair game

in global negotiations, it is somewhat disingenuous to disconnect the devel-

oped worlds progress from developing nations. Setting aside the excesses of

the colonial era, during which emissions were still quite low, economic

growth in developed countries has in fact made a real difference to those liv-ing in developing economies, providing export-oriented jobs as well as

improvements in public health, education, and other fields. This is perhaps

most spectacular in the case of China, where rapid growth in the last 30

years is substantially attributable to Western investment and perhaps exces-

sive consumer demand for cheap imports.

What happened to domesticclimate legislation?

The failure in Copenhagen was both a contributor to and a

consequence of the breakdown in domestic action attempted

before and after the meeting. It was a consequence of the Obama

administrations strategic decision to use its then-large congressional majori-

ties to push health care reform as its top priority in the months leading up to

the summit. Given the rancor associated with this debate especially severe

during the summer of2009 this had an immediate impact on the

prospects for climate legislation. That impact was compounded by earlier

polarizing debates on the economic stimulus package and continuing weak

growth after the stimulus.

Simultaneously and unsurprisingly, the administration, Senator John

Kerry, and others behind the cap-and-trade bill faced considerable skepti-

cism from fellow Democrats representing coal-producing and coal-using

states in the Senate. These Democrats were quite concerned about the effects




22/115

20 Policy Review

the legislation could have on coal producers and utilities or, in other words,

on jobs and energy prices. In an already bitter political environment, and

against the background of a growing grass roots Tea Party movement ener-

gized by attempts at federal government intervention, Senate Republicansnot passionately committed to the climate issue had little reason to be more

accommodating than these Senate Democrats.

After Copenhagen, with no real deal to trumpet, the argument for a cli-

mate bill forcing significant emissions cuts was dramatically weakened by

the fact that developing countries, especially China, had not made a commit-

ment to take any new emissions-limiting measures they were not previously

expected to take. Congressional concern about Chinas emissions had

already been a major concern when the KyotoProtocol was negotiated and signed, as reflected in

the 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution. Approved 950

prior to the Clinton administrations decision to sign

Kyoto, Byrd-Hagel explicitly expressed the sense of

the Senate that the exemption for Developing

Country Parties [in the un Framework Convention

on Climate Change] is inconsistent with the need for

global action on climate change and is environmen-tally flawed and stated that the United States

should not undertake any commitment to reduce its

own emissions without new specific scheduled

commitments by developing countries.

The interrelationship between the domestic and international levels of the

climate issue through Chinas role may actually prevent action in either

arena by creating a catch-22. In brief, Congress wont approve strong emis-

sions limits without a commitment from China and China wont make acommitment before the United States does (if Beijing will make a commit-

ment at all, which is subject to question). Climate bill advocates knew before

Copenhagen that they would need to defend themselves against charges that

the plan was not only costly domestically, but could further weaken U.S.

competitiveness vis--vis China during a recession, and senators backing the

cap-and-trade bill tried to avoid the catch-22 by attempting to demonstrate

sufficient support for the bill without actually passing it. They sought to

strengthen the administrations negotiating position, hoping that an agree-

ment in the Copenhagen talks would in turn provide the momentum they

needed to get cap-and-trade through the Senate. This was far too complex a

strategy to work in practice.

With nothing to show from China in the wake of Copenhagen, Senate

Democrats were in a weaker substantive position and unable to give the cli-

mate bill sustained attention as the 2010 midterm elections approached.

After courting Republican Senator Lindsey Graham before and after the

summit, in mid-2010 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid alienated him by

sidelining climate legislation in favor of immigration reform, to strengthen


After

Copenhagen,

the argument for

a U.S. climate

bill forcing

significantemissions cuts

was weakened.


23/115

his own struggling reelection campaign. Either legislation would have been

quite difficult to pass in an election year, but Senator Reids decision effec-

tively killed the most prominent and promising bipartisan negotiations on a

climate bill.Underlying all of the back-and-forth on Capitol Hill was the biggest

obstacle to climate change legislation: the fact that the American people

were never truly behind emissions limits. Public support for cap-and-trade

was basically illusory: Though 66 percent supported emissions limits in

principle in Pew Research Center polling in the summer of2010, only 32

percent viewed climate change as a priority compared to 81 percent

who focused on jobs and 67 percent on energy needs. Thus, while the idea

of emissions reductions had some appeal, most peo-ple subordinated it to other concerns, and legislation

that appeared either to put jobs at risk or to raise

energy costs had little support. Climate bill advo-

cates were well aware of this problem, which was

one of the factors behind proposals to create green

jobs, but they were never able convincingly to

overcome it in the public eye.

In fact, though they have tried many differentarguments, climate advocates have thus far largely

failed in making a sufficiently strong case for emis-

sions limits on any basis. While the scientific case for

climate change is solid, the approaching calamity

argument about its expected consequences hasnt gained traction. This

appears partially due to good public relations by climate skeptics (helped

recently by foolish and highly-publicized emails among a handful of scien-

tists) and to record-high snowfall throughout the United States in the winterof2009-10 that was consistent with climate change modeling but confused

many Americans.

The moral argument for action to save indigenous peoples, animals, and

glaciers is closely related to the calamity argument and often has a greater

emotional appeal. However, despite support from some evangelical

Christian groups focused on humanitys stewardship of Gods creation, this

has also fallen short.

Some conservatives have been attracted to two different national security

arguments for measures that address climate change. One has highlighted

the possible security consequences of floods, droughts, and refugee flows in

failed and failing states and has been promoted by former senior military

officers. The other has targeted reductions in oil consumption to improve

energy security, usually combined with dubious claims that lower American

oil imports will deny revenue to hostile regimes or groups.

These arguments appear insufficient largely because most people see the

benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions as long-term, abstract, and

distant, while they see the costs as immediate, concrete, and personal. As a



The biggest

obstacle to

climate change

legislation: the

American people

were nevertruly behind

emissions limits.


24/115

result, strong limit-based policies are almost inherently impractical in demo-

cratic societies or, indeed, authoritarian systems that are not prepared to

impose them without regard to public reaction.

Actually, without inexpensive and widely applicable new technologies tobreak the link between energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions,

the effectiveness of any limits is inversely proportional to their popularity.

Making emissions limits more effective requires making energy more expen-

sive, with public support for the policy declining as it becomes more effec-

tive. Conversely, making limit-based policies sufficiently popular to win pub-

lic support and legislative approval requires either making them ineffective,

by restricting energy price increases, or extremely costly, by providing offset-

ting subsidies. The fate of the U.S. climate bill istelling in this regard in that its emission reductions

of17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 were

more modest even than the reductions the Clinton

administration accepted under Kyoto and the bill

still failed.

Even in Europe, where climate policies are seem-

ingly embraced by the public, much of the reduction

in greenhouse gas emissions is in a sense artificial.The European Unions population growth rate has

been half Americas rate over the last decade, some-

thing that in itself sharply slows emissions growth in

comparison to the United States and other countries

with more rapidly increasing populations, requiring

less effort to make emissions cuts measured from a

common baseline year. Europe also benefits from accounting rules that com-

pare current emissions to years when emissions were artificially high, espe-cially by combining emissions for West Germany and East Germany in

1990 and comparing them with todays united Germany, in which many of

East Germanys highly inefficient power plants and factories no longer exist

for economic reasons. According to Eurostat, Germany represented around

20 percent of Europes total emissions in 2008, but accounted for 43 per-

cent of the decline in emissions since 1990. Finally, Europe (and Germany in

particular) is in a sense outsourcing greenhouse emissions through its exten-

sive use of Russias natural gas rather than domestic coal, even as Moscow

substitutes its own coal for gas internally to maintain export revenues.

Europe seems likely to confront Americas same dilemmas moving for-

ward and may, in fact, already be facing them. For while citizens in most

European countries are accustomed to higher gasoline and electricity prices

and, for that matter, higher taxes it is not the absolute level of these

costs that excites public opinion but rather the changes up and down. So

while Europeans may tolerate higher costs, it is far from assured that they

would accept considerable new increases. Moreover, at the level of the

European Union, European advocates of steep emission reductions face a


Even in Europe,

whose public

seems to embrace

climate policies,

much of the

reduction ingreenhouse gas

emissions is in a

sense artificial.

22 Policy Review


25/115

problem similar to that of the Senate Democrats but more severe: They need

to accommodate coal-dependent national governments, rather than coal-

dependent senators. After bailing out Greece and Ireland, how much will

Germans be willing to pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Poland,Hungary, and other new members of the European Union? And how much

will the eu and its member states be able to pay while implementing austeri-

ty packages to address calamitous deficits?

At the deepest level, it is so difficult to make climate policy because it is

not really climate policy at all, but a back door to energy policy. And energy

is one of the most politically sensitive issues in modern society, because it is

so intimately intertwined with so many other issues, both economically and

in daily life. In America, energy policy intersects with life in countless ways,from how people get to work (and, in fact, whether they have a job in some

cases) to how comfortable they are in their homes, how much they pay for

energy, and how much they have left over for other things. As a result, mak-

ing energy policy is an extremely dangerous pursuit for politicians: It carries

within it scores of potential booby traps, any of which might end a career in

elected office. From a political perspective, trying to pass climate change leg-

islation is like trying to walk through a minefield with a blindfold and a

dozen different sleeve-tugging guides, each of whom is sure that his path isthe safe one.

Climate change lessons

With this in mind, the first climate policy lesson for the

Obama administration is that the climate issue simply does not

and in the foreseeable future cannot provide a sufficiently broadpolitical base to make the policy changes necessary to address climate

change successfully. What America really needs is more effective and focused

economic policy, including energy policy, driven by Americas economic

needs but sensitive to climate concerns. Trying to make economic policy or

even energy policy via climate policy puts the politics upside down and will

not succeed in preventing climate change.

The second and related lesson is that even seemingly minor yet still bind-

ing international commitments will be difficult if not impossible to ratify

within the United States, especially in a more closely divided Senate. Many

have discussed a compromise solution for the climate negotiations, under

which countries would sign a treaty codifying their existing domestic poli-

cies. While this appears to be noncontroversial on its face (and limited in its

impact), even this outcome is unlikely in view of Americas domestic political

realities. In view of the attention to the economy and to China during

the 2010 election campaign, virtually any U.S. climate legislation, even a

further watered-down domestic cap-and-trade bill, would have a minimal

chance to overcome a Senate filibuster with 60 votes, let alone win the 67




26/115

24 Policy Review

votes required by the Constitution to ratify a treaty and internationalize

such a policy. The door to a global treaty involving the United States is all

but shut.

A third lesson is that China, like the United States, is making decisionsbased on its domestic needs rather than any particular sense of global oblig-

ation to reduce climate change impact in more vulnerable countries. This sit-

uation is even less likely to change in China than in America, because of dif-

ferences between what leaders in the two countries might reasonably fear.

The president, his cabinet, senators, and House members might lose their

jobs as a result of costly policies that slow growth, but many of them would

probably move quickly into new jobs with higher pay. Chinas leaders have

considerably more at stake: They fear that a slowingeconomy could produce widespread protests, politi-

cal instability, or even the collapse of the

Communist Partys control. Chinas climate policy

will be driven by its leaders need to maintain

exports and create jobs as well as their interest in

reducing energy consumption as a matter of eco-

nomic policy and energy security rather than special

environmental concern.Another lesson, the fourth, is that U.S. climate

policy cannot be disconnected from Americas

broader national interests. The sharp reductions in

Chinas emissions that advocates seek would likely

require a foreign investment effort on the scale of

the Marshall Plan something difficult to reconcile

with Americas economic and security interests vis--vis China at a time

when Beijing is already becoming increasingly assertive and when Chinasprosperity is in large measure attributable to U.S. policy in the first place.

The massive transfers of wealth some advocates seek from the United States

and Europe to China and other developing nations are totally impractical.

Even if it materializes, the $100 billion per year by 2020 envisioned under

the Cancun agreement will make only a modest difference due to the scale of

investment required.

The administration should not need to learn that un-based processes are

often ineffective, but this must be the fifth lesson. The two most important

participants in un climate talks the United States and China are

unlikely to accept un-mandated emissions limits, especially limits sufficient-

ly tough to avert climate change impacts. (Still, each will probably do much

more than it is prepared to promise.) The most committed participants, in

Europe, dont produce a sufficiently large share of global emissions for even

drastic cuts to succeed on their own. And the most anxious participants, in

poorer developing countries, can do little more than watch the process with

diminishing hope, while trying to extract compensation payments from

wealthier economies.


China, like the

United States, is

making decisions

based on its

domestic needs

rather than anyparticular sense

of global

obligation.


27/115

The sixth and final lesson is the central role of technology. The history of

international climate talks shows that governments and societies will gener-

ally commit only to limits that they believe to be economically viable, which

from a policymaking perspective means limits that nations can reasonablyexpect to satisfy on the basis of existing technologies and expected improve-

ments which we already know will be inadequate to prevent climate

change. At the same time, if we achieve a technological breakthrough that

makes radical emissions reductions economically attractive, binding limits

will not be necessary to produce the required action.

What to do?

Taken together these lessons force a broad conclusion that

must be the basis for any successful policy: It is very unlikely that

humanity will be able to stop or considerably slow climate change

by relying on binding emissions limits, whether domestic or international.

At the international level, this has several policy implications. The first is

that emissions-reduction discussions should focus on action-oriented dia-

logue among major emitters, the top 21 of which accounted for 79 percentof global emissions in 2007, according to the International Energy Agency.

un-based processes create the illusion of action, consuming considerable

time and energy in the process (as well as producing a lot of co2 to bring

delegates to international conferences), but are secondary to solving the cli-

mate challenge. Like in Cancun, the United States should reduce its diplo-

matic commitment and presence at future unfccc meetings, concentrating

on using the sessions for coordination and information-sharing rather than

negotiation..While the Bush administration made plenty of mistakes early on, theatri-

cally pulling out of Kyoto when it could just as easily have allowed it to lan-

guish in the Senate, as it surely would have, and vocally denying the science

of climate change, it eventually saw the need to address climate change

through discussion with major emitters. Combined with an apparent preex-

isting bias against the United Nations, this led President Bush to launch the

Major Economies Meeting, bringing together the worlds largest economies

to discuss energy technology and related issues. The Obama administration

re-branded this effort as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and

Climate.

Secondly, rather than trying to cajole or shame China into taking on bind-

ing commitments in international negotiations, which will not produce

important results, America should focus on encouraging further Chinese

action to reduce emissions. This could include offering expanded economic,

scientific, and technical cooperation with China (while protecting U.S. eco-

nomic interests, including intellectual property rights) to accelerate its

efforts. Simultaneously, the United States should underscore to Beijing the




28/115

26 Policy Review

climate change impacts predicted in major studies and how associated

extremes in weather would be especially problematic for China, with its

lower per capita gdp and less resilient political, economic, and social sys-

tems. This should not be a public message, but it can be a clear one.In the realms of diplomacy and global public opinion, the United States

should cede no ground, working to prevail in rhetorical battles and to win

over media and thought leaders. Tactics in these areas could include working

with delegations from smaller developing countries to shift the onus of

action (and blame) to China by demonstrating an American commitment to

taking real and measurable steps to reduce emissions. Already committed to

the principle of common but differentiated responsibility with respect to

their own actions, poor developing nations areincreasingly accepting the notion that not all devel-

oping countries have equal obligations and might at

a minimum deprive China of their public support.

The U.S. appeared to make some headway in this

direction at Cancun. Realistically, these efforts will

probably have little impact on Chinese policy; for

many if not most of these governments, concerns

over climate change impacts are long-term and sec-ondary to their immediate hopes for economic

growth, infrastructure projects, and the political

benefits of both. Chinese investment can make a key

contribution to achieving these objectives. Chinese investment can make a

key contribution to achieving these objectives

What is important is to recognize that there is a difference between China

and other developing economies, and even between China and other large

developing economies like India and Brazil. The difference is a matter ofscale; one can credibly refer to the United States and China as a g2 because

their combined economies and greenhouse gas emissions are so large.

Indias emissions are one-fifth to one-quarter of U.S. or Chinese emissions,

and are growing at two-thirds the rate of Chinas emissions. China, India,

Brazil, and other developing nations all share an emphasis on development

rather than emissions reductions and an unwillingness to accept binding

international limits on their emissions, but they do not have equal responsi-

bility for projected growth in emissions from developing economies or equal

abilities to reduce emissions or address their consequences.

Domestically, the United States should focus on energy policy rather than

climate policy, recognizing that altering energy consumption patterns takes

quite some time and seeking both incremental improvements in efficiency

and breakthroughs. The central goal of such a policy would be to orient

American energy policy to serve broader national economic and security

goals, by increasing efficiency and therefore productivity, contributing to

economic growth and creating jobs, maintaining and extending Americas

global leadership in science and technology, and limiting our exposure to


In the realms

of diplomacy

and global

public opinion,

the United States

should cedeno ground.


29/115


30/115

28 Policy Review

climate and energy goals. As the incubators for ideas, in constant competi-

tion with their neighbors for population and economic vitality, states are

well-placed to develop practical solutions that respond to their varied cir-

cumstances. The Department of Educations Race to the Top competitionfor federal funds might serve as a model to catalyze new ideas; one can

imagine a similar program of incentives that encourages states (or groups of

states) to compete to formulate the best emissions reduction strategies in tar-

geted sectors, such as transportation, electricity, or commercial or residential

buildings. Effective approaches could be implemented on a wider scale.

Finally, recognizing that the world is unlikely to stop climate change,

America will need to intensify research on climate change impact and begin

federal, state, and local assessments of the policies needed to adapt to themost likely domestic consequences. While important steps can and will be

taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, any country, industry, or commu-

nity that does not increase its understanding of the impact of climate change

and build up resilience is putting itself at considerable risk.



31/115

A

ccording t o t he great historian of theHolocaust, Raul Hilberg, the phrase Never Again

first appeared on handmade signs put up by inmatesat Buchenwald in April, 1945 , shortly after thecamp had been liberated by U.S. forces. I think itwas really the Communists who were behind it, but I

am not sure, Hilberg said in one of the last interviews he gave before hisdeath in the summer of2007. Since then, Never Again has become kindof shorthand for the remembrance of the Shoah. At Buchenwald, the hand-made signs were long ago replaced by a stone monument onto which thewords are embossed in metal letters. And as a usage, it has come to seemlike a final word not just on the murder of the Jews of Europe, but on anygreat crime against humanity that could not be prevented. Never Againhas appeared on monuments and memorials from Paine, Chile, the town

The Persistence of

GenocideBy David Rieff

Author David Rieff is a New York-based writer and policy analyst who has writ-ten extensively about humanitarian aid and human rights. He is the author ofeight books, includingA Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis andAt

the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention, and is current-ly writing a book on the global food crisis.



32/115

30 Policy Review

with proportionately more victims of the Pinochet dictatorship than anyother place in the country, to the Genocide Museum in Kigali, Rwanda. Thereport ofconadep, the Argentine truth commission set up in 1984 after

the fall of the Galtieri dictatorship, was titled Nunca Mas NeverAgain in Spanish. And there is now at least one online Holocaust memorialcalled Never Again.

There is nothing wrong with this. But there is also nothing all that rightwith it either. Bluntly put, an undeniable gulf exists between the frequencywith which the phrase is used above all on days of remembrance mostcommonly marking the Shoah, but now, increasingly, other great crimesagainst humanity and the reality, which is that 65 years after the libera-

tion of the Nazi concentration camps, neveragain has proved to be nothing more than apromise on which no state has ever been willing todeliver. When, last May, the writer Elie Wiesel, him-self a former prisoner in Buchenwald, accompaniedPresident Barack Obama and Chancellor AngelaMerkel to the site of the camp, he said that he hadalways imagined that he would return some day and

tell his fathers ghost that the world had learnedfrom the Holocaust and that it had become asacred duty for people everywhere to prevent itfrom recurring. But, Wiesel continued, had theworld actually learned anything, there would be

no Cambodia, and no Rwanda and no Darfur and no Bosnia.Wiesel was right: The world has learned very little. But this has not

stopped it from pontificating much. The Obama administrations National

Security Strategy Paper, issued in May 2010, exemplifies this tendency. Itasserts confidently that The United States is committed to working withour allies, and to strengthening our own internal capabilities, in order toensure that the United States and the international community are proactive-ly engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide. Andyet again, we are treated to the promise, never again. In the event thatprevention fails, the report states, the United States will work both multi-laterally and bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, and in certain instances military means to prevent and respond to genocideand mass atrocities.

Of course, this is not strategy, but a promise that, decade in and decadeout, has proved to be empty. For if one were to evaluate these commitmentsby the results they have produced so far, one would have to say that all thisproactive engagement and diplomatic, financial, and humanitarianmobilization has not accomplished very much. No one should be surprisedby this. The U.S. is fighting two wars and still coping (though it has fallenfrom the headlines) with the floods in Pakistan, whose effects will be felt formany years in a country where Americas security interests and humanitari-

David Rieff

Since 1945,

never again

has meant,

essentially,

Never again

will Germans killJews in Europe

in the 1940s.


33/115

an relief efforts are inseparable. At the same time, the crisis over Iransimminent acquisition of nuclear weapons capability is approaching its cul-mination. Add to this the fact that the American economy is in shambles,

and you do not exactly have a recipe for engagement. The stark fact is thatnever again has never been a political priority for either the United Statesor the so-called international community (itself a self-flattering idea with nomore reality than a unicorn). Nor, despite all the bluff talk about moralimperatives backed by international resolve, is there any evidence that it isbecoming one.

And yet, however at variance they are with both geopolitical and geoeco-nomic realities, the arguments exemplified by this document reflect the con-

ventional wisdom of the great and the good in America across the main-stream (as one is obliged to say in this, the era of the tea parties) politicalspectrum. Even a fairly cursory online search will reveal that there are a vastnumber of papers, book-length studies, think tank reports, and UnitedNations documents proposing programs for preventing or at least haltinggenocides. For once, the metaphor cottage industry truly is appropriate.And what unites almost all of them is that they start from the premise thatprevention is possible, if only the international community would live up

to the commitments it made in the Genocide Convention of1948, and insubsequent international covenants, treaties, and un declarations. If, theargument goes, the worlds great powers, first and foremost of course theUnited States, in collaboration with the un system and with global civil soci-ety, would act decisively and in a timely way, we could actually enforce themoral standards supposedly agreed upon in the aftermath of the Holocaust.If they do not, of course, then never again will never mean much morethan it has meant since 1945 which, essentially, is Never again will

Germans kill Jews in Europe in the 1940s.

The report of the United States Institute for Peaces task forceon genocide, chaired by former Secretary of State MadeleineAlbright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen, is among

the best of these efforts. As the report makes clear, the task force undertookits work all too painfully aware of the gulf between the international consen-sus on the moral imperative of stopping genocide and the ineffectiveness todate of the actual responses. Indeed, the authors begin by stating plainly that60 years after the United Nations adopted the Genocide Convention andtwenty years after it was ratified by the U.S. Senate, The world agrees thatgenocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. Tofind ways to match words and stop allowing the unacceptable, Albrightand Cohen write with commendable candor, is in fact one of most persis-tent puzzles of our times.

Whether or not one agrees with the task force about what can or cannotbe done to change this, there can be no question that sorrow over theworlds collective failure to act in East Pakistan, or Cambodia, or Rwanda is


The Persistence of Genocide


34/115

32 Policy Review

the only honorable response imaginable. But the befuddlement the authorsof the report confess to feeling is another matter entirely. Like most thinkinginfluenced by the human rights movement, the task force seems imbued with

the famous Kantian mot dordre: Ought implies can. But to put the mat-ter bluntly, there is no historical basis to believe anything of the sort, and agreat deal of evidence to suggest a diametrically opposing conclusion. Ofcourse, history is not a straitjacket, and the authors of the report, againechoing much thinking within the human rights movement, particularlyMichael Ignatieffs work in the 1990s, do make the argument that since1945 there has been what Ignatieff calls A revolution of global concernand they call a revolution in conscience. In fairness, if in fact they are bas-

ing their optimism on this chiliastic idea, then onebetter understands the degree to which the membersof the task force came to believe that genocide, farfrom being A Problem From Hell, as SamanthaPower titled her influential book on the subject, inreality is a problem if not easily solved then at leastsusceptible to solution though, again, only if allthe international actors, by whom the authors mean

the great powers, the un system, countries in aregion where there is a risk of a genocide occurring,and what they rather uncritically call civil society,make it a priority.

Since it starts from this presupposition, it is hard-ly surprising that the report is upbeat about the

prospects for finally reversing course. Preventing genocide, the authorsinsist, is a goal that can be achieved with the right institutional structures,

strategies, and partnerships in short, with the right blueprint. To accom-plish this, the task force emphasizes the need for strengthening internationalcooperation both in terms of identifying places where there is a danger of agenocide being carried out and coordinated action to head it off or at leasthalt it. Four specific responses are recommended, one predominantly infor-mational (early warning) and three operational (early prevention, preventivediplomacy, and, finally, military intervention when all else has failed). Noneof this is exactly new, and most of it is commonsensical from a conceptualstandpoint. But one of the great strengths of the report, as befits the work ofa task force chaired by two former cabinet secretaries, is this practical bent that is to say, its emphasis on creating or strengthening institutional struc-tures within the U.S. government and the un system and showing how suchreforms will enable policymakers to respond effectively to genocide.

However, this same presupposition leads the authors of the report to writeas if there were little need for them to elaborate the political and ideologicalbases for the can do approach they recommend. Francis Fukuyamas con-troversial theory of the End of History goes unmentioned, but there ismore than a little of Fukuyama in their assumptions about a final interna-

David Rieff

Preventing

genocide is a

goal that can be

achieved with the

right institutional

structures,strategies, and

partnerships . . .


35/115

tional consensus having been established with regard to the norms that havecome into force protecting populations from genocide or mass atrocitycrimes. It is true that there is a body of such norms: the Genocide

Convention, the un s so-called Responsibility to Protect doctrine, adopted bythe World Summit (with the strong support of the Bush administration) in2005, and various international instruments limiting impunity, above all theRome Statute that created the International Criminal Court. And, presum-ably, it is with these in mind that the reports authors can assert so confidentlythat the focus in genocide prevention can now be on implement[ing] andoperationalizing the commitments [these instruments] contain.

It is here that doubt will begin to assail more skeptical readers. Almost

since its inception, the human rights movement hasbeen a movement of lawyers. And for lawyers, theestablishment of black-letter international law isindeed the end of the story from a normativepoint of view an internationalized version ofstaredecisis, but extended to the nth degree. On thisaccount such a norm, once firmly established(which, activists readily admit, may take time; they

are not naifs), can within a fairly short period there-after be understood as an ineradicable and unchal-lengeable part of the basic users manual for interna-tional relations. This is what has allowed the human rights movement (and,at least with regard to the question of genocide, the members of the taskforce in the main seem to have been of a similar cast of mind) to hew towhat is essentially a positivist progress narrative. However, the human rightsmovements certitude on the matter derives less from its historical experience

than it does from its ideologic

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